“A Fickle, and Confused Multitude”: War and Politics in Revolutionary Philadelphia, 1750-1783 by Paul Langston B.A., Stephen F. Austin State University, 1997 M.A., University of North Texas, 2006 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of History 2013 i This thesis entitled: “A Fickle, and Confused Multitude”: War and Politics in Revolutionary Philadelphia, 1750-1783 written by Paul Langston has been approved for the Department of History (Professor Virginia DeJohn Anderson) (Professor Fred W. Anderson) Date The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. ii Langston, Paul D. (Ph.D., History Department) “A Fickle, and Confused Multitude”: War and Politics in Revolutionary Philadelphia, 1750-1783 Thesis directed by Professor Virginia DeJohn Anderson ABSTRACT This dissertation explores the crucial link between war and politics in Philadelphia during the American Revolution. It demonstrates how war exacerbated existing political conflicts, reshaped prewar political alliances, and allowed for the rise of new political coalitions, all developments that were tied to specific fluctuations in the progress of the military conflict. I argue that the War for Independence played a central role in shaping Philadelphia’s contentious politics with regard to matters of balancing liberty and security. It was amidst this turmoil that the new state government sought to establish its sovereignty and at the same time fend off Pennsylvania’s British enemies. In so doing, the state government often exercised coercive wartime powers that it deemed necessary to ensure an American victory. Political leaders learned that war could be a political tool in achieving their aspirations. In times of excessive fear and violence, the public was far more likely to support aggressive wartime measures even at the cost of personal liberties. Yet once wartime fears dissipated or the government proved incapable of protecting citizens, the electorate would quickly redefine those coercive measures as abuses by an oppressive government. For eight long years, Pennsylvania’s government thus had to balance its use of wartime measures to ensure security without creating an internal political backlash from its own people. Philadelphians’ assessment of their government’s success in maintaining this delicate balance fluctuated in response to the ebbs and flows of the conduct of the war. iii This dissertation tells the story of those governmental struggles as they played out against the backdrop of a military conflict that Pennsylvania’s officials could neither predict nor control. By intertwining the existing social and political history of Revolutionary-era Philadelphia and Pennsylvania with the military narrative, this dissertation enhances our understanding of the ways in which the war—its battles, logistical demands, governmental demands for allegiance, and perpetual uncertainty—helped to determine the course of politics in the city. iv CONTENTS Introduction 1 Chapter 1 “The Election, a Medley”: A War to Motivate the Masses 14 Chapter 2 “The Die is Irrevocably Cast”: Fear and Uncertainty in War 54 Chapter 3 “Where the Storm Will Turn Now, No One Knows as Yet”: Implementing Government During War, 1776–1777 92 Chapter 4 “The Great Object on Which All Political Institutions Must Depend”: Belligerents and Governmental Security, 1777-1778 131 Chapter 5 “Hunger Will Break Through Stone Walls”: Political Responses to War Driven Flour Shortages 170 Conclusion “Force . Will Disgust the People”: The Fall of the Constitutionalist Government 204 Bibliography 224 v Introduction The political struggle to maintain governmental security, while at the same time protecting citizens’ rights, has been an ongoing concern in America since the nation’s inception. In times of war, such concerns reach their highest pitch. Those in power, responsible for prosecuting the war, often take extraordinary measures in the name of defense, which then encourages their opponents to condemn such actions as compromising the rights of American citizens. The citizenry, in turn, must decide which group best represents the public interest and vote accordingly. One of the earliest manifestations of this conflict between liberty and security appeared in Philadelphia during the American Revolution. This dissertation analyzes the central role played by the War for Independence in shaping Philadelphia’s contentious politics with regard to precisely these matters of balancing liberty and security. It is inspired in part by John Shy’s assertion in 1973 that historians could learn a great deal by exploring the link between war and politics.1 Shy argues that the war itself acted as an agent of political change, in addition to the concerns of ideology, class, and ethnic tensions that have been the focus of many Revolutionary histories. The war, he suggests, produced a three- way struggle as British and American forces vied for political support of the local population.2 Both governments used the violence of war, or the threat of aggression, to try and compel allegiance. Military occupations, confiscation of property, and forced military service were tactics used by both British and American authorities during eight years of war. Britain also 1 John Shy, “The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War,” Essays on the American Revolution, eds. Stephen Kurtz and James Hutson (Chapel Hill, 1973): 121-156. 2 John Shy conceptualized the politics of Revolutionary America as a triangular relationship among two belligerents vying for popular support of the local inhabitants. By means of the war, the British army (the political arm of the Crown), the American government and its military forces, and the civilian population were linked in this political struggle. Consequently, the violence of war was as much a means of coercion as an instrument of destruction. By eliminating or suppressing the population’s support for its opponent, one side in the conflict could promote its political agenda and establish control over a region. 1 attempted to use the carrot as well as the stick to cultivate loyalist support and thus weaken patriot resistance. The Americans, in turn, scrambled to create new revolutionary organizations that would be trusted with political and military functions that often involved coercion as well. In between the British and American governments and armies stood a vulnerable populace. Individuals tried to choose the path of greatest personal or economic security, but as the fortunes of war fluctuated, it was often difficult to know what the safest path might be. Shy insists that lessons learned during the Revolutionary War were as much political as military. Loyalists discovered that only the constant presence of the British army could ensure their protection. Whenever the redcoats moved on, patriot groups reassumed control of a region and punished loyalist populations. At the same time, those who supported the patriot cause had to create new governmental as well as new military institutions and learn how best to use them. The war afforded previously powerless groups, or groups that had formerly avoided politics, the opportunity to participate in government through these new organizations. As they did so, they engaged in vigorous debates about legitimacy, representation, and the powers of elected officials. Thus patriots often battled with one another over the legalities of wartime powers even as they fought together to retain an independent government. To examine local politics without paying close attention to the way they intersected with the progress of the war, Shy concludes, is to ignore what was perhaps the most important engine of political change in Revolutionary America. Philadelphia is an especially good place for such an examination because of its political and military significance. The city was the heart of state and national politics. As both the state government and the Continental Congress hastily hashed out political boundaries and sought to implement a new political culture, military demands compounded an already difficult situation. 2 Nowhere else did a fledgling state government contend with the continued presence and demands of the national government and the American army, in addition to the ongoing British threat. The dependence of the national government and the army on the success and contributions of the states meant that any perceived incompetence by Pennsylvania’s state government resulted in the immediate entanglement of the Continental Congress and American army in local politics. Political feuds and incompetence within Pennsylvania’s state government that could have been managed during a time of peace hampered war efforts and became a military liability to the entire nation. Philadelphia was also militarily significant because of its nearness to the fighting and the city’s role as a pseudo-national capital. Because the city was home to the Continental Congress, Philadelphians viewed their city as a prime military target for the British army. Government officials interpreted continued feints and battles to the immediate northeast as a prelude to invasion. Additionally, unlike New York City or Charleston, Philadelphia was the only major American city to be