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AGGRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE:

ETHNONATIONAL DIMENSION AND CIVILIZATIONAL CONFRONTATION УДК 94(477.6):94(470+571) ББК 63.3(4УКР)64+63.3(0)4-68

Hai-Nyzhnyk P., Chupriy L., Fihurnyi Y., Krasnodemska I., Chyrkov O. (2018). Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine: ethnonational dimension and civilizational confrontation. Saarbrücken (Germany): LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. 229 p.

8PSLtexts are recommended for publication by the Academic Council of the Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies of Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (protocol No.5 of June 29, 2017 / protocol No.7, of October 26, 2017 / protocol No.8, of December 28, 2017)

The expert-analytical study analyzes the preconditions, course and contemporary socio-political consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, which has signs of not only direct and covert, but also inter-state conflict and even civilizational confrontation.

ISBN © Pavlo Hai-Nyzhnyk © Leonid Chupriy © Yuriy Fihurnyi © Iryna Krasnodemska © Oleg Chyrkov LIST OF CONTENTS

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THE WORLD SHOULD UNITE AROUND UKRAINE 5 Introductory remarks

Pavlo HAI-NYZHNYK

(Doctor of History, Academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Historical Studies Department of the Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies of Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Kyiv)

THE WORLD SHOULD UNITE AROUND UKRAINE*

«Nation is secure when it does not have to sacrifice its legal interests for the sake of avoiding war and when, in case of necessity, it is able to protect these interests by means of war.»

Walter Lippmann

Modern global order undergoes intense transformations, which implies redistribution of leverages, scope of influence, and balances as in the meaning of control over planetary resources, globalized financial and economic system, energy sphere, regulation and acquisition of new high-tech communications and inventions, etc., so in the meaning of search for new humanitarian bases of cohabitation on our planet and basic framework for geopolitical relations, formulae, models, and gears of efficient international security system. Ukraine, which geographically and historically has always lain on the transition of global geopolitical interests, trade and economic ways, and civilization-forming processes, appeared in the spotlight of radical world- wide changes. It is one of the flashpoints in Eurasian terrains, where modernity transforms and the future of global relations is being born. Unfortunately, humanistic principles of solving civilizational crises and crucial contradictions in the global redistribution of spheres of interest often yield to power methods, which, under modern conditions, acquire hybrid form and total features. Ever since the declaration of its independence and sovereignty, the state of Ukraine – as the subject of international community—has permanently been on the periphery of opposition be- * Translated by Victoria Kalyna. 6 tween West and East and remained an object of potential struggle between the giants of global geopolitics: USA and Europe (NATO and EU), on the one hand, and Russia, on the other. This opposition culminated in the 2014 aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and vividly testified the imperial revanchist nature of Moscovia, which, under the conditions and 20th-century realia, seems completely anachronistic. The victory of the Revolution of Dignity, which the Kremlin political strategists had hypothetically assumed and feared, brought to naught the entire many-year effort of Russia to conquer Ukraine in a hybrid creeping manner and transform it into Russia’s satellite state with the controlled President and dummy politicians. However, the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, as well as the Russian political establishment, did not only refuse to admit the proved fact that Ukraine had started its separation from the peri-Moscow civilization orbit but also couldn’t (due to their narrowed vision) realize a new geopolitical reality. Putin treated that as his personal offence and failure as well as a challenge for Russia itself, a permanent threat to its future existence from both the neoimperial perspective and the point of danger: its megasubjectivity could turn into historical retrospective. Objective reality proves the disappointing result: this war is for Ukraine and its nation not only the visionary conflict or clash of civilizations but also a fight for the right of existence in the full and impressive meaning of these words. Onset of the undeclared war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is an unconcealed aggression against the sovereign independent state and the demonstrative violation of international norms. It is absolutely obvious that Putin’s Russia is not only an aggressor but also a terrorist state threatening European and global security. Consequently, the entire civilized world (Christians and Muslims, Buddhists and Jews, atheists, politicians, and businessmen) must realize that, the mask of the so-called managed democracy of the Russian Federation is a monster of ochlocratic tyranny in disguise. It is a political (and not exclusively) maniac-pervert that had enwreathed the impoverished nations of his Khanate with ferrets of ignorance, fear, and lie to keep poisoning them with all-encompassing hatred and arrogance, nurtured by the subliminal and incomprehensible desire to remain in their miserable, animal-like state. He aims for destruction. His hunger doesn’t have any life or political logic; it cannot be rationally explained. It is an instinct, uncontrolled desire to destroy and 7 enslave, subconscious aspiration to not only nullify the millennia-old human values and cohabitation rules but also an attempt to master, deride, and emasculate the essence, the goals, and the missions of world civilizations. Global community must understand that Putin’s Moscovia is an aggressor state by nature, that Putin’s empire doesn’t only sponsor terrorism but is a terrorist state itself. To crown it all, this insane, miserable, and insatiable organism is headed by the one who aims to redivide the world according to his imperial hallucinations caused by his sick imagination. Russia is trying to plunge the mankind in chaos and despair as well as implant it the virus of moral and virtue fall. The plague of decay, which is to provide the Kremlin with the possibility to spread its lies, fears, and ignorance through its and its satraps’ rule, can approximate the end, which will be ruled by sin, fear, and darkness, permanent war, poverty, and weeping over blood and losses… Ukraine is now hindering the implementation of these world-hating intentions. Today it confronts the newly-built empire of evil and will break the ice for its fall. Thus, the world (people of various opinions and religions, states with different political and social systems, etc.) must unite around Ukraine to save themselves and civilization advancement by accelerating the death of the dragon of sufferings and razing to the ground the new empire of evil! Oleg CHYRKOV

ETHNIC FACTOR IN THE PRECONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGGRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE 9 Chapter 1

Oleg CHYRKOV

(Research fellow of the Department of Ukrainian Ethnology Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Kyiv)

ETHNIC FACTOR IN THE PRECONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGGRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE

Estimation of the ethnic factor in the russian aggression against Ukraine necessary for mitigation of threats and their prevention in the future. The recent expansion of Moscow to the southwest is taking place today according to two territorial vectors: the Crimean peninsula and the strip of urban agglomerations of Donetsk and Luhansk regions – the least consolidated territorial parts of the modern Ukrainian nation. In our opinion, among the true reasons for the weak consolidation of the citizens of these regions are the following ones: 1) remote, peripheral geographical location (far from the capital) with powerful regional centers; 2) historically conditioned (in the conditions of the Russian Empire and the USSR) ethnic- cultural russification, sovietization and communization of a large proportion of citizens, and 3) the presence of a large proportion of migrants from the Russian Federation and their descendants in the first and second generations among local residents. The ethnic-cultural factor determined the weak link of the Ukrainian state, even in the first years of its revival – in the late 1980’s. In our opinion, since then it has been weakened rather than strengthened. And at the times of extreme weakness and vulnerability of the state power of Ukraine, the treacherous «brotherly» attack was leveled at the weakest link. In its turn, the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine affects social processes (in their broadest sense) that take place all over Ukraine (on its occupied and not occupied territories) and lead to certain changes in the ethnic-cultural. Modern effects of aggression of the Russian Federation for Ukrainian society can be viewed from different an- 10 gles – valuable, philosophical, political, methodological and other ones. We will note some of the consequences, which seem to us the most significant ones (by the end of 2017) in order to cover the ethnic factor in Russian aggression. 1. The fact of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, as well as the need to counteract it, led to a wave of political consolidation of Ukrainian society on the territory not seized by the aggressor. There took place the actualization of national self-consciousness, patriotic feelings, and the growth of the level of national (and probably ethnic) consolidation. There can be observed a relatively rapid decrease of the share of the Russian in Ukraine, in particular the decrease of citizens, who during sociological surveys identify themselves as ethnic Russians, the decrease of Russian on television, on radio, in cinema, among the songwriting, the decrease of citizens who support the administrative subordination of Or- thodox believers to the Moscow Patriarchate (more than 2 times), the decrease of children who are educated in Russian and of children studying Russian at non-Russian-teaching schools, as well as the decrease of the volume of information produced in Russia. 2. Capture by the Russian Federation and disintegration of two territorial parts of Ukraine: 1) the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol; 2) the southeastern part of the Donetsk region and the southern part of the Luhansk region. The first of them is annexed and is being «digested» and is being adapted to the needs of domestic and foreign policy of Moscow. The Russian Federation mainly takes advantage of the geographical location of the Crimean peninsula in the military strategic sphere, in opposition to the North Atlantic Alliance. In his speech dedicated to the annexation of the Crimea, V. Putin interpreted it as a reunification of the once disunited Rus- sian people. The second part of Ukraine, which is being disintegrated, has another purpose. It is obvious that according to the Moscow plan it can perform several roles. One of them is the role of a bargaining chip: Russia leaves the occupied part of Donbas at the price of the recognition that the Crimea belongs to Russia. It seems that Ukrainians and the international community don’t accept this option. Therefore, Moscow tries delegate to this occupied part of the country the functions which the Autonomous Re- public of Crimea and Sevastopol used to perform to a certain (less) extent 11 from the period of the collapse of the USSR until the spring of 2014. Ac- quiring autonomous status in the unitary Ukraine, the occupied parts of the two Ukrainian regions should become legitimate state political subjects of Ukraine. On these territories there must be preserved certain ethnic-cultural, mental, socio-political features formed by the Russian metropolis at the times of the USSR and updated by Russian propaganda during the Pu- tin’s reign in the Kremlin. Significant influence on the public consciousness of the inhabitants of these state-owned political entities should be attributed to Moscow. By threatening with separatism or weapons, using the «updated» (practically agreed with Putin) legislation, the means of influencing the organs of supreme power in Ukraine controlled by Russia should be part of the Donbas as a short chain between the Russian master and his property, Ukraine. It can be used to slow down social and political progress, to change its direction, for example: to restrain Ukraine’s progress through decomunization, to overcome the consequences of russification, to fight corruption, and also to hinder the European integration process, entry into the North Atlantic Alliance, image loss and other damage to the Ukrainian state whenever Moscow needs it. Informational, cultural, educational, ethnic and other policies have radically changed in the occupied territories of Ukraine. It directs ethnic and migration processes towards the russification of the population of these territories, migratory influx of Russians and the departure of ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. 3. The irreversibility of the strategic foreign policy vector of Ukraine towards the EU and the North Atlantic Alliance. However, the speed of Ukraine’s progress in this direction is small. The impact of the Rus- sian-Ukrainian war on the speed of Ukraine’s progress in this direction is difficult to assess because it, on the one hand (political intentions), is its catalyst, whereas on the other hand (political practice, financial support) is its brake. 4. The aggression of a large part of economic entities of Ukraine, as well as the imbalance of the entire economic complex through trade warfronts, coincided with the decrease in demand and prices for the main export goods of Ukraine, which together led to a sharp decrease in GDP and living standards of Ukrainian citizens (GDP indicator per capita, which was among the smallest in Europe in 2012–2013, decreased by 3 times – to about 2 thousand dollars per capita per year). For most of Ukrainian families, during 2014–2017, the income per capita is less than 100 USD per 12 month (including children and pensioners)! Citizens’ poverty has led to an intensification of migration flows from Ukraine (for study, work, permanent residence), and also makes Ukraine unattractive to many of its citizens remaining on the territories occupied by Russia (in the Crimea and part of the Donbas). 5. Forced migration of a large number of people. The migratory flow of temporary and permanent population from the territories occupied by Russia, which, in the average, has certain differences in ethnic-cultural characteristics, compared with the local population of migrant arrival areas. Naturally, among the forced migrants from Donetsk, Makiivka, Hor- livka, Luhansk and other occupied cities, relatively large shares are ethnic Russians, citizens who do not speak fluent Ukrainian, atheists and adepts of the Russian Orthodox Church (UOC MP). 6. Formation of Ukrainian national discourse as for the challenges provoked by the aggression of the Russian Federation or exacerbated by it. The military and around military segment appeared in the subject of modern Ukrainian literature (artistic, scientific, etc.) on the basis of the real phenomenon of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The public opinion shaped in Ukrainian society in terms of restoring the territorial integrity of the country and ensuring national sovereignty in the territories controlled by the Rus- sian Federation makes it impossible for the Ukrainian authorities to accept the Moscow requirements, namely it makes it impossible not to deny the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, to change the state structure in such a way that the occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are Moscow’s manipulating point, which helps to guide Ukraine in the direction favourable for Russia. The impact of the Russian aggression on the national economy, defense, foreign policy, work of the media, and living standards of the population is more noticeable and tangible than the impact on ethnic-cultural phenomena. Yet, it isn’t less important for the society and it needs awareness. Understanding the interdependence of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as understanding ethnic-cultural changes in Ukraine is crucial first of all due to the acute need for correction of the national security policy, for the development of a general concept of the past and the contemporary development of the ethnic structure of the people on the territory of Ukraine, for the opposition of scientifically grounded knowledge to the fabrications of the hostile propaganda and information aggression. 13 We compared the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine with the factors that led to a consistent change of the ethnic-cultural composition of the population on the territory of modern Donetsk and Luhansk regions from the ancient times to the present. The ethnic-cultural changes caused by the latest Russian expansion are put in one line with the main stages of the ethnic-cultural history of the Donetsk region called Overa- zov territory, and some historical parallels are given. As for the annexed Crimea, there were determined contemporary ethnic-cultural tendencies, there was grounded the necessity to continue the legislative provision of the status of Crimean Tatars as indigenous people. The language situation was considered from the historical and sociolinguistic point of view along with the major changes that had been taking place in the development of the ethnic composition of the region’s population. Since the cause-effect link between the changes in the linguistic situation (in the Crimea and the regions of the southeast of the country) and the political process in Ukraine are too strong, we do not reject the ethnic-political view on the situation. Research source base There exists a wide range of sources for studies of ethnic-cultural and linguistic changes on the territory of the south-eastern regions of the country and the Crimean peninsula. A great number of works describe ethnic-cultural changes in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which took place during a certain historical period, and they define the reasons for these changes. However, we still do not have a generalized picture, a point of view encompassing a time span from centuries ago till today. There are scientific and popular-scientific editions containing a lot of generalized historical information about the ethnic-cultural specifics of people living in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, among which we distinguish historical atlas- es of Ukraine (the first volume of The Historical Atlas of Ukraine [30], Atlas of the History of Ukraine [9], 2015 edition of The Historical Atlas of Ukraine [48]), collective works Ethnic History of Ancient Ukraine [21], Donbas in Ethnopolitical Dimension [20], Ethnonational Processes in Ukraine: His- tory and Modernity [22]They cover a long time period and systematize a substantial volume of historical knowledge. The history of populating Donetsk and Luhansk regions was covered by V. Kabuzan [31], V. Pirko [55], T. Chukhlib [91], and other researchers. The communist power policy as for Donbas is described in many works of the Ukrainian Independence era. They include publications of 14 such Ukrainian authors as S. Kulchytskyi, L. Yakubova [42], P. Lavrov [45], A. Rusnachenko [63], V. Marochko [50], as well as foreign scientists: the American H. Kuromiia [43], Polish researcher M. Studenna-Skrukva [72]. Different aspects of changes in the ethnic-cultural situation in Do- netsk and Luhansk regions were studied by modern Ukrainian researchers: I. Kononov [34], V. Skliar [67], V. Kotyhorenko [36], L. Hasydzhak [15], N. Makarenko [49], O. Kalakura [32], O. Kryvytska [37], V. Voinalovych, N. Kochan [61], O. Maiboroda [53]. The Russian researcher A. Illarionov was informing about the com- putational ethnic structure of the population during the military actions period (2014) (calculations done by Yu. Symonenko) [29]. His denial of V. Pu- tin’s statements regarding the quantitative superiority of ethnic Russians in the region and the «transfer» of Donbas to Ukraine during the creation of the USSR [6; 28] is valuable. The ethnic factor of the Russian-Ukrainian warfare is shown in modern works of Ukrainian authors writing about war: «“Brotherly” Invasion. Russia’s War against Ukraine of the 12th–21st Centuries» [11], «Neighbors» [19], «The Fifth Russian-Ukrainian War: From Maidan to the Eastern Front (Approaches, Estimations, Interpretations)» [57], «Russian-Ukrainian Hy- brid Warfare: A Sociologist’s Look» [64], «Russia: Identity of the Aggres- sor» [75], «World War III: A Fight for Ukraine» [79], as well as in a large number of other sources when compared to one another and well-known facts (for example, interviews, news, and other information from press, radio, TV, online resources, etc.). The emergence of a new tendency concerning the development of the ethnic structure of the Ukrainian population in Donetsk and Luhansk regions after the collapse of the USSR [87, 88; 89] was revealed and described according to the materials of the on-the-day statistics in the 1990s. The obtained results, as well as an overall estimation of the key ethnic-cultural changes of the population in these two regions from the oldest times till present [83], were used to prepare this publication. Some of the listed works also refer to the Crimean peninsula. The dynamics of quantity and settlement of Ukrainians in Crimea in the 20th century is covered in the article by S. Kiseleva and A. Petrogradskaya [33], while key changes in the ethnic structure of the population inhabiting the Crimean peninsula, are provided in the article of O. Chyrkov [90]. The results of the last population census held in Crimea are presented on the web-page of census statistical data statdata.ru [54]. M. Krylatov put to 15 doubt the results of the census carried out by the occupation authorities – «Census of the Population in the Crimean Federal District», which can be found in his article [38]. Among the sources used in our study there are those that contribute to the knowledge about the linguistic situation and its changes. These include analytical reviews of volunteers’ movement «Space of Freedom» on the situation of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine in 2011 [70], in 2014– 2015 [8; 69], in 2016 [71]; «Ukrainian language in Donbas: the year under occupation» [77]; «Language learning in Ukrainian schools and learning Russian language in them» [52]; an article by N. Filatova about the linguistic situation in the Donetsk region in the conditions of independent Ukraine [80]; data on the publication of books and brochures in the Ukrainian language and language of the occupant on the website of the State Scientific Institution «The Book Chamber of Ukraine named after Ivan Fedorov» [18]; letters sent from the occupied territories [47]. Valuable material characterizing the linguistic situation in the Do- netsk region on the eve of the so-called «Russian spring» in 2014 is contained in the monograph «Ukrainian oral speech of the Donetsk region» [92] and in the dissertation research «Sociolinguistic portrait of small cities of Donetsk region» [40], and the material characterizing the state language, ethnic and cultural policies can be found in the following writings: «State language policy in Ukraine of the last decade» [51], «Ukrainians are not afraid of citizens, but authorities» [41], etc. V. Altukhov [7], I. Kononov [34], I. Kudrejko [39], S. Laschenko [46], V. Sklyar [68], O. Tykhyi [74], and others, described the linguistic situation in the Donetsk region at different times. There is a large scope of information about the linguistic situation in the regions of the Donbas. The language situation in the Donetsk region during Russian aggression in the context of contemporary ethnic-cultural tendencies is highlighted in our article [81]. The changes taking place in the national, linguistic and other self-identification of Ukrainian citizens during 2005–2015, in particular in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, were discovered and analyzed by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies named after Alexan- der Razumkov based on the analysis of the results of sociological surveys (which is reflected in the journal «National Security and Defense» [27]). 16 Numerous facts about the linguistic and ethnic-cultural situation in the regions of Donbas during Russian aggression are contained in various web resources. New laws of Ukraine, numerous news reports on draft changes to the laws in Ukrainian language legislation, the consequences of innova- tions in language legislation, official statements and actions of Ukrainian officials, as well as representatives of the occupational (Russian-collab- orate) administration give an idea of the legislative provision of the implementation of the state language into the public practice, different orientation of linguistic and cultural policy in different territories of Ukraine. Given the limitations of the volume, we are not able to list them all, but we are going to provide the list of sources of some important or remarkable messages: messages about the gradual transfer of schools of Donetsk region to Ukrainian language teaching [24], about the competitions for the transfer of school to Ukrainian language teaching [23], information that teachers of Ukrainian language on the occupied territory will now teach Russian [76], information about the state of studying of the history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian language in schools on the occupied territory [93], information about changes to Ukrainian legislation on the state language [58], etc. A significant group of sources consists of media reports and analytical articles containing speeches and interviews with the head of the Krem- lin – V. Putin. The combination of these and other sources makes it possible to identify and characterize the ethnic factor in the historical preconditions of Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as in its current social consequences.

General principal factors of ethnic-cultural changes and main ethnic-cultural stages in the southern east of Ukraine

The following chapter chronologically lists (from the oldest times till today) the generalized key factors of the gradual change happening to the ethnic-cultural nature of population in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (events, processes, historical facts) and, along with that, major ethnic-cultural stages defined by their impact1. Formation, development, and further ethnic differentiation of the first Indo-European groups and communities, their ability to adapt to natu-

Q`IQ`VRV :1C VV7H_ S8OSb9I` a8 17 ral agro-climatic changes and to compete for natural resources with other ethnic communities are the factors of Indo-Europeans’ spread. They dominated in the region, and moreover, they actively populated it, got assimilated, and linguistically mixed various peoples in Europe and Asia, significantly impacting their cultures. This led to a long-lasting (several thousand-year long) ancient Indo-Europeans’ reign in the terrains of Donetsk and Over- azov regions, which later became one of their successors’ branches – In- do-Iranians, from which separate nomadic Iranian-language tribes finally originated. Written sources contain the names of ancient powerful groupings of Cimmerians, Scythians, and Sarmatians. Each of those groupings was reigning in the lands of the Siversky Donets and Overazov basins in their time. The first ethnic-cultural stage in south-eastern part of the modern Ukrainian national territory was that of Pre-Indo-European fishermen and hunters. The second one was marked by Proto-Indo-European and first Indo-European groups of tribes before their ethnic differentiation. In the 2nd millennium BC, Indo-Europeans actively spread from the territory of Ukraine along the Dnieper, Neman, and Western Dvina to the Baltic Sea; along the Danube to Asia Minor; over the Caucasus to the mountain rang- es of Altai, Tan-Shan, Pamir, Hindu Kush, and western parts of Himalayans [9, p. 15]. Since then, the territory populated by speakers of Indo-European languages has become many times larger. It should be mentioned that contemporary science doesn’t have enough evidence of linguistic or cultural changes of population to shape a concrete, substantiated vision. Despite the achievement of modern ar- chaeology and other sciences, our knowledge of changes in ethnic-cultural features of the population inhabiting the region as well as entire Ukraine, not only in regard to Paleolithic but also Mesolithic and Neolithic eras, are to a great extent hypothetic. The third stage was that of Indo-Iranian and Iranian cattle-breeding tribes. Iranian language speakers of the Northern Black Sea region were an active subject of the historical process, namely of ethnic-cultural interaction in European, West-Asian, and North-African terrains. The fourth ethnic-cultural stage in the terrains of Donetsk and Lu- hansk regions commenced with the mass relocation of ethnically related and alien population. Ukrainian lands played two important roles in the Mi- gration Period: 1) they served as a transit; 2) they produced a demographic resource for settlement. The migration was accompanied by conflicts, 18 new political unions, ethnically and culturally unstable stage in the region, ending in a long-term domination of Turkic tribes. The tribes of Irani- an language-speaking Caucasian nomads of the Indo-European language family were substituted by Turkic language-speaking nomads of the Altai language family who belonged to the Mongoloid race and mixed (with Cau- casians) anthropological types and minor transitional races. The fifth stage was Turkic, terminating with the formation of the Crimean Tatar people (indigenous people of Ukraine). The steppes of the Siversky Donets and Overazov basins were populated by Kutrigurs, and later, by Black Bulgars. There were also Sabirs, Saragurs, Utigurs, Pechenegs, Torks, Cumans and other Turkic-speaking nomads. Polovtsi had two groupings in these terrains: Don and Overazov ones (1036–1223). For some time, these lands were simultaneously inhabited by Turks and Iranian-speaking Alans, Finnish-speaking Ugric people. After the collapse of the Golden Horde, the Overazov territory and the Right-Bank area of Lower and partially Middle Siversky Donets basin belonged to the Crimean Khanate, while the Left-Bank area, to the Great Horde, superseded in the 16th c. by the Kingdom of Moscow. In 1452, after the defeat of the Golden Horde khan Seid Akhmet, the northern and western parts of the lands in the Siversky Donets basin came into possession of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In the 16th century they were divided by the Kingdom of Poland and that of Moscow. Ukrainians called the adjacent lands, barely populated by nomads, the Wild Fields. As a result of the competition between Christian Europe and Otto- man Empire, as well as due to the activity of Russia in the Black Sea region, Ukrainians began to colonize the Wild Fields for farming more actively. In this regard, Cossacks played an important role: Zaporozhian Cossacks in their western and southern parts, and Sloboda Cossacks in the northern area. During the 17th c., the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions belonged to Moscow (northern part) and Crimean Khanate (southern part). In the late 17th – early 18th century, Russian Kingdom followed active domestic and foreign policy in the region of Azov using Ukrainian Cossacks. This led to boundary displacement of the Russian Empire to the south and temporary expansion of jurisdiction of Zaporozhzhia to the lower Don, together with Azov city. The sixth stage was Ukrainian feudal, agrarian. In the second half of the 17th, during the 18th, and beginning of the 19th century, the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions was finally populated by Ukrainians together 19 with Russians, Greek, Germans, Moldovans, and representatives of other nations. It is then that the key ethnic features of the local population were being formed. The Russian empire started, and the USSR finished the seventh great ethnic-cultural stage – the Russian-Ukrainian, modernizing, industrial, urbanizing, and transformational one. It consists of several different phases, which we, however, won’t specify. This stage lasted in the second half of the 19th century (most vividly, from the end of the 19th c. till the end of the 1980s). Active development of capitalistic relations on the resource base of Donbas was an important factor for ethnic-cultural changes in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It was taking place in the ethnic Ukrainian territory when Ukrainian people didn’t possess legal standing internationally and were deprived of all rights in the Russian empire. The limited use of labor resources of the Ukrainian people in their own ethnic territory, their engagement into agricultural colonization of far alien lands along with the simultaneous resettlement of a large number of absolutely or almost landless Russian peasants, as well as representatives of other nations, for work at industrial enterprises of Donetsk–Overazov territories, had prompt and remote ethnic-cultural consequences. 1. The share of ethnic Ukrainians was decreasing, while the share of Russians in some parts of ethnic Ukrainian territory was growing. 2. The demographic resource of restoring Ukrainian community and Ukrainian ethnicity in south-European part of Russian empire, where the number of Russians was relatively small, was reducing. 3. Parts of Ukrainian ethnos separated from their major ethnic core were more prone firstly to linguistic and later to complete ethnic assimilation by the imperial nation – the Rus- sians. In the 19th – first third of the 20th century, Ukrainian ethnic territory significantly exceeded the borders of modern Ukrainian national territory: it stretched beyond the Don, to the northern part of the eastern Black Sea coast, and northern-western part of the Caucasus. Ignoring the ethnic factor, insisting on economic and other arguments, the Russian Federation managed to subordinate vast areas of eastern Ukrainian ethnic territory in the 1920s. In the 1930s, due to the Famine-Genocide and «national assimilation policy» of CPSS and the government of the Russian Federation, ethnic Ukrainians from the RSFSR regions bordering on Ukraine began to be considered Russians. It should be reminded that several millions of ethnic 20 Ukrainians, who considered themselves as such at the time of the population census in 1926, related themselves to the Russian nation at the time of the population census in 1939. We can draw a historical parallel between the modern ethnic-political and ethnic-cultural changes in Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia and modern Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Rostov, Volgograd regions, Kras- nodar and Stavropol Territories of Russia. The sources of tendencies (Rus- sian authorities and aggressive chauvinistic strata of the Ukrainian society) as well as the direction of changes (Russification) are the same. The methods are also considerably similar: discrediting Ukrainians, removing from all levels of power uncompromising Ukrainians, groundless accusa- tions and stigmatization, looting, using military power, local marginal strata and non-residing Russian activists (previously–communists and Komsomol members, chauvinists, xenophobes, neofascists, and so on). S. Kulchytskyi and L. Yakubova came to the conclusion that the entire Soviet history of Donbas testifies the idea of communism to be utopian, «and the attempt to implement it turns into mass terror, social-economic and ethnic-cultural degrading»[42, p. 712]. Building communism and the politics of creating «united Soviet nation» from multiple nations resulted in an intense loss of ethnic features, especially by nations related to Russians–Belarusians and Ukrainians– which obviously manifested itself in Donetsk and Overazov region. From the end of the 19th century till the collapse of the USSR, the process of Russification was a determinant in the development of the ethnic structure of population in the region. Forced collectivization and the Great Famine, urbanization, migration, language, education, and information policy led to a considerable decrease of proportion of Ukrainians to the number hardly exceeding a half. The dissolution of the Russian communist empire and establishment of the Ukrainian national state, which implements hesitant «multivector» language and cultural policy, were accompanied by the emerging tendency to return the Russified part of Ukrainians to the Ukrainian ethnic community with concurrent preservation of the linguistic and cultural Russification processes. The eighth stage was Russian-Ukrainian post-Soviet, post imperial one, which was formed during the democratization process of the USSR and its collapse in the second half of the 1980s – early 1900s. The onset of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in February–April of 2014 can be considered to be the end of the first phase of this stage. 21 The reanimation of the USSR’s ethnic-cultural tendencies in the territories of Ukraine conquered and controlled by the Russian Federation is characteristic for the second phase of the eighth stage.

The ethnic-cultural situation on the Crimean peninsula after the collapse of the USSR is an important component of social soil favorable to political destabilization and Russian expansion2 The range of problems which the Crimean region represents to the Ukrainian state is determined primarily by the general social situation in- herited from the tsarist and from the USSR past, as well as it is deepened by the inadequate problems and new challenges to the domestic and foreign policy of Kiev (with the signs of capitulation), and to a lesser extent it is determined by the geographical location of the peninsula and the unblush- ing deception of Russia in the region of the Black Sea. Thanks to the favorable natural conditions, the territory of the peninsula was settled by people hundreds of thousands of years ago. Among the Ukrainian regions, the history of the settlements in the Crimea can be compared only to the history of the settlements in the Transcarpathian region. The ethnic palette of the Crimea in its historical times was colorful, although at different stages of the history of the peninsula a certain ethnic community was politically conducting or quantitatively dominant. The territorial movement of ethnic communities, which in each particular historical situation was conditioned by a complex of many factors, led to changes in the ethnic structure of the population of certain parts of Ukraine, in particular Crimea. Transformational ethnic processes, which depended to a large extent on the policy of the social elite and its ethnic-cultural rice, played an important role in ethnic-structural changes. Migration, acculturation, ethnic assimilation, ethnic consolidation and other processes led to the formation of Crimean Tatars, Karaites and Krymchaks. Before the «accession» of the Crimea to the Russian Empire at different times there lived and reigned (alternately or simultaneously in different parts of the Crimea) such ethnic communities: Cimmerians, Scythians (Scythians), Taurus, ancient Greeks, Sarmatians, Alans, Romans, Goths, Huns, Khazars, Rus, Pechenegs, Polovtsi, Italians, Tatars of the Golden

Q`IQ`VRV :1C VV7H_ S8L8P b888I` a8 22 Horde, Turks, Russians. The migratory outflow of Crimean Tatars from the Crimean sub-region was large and took place in several waves. The large quantitative advantage of the Russian ethno-territorial group on the peninsula, as compared to the rest of the population, was negatively displayed in the time of Ukraine’s non-dependence on Russia. It caused the complication of the state system of the country, slowed down the process of transformation of the Ukrainian fragment of the «Soviet people» into a consolidated national community, was the reason for the latest imperial attacks of Russia. Absolute superiority of the Russian ethnicity was not formed on the peninsula until the end of the existence of the Russian monarchical empire. It became more eminent after the criminal deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the middle of the twentieth century. At the end of the Second World War, the Crimean Tatar people and other local territorial ethnic groups were deported, and the autonomous status of the Crimea was abolished. On June 30, 1945 there was formed the Crimean region of the RSFSR, which in 1954, in accordance with that- time law was transferred to the USSR. Since then, the economic situation on the peninsula has steadily improved. A lot of efforts were made, and a lot of funds from the budget of the Ukrainian SSR were spent on the development of recreational, transport, agricultural, industrial and social infrastructure on the peninsula. Despite the rehabilitation of the Crimean Ta- tars, they were not returned their real estate, and it was not until the end of the 1980s that they were allowed to settle in their native lands.

Change of linguistic local situation in the period of collapse of the ussr and post-colonial Ukraine3 Changing of the linguistic situation in Ukraine in the context of ethnic-cultural tendencies of the period of democratization and the collapse of the USSR. In the period of the USSR the expansion of the functioning of the Russian language in the Ukrainian SSR was supported in every way. There was an increase in the proportion of persons considering Rus- sian to be their native language, as well as the proportion of those who spoke Russian fluently. At the same time, the share of ethnic Ukrainians, the proportion of people who spoke Ukrainian fluently, and, above all, the proportion of those who considered Ukrainian to be their mother tongue, declined. By the end of the 1980s, the process of linguistic and cultural Q`IQ`VRV :1C VV7H^_ ZZSP8c85Z T PX P!L88R_P_P9I`a6 _ S8P bP]_Sb9` a8 23 russification was determining in the ethnic-cultural sphere of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. The share of people speaking Russian fluently increased to almost 100% in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Russian-Ukrainian local «islands» of Donbas merged into a layer of the Ukrainian-Russian population, where Ukrainians prevailed as for the ethnic awareness, whereas Russian ethnicity prevailed according to linguistic and cultural characteristics [83]. The results of the All-Union Population Census of 1989 showed that the proportion of ethnic Russians among the population of Donetsk region increased compared to 1979 and the proportional rate of Ukrainians and Russians was coming to the point of 50% to 50%. As for the other ethnic groups it is possible to say that only the Greek share was a significant one at that period. The ethnic-cultural life of representatives of more than 100 other peoples who lived in the region wasn’t manifested at all. Most of those representatives were only a statistical ag- gregate in the census tables on the basis of a common ethnic identity, and they did not have permanent cultural, economic, political or other ties. The territories targeted by the latest Russian armed aggression differ significantly from the rest of the country and from neighboring regions with ethnic-structural features and the defining directions for the development of ethnic structure in the post-colonial period of Ukrainian history [89]. An important social feature of the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine was that «it is here that the CPSU has made the greatest success in transforming the Ukrainian people into the so-called «Savetsky (Soviet) people» (the name is given on the pronunciation of the Russian original)», and «characteristic features of a large part (in some regions – the greater part) of ethnic Ukrainian population of these territories is, among other things, linguistic and cultural russification, disregard for specific Ukrainian ethnic traits, stereotypical thinking of Ukrainian language and of all the elements of Ukrainian spiritual culture as of a non-prestigious, unequal, un- promising, non-profitable, backward and irrelevant ones». These signs miraculously coexisted with the preservation of the historical memory of Ukrainians (though it was made to resemble the Russian one) and with the preservation of the ethnic self-identity of Ukrainians [89, p. 227]. The formation of a new decisive trend in the development of the ethnic structure of the people of Ukraine took place as a result of the policy of «Perestroika» introduced by M.Gorbachev. After the collapse of the USSR, this trend has intensified. In contrast to the continued decline in previous decades, the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians among all Ukrainian 24 citizens began to increase, and the proportion of the politically dominant ethnic group in the USSR, the Russians, began to decrease [88]. However, hegemony of Russians and Russified groups in the language and culture of many regions of the country persisted. The Kremlin rulers progressed in this way on those Ukrainian territories, where in the twentieth century began to quantitatively dominate the so-called «Russian-speaking population» – on the Crimean peninsula and in the regions of Donbas [84]. It consisted of ethnic Russians and separated to a certain extent (in whole or in part) by rising from their ethnic roots populations of different ethnic origins. It was replenished mainly due to two groups of citizens: those born in mixed Ukrainian-Russian families, and those born in one-ethnic families of Ukrainians, but educated and trained in Russian. The indifferent attitude to Ukrainian language of a large part of citizens in the Donetsk region, as in most regions of Ukraine, began to change in 1988–1989. Under the conditions of implementation of the policy of democratization of society in the Donetsk region by the leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the ethnic-cultural upsurge of Ukrainians, Greeks and other ethnic groups took place. Then actively formed cultural associations of a number of ethnic groups in the region, whose main activity was the maintenance of their ethnic identity, support for their languages. At the beginning of 1989, the first mass public-political organization of Donetsk Oblast – the Donetsk Regional Organization of the Ukrainian Lan- guage Society named after Taras Shevchenko (DTUM) [10, p. 213] – was created. At that time Ukrainian language received the status of the state language in the Ukrainian SSR. However, then Russian language, which actually served as the state one in the USSR, had the status of «language of inter-ethnic communication», and on the eve of the collapse of the USSR, it was intensively executed legislatively as the state language in the USSR. These and other factors made the status of the state for the Ukrainian language in the Ukrainian SSR inferior. According to the results of sociological surveys conducted by the statistical department of the region in 1991, 32% of the residents of the region recognized themselves as representatives of the Ukrainian people, 25.5% – Russian, and 36.5% – Ukrainian and Russian peoples simultaneously, while 51% stated that Ukrainian and Russian cultures simultaneously influenced their formation as individuals [65, p.90]. Despite the prevalent use of the Russian language, of the ethnic and cultural split of the inhabitants of the region they supported the State In- 25 dependence Act of Ukraine on the referendum on December 1, 1991, giving over 83% of the vote [62]. Language situation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the context of ethnic-cultural tendencies of independent Ukraine. The inhabitants of the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine were highly willing to prior- itize the development of Ukrainian language in the independent Ukraine at the end of 1991. However, the decline in living standards and the indecisiveness of the Ukrainian authorities in changing linguistic policy negatively affected the linguistic situation in the country. The positive changes were taking place too slowly, encountering enormous difficulties in the most Russified regions, thanks to the efforts of civic organizations and patriotic citizens. In Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the social field of functioning of the Ukrainian language, in particular, in public administration, education, professional culture, mass media, has gradually expanded. Part of the younger generation of Ukrainian citizens turned to a new linguistic behavior, when the Ukrainian language was used by speakers along with the Russian one. But stereotypes of linguistic behavior typical for the past and other stereotypes about Ukrainian ethnicity formed in the past remained in the minds and subconsciousness of a large part of the population of the region. The state neither worked out nor implemented the language policy responding to the threatening situation, to the disappearance of the Ukrainian language in Donbas region. It was impossible to change the dangerous situation for Ukrainians with the help of weak-willed public organizations and individual enthusiasts. Our comparisons and calculations of the results of the censuses of 1989 and 2001 show that the share of citizens with Ukrainian language as their mother tongue among the entire population of Donetsk and Luhansk regions decreased in average by 6 percentage points. In almost 13 years of the inter-censorial period, it had fallen to a record low level – up to 24.10% of the entire population of the Donetsk region [89, p. 226]. And among Do- netsk residents who considered themselves Ukrainians the share of those who believed Ukrainian to be their mother tongue decreased by 18.36 p.p. [89, p. 227]! The number of ethnic Ukrainians with Russian as their native language in two regions increased by 753.182 people [89, p. 228]. Con- cerning the communicative power of languages in the Donetsk region, I. Kononov concluded that only Ukrainian and Russian are present in all 26 spheres of life, while the languages of other ethnic groups are most often used only in certain situations of family or friendly communication [34]. The greatest defeat experienced by Ukrainians in the 13 inter-censorial years of the struggle and defending the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine is the accelerated alienation of ethnic Ukrainians in Donbas from specific Ukrainian ethnic features. Among the factors that predetermined such an increase in events, is that «the attractiveness of the Russian language and the lack of prestige of the Ukrainian language, as well as in general, the supremacy of Russia over Ukraine, were widely supported by the ideological and communicative habits (stereotypes) of the political leaders of Ukrainian society, who at that time were wealthy entrepreneurs and the top of the state apparatus» [89, p. 226]. With such managerial staff it was in vain to hope for a Ukrainian-centric goal-setting in politics, or at least for some organized, supported and guided processes of returning differently russified Ukrainians to Ukrainian spirituality, making them speaking Ukrainian language again [89, p. 227]. According to V. Sklyar, the level of national consciousness and linguistic stability of ethnic Ukrainians of the Donbas in the independent Ukraine remained low. Therefore, «the type of their linguistic behavior has not actually been changed» [66]. We agree with this opinion, but we need to clarify that this statement is correct for the majority of the population of the region, but not for everyone. The analysis of the population census data of 2001, made by the researcher, testified the «dominant position» of Russians and the status of Ukrainians as a mass ethnic group or subordinate majority who undergoes linguistic assimilation [66]. The situation is typical for the politically subordinate population of the colonies, when the prestigious, economically profitable, vital for social competition language of the colonizer becomes favorable for the assimilation of the local population. Post-colonial tendency of ethnic-structural development of Ukrainian society in Donetsk and Luhansk regions appeared later than in most regions of Ukraine [88]. In addition, there was a regional specificity of ethnic-structural landslides. An increase in the proportion of those who considered themselves to belong to the Ukrainian ethnic group was followed by the further growth of the share of those who consider Russian to be their mother tongue. Ethnic-structural differences between the people of the Donetsk–Overazov region and the majority of the rest of the country’s population deepened during the collapse of the USSR and the inde- 27 pendence of Ukraine. Linguistic and cultural regionalization of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions was a dangerous phenomenon, on which some political forces did not pay enough attention, while others fueled and deepened it, used it in the struggle for power [83, p. 61]. During the crisis of communism, the collapse of the world socialist system, and at the post-colonial stage of the historical development of Ukraine, there have been formed new sufficiently stable trends in ethnic-cultural changes. The volume, directions and ethnic-speaking composition of external migratory flows, together with the return of a part of the russified groups of Ukrainian people to the bosom of their ethnicity, led to a decrease in the proportion of ethnic Russians in Ukraine, to a decrease in the number of those who consider Russian to be their mother tongue. But the trends and intensity of ethnic-demographic and transformational ethnic processes that took place in Ukraine had territorial differences. Important changes in the functioning of the Ukrainian language in Donetsk region occurred in 2004–2005, when, after the presidential elections on radio stations and TV channels, there appeared Ukrainian-speaking content, when there was introduced the circulation of documents in Ukrainian, when there was increased the number of teaching hours of Ukrainian language in educational institutions etc. However, despite the positive changes that took place at that time, the local authorities used to speculate on the linguistic issue during election campaigns [92, p. 4]. In early 2005, we were of the opinion that the practical solution to the problem of stopping the russification of Ukrainians at the state level had not really begun, and the situation was extremely threatening, and the delay with this significantly damaged Ukrainian society. That time public statements by the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko gave grounds for doubting that «the Ukrainian authorities will finally take up the suspension of the russification of ethnic Ukrainians and Ukraine. There is no doubt that the veiled and frank flood of the SPU, Our Ukraine, BYuT with Ukrainian Ukrainophobes is a shameful mistake that can prove to be fatal for the Ukrainians» [89, p. 228]. The events that followed those statements as well as today’s events leave no doubt about the mistakes and inefficiencies of the language, staffing, and information policy in the region at that time. The Party of Regions, which came to power after the disappointment of a significant part of the voters with the leaders of the «orange» political forces, significantly worsened the moral, political, and political-legal situation with the state status of the Ukrainian language. Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada 28 began to correct it only after the escape of President Viktor Yanukovych to Russia. However, this process was slowed down due to the authorities’ fears of obtaining negative social consequences in the difficult conditions of external aggression. In the information space of the Donetsk region there were about one hundred and fifty broadcasters in Russian (mostly) and Ukrainian. Ukrainian prevailed only in the programs of the regional state television and radio broadcasting company (about 65%) [92, p. 76]. Now the floor is taken by the occupying media (Russians and puppets of the Kremlin). A similar situation can be observed with the media space of Luhansk region. After the collapse of the USSR on the Crimean peninsula, it was neither clear from the language and information basis of media content and social networks that the state language is Ukrainian, nor understandable that one of the official languages of the ARC is Ukrainian. Ukrainian oral speech of Donetsk region is marked by a strong defor- mational influence of the Russian language. Such deformations represent a wide range of interference processes: from single intermittent errors to complete non-differentiation Ukrainian and Russian language codes, which leads to the linguistic mixing and distribution of hybrid forms of speech. Under favorable communicative conditions it is possible to overcome or minimize the influence of the Russian language [92, p. 145]. Unfortunately, a lot of time was lost. The authorities did not conduct a balanced linguistic and cultural policy, and the pro-Russian forces successfully used it. Purely public and educational initiatives are not enough to improve the situation [16].

Ethnic factor in the historical preconditions of the undeclared, hybrid war of russia against Ukraine

The course on the change of the ethnic reality in post-colonial Ukraine is not acceptable for the leaders of the Russian Federation. The ethnic-demographic situation on the all-Ukrainian scale was changed in favor of indigenous people of Ukraine. Their natural growth didn’t significantly differ from ethnic alien groups. However, scale, directions, and ethnic-linguistic composition of the external migration flows together with the return of a part of Russified groups of Ukrainian population to the fold 29 of their ethnicity contributed to reducing the proportion of ethnic Rus- sians in Ukraine, as well as of those who considered Russian to be their mother tongue. It is important that the integrity of Crimean Tatars with the Ukrainian nation, as that of the Ukrainian Russians’ ethnic group, had considerably grown. Hence, the Russian Federation was losing its major social basis for the destabilization of Ukrainian society according to its influence on the Ukrainian government. In Donetsk and Luhansk regions, this tendency received positive statistics data later than in the majority of Ukrainian regions. Besides, it showed regional specifics of ethnic-cultural shifts: 1) growth of those who considered themselves part of Ukrainian ethnos was followed by the growth of those who considered Russian their mother tongue; 2) due to a large number of individuals with an unstable or unclear self-identification (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, historical, moral-ethnic, political), who were sensitive to the manipulations of the Kremlin political technologists, the mentioned direction for changes was not established and the perspective was vague. At the beginning of the 21st century, revanchist mood in the Rus- sian society and insatiable ambitions of its political leadership generated the cold aggressive policy of the Russian Federation in regard to such its neighbors in the terrains of the former USSR that aimed for independent determination of their destiny, integration with European countries. An important circumstance, favoring the development and beginning of the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian Federation, was the accumulation of relatively large gold and foreign-currency reserves by means of oil and gas export. Moscow laid great expectations upon the ethnic-cultural factor in the process of subduing Ukraine. «According to the official census, seventeen million out of forty-five million people are Russians. Some regions, for instance, Crimea, are inhabited exclusively by Russians. 90% are Rus- sians»4, the President of the Russian Federation was boldly lying in his speech to the participants of the North-Atlantic Alliance member states meeting in Bucharest (April 2008), where the problem of providing Ukraine with the Action Plan for NATO membership (APM) was considered. Per- centage of Ukrainian Russians by region see: «Percentage of ethnic Rus- sians in Ukraine by region in 2001 Ukrainian Census».

`:J C: VR``QI% 1:J:` V` .VQH%IVJ 7H% 1J7Q% .9I` a8 30

Percentage of ethnic Russians in Ukraine by region in 2001 Ukrainian Census [4].

Next loud insinuations regarding Ukrainian ethnic-cultural reality could be heard in V. Putin’s speech where he outlined the territory for which Russia claims in case Ukraine joins NATO (translation from Russian): «We don’t have any right of veto and cannot have it; we do not claim it. But I want all of us, when considering such issues, to understand that we also have our interests there. Seventeen million Russians live in Ukraine. Who can say we don’t have any interests there? Look at the south: the entire southern Ukraine is Russian»5. We see that Russia emphasizes the ethnic argument, creates a fantastic picture of the entirely Russian south of Ukraine, probably counting on the active part of Ukrainian Russians, the majority of south- and east-Ukrainian residents in the implementation of Moscow secession and appropriation policy in regard to Ukraine. Share of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukrainian cities, towns and districts according to the 2001 census can be seen on map «Ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine by raions (2001 census)». Russian influence on the Ukrainian government grew stronger after Viktor Yanukovych and Party of Regions entered the office. The key social basis of this political power, its electoral core, was located in the industrial cities of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and on the Crimean

`:J C: VR``QI% 1:J:` V` .VQH%IVJ 7H% 1J7Q% .9I` a8 31

Ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine by raions (2001 census) [5]. peninsula; ethnically and nationally it was among those layers of Ukrainian citizens that experienced Russification the most, didn’t care for anything Ukrainian, didn’t speak Ukrainian, or were only passive speakers (could understand but could not speak). It was obvious that Moscow set a goal to draw Ukraine into its «pocket» Customs union and hinder its further approximation to European and Euro-Atlantic international organizations. That is to stronger tie Ukraine to itself and to enable any future development of the direct connections (economic, political, security, etc.) between Ukraine and the non-Russian world. Restrictions of sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation naturally diminished its ability to systematically resist Russification, absorption by the Russian world and brought to naught its legal standing in the international politics. After pretended or real hesitations, the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych began to publically favor Moscow plan, which contradicted his previous declarations both in Ukraine and abroad, as well as agreements with European partners. This, as well as the private-type negotiations with V. Putin, raised indignation and protest among some Ukrainian citizens and later led to a several-month political crisis. The time period during and right after V. Yanukovych’s escape to Russia created favorable conditions for seizing those Ukrainian territories where state agencies were the easiest to resubordinate or liquidate. 32 During that period, persuading Ukrainian citizens to subordinate and obey the «elder brother», Moscow used not only economic and political pressure but also incredibly absurd rhetoric that two nations (Russians and Ukrainians) are actually one nation. In September of 2013, the Presi- dent of the Russian Federation publically announced (translated from Rus- sian): «You know that no matter what happens and which direction Ukraine moves, we will anyway meet. Because we are one nation». Substantiating such position, V. Putin recalled the arguments of tsar and communist party times: «For we have one Dnieper laver, certainly, common historical roots and common destinies. We have one religion, one faith, very similar cultures, languages, traditions, and mentalities» [59]. The statement that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation was many times pronounced by the President of the Russian Federation not only simultaneously with anti-European (against Ukraine’s movement towards the EU and NATO) information campaign but also during military actions against Ukraine, vilifying Armed Forces of Ukraine and government, dealing economic and diplomatic blows to Ukraine, etc. At the meeting-concert of March 18, 2015, V. Putin said that two nations are one; on April 16, 2015, he did it on «Pryamaya liniya» (Direct Line with Vladimir Pu- tin TV show); on June 19, 2015, at Saint Petersburg international economic forum. There, the statement that Russians and Ukrainians «are one nation, one ethnos» was likely to have its main continuation for the Kremlin: Ukraine and Russia are doomed to common future. But the tragic experience shows that Ukrainian-Russian alliance ignores national interests of Ukraine, its resources being used for Moscow to achieve its tsarist goals. V. Tkachenko considers that Russia doesn’t see any future for Ukraine as for a national state [75, p. 50.]. The Russian President complemented his seemingly sincere con- victions about the affinity of Russians and Ukrainians and about the inevi- tability of their common future with made-up facts of transferring Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Odesa region, Donbas, No- vorossiya to Ukraine by the Soviet government in the 1920s during the creation of the USSR, as well as about random, groundless, beneficial for Ukraine determination of Russian-Ukrainian borders at that time. V. Pu- tin proclaimed such stories on, for example, April 17, 2014 in the so-called «Novorossiya commentaries»; on October 24, 2014, in his answers to questions concerning his Sochi speech at the panel session of the Interna- 33 tional discussion club «Valdai»; on January 25, 2016, in his speech at the All-Russian national front forum. Conscious information subversions on the part of the Russian government conveyed distorted information on ethnic reality and history of Ukrainian national territory formation. However, online resources posted materials of some Russian researchers refuting historical and territorial fantasies of the Russian authorities [28]. The increase in the level of national self-awareness of Ukraini- ans among the main causes of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The ethnic factor is present not only in information subversions aimed at inclining Ukrainians to obedience and subordination to the «elder brother» but also among the reasons of the aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. We suggest that there are three reasons of this aggression (one internal and two external ones) in the ethnological-historical and global dimensions. 1. Spread and updating of Ukrainian national consciousness in the Ukrainian society to such a level when the rest of the country’s citizens (who consider themselves, for instance, citizens of the world, belonging to the «Russian World», «Novorussians», and so on) start losing chances to elect «their» power, which doesn’t care for national Ukrainian interests and implements the «Russia’s younger brother» policy. Russian government understood Ukrainian ethnic-political reality and the fact that it would be impossible to bring its «obedient person» to power in Ukraine by means of democratic elections. 2. The Russian Federation’s ambition was to keep Ukraine highly Russified, which had been already achieved. Full and partial Russification of Ukrainian citizens was considered and practically used by the Russian Federation as a resource of influence on shaping government in Ukraine, its foreign and domestic policy. Russian neoimperialists underestimated consolidation of Ukrainian nation, its political mobility and proactivity in defending its vital interests – as well as a qualitative superiority of nationally conscious citizens, comparing to the «lost» «non-existent» visitors as if from some «parallel» Eurasian-Russian world – in the regions where a relative majority of the electorate supported Party of Regions and its candidates. It is not a secret that quite many modern Russians treat Ukrainians arrogantly and aggressively. After the wreck of communist ideology and collapse of the USSR, the Russian society has preserved and keeps show- 34 ing features indicative of imperial societies, which do not recognize equality and self-sufficiency of all other nations and states. Ye. Dobrovolskyi rightly states that «Moscovites consider Ukrainian language and nation a historical disjunction, which was caused by the harmful influence of Lithu- ania and Poland» [19, p. 178]. 3. Recognition of Ukrainians by European nations and most countries of the world as a sovereign nation, equal to them in rights and worth from the point of view of cultural and linguistic uniqueness, historical experience, perspectives of development and free cooperation. Significance, role, place of ethnicity in concrete social and historical prerequisites of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2013 – beginning of 2014 can be explained by a set of factors: 1) ethnic-territorial; 2) ethnic-social (in its narrow sense); 3) ethnic-cultural; 4) ethnic-psychic; 5) ethnic-political; 6) ethnic-demographic. Local Ukrainian population (almost completely Russian-speaking) was very successfully used by Russians in their tactic deeds, namely as a «human shield» from the Armed Forces of Ukraine [14]. Let us mention that during military operations in Horlivka, social networks, for example, announced political persecution of citizens: «…Horlivka ,,clearances” begin. ,,Clearances” from ukrops»6. S. Fedorchuk, who witnessed the onset of the «Russian Spring» in Donetsk, recalled that due to the local police and SSU bases, «DPR» managed to «carry out large-scale repressions against Ukrainian activists and create the atmosphere of fear and anti-Ukrainian genocide» [26]. Y. Felshtynskyi and M. Stanchev saw the intermediary goal of the «Russian Spring» in unfolding information warfare, provoking interethnic, interreligious, and interregional collisions, and creation of conditions for Russian military invasion of Ukraine for its gradual full occupation. In their opinion, the ultimate goal of V. Putin is to liquidate Ukraine as a state is [79, p. 266]. Influence of military expansion of Russia on the ethnic-cultural development of the total ukrainian society

Military expansion of the Russian Federation, which quite quickly led to the globally unrecognized annexation of the Autonomous republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as the seizure of a large territory of Donetsk

`:J C: VR``QI% 1:J:` V` .VQH%IVJ 7H9I` a8 35 and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, became the key factor for changes in the ethnic-cultural situation. Changes in Moscow-controlled territories of Ukraine. The share of indigenous peoples (Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars) in the occupied territories began decreasing, while that of ethnic Russians resumed its growth. The population census conducted by the occupational power and collaborators in Crimea testified it. However, certain mistakes or, probably, conscious actions led to some «delusion» of absolute and relative quantity of Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars in the AR of Crimea and Sevas- topol city. The same tendency is observed in the occupied by Moscow part of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. This is testified by the indirect data (volume and directions of migration flows; constant presence of Russian military personnel and mercenaries, intelligence service subdivisions, politicians, cultural professionals, entrepreneurs, and other citizens of the Russian Federation; syllabi change; language policy change; radical change of cultural and information policy; considerable changes of economic ties and passenger flows, and so on). The tendencies of changing ethnic structure of the population in the occupied Crimean part of Ukraine can be extrapo- lated to the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions through a significant similarity of linguistic, cultural, and political preferences among the population and similarity of changes that happened in all spheres of life of the local Ukrainian citizens. The mentioned ethnic-structural trend correlates to the ideological control established by Moscow in regard to the media field in the occupied territories of Ukraine. The policy of isolating people from non-Rus- sian sources of information is observed. There is a tendency that facts and thoughts covered in messages, analytical materials about real events that currently happen in the world (Ukraine, Syria, France, USA, and so on), made public by not Russian or pro-Russian mass media, are systematically interpreted, refuted, and distorted in Russia-controlled dummy mass media formations. More than 30 Russian TV channels, about 40 radio stations broadcast in occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; about 70 Russian newspapers are distributed; about 100 information-analytical web-portals and around 1000 web-pages in social networks and blogs are available [14, p. 220]. Russian content determines the rhetoric of local media; «we can speak about the creation of a single media platform» [14, p. 221] by 36 the Russian Federation together with terroristic organizations «DPR» and «LPR». A similar situation is observed in the Crimean information space. Education and cultural policy of the Russian Federation as for the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions is aimed at the worldview «attachment» to Russia, as well as at further linguistic, cultural, ethnic Russification of the population in the occupied territories. Ukraine-pho- bic «patriotic» upbringing of children and youth; implanting state Russian symbols, traditions and outlook, Russian interpretation of the USSR history, Russian empire and the so-called «Novorossiya»; creation of artists’ and writers’ unions; tours and performances of Russians theaters, ensem- bles, and pop-artists in the occupied territories, as well as other activities, lay foundations for a steady, deep Russification of local people, primarily children and youth. Crimean education and cultural situation resemble the ones existing in the regions of the Russian Federation. The key ethnic-cultural «trophy» of Moscow is Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians – the largest language-cultural population group in the seized territories. Its considerable part consists of children born in ethnically mixed Russian-Ukrainian families. In many settlements, which are currently under Russian occupation, the share of citizens born in Rus- sian-Ukrainian marriages exceeds 20%. There is a possibility to quickly reduce the ethnic Ukrainians’ share in the uncontrolled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions from the absolute majority to nearly 40% of the population. Changes in the linguistic situation in Ukraine in the context of ethnic-cultural tendencies in the years of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The use of the Ukrainian language in various spheres of social life and the influence of the Revolution of Dignity and the Russo-Ukrainian War on the current language situation in Ukraine were analyzed by the authors of the analytical review «The Situation of the Ukrainian Language in 2014–2015 years» [69], presented by the «Space of Freedom» movement. This review states that there is a rapid forced russification in the occupied territories of Donetsk region, and that the Ukrainian language is removed from almost all spheres of public life. The language policy of the occupation authorities in the field of education was aimed at rapid russification and was introduced in higher education institutions and school education. During the 2014– 2015 academic year Ukrainian-teaching schools were rapidly transformed into Russian-teaching ones. There was also the reduction of the number of hours for studying the Ukrainian language in schools in the occupied 37 territories. These processes were held in several waves [69]. The media reported that in at least one school in Donetsk, which until that time preserved Ukrainian-speaking teaching, parents were forced to write a statement about their desire to be taught in Russian in the next academic year. «DNR» militants ordered to fulfill the requirement immediately to those who did not want to write such statements and replied that they would think the present, and they were threatened that their children would have problems otherwise. Mass media cite the teacher of the junior Eugene, who is afraid that «From next year, most likely, we will not have Ukrainian, or maybe there will be one optional lesson a week» [69]. We have enough reasons to suppose that by the summer of 2015 there were no schools with Ukrainian language teaching in the regional center in the regional center. Studying Ukrainian at certain schools became optional. However, individual teachers in an unfavorable environment are responsible for teaching the Ukrainian language. «We rely on this as we can: we teach a full course of language and literature, tell about events in the history of Ukraine. By November 9th, we held the Week of Ukrainian Writing and Language, the competition of experts in the Ukrainian language named after Peter Jacyk, explaining the situation in the Donetsk region. But we must admit: on the background of local propaganda our voice is weak. However, it is present!» – wrote a teacher from Donetsk [76]. On the eve of the beginning of the aggression of the Russian Fed- eration against Ukraine in 2014, the language situation in Donetsk region was generally characterized as follows: the extremely high level of russification of the population, which objectively complicated and slowed down the introduction of the Ukrainian language into the public sphere; lack of effective state policy aimed at expanding the spheres of real functioning of the Ukrainian language; Depending on Russia’s informational, political and other influences; bilingualism with a great predominance of the Russian language and the use of the language sourzhik (slang, a mixture of two languages); wave-like, inconsistent and controversial changes in the situation. Russia has been stimulating, and has used the political destabilization of Ukraine, the erosion of separatist sentiment in the Crimean peninsula and in the regions of the Donbas. Due to the separation of a small part of the inhabitants of Donbas by separatism and the weak integration into the Ukrainian society of former migrants from the RSFSR to the Crimea, the Russian Federation tried to conceal from the international community a wide range of aggressive foreign policy actions that violate international 38 law, numerous provisions of interstate agreements. They are aimed at destabilizing, appropriating the territory, transforming the state structure of Ukraine into a form that will provide Moscow with restrictions on the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation, sufficient control over the internal and external policies of the Ukrainian authorities, and, if necessary, the territorial split and destruction of the Ukrainian state. The Kremlin rulers with a certain success conceal even an outright armed aggression against Ukraine, but not all of the international community aspire, largely because of the lack of readiness for adequate political steps on a nuclear Russian state with hardly predictable leadership. The revanchist sentiment in Russian society and the neo-imperial policy of Russian power gave rise to a new expansion into Ukraine and military actions, accompanied by a decrease in the proportion of Ukrainians in the occupied territories [84]. This is the main ethnic-structural trend in the lands of Ukraine seized by Moscow, which correlates with the introduction by Moscow of ideological control over the media field in the captured parts of Ukraine. Ukraine’s informational presence in the occupied territories is significantly inferior to Russian in all respects. Sociological studies of 2014–2015 give a general picture of the complex, dismal language and ethnіс-cultural situation in the Donbas. About 49% of those polled in Donetsk region consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, but only 14% consider Ukrainian to be their native language. One third of the respondents consider Ukrainian and Russian to be their mother tongues simultaneously, 45% – Russian, 8% – other languages [27, p. 51]. 16% of respondents in Donetsk region think that Ukrainian should be the only official language, 42% believe that Russian may have official status in certain regions, 36% are supporters of the state status of two languages. 54% of the respondents in the region believe that every citizen of Ukraine, regardless of his ethnic background, should know the Ukrainian language, the basics of Ukrainian history and culture, and 36% do not think so. 32% of respondents associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition, with 28% of the Soviets (which accounts for the largest share of respondents from all regions of Ukraine), with Russians – 10%, and European ones – 9%. It is important that 36% of respondents in the region expect different cultural traditions in different regions of the country in the future. 19% of respondents believe that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will dominate, 13% – European, 10% – Soviet, 6% – Russian [27, p. 65]. 39 The RF aggression against Ukraine also stimulated positive ethnic and cultural changes in the non-occupied part of Ukrainian society. So- cial institutions, let them slowly, but get rid of the function of reproducing the Russian-Soviet spiritual heritage. The level of national consolidation is increasing in the political plane and, to a lesser extent, in ethno-cultural one. Structural elements formed in the conditions of the colonial sub- Ukrainian existence of Ukrainian society, are steadily decreasing in their specific weight, irreversibly losing their political influence, in certain areas of the country we can speak about the approach of their disappearance. The share of the Russian ethnic group is decreasing; the share of the Rus- sian language in public policy and concert activity has decreased; considerably weakened the position of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine (registered as «Ukrainian») – one of the most important instruments of Russia’s neo-colonial policy towards Ukraine; the proportion of students of Russian-language secondary schools decreases steadily; the proportion of students studying in Russian is decreasing; the share of books and brochures published in the language of the Moscow invader decreases; the segment of books issued in the Russian Federation decreases on the book market of the country; the legislative provision of the growth of the proportion of television and radio products in the state language is being formed, examples of imposing penalties on violators of legislation regarding the language of the media are emerging. The use of language quotas on radio has given positive changes, which, in our opinion, indicate excessive caution by the Verkhovna Rada in determining the size of the minimum share of the product in Ukrainian. The law on language quota on the radio came into force on November 8, 2016. During the first year of its operation, the total volume of songs in the state language should be not less than 25%, and TV broadcasting – not less than 50%. However, radio stations have significantly violated the specified quota. During 8.11. 2016 – 30.08. 2017 the National Council of Ukraine for Television and Radio Broadcasting imposed fines on 15 radio stations for non-fulfillment of language quotas [25]. Member of the National Council S. Kostinsky said that national radio stations exceed the quota for broadcasting songs in the Ukrainian language, on average, by 7 percentage points, and from the broadcasting in the state language – by 30 [25]. Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information Policy V. Syumar said that at the end of September, the share of Ukrainian songs on Ukrainian radio stations is more than 40% [94]. 40 In May 2017, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine introduced quotas for television content in Ukrainian. The President of Ukraine signed the law in June, which came into force in October. One more year of transition is foreseen. In the total weekly broadcast of the broadcasting organizations of the national and regional broadcasting category, the share of broadcasts and / or films in the state language must be at least 75% in each of the time periods between 7 and 18, as well as between 18 and 22. Local TV channels’ quota is lower and equals to 50% [58]. The Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine intends to introduce an excise stamp for a Russian book [12]. Another significant step towards returning full-fledged functioning of the Ukrainian language throughout the country could be the law regulating the functioning of the state language in the service sector. In the message of the President of Ukraine on the internal and external situation of the Ukrainian state, proclaimed in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on September 7, 2017, it was stressed that «the state does not interfere in the sphere of private linguistic communication at all, and never will interfere!» [56]. Sociological surveys indicate an increase in the share of citizens who want social transformation in order to ensure the full functioning of the Ukrainian language throughout the country. In incomplete three years between the KIIS surveys (September 2014 and May 2017), the share of supporters of the Ukrainian language spreading grew among those polled by 11 percentage points (up to 61% in Ukraine, on average), while the share of supporters of the raising the status of the Russian language has decreased by 9 percentage points. A quarter of those who communicate mainly in Rus- sian spoke for the necessary support to the Ukrainian language. The share of those who believe that civil service representatives throughout Ukraine should speak Ukrainian with citizens who turned to them in Ukrainian increased by 9 percentage points (up to 70%). And the share of respondents who believe that service providers should also respond in Ukrainian, increased by 19 percentage points (from 35% to 54%). In the eastern and southern regions, more than a third of respondents expressed this opinion, which is twice as high as it was three years ago [41]. Comparison of the results of modern (2017) sociological research- es of the sociological service of the O. Razumkov Center conducted since 2005 testifies to significant changes taking place in the language structure of society, in the attitude of citizens to the status of Ukrainian and Russian 41 languages, in citizens’ understanding of national identification, in attributive features Ukrainian citizen, etc. The understanding of the Ukrainian nation as a civil society (to 56%) strengthened, the support of the idea of its purely ethnic condition (to 19%), the level of support of its «cultural» understanding (17%) has weakened. At the same time, 73% of respondents believe that every citizen of Ukraine, regardless of his ethnic background, must know the Ukrainian language, as well as the background history and culture of Ukraine. Mostly, the civic understanding of the essence of the national community is combined with the support of the need for the Ukrainian cultural component as an attributive feature of every citizen [27]. The language situation, like the entire ethnic-cultural sphere of society, largely depends on language policy in education. Despite criticism by many activists of the linguistic component of the reform of education adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, we believe that in the eastern regions the new language policy of the state in the system of national education will lead to positive results. They are necessary from the point of view of national interests, in particular to increase the level of national security. For decades, in the schools of Crimea and Donbas regions, the study of the Ukrainian language at the school was organized in such a way that a large number of graduates (certified in the Ukrainian language) were not able to communicate in Ukrainian, spoke it at an extremely low level, too limited. Accordingly, non-integrative or partial integration of young people and older age groups into Ukrainian spiritual culture (in particular, in its information field) was maintained, the alienation of a large part of citizens from Ukrainian ethnicity, from the primary Ukrainian ethnic rice was supported. Under the condition of implementing a new approach to the organization of the study of the state language by schoolchildren where teaching is carried out today in Russian or in the languages of other ethnic minorities, the number of graduates of schools that do not speak fluently or speak Ukrainian language only passively will be substantially reduced. Minister of Education of Ukraine L.Grinevich assumes that children of mi- nor ethnic groups will study in their native language at junior high school and partially in middle and senior school [83]. The practical implementation of such an approach will definitely contribute to overcoming the barrier of psycho-emotional, communicative, linguistic and cultural alienation of a significant part of the youth of Ukraine controlled by the territory of Do- netsk and Luhansk regions from non-russified or russified to a much lesser extent by parts of Ukrainian society. 42 The most noticeable ethnic-structural changes during the war years (among those confirmed statistically) occurred in the relative number of students of the country’s health-care center studying the occupier’s language. In the 2016/2017 academic year, this was 4.7 percentage points less than in the 2014–2015 academic year (excluding students from the occupied territories). According to our calculations, according to the statistics [52], the central and northern regions of the country became the leaders as for this indicator: Kyiv (students studying Russian decreased by 11.3 percentage points), Khmelnytsky oblast (region) – 9.0 pp, Vinnytsya region (9.0 pp), Kirovogradska oblast (8.6 pp), Sumy region (8.2 pp), Cherkasy region (8.1 pp), Zhytomyr region (7.0 pp), Chernihiv region (6.7 pp), Kyiv oblast (6.4 pp). Among the southern regions – Kherson region (decrease was 5.7 pp). In the rest of the southern and south-eastern oblasts, as well as in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions not occupied by Russia, the decrease in the share of students studying the Russian language was insignificant (0.12 and 1.5 percentage points respectively, according to parts of two areas). Approximately 9 out of 10 students of the free part of the Donetsk region continue to study in Russian or study Russian as a school subject. In the western and central regions, the language of the aggressor is still being studied, roughly by 1 student out of 10; In Kharkiv, Dniprop- etrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions there are usually 7–8 students from 10 studying it, in Odessa – 8–9 per each dozen, almost 4 in Mykolaiv, and almost 5 out of 10 in Kherson (about half). We see that there is a need for systematic coordinated work of the state and an active part of society on the rapid and steady increase of the prestige of the Ukrainian language and the effective introduction into the public practice of a number of regions among the population, including Donetsk and Luhansk. The appointment of those who do not speak state language fluently and publicly demonstrate this to ministerial posts or heading posts of regional and district ad- ministrations slows down the positive ethnic-structural changes necessary for the successful transformation of the entire so-called «Ukrainian socialist nation» for a self-sufficient original up-to-date Ukrainian nation. The current government must correct the mistakes made during the period of independence, provide an effective, scientifically grounded policy with intensive ethnic-structural changes that are useful for the whole society. We consider contemporary socio-historical conditions to be favorable for a tangible complex strengthening of positive ethnic-structural tendencies in the southern and eastern regions, as well as in the free from the 43 invader parts of 2 oblasts. It should be done in a democratic way. For the stable development of Ukrainian society, in order to increase the level of national security, the ethnic-structural trends inherent in the central and northern regions today should not be scarce in the south and south-east. Instead, they must finally become insurmountable there, and lead to irre- versible changes. Options for the ethnic-cultural future of the occupied parts of Ukraine. Today we cannot know whether these new tendencies of ethnic-cultural changes will last long, begin the eighth stage of the ethnic-cultural history of the region, or remain just a short episode. There are different assumptions regarding the future of the occupied territories. If unitary Ukraine regains its control over the entire territory of Donbas regions, then it’s quite possible to resume previous tendencies which were formed after the collapse of the USSR. Ethnic-cultural changes can unfold according to the scenario which is common in adjacent regions (Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zapor- izhzhia) when either the share of ethnic Russians in the population or the share of Russian native speakers among all inhabitants of the regions sub- sides. If European «peace-makers» force the Ukrainian government into legitimizing occupation-collaborative administration through «elections», then the specified tendency will be preserved, while the possibility of political and legal, juridical execution of future absorption of this territory by Russia will keep growing. Political expert H. Kukhaleishvili doubts that Russia will play fair and square in Donbas. In his opinion, these regions will become «the strong- hold for Russian chauvinists and former terrorists». The Kremlin will suc- ceed in keeping them in power «for political tension on Kyiv. Even under the conditions of peace, the pro-Russian Donbas will leave the possibility of its independence open as Bankova actions differ from the Kremlin’s vision» [44]. Let’s hope for another state of things. The Ukrainian society has not yet formed a consolidated position on the desirable policy of Kyiv regarding the «DNR» and «LNR» created by Russians and their state-political future. A sociological survey carried out in the summer of 2017 [78] showed that 55% of the respondents see the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in their pre-war state of being, whereas the possibility of «giving these territories a higher level of autonomy in Ukraine» is assumed by every fifth respondent, for the independent existence of these entities, and about 9% of the respondents supported the 44 idea of their admission to Russia. Support of proposals to grant more rights to non-controlled territories tends to decrease. In the eastern regions of the country, this position is inherent in the largest share of respondents – 28%. However, supporters of the idea that these territories must preserve their pre-war status of a part of Ukraine prevail as a relative majority. About 70% of the surveyed citizens believe that it is possible to reach peace on Donbas, but only 18% agree to take any actions for the sake of peace. Not all compromises are acceptable for the vast majority of respondents. It’s hard to make any forecast regarding the Crimea as well. Howev- er, we can confidently say that under occupation, a part of Crimean Tatars will decrease much slower than that of ethnic Ukrainians. The key Crime- an ethnic-cultural trend of 2014–2016 will remain the same. The growth of ethnic Russians’ share due to migration and ethnic assimilation of some Ukrainians and other ethnic components will remain unchanged at least till the end of its occupation. The delay or unwillingness of legislative provision of the Crimean Ta- tars (the Crimean people) with the status of indigenous people of Ukraine was useful for Russian occupiers. Ukraine must continue legislative provision of the Crimean Tatars’ status of indigenous people. From the scientific point of view, such ethnic communities are considered indigenous to some territory in the historical and ethnological sense that were being formed in it, originated, or at least underwent ethnologically crucial changes at the main stage of their ethnic genesis. Sometimes such ethnic communities are considered to be indigenous to some territory that, although they have not being formed in it, «have deeply rooted» in the local physical and spiritual soil after their long presence there [86, p. 105]. According to such historic-ethnological view, today the indigenous people of Ukraine are presented by Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar ethnic groups. Karaites and Krymchaks can also be determined as such, though with a certain precaution. Other ethnicities which are currently present in Ukraine are arrivers and have their historical and ethnic homelands outside Ukraine. At different time periods, representatives or entire groups of already formed ethnic communities migrated to Ukraine (in terms of its modern territory and borders) [85], to ethnic territories of the indigenous peoples of Ukraine (quite frequently, to scantily populated areas or cleared from indigenous people). 45 Speaking about the status of indigenous people, they mean, first of all, formally acknowledged (or awarded) in the international rights and national legislation political and legal status of certain ethnic communities that need special or additional rights. This need is caused by their unfavorable economic and social conditions comparing to ethnic majority or other segments of the society and have a number of obstacles on the way of preserving national uniqueness, social movement, economic growth, and implementation of their rights. The indigenous status is given to those nations that live a tribal life, whose social, cultural, and economic conditions differ from other groups, and whose state of affairs is fully or partially regulated by their own traditions, customs, or special legislation; to the nations who are descendants of those who inhabited the country, or the geographical region which includes this country, during its conquest, colonization, or during the establishment of existing state borders, and who, regardless of their legal status, preserve some or all their social, economic, cultural, or political institutes. Economic, social, and cultural rights of indigenous peoples are guaranteed in different international and national documents, which include the statutory «UN Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples» (adopted by resolution 61/295 of the General Assembly on September 13, 2007) [17]. Cultural rights contain protection of traditional and religious practices, languages, sacred places, cultural legacy, intellectual property, oral and traditional history, etc. Article No.3 is especially important, as it guarantees the right for self-determination of indigenous people. There is a number of other rights of indigenous people important for Ukraine due to the occupation of the Crimea, namely the collective right for living in freedom, peace, and security as indigenous people; allowance or prohibition of military activity in their terrains; determination of priorities and development of strategies for exploring or using their lands and other resources; right for quick settlement of conflicts and controversies with states or other parties, and also for effective means of legal defense in case of any violation of individual and group rights. It was as early as in 1996 that the rights of indigenous people were considered in the Constitution of Ukraine [35. p. 141]. However, statutory and regulatory provision of the status and rights of indigenous peoples of Ukraine was a very slow process. The occupation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation accelerated it. In a month after the beginning of the occupation (03/20/2014), the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the 46 Regulation «On the Claim of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as for the guarantees of the Crimean Tatars’ rights in Ukrainian state» [13. p. 581], which was approved by 283 deputies. Crimean Tatars were recognized to be the indigenous people of Ukraine; they are guaranteed the protection and realization of their indispensible right for self-determination in sovereign and independent Ukrainian state. Mejlis is recognized to be the plenipotentiary authority of the Crimean Tatars, and the executive power authority of Ku- rultai (the supreme representative body of the Crimean Tatars). From the historical-ethnological perspective, all modern nations of the world are indigenous to some territories. However, in the political and legal sense, only several percent of the global population belong to indigenous peoples today. Ukrainians, Frenchmen, Germans, Chinese, Japanese, and many other ethnic groups don’t have any need granting themselves the indigenous status in their own countries, where they are historically aboriginal, have formed political self-determination when building sovereign independent states, constitute political avant-garde and the majority of citizens; have names cognate of the names of their countries. Since the establishment of the sovereign Ukrainian unitary state, the Ukrainian ethnos has the highest political and legal status which ethnic communities can have both – in the entire territory of Ukraine and in its part—the Crimean peninsula. According to the formed criteria of the international law and historical-ethnological features, we should grant the status of indigenous people of Ukraine not only to the Crimean Tatars but also to the Karaites and to the Krymchaks. All of them are rooted in the Crimean part of Ukraine and require this status for strengthening their guarantees of future existence. Ukrainian state is responsible for the destiny of the indigenous people.

* * * Comparison of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the factors that led to consistent ethnic and cultural changes in the past, as well as with the main stages of the ethnic-cultural history of the region, testifies to the existence of a strong cause-and-effect relationship between wars, the change of the political entity controlling the territory, and the ethnic-cultural situation and the directions of its changes. The loss of a certain ethnic-political subject of real military control over the territory led to forced migrations and the direction of ethnic processes in a favorable or acceptable course for new rulers. 47 The dominant position of the Russian language and culture, achieved in the conditions of the Russian Empire and the USSR on the territory of many regions of Ukraine by discriminating Ukrainian nationality by the Russian government, was not overcome after the collapse of the USSR. However, in post-colonial Ukraine, Ukrainian ethnic identity began to spread among the population of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (though slower than in other regions of the country) and there formed significant parts of the linguistically and culturally rushed population. There improved ethnic self-awareness of Ukrainians in the Crimea and the functioning of the Ukrainian language in state administration, education, mass media, legal proceedings and some other spheres of social life became noticeably strengthened. Si- multaneously with a decrease in the number of Ukrainian-speakers considering Ukrainian to be their native language, there was an increase in the number of people speaking Ukrainian fluently. After the political defeat of Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Re- gions, a new wave of ethnic renaissance in Ukraine was expected, in particular the introduction of the state language into the public practice. Never- theless, the occupation by the Russian Federation of part of the Ukrainian territory destroyed post-imperial trends in ethno-cultural development, led to the restoration of the old (the times of the USSR) direction of changes in the ethnic structure of the population, narrowing the spheres of the functioning of the Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and other languages, and put even the ethno-cultural development in the situation of uncertainty even in the short term perspective. In the occupied part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, there are sufficient grounds to reasonably assume that the share of ethnic Ukrainians will be reduced, and the share of ethnic Russians will increase. And in the Crimea this presupposition is confirmed by the results of the population census. Occupation by the Russian Federation of the Ukrainian territory has increased and deepened the differences in ethno-cultural development and changes in linguistic situations between the main part of Ukraine, on the one hand, and Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the Crimean peninsula on the other. Due to the Russia’s occupation and its determined language, cultural, information policy in 2014, the language situation, which was controlled by Russia and local collaborators in the Donetsk region, began to change the trend radically. We do not have a complete view of those changes, but the trends are clear. The language situation is changing in a direction opposite to the tendencies characteristic of the linguistic sit- 48 uation on the part of the region free from the invader. The functioning of the Ukrainian language in the public sphere is quickly reduced to nothing. There are reasonable grounds for assuming a decrease in the level of knowledge of the Ukrainian literary language, and an increase in the proportion of people who do not speak Ukrainian fluently consider themselves to belong to the Russian ethnic group. De-occupation of that part of the region is a necessary (but, of course, insufficient) condition for the termination of the process of disappearance of the Ukrainian language out of use. Two factors play a key role in the development of the ethno-cultural situation in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by Ukraine. 1. Actualization of national self-consciousness, patriotic feelings, increase of the level of national (probably, also ethnic) consolidation. 2. Migration flow of temporary and permanent population from territories occupied by Russia, which in general has certain differences in ethno-cultural characteristics in comparison with the local population of the regions of arrival. Naturally, among the internally displaced persons from Donetsk, Makiivka, Gorlivka, Luhansk and other occupied cities, there is a relatively large share of ethnic Russians, citizens who do not speak Ukrainian fluently, atheists and supporters of the Russian Orthodox Church. Among the population living in areas free from the aggressor, there is a slow improvement in socio-political and legislative conditions for the introduction of the Ukrainian language into public practice (on radio, on television, in education, in cultural institutions, in local authorities, etc.), as well as signs of a slight expansion of the real functioning of the Ukrainian language and the continuation of the post-colonial, post-Soviet tendency to increase the share of ethnic Ukrainians, especially among children and young people. The totality of the facts known to us about the linguistic situation in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are free of «lost» strang- ers from Russia suggests that the political consolidation of Ukrainian citizens on the basis of protection of national interests, territorial integrity, sovereignty, cultural identity has not yet reached the level, sufficient for a rapid change in linguistic behavior of a large proportion of the population, massive changes in linguistic or linguistic-cultural self-identification. Yet, today there really are the necessary preconditions for the movement in the all-Ukrainian direction not only by means of propagation of Ukrainian ethnic consciousness, but also by means of changing the linguistic behavior 49 of the tsarist times or the Ukrainian SSR’s model. There is the lack of only additional incentives and, above all, political will. In the main territorial part of Ukraine not occupied by Russia Russian aggression led to the acceleration of political consolidation of most of the nation on a single historiographical platform based on value-orientation, world-view, civilization and foreign policy. Ethnic and cultural distancing from Russia and from the Russian population has intensified, distancing from Russian and Russian culture has intensified to a lesser extent. There is an increase in the level of national solidarity, the ability to social mobility and self-organization in critical conditions, internal cohesion, and sacrifice for national interests, honor and dignity. In this process, all ethnic components of Ukrainian society are involved. Unfortunately, present Ukrainian authorities had been keeping legislative norms adopted during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych for quite a long period of time. It was not until 2016 that there was accorded practical support to Ukrainian language by introducing quotas for the Ukraine- made and Ukrainian-speaking music product. Analyzing the present situation with television and radio, as well as the language structure of Ukrainian content web resources, this step was not enough for effective support. In 2017, the following steps were taken in this direction. Obviously, Russian aggression was preventing the introduction of the Ukrainian language into active use by public, and even some ministers do not speak it freely. In the up-to-date set of national problems a significant role has been played and is still being played by the peculiarities of the ethnic composition of the Crimean population and the Donetsk–Overazov region of Ukraine. We believe that these peculiarities were important factors for the aspirations and efforts of certain political forces to oppose the region’s people to the main part of the Ukrainian nation, to form and spread the mood of the language-cultural alienation of the region from Ukrainians, to fuel the political separation of the regions of the Donbas and re-subordinate it to the Russian Federation. Among the actions Ukrainian authorities must take to prevent the formation of a favorable environment for the hybrid warfare in the Ukrainian society by neighboring countries, it is critically important to implement a determined and consistent policy of introducing the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian spiritual culture into the public practice of those social stratum of the population and those territorial groups of the Ukrainian nation that have 50 suffered the most from linguistic, cultural and ethnic russification. This must be done respecting the principles of democracy. There should also be modernization, systematization and deepening of the Ukrainian-speaking component in the national system of education and upbringing.

SOURCES AND LITERATURE

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Vol. 122(7). – pp. 112–118. 81. Філатова Н.С., Чирков О.А. Мовна ситуація у Донецькій області під час російської агресії у контексті сучасни етнокультурни тенденцій // Етнічна історія народів Європи. Nataliia Filatova, Oleg Chyrkov. (2017). Language situation in the Donetsk region during Russian aggression in the context of modern ethnocultural trends. Ethnic history of the peoples of Europe. Vol. 53. –pp. 165–176. 82. Чабарай Г. Реформа невдоволення. Як в Україні та за кордоном відреагували на мовне питання Закону про освіту. Chabaray G. Reform discontent. Both in Ukraine and abroad responded to the language issue of the law on education [online]. Available at: http//tyzhden.ua/ News/199617 83. Чирков О. Головні етнокультурні зміни людності на території Донецько-Приазовського краю від найдавніши часів до сучасності: спроба узагальнюючої оцінки // Переяславський літопис: зб. наук. статей. Chyrkov, O. (2015). Major Ethnocultural Changes of Population in the Ter- ritory of Donetsk-Near-Azov Area from the Oldest Times till Today (An Attempt of the Generalized Evaluation). Pereiaslav Litopys, (8), pp. 55–65 [online]. Available at: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Perlit_2015_8_10. 84. Чирков О. Етнічний чинник в агресії Російської Федерації проти України: етнокультурна історія південно-с ідни українськи земель і сучасні маніпуляції Кремля // Агресія Росії проти України: історичні передумови та сучасні виклики: колективна монографія. Chyrkov O. Ethnic factor in aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine: ethno-cultural history of South-Eastern Ukrainian lands and the manip- 60 ulation of the Kremlin. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine: historical background and modern challenges: collective monograph. (2016). Author.: p. Hai-Nyzhnyk etc. Kyiv: MP «Lesia»/ pp. 109–130. 85. Чирков О. Зовнішня міграція – головна причина наявності етнічно неукраїнської людності в сучасній Україні // Дзеркало тижня. Україна. Chyrkov, O. (2002). External Migration as the Key Reason of Ethnically Non- Ukrainian People in Modern Ukraine [online]. Dzerkalo tyzhnia. Ukraina, (3), Jan. 25. Available at: http://gazeta.dt.ua 86. Чирков О. Корінні народи (корінні етноси) // Україна – Етнос. Науковий понятійно-термінологічний словник-довідник з етнологічни та дотични до ни проблем українознавства. Chyrkov, O. (2006). Indigenous People (Indigenous Ethne). Ukraine – Eth- nos. Scientific Conceptual-Terminological Thesaurus on Ethnological and Related Ukrainian Studies Problems. Kyiv, p. 105 87. Чирков О. Розвиток етнічної структури населення України впродовж останнього десятиріччя (1989–1998 рр.) // Історія України. Chyrkov, O. (1999). The development of the ethnic structure of the population of Ukraine during the past decade (1989–1998). The History Of Ukraine. Vol. 42(154). pp. 6–8. 88. Чирков О. Сучасні тенденції розвитку етнічної структури населення України та її регіонів // Українознавство: Календар-щорічник / Інститут українознавства Київського університету. Chyrkov, O. (1998). Modern Tendencies in Development of the Ethnic Struc- ture of Ukraine’s Population and Its Regions. Ukrainoznavstvo [Ukrainian Studies]: Annual Calendar. Kyiv: Ukrainian Studies Institute of Kyiv University, pp.45–52. 89. Чирков О. Центр ваги поросійщени українськи мас пересувається на Донбас. (Російщення українців Донецької і Луганської областей за 13 років – від початку 1989 р. до кінця 2001 р. за статистичними даними.) // Українознавство. Ч. 1. Chyrkov, O. (2005). Gravity Center of the Russified Ukrainian Masses Moves on to Donbas. (Russification of Ukrainians in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions during 13 Years: From Early 1989 till Late 2001 according to Statistical Data). [online]. Ukrainoznavstvo [Ukrainian Studies], Vol. 1, pp. 225–228. Available at: http://www. ualogos.kiev.ua/fulltext.html?id=1690 90. Чирков О.А. Сучасні та можливі майбутні зміни етнічної будови людності Кримського півострова // Збірник наукови праць НДІ українознавства. 61 Chyrkov, A. (2005). Modern and Possible Future Changes of the Ethnic Structure of the Population in the Crimean Peninsula. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats NDI ukrainoznavstva. [Collected Scientific Works of RIUS], Vol. VII, Kyiv. pp. 20–42. 91. Чу ліб Т.В. Донеччина та Луганщина – козацькі землі України (VІ– VІІІ ст.) / Відп. Ред. В. Смолій; НАН України. Інститут історії України [ukr]. Chukhlib, T., Smoliy, V., ed. (2014). Donetsk and Luhansk Regions Are Cos- sack Lands of Ukraine (16th–18th Centuries). Kyiv: NAS of Ukraine. Institute of His- tory of Ukraine, 105 p. 92. Шевчук-Клюжева О. Українське усне мовлення Донеччини [ukr]. Shevchuk-Kluzheva O. (2015). Ukrainian oral speech in Donetsk Region. Vinnytsia: Publishing House «Tvory», 162 p. 93. Школи «ДНР»: як вивчають українську історію і мову [ukr]. Schools in «DPR»: How to study history of Ukraine and Ukrainian language [online]. Available at: http://novynarnia.com/2016/10/27/shkoli-dnr-yak-vivchayut- ukrayinsku-istoriyu-i-movu/ 94. Языковые квоты на радио: Сюмар рассказала о позитивны результата [rus.]. Language quotes on the radio: Siumar described the positive results [online]. Available at: https://newsone.ua/ru/yazykovye-kvoty-na-radio-syumar-rass- kazala-o-pozitivnyx-rezultatax Leonid CHUPRIY

MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONTESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF TRAINING CHALLENGES 63 Chapter 2

Leonid CHUPRIY

(Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the Department of Sociology and Political Science of the National Aviation University, Kyiv)

MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONTESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF TRAINING CHALLENGES*

Theoretical and practical approaches to the development of military-political conflicts in modern globalization realities In many regions of the world intensified inter-state rivalry at the regional and local levels, and thus growing the risk of a significant number of violent conflicts, most of which took the form of armed confrontation. Local wars and military conflicts of different scale and intensity, mostly permanent form of a military solution to political, territorial, ethnonational, religious, economic and other contradictions, constitute one of the major threats to national and international security. New, global era in human history, has set new tasks in studying of the main trends of the evolution of military-political conflicts. One of them concerns the identification of a seemingly long time and finally resolved by science questions such as definition of war, armed conflicts, military aggression, the causes that generate them, the goal that put the initiators of the confrontation. For Ukraine, this issue is particularly relevant because we must clearly define the features of the conflict in which the Ukraine and outline ways to overcome it [9]. Therefore, we should first analyze the essential characteristics of concepts such as “armed conflict”, “military conflict”, “war” [44, p.265]. Іn the classic sense, armed conflict is, first of all, war. It is a fundamental socio-political phenomenon, the conceptualization of an entity which was engaged in many well-known social scientists, political scientists, and philosophers.

* Translation from Ukrainian: Alexander Kislyuk. 64 Wide popularity, both among politicians and scientists is the determination of K. von Clausewitz, according to whom the war – a major conflict of interest, which are regulated by the blood, an act of violence intended to compel an opponent to fulfill our will [17, p.35]. From the point of view of its political nature, the war – “certanily irrational action that occurs on be- half of the state of a community and which is based on political goals” [17, p.28]. By this time most of the authors in understanding the war based on this definition. In foreign scientific literature is quite common interpretation of the war, proposed 1982 by American researchers D.Singer and M.Smalley. Ac- cording to him, war should be considered “any sustained clash between military forces of two or more governments (interstate war) or between the regular army and some other (at least one) armed group (intrastate war), the number of victims among which are more than one thousand people throughout the collision” [54, p.87]. Scientists at the Washington Institute for the world also, there are three formal signs of war: involvement in the conflict least one of the regular army; the existence of inevitable logic circuit in the sequence of events of the armed conflict, the minimum losses of 1,000 or more lives for the year. In most modern interpretations of the war for the main symptom of take organized, collective armed violence. Many theories also remind us that war does not happen without mass casualties; they help to distinguish war from personal enmity between individuals. However often in definitions of war only give you one or a number of factors that allow us to identify this socio-political phenomenon. Among them: the duration of the collision of military forces; the regular army; the number of minimum human losses. Thus questions remain: What should be the length “collision”, so it can be called a war? What should be the minimum number of casualties? For example, the armed conflict in Northern Ireland is not considered a war for insufficient number of victims: throughout the conflict (over 30 years) from a violent death killed about 4 thousand people (military and civilians) [43, p.16]. Finally, how to qualify as a terrorist and anti-terrorist operations, often abbreviated war? Some of the authors strive to give a broader interpretation of the war, in fact, identify it with strife, hatred, violence. In particular, a variation 65 of the present war considered “cold war”, in the chain of wars also list the “currency”, “credit”, “price”, “customs”, “technology”, etc. This is largely due to the fact that both in public opinion and in the views of new researchers obtained relatively recently, forms of confrontation contain elements of strategy and tactics of the war, aimed at defeating the enemy. Some researchers are not satisfied with the well-known formula K. von Clausewitz about war as the continuation of politics by violent means. The fact is that today, the arsenal of such funds “violence” is much bigger: along with the classic weapon in the war increasingly apply political, economic, financial, information, secret funds. In particular, in the US there have been numerous studies concerning the development of peaceful means of achieving goals is extremely decisive armed struggle. Unfortunately, modern scientists are still failed to develop a common approach to understanding the concept of war is adequate to the current conditions. Existing definitions of excessive operating and can not serve as an effective tool for the analysis of new phenomena in this in this area of social interaction. Some help to researchers in the identification of “state of war”, as it seemed, was given the fact “Declaration of war” by subjects who intended to fight. Yes, more, Grotius argued that “the Declaration of a state of war” is a necessary condition that must be met before the war. “The rule” of G.Gro- tius was determined in order to eliminate the fact of a sudden attack of one state by the second” [11, p.56]. The Declaration of war was useful as a “last ultimatum”, which aimed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. But in the times of Grotius there were no General obligations regarding such Declara- tion and history has known many occasions when it was not done. In the future, with the development of the speed of deployment of military action, was the prevailing opinion about the mandatory “Declara- tion of war” because of rapid military attack were tantamount to treason”. Therefore the Hague agreement of 1907 included the point on obligatory state of “Declaration of war”. According to this agreement, hostilities should not begin without prior and clear warnings in the form of a Declara- tion of war or ultimatum” [51, p.133]. Since the “Declaration of war” became law, they also defined specific rules regarding its shape. Since the end of XIX century “Declaration of war”, even done unilat- erally, was sufficient to speak of a “state of war”. Such a Declaration was a 66 legal instrument, not just a “challenge that could be accepted or rejected.” However, powerful States sometimes ignore such declarations, even if decided and continued military action [17, p.11]. However, by this time, under international law, in order to take military action, the government should declare a “state of war”, a military or state of emergency, which is introduced along with the announcement of a state of war. In particular, in Ukraine a “state of war is declared, when an attack of another state or group of States, of aggression, where there is an imminent threat of armed attack of another state” [9]. At the same time, under international law, war is an armed conflict between two or more States. In the case of a Declaration of war terminated diplomatic relations between the warring parties (the States). That is, wars are subjects of international law. As can be seen from the definition, it includes other “neighboring” with the war, the concept of “armed conflict”, scientific interpretation which also causes certain difficulties. For example, some military experts, in particular, Ruban L. S. believes that “armed conflict” can be taken in any conflict involving weapons, political motives there may be and are not present. In general, in recent years, new forms of conflict, not political in their nature and reasons, them causing. Armed gangs, whose members are linked relatively random connections, a little concerned about the pursuit of political power indiscriminately struggle for direct control over the means of production. The form of these military operations against the merchant ships of any state adopts the maritime piracy that is common in South-East Asia; but the pirates also have the purpose of enrichment, not any political purpose. In Afghanistan, the various tribal leaders waging an armed struggle with each other in order to gain political power, as control over the territories, which are used as plantations for the cultivation of narcotic raw materials. In this regard, the more legitimate is the notion of “military conflict”. In contrast to the “armed conflict” the “military conflict” is characterized by the obligatory presence of political motives in the use of weapons. Military conflict – is the highest degree of aggravation of contradictions between the subjects of military-strategic relations and at the same time is a form of conflict resolution, using a limited scale of the armed forces (military units). The nature of military conflict is the continuation of politics by means of armed violence [10, p.10]. 67 To military conflicts include various military incidents, military actions and other armed clashes minor scale (low intensity) with regular or irregular units, in which act a formal Declaration of war missing [28, p.24]. Military conflict is often seen as a form of national-ethnic, religious and other contradictions with the use of armed violence in which state or States are not moving in a particular state, defined as war. Researchers share military conflicts at the interstate and intra-state conflicts. For example, in national military conflicts, military operations are conducted, on the one hand, the regular armed forces (government forces), a other irregular armed groups. The front line in its classical form, as a rule, absent. Armed groups use guerrilla methods in the fight – ambushes, surprise attacks on enemy units, a violation of the communications. Signif- icant widespread diversionary and terrorist attacks. Recently a number of researchers often use the term “limited military conflict”, these include conflicts associated with the change of status of a particular site and affect the interests, including the leading States of the world and are conducted with the most modern means of warfare. In a limited military conflict the number of parties that are fighting is from 7 to 30 thousand people; up to 150 tanks, 300 armored combat vehicles; 10–15 lung (including combat training) aircraft; up to 20 helicopters [21, p.43]. However, quite wide, a frequently arbitrary use of the term “armed conflict” inevitably raises the question of the boundaries of this definition and its correlation with the term “war”. For example, A.P.Tsygankov believes that since the content of the term “armed conflict” includes any situation, regardless of its legal qualification, in which two or more parties confront each other with weapons in hand”, then, depending on the circumstances of use of a particular concept. This, of course, does not clarify the essence of the problem [42, p.27]. It should be noted that the problem of the relation of the concepts of “armed conflict”, “military conflict” and “war” provoked a lively discussion among scholars. In the end, the decision was made apparent the importance of the “disengagement” of these definitions and on the need to develop “situational”, that is, a flexible approach to their identification. For example, in the 1990s, pp. the term “armed conflict” meant less than war,” and then it became “extended” because not all of the many armed conflicts that have occurred over the last decade, can be attributed to the category “war”. Armed conflict can be a may not be a war. 68 We should accept the fact that despite the prerogative of the researchers, these concepts are included in the arsenal of the armed struggle between people still require a certain boundary line, if they are used in contemporary political practice. However, the emphasis on the fundamental difference between them is not particularly effective, because it is not about the classification of forms of armed struggle, on a division of the same scale. The war, and any military conflict is a different degree of expression of an organized armed struggle, inevitably marked by massive bloodshed. In them enormous potential of destruction and demolition, they can kill humanity, life on Earth, to crush the planet itself. The experience of recent military conflicts (Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.), their beginning was marked by powerful air strikes and precision-guided missiles, designed to destroy the military-political leadership of the enemy, control points, knots of communication, economy, life-support systems of the population and force the enemy to surrender. Their characteristic features are: strong advantage to one party in total power, economy, military-technical and or- ganizational relations, media, coalition support, transience, and the like. Hence the importance of the shift of attention of scientists to identify truly new characteristics and peculiarities of modern forms of armed confrontation, as well as ways of their prevention. Today aktualisierte and the problem of finding a basis for internal differentiation of individual species of an armed confrontation. Thus, in the framework of traditional studies of war for a moral principle shared in a just war (defense of the national territory, national independence and sovereignty) and unfair (aggressive, aggressive). This separation for political purposes – for conquest and wars of national liberation. Scientists, in particular V.Serebryannikov, P.Tsygankov offer a range of criteria that include: a) assessment of the real political intentions and goals of participants in the war (conflict); b) the legal qualification of the actions of the parties (according to the UN Charter, international law); c) moral justification for the actions of the parties from the point of view of universal norms of humanity [42, p.28]. In our opinion, in connection with the aggravation of inter-ethnic conflicts, often a deliberate decision of the stakeholders, these classifica- tions are necessarily subjective and do not meet current realities. Depending on the type of participants, war is sometimes divided into classical and classical inter-state internal (civil) war. The civil war is 69 often characterized as an armed conflict of various social strata of society. In recent years this classification has been enriched with new types: “inter-state war, internal subversive action” and “internal war and external intervention” (Yugoslavia, East Timor, Iraq, Syria). However, some “internal” (e.g., in Lebanon in 1975, p.) and tribal wars (in Afghanistan in recent decades), where all parties are non-state actors, do not fit into this classification. Widely known is also a typology that includes: 1) classical territorial war whose purpose is conquest (settling) area (sometimes involves the subjugation of the population living on it); 2) success war (secession and the formation of an independent state); 3) irredentists war (for the reunification of the representatives of the divided ethnic groups, compactly living on territories of the neighboring States). At the direction of the hostilities distinguish between conventional war, aimed at the neutralization or destruction of the enemy’s military potential, and total war, in which military operations are conducted against enemy troops and against the population of his country [41, p.56]. The spread of international terrorism has forced doslyk y the last classification to allocate the so-called totalitarian war, in which actions are directed primarily or exclusively against the civilian population. Domestic authors draw attention to the typology constructed according to such basic characteristics, as the ways of warfare, according to which wars are divided into regular (classic); guerrilla and subversive, as well as contact and contactless war (or the war of the sixth generation and the “war on invisible” [41, p.57]. In the latter case we are talking about wars, there are practically no clashes, which is a latent enemy. Modern typology of wars quickly enriched for large-scale and particularly military-technical and strategic criteria: their arms; the symmetry or skewness (same or different); contact or infinity (with ground battles or not); covering all geographical areas or some of them; “rebellion-war” and others. Some authors emphasize “asymmetric warfare”, which are understood war between different types of social actors (e.g. state vs non-state actors), as well as armed conflicts in which enemies use various means of armed struggle. According to N.Khrustalyov, asymmetric is the conflict, the sides of which are different in type war. Vdovina to the classification 70 M.Khrustalev, wars are classified according to their nature and purposes. Types of wars by nature are divided into three types: 1) regular (fighting make regular military formations); 2) partisan (military action carried out guerrilla groups); 3) sabotage and terrorism (combat actions are carried out by terrorist groups). Goals also, there are three types: 1) of the Convention (the goal is the destruction of the military forces of the enemy); 2) conventional (goal is the destruction of the civilian population, however, allowed the use of weapons of mass destruction); 3) total (goal is the complete destruction of the enemy, including the civilian population) [40, p.64]. By definition of N.Khrustalyov, asymmetric conflict is a type of armed conflict, which involves the unequal relations, the asymmetry of the poten- tials of the opposing sides inherent in the current military-political situation in which: 1) the weak side resorts to the strategy different from the strategy a strong opponent, often uses unconventional methods of warfare (sabotage and terrorist tactics, move the fighting into the cities, using civilians and civilian infrastructure as shields, etc.) – the purpose of which is causing physical and psychological harm to achieve a political victory that involves the imposition on a stronger enemy is disadvantageous to current models of conflict, stretching its time frame; 2) strong side under conditions of an asymmetric confrontation is faced with several challenges (impossibility of observance of the principles and norms of international humanitarian law, pressure from the international community and media, inability to quickly solve strategic problems, etc) [40, p.64]. It should be noted that, despite the fact that all of these “qualifi- cations” wars are far from perfect, but they are also used in the military (armed) conflicts. In the framework of the typology of armed struggle, widespread terms such as “information warfare, cyber warfare, psychological war” [23, p.85]. The current common definition of “war” do not take into account these relatively new according to their strategic importance phenomena, which are reflected in the terms “informational war”, “cyberwar”. Such terms are at first glance somewhat “exotic” and their use of the media often 71 give them a metaphorical hue. Thus on the foreground often does not put forward the essential features of the war, a her methods. Sometimes the use of these terms becomes excessively categorical and obscures the fact that the main characteristic of war is still the armed struggle, the conduct of hostilities, accompanied by mass killings. Time ignore the fact that in such cases, describes not so much the phenomenon of war itself, how many new strategies and high-tech means, the use of which is intended to ensure the achievement of political goals without resorting to war. However, it would be imprudent to underestimate the heuristic potential that carry the above-mentioned terms, their importance for the understanding of evolution which are war in the modern history of mankind from the point of view of ways of managing them and their content. In our opinion, most of the uncertainty arises from the typology of the forms of the armed struggle for socio-political and geopolitical content. First, is stored previously adopted, the distribution of wars on the socio-political content into four main types – between States of opposite systems, within the liberal peace, for liberation from the foreign yoke and civilian. Secondly, the modern geopolitical classification includes global, regional, subregional and local wars. In recent years, as an independent type began to allocate a local war with the trend of escalating into a “regional war”. There are also attempts at identifying “new types of war” – global, international, inter-civilizational, civilizational.

Features of the typology of armed conflicts in the contemporary globalization realities The modern world development is determined by two inseparable processes of globalization and fragmentation. So, the intertwining of financial, commercial and industrial connections is not only a source of interdependence, but and its skewness, resulting in deepening of traditional forms of inequality and new ones, thereby exacerbating the causes of military conflicts. Globalization presents new, previously unknown possibilities of their management – from the point of view of resources (financial, technological) and the actors involved in the conflict. There are new types of military-political conflict, a type of known wars, becoming increasingly common such that were hardly noticeable and does not affect the overall view of security environment. 72 Moreover, it is very difficult is the question of socio-political groupings wars by types, connected with the peculiarities of the era, its characteristic contradictions. Some believe that with the onset of the XXI century started a new era. Others believe that although the location of power has changed, the military contradictions, typical of the XX century, persist and even tend to increase, but at the same time the new contradictions emerged on the foreground. In this connection it is expedient to allocate a number of facts that enable researchers to identify new theoretical and methodological approaches to the analysis of contemporary forms of armed struggle. At the present stage due to the simultaneous action of the processes of globalization and fragmentation takes place, the real transformation of the existing system of international relations. On the one hand, globalization itself objectively is the development of connections and relationships, intensify the exchange between the countries and peoples of the technological and cultural achievements that naturally serve the world. On the other hand, it becomes a generator of wars and armed conflicts as a result of the implementation of the policy of imposition of one peoples of other alien forms of existence. In any case, the global changes in the world community inevitably lead to a revision of the existing world balance of forces [7, 18]. According to experts, in the classical sense of war is inseparable from the state, which is a essential part of at least one of the subjects. The globalization of the world community has strengthened the integration processes not only in the economic and information spheres, but in the military. So, independent and visible force in addressing security issues become a global military monopoly, for example, NATO, which seek not only to implement foreign-policy objectives of the participating countries, but also to promote their interests in the process of strengthening its own corporate culture and value system. The majority of transnational military cor- porations have the security and intelligence potential and equipping they have security services that surpass the armies of many modern countries in terms of potential and equipment. In the context of globalization there is little that can be considered an “internal problem”, and some States have the potential for their independent decisions. According to experts, in modern conditions state-cen- tered model is an anachronism. States only exist as long as on the basis of their will arise a new global structure [49, p.21]. 73 The expansion of the list of threats and challenges, which experts call unconventional, to distinguish them from the classic threats of a military nature emanating from the national state, provide a broad base for informed intervention, including military. In addition, one of the factors of the use of armed forces in the modern world is the ability to project power in the shortest possible time in any region. In the modern era significantly intensified the process of the so- called “supranationalisation” – one of the most important trends of the modern world is the formation of several regional essentially “supra-national” communities characterised by cultural and historical heritage. In this regard, in the bowels of the European Union for several years there is discussion about the formation of a European defense identity and the necessity of creation of own armed forces, in fact supranational. It’s not just about creating a new form armed units and the reform of planning and management, but on change of system of motivation of the “man in uniform”. If earlier this man was called for service or was hired to defend the interests of a state, now there is a supranational institution with not only a system of values and ideals. Along with the globalization in the world community the active processes fragmentation or localization. It takes place the crushing of the subjects of contemporary world politics that radically changed the nature of global competition, which increases the risk of unauthorized armed clashes. So, in the XX century the international community has developed norms and procedures for advertising, conducting and terminating the war. However, with the emergence and strengthening of the “independence” of the new actors in world politics has increased the number of those who are not inclined to obey those rules. The majority of researchers emphasize the socio-political trends based on statistical analysis of many social factors: while the number of classical inter-state wars is decreasing, a growing number of intra-state conflicts and wars. Thus, the violence is growing, but in the form of local wars and armed conflicts – civil conflicts that have great destructive potential and characterized by extreme brutality. A manifestation of the fragmentation of the modern world on the other side of globalization becomes the destruction of the unity of the international strategic environment, accompanied by the “privatization wars”, “return to the new Medieval with the danger of unrestrained anarchy” [6, p.49]. 74 However, the most significant, if we talk about the essence of contemporary armed confrontation, is the fact that in the arena of world politics are gaining power and influence of illegitimate entities. This “mafia” associations, gangs, armed groups and the organization of international terrorism to achieve their goals not stop before any crime [37, p.12]. Special attention should be paid to the activities of Muslim terrorist organizations that are hiding behind Islamic slogans. It is incorrect to say that a single Western civilization, which unites Europe and North America are opposed to Islamic civilization, which formed a different system of criteria for the use of military force, “in the depths of the Islamic world is formed and the physical and spiritual force that came to the line of confrontation with the European world” [29, p.55]. First, it is hardly possible to talk about the undoubted unity of “West- ern civilization”, which continue to ravage significant political, economic and social contradictions [35, p.127]. Secondly, the terrorist activities of several extremist organizations has little to do with traditional Muslim values. In fact, it is a form of expression of a particular radical ideology and religious fundamentalism. Religious fundamentalists prefer bellicose style of politics, a political conflict is to the fundamentalists, the scene of the battle or war in which, in the end, the “faithful” should win, and for this it is all acceptable. One of the consequences of this militancy is a willingness to participate in any, often illegitimate, unconstitutional or radical political act. A typical justification of the fundamentalists is that they destroy the evil, fulfilling the wishes of God (Allah). Unfortunately, very often religious fundamentalism, in this case Isla- mism, is used by a small group of individuals seeking to subordinate politics to their political whims, ambitious and selfish purposes. At the same time, networked, widely distributed structure of the fundamentalist Islamist organizations stable and malusable. In addition, this structure greatly enhances its power through the connection to the infrastructure of the attacked side. It’s not just about Internet, banking networks, and transport of the European civilization. Operated training systems, technology policy and economic institutions “of the attacked side”, it is quite within the scope of the fundamentalist concept of waging war by means of the enemy. Strike force has a new weapon of mass destruction – suicide bombers. Production of this weapon does not require large factories, mines, 75 large warehouses, a resources for the production of “human-bombs” are not restricted and easily renewable. The Islamists choose centers, the destruction of which will be able to disrupt public life, to mislead public opinion, to arouse powerful negative emotions (fear, apathy). They believe that the harm does not have to hit the centers of government or military control, it was the aim in conventional wars, – the choice of the object of the attack does not matter. This object is the civilian population of the country. Traditional security structures of the type of inter-state armed alli- ances are not adapted to fight against fundamentalist threats. Moreover, inappropriate use of the power of the strongest military powers in the world and its allies in Iraq not only found to be ineffective, but also added a “new breath” of transnational terrorism. The existence of nuclear weapons to strike the answer loses meaning: there is no specific addresses, “party that threatens the” scattered among the civilian population in the vast territory. The enemy is not the government, it is not a compact entity. It is a network organization which covers half a continent, gradually penetrating European and North Ameri- can continents legal and illegal migration channels. Therefore, opportunities for appropriate target of the strike, organized through traditional military means, is completely insignificant. A new war have a complex multilevel structure, in terms of the composition of the conflicting parties. The sides of most intra-state conflicts are non-state actors, namely: organised crime, criminal gangs, religious movements, international charity organization, the Diaspora, the rebel group [53, p.18]. This diversification of the parties to the conflict reflects not only new opportunities and potential that got these actors because of objective processes in the international system, but the multilayer structure of contradictions lying at the heart of every modern conflict and the complexity of the task relative to their long-term settlement on the basis of the interests of all. Collision of large States and inter-state wars of the type First or Sec- ond world wars do become less likely, but the world is not becoming safer. In the modern world it is observing the growing of number of States, international institutions, various non-governmental organizations, international mafias and criminal groups, an increasing of economic power and political potential of big business, intensifying of mass migration flows, is increasing the impact of the major media on consciousness and behavior 76 of people. In this case, firstly, there are the extremely complicated relations between the heterogeneous actors; second, grow their ability to influence the international system to their advantage. In general, there is a complication of forms and rates of contemporary armed struggle and, consequently, the strategic environment of world politics. According to D.Near, the post-bipolar conflict takes the form of a triad based on “ interconnection of dynamics centralization, decentralization and transnationalization” [46, p.169]. In fact, the same is referring to J.Nai, saying that world politics has become “three-dimensional chess game”. In this “top Board” are the classic military aspects of relations between States; “average” – the international economy – the distribution of power is multipolar in nature; finally, the “bottom Board” – “at the level of transnational relations is power distributed widely and distributed between States and non-state actors” [22, p.37]. Regarding the relationship between the concepts, the domestic social discourse in general and political science specifically described in this context, a certain terminological chaos. Due to objective and subjective reasons, the problem of conceptualizing the concepts of both war and category “military-political conflict.” Reaching unanimity in defining these terms, replacing them comparable concepts, uncritical approach to the problem of mapping categories, the majority of researchers further con- fuse the situation. One of the ways the institution to a standstill is a legal approach without taking into account political, sociological and philosophical achievements, examples of which are the conclusions we analyzed the following two monographs. In international legal practice, the term “war” is gradually replacing the relatively new concept of “armed conflict”. The term “international armed conflict” was first formally applied in the Geneva Convention 1949. This provides the foundation to individual researchers, regardless of social and international contexts, be repelled by this category. To armed conflicts of an international character referred non-defensive wars in the exercise of a state or group of States the right to individual or collective self-defence against aggression; war of national liberation from colonial or dependent peoples who have risen arms in hand to fight for their national liberation and the formation of their own independent state. In the first case we can speak about the classic inter-state war, the main feature of which is participation in the conflict of two or more subjects of international law – States. And characteristics of armed conflict “defence”, 77 “the realization of the right to self-defence” has no qualifying values for the use of the term “war”. It can be aggressive war, but in compliance with the formal requirements specified above. Hard to call the US actions in Iraq a defensive war, however, the formal requirements of the announcement, etc. was performed. To this kind of conflict belongs the war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1990 pp.), the Falklands war (1982), clashes between Libya and Chad over the possession of territory Aozu (1973-1988.), the actions of South Africa in Angola (1975-1989.), the conflict in Kuwait (1991). M.Art- sybasov and S.Egorov noted that a sign “armed” is characterized by the use of weapons against the other belligerent. Therefore, the conflict cannot be called “armed” if you don’t use weapons. Without it, the concept of “armed conflict” loses its specificity. In turn, V.Dyachenko, N.Tsyurupa, P.Shumskybelieve that the term “armed conflict” is much broader than the concept of “war”. It covers “all types of organized forms of armed clashes of social forces both within the state and inter-state level, or between coalitions of States, which are characterized by a sufficient level of controlled violence, a peaceful transition from the militaristic ways of life with the inevitable wide violation of the rights and freedoms of the population” [14, p.33]. The authors attributed the concept of “war” to the kind of military conflict, and note that in its form it is a type of armed conflict. “Military conflict” is quite a broad concept that is used in official documents, scientific papers, and every day. According to domestic scientists, essential feature of the military conflict should be considered scale. According to the proposed basic typology of armed conflict, local war is their component – in contrast to international practice where armed conflict is seen as a stage of military conflict. In the broadest sense, military conflict is an extreme form of the collision parties concerned to resolve significant contradictions in the process of social interaction with the use of armed force. In a narrow sense – is a form of armed clashes with the use of regular and irregular armed groups, who do not go to war. “Armed conflict is an extreme form of conflict resolution between States with double-sided use of armed forces”. A.Klimenko “defines a military conflict as any armed conflict, a form of conflict resolution between States of different social groups with the use of military force” [39, p.6]. The same opinion is expressed by authors O.Gurzhiy and P.Pra- vec, on the notion of “war” and “armed conflict”. Military conflict covers all 78 forms of armed violence – from border and internal armed conflicts to world wars [12, p.8]. The most optimal for such formalities approach is the position of G.Perepelitsa, which offers a methodological use of the concept “military-political conflict,” arguing that, unlike military conflict, in the military-political conflict developed and resolved only the political contradictions. Military-political conflict and war have a common essential characteristic of the political contradiction, which is solved in the form of armed struggle by military forces. At the same time, in his opinion, these concepts are not identical. “War does not include the whole diversity of processes, forms and ways of resolution of conflicts” [27, p.256]. Political tensions in the war, as a rule, can only be solved in the form of armed struggle. “Without armed struggle, there is no war. A military-political conflict – is the struggle in different forms, where, of course, dominates the armed struggle, but the latter is not a mandatory point of conflict”. Mandatory moment of the military-political conflict, its essential feature is the use or threat of use of military force. Military-political conflict is a clash of political interests of policy actors using military force. G.Perepelitsa notes that the most typical form of military-political conflict is war [27, p.257]. War is a socio – political phenomenon, the main content of which is determined armed struggle. Representatives of various philosophical schools and directions see the causes of war in different ways – in economics, politics, human psychology, the lack of living space, resources, materials. Jean-Jacques Rousseau on this occasion, wrote in 1762 in his treatise “The social con- tract”: “the War is not a relationship between people, but between a States, and people become enemies by accident, as representatives of the state, not as human beings” [31, p.78]. The war can be considered: first, as a tool used by politicians to achieve their goals; second, as an armed struggle between two or more public entities (in particular, as the state organized entities), which have resistance to each other; thirdly, as a certain state of society in all its dimensions, which is characterized by the dominant armed violence and the cor- responding methods and means. War and the process of its emergence, at least subject to the action of the regularities of the policy (trends in policy), the armed struggle and society in their interrelation and interdependence. In modern conditions of military-political conflicts acquires a qualitatively new content as the content of the fighting, quantitative and qualitative indicators, and the type of contradictions that are resolved. At the 79 first level they are socio-political preconditions for the emergence of conflicts, separatism, territorial disputes, national mentality of a particular ethnic group, elementary struggle for power, economic disputes and so forth, which led to the increase in the number of both international and domestic threat of socio-political conflict, a recent, in most cases, escalated into local, regional conflicts involving coalitions of States against one state. Despite the ban on the use of military force in international relations, States often refer to it for dispute resolution and conflict situations that arise between them. This also applies to recent history, when over a long period of the cold war and global confrontation between the two su- perpowers. The world community is increasingly faced with new, unconventional forms of war and conflict, which have become a constant attribute of the modern stage of international relations. In many regions of the world intensified inter-state rivalry at the regional and local levels, and thus growing the risk of a significant number of violent conflicts, most of which took the form of armed confrontation. Local wars and military conflicts of different scale and intensity that have become a permanent form of a military solution to political, territorial, ethnonational, religious, economic and other contradictions, constitute one of the major threats to national and international security. From the foregoing it can be concluded that the concept of “armed conflict” in its significance and content is very close to the concept of “warlike conflict” where the essential characteristic is the notion of the “military power.” Therefore, the concept of “armed conflict” and “warlike conflict” is almost equivalent, the only difference is that the “armed conflict” focuses primarily on the process of bilateral use of military force [25, p.26]. Military-political conflict consists of two parts: political and military. On the one hand, it is a political contradiction, a struggle between social forces over political power. On the other hand, the armed struggle, the use of military force, acts as a mechanism of development and resolution of conflict. In a military (=warlike) conflict can be resolved the contradictions of different nature: economic, territorial, demographic, ethnic, national, religious, ideological, and criminal. The widest it can be defined as a dispute in which at least one organized party demonstrates a willingness to use armed violence to advance their interests in the troubled region. Political and military conflicts occur in various forms, ranging from minor collisions paramilitary forces and ending a fairly large-scale fight- 80 ing, which cover large areas. As a rule, the cause of these conflicts is the struggle for political power in the state, making their effect on the population is more tangible. A distinctive feature of contemporary conflicts is the strengthening of the role of external forces and their impact on and over the course of modern military-political conflicts, which continue to be the continuation of politics by military means, a tool for achieving political and geopolitical goals and the realization of economic interests. The onset of a multipolar world instead of bipolar in the context of globalization is accompanied by a surge of a number of conflicts, a characteristic feature of which is their transition from global to regional and local. Local wars and military conflicts are today one of the main threats to national and international security. So, on the agenda there was the problem of creating a holistic concept of the political-military conflict, which would allow to propose effective ways of its settlement. Begin its construction by identifying the essence of the military-political conflict. Therefore, the logic of G.Perepelytsa, political terror and political terrorism using the threat of military force can be attributed to the varieties of military-political conflicts [25, p.27]. Political terrorism is really similar to the political-military conflict of low intensity. The general is a violent framework and political setting, because the political-military conflict and political terrorism is a form of organized violence. But the terrorism we saw in New York, Paris, Brussels is deeply conspiratorial and anonymous organizations and groups, “a neb- ulous enemy,” the ghosts, scattered in the middle of the countries and around the world. It may not be “belligerent”, capable of conducting armed struggle against the troops avoided in principle. The war with the enemy with an army – is nonsense, because war, as Clausewitz argued, there is always the collision of two living openly opposing armed parties. Armed forces weakly contribute to the fight against conspiratorial terrorism. “Recent armed conflicts and local wars, says Professor Smolianuk, give grounds to assert that the socio-political reality are fighting a new sample, the qualitative difference of which is to achieve political goals without massive armies, but by applying the optimum combination of other forms of interstate violence, among which military violence is a major but not exclusive positions” [38, p.131]. The confirmation of this thesis of V.Smolianuk is the Palestinian-Is- raeli conflict, which has actually turned into a “war of terror”. We are talking about terrorism as a particular form of fighting as “a new kind of war” (the 81 expression B.Jenkins). In accordance with this position, the scope of the term “terrorism” can be included in the scope of the concept “war”. Ana- lyst M.Liebig strongly argues that terrorism isn’t a social phenomenon, it is a form of small war [4, p.88]. Political terrorism is closely linked with public policy stakeholders in the maintenance of international tensions in certain countries, and it is impossible without the involvement of appropriate institutional structures, which are aimed at destabilizing the situation in a particular country(region), discrediting his government, certain state and political leaders, incit- ing ethnic and religious hatred, the motivation of the population to disobe- dience to the state authorities and local self-government, training armed resistance and the involvement of local people in armed struggle, the implementation of other illegal actions by spreading false rumors and misin- formation. According to N.Onischuk, quoting J.Kennedy, that terrorism is a war of ambushes, not battles, the desire for victory through the exhaustion and disorganization of the enemy instead of retracting it into open war [24, p.36]. So here, at first glance, it seems that political terrorism has a lot in common with the guerrilla movement, given that they use similar methods of struggle. But there is a significant difference: the guerrilla struggle which G.Perepelitsa defines as a form of military-political conflict in which one of the parties fighting on the territory controlled by the enemy unlike terrorism, is not directed against the civilian population and therefore has some public support [27]. Guerrilla warfare is considered as the use of armed violence by illegal non-state organizations, which is aimed at all military installations. Terrorism, by contrast, sends armed violence mainly on non-military targets, because it is primarily designed for psychological effect, not a military-strategic victory. Thus, the distinction between terrorist and guerrilla warfare can be carried out by the following criteria: adherence to or neglect of the armed struggle, that is, the rules of armed conflict. In a broad sense, under armed conflict, the military experts understand any conflict with a use of weapons. But, as rightly pointed out by G.Perepelitsa, in armed conflict, such use of weapons is two-sided. In a narrow sense, in particular A.Antsupov, A.Shipilov believe that the armed conflict – the conflict between the medium and large social groups, in which the parties use of weapons (armed forces), except for the armed forces [3, p.34]. Domestic scientist, specialist in military security V.Bogdanovich de- 82 fines armed conflict as a form of resolving national-ethnic, religious, political, territorial and other contradictions with the use of armed violence both within the country and in adjacent state (s) in which the state does not go into a state of war [5, p.17]. His colleague O.Manachinsky argues that the types of military conflicts can be considered as border conflicts, military action, armed incidents and internal armed conflicts [16, p.42]. “Under the military conflict should be understood any clash, a confrontation, a form of conflict resolution between the conflicting parties with the use of military force to achieve certain political goals. Its main forms are conflicts of different scales (local, regional, global) in which States are not moving in a particular state characteristic of wars (armed incidents, border clashes and military actions). A special place belongs to the civil war, in which under certain conditions can develop internal armed conflicts. Be- cause, in contrast to the internal armed conflict, where political goals are self-determination and territorial jurisdiction, the assertion of the uniqueness of socio-cultural, national and religious values, the purpose of the civil war is the struggle for state power” [8, p.216]. V.Bogdanovich defines a military conflict as a clash of interests socio-political subjects with the use of military force. According to other researchers, under the military conflict is possible to understand the contradictions between the subjects of military-strategic relations, stressing the degree of aggravation of these contradictions and form their permissions (using a limited scale of armed forces) [5, p.17]. Other authors believe that a military conflict – a form of interstate conflict, which is characterized by clash of interests of the warring parties, who to achieve their purposes with varying degrees of limitations of military means [15, p.48]. Therefore, if we look into exclusively military conflicts, it is thus argued that the main parties to the conflict with military means is only the state. But for today, even international, conflicts it is not always the case. In the last quarter of the last century, the main subjects of warfare were: the state (coalition of States); national liberation movements and organizations; the ruling regimes (the Central government) and armed opposition groups in internal conflicts. Today more and more often direct participants in conflict are not only of the state in the unity of their institutions, a diverse social community, economic, criminal organizations, the peculiarity of which in the modern world is that they acquire a political character. The concept of military-political conflict should also relate such no- tions as occupation, humanitarian intervention, aggression. Occupation is 83 the acquisition of territory which is not under sovereignty of any state. Thus, according to domestic scientist M.Shulga, there are fictitious (or symbolic) and the efficient occupation. “The first is formal in nature and usually con- fined to the raising of the national flag in this territory, or a statement from the relevant state about your possession of a certain territory. The effective occupation involves effective control and management of the territory and has a few rules, namely: the peaceful nature of the occupation; the practical implementation of sovereign action; the exercise of sovereign actions to the extent that provided the territorial rule; the continuous implementation of such actions. The possibility of humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter, according to which in case of the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in the conditions of insuf- ficiency of measures not involving the use of armed force, the UN Security Council is authorized to take such action by air, sea or land forces, which are necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” [15, c.48]. In scientific literature there are different points of view regarding the definition of aggression (aggressive war) at the national level. Aggression (lat. – attack) is “the use of armed force by one state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or acts in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” Aggression manifests itself in such forms as the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a particular state in the territory of another bombing or the use of any other weapons against the population of another country, the blockade of the coast or ports, the attack on air, sea or land forces of another state may use the territory of one state by another against a third state, the preparation and travel of armed bands, groups, mercenaries for the commission of operations on the territory of other States. This list is not complete. That is why the UN Security Council may, if necessary and in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter (art. 4) to qualify as aggression and other aggressive acts. The main the most important feature of military-political conflict, unlike aggression, is the armed struggle, as a two-way use of weapons. With- out armed struggle, in fact, there is no war or armed political conflict. In the armed struggle are intertwined, concentrated all the efforts of States, all their potential, because it can help achieve their political interests and goals. Non-violent means become subordinate to the armed struggle and play a secondary role. While armed struggle has relative autonomy. It was 84 as if she characterizes violent military-technical side of war, which follows its own laws. Although armed struggle is one of the main features of political-military conflict and war as a form of weapons and political conflict, however, their deep essence is a political contradiction that is inherent in them. As history shows, wars, political and military conflicts arise due to incompatible political interests and goals, which are political entities. The use of military force, including the army always caused by political decisions. It will therefore be legitimate to argue that war as any military-political conflict is the result of political relations, not a form of armed struggle. Form of armed struggle, fight, combat operation and the like, because the content of the armed struggle of offensive or defensive combat actions of the opposing sides. Military-political conflict and war have a common basic essential line, a political contradiction, which is solved with military force. At the same time, these concepts are not identical. War does not include the whole diversity of processes, forms and ways of development of this contradiction. To achieve the goals of war, all political and legal superstructure, the ideological means to the spiritual sphere, the economic basis, because in the war, of course, are persecuted major political interests and goals of the state. The opposing sides in the war are the subjects that are of great public importance – government, coalition, bloc of States, the national liberation movement. Although a significant number of Western authors F.Valle, Is.Krippendorf, L.Oppenheimer, T.Ropp, S.Russo, G.Hyde believe the subjects of war, exclusively of the state. So T.Ropp, author of “War in the modern world” and articles on this subject in the “Encyclopaedia Americana,” defines war as “a conflict between States by the use of force” [48, p.49]. Military-political conflict, along with the deep connections and relationships, expressing its essence, contains elements determined by the particular circumstances that constitute the essence of the studied phenomenon. As you know, is always beyond its essence, therefore, to understand political-military conflict in its substantial aspect is necessary to explain the origins, characteristics and possible typology of the phenomenon. The analysis of world events over the past decade indicates an increase in the number of local military-political conflict or, according to NATO classification, low-intensity conflicts. They are a potential threat to Ukraine, because in the current environment, the interrelation and interdependence of States and of different regions, high mobility of armed forces 85 and high efficiency of conventional arms to any armed conflict are capable of rapid escalation, transformation into a full-scale war with all its tragic consequences. Despite the peaceful respite of the mid-90-s last century, at the beginning of the new Millennium, the overall level of conflict at the local and regional level is not only reduced, but did not show any tendency to relative stabilization. The transition to non-violent civilization, which was mentioned in the beginning of XXI century, is delayed indefinitely, as evidenced by the statistics. In the last decade among professionals, there are discussions not only about new types of war, but also about the transformation of the concept of “war”, its essence and features. In scientific, specialized and political literature there is no unambiguous interpretation of this phenomenon, a number of definitions of the modern type of warfare. It is called “non- linear”, “unconventional”, “hybrid”, “mixed”, non-standard,” “war without a front line”, “proxy-war”, “guerrilla” or “low-intensity conflict”. The researcher of war Martin van Creveld argues that the war in the classic sense will cease to exist in the near future, but she will be replaced by the low-intensity conflicts, military clashes, terrorist attacks, mass killings of civilians and total propaganda that will be one of the elements of control over the population. In recent years, a form of military conflict that begins with “peaceful” anti-government actions and ends with a hard by civil war and external intervention, this form may be called a new type of war of the modern era. This war goes beyond the traditional understanding of it, acquiring a mixed character, turning into a tangle of political intrigue, fierce competition for resources and financial flows, irreconcilable civilizational clashes. The course allowed all possible means, the parties resorted to any most dishonorable methods and techniques of action – such as power and non-violent. The victims of the conflict of a new type are civilians, first and foremost the most vulnerable categories of the population – the elderly, women and children. On the battlefield of modern military conflict along with regular troops there is a lot of new actors: irregulars rebels and militants, criminal gangs, international terrorist networks, private military campaigns and legions of foreign mercenaries, divisions of special services of different countries, as well as military contingents of international organizations. In conditions of civil war it becomes impossible to distinguish the guilty from the innocent, the enemies from the allies, cattlemen and farm- 86 ers from the insurgents and suicide bombers. Since the mid 2000-ies in Western scientific thought appears the term “hybrid war”, but in many cases it is interpreted in other terms and concepts, in contrast to modern interpretations. The conceptual justification for such a war in the XXI century engaged in such foreign scientists, analysts and military theorists: P.Glenn, J.Gordon, D.Clellan, D.Gordon, W.Nemeth, J.Mattis, P.Ulch, F.Hoffman, E. Simpson, F. van Kappen, M. van Kreveld, E.Lucas, J.Machen and others. Near asymmetric conflicts and wars inconventional also used the concept of “hybrid war”, which is now increasingly used. The author of this concept is a theorist in the field of armed conflict and military-political strategy F.Hoffman [52, c.2]. He notes that conflicts are multi-modal (those which are conducted in different ways) and multivariate that are not included in the boundaries of the simple design of armed conflict or war. According to F.Hoffman, future threats are more likely to be characterized as a hybrid, the ratio of traditional and irregular strategies and tactics that is decentralized planning and execution, involvement of non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies. Italian scientist, philosopher Umberto Eco called these conflicts ne- owars. And interestingly, one of his first rules directly returns us to the “little green men”, as reads: “In neowar hard to know who is the enemy” [45, p.20]. And this principle of the maximum was used in the Crimean situation, as Russia in response to the charges could only shrug, saying, we are not there. His interpretation of the “hybrid war” offers Michael Isherwood in the book “Air power for the hybrid war”. Isherwood noted that potentially “hybrid war” today can only take so many conflicting States. He explains that the complex nature of hybrid war requires military commanders and civilian leaders an understanding of their operating environment or the feeling of the battle space. The “hybrid” enemy may be hiding among the civilian population, to be not similar to a typical enemy, and to use the “electronic orphanage”, established by global telecommunications market [34]. Authoritative reference book “Military Balance” for 2015 interprets the “hybrid war” as “the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign, aimed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and getting psychological benefits, uses diplomatic options; large-scale and lightning-fast information, electronic and cyber operations; cover and con- cealment of military and intelligence operations, combined with economic pressure” [30]. 87 Among the Ukrainian experts, which are partially paid attention to the study of problems of “hybrid” war, it is possible to allocate such, as: Is.Magda, V.Gorbulin, Yu.Trebon, P.Hai-Nyzhnyk, V.Vasilenko, S.Datsyuk, O.Turchynov, etc. For the characteristics of the present confrontation between Ukraine and Russia can also be applied to such concepts as “nonconventional war,” “irregular war” or “mixed war”, or state-sponsored “hybrid war”. In these concepts goes back to “blur” the outlines of military conflict and the involvement of non-military means, which in the normal state are not directly related to classical military confrontation. “Hybrid warfare” is a type of a informal war, in which it is impossible to clearly define the parties to the conflict, what are the benefits side is the aggressor. In the hybrid wars in the first place is information-psychological influence on the population, the second – economically-political (trading, gas, diplomatic) confrontation. A military operation that was applied in the end are aimed not so much to win or hold territory, how to cause chaos of continuous conflict and continuous generation of provocations. A state which is a “hybrid war” that implements the deal with non-state actors – militants, local groups, organizations, and the relationship is completely negated. Thomas Shelling in his book “Strategy of conflict” proved that so- called “clean” conflicts in which the interests of the parties are opposite, exist only in the war, aimed at mutual destruction, that in modern conditions is quite rare. Thus, it is possible to give a definition of “hybrid war”, is a combination of military threats, covert intervention, covert supply of arms and weapons systems, economic blackmail, informational provocations in the media with the purpose of disinformation to achieve political and military objectives of the aggressor country [9]. In this case the aggressor country remain publicly uninvolved in the solution to the conflict. It should be noted that in the “hybrid war” to the fore come the problems of violent conflicts characterized by high intensity and wide application of methods of direct aggression, as well as the ability to engage in its sphere and to infect more people, destroying the historically established system of state stability and, therefore, security. Analysis of modern scientific and practical views on the nature of “hybrid wars” (how the newest forms of nonconventional, asymmetric conflict) emphasizes its multidi- mensional nature, which absorbs the actual military, political, informational, economic and socio-cultural dimensions. Even a century ago, the vast majority, it was almost exhausted by the armed struggle, and now increasingly 88 complemented by diplomatic, economic, informational and psychological, intelligence-subversive, terrorist and other forms of struggle that are subject to a single purpose and takes place not only on the territory of certain countries but also on the global geopolitical space. At the moment in the world there is a clear tendency to increase the level of conflict of tension, so a very important issue is to develop adequate predictive capacity to identify potential hotbeds of tension, the effectiveness of which largely depends on the consideration and thorough analysis of the sources, characteristics, structural elements of any type of conflict. To win in “hybrid warfare” we need to have modern armed forces, security forces, capable of conducting anti-terrorist struggle, advanced and secure tools. Recently, in connection with the increasing role of information component in the armed struggle in the context of globalization and the emergence of the information society, some researchers (I.Vorobyov, V.Gulin, G.Pocheptsov,V.Slipchenko) consider it necessary to introduce the term “information warfare” when the purpose of the confrontation is achieved purely by means of information fight, and therefore, the information as such in a certain direction its use becomes a tool of achieving political goals, the information weapon. Otherwise, this information component should be considered as only one of the types of comprehensive support of the war that it would be combined with the following type. Network-centric warfare – war, focused on achieving information superiority through the Association of military objects in the information network. In contrast to the “network war” is a purely military concept, held a long way from the intellectual development and brainstorming through experiments and simulation to action and affected the change in U.S. military strategy and, consequently, on the infrastructure of the Pentagon. In many respects it became possible thanks to info communication hyposta- sis (the creation of the global information and communication environment) and info communication technologies [33, p.130]. In other words, the essence of this military doctrine is to hold war focused on the achievement of information superiority and Effects-based operations [2, p.141]. This is the concept of warfare, which would increase the military power of the united group of forces through the creation of information-switching network connecting the sources of information (intelligence), control and means of destruction (suppression). It provides communication to participants of operations of reliable and full information on the situation in almost real time. 89 Asymmetric war – war between adversaries, in the military where there is a significant imbalance (asymmetry), or which used radically different strategies and tactics, accordingly, pose different political goals and use other tools of warfare. To offset the imbalance of conventional means of warfare, the weak side of the asymmetric warfare refers to unconventional means: guerrilla warfare, sabotage, passive resistance, terrorism, psychological warfare, support for anti-government groups that support anti-government movements (parties) and the like. Therefore, the armed conflict that is happening in the East of Ukraine, we can characterize as a hybrid, asymmetric war of Russian Fed- eration against Ukraine.

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AGGRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE: BACKGROUNDS, COURSE AND MODERN SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 95 Chapter 3

Yuriy FIHURNYI

(Candidate of Historical Sciences, Head of the Department of Ukrainian Ethnology Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Kyiv)

AGGRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE: BACKGROUNDS, COURSE AND MODERN SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES*

At the breakthrough of 2013–2014, Ukraine was experiencing difficult times. Due to the short-sighted domestic and foreign policy of the then authorities, protest actions began in Kyiv, which later grew into the Revolution of Dignity. Revolutionary protests have captured almost all regions of Ukraine and led to the escape of Viktor Yanukovych and his immediate neighbors. During reformatting of power structures the Ukrainian state was extremely weakened. Its weakness was taken by the northeastern neighbor, the so-called «brotherly» Russian Federation (hereinafter – the Russian Federation). At first, the aggressor captured the Crimean peninsula, and then, with the help of its agents, destabilized the situation in the east and south of Ukraine, and somewhat subsequently launched an armed invasion of Ukraine. The urgency of the study of this problem is that by analyzing and comprehending the armed and informational Russian aggression against Ukraine and the modern social consequences of the war in eastern Ukraine, we have the opportunity to briefly analyze the preconditions, course and possible measures of the Ukrainian authorities to restore the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state. The scientific novelty of the work is to address the important problems of contemporary Ukrainian history, namely, the Russian-Ukrainian armed and informational confrontation, the study and analysis of which is just beginning, and since this conflict is not yet complete, its final comprehension is delayed indefinitely.

* Translation from Ukrainian: Alexander Kislyuk. 96 The study and mastery of the goal, namely, the impartial analysis of Russian informational and militant aggression against Ukrainians and the sociopolitical consequences of the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014–2017, provides for the following main tasks: 1) to briefly analyze historiography on this subject; 2) to disclose the preconditions of Russian aggression, namely, the significance of the concept of «Russian world» as an important element of the information war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine; 3) characterize the course undeclared Russian-Ukrainian military conflict and reveal its most important militaristic, diplomatic and geopolitical factors; 4) analyze the current socio-political consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine; 5) summarize the study. Historiography of the topic of research. One of the important modern social consequences of the RF aggression against Ukraine was the emergence of a large number of works of various formats on this pressing issue. According to our estimates, since the beginning of Russian aggression (February 2014) and by October 2017, more than 100 publications, directly or indirectly devoted to this unpublished war, appeared. Among them: scientific monographs, popular science books, brochures, photo albums, collections of documents, materials and documentary evidence, blogs, biographies of heroes, fiction and even children’s books. In general, the majority of texts (scientific, scientific, popular, documentary, artistic, artistic, etc.) serve as an effective means of preserving these events for the contemporaries and for the descendants in the national memory of these events. They also carry out an important function of understanding and rethinking that is absolutely necessary to fix and visualize the experience gained (positive and negative) and its further consolidation in the historical memory of Ukrainians. In the appendix to the scientific work, we present only the most interesting, as we think, publications that comprehensively cover the Russian-Ukrainian war (see Appendix). In general, the researchers of the problem of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, its preconditions and modern social consequences are: A.Antonov-Ovsienko, A.Astafev, T.Berezovets, A.Boyko, P.Burkovsky, Y.Butusov, O.Valevsky, V.Vasilenko, O.Vlasik, O.Haran, P.Hai-Nyzhnyk, K.Halushko, M.Gergelyuk, V.Golovchenko, V.Gorbulin, S.Grabovsky, M.Doroshko, O.Yeremeyev, O.Zadorozhniy, L.Zaliznyak, S.Zdioruk, S.Zubchenko, A.Ivanets, A.Ishchenko, O.Kalinovska, O.Krystop, I.Krasnodemska, A.Kashpor, E.Lianov, A.Litvenenko, V.Lozovy, I.Losev, 97 A.Lyashenko, E.Magda, V.Morocco, P.Pavlenko, M.Piren, Y.Potapenko, I.Ruschenko, O.Sagan, I.Sidor, B.Sokolov, M.Slaboshpitsky, M.Stanchev, I.Todorov, V.Tokmak, Y.Tincchenko, V.Tkachenko, V.Tokman, V.Tkach, O.Chyrkov, L.Chupriy, T.Chukhlib, Y.Feltyshynsky, L.Filipovich, Y.Figurnyi, V.Yablonsky and others. We hope that this acute and painful topic of Ukrainians and the whole world community will continue to be at the center of attention as direct participants of the unpublished Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as scholars, analysts, journalists, journalists and all conscious and indifferent Ukrainian citizens, as well as our friends outside of the Ukrainian state. Prerequisites for Russian aggression: «Russian world» – an important element of the information warfare against the Russian Federation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed that all the former Soviet republics finally lost their totalitarian heritage and gained a real opportunity to return to democratic development. For most post-Soviet states, this path turned out to be difficult and thorny, but real. The achievements of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia would have been inspired by other post-colonial countries. If Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova tried to catch up with the Baltic states, then other post-Soviet republics opted for a reverse direction of development - authoritarianism. A special role in these destructive processes has been played by the Russian Federation. The main goal of the Kremlin was not only to preserve the unity of the Russian state (two bloody Chechen wars - a vivid example of the struggle against so-called «separatism» in Russian), but also significantly strengthen its international, political, economic and military capabilities and restore the status of a superpower. In these ambitious plans, Ukraine has occupied (and still has) an important place, since without its industry, favorable geopolitical position, intellectual potential and high human resources of the Russian Federation will never reach a level, for example, the United States or the People’s Republic of China, etc. Initially, Moscow tried to return Kyiv with advantageous economic proposals and bribed the Ukrainian establishment with money, rewards and other preferences. The Kremlin was especially hopeful for the so-called «soft power», namely – for the so-called concept of «Russian world». Liquidation at the end of the twentieth century. The USSR provided a real opportunity for the former Soviet republics to get rid of a totalitarian heritage and to embark on a path of democratic development. Initially, the Russian leadership tried at least to formally democratize the country, 98 but eventually abandoned these plans and began actively promoting and restoring neo-imperial discourse. The main driver of these ideological changes at the beginning of the XXI century became President of the Russian Federation V.Putin. In particular, this process accelerated in Russia after the Orange Revolution of 2004–2005. Recognizing that Ukraine could become a model and guide for both the Russian and other post-Soviet republics on the path of democratization, westernization and liberalization, Putin initiated the process of developing and forming a new an ideology that would help restore the modernized modern Russian empire. In the end, it is the concept of the «Russian world» and should have become such an ideological doctrine or its important component [24, p.45]. Almost all of 2006 in the Russian Federation there was an active discussion devoted to the problems of its strategic development. It was attended by many politicians and experts. Great attention was drawn to controversy between the first deputy head of the Russian government D.Medvedev and the assistant to the President of Russia V.Surkov. The latter, on the basis of the basic ideological principles of the «modernized» Russia, said: «If Russia does not create its own discourse, its own public philosophy is acceptable to at least the majority, and ideally for all of our citizens, ideology (it is not a state ideology, but a national one , although the term «national idea» is somewhat rubbed and devalued), then we will not talk...» [19, p.40]. That is why, V.Surkov emphasized, the main task of our (that is, Russian – Yu.F.) culture is the creation of our own system of images and meanings, which will enable us to maintain the integrity of the nation, since it can not be kept only by administrative means. After all, only those people who have a complete understanding of themselves, their essence, who he is, where he goes, for what and for what purpose can live in organic development [19, p.40]. It is worth noting that we agree that the term «Russian world» was introduced by Russian President Vladimir Putin to the wide public- political discourse of Russia, which, in particular, in late 2006 – early 2007, addressed in detail in his public speeches, connected with compatriots who live abroad in terms of their linguistic, cultural and civilizational unity [23, p.12]. So, on October 24, 2006, in his welcoming remarks to the participants of the World Congress of Compatriots, V.Putin stated: «This day, undoubtedly, unites not only the multinational people of Russia, but also millions of our compatriots abroad, unites all so-called Russian world. 99 We are truly united, and no borders and barriers will hinder this unity. We have only one common goal - to make this unity even stronger» [4]. Subsequently, in June 2007, according to the decree of V.Putin, a non-state center for support and popularization of Russian language and culture «Russian World» was created. The founders of the Fund were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. His main tasks were set out clearly and ambitiously: «The Russian world is not only Russian, not only our compatriots in the countries of the near and far abroad, emigrants, Russians and their descendants. These are also foreign citizens who speak Russian, studying or teaching it, all those who sincerely is interested in Russia, who cares about its future» [12]. Also, in the fundamentals of this fund, it was recorded that all the layers of the Russian world – polyethnic, multiconfessional, socially and ideologically heterogeneous, multicultural, geographically segmented – are united through awareness of involvement in Russia. By forming the ideological foundations of the concept of «Russian world» as a global civilization project, Putin’s ideologists create a new identity and opportunities for effective cooperation with the rest of the world and additional impulses for their own development. All of the above- mentioned features are characteristic of both Russians living in the country and the rest of the Russians in the world’s diaspora. For the supporters of the «Russian world,» the terms «communion», «collegiality», «collectivism», and their historical existence were based on a certain social practice. In their opinion, the practice of the last decades shows that one of the problems of today’s Russia is the division of society, the separation of ethnic Russians scattered over the post-Soviet territories [12]. Thus, the sphere of influence of the concept-ideologue of the «Russian world» extends not only to Russia and to the post-Soviet space, but also to the whole world where ethnic Russians and so on. «Russian- language». Under the cover of the cultural project of the Russian Federation began to actively spread its geopolitical, political, economic and cultural influence. With the election of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church (hereinafter – the Russian Orthodox Church) Kiril (Gundyayev), the ideas of the «Russian world» acquired the so-called «sacral» sound. Thus, in a program statement by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church at the Third Russian Assembly on November 3, 2009, in particular, it was emphasized: «The core of the Russian world today is Russia, Ukraine, Belarus. And St. Reverend Lawrence Chernigovsky expressed this idea 100 with a famous phrase: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus – this is the holy Russia. It is this understanding of the «Russian world» laid in the modern self- denomination of our Church. The church is called Russian not on an ethnic basis. This denomination indicates that the Russian Orthodox Church performs a pastoral mission among peoples who accept Russian spiritual and cultural tradition as the basis of their national identity or at least as its essential part» [5]. Thus, Ukraine and Ukrainians, beyond their will, were included in the ideological concept of the «Russian world» with all the unpredictable consequences for them. Namely: the initial «fraternal» cooperation, the gradual «soft» absorption, the time-stretched full assimilation and the final elimination of Ukraine and Ukrainians as a sovereign state and a distinct nation [24, p.47]. During the speech on November 3, 2009, the patriarch of the ROC outlined not only the priorities of the so-called. «Russian world», as well as its basic elements, «support» – Orthodoxy, Russian language and culture, and common historical memory and common views on social development. In particular, he stressed that the third important basic element of this concept is the common historical memory and common views on social development [5]. It is these main directions (Orthodoxy, Russian language and culture, and a common historical past) that have become a priority in the full-scale attack on the ideology of the «Russian world» on Ukraine and Ukrainians. The realization of its main tasks was planned for a near and far-off perspective, since V.Putin hoped that the puppet presidency of V.Yanukovich «this is serious and for a long time.» However, the Dignity Revolution has crossed all the plans of the Kremlin. Consequently, V.Putin was forced to apply, in addition to the «soft power» of the «Russian world,» and also «hard force» – seizing the Crimea and fomenting the war on the Donbass. So, in February 2014, an unidentified hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war, which continues to this day, began. Despite the predominance of military, diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic factors in this conflict, the Russian leadership continues to actively use the ideologues of the «Russian world», believing that only the comprehensive use of all means will enable them to completely defeat Ukraine [24, p.48]. To understand the danger of the concept of the «Russian world» for Ukrainians, we will briefly mention its basic elements. 101 First, it is the Russian Orthodox Church. If the Church in our closest neighbors – Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, Belarus and Russia – is an expression and guarantor of their statehood, sovereignty, unitarity and identity, then the opposite is true in Ukraine. One of the leading denominations – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (hereinafter referred to as the UOC-MP), despite its seemingly national independence and church autonomy, is the structural and subordinate part (subdivision) of the Russian Orthodox Church. Let’s remind that it is this conservative, but ideologically aggressive, Proputean religious organization that is one of the pillars and spiritual scratch of so- called. «Russian world». Thus, de jure Ukrainian, and de facto pro-Russian UOC-MP, is essentially the fifth column of the Russian Federation and an agent of influence and a leader of the aggressive-neo-imperialist «Russian world» in Ukraine. Such church pluralism under the conditions of the undeclared, but real Russian-Ukrainian war creates additional threats and separates Ukraine and Ukrainians instead of uniting and uniting all patriotic forces for the restoration of the state’s integrity of our Motherland and the return of peace, peace, agreement and understanding on the Ukrainian territory [24, p.48]. Secondly, it is information security. When the armed confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv was reduced to a minimum (shelling and firefight on the line of collision), the main battlefield is the information space. It is the mass media (television, Internet, newspapers, magazines, radio, etc.) that are becoming a real and effective weapon in this hybrid war. The restoration of the new Russian Empire, the return of post-Soviet republics to the orbit of Moscow’s direct influence, is an urgent task of the Kremlin. At the same time, the solution of these tasks is not made by «traditional» means of influence (by the army, diplomacy, etc.), but using the latest information technologies that ordinary ordinary people turn into zombie creatures with a distorted national and social identity. The main instrument in these aggressive plans was the aggressive information propaganda of the Russian Federation [24, p.48]. The information aggression of its neighbors was carried out throughout Ukraine, but it proved to be effective only in the most Russified regions – in Crimea and in the east of Ukraine, where the neo-imperial doctrine of the «Russian world» allowed the deepest roots. Political pressure and economic sanctions in the West limit Russia’s use of direct military aggression against Ukraine, and therefore the information component has 102 all the chances to become the main factor in confronting Kyiv and Moscow [24, p.48–49]. That is why an important factor in the fight against Russian aggression and its negative impact on the socio-political situation in Ukraine is one of the important factors. In the opinion of A.Boyko, the mass media (newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and the Internet) have to talk, persuade, promote and conduct an active dialogue with society in order to consolidate the «Ukrainian World» in the consciousness of Ukrainians, as opposed to the imperial-chauvinistic «Russian» world», because this ideology is distributed in numerous pro-Russian media, including those under the control of the UOC-MP [2, p.823]. Thus, in the hybrid war, information security is one of the priorities in protecting state sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, national interests, consolidating society and restoring the territorial integrity of our Motherland. Thirdly, it is Russian language and culture. It is quite reasonable that an important component of the Russian authorities’ activity in implementing the concept of «Russian world» is to strengthen positions and expand the range of the n language, while the special attention to the issues of the functioning of the Russian language is also due to the fact that the latter is one of the cornerstones of this propaganda ideologues, unifying factor of the international community of citizens of different countries associated with Russia [23, p.32]. For example, at one of the meetings with representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, V.Putin, speaking about the proclamation of the Year of the Russian language, clarified the content of the concept: «The Russian world can and must unite all who expensive Russian word and Russian culture, wherever they live, in Russia or abroad. More often use this phrase – «Russian world» [23, p.12]. Patriarch Kirill, in turn, also noted the archiveness of the Russian language. He firmly believes that the Russian language is a powerful communicative element of the concept of «Russian world», since it has become the fruit of joint efforts of people of different nationalities and has become a means of communication between different peoples, which is why it is necessary to make efforts to preserve and spread this common good. He also emphasized that it is first and foremost important to create conditions for the study of numerous compatriots living in far abroad, the Russian language and their acquaintance with Russian culture, and the 103 Russian Orthodox Church, the state and public structures should establish centers for the study of the Russian language, organize events aimed at preserving Russian traditions, helping to produce periodicals, creating Internet sites in Russian, etc. [5]. One of the ideologues of the «Russian world» among scientists – the Russian ethnologist, historian, director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences named after M.Mikluho- Maclay, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.Tishkov also emphasized that it is the Russian language and Russian-language or Soviet culture, In fact, this «world» is united and constructed [17]. Therefore, one can not but agree with the Ukrainian scientists that «...the cultural component is not only one of the most important, but dominant in the concept of the RM («Russian world» – Yu.F.). Culture and language are virtually the only thing that can unite the citizens of Russia, the Russian diaspora, Russian-speaking (regardless of nationality) of citizens of other states and all others who are considered as a potential member of this global community «[23, p.47]. Fourth, it is Russian education and science. One of the priority directions of expansion of the «Russian world» in Ukraine is the strong promotion and strengthening of the positions of Russian education and science and their use in the neo-Imperial discourse. In particular, D.Tabachnyk, who served as Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine in 2002–2005, 2006–2007, and in 2010–2014 – the Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine, all this time actively implemented ideology in Ukraine and the basic principles of the «Russian world». He noted, among other things, that the unity of the Slavic world, the preservation of its identity, its successful competition with the German world directly depends on the strength and unity of the «Russian world» – the class ridge of the Slavs and that in fact the only large Russian nation, which includes in itself the Great Russians, the Little Russians and Byelorussians, have not disappeared yet [20, p.305– 306]. Thus, in Ukraine, the ex-minister of education and science D.Tabachnyk has a special place in strengthening the positions of the Russian language and promoting the ideas of the «Russian world», which, in an interview with the Russian radio station «Echo of Moscow», in particular, talked about its decisive role in ensuring the printing of school textbooks in Russian for funds from the state budget of Ukraine, expanding the scope of studying Russian literature in Ukrainian schools, returning 104 to the practice of conducting all-Ukrainian school Olympiads in Russian language and literature, as well as their struggle with the «resistance of nationalists» in the education system [23, p.35]. During these years, anti-Ukrainian activities of D.Tabachnyk led to a significant strengthening of the position of the concept of «Russian world» in Ukraine. For example, at the request of «Week. UA», the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine replied that out of 19 thousand 70 general schools functioning in Ukraine, teaching in Russian was carried out in 1 256, in particular, in the 2012/2013 academic year, out of 225 thousands of 690 classes of general educational institutions in Ukrainian were taught in 191 thousand 502 classes (84.9%), in Russian – 31 thousand 372 (13.9%). The largest number of schools with Russian language education was in the AR Crimea (343), Donetsk (200) and Luhansk (151) oblasts [21]. We would like to emphasize that it is the regions of Ukraine where the ideas of the «Russian world» have become the most widespread (Crimea, Donbas), were victims of Russian armed aggression. And in those regions of Ukraine, where this ideology did not occupy the dominant position in the education, science and culture, the national Ukrainian identity and, consequently, statehood were preserved. Thus, for a long time, the Russian Federation actively implemented ideas and principles of the «Russian world» in the spiritual, informational, linguistic, cultural, educational and scientific space of Ukraine, which ultimately led to the weakening of the Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian nation and the national identity [24, p.50–51]. Taking into account the above-mentioned factors, we emphasize and outline the criminal role and mission of the concept of «Russian world» in the course of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. With the escape of Viktor Yanukovych to Russia and the victory of the first stage of the National Revolution at the beginning of the XXI century. – Revolution of dignity, V.Putin, realizing that Ukraine finally leaves the sphere of its influence, begins an unpublished war against her, taking all the available factors into account. However, this is not an ordinary armed conflict between neighboring states for possession of disputed territories, which were the majority of wars in the history of mankind, and the latest civilization war [11, p.4]. It is grounded to prove this point of view and to the scientists. In particular, M.Piren emphasizes: «The historical experience of many countries confirms the indisputable fact that the internal destruction of the states always begins with the deformation of the national consciousness 105 of their citizens, the spread of indifference, indifference as antipodes of patriotism, and the citizenship of its people. Unfortunately, these phenomena were constantly declared by the Moscow Church in Ukraine, inclining the ideas of the «Russian world», which has led to the emergence of «new republics», separatism, terrorism and the sufferings of «simple mortal» citizens in the Donetsk region. The ideas of discord were planted by the Moscow media as part of the imperial ideologue of the «Russian world» [13, p.177–178]. Y.Potapenko emphasizes on this: «It is the promotion and popularization of the ideology of the Russian world that the native soil for Putin’s idea of» Novorossiia «was prepared, an attempt to implement which already cost the peoples of Ukraine and Russia thousands of lives, fraught destinies, destroyed the psyche, led to turbulent flows hate on both sides. We will obviously feel the consequences of this hatred for a decade, as our northern neighbors» [5, p.300]. «In particular, the concept of the «Russian world», which de facto turned into a frankly Nazi and chauvinistic, should be banned at the international level – just as Nazi was banned at the same time – emphasizes the famous Ukrainian scientist and politician (former head of the National Security and Defense Council and Director of the National Institute Strategic Studies) V.Horbulin. – And for the people (or states) that promote it, they should have the same legal consequences as those who follow the Nazi ideology. Indeed, in fact, speaking of the practical expression of the concept of the «Russian world», we are confronted with a true «Orthodox IDIL» – in the east of Ukraine, several different «Orthodox armies» act (or acted) at once, committing such offenses, which even the IDIL fighters did not fall on opinion» [9, p.2]. So, in its essence, the «Russian world» as a politico-ideological concept is not an ordinary cultural project, but a neo-imperial geopolitical ideological doctrine that aims to not only substantiate theoretically and help to virtually reintegrate Russia as a superstate at the borders of 1914 but also eliminate it. Ukrainian statehood and the Ukrainian nation. The course of the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian military conflict: militaristic, diplomatic and geopolitical factors. During the reign of the pro- Russian government in Ukraine, domestic authorities gradually surrendered national interests, and turned the state into a Little Russian protectorate of the Russian Federation. However, the Revolution of Dignity crossed out all plans of Russian powers, so they reoriented on the power solution of the 106 so-called «Ukrainian question», namely, the gradual weakening of Ukraine, dismemberment and final the elimination of Ukrainian statehood, the destruction of the Ukrainian nation and the absorption and full assimilation of Ukrainians. The course of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war can be divided into the following stages: 1) the annexation of the Crimea (February– March 2014); 2) the project «Novorossiia» (April–July 2014); 3) disguised military aggression of the RF against Ukraine (July 2014 – February 2015); 4) stabilization of the front line in the east of Ukraine, permanent combat clashes in the most important areas of the confrontation and the continuous hidden military and open information aggression of the Russian Federation (February 2015 – to this day). The annexation of Crimea has become the highest «achievement» of the Russian Federation as a whole, and Putin in particular, since the Kremlin cynically violated intergovernmental agreements and committed an act of aggression against a neighboring state. At the same time, the temporary loss of the Crimean peninsula is a defeat of the modern Ukrainian state and its then-day leadership in the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. It is also necessary to separate the inaction of the Ukrainian authorities and the actions of the members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who were loyal oaths and executed an order that prevented them from using weapons against so-called «green men». It should be noted that the seizure of the Crimea of Russia was not a spontaneous decision of the Kremlin, but was preparing for many years. In this regard, Pavlo Hai-Nyzhnyk stressed: «Crimea was the only region with a rather strong pro-Russian identity and at the same time was sufficiently saturated by the Kremlin’s agents and armed units of the regular Russian army. It is definitely known that the Russian invasion was preceded by an active propaganda campaign, sabotage and agency activity, first of all in Sevastopol, deployed long before the start of February events directly to the special services of the Russian Federation. The main task of the Kremlin agents was the demoralization of the personnel of the Armed Forces and the encouragement of our military to refuse the armed resistance of the aggressor» [7, p.200–201]. The loss of the Crimean peninsula and the large grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter – the Armed Forces of Ukraine) in Crimea has led to a weakening of the official Kyiv on the international scene and the demoralization of Ukrainian society. Successful seizure of 107 the Crimea pushed Putin to implement the next Novorossiya project, the essence of which was the dismemberment of Ukraine and the separation of the eastern and southern regions from it, with the subsequent prolongation of these destructive processes in the central, northern and western regions. Thus began the so-called «Russian Spring», which was supposed to put an end to the united Ukraine and finally destroy its cohesiveness and sovereignty. However, in May 2014, Ukrainians took offensive, destroyed Putin’s terrorists in Odessa, elected in the first round the President of Ukraine P.Poroshenko, began to create volunteer battalions and join massively the Armed Forces and the National Guard of Ukraine. In turn, the nation- elected President, with his decree, proclaimed an anti-terrorist operation and began a counter-attack on terrorist cells in eastern Ukraine. In a short time, it became clear to Putin that the «Russian Spring» had collapsed, and therefore he began unwritten armed aggression against Ukraine. An attack on the Russian Army was a surprise to the top leadership of the Armed Forces. He led to a series of loud defeats and significant losses among servicemen and volunteers. One of them – Ilovaisky boiler (boiler). At the same time, Ukrainians demonstrated the fighting spirit and military skill, which resulted in a large number of killed and wounded Russian soldiers and terrorists. In the end, the pressure of the world community and a realistic assessment of the military situation in the east of Ukraine led to the beginning of peace talks in the capital of Belarus. Thanks to the mediation of European leaders, the situation in eastern Ukraine has somewhat stabilized. At the same time, the so-called «Minsk-1» (September 2014), «Minsk-2» (February 2015) failed to radically solve the problem, they only temporarily «froze» it, as the open military conflict in the Donbass became concealed, but daily reports of killed, wounded and destroyed only confirm this terrible situation, namely the conduct of hostilities in the east of Ukraine. P. Hai-Nyzhnyk is convinced that the so-called «Minsk agreements» were only a kind of diplomatic cover for separate talks between Russian, European and Ukrainian negotiators in order to resolve armed conflict at the price of Ukraine and Ukrainian national interests. As a result, the refusal of P.Poroshenko and his diplomatic team from Budapest, Geneva and other formats, the removal from the assistance of large geopolitical players – the United States, Great Britain, the European Union and the abandonment of Ukraine almost by itself on the Russian Federation itself. Since the mediation of France and Germany was only a cover of the compromise 108 policy of F.Oland and A.Merkel regarding the aggressive actions (military and information) of Putin [7, p.277–279]. In this regard, Ukrainian-Ukrainian scientists in the expert-analytical report note: «The Minsk process» should be considered as a mechanism for reducing the intensity of the military component of the conflict and transfer it to the category of frozen. The distorted implementation of the «Minsk Agreements» is unprofitable for Ukraine. After all, it returns to Ukraine the ruined territories, which are completely controlled and controlled by local bandit groups and Russian occupiers, and a huge amount of an angry electorate that was washed away by Russian propaganda consciousness. Therefore, it is necessary to agree on the use of other formats, including the Norman, Geneva, or even require a return to the Budapest but updated, which will make it possible to develop more effective ways to resolve the conflict «[1, p.25]. Despite the peacekeeping statements of diplomats, this hybrid undeclared war will continue in the future. The conflict will somewhat change its forms, but not the essence. For Putin, the war will end only when Ukraine and Ukrainians capitulate and will become an integral part of the great-power Russia and so on. «Russkagh world». For the Ukrainian state - when Russia as an imperial project disappears from the political map of the world. We are convinced that the modern hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war is not an ordinary armed interstate confrontation over the earth, natural resources, population, etc., but is nothing else (as the scholar L.Zalizniak remarked) as a civilizational conflict [11, p.5]. In order to understand the essence of the civilizational confrontation on the territory of Ukraine at the beginning of the twenty-first century. between democratic Europe and authoritarian Russia, one should know well the history of their relationship. Europe was not always «democratic», but it was democracy, liberal-market, and universal Christian values that helped transform this western Eurasia region into a locomotive for the development of human civilization. In contrast, the Russian centralized state was based on the principles of a «wild» Asian mode of production, the main elements of which are monopolization, the privatization of all spheres of life, and the concentration of all power in one’s hands [11, p.122–142]. It was thanks to these system-forming factors that the small Moscow principality eventually became a huge Russian empire, and eventually in the USSR with a huge number of satellites around the world. These phantom imperial totalitarian 109 memories of greatness and geopolitical dominance are fueled by the revanchist sentiments of Putin and his followers. Therefore, it is doomed to be the battlefield between European and Eurasian civilizations, as long as Russia exists in the format of the de jure federation, and de facto empires. In turn, the fundamental differences in the ethnic, state-building, nation-building and ethnocultural traditions of Ukrainians and Russians have been, are and will be the source of a permanent Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. This civilization conflict will last until the victory of one of the conflicting forces. Therefore, Ukrainians need to adjust to a long-lasting confrontation with the north-eastern aggressor. Any war is a huge test for the state and the nation, and the Russian- Ukrainian military confrontation is not an exception to the rules. Already For the fourth consecutive year this conflict continues, therefore it is time to reflect on and to specify its socio-political consequences for both Ukraine and the world community. For a long time, Europe was in a comfortable state – peace and harmony on the continent (the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars became only a temporary «ugly misunderstanding»). But with the election of the President of the Russian Federation in early 2000, Putin, this state «began to rise from the knees» and, in the end, began to format the surrounding world system. Initially, this reformatted only the so-called «near abroad» (Georgia and Ukraine), later came the time and «far abroad» (Syria). The Euro-Atlantic community had the opportunity to immediately stop the revanchism and neo-imperial ambitions of the Kremlin, giving a green light at the NATO summit in Bucharest (2007) on the plan of action of Ukraine and Georgia membership in this defense alliance. However, this plan was blocked by the leading European countries, as a result of the Russian- Georgian war of 2008, the strengthening of the Russian Federation and the weakening of European civilization. Putin made conclusions for this conflict, started military reform, rearmed the army and strengthened the informational pressure on the near and far abroad, while the Euro-Atlantic community almost ignored the beginning of the new Cold War and its gradual evolution into the «hot» stage. Anaesthesia of the Crimea of Russia caught unexpectedly by the EU and the United States. The Budapest memorandum was only a declaration of intent, and Ukraine was on its own with the aggressor. Then there were diplomatic talks, «deep concern» of our western distant and close neighbors, Minsk-1, Minsk-2, meetings in the Norman format, and so on. 110 However, this was not a fight against Russian aggression, but probably only an imitation of this struggle. It reminds us of it in 1938, when France and Great Britain tried to satisfy the predatory appetites of Germany at the price of Czechoslovakia. As a result: instead of peace, Europe received World War II. Did European leaders draw conclusions from past events? Hope that way. When the Czechs capitulated to the Nazis in 1938, the Ukrainians in 2014 fought the «rachists» and for the fourth consecutive year they held the front line. Thus, the Euro-Atlantic community must not be content with the memorandums of peace and understanding with the Russian Federation, and begin to actively respond to the Russian-Ukrainian war. To do this, they need, at least: 1) to change the direction of policy towards violators of international agreements and not to condescend to the aggressor, but to punish him quickly; 2) reforming NATO in the context of current geopolitical and geostrategic challenges and the peculiarities of hybrid confrontation; 3) to strengthen information security and successfully counteract the total fake propaganda and cyber attacks from the RF; 4) respond lightly to the violation of the borders of both NATO members and the EU and Associated States (such as Ukraine), which can be rightly attributed to European civilization. Modern socio-political consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Ukraine is in the very center of a civilizational confrontation, so it must respond more quickly to the armed and informational aggression of the Russian Federation. Domestic authorities, military, politicians, analysts, intellectuals and conscious citizens must understand the preconditions, course and essence of Russian aggression against Ukrainians and make balanced conclusions. In our opinion, the most important socio-political consequences of the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014–2017 is a significant increase in a number of determinants. The first one is militaristic. The best defender of Ukraine and Ukrainians is not the international memorandums, treaties, pacts and agreements, but the Armed Forces. Only the Ukrainian army is a reliable guarantor of the Ukrainian Self-Assembly The state Allies can betray, and a patriotic, professional, well- motivated Ukrainian national army will always be guarded by Ukrainian statehood. For almost 23 years, the Armed Forces of Ukraine was deliberately destroyed, decomposed, robbed and trapped, but the time came for testing, and Ukrainian troops and volunteers stopped the enemy in 111 bulk and continued to hold the eastern front. Therefore, the Ukrainian army should be sufficiently financed, re-armed, reformed and Ukrainianized. In our opinion, there should be only five privileged and most highly paid professions in the society: military servicemen, law enforcement officers, scientists, doctors and educators, not top officials, people’s deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or judges of all instances, etc. One of the main factors of the cardinal renewal of the Armed Forces is the domestic military-industrial complex (hereinafter – MIC). It was Ukraine at the time of totalitarianism that was one of the largest centers of the Soviet military-industrial complex. After the disintegration of the USSR, difficult times for the Ukrainian military-industrial complex came. Despite these hardships, Ukraine has been in the top ten exporters of arms and military equipment for about 20 years. But all this was not the development of its military-industrial complex, but its stagnation and degradation (since it existed at the expense of Soviet technology and the sale of old military reserves). In the end, the time has come for radical changes and updates. We fully agree with Pavlo Hai-Nyzhnyk, that Ukraine must restore, modernize and strengthen the military-industrial complex as soon as possible, transfer it to modern innovative technologies, start production of not only defensive, but also offensive weapons [6, p.41]. P.Hai-Nyzhnyk offers his algorithm for the strengthening of the militaristic city of the Ukrainian state: «It is necessary immediately to form units so-called. cyber troops and the forces of electronic counteraction, to launch the creation of space forces and relevant scientific and technical laboratories, to establish anti-tank weapons production, to revive naval forces, which should not be entirely concentrated in the Crimea, and the 2014 experience confirms this. An urgent need is to coordinate the efforts of the entire state to restore modern air forces and the so-called strategic air defense system, in particular, to supply medium-range missiles. It is about creating, for example, a high- precision and powerful non-nuclear weapon / complex of tools capable of causing a rapid and devastating blow to the critical infrastructure of a possible aggressor (chemical plants, dams, nuclear and other power stations, important government and military objects, control centers, provision, etc.). Ukraine must now take up the creation of non-nuclear missile systems with a potential range of about 2500–4000 km, and so on. In the future, the capability of capturing tactical nuclear weapons should be laid. In general, the military organization of the state, its military-industrial 112 complex, the system of armament of the Armed Forces, etc., need not just restructuring, they need to rebuild it from scratch, according to norms and standards of modern times» [6, p.41–42]. In the end, this revolutionary update of the Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex will help Ukraine to become a potential regional leader in the near future after defeating Russia into a powerful world power. The second factor is the state. Only a legal, democratic, innovative, prosperous state can guarantee Ukraine’s and Ukrainians’ progressive development, preservation of Ukrainian identity and geopolitical subjectivity. Unfortunately, at present, the Ukrainian state is clan-oligarchic, and therefore needs urgent reform. For a quarter century of its modern development, Ukraine has turned into a quasi-state with a clan-oligarchic economy and administration, a typical poor country of the so-called. «Third World», which is doomed only to impoverishment and extinction. If the oligarchs and their supporters are satisfied with this situation, then the vast majority of Ukrainians, and especially their passionate share, do not satisfy this state of affairs. Therefore, this inability to overcome the difficult legacy of colonialism and totalitarianism by evolutionary way led to the emergence of revolutionary preconditions. In the end, anti-Kuchma appearances in 2000–2002, the Orange Revolution of 2004–2005 are the peculiar preparatory stages that led to a revolutionary breakthrough in the 2013–2014 biennium – the Ukrainian National Revolution of the early twenty-first century. The time that came to pass after the conclusion of EuroMaydan, as Y.Potapenko rightly pointed out, clearly demonstrated: the oligarchic corrupt system does not dare to dismantle the new government, as well as to undertake radical reforms and lustration. In his opinion, the Revolution of Dignity and the attempts of individual oligarchs to expand their own wealth and influence as much as possible after the revolutionary events revealed the apparent impossibility to build modern European democracy and an effective economy in Ukraine without the determined and final displacement of the oligarchs from the planning and implementation of state policy [14, p.98–99]. At the same time, the modern Russian-Ukrainian war is not a classical military conflict with the declaration of war, the transfer of the national economy to military rails, the mobilization of all available resources, the continuous front of combat operations, etc., and a hybrid confrontation, when soldiers without recognizable signs capture («squeeze») huge 113 territories, between diplomats do not stop diplomatic, political, economic, cultural ties and at the same time there is an active information war and permanent open and hidden armed suites Ivy with a possible full-scale escalation of the military conflict. Such a hybrid war can last a long time. Therefore, Ukrainians must constantly support the combat readiness of their troops, control the Eastern (Donbas) and Southern (Crimea) external fronts and go on an internal offensive – eliminate the oligarch, overcome the consequences of totalitarianism, colonialism and preserve and develop the identity of Ukrainians. The clan-oligarchic system has been functioning in Ukraine for more than two decades. And it would not be possible to completely destroy it with one volitional decision, because it has penetrated into all spheres of politics, economy, culture of Ukrainian society. The main feature of the oligarchy is the inseparable combination of big business with corrupt authorities, monopolization of the economy, the destruction of medium and small businesses, ignoring of market and competitive principles in the economy. Due to the dominance of the clan-oligarchic system in Ukraine, the polarization of society, the «fabulous» enrichment of a handful of nouveauties and the massive depletion of millions of ordinary Ukrainians, the degradation of the state and its transformation into a raw material supplement to developed economies and a source of cheap able-bodied populations. Despite this difficult diagnosis, Ukraine has a future. First of all, we must completely eliminate the clan-oligarchic system through a comprehensive solution to such problems: finally divide business and power, completely renew the political elite, complete the reform of the economy and the banking and financial sector, develop a competitive environment and medium and small businesses. There is an urgent need for the continuation of important radical changes in the public sphere (executive, legislative and judicial systems, in all branches of government), the defense sector of Ukraine and law enforcement agencies. It is also necessary once and for all to deprive the political, economic, financial, security, information, and national-cultural space of Ukraine from the explicit and covert agents of the Russian Federation’s influence. The third element is national. At the turn of the twentieth-twentieth century. the main trend in the development of human civilization is globalization. It is precisely for it that it should become the engine of the development of human civilization, reduce the gap between rich and poor countries, accelerate progress and innovate in all spheres of life. But time has 114 shown that it is impossible to unify everything, and the national component remains a significant factor both for foreign international politics and for the internal development of many states and nations. In the end, globalism itself was not a panacea for all the misfortunes and disadvantages. In this regard, the director of the Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine B.Halayko emphasizes: «Today there is a global crisis of both economic model and artificial multiculturalistic models of a society of identities. In parallelthe dominant financial and industrial elites of the world continue to defend the values of globalism, outlining the national revival of the manipulative term «populism». At the same time, there is a renaissance of nationalism in Europe and in the world, which we can outline as the third wave of national revival. In the neighboring countries of Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, today the national-oriented conservative forces are in power. In the United States, there are similar processes in which traditional conservative views dominate the society. Actually, the last presidential campaign in 2016 in the United States has become a triumphant return of nationalist values to a great policy» [8, p.59]. One of the most effective factors in the formation of a Ukrainian political nation is the development of a civil society, the basis of which must become conscious Ukrainian citizens. It is they who create horizontal links between them, thereby reinforcing the firm groundwork of the Ukrainian state and political nation. During the unpublished Russian-Ukrainian War, the phenomenon of volunteering has become widespread in Ukraine. When the destiny of the Motherland was decided in the East in 2014, volunteer battalions and volunteers took on the main burden of the struggle against Russian attackers and their terrorist assassins and eventually helped to stop the hostile offensive and stabilized the front line with the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the National Guard of Ukraine. One of the first volunteers, the founder of one of the largest volunteer organizations in Ukraine, the Battalion of the Non-Believers, at the Holy Assumption Cathedral (Poltava), the Archbishop of Poltava and Kremenchug UOC-KP Fedir (Valentyn Bubnyuk) began his volunteering activities in March 2014, when the priests loaded the products and carried them to Crimea to Ukrainian soldiers. Somewhat later they began to travel to the East several times a week. Then the cathedral was finally filled with products, things, and the box for donations to the war several times exceeded the needs of the church, which were in peacetime. Archbishop 115 Feodor is convinced that after the war part of the volunteers will still be withdrawn, but many volunteer organizations will continue to work, this will facilitate their resettlement into large civil society organizations, which will help them more influence the authorities [26, p.878]. The story of the victorious life of the patriot-nationalist Yaroslav Potapenko (1975–2016) is illustrative. Yaroslav Aleksandrovich not only professionally analyzed the preconditions, course and probable consequences of the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, but also practically contributed to the victory over the aggressor. He sought to go volunteers to the front, and would go, only the birth of a daughter restrained him. The fact that he can not protect Ukraine from attackers and terrorists with arms in his hands was very annoying to Yaroslav, so the nationalist patriot became a real leader and organizer of the voluntary movement of Pereiaslavl region and took away the assembled help on the very «front line», and repeatedly fell under enemy fire (in so the number and under Debaltsevo) [27, p.130]. Consequently, during the most active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it was the national factor that grouped the Ukrainians and united their lions in the struggle against the zealous and cruel aggressor. Putin hoped that almost a quarter of a century «quiet» denationalization of Ukrainians would lead to the disappearance of the Ukrainian nation. But his hopes were in vain. Ukrainians, Russians, Crimean Tatars, Jews, Moldovans, Poles, Belarusians and other ethnic communities of the Ukrainian state united and created a Ukrainian political nation that stopped Putin’s terrorists. The fourth component is ethnocultural. Almost all of the conquerors (except for the Lithuanians of the time of the existence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), who once ruled on the Ukrainian ethnic lands, sought not only to conquer Ukrainians, but eventually absorb them. To this end, they planted their language, culture, traditions, customs, faith, etc. The greatest ethnic-cultural discrimination experienced by Ukrainians in the Soviet era. With the restoration of Ukrainian statehood, the ethnocultural renaissance began, but very quickly it stopped and stagnation processes began. Despite the fierce offensive by the ideologue of the concept of «Russіan world» and globalization, the indifference of corrupt authorities and ordinary citizens, conscious Ukrainians managed to preserve and somewhat expand the use of their native language and respect for ethno-cultural traditions. Symbolically, the aggressor captured only those areas where the Russian language and post-Soviet Erzat culture (so-called «scoop») dominated 116 undividedly. Therefore, Ukrainians must continue to preserve and develop (qualitatively and quantitatively) the ethno-cultural component of national culture. According to Biblical legends, Moses for forty years led his people to a desert until the last Jew died, who remembered Egyptian slavery, and only then he brought them to the land «promised». Many of the domestic intellectuals and politicians propagate such tactics of actions, the essence of which is the natural change of human generations. Languages will eventually go away in the absence of the so-called «scoops», and young people a priori grow up with patriots. Unfortunately, this concept does not work in modern conditions. For Ukraine and Ukrainians, we must fight at all times on all fronts (military, ideological, informational, economic, political, cultural, educational, etc.). In the third millennium, we live in a globalized world and can not be separated from it by a large wall such as the so-called Berlin Wall. We must be able to master the situation and help our compatriots to become a united political nation, a nation of winners! To this end, it is necessary to cultivate love for the native language and ethnoculture, to introduce national-patriotic education from kindergarten to high school and to develop conscious knowledge of Ukrainian history [25, p.131]. In connection with the active assault on Ukraine by the imperial ideologue «Russіan world» there is an urgent need for the development of comprehensive Ukrainization. Under Ukrainianization, we mean the consistent activity of the state, aimed at the development of Ukrainian- centric ideology in all spheres of society – politics, economy, culture, education, science, army, police, etc. [25, p.132]. Thus, Ukrainization is not only a mechanical, one-dimensional displacement of the Russian language from all realms and the replacement of it with Ukrainian. First of all, Ukrainization must become a generally accepted and official ideological policy, an ideological basis of the state, and an effective means to overcome the consequences of Russian colonialism, Soviet totalitarianism and Putin’s imperialism, and the preservation and development of the native language, culture, traditions, customs, mentality and identity of Ukrainians. The fifth element is religious. Russian aggression (troops and information) significantly influenced the religious situation in Ukraine. In view of the fact that any war, even a hybrid, carries with it primarily destruction, death, injury, wandering and other horrors, then a consequence of a society (both at the front and in the bosom) is a dynamic process of returning to 117 Christian values. Faith in God in such difficult, revolutionary times helps a person to remain, first and foremost, a person, although wartime tribulation always experiences it with strength and endurance. As they say: «there are no atheists on the front,» and relatives and friends far beyond the line of the front they pray sincerely for the life and health of their relatives and friends. In addition to the general-spiritual level, there is a purely practical dimension when religion (in our case, Orthodox Christianity) becomes a militant ideology (ideological weapon) and helps to defeat the enemy. If our native enemy, Russia (the Moscow Empire, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, Russia) has its own monolithic church organization – the Russian Orthodox Church, which is a reliable instrument of V.Putin’s imperial- chauvinistic policy, then Ukraine, unfortunately, does not have the Single Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church Church (hereinafter – the SLUOC), and this extremely damages the domestic state creation and nation-building. Historically, the destruction and disintegration of Ukrainian state formations (Kyiv Rus, the Hetmanate, the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Ukrainian State of P.Skoropadsky, the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, etc.) did not contribute to the creation of the SLUOC. Only with the restoration of Ukrainian statehood at the end of the twentieth century. there were real prerequisites for the revival of the Cathedral Ukrainian Orthodoxy.However, post-imperial, post-totalitarian legacies, and the insurrection of the former metropolis, especially the Russian Orthodox Church, significantly inhibited these processes. In the end, Russian aggression (military and informational) has forced all Ukrainian citizens to be determined to one degree or another, with whom they are - with the Motherland or with the aggressor! Since the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (hereinafter – the UOC-KP) has enjoyed great respect since ancient times in Ukraine, the society sought to hear the opinion of its pastors. If the Patriarch of the UOC-KP Filaret publicly declared that Ukraine should close the border and eliminate all terrorists as soon as possible, then the leader of the UOC-MP, Onufriy, did not recognize the aggression of the Russian Federation, and called this undeclared hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war – exclusively internally Ukrainian, the most ordinary civil conflict, ordinary struggle with separatists and so on. Such a well-balanced state position of the high clergy of the UOC-KP and, accordingly, anti-state leaders of the UOC-MP, has been reflected in public opinion. 118 Thus, according to the results of sociological research of the Razumkov Center conducted by him in the spring of 2016, one can trace the dynamics of changes in religious preferences in Ukraine. In particular, if some 70.4% of the polled citizens recognized themselves as believers, 38.1% of the respondents are supporters of the UOC-KP, while the UOC- MP is 23% [16, p.27, 31]. Also, in the sociological questionnaires there is a graph «just Orthodox». However, if in the spring of 2014 sociologists recorded such sympathies in the amount of 39.8%, then in 2 years their number decreased to 32.3% [16, p.20, 31]. Such a dynamics of changes shows that the reduction of the number of «just Orthodox» is in favor of the UOC-KP. At the same time, supporters of the «Russіan world» disregard public opinion and appeal to totally different indicators. In particular, they insist on the official statistics of the Department of Religion and Nationalities of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, according to which, on January 1, 2016, there were registered 12,334 communities of the UOC-MP, 4,921 communities of the UOC-KP, 1,188 communities of the UAOC, etc. [15]. These figures are, according to supporters and supporters of the Kremlin, evidence of the dominant position in Ukraine of the UOC-MP and the marginalization of the UOC-KP. Unfortunately, no one in ordinary Ukraine explains that the above statistics are, first of all, purely formal and does not reflect the essential deep changes in the religious environment of Ukraine. For more than a quarter of a century, the domestic authorities, hiding behind the abstract slogan that the Church in the Ukrainian state itself exists, de jure occupy a neutral position, and de facto contributed in every way to the permanent expansion of the Russian Orthodox Church and the domination of its Little Russian branch – the UOC-MP. In the end, such a fatal anti-state policy of the domestic establishment has led to catastrophic consequences – the spread of «Orthodox Russian imperial ideology» throughout Ukraine. However, where leading state Christian churches, namely the UOC-KP and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), had strong positions, the influence of the «rachists» was minimal, whereas in the eastern and southern territories, they were, to the utmost regret, rooted successfully among Ukrainian citizens, postulates and dogmas of the «Russіan world». In the end, the so-called «Russian spring» of 2014 was the result of a short-sighted and criminal policy (pseudo) of the Ukrainian establishment. 119 That is why the time has come to radically change the state policy in the religious sphere. Particularly this problem was aggravated in the conditions of the unpublished Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, when the very existence of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian nation was put under enormous threat. In these extremely critical times for Ukraine and Ukrainians, there are many different proposals to overcome an arrogant enemy and save the state. In our opinion, the most concisely and conceptually expressed the Most Holy Patriarch of Kyiv and All Russia-Ukraine Filaret: «In order to approve the Ukrainian state, we need two things: a strong army and a single local Orthodox Church» [18]. It is significant that the clergy of the UOC-KP, UGCC, UAOC actively help to create volunteer battalions of the Chaplaincy service in the Armed Forces, the National Guard of Ukraine. Chaplains on the front, above all, are clerics who support Ukrainian fighters with the Word of God, raise their fighting spirit and take care of their spiritual needs [26, p.877]. It should also be noted that if the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the authorities began to allocate equally sufficient funds from the state budget (which probably will contribute to the restoration and strengthening of the combat capability of the Ukrainian troops), then the religious issues remain beyond their control. It is quite obvious that the existence and functioning of the EP UOC will not only improve the religious situation in Ukraine, but will also strengthen the Ukrainian state and help to defeat the Russian aggressor. However, the main obstacle to the unification of all Orthodox denominations in the EP of the UOC is the existence in Ukraine of a regional branch of the Orthodox Church of the UOC-MP, the clergy and believers of which, in the overwhelming majority, are supporters of the «Russіan world» and sympathizers of the anti-Ukrainian policy of the Russian Federation. The sermon in all the Ukrainian churches of the UOC-MP, the imperial chauvinistic postulates, the «russmirovskih- of Russіan world « ideologues, the capitulations, etc., disorient the public and does not contribute to the grouping of society under the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. Moreover, some of the most ancient spiritual and sacred monuments of the UOC-Kyiv Pechersk Lavra and Pochayiv Lavra have turned into criminal centers of anti-Ukrainian activities. Taking into account that the first of them is in the capital of Ukraine, and the second one on the adjacency of Volhynia with the Western Podillya, they have opportunities and really influence the considerable weakening of Ukrainian state-building, nation- 120 building, ethno-cultural and religious processes and, in turn, increase the growth of Proputin, proimperial and about totalitarian sentiment in Ukraine. Thus, the criminal and terrorist activities of the UOC-MP in the temporarily occupied Crimea and in the so-called «Separate Regions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts» should be a separate topic of a special analytical study. In this critical situation, the greatest danger to Ukrainian statehood is the existence of such a pro-Putin-imperial «soft» but extremely powerful UOC- MP, as well as a large number of its sympathizers in Ukraine. Recall that the so-called «Russian Spring» in 2014 is a vivid consequence of quarter- century anti-Ukrainian activities of the UOC-MP, and tens of thousands of dead, wounded, injured and displaced persons are a terrible result of the religious authorities’ neglect of the national authorities. That is why we are fully solidarized with Y.Potapenko, who stated: «I am not inclined to join the idea of the prohibition on the activities of the UOC-MP in Ukraine, but the anti-state attacks of the leaders of this institution must still be firmly and resolutely responsive to the state, officially diplomatic level ... The loyalty of a significant number of citizens from the south-eastern regions to the ideas of the «Russіan world» testifies that part of Ukraine still can not be mentally, ideologically and politically detached from hostile civilization, an aggressor country, still erebuvaye depending on its cultural matrix and mental stereotypes «[14, p.298]. But apart from the domestic Ukrainian aspect, this problem is still geopolitical. In this regard, Patriarch Filaret emphasizes: «The only Local Church in Ukraine is the path to reconciliation in the world Orthodoxy, because it is no less numerous than the Russian Church. And she received Christianity from Kyiv, and not vice versa – Kyiv from Moscow. Therefore, they have no reason to claim primacy in Orthodoxy. And if this competition is not there, peace and harmony will come» [18]. On June 17–26, 2016, on the island of Crete (Greece), the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church took place, which became a notable phenomenon in world Orthodoxy. Although it did not de jure address the issue of settling the algorithm for the acquisition of autocephaly and the association and recognition of the EP UOC, but de facto the program documents of the cathedral fixed provisions that should eventually contribute to the solution of the Ukrainian religious question. To the right opinion of O.Yeremeyev of the establishment of the EP of the UOC is important and necessary not only for the harmonization of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy but also for the further development of the Ecumenical Orthodox 121 because the ROC will lose the quantitative superiority in the parishes and faithful, which will make impossible further attempts to implement the theory of «Moscow – Third Rome» and her modern manifestation - the doctrine of the «Russіan world», which the Ecumenical Patriarch recognized «arrogant» [10, p.850]. Due to this, the spiritual crisis of Russian Orthodoxy will not turn into a universal Orthodox crisis, and therefore – a real way will be opened to overcome the separation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and in connection with the fact that Ukraine is a country which according to the number of believers is one of the greatest, then the harmonization of relations between the Orthodox in it will have a positive effect on the all- Orthodox level [10, p.850]. Based on the above, it is extremely important that the Ukrainian authorities begin to take the first steps towards the establishment of the EP of the UOC. One of the first swallows before this was the Appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the Ecumenical Patriarch of February 16, 2016, which was officially taken for consideration by the Synod of the Constantinople Patriarchate and created a commission for its study [3, p.852–853]. We hope that in the future this positive manifestation will become a nationwide trend, and domestic legislative, executive and judicial authorities will unite their efforts to create and operate the EP of the UOC. In our opinion, the decision of this important religious issue to the state bodies must be joined by conscious citizens and public organizations. Overcoming Orthodox disunity and uniting political Ukrainianity will create a synergistic effect that will help restore the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and create an SLUOC. Thus, for the final victory over the Russian aggressor, apart from military, geopolitical, diplomatic, political, economic, ethno-cultural, etc., it will necessarily be necessary to engage also the sacred-spiritual factor – the unification of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the EP of the UOC and its national-patriotic state activity in the name of building a democratic, spiritual, legal, innovative, wealthy and powerful Ukrainian independent congregation State. The sixth factor is civilization. From the very beginnings of the birth and formation of Ukrainians as a self-sufficient ethnos (middle I millennium BC), Ukrainian ethnic lands have always belonged to European civilization, at the time of the East Roman. Kievan Rus (Rus, Russian land, Ukraine-Rus, etc.) was created and developed primarily under the powerful influence of Byzantine statehood and culture. The collapse of Kievan Rus-Ukraine and 122 the conquest by the enemy of the Galician-Volyn kingdom initially deprived Ukrainians of their own statehood, of the political elite, of economic freedom, which in turn led to national and religious oppression. In the end, the policy of Khmelnytsky became a worthy answer to this historic challenge. For a short time Hetmanate turned into a powerful Eastern European state, a subject of international policy, which friends and enemies had to reckon with. The elimination of serfdom, religious oppression, the development of advanced bourgeois relations, the creation of the Cossack (Ukrainian) nation – this is only an incomplete list of the most important achievements of the Ukrainian national revolution of the middle of the XVII century. However, the confrontation and mutual struggle within the proletarian-hetman elite and the gradual reorientation of the Hetmanate from the European civilization to the Eurasian led to the fact that its achievements were not fixed and due to its incompleteness the then Ukrainian national liberation revolution was defeated. After the revolutionary uprising, the Ruin came. Despite the failure, the Cossack Revolution has restored the faith of Ukrainians in their state-building forces. The Left-Bank Hetmanate existed for 135 years and contributed to the preservation of the Ukrainian ethno-cultural space and the national-cultural revival of the nineteenth century. The next Ukrainian national revolution of 1917–1921 was a consequence of the First World War and the European civilization crisis. Of the six largest empires in the world that began this war, only two survived – British and French. German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian – collapsed. It was from the ruins of the latter that the Russian and Ukrainian revolutions took place. Unfortunately, the imperial thinking of Russian revolutionary democrats and the little Russianship of the Ukrainian socialists, as well as the small bourgeoisie, contributed to their defeat and the victory of the Russian Bolsheviks. The vast majority of Ukrainian peasants and proletarians did not want to support the Ukrainian revolution. They believed in the Bolshevik slogans («Earth to peasants», «Plants and factories to workers», «Wars to the end», «Peace to huts, war to palaces», etc.) and preserved for the most part neutrality. Later, the fire of peasant uprisings was fueled by the Bolshevik occupation armada. Somewhat later, for this indifference, namely from 1929–1933, many of them paid the lives and deaths of their relatives. In turn, the then Ukrainian middle class (urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals and military personnel, and others) could not capture the military-political and revolutionary situation, did not find an understanding, and their leaders «quarreled» between themselves 123 and «conquered» themselves for joy Russian and Ukrainian Bolsheviks. So again, Ukraine lost the opportunity to return to European civilization and remained in the Eurasian totalitarian Communist-Bolshevik camp. Despite the defeat of the social revolution and the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people in 1917–1921 and the restoration of the Russian Empire in the format of the USSR, the winners were forced to give the Dnipro a formal status of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR). In connection with the adoption of a new so-called The Stalinist constitution in 1937 became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). Although it was really a continental neocolonium that was exploited and exploited no longer in the name of the king-father, but with the aim of building a «All-planet (Zemsharna) republic» and the victory of the world proletarian revolution. In the end, the USSR lasted for almost 69 years and self-destructed, and the formal USSR became a post-Soviet, post- totalitarian, post-genocidal country within the CIS. At the same time, if the former Soviet Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) started to actively overcome the consequences of colonialism, totalitarianism and began the path of reforms, which subsequently opened their way to NATO and the EU, then Ukraine once again failed to upgrade the political elite and did not change the post-Soviet vector development, constantly balancing between the European and Euro-Asian choices. Thus, since the birth of the Ukrainian ethnic community (the boundary of the IV–V centuries), the formation of the first pre-Ukrainian multi-ethnic empire of Kievan Rus (end of the X-th century) and the middle of the XVIII century. Ukraine was in the continuum of European civilization. However, after the submission of the Hetmanate to the Moscow kingdom, Ukraine gradually becomes part of the Eurasian civilization. For a while, Western Ukraine has joined the Dnieper with Europe, but after the Second World War the so-called «iron curtain» separated Ukraine from European civilization. Over three hundred years of Ukrainians staying in the Eurasian geopolitical space imposed a strong imprint on them. Therefore, despite the restoration of the Ukrainian state in 1991, Ukraine could not completely break the Eurasian civilization net. However, the armed and informational aggression of the Russian Federation, the struggle against the enemy and the strengthening of its own state should help the Ukrainians, in the end, to get rid of Eurasianism and return to the womb of the maternal European civilization. 124 * * * Thus, after analyzing Russian military and informational aggression against Ukrainians and the contemporary sociopolitical consequences of the war in the east and south of Ukraine in 2014–2017, one can conclude that this is not an ordinary armed confrontation over land, natural resources, population, etc., and civilizational conflict. In the end, if it is not stopped in time, it can lead to the Third World War. Despite the quantitative and qualitative advantage of the aggressor, Ukraine stopped armed invasion of the attackers. As to the socio-political consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war, they can be characterized in two main dimensions: geopolitical and intra-Ukrainian. The geostrategic aspect involves a rigorous response to violators of international law and interstate agreements; reforming the Euro-Atlantic defense alliance in the context of modern geopolitical and geostrategic challenges and the peculiarities of armed and hybrid confrontation; strengthening of information security and counteraction to total fake propaganda and cyber attacks from the Russian Federation; A lightning-fast response to the violation of any border aggressors as members of NATO, as well as EU countries and associated states, which can be identified with European civilization. In turn, regional, intra-Ukrainian discourse is directly connected with the strengthening of such determinants in the development of Ukraine, the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian society, such as: militarization (cofinancing, rearmament, reformation and Ukrainianization of the army); state-owned (reformatting and eliminating the clan-oligarchic model and building a legal, democratic, high-tech and wealthy Ukrainian Self-Associated State); national (the creation of a Ukrainian political nation); ethno-cultural (Ukrainianization of the state of Ukraine, expansion of the use of the native language and the preservation of ethnic and cultural customs and traditions by Ukrainians), religious (the creation of the EP UOC) and civilization (the return of Ukraine and Ukrainians to the geopolitical, geo-economic and geocultural space of European civilization).

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REACTION OF THE WESTERN MASS MEDIA TO THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR (2014–2015) 136 Chapter 4

Iryna KRASNODEMSKA

(Candidate of Historical Sciences, Lead research fellow of the Historical Studies Department of Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Kyiv)

REACTION OF THE WESTERN MASS MEDIA TO THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR (2014–2015)*

From the beginning of 21st century on the European continent there is a tense geopolitical rivalry between two important world political centers of influence – the EU and the Russian Federation, which consistently em- body in principle different directions of integration in the interstate projects of the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. If the EU is pursuing a policy of expanding and raising a number of partner countries that would formulate their domestic and foreign policies on democratic principles, the Russian Federation seeks to turn these countries into their exclusive interests, exporting them to the Eurasian (authoritarian) state model with the so-called «Managed democracy» and the foundation, under its own care, of a strong, integrated formation that would operate in accordance with its principles and outlooks. In particular, Russia’s «share and rule» policy towards its neighbors was put put to the test by Russia in 1992 when in Moldova, in the region- Transnistria, it was created the so-called Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (TMR), and in the case of Georgia: in 1992–1993, by direct military assistance to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists, and in August 2008, direct military aggression, which resulted that Russian troops occupsied Abkhazia and South Ossetia in full. Moreover, Russia recognized the «independent states» controlled by itself Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Due to the «multi-vector» of its foreign policy, Ukraine gradually became the center of a geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the EU. Russia tried to prevent the European integration of Ukraine and subordinate it to its own geopolitical goals. It shoud be noted that the Rus- * Translation from Ukrainian: Alexander Kislyuk. 137 sian policy towards Ukraine has passed three stages of development: 1) a soft conviction in Eurasian integration under the protection of the Russian Federation; 2) harsh coercion (by using of political, diplomatic, economic, energy, information levers of influence); 3) direct military aggression from 2014. Following the victory in February 2014 of the Revolution of Dignity, the leadership of the Russian Federation openly embarked on the actual destruction of the independent Ukrainian state: by the Russian troops was occupied the Crimea, and after the so-called «people’s referendum» that took place there on March 16, 2014 under the blows of Russian ma- chine guns, after a few days the RF annexed the peninsula. On the part of the Donbass, with the direct participation of Russian military-political structures and various mercenaries, local pro-Russian collaboraters announced on April 7, 2014, the so-called «Donetsk People’s Republic» DPR and April 27, 2014 – «Luhansk People’s Republic» LPR. All these are the consequences of the chauvinistic great-power policy of the ruling elite of Russia, which considered the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and Ukraine’s independence as a «disappointment with a historical misunderstanding». West media coverage of the Russian aggression in the Crimea (february-march, 2014) Despite the fact that the historic changes that took place in Ukraine under the influence of EuroMaydan (November 30, 2013 – February 23, 2014) and the Russian aggression 2014–2016 years requires some time for their comprehension, yet we will try to follow the transformation of world public opinion about these events. The Russian-Ukrainian War in the south and east of Ukraine, which has been going on for more than 3 years, was preceded by the Revolution of Dignity (December 2013 – February 2014). It was the foreign media of the beginning of 2014 that devoted considerable attention to the publication of a photo from the Maidan in Ukraine, various informational and analytical articles that highlighted the course of the confrontation and expressed hopes for change, reflection on values, calls for sanctions and the overthrow of the then President Viktor Yanukovych, fears of the civil war and the Yugoslav scenario. A special resonance («concern») was caused by the attempts of bloody overthrow of the Maidan and mass executions on February 18–19, 2014, «The Most Bloodshed during Ukraine’s Independence», «The Last 138 Ukrainian Front», «Plunge into a Confusion» – Such words described events of February 18–21, 2014 in the world of mass media. In particular, the German magazine Frankfurter Allgemeine on February 18 urged the western community to try to prevent further bloodshed in Ukraine and noted that «in Kyiv today it is about the country’s future and about many more». «Ukraine has reached a point at which the risk of a civil warincredibly great. The blame lies in the regime of President Yanukovych, because he sabo- taged the possibility of a political solution», – noted in the newspaper [13]. The German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung on February 19 published an article «Kyiv in the Fire – Understanding of Negotiations wasn’t reached», in which it reported the tragic events the killed, wounded as a result of night clashes on Maidan. On February 20, Der Spiegel Online International, the Daily Mail, («Reflected the Evil Empire and the Nation at the Civil War») spoke about the importance of confrontation in Ukraine on a global scale, warned about the possibility of deploying a civil war in the country. In these publications, the blame for the exacerbation of the situation in the center of Kiev was relied on the president of Russia Vladimir Putin, who wants to restore the Soviet Union and is forcing Ukrainians to join the alliance with Moscow [6]. However, not all media were unequivocal in their position regarding Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanukovych and their role in the bloodshed in late February. So, on the German TV channel ARD appeared transmis- sion-investigation of the crime, which stated that not the former President Viktor Yanukovych and his special-appointed guilty of assassinations, but the protesters themselves. Howeverl, such programs did not appear on the main German channels later [13]. «The image of bodies punctured by bullets and molded among the semi-elaborate fractures of destruction, as well as medical workers who screw casualties and wounded the emergency services, some of which are located in the lobby of the hotel, shocked the country and the world» – such a picture of the events in Kyiv was depicted by the American newspaper The New York Times to its readers on February 21 [6]. Welcoming the signing of the crisis resolution agreement on Feb- ruary 21, 2014, the German mass media expressed grave concern about Ukraine’s political uncertainty and called on the Ukrainian political elite not to repeat the mistakes made after the Orange Revolution of 2004 [37]. At that time, the Germans were not very sympathetic to George So- ros’s idea of the new Marshall Plan for Ukraine, since they were unhappy 139 with the financing of the German taxpayers of the eurozone crisis countries and did not want to find additional funds for the Marshall new plan [38]. German editions (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Allgemeine Zeitung), having paid considerable attention to political changes in Ukraine and the future of Ukraine, urged it, after normalization of the situation, to return to the course on European integration, from which Viktor Yanukovych de- scend drew attention [5]. Die Welt newspaper in the article «Ukraine in the EU? A good illusion» is responding to the prospect of a possible membership of Kiev: «Changes in Ukraine were so insulting that the power of the Maidan seemed to some to the infinite. Y.Tymoshenko says that her country can become a member of the EU in a short time» [5]. «Ukraine is a European country, historically and today. However, euphoria is a bad advisor. The European Union should help Ukraine quickly. However, he should not be confused with the pathos of freedom and breakthrough in Ukraine. ... The EU needs to protect Ukrainians from disappointment and therefore to allow convergence today, but to say no to the prospect of accession. ... The lesson of the expansion stages is: membership at a time when countries are ripe – and not long before hoping that this will happen», – writes Florian Eder in the pages of this newspaper [5]. The newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in the article «Ukrainian scenarios» analyzes the challenges that the possible development of the situation in Ukraine puts before the North Atlantic Alliance. «NATO has not yet had a thorough discussion of the scenarios and prob- abilities that may take place in Ukraine in the coming days and weeks. The first exchange of views is scheduled for dinner, which was invited by defense ministers during their meeting in Brussels. According to diplomats, it is obvious that the situation in the country after the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych has not stabilized. In their opinion, separation, civil war or military intervention of Russia is still possible. The most dangerous scenario would be the military intervention of Russia, for example, in order to «liberate» the Crimea. After experience with the Russian invasion of Georgia «for the protection of Russian citizens» in NATO, a priori do not exclude such actions», – notes the magazine [5]. The Austrian edition in his editorial Die Presse called: «It’s time to drive Yanukovych!» [13]. Concerns of German society caused Russia’s actions aimed at the annexation of Crimea. Such actions were seen as Putin’s attempt to «na- 140 tionalize» the Russian elite and continue to build a regime of authoritarian «sovereign democracy» [39]. Support on March 1, 2014 by both chambers of the State Duma of Russia, the treatment of the President of Russia V. Putin on the permission to use the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine was interpreted by the German press as a «controlled escalation» of events around the Crimea [39]. At the same time, the US media condemned violence on both sides and drew attention to the warnings of the administration of the US president regarding the introduction of a state of emergency in Ukraine. This, in particular, was mentioned in the article «The Ukrainian leader is grasp- ing for power against the background of the spread of chaos» (The New York Times) with reference to the words of the representative of the US Department of State. In addition, the publication noted that the country is immersed in «an even greater mess» [6]. One of the major topics in the American press was the political divisions of Ukrainian society. Time magazines, The Washington Post, USA Today, and others. wrote about Ukraine as a divided country standing between the past and the future, and pointed to a different attitude toward then-President V. Yanukovych (hostile – in the west, favored in the east of Ukraine). Describing those violent events as the most brutal in the history of independent Ukraine, they noted that Kyiv is on the verge of a «turning point». According to John Will, a political columnist for the Washington Post, the situation in Ukraine is likely to be «the final episode of the Cold War». «The agony of Ukraine is an echo of the process of stripping after a» prolonged «experiment», he wrote, referring to the «experiment» of the existence of the Soviet Union [6]. After the escape of Viktor Yanukovych, the top theme of the Ukrain- ian issue in the western mass media was the occupation, and then the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation. Since the beginning of March 2014, the Washington Post magazine published dozens of articles devoted to this issue. In particular, «Crimea sets referendum on joining Russia», «Crimea’s parliament votes to join Russia», «U.S. warns Russia against annexing Crimea», «Crimeans vote to break away from Ukraine, join Russia», «Russia recognizes Crimea’s independence, defying new US and EU sanctions», «The dubious Crimean referendum on annexation by Russia», «Kremlin says Crimea is now officially part of Russia after treaty signing, Putin’s speech», «What is moti- 141 vating Putin?», «The downsides of Crimea for Russia», «Building a federal Ukraine?», «Russia celebrates Crimea annexation while Ukraine looks to West for support», «US warns Russia against annexing Crimea», etc. We consider it necessary to dwell briefly on the main historical moments of occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in Febru- ary-March 2014 and to show the reaction to these events of the western mass media. Initially, on February 23, a 20 thousandth rally took place in Sev- astopol, where it was decided not to transfer taxes to Kyiv and the citizen of Russia O. Chalyi was proclaimed as a mayor. On February 27, 2014, unidentified «green men» (Russian militants, special forces) in a military uniform without identification marks, with the participation of local pro-Russian militants, seized the buildings of the parliament and the Crimean government. Meanwhile, deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea sought to implement their ideas on separation from Ukraine and accession to Russia as soon as possible (which President Obama, the new government in Kyiv and European leaders considered provocative and illegal). So they gathered for an extraordinary session and decided to hold a referendum on the future of the Crimea on March 16, 2014 to confirm this decision [23] (originally scheduled for May 25, then later on March 30). In particular, the Crimeans should answer the question of the restoration of the Crimean Constitution in 1992 and the entry of the Crimea into Russia. The announcement of the referendum took place contrary to the Ukrainian legislation, which does not provide for local referendums; and the question of changing the borders of Ukraine should be made exclusively on an all-Ukrainian referendum. Despite the decree of the then acting president of Ukraine O.Turchinov about the suspension of the decision of the Crimean parliament, the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which recognized the announcement of a referendum in Crimea in a manner that was not in line with the Constitution of Ukraine, as well as the position of the UN Security Council, the pseudo-referendum was held. The so-called «international observers», whom the Russian Federation and the Crimean separatists allowed to work on the «referendum» on the peninsula, were representatives of ultra-right, neo-Nazi and communist European parties and persons with Nazi and pro-communist views. During two weeks, pro-Russian forces held large rallies in Crimea, while pro-Ukrainian rallies were smaller and more sporadic. The Crimean government stopped airing Ukrainian television programs and substituted them with programs from Moscow. Pro-Ukrainian activists and journalists 142 were detained as the regional government warned that provocateurs might cause problems, and some complained of being beaten by vigilantes, – the American The Washington Post wrote on March 17 [26]. She also noted that in the conditions of boycotting the referendum by the Crimean Tatar people, the presence of a large number of armed Russian servicemen, as well as falsifications, according to the report of the Crimean electoral spokesman M.Malyshev, 127,4096 Crimeans (83.1% of the total number of voters voted in the referendum in the ARC) ), of which 1023 002 (96,77%) «for the reunification with the Russian Federation» and 31997 (2,51%) «against», 9097 ballots were invalid [24; 26]. Most Crimean Tatars, the Muslim minority, did not vote. At some polling stations, according to officials, no Tatar was registered during the day [26]. «This is is totally illegitimate, and I can can’t bear to think about how things will be afterward», said T.Zhytov, 40, said. «I am Russian, and my husband is a Tatar. We never had any problems. Life in Ukraine is not perfect, but it was peaceful. Now Russia is trying to divide us», wrote the publication [26]. The correspondent of The Washington Post, Ilya Somin, in his article «The dubious Crimean referendum on annexation by Russia», noted that «the referendum result was “achieved” by fraud and/or intimidation – tactics which the Putin regime had previously resorted to in Russia itself. The likelihood of fraud is also suggested by the fact that even some Russian journalists were forcibly prevented from observing the vote count and had their camera smashed by officials» [28]. One of the facts of pressure on journalists is the American USA To- day. According to an independent reporter from Cyprus Tatyana Tkachen- ko, she was questioned until 4 o’clock in the morning in a cold room under the blow of an automaton and threatened to be put in prison for espionage, but subsequently released [63]. In the opinion of the American journalist, television presenter, blog- ger B. Friedman, «the reality that the really intimidating aspect of the situation for potential opponents of annexation is that Crimea is now under the control of a regime with an extensive record of persecuting political dissenters. The possibility of persecution or harrassment after the fact is in itself intimidating, regardless of whether troops directly intimidated people at polling places or not» [28]. Speaking in those days several times with Putin, Obama stated said that the referendum «would never be recognized by the United States and 143 the international community» and that «we are prepared to impose additional costs on Russia for its actions» [25]. US President Obama reiterat- ed «that a diplomatic resolution cannot be achieved while Russian military forces continue their incursions into Ukrainian territory and that the large- scale Russian military exercises on Ukraine’s borders only exacerbate the tension» [25]. In a telephone conversation with US Secretary of State John Kerry, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that «the results should be a starting point in determining the future of the peninsula». … In turn, John Kerry confirmed that the US government did not recognize the results of the referendum and expressed serious concerns about Russian military activities near the Crimean border and the continuation of provocations in eastern cities of Ukraine [24; 25]. Shortly after of this the call, the Foreign Ministry of Russia noted with cautious optimism that both sides «agreed to continue working toward a solution to the crisis through an earliest possible launch of constitutional reform in Ukraine» [25]. The results of the «referendum on self-determination» of Crimea, which took place on March 16, 2014, did not become a sensation for the Germans who denied any analogy with the Kosovo problem. It was explained by the fact that the European course of Serbia has some contradictions. On the one hand, Serbia seeks to ensure that Kosovo’s independence is not tied to its accession to the EU, but on the other hand it tries to use the EU to put pressure on Kosovo. In fact, the financial and economic dependence of Kosovo remains a major factor in the weakness of its independence. There- fore, Kosovo balances on the verge of separating the states «that have taken place» from states that are recognized as «problematic» [7, p. 172]. March 18, 2014 The Washington Post published a thorough analysis of Putin’s speech in the Kremlin on the signing of the «Treaty on the Adop- tion of Crimea in Russia». Although in his speech, Putin compared the accession of the Crimea to the Russian Federation with the independence of Kosovo in 2008 and the reunification of Germany in 1990, but in reality, this is the first time that one European nation has seized territory from another since the end of World War II, – the newspaper wrote [30]. In March 2014, the Canadian daily The Globe and Mail published a statement by the then prime minister of Canada Stephen Joseph Harper’s statement that V.Putin has violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum where Ukraine relinquished its share of the Soviet arsenal of nuclear weapons 144 «on the basis of an explicit Russian guarantee of its territorial integrity». J.Harper also announced he would restart free-trade talks with Ukraine, a show of support for the country’s new leadership [66]. Correspondents from The Globe and Mail from the very beginning of the crisis in Ukraine traced events on the spot. Senior international correspondent Mark MacKinnon, European bureau chief (now Editor of Report on Business) Paul Waldie and international affairs columnist Doug Saun- ders were there as protests swelled in the snowy Maidan in Kiev in No- vember and when protesters were killed in the streets in February before the sudden ouster of President V.Yanukovych. They reported on the rise of right-wing nationalists in the capital and the growing separatist sentiment in Russian-speaking regions that saw Russia’s shock annexation of Crimea in March, the massing of Russian troops on the Ukraine border and separatist in eastern Ukraine. «Crimea vote will deepen chasm between Moscow and West», «Diplomats running out of ways to stop slide toward war in Eastern Europe», – reported the publication [35]. The Russian government has banned entry to 13 Canadian senior civil servants and politicians in retaliation for punitive actions that Ottawa levied on Moscow elite over the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Ukraine. But «Canadian officials named today by Russia aren’t oligarchs; they aren’t people threatening to annex peaceful neighbours by military force», – told reporters Foreign Affairs Minister Canada John Baird [54]. In those boisterous days, the German edition of Bild argued that Russia planned an annexation of the Crimea long before the events of 2014. Referring to the Lithuanian border guards, the article describes the case of two people who were detained during a trip from Kaliningrad to Russia through Lithuania. In 1992 and 1994, the detainees seized passports, where Odesa and Crimea were designated as the birthplace, marked as territories of the Russian Federation. The authors of the publication note that one of the confiscated documents was issued on December 24, 2013, the other one – «could have been in effect since 2011» [14]. «This document is a blatant proof of Russia’s official position regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula», Bild writes, specifying that citizens of Russia with such passports banned travel through Lithuania. In addition, the article publishes samples of the documents [14]. 145 The annexation of the Crimea in the German media was called the price for non-alignment of Ukraine with the Customs Union. Among the top ranking politicians in Germany, only the finance minister, the Christian democrat Wolfgang Schoubble, was publicly comparing Putin’s actions in the Crimea with Hitler’s actions against the Sudeten Germans [7, p.172]. In an interview with the German press, former head of the former Rus- sian oil company Yukos, M.Khodorkovsky predicted that Western sanctions would push the elite out of Putin, and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine would provoke a civil war in Russia. Before the acting president of Ukraine O.Turchynov called for consent for a referendum on federalizationUkraine, seeing in the rejection of this «propaganda» of the Ukrainian-Russian war. In an attempt to prevent such a scenario, German Chancellor Merkel offered to host round tables in Ukraine on national reconciliation between East and West without discussing the status of the Russian language and the non-aligned status of Ukraine [7, p.172]. Along with the German, the Polish weekly Rzeczpospolita paid much attention to the problems of Ukrainian-Russian relations, which at that time intensified due to the annexation of Crimea and manifestations of separatism in the east of Ukraine. In it 28 articles were published on this subject. The magazine is actively opposed to Moscow’s proposal to lift the restrictions that were previously imposed on Ukrainian producers in exchange for the refusal of Kiev from the Association Agreement with the EU (R.Sovsun, «Russian» carrot «for Ukraine»). The authors of the articles, for the most part, condemn the annexation of the Crimea and the violation of Ukrainian borders (V.Guretsky, «Under the example of the Crimea, Putin can annex a part of Kazakhstan»). Journalists of the journal indicate a real threat of Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine and express support for the Ukrainian people in connection with pro-Russian separatist operations in the east of Ukraine (M.Michalak, «Ukraine: Passport Control at the Donbass Border»). In general, this section is devoted to 21% of publications, of which positive – 16%, negative – 5% [10, p.68]. According to U. Peresotskaya’s, the main themes of the March 2014 publications of the two commercial and most replicated Polish weekly papers Polityka and Newsweek Polska, which form the outlook of the Poles, are: the capture of the Crimean parliament by unknown armed people (Feb- ruary 27), staying «Green men» (February to March), holding a referendum (March 16) and signing in the Kremlin the document «The Treaty on the Adoption of the Crimea in Russia» (March 18) [9, p. 32] 146 The main trend in these Polish weekly papers is the coverage of the confrontation Simferopol – Kyiv, Ukraine – Russia, Crimea – Ukraine, Crimean self-defense – Ukrainian military, pro-Russian residents – Crime- an Tatars, Kremlin propaganda – foreign media. In some analytical critical materials there is an image of a Ukrainian and the author’s own opinion, a clear pro-Ukrainian position, and also contains an analytical material on the information war of Russia against Ukraine in Europe («Szósta kolumna Putina», «Druga wojna krymska») [9, p.36]. According to the journalist Polityka, «the black script, which is gaining popularity among some Polish politicians, suggests that Crimea is only the beginning of a great division of Ukraine, which can lose even a third of its territory in the east» [9, p.37]. After the so-called «Crimean referendum» in the world mass-media appeared publications about the need for immediate introduction of financial sanctions against Russian and Ukrainian civil servants involved in supporting the Crimean referendum and the annexation of the Crimea. Even then, The Washington Post, in its editorial, noted that Russia’s most powerful non-military tool is the Russian exclusion from its banking system. The United States of America and most Western countries said they did not recognize the results of the referendum, referring to the Rus- sian military occupation that had started then, and the crisis conditions under which «voting» was conducted [24; 13]. But until Russia ends its «provocative» troop movements, pulls its troops in Crimea back to their barracks and stops its partisans from agi- tating within Ukrainian cities, the official said, political overtures cannot be taken seriously [25]. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) said on Fox News Sunday: «Putin has started a game of Russian roulette, and I think that the United States and the West have to be very clear in their response, because he will calculate about how far he can go. So that means having very robust sanctions ready to go, starting with the Crimea vote and moving onward» [25]. He added: «I think the question will be, what does Russia do in response? And having those sanctions ready – whether it be against the defense minister, the federal security service, the secretary of their security council, possibly the executives of Gazprom and Rosneft, which are their oil and gas companies»… [25]. The U.S. sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans on some of Putin’s closest aides. The European Union separately announced sanctions 147 on 21 individuals, including several Russian military commanders. The Eu- ropean list did not include Kremlin aides [27]. Under the sanctions, one U.S. official said, «all assets are frozen; no U.S. person can do business with them. ... If they want to transact in dollars, for example, they will be unable to do so. They will be unable to send any money through the United States» [27]. «More broadly», this official said, «the people we designate will tend to find great difficulty in access- ing financial services elsewhere in the world, particularly in Europe and the Gulf» [27]. And while in Moscow politicians joked about sanctions, measures began to demonstrate effectiveness, and several hundreds of thousands of Russians felt their influence. Master Card and Visa suspended operations with the bank «Russia», «SMP Bank» and other small banks [34]. Another senior U.S. official emphasized that the measures were designed to block the «personal assets and wealth» of Putin «cronies» [27]. Some Republi- can lawmakers criticized the administration’s measures as insufficient. Sen. John McCain (Ariz.) called for «a far more significant response», saying that sanctioning only seven Russians «is wholly inadequate at this stage». Sen. Ted Cruz (Tex.) described U.S. policy toward Russia as «appease- ment» and called for an expanded American military presence in Eastern Europe [27]. Together with the US economic sanctions against Russia joined Germany. But these days, the vice-chancellor, Social Democrat Z.Gabriel, negotiated in Moscow to minimize the damage to the German business from sanctions [40]. It was heard in the German press and reservations from conducting direct historical parallels: «Putin is not Hitler, Crimea is not Sudeti, 2014 is not 1938» [41]. Interestingly, in our opinion, there is an analysis on Vladimir Putin’s statement of journalist Joshua Tucker on The Washington Post that it intends to make the Crimea a part of the Russian Federation and that the Russian Federation does not pretend outside the Crimea another territori- ums of Ukraine. He tried to explain the motivation for action Russian Pres- ident, their consequences and identified 4 main statements and argued them: 1) the importance of the Crimea for Russian security; 2) the «greater Russia» plan; 3) Crimea – Putin’s post-2011 new domestic constituen- cy; 4) the Euromaidan example as a threat to the Russian political regime. «These four explanations are, of course, not exclusive of all the arguments out there – and there are points of overlap between them – but I believe 148 they encompass many of them, and I hope they will be helpful for people trying to organize their thoughts about Russia, Ukraine and Crimea», – he remarked [31]. Timothy Fry, a political scientist at Columbia University, described the referendum in Crimea as a «joke wrapped in a farce within the tragedy», in the article «The downsides of Crimea for Russia». Voting among armed soldiers with counterfeit ballots and little time for public debate is unlikely to be the best practice» [32]. Focusing on the economic and political situation in Russia, the scientist asks whether the anticipation of a slow- ing economy and lower personal popularity in the future will make Russia more likely to repeat a Crimean scenario in Eastern Ukraine, Transdniestr, Kazakhstan or the Baltics as a way to divert attention from deeper problems or whether these negative trends would moderate Russian foreign policy? And it concludes «events in Crimea will likely divert Russia from addressing its most important problems. The annexation of Crimea – perhaps only the second such redistribution of territory between countries in post-war Europe – will prove a great boon to the Kremlin, but there are real downsides here for Moscow as well» [32]. «Insatiable» the influential British magazine The Economist came out with such an article and cover after the Russian annexation of Crimea expanded its aggression to eastern Ukraine [13]. «First, Vladimir Putin mauled Georgia, but the world forgave him – because Russia was too important to be cut adrift. Then he gobbled up Crimea, but the world accepted it – because Crimea should have been Russian all along. Now he has infiltrated eastern Ukraine, but the world is hesitating – because infiltration is not quite invasion. But if the West does not face up to Mr Putin now, it may find him at its door», – warned The Economist [13]. Political scientists of Oxford University G.Sace and London Univer- sity of Economics J.Hughes in his discourse, in his discourse «Building a federal Ukraine?» ponder on the positive and negative moments of the federal system, including its prospects for Ukraine, and two scenarios for future development. They believed that, firstly, «there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kyiv could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it 149 would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unrave- ling» [33]. Secondly, there could be a state-wide of constitutional reform may go through for the purpose of comprehensive federalization or decentralization, greater powers for all regions, the provision of self-governing powers in the cultural sphere (including language and education), economic governance, taxation and police activity. The election (and not the appointment of the president) of the regional governors is an important aspect of the reforms. This reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would almost certainly be international monitoring and ad- vice, – observing scientists [33]. Regarding the federalization of Ukraine, we note that along with some of its positive aspects (increasing the powers of territorial communities in relations with the center and mutual control of the two branches of power, the choice of ways and mechanisms for the development of specific regions, redistribution of financial flows, reducing the level of contradictions in society, etc.), given the current situation in the country, there are many and negative sides. First, federalization will lead to an even greater split within Ukraine, in particular, according to the language criterion in the Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking regions, which will further lead to conflict situations. Secondly, federalization is dangerous because of the different economic potential of the regions of Ukraine (west – agrarian, east – industrial). Unitary form of the state more or less allows to equal- ize the pace of development; in the federal state, the differences in the economic development of the regions will be aggravated. Thirdly, even if federalisation eliminates cultural contradictions between the regions, although there is no guarantee that this will be the case, it will not be able to assist in foreign policy, in particular, in terms of joining NATO, the EU, or even the Customs Union, and the common It will be very difficult to reach an opinion, if at all possible. Thus, in our opinion, the unitary state is characterized by greater unity, from the unity of state authorities, armed forces, the tax system, etc., to the unity of interests of citizens and territory, and only the unitary state can preserve the integrity of Ukraine today. 150 The American non-state fnalitical center «Stratfor» was speculating on trying to conceal the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, when he annexed the Crimea in 2014. It was noted that the price of annexation of the peninsula was actually too high for Moscow - Russian aggression forced NATO members to «strengthen their military presence in Eastern Europe», while Western countries – to impose numerous sanctions on Russia’s energy, finance and defense spheres. According to Andriy Illarionov, a former economic adviser to Putin, «Russia’s intervention in Ukraine cost Moscow at least $ 94 billion a year. It should also be remembered about the fall in oil prices and the economic crisis in which Russia was the result of aggression against Ukraine. All this became the high price that Russia had to pay for the annexation of the Crimea» [64]. Western politicians have long been trying to understand why Rus- sia has gone to such costs: someone was analyzing Putin’s actions as an attempt to return the former USSR territories; some thought that the annexation of the Crimea was a response to NATO’s continued expansion, but only a few drew attention to the internal causes of the Kremlin’s foreign aggression. The cost of the Olympics in Sochi, which took place on the eve of the annexation of the Crimea, caused the indignation of the Russian people – it was the most expensive Winter Olympic Games in history, costing about $ 50 billion. Some experts believe that part of the reason for the annexation could be a distraction from the Kremlin’s crazy costs for the Olympics and related corruption, as it pointed to even more serious problems within Russia. However, «interference in other countries is an expensive means to disguise contradictions within the country» [64]. The influential British financial newspaper Financial Times writes that the real battle for the future of Ukraine is currently under way in the economic sphere of the state. According to the author, the most important task of Ukraine is «the restoration of stability and economic prosperity, even if its territorial integrity is subjected to brutal pressure» [64]. The author believes that the Russian aggression was intended not to capture Ukrainian lands, but to destabilize the Ukrainian economy in order to weaken Ukraine as a state as much as possible. At the beginning of the conflict, the Kremlin managed to achieve its intended goal – as a result of Russian aggression, the hryvnia lost 70% of its value relative to the dollar, inflation began, and the economy of Ukraine suffered a significant decline. [64]. Three years later, the author sees a slightly different picture: macroe- 151 conomic stability has been achieved, and Ukraine has been on the path of economic recovery, the Ukrainian economy has achieved positive results. A Free Trade Agreement with the EU «creates an opportunity for Ukraine to become an integral part of the continental supply chain» [64]. Kyiv should do everything necessary for a successful onereforming its economy. Par- ticular attention needs to be paid to combating corruption, which is a major challenge for the development of a stable country. Summing up, the journalist notes that reforms, and not military capabilities, will help Ukraine achieve economic independence, noting that «reforms are and always were its most powerful weapon» [64]. The American newspaper The Washington Times reflects on the global ambitions of Putin. The author believes that the Russian president wants to return to Moscow its Soviet glory, transforming Russia into a full- fledged competitor of the United States. In order to achieve this, Putin must have control over Eastern and Central Europe, even if it leads to a serious deterioration of relations with the West, – the author notes [64]. The Kremlin’s encroachment on the status of a superpower is evident, the article says. The Russian military power was in bad shape after the collapse of the USSR, but now the Kremlin is rebuilding and modernizing its military potential. We must also remember the author observes that Russia still has a rather powerful nuclear arsenal that could seriously threaten the world, which the Russian leader very much likes to remind. [64]. The journalist notes that «Western agreements with corrupt Russian financial institutions and oligarchs are often closely linked to V.Putin’s own, whose personal wealth is considered to be larger than that of White Gates and Jeff Bezos, the richest people in the world» [64]. One of the prophets, in our opinion, can be considered an article. «Insatiable. The cost of stopping the Russian bear now is high – but it will only get higher if the West does nothing» (The Economist, April 19, 2014). It says that in 2008 Putin invaded Georgia, then annexed the Crimea, and the West was only watching because Russia «was too important to go against it.» But now, «That is why the West needs to show Mr.Putin that further action will be costly. So far, its rhetoric has marched far ahead of its willingness to act–only adding to the aura of weakness. Not enough is at stake in Ukraine to risk war with a nuclear-armed Russia», – the magazine writes [3]. 152 Russian-Ukrainian War in Eastern Ukraine in the West media discourse (2014-2015) In the West, it seems, for a long time could not believe in a phenomenon like «green men,» pseudo-referendums in the style of Stalin / Hitler possible in the 21st century. Along with the occupation, publications on the «Yugoslav script» for Ukraine began to be published more often. In April 2014, the second phase of the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine began, when armed groups controlled, managed and funded by Russian special services announced the creation of a so-called DPR (April 7) and LPR (April 27). Then Professor of Donetsk University I. Todorov on pages of the British The Guardian expressed his opinion on two scenarios of the future development of events in the east of Ukraine. Firstly, «Russia would annex the east of Ukraine, as it did last month with Crimea». Second, «Moscow would install a puppet regime analogous to the one in Trans-Dniester, the breakaway Moldovan region next to western Ukraine», – he said. And added that «there was a growing feeling that Ukraine would be better off dumping its troublesome eastern provinces and creating a modern European country without them» [43]. On the same days, The Guardian informed that «there is overwhelming support in eastern Ukraine for greater autonomy from Kiev, as well as for Russian to be given the status of an official state language. According to an opinion poll in February, though, the separatists are in the minority – with only 26% in the east supporting union with Russia» [43]. According to the Interfax-Ukraine news agency, UK foreign minister William Hague said on April 14 that behind the scenes of events in eastern Ukraine is Russia, which wants to destabilize the country and disrupt the presidential election. In particular, he remarked: «There can be no doubt that it was planned by Russia: the forces involved in it, well-armed, well-prepared, well-equipped and coordinated, behave in the same way as the Russian military behaved in the Crimea» [8]. According to Wil- liam Hague, «there are all signs of further growing deliberate violation of Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty, and it is also very dangerous. ... Part of what we see in Russia’s behavior is deliberate destabilization of Ukraine and a threat to (presidential) elections. Therefore, there must be a clear international response ... It is very important to react to what Russia has done», – said the Foreign Minister of Great Britain [8]. 153 Achieving consensus among the 28 EU member states is a complex process. In discussing the issue of extending sanctions against Russia, not to mention the introduction of new restrictive measures, serious differences persist between the 28 member states of the EU and there are ongoing discussions on this issue. Among the EU countries, on the one hand, there are «hawks» that call for a tough confrontation with Russia, strengthening economic sanctions and providing more active support to Ukraine. Some even assume the possibility of supplying weapons to Ukraine for protection. From the beginning, such a hard line was chosen by Poland, the Baltic States, and to a lesser extent Romania. For each of these countries, there are their own motifs, which are connected, first of all, with recent history. The United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries are also attracted to this group [15]. At the same time, some EU countries took a mixed stand against Ukraine and Russia in the current wars. They are conventionally called «Russia’s understanders» («those who understand Russia»). France, the southern member states of the Union (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, countries of Southeastern Europe) are in no hurry to confront Russia through Ukraine. It is possible that some EU countries may continue to veto new sanctions against Russia or block their continuation. Such intentions have repeatedly been voiced in government circles in Italy, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Greece and Hungary. Separate reservations at different times were put forward by representatives of the power structures of the Czech Republic, Austria and France [15]. Despite the fact that the position of Poland and the Baltic states that have long pointed to the threat from Russia has for some time been a minority position, and these countries have been called panicers, with the increase in aggressive behavior of Russia and the intensification of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, it has gradually become the position of the majority [15]. The largest role in this process was played by the Federal Repub- lic of Germany, in particular its Chancellor A.Merkel, who discovered Rus- sia’s unexpected unwavering solidarity and firmness over Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine. This one Kremlin’s steadfastness was all the more unexpected, since Russia consistently tried to turn Germany into its center of influence in Western Europe, giving preferences to German business and drawing German politicians into their own projects. Despite all of Germany, it took the initiative of the head of the West European countries to stop Russian aggression. The result of this initiative was the implemen- 154 tation of a single EU policy in the area of diplomatic and economic pressure on Moscow and overcoming the resistance of a number of EU-oriented countries [15]. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland D.Tusk, commenting on the start of the ATO in eastern Ukraine, said that «Ukrainians have acted rationally today, refraining from a sharp reaction to the actions of separatists. But the moment has come when the Ukrainian state must begin to act decisively». He also stressed that «he agrees with the position of the Ukrainian authorities regarding the perception of separatists in eastern Ukraine as terrorists. Putin will be delayed where Ukraine will allow. Therefore, Kyiv must take its own hands and decide itself when it will fight for the territorial integrity of the country and what means it will use» [17]. According to the head of the Polish government, no third party will be more involved in the defense of Ukraine than the Ukrainians themselves [17]. On April 15, 2014, before the EU Council meeting at the level of defense ministers of the 28 EU member states in Luxembourg, NATO Sec- retary General, A.F.Rasmussen, in turn, accused Russia of involvement in separatist unrest in eastern Ukraine. In particular, he stated that «Russia’s behavior and local events speak for themselves. We fundamentally do not comment on intelligence, but it is obvious that Russia’s hands are actively involved in this» [2]. Thus, the seizure of pro-Russian militants, Russian saboteurs and mercenaries of administrative buildings on the Donbass in the spring of 2014 led to the so-called the Crimean scenario of an anti-constitutional referendum (nobody recognized the «popular will») regarding the independence of the DPR and LPR, which took place on May 11, 2014. The militants, with active assistance from the local authorities, simply captured the boxes for voting with the Ukrainian emblem, voter lists, formed «commis- sions» and sent to the addresses a few days later, and then printed on the xerox «ballots», which had one question: «Do you support the act of state independence of the DPR (LPR)?». Most people who went to this «referendum» did not realize its ille- gality, and someone went «dreaming» about Russian pensions and sal- aries, and so on. In order to create the visibility of mass voting, terrorists resorted to intimidation, promises of paradise life «both in Russia and the Crimea» and simply opened a small number of polling stations in order to have queues there. As a result, Russian TV channels got the right picture – the people of Donbass mass referendum. According to the initiators of 155 the referendum, the turnout of voters in the Donetsk region amounted to 74.87%. «For» voted 89,07 percent, «against» – 10,19 percent, and 0,74 percent of the ballots were spoiled [76]. After announcing the results of the «referendum» the next day – May 12, a statement was made on the appeal of the DPR to consider the issue of its membership in the Russian Federa- tion, as well as announced the prospects of association with the Luhansk People’s Republic to the «state» «Novorossiia» [77]. During May 2014, their self-nomadic leaders (among which there were many Russian citizens), held unofficially fictitious referendums on the separation of these illegitimate entities from Ukraine. At that time, under the pretext of those «referenda» and in support of illegal territorial formations, intelligence and sabotage groups headed by personnel of the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, paramilitary formations of the Russian Cossacks, staffed by Chechens – citizens of the Rus- sian Federation, the infamous battalion «Vostok» and also involved such armed groups of mercenaries as the «Russian sector» and «Oplot». By Their involvement involved the seizure of administrative buildings in many settlements of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, attacks on Ukrainian ground forces and airplanes of the Air Forces of Ukraine. Controlled, guided and funded by the Russian armed forces involved in an aggressive war against Ukraine, they were regularly fed up with Russian mercenaries from among the Russian Armed Forces released to the reserve and supplies of weapons and military equipment, including tanks, artillery systems, anti-tank fighting and modern anti-aircraft missile systems. When military actions began and the first victims appeared, some journalists, such as the correspondent of The Economist, T.Judah, compared the causes of this war with the causes of Yugoslav conflict. In April 2014, in the article «Ukraine: A Fake War?» The New York Review of Books website, he wrote: «Ukraine is not like Yugoslavia, although the atmosphere in the east is very similar to a combination of insults and despair» [36]. While in the eastern Ukraine in April 2014, T.Judah described in detail the events of that time. While communicating with people in those days, he noted that some of them supported the federalization of Ukraine, others wanted the Donbass to become a part of Russia. As an example, he gives an appearance before the layout depicting the Russian border of a young girl Y.Yefanova, who told she wanted Donbas to unite with Russia because links between them were very close and much of her family was in Russia. From others it was possible to hear: «It is impossible to be friends with Eu- 156 rope and with Russia», «If Russia was here, it would put everything in order. It would fight corruption» etc. [36]. Among the stereotypes of the inhabitants of Donbass was the fact that they «hardworking people of Donbass» subsidized lazy people in the center and west of Ukrain. Repeating what they hear from Russian media, they claimed the government in Kiev was a «fascist junta». One woman said: «Only Russia can save us from a power that is not democratic, by which she meant the new government in Kiev», – wrote T.Judah [36]. Reflecting on the nature of hatred among many people in eastern Ukraine, he relates it to a large extent with Russian television, which looks there, and compares it to what the Serbian and other former Yugoslavian media did when Yugoslavia disappeared. Then the Serbs imposed on end- less documentary films about the Croatian fascists, which, as they said, are returning. Russian media now say that the Ukrainian fascists are returning [13]. The fact that the riots in the east of Ukraine «bears tell-tale signs of Moscow’s involvement» In April 2014, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, S.Power, also stated [62]. Along with the above objective assessment of the events in eastern Ukraine in April-May 2014, some journalists, experts and political scientists in the western media – knowingly or not – manipulate facts about Ukraine. In particular, in the article «Disorganization on the ground» on tyzhden. ua a number of publications of the British and German mass media were analyzed, in which, according to the authors, Ukraine is a territory, and not a sovereign state having its national interests and the right to defend them. In particular, Ruth Deyermond on the pages of The Guardian insisted that «those who think that it is a question of neo-imperialist seizure of land are mistaken. But Russia still wants to maintain its status as a great power. ... Russia’s actions in Ukraine were and are an attempt to save her position. The intensification of the crisis is something that should be avoided for success, and therefore, the Russian Federation remains open to a negotiations» [71]. In her opinion, the Ukrainian crisis is primarily internal, and its decision will depend on Ukrainians. But Russia’s role is also the key to crisis management [71]. And the German edition of Spiegel Online wrote that the road to peace in Ukraine starts with confidence. The West will not lose anything if it clearly makes it clear that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO or the EU in the near future. Such a promise could have appeased 157 Russia’s fears that the two [western] unions would become closer to Rus- sia’s territory and stabilize the sense of security [in Russia] [71]. Ethnic clashes and the struggle for independence – that’s normal, you do not have to worry about, and Britain and Europe have nothing to threaten, says Tony Barber on the pages of the British The Financial Times. The author actively uses the terms of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Balkan style and the desire of pro-Russian citizens to unite with their mother country as an effective factor. conflicts in the east and south of Ukraine. Like, ethnic groups again divide the territory [71]. A.Liven, a British political scientist, journalist and professor at Cam- bridge University, in his blog for The New York Review of Books, calls on the «unelected interim» government in Kiev to adopt the idea of federalization, to stop the ATO against separatist centers in the east, and to hold national and regional elections in accordance with the new Constitution, agreed by all parties (in particular Russia, the USA and Ukraine) [71]. In May 2014, the German leftist newspaper Der Freitag published an article devoted to the pro-Ukrainian rally on the Pottshammer-Platz in the German capital on May 10. The article, entitled «The Demonstration of the Ukrainian Neo-Nazis in Berlin» by Klaus Ehrlich, stated that «the Ukrainian extreme right was intensified in the country» (Germany) and described a peaceful rally where there was no nationalist or fascist slogan as a «neo-Nazi demonstration» [71]. Thus, the main leitmotif of these «pro-Russian» publications is that Ukraine is in the orbit of the natural geopolitical interests of Russia and the West should not be attacked by them. Indeed, it seems to us, such manip- ulation is dangerous. After all, a Western reader who does not know much about Ukraine, its history, can believe it. Next we consider it necessary to at least retrospectively dwell on the course of events in the east of Ukraine spring-summer of 2014. The fighting on the Donbass began on April 12, 2014, with the capture of Russian troops led by Russian intelligence officers, Slavyansky, Krama- torsk, Druzhkovka, Mariupol, and Yenakievo, where the Russian saboteurs seized the arms of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with armor of the local collaborators and took them to their ranks In the conditions of non-opposition of local power structures of Ukraine, and sometimes also open cooperation, small assault squads of Russian saboteurs in the following days took control of Gorlivka and other cities of Donetsk region and Lugansh- chyna. April 13, 2014, in response to the invasion of sabotage troops and 158 to stop terrorists and separatists, acting President of Ukraine O.Turchinov announced the launch of a large-scale anti-terrorist operation (hereinafter – ATO) with the involvement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter – the Armed Forces) and set a deadline for evacuation in the morning [62]. In Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, special forces subjected to the SBU and the Armed Forces adopted the first battle in the morning of April 13 in Semenivka, the suburbs of Slovyansk, in the ambush of pro-Russian militants, which killed the captain of the SBU Alpha units. And already on May 5, a battle took place near here, which entered a bright page in the newest history of the National Guard of Ukraine. In a fierce battle clash, in which the terrorists used hard weapons for the first time since the start of the ATO, Ukrainian troops gained a brilliant victory over the enemy, showing the highest combat training and courage. At this time, the ATO leadership decided to gradually surround Slavy- ansk, cutting off the garrison of pro-Russian militants from the supply of weapons from Russia. On May 11, 2014, the «pro-Russian» referenda were held on the territory of some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, which raised the question of maintaining the sovereign statehood and sovereign DPR and LPR proclaimed in April. According to the organizers of the «referendums», the issue was supported by voters, and according to independent witnesses, «referendums» had all signs of fictitiousness. On June 1, 2014, pro-Russian militants launched a several-day assault on the border guard in Luhansk, which ended June 4 with the exit of the Ukrainian garrison from the border guard. On June 2, 2014, near the headquarters of pro-Russian militants stationed in Lugansk Oblast State Administration, there was a series of bombings that killed civilians. June 12 began the delivery of heavy armored vehicles from Russia: to the snowfall came a column of tanks, and through Lugansk went through a column of volley fire systems «Grad», which was first used the next day in the war on the Donbass – June 13, Russian militants fired a Ukrainian checkpoint under Dobropillym. At that time (in the spring-summer of 2014) the newly elected Ukrainian authorities and power structures were not prepared for such developments in the east of Ukraine. Unfortunately, they did not always react and act accordingly, which did not contribute to the worthy defeat of the enemy. It is difficult not to agree with the above-mentioned T.Judah, who expressed his misunderstanding why the «government in Kiev was not re- 159 acting as large parts of eastern Ukraine fell to the rebels. Looking at the map, one could see that all the towns where there had been serious trouble lay at strategic rail junctions or on the main road from Belgorod in Russia, where a large part of a potential invasion force of some 35,000 troops is stationed. The road runs south to Kharkiv, where there have been clashes between pro- and anti-government crowds, all the way down to Mariupol on the Black Sea» [36]. Several buildings of the SBU and the Ministry of In- ternal Affairs were captured in the cities on this road. «Police forces either surrendered or defected or became neutral», – he wrote [36]. On June 20, 2014, during a trip to the Donbass, President of Ukraine P.Poroshenko announced a ten-day unilateral ceasefire, called on illegal armed groups to hand over weapons and stressed that the fighting would have only the nature of the response, that is, in the event of an attack by separatists on Ukrainian security forces. Also, P.Poroshenko presented his peace plan on the situation in the east of the country on Donbass, which included 15 item. The plan provided for security guarantees for all participants in the negotiations, the release from criminal liability of persons who made weapons and did not commit serious crimes, the release of hostages, etc. However, the proposed conditions of P.Poroshenko were not perceived by separatists, they did not stop the fire and refused to hand over weapons. After 10 days of unilateral cease-fire, the Ukrainian forces completed the surroundings of the Slovyansk, forcing the group of Russian militants to retreat to Donetsk on July 5, 2014. The ATO headquarters began a large-scale operation to establish control over the Russian-Ukrainian border, creating, through the forces of several brigades, a 15-kilometer zone along the border controlled by the Armed Forces and battalions of territorial defense. At the same time, the Ukrainian forces began an operation on the decommissioning of the LAP and the Luhansk region. July 11, 2014, against the background of the threat of full blocking of the border by Ukrainian forces, Russian regular troops began participating in the war, inflicting a devastating missile strike on Ukrainian formation under Zelenopillya, a village several kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border, from its territory. Since then, the entire line of Ukrainian formations near the border – from Luhansk region to the Azov Sea coast – during July–August 2014 was under systematic artillery shelling from the territory of the Russian Federation, to which Ukrainian formations did not answer. The shelling led to the cutting of supply lines of the Ukrainian group, was 160 in the area of Izvarin, and significant Ukrainian forces were surrounded for weeks. The operation on their de-blockade was held on August 6–7, 2014, after which the depleted units were withdrawn from the combat zone, thus finally losing control of 140 km of state border. Therefore, in the summer of 2014, most of the publications in the world’s mass media were devoted to the above-mentioned events in eastern Ukraine, the ATO’s course, the temporary cease-fire that did not de facto exist, presidential elections, hopes for change and reforms. However, the top theme of the summer and the results of many world media and one of the decisive themes of 2014 was the aviation catastrophe July 17, 2014. Malaysia Airlines Flight Passenger Boeing 777, which killed all passengers and crew (a total of 298 people). «Vladimir Putin can stop this war. The lost Malaysian plane is an appeal to end the conflict in Ukraine», – with this heading the editorial article of one of the most important editions has been published of The New York Times. At that time, the Russian media provided snapshots from which it was apparent that the plane was shot down by a Ukrainian military fighter aircraft with an air-to-air missile. At the same time, an investigation into the Bellingcat journalistic organization found that the RF Ministry of Defense provided false satellite imagery to accuse Ukraine of this catastrophe [12]. The US Department of State called those pictures meaningless, saying that in this way, Moscow is trying to avoid responsibility for the aircraft shot down [48]. Instead, on October 18, 2014, Deutsche Welle, referring to Der Spiegel, reported that according to a German intelligence report, a Malaysian plane Boeing-777 flight MH-17 in the sky over Eastern Ukraine caused pro-Russian separatists. This is what Gerhard Schindler, President of the Federal Intelligence Service of Germany, told the members of the parliamentary control body of the German Bundestag, Germany, on Octo- ber 8, presenting solid evidence, – informed the magazine [61]. Experts from Warsaw, London, and Munich, investigating fragments of a plane shot down, found that the MH-17 was shot down by Buk, issued from the territory of Russia [42]. The fragments of the missile system of the Buc was found in wreckage of the Malaysian aircraft, – the Dutch edition RTL Nieuws writes with reference to the experts’ conclusions [4]. This information was confirmed by the American CNN channel, which referred to its own sources at the Pentagon [16]. Direct evidence of Russia’s involvement in a plane crash was also reported by the Wall Street Journal, referring to US intelligence officials [42]. 161 Four months after the fall of the Boeing-777, under the supervision of Dutch investigators and officials from the OSCE, work was begun on cleaning up the wreckage of Boeing-777. The fragments were delivered to Kharkiv, where, as in the Netherlands, an investigation into the causes of the crash was conducted, informing The Epoch Times and noted that the fragments of the aircraft were in the territory controlled by the ins rebels and scattered within a radius of 20 square kilometers [47]. After the crash, Boeing-777 is the Ukrainian top theme in the world’s media was the events in eastern Ukraine, in particular the fierce battles near the town of Ilovajsk, Donetsk region. in August 2014 Two storming of this city took place on August 6 and 10. At the same time, along with the battle of Ilovajsk, fights continued for Savur-Mohyla and Krasny Luch, located near the city. The militants managed to push the Ukrainian military from there and thus create the preconditions for the boiler. The third assault on Ilovaysk was held on August 18. Then the Donbas, Dnipro-1 battalions entered the city with the support of the Armed Forces. They were able to take control of part of the city. The operation was carried out by significantly lesser forces than was anticipated under the plan. As a result of the sudden invasion of August 24–25, 2014 by regular units of the Russian Armed Forces and their march towards the city of Ilovajsk, a large part of the fighters from the volunteer battalions (Dnipro-1, Peacemaker, Svityaz, Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk», Na- tional Guard «Donbas» and forces of the sector «B») got into the surround. One of the reasons for this was the retreat of military formations from No- voazovsk, which allowed the militants of the DPR and Russian soldiers to surround the territorial defense fighters. They were assisted by the Brigade of the National Guard, however, without reaching their destination, they received an order to turn the command back. The second is the desertion of certain Ukrainian units. Lieutenant general R.Khomchak, who at that time held the post of the commanding sector «B» of the ATO and led the operation on the capture of Ilovaysk, remarked «It was completely unexpected. The Russian forces simply marched in, It was hardly a coincidence the Russian advance came to its climax on the 23rd anniversary of Ukraine’s declaration of independence. The Russians wanted to show us that our – independence doesn’t mean anything to them» [51]. Journalist L.Kim – one of those who tried to understand what happened under Ilovajsky. «That night (August 29), R.Khomchak’s command 162 post in Mnohopillya, situated 6km south town of Ilovaisk, came under Rus- sian mortar fire for four hours. Тhe assault left 10 Ukrainian soldiers dead and the woods around flattened. R.Khomchak understood that his invisible foe was cutting off his only escape route, but he couldn’t obtain permission from the military commanders in Kiev to make an orderly withdrawal…», – wrote an American weekly Newsweek [51]. Numerous reports by L.Kim about the events in Ukraine published an online edition Slate, Buzzfeed, Zeit Online, Deutsche Welle and other. In them, the author also emphasizes the fact that in the armed conflict involved exactly the regular army of Russia and cites figures for the dead, which Russia denies [3]. On August 29 at night, Putin appealed to fighters to open a humanitarian corridor for the Ukrainian military who were surrounded [11]. On the same day at 6 o’clock. In the morning, a Russian officer arrived in Mil- itopol’ya and informed the Ukrainian side that an exit should take place without weapons. At 8 hours 15 min. Ukrainian military armed columns began to move from the city for pre-agreed with the Russian side routes. Unfortunately, despite all the arrangements, the columns were shot on the marching. Fights near Ilovajsk became one of the turning points of the war in eastern Ukraine: the Armed Forces lost their initiative in the Donbass and switched from attack to defense. The German Deutsche Welle published on October 20 the information of the Interim Investigative Commission of the Verkhovna Rada, according to which the total number of deaths, wounded and soldiers who died from wounds in the battles near Ilovaysk, is up to a thousand people, including more than 300 dead [45]. The Ukrainian leadership urged heavy losses before the Minsk Armistice was concluded within the contact group Ukraine-Russia-OSCE with the involvement of representatives of Russian militants. According to the official website of the Pentagon, in November 2014, the United States provided Ukraine with weapons for combating mortar fire, in particular, they supplied Ukraine with radar systems designed to combat the mortar calculations of the enemy, allowing the use of this weapon in the ATO zone [70]. At present, the US military has set up three lightweight munitions fire suppression systems. This is the first batch of 20 such systems to be provided to Ukraine, «said the spokesman of the Pentagon, Colonel Stephen Warren. Delivery of others will be done over the next few weeks [70]. «The radar system identifies your shotgun, and calculates the coordinates from where the enemy shot the shot, giving the opportunity 163 to respond (defeat the enemy)», – said the Pentagon official spokesman [70]. «The Ukrainian armed forces will determine how, where and when they will employ the systems. Ukrainian military can connect radar systems with artillery fire systems, or they can react (on mortar shots) with ground forces», – said the spokesman of the Pentagon [70]. On November 2, 2014, on the majority of the territory controlled by the DPR, the so-called «Election» to the People’s Council of the DPR and the election of the head of the DPR. For the People’s Council of the DPR under the proportional electoral system, 100 deputies have been elected for a term of 4 years. The majority (68 mandates) got the DPR, the Prime Minister of the self-proclaimed state became O.Zakharchenko, who, after the pseudo-election to the «parliament» of the DPR, appointed a new government. The Guardian then published a message to the Organization for Se- curity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the main election observation body in Europe, that this has nothing to do with the election [44]. «De- spite the surreal nature of the vote, there is no doubt that, among the older generation at least, there was great enthusiasm for it, perhaps less as an endorsement of the Donetsk republic and more as a message to Kiev that the region would never again be part of Ukraine. ... According to the Minsk agreement, Ukraine has given the regions special increased autonomy for a three-year period, but in practice, president Petro Poroshenko appears to have given up on the regions, unable to win a military victory against supe- rior Russian firepower», – noticed the publication [44]. The special attention of the world media in the fall-winter of 2014 was focused on events around the Donetsk airport, which lasted 242 days (May 2014 – January 2015) and became one of the heroic pages of the Rus- sian-Ukrainian confrontation of recent years. It all started about 3 hours on the night of May 26, 2014, when a group of Russian special forces, mercenaries and pro-Russian militants took part of the airport buildings and issued an ultimatum to the Ukrainian military who at that time guarded the internal perimeter of the DAP, to make up weapons and surrender. The government, on the other hand, put forward its ultimatum on weapons and the liberation of administrative structures by separatists. Requirements of both sides remained without reaction, the battle began, and the airport almost immediately became the «hottest» point on the ATO map. On May 26, units of the Army Special Forces with the support of combat aircraft struck terrorists who were trying to take control of the 164 Donetsk International Airport. Attack and Army aircraft were involved, landing landing was conducted. The Ukrainian units acted swiftly and effectively – about 45 insurgents were killed, several dozen wounded. One third of the «East» battalion was destroyed by ATO forces. In the ranks of militants panic began, some terrorist leaders hurriedly left the city. The Ukrainian units are locked up in the airport area, – said in the press center of the Na- tional Security and Defense Council. Attempts to assault the Donetsk airport by terrorists have since been regular, but the Ukrainian military successfully repelled them. Then ua legend was born about «cyborgs» [1]. The first Ukrainian fighters so began to call the fighters for superhuman resistance in defense. On October 28, 2014, on the first page of the American Los Angeles Times, published an article «Ukraine fighters, surrounded at wrecked airport, refuse to give up» with the photographs of the only foreign correspondent S.Loiko, who spent several days in a neighborhood surrounded by Russian militants of the Donetsk airport. He was impressed by the bravery of Ukrainian defenders and published fragments of interviews with them [3]. Serious assault on the airport began after the conclusion of the Minsk Agreements in September 2014. These agreements, in particular, envisaged a «stop of units and military formations of the parties on the line of their collision as of September 19, 2014» and the withdrawal of heavy weapons 15 kilometers from this line. The real fulfillment of these conditions would mean that separatists should liberate a significant part of Donetsk from armed forces. According to the military, the separatists carried out constant attacks on the airport in order to gain an advantage in determining the distribution line near Donetsk. «Donetsk airport, along with the adjacent heights under the control of the Ukrainian forces, is the base for further offensive from the separatist side ... When creating a buffer zone, separatists will actually have to depart for the other outskirts of Donetsk», – said on January 16 the spokesman of the DUK «The Right Sector» A.Sharaskin [22]. Later, the authorities of the self-proclaimed DPR and the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that «the airport of Donetsk according to Minsk agreements should be transferred to the control of the militias» However, the Ukrainian Min- istry of Foreign Affairs denied it. «There are no words about the Donetsk airport in the Minsk agreements», said the spokesman of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yevhen Perebyinis [22]. 165 In the assault of the airport were involved not only «moneyers», but also personnel n military, in particular, specially appointed GRU. From the Ukrainian side, the 95th and 79th airborne brigades, the 3rd special-purpose regiment and a number of volunteer battalions were involved at various times in the defense of the airport. Military tasks for the defense of the nearby settlement of Sashki and the airport were carried out by infan- trymen, gunners and tankers of the 93rd mechanized brigade, tankers of the 1st Panzer Brigade and subdivisions of the Battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs «Dnipro-1», and others. This strategically important object (the Donetsk airport) for the separatists was an irritant that had to be eliminated. As S.Semenchenko, the commander of the Donbass battalion noted, «he also became a matter of principle for the separatists. As for us, he is a symbol of heroism, and in the eyes of the separatists he received a fundamental value» [22]. Al- though attempts to take the airport by the DPR did not stop all the fall and December 2014, especially the brutal battles began after the New Year. On January 13, 2015, after the massive artillery and tank bombardments by terrorists, the control tower of the airport collapsed, where the major was the Ukrainian flag and which became a symbol of its defense to the people. On the same day, the militants pushed the «cyborgs» an ultimatum – either to leave the airport, or to perish. The military chose a fight, and since then, collisions at the airport have not longer subsided. At that time, the DPR stated that the Ukrainian forces were firing residential areas of Donetsk from the airport and Pisky. Separatists even said that they were ready to guarantee the safety of «cyborgs» who would agree peacefully to leave the airport. However, the defenders objected to such allegations and disagreed with the proposals and ultimatums of the opponents. The Ukrainian army reacted strongly to the attempted assault, and managed to win part of the territory. It was the panic of the separatists that the Ukrainian side explained the blast of the Putilivsky Bridge near Donetsk airport. According to representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the fighters of the DPR sought to secure themselves from the entry of the ATO forces in Donetsk from the side of the airport. Separa- tists also said that the bridge was destroyed during a breakthrough by the Ukrainian military. On January 19, 2015, militants blew up the second floor of the new airport terminal. However, on January 20 and 21, reports of killed and captured cyborgs began to appear. Russian mass-media appeared plots about 166 the captured Ukrainian fighters [22]. Several days earlier, the leaders of the DPR repeatedly stated that they were completely seized by the airport, which, however, was not true at that time. The Ministry of Defense then stated: «Yesterday, 20 Armed Forces of Ukraine soldiers came out with fights from the territory of the terminals, because their positions were destroyed and fired fusillade by direct guidance. 16 soldiers were wounded during the battle and were captured by terrorists. For the past 24 hours, 6 Ukrainian servicemen were killed in the battles for the airport» [22]. Even- tually, on the night of January 22, using the short truce to export the dead and wounded, the militants replaced the building and completely destroyed it. Only a frame remained of it, so there was nothing more to defend. Only then Ukrainian troops departed to other airport buildings and surrounding settlements [1]. Thus, the defense of Donetsk airport became a glorious page of Ukrainian military history, and its «cyborgs» now and forever have become a symbol of the invincibility of the spirit of the defenders of Ukraine. The memory of this feat will last for centuries in the hearts of Ukrainians and will bring up the generation of defenders of Ukraine. Representatives of Russia (Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine M.Zurabov), Ukraine (second President of Ukraine L.Kuchma) and OSCE at the summit in Minsk on February 11–12, 2015, after the agreement of the leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia in the format of the «Norman Four» (Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini) and self-proclaimed republics (O.Zakharchenko, I.Plotnitsky) signed an agreement («peaceful settlement plan»), which consisted of 13 item for the purpose of deesca- lating armed conflict in the east of Ukraine, which included: an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and its strict implementation starting 00 an hour 00 min February 15, 2015; the removal of all heavy weapons by both sides at a distance; providing for pardon and amnesty, the release and exchange of all hostages and illegally detained persons; restoration of full control over the state border by the Government of Ukraine throughout the conflict zone; the withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, military equipment, and also mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE; holding constitutional reform in Ukraine, holding local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, etc. [55]. Neither of these item not fulfilled, and in Moscow and Kiev for more than two years it has been arguing over how to treat the documents signed in Minsk. 167 A concluded treaty on Ukraine raises the risk of undermining peace in Europe, according to V.Sokor, an article in The Wall Street Journal. In his opinion, the Minsk agreements of February 12 authorize both Kremlin-controlled «people’s republics» to take part in negotiations on reforming the constitution and legislation of Ukraine. In this way, the European course of Ukraine can be blocked. «The conditions also allow Russia and separatist» republics «to keep their troops in the east of Ukraine and place their own forces along the territory that is legally Ukrainian», – wrote the author [19, p.5]. Unfortunately, as The Washington time wrote on April 9, 2015, NATO and the United States were compelled to admit that Russia was not following the Minsk treaties, as evidenced by the facts of further arming of Russian insurgents in eastern Ukraine. In addition, there are ongoing military training of Russian military personnel on the border with Ukraine. Such an increase in the military power of the Russian Federation in the Donbass suggests that it wants to seize even more Ukrainian territory [56]. January and February 2015 marked the last fights for the Donetsk airport (as discussed above) and storming the city of Debaltsevo. In mid-February 2015 в The New York Times a series of publications came out Andrew E.Kramerfeb («Despite Ukraine Truce, a Battle That Contin- ues», «With Ukrainian Troops Trapped, a Cease-Fire Grows More Fragile», «Ukrainian Soldiers’ Retreat From Eastern Town Raises Doubt for Truce», «Despite Truce, Shelling Continues in Parts of Ukraine», «Ukraine Cease- Fire Goes Into Effect, but Rebel Leader in Key Town Repudiates Accord»), in which it’s about the aggravation of the situation in the east of Ukraine, in particular the intense battles in the area of Debaltsevo city. «As many as 8,000 Ukrainian soldiers are holed up in the city, a rail hub connecting the capitals of the two rebel regions, Donetsk and Luhansk. Rebels have february 15 sent text messages to phones in the town, telling the soldiers that they have been abandoned and should surrender. The Ukrainian government maintains that the town was not surrounded before the cease-fire took effect, and that European monitors should insist that the separatist forces halt their offensive and open a corridor to evacuate the wounded. … Ukrainian officials and the United States say the Russian Army is directly engaged in the battle, while the Russian authorities deny any role in the fighting in eastern Ukraine», – noted the author [73], 168 As evidence, US ambassador to Ukraine Jeffrey R.Pyatt posted satellite images on his Twitter account, confirming the use of Russian artillery to help separatists surround Debaltsevo. One image seemed to show four gun lines of towed artillery and one of self-propelled artillery northeast of Debaltseve. Another showed what R.Pyatt said were air-defense systems, and the third showed the black, streaky exhaust plumes of what was labe- led a «Russian multiple rocket launcher deployment» [74]. On February 17, Ukrainian journalist A.Tsaplienko said that Debalt- sevo militants seized the police station and the railway station. The information was partially confirmed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Donetsk region – regarding the destruction of the police department building. However, the Interior Ministry noted that however, law enforcement officers are still in the city to assist the remaining residents. And on the morning of February 18, there was information about the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Debaltsevo. This was reported by the Don- bass campaign commissar S.Semenchenko on the Facebook page, a little later the information was confirmed by journalists. Later in the afternoon, speaking at the Boryspil airport before departure to the ATO zone, President Poroshenko confirmed the information about the withdrawal of Ukrainian parts. He stated that all the forces, except for one company, planned to leave the Debaltsevsky bridgehead with equipment and weapons. In the spring of 2015, EU leaders were debating whether to keep sanctions by the end of this year, or to postpone this decision by June. German Chancellor A.Merkel and the President of the European Council, D. Tusk, like most of Russia’s European neighbors, supported the rigid option. The leaders of Hungary, Italy, Cyprus, Austria, Spain and Slovakia are more «peaceful». In their opinion, if the extension of sanctions is announced now, the peace deal will be undermined, because Moscow will see that its attempt to compromise does not meet reciprocity, – explained the columnist Bloomberg 9 View L.Bershidsky [53]. As a result, EU leaders at the Brussels summit on March 19–20, 2015 agreed to keep sanctions against Russia in effect until all conditions of the peace accords in Ukraine are fully implemented. On March 11, 2015, the US Department of the Treasury imposed a new sanctions package against the 14 people that Washington considered responsible for the conflict in Ukraine. To this day, sanctions were introduced either against high-ranking Russian politicians, or against those who 169 were in the immediate surroundings of President V.Putin. The new list was mainly made by the leaders of the separatists from the Donbass. It also includes people who did not belong to the ruling circles of Russia and which are connected with the Ukrainian conflict only by ideology [18, p.10] After a month of relative calm, the struggle in eastern Ukraine has intensified again, while diplomats gathered for a meeting in Berlin to dis- cuss the situation in Ukraine. Observers from the OSCE claimed intense collisions on the front line using heavy artillery, – wrote The Epoch Times on April 13, 2015 [57]. According to the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine E. Perebinisis, since the beginning of the armistice, announced on February 15, 65 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the Donbass, while another 243 were injured. According to him, members of anti-government armed units, despite the signing of the Minsk Agreements, have not complied with the cease-fire regime for a single day [19, p.4]. On March 23, 2015, The Epoch Times reported on the unsustainable gunfire in Shirokine between the Ukrainian troops and pro-Russian separatists, despite a truce. The city itself is not strategic for the military, but it has provided access for separatists to the port city of Mariupol, which the Ukrainian military tried to protect at any price. For separatists, Mariupol is important in terms of building a land bridge from Russia to the occupied Crimea, – the newspaper wrote [18, p. 4; 52]. At the end of May 2015, the fighting zone in the Donbass has expanded, – said the speaker of the administration of the President of Ukraine on special operations O.Motuzianik. He noted that the epicenter of the confrontation between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and anti-government armed formations was still two settlements of the Donetsk region – Donetsk and Horlivka. Aggravation of fighting was also observed in the village Shi- rokino, located on the approaches to the city-port of Mariupol [20, p.4]. The fighting, which in recent months has been reduced to local clashes at specific points, has intensified strongly in Marinka and Krasnogorіvka, not far from Donetsk, – the Spanish El Mundo reported in June 2015. Ukrainian troops and pro-Russian separatists encountered there in the most intense battle in recent months. Kiev claims that the first militia attacked their positions. But the leaders of the so-called DPR insist that this was not an offensive, but an attempt to curb the bombings carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, – noted the newspaper [58]. The situation remained fragile and very disturbing. The struggle continues, albeit with less intensity than a few months ago. But separatist forces with the support of Russia continue to 170 destabilize part of Eastern Ukraine, – wrote El Mundo on June 17 [60]. To stop the offensive, the SCU, having warned its international partners, returned to combat positions heavy weapons that were previously taken out of the line of collision in accordance with the Minsk agreements. As reported by the French Le Figaro, at the G7 summit (G7) in early summer 2015, statements were made that three months had passed since the signing of other Minsk agreements, but the situation is still unstable, and the cease-fire is under constant a threat [59]. The leaders of the G7 confirmed their non-recognition of the annexation of the Crimea of the Russian Federation and led to the lifting of sanctions against the RF as soon as possible implementation of the Minsk agreements. In addition, Russia has demanded respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and cease «cross-border support of separatist forces». A.Merkel, while pointing out that violations existed on both sides – both by the separatists and by the government [59]. * * * The Russian-Ukrainian conflict develops under conditions of systematic negation by the Russian Federation of its participation in armed conflict, which greatly complicates the clear unquestioning legal definition of the nature of the armed conflict and results in the absence of clear estimates of the conflict between Ukrainian society, the international community and the western media. As an example, the conflict has received ambiguous assessments even among the national-patriotic circles of Ukraine, where the war is estimated in the spectrum from the Third Liberation, the War of Independence and the domestic war to Russia’s pragmatic attempt to keep Ukraine in the orbit of its influence. In 2014, NATO described the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as a «hybrid war» [67; 68]. In August 2017, the Foreign Minister of Poland, in an interview with the Russian newspaper, stressed that there is no such thing as a «crisis in Ukraine», but there is a Russian-Ukrainian conflict initiated by Russia [69]. As reported by the British The Guardian on November 20, 2014, according to the UN since the signing of the ceasefire agreement (July 2014), about 13 people die every day in Ukraine as a result of hostilities. Also, the report of the UN refers to the large number of internally displaced people, by the end of the fall of 2014 this figure was 466829 people [46]. About the 4317 dead, 9921 wounded and 46,630,030 displaced by the war in eastern 171 Ukraine were filed by American The Washington Post, The Deseret News, The Wall Street Journal, (WSJ), and others. [49]. Almost a year later (December 9, 2015) The Guardian published UN information that 9098 people were killed during the 21 month of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine (April 2014 – December 2015) and more than 20,000 were injured. The report also states that since August 2014, as a result of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons losses considerably decreased. In September 2014, according to Western media, politicians and experts, the situation in the east of Ukraine changed a little, as Kyiv gradually lost control of the vast territories in the east, which took pro-Russian militants. From now on, the Russian Federation is clearly perceived in the West as a direct initiator and a participant in the conflict, which has a decisive influence on its course. At the same time, there is growing awareness that it was precisely for this development that the refusal of the United States and NATO to provide military assistance to Ukraine contributed to. Currently, there is no expectation of rapid de-escalation in eastern Ukraine. There is a widespread view that Moscow is conducting a course to freeze the conflict in the Transnistrian scenario. An analysis of the US information space shows a marked increase in internal pressure on the White House administration, in particular, on the part of Congress, on the issue of providing armed assistance to Ukraine. The probability that such an aid will still be provided in the event of further Russian aggression in Ukraine and a critical deterioration of the situation is one of the factors restraining Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The American press continues to criticize the «inert» and anticipated US position on the use of more stringent sanctions against the RF due to its violation of international law and the creation of threats to both Ukraine and international order. In the context of the commencement of a new round of EU–US sanctions of September 12, 2014 against Moscow, it was noted that, in the case of Russia’s real promotion of a cessation of the conflict in Ukraine, sanctions will be lifted. A splash of attention to the Ukrainian issue was observed in the UK media ahead of and during the NATO Summit in Wales on September 4–5, 2014. British journalists advocated a rigorous response to threats to security by the Allies coming from Russia as part of the Alliance, and also providing effective assistance to Ukraine, including armed. In a number of reports have been criticized by Obama because of insufficiently rigid policies 172 regarding Russia, as well as NATO, due to the inability of the organization to deter aggression Russia. During the active phase of the ATO, the European media (Belgium, Luxembourg, Bulgarian, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, Polish, Hungarian, French, Czech, German, Polish) provided mainly information in the light of the official policy of their states and the EU, mainly in positive or in a neutral key. In particular, their mass media paid special attention to Ukraine’s support in confronting Russia, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the negotiation process on the ceasefire in the Donbass, the need to provide Ukraine with military-technical (including weapons), financial and humanitarian assistance. In their opinion, the settlement of the conflict in the Donbass lies in the political and diplomatic plane. In particular, at the end of summer and autumn 2014, a number of publications were devoted to attempts to find an understanding within the framework of the Minsk accords and the parliamentary elections [21]. The effectiveness of the Minsk format was of interest to most international observers, as the EU hoped for this, and the Ukrainian president also declared such a vision [13]. On November 22, 2014, the New York Times published an article by E. Cremer, «With Borscht and Rifle Scopes, Volunteers Power Ukraine Forces». «As long as the Ukrainian authorities say that it is ready for any type of attack, cooking is kept secret, which makes many fear that it is a cover for weakness. Most of the open fortifications are made by volunteers who provide not only moral and physical support, but at least a glimpse of hope that Ukrainian troops will be able to stand up for themselves», the author wrote. The article gives comments by representatives of volunteer organizations, describes the types of their activities - providing the army with food, clothing, night vision devices. In general, the New York Times from the beginning of the protests in Ukraine and throughout the year elab- orated in detail the events, with its own correspondents here. Most of the materials are reports from the Donbass, where journalists communicated with local residents, including separatists, as well as with Ukrainian soldiers [3]. At the beginning of December 2014, М.Dejevsky, on the pages of the British newspaper The Independent, remarked that there was a so-called «frozen conflict» in Ukraine, which according to some experts would be included and excluded from Moscow’s will, thus making East Ukraine un- managed for Kyiv, and this is the best option for the Kremlin. Others insist- 173 ed that Russia did not need it at all, because it has neither money nor desire for it. And if the official authority in Kyiv really wants to keep the country together, then it should give the eastern regions even greater autonomy. Ukraine and Russia should reach consensus in order to avoid a humanitarian or military catastrophe in eastern Ukraine [50]. Senior Director for Human Rights and Democracy at the McCain In- stitute, D.Cremer, in his post, «There will be no ‘win-win’ deal with Putin» (Washington Post, December 11, 2014) denied the positions of his col- leagues – American experts J.Shapiro and M.O’Genlon, who advise NATO countries to start cooperation with Putin and together establish a new security order in Europe. «How can we build a new European security structure with a man who perceives everything that symbolizes the West, a huge threat to himself?», – remarks D.Crémer. For the West there is only one way today – it is to restrain Putin, and not to compromise with him [3]. In the beginning of 2015, Swedish writer and historian P.Jonsson, who has lived in Warsaw for more than three decades, writes about the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Belarus and Ukraine), in particular for the Swedish newspaper Goteborgs-Posten, the Finnish Swedish-language television and radio channel YLE, for The scientific journal Baltic Worlds, in a discussion with S.Buk in Lviv, asked how he evaluated the information Western media provided about events in Ukraine, he replied that he read several European, American, Scandinavian newspapers. They are interested in Ukraine, but correspondents in Moscow have a different view of the events in Ukraine than the correspondents who are on the spot or those who come. I think that much has changed in the last two years, more than after 2004. Western media no longer have any illusions about Putin, «said Peter Johnson [72]. He also noticed that he conducted such a study, which confirmed that German newspapers are the most critical in Europe. In his opinion, this is true. She reads Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt. The latest edition is supported by Chancellor A.Merkel’s party, but they have no illusions about Putin at all and even criticize Mrs Merkel for her indecisiveness. The same thing is observed in New York Times, The Washington Post. «They have their correspondents in eastern Ukraine, who make reports and analytics. This is a huge progress. Ukraine, perhaps for the first time because of this tragedy, the war is differently interpreted by the Western media», noted P.Jonsson [72]. Asked how Western politicians assess the situation in Ukraine, he said that they now tend to Ukraine as a country that has the right to 174 choose, which should be respected. and keep up. And he added that the European Union and the United States did good deal with those sanctions, and worked together. But he believes that in this final phase, however, they did not have a common, meaningful concept and were a little naive. In his opinion, this was a mistake. P.Jonsson sees progress, in particular, when A. Merkel said that Putin is not in our world. «The only reason is fear of a great war. Unfortunately, such a fear exists and he is real», said Peter [72]. In his opinion, the best solution, besides further sanctions, is economic assistance for Ukraine, which is absolutely needed. «We can give Ukraine a weapon, but the best support will be if the European countries (those who signed the Budapest memorandum) will be able to locate foreign troops on the territory of the conflict in Ukraine in order to control» [72]. Calb Marvin, a political scientist and television journalist at American news agencies CBS and NBC News (USA), in his article «Putin won his war in Ukraine» (The Washington Post, September 7, 2015) draws attention to the fact that the war in Ukraine has ceased to be on the front lines of West- ern media. Following the annexation by the Russian Federation of Crimea and the organization of a pro-Russian uprising in the Donbass, Ukraine was at the center of world news. Nowadays, Ukraine, as a European crisis, has lost its relevance, as there were other global and less-massive news [75]. «Putin has, slowly but surely, “frozen” the conflict, much as he did in 2008 in the of Georgia. Far more than Western leaders, Putin can now influence and, when necessary, control the flow of economic, political and diplomatic developments in Ukraine. For this “victory,” Putin has had to pay a heavy price. His economy has floundered, his reputation has suffered and Russia has experienced a return to domestic disorder and discontent that is real, even spreading». And adds: «Putin can tolerate an independent Ukraine so long as it is “friendly” to Russian national interests, he trusts only himself to define this friendship» [75]. In publications of the German media on economic topics, the number of publications that denied the negative effect of Western sanctions on the Russian economy, or emphasized the benefits of Russia’s inclusion in the global economy, increased. At the same time, journalists analyzed the possibility of strengthening sanctions against the Russian Federation in the financial sphere. According to German financial market participants, further measures will be counterproductive as they can cause global economic upheaval. 175 The Germans mostly have a positive attitude towards Ukraine. Ac- cording to a poll by the German television channel ARD, more than 55% of respondents believe NATO should increase support for Ukraine in confrontation with the Russian Federation. 82% of those polled are convinced that Russia’s actions in the east of Ukraine are threatening international security; 61% support EU pressure on the Russian Federation. A significant proportion of supporters of the strengthening of Germany’s role in resolving the situation in Ukraine (56%) [21]. There were positive changes in the public opinion of the Czech Republic regarding Ukraine. Whereas the Czechs previously perceived Ukraine as a corrupt country with cheap labor (almost 100,000 Ukraini- an labor migrants in the Czech Republic), in the 2014–2015 period, sympathies grew, and in some places, and the enthusiasm of Ukrainians who defended the territorial integrity of their state and were ready to put for her life. According to the Czech Center for Public Opinion Research at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in 2014, 78% of Czechs surveyed negatively reacted to Russia’s actions against Ukraine [21]. Belgian and Luxembourg journalists, positively evaluating the ceasefire on September 5, 2014, expressed the opinion that the armistice was a success primarily by the separatists and Russia, since it consolidated the loss of several eastern cities in Kyiv. They noted that deescalation of the situation in the Donbass would be accompanied by the creation of a «frozen conflict», which would make it impossible for Ukraine to join NATO. [21] The Dutch journalists, highlighting the progress of the MN17 aircraft crash investigation, emphasized the need to return the experts of the international mission to the scene of a disaster to restore the remains of the dead. Ukraine’s appeal to Western countries to provide military-technical assistance has caused an ambiguous reaction of the media. The inability of the Netherlands to provide such support to Ukraine was explained by the unwillingness to provoke Russia to further escalate the situation and invade the Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine [21]. In French magazines, in a constructive way, the adoption of amnesty laws and special local self-government regulations in some regions of eastern Ukraine were considered, but some reservations were expressed about the risks which the Ukrainian authorities took upon themselves, as well as the very procedure of voting in Ukraine [21]. 176 The main source of anti-Ukrainian content in the Bulgarian mass media was the Russian-funded Alfa channel of the nationalist Ataka party. In addition, the parties «BSP» and «The Coat of Arms» tried to play on the pro-Russian field, trying to attract the support of pro-Russian voters, call- ing for a reduction in the level of sanctions of the EU against the Russian Federation [21]. In Italy, publications of anti-Ukrainian content were related to anti-Ukrainian activities of Russia, which attracted influential representatives of business circles in Italy, popular Russian artists who expressed support for the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine and called for the abolition of EU sanctions against Russia [21]. A marked increase in anti-Ukrainian sentiment was recorded in Sep- tember 2014, Hungary’s media space, although most of the publications and reports about Ukraine were positive or neutral. Hungarian experts believed that neither NATO, nor the United Na- tions, nor the EU was able to stop Russia, which was a high probability of Russia’s attempts to «tear» away from Ukraine, along with Luhansk and Donetsk, several more southeastern regions. The opinion was expressed on the expediency of federalization of Ukraine as a way of resolving the conflict and its preservation as a sovereign state, which pursued a number of goals – from the use of the Hungarian factor to strengthen separatist sentiment in Transcarpathia until the disruption of mobilization in Ukraine and the prevention of ratification of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU by the State Assembly Hungary [21]. The main source of anti-Ukrainian messages was the traditional «holes of Russian propaganda» – the online edition of «Kurutz» and «Guidpho». Local media spread typical Russian propaganda of anti-Amer- icanism [21]. For the anti-Ukrainian campaign in the Czech Republic, the Russian side attracted compatriots who speak in TV broadcasts, as well as local political forces (the Communist Party of the Czech Republic and Moravia, the Czech Social-Democratic Party), the V.Klaus Institute, which was created incl. on funds of «Lukoil» [21]. Often, attention was drawn to foreign media and to the social and humanitarian problems faced by the population living in the Donbass. In particular, life in bomb shelters and reports of starvation. Pseudo-humanitarian convoy V.Putin also did not remain unnoticed [14]. It is important that publications also appeared about the origin of pseudo-republics in 177 eastern Ukraine. In particular, the article by Konrad Schöller in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is important that Russia is openly financing the pseudo republics of the Donbass [14]. Most of the leading European media outlets sent their correspondents to the combat zone. Accordingly, their reports objectively reflected the situation in Ukraine. During the active phase of ATO, the Ukrainian theme was mainstream in TV broadcasts, newspapers and Internet editions. So, analyzing the information about the Russian-Ukrainian war in the mass media of the United States and Europe for 2014–2015, we can draw the following conclusions: • the next cycle of the confrontation between the West and the Rus- sian Federation for the influence on Ukraine was completed and the vector of its future development was recognized; • western politicians were convinced that the conflict in eastern Ukraine could not be resolved by force, because Russia would not allow a military defeat of separatists; • the parties to the conflict around Ukraine failed to achieve a decisive victory and the situation to a certain extent is pathetic; • The application by the West of the principle of «balance of power» due to the economic relaxation of Russia does not allow the latter to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine; • the West’s goal is to prevent the Russian-Ukrainian «hot» war, as well as to engage in a military confrontation with Russia; • For the West, the earliest deescalation of the situation in Ukraine remains to be prioritized, the territorial integrity preserved (the Crimea remains open, however), avoiding such changes in the territorial structure of Ukraine that will make it impossible to apply the Association Agreement.

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UN: Deaths keep rising in Ukraine, now over 4300 [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/un- says-killings-displacement-rise-inukraine/2014/11/20/3da2cdc2-70b1-11e4-a2c2- 478179fd0489_story.html ; https://www.deseretnews.com/article/765663048/ UN-Deaths-keep-rising-in-Ukraine-now-over-4300.html; Morse А. Death Toll Mounts in Ukraine for Civilians, Fighters Alike, U.N. Says [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-crisis-continues-to-take- toll-on-civilians-says-united-nations-1416477651 50. Dejevsky М. Ukraine analysis: Russia may prefer an extended ’frozen conflict’ but freezing conditions loom for all / Mary Dejevsky [Electronic resource]. 183 – Mode of access: http: // http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ ukraine-analysis-russia-may-prefer-an-extended-frozen-conflict-but-freezing- conditions-loom-for-all-9911391.html. – London, 2014. – 08.12 51. Kim L. The Battle of Ilovaisk: Details of a Massacre Inside Rebel-Held Eastern Ukraine / Lucian Kim [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: http:// archive.fo/20141104172533/http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/battle-ilovaisk- details-massacre-inside-rebel-held-eastern-ukraine-282003.html#selec- tion-2069.2-2073.10 52. Fighting Near Ukraine Port Show Truce is Not Effective [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1295539-fighting- near-ukraine-port-show-truce-is-noteffective/. – New York, 2015. – 23.03. 53. Bershidsky L. Don’t Punish Russia for Compromising in Ukraine / Leonid Bershidsky [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: http://origin-www. bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-19/don-t-punish-russia-for-compromising- in-ukraine. – New York, 2015. – 19.03. 54. Chase S. Russia imposes sanctions on 13 Canadians, including MPs / Steven Chase [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/russia-bans-entry-to-13-canadians-in-retaliation-for-otta- was-sanctions/article17635115/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com& 55. Minsk Treaty 2015 [ukr.] [Мінська угода–2015] [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D1%96%D0%BD%D1%81% D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B0_%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0_(2015) 56. Blank S. Putin’s next offensive: The Russian military has a choice of Ukrainian targets if the West remains spineless / Stephen Blank [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/9/ stephen-blank-putinsnext-offensive-in-ukraine/ . – Washington, 2015. – 09.04. 57. Fighting Picks up in War-Torn Eastern [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1319010-fighting-picks-up-in-war- torn-eastern-ukraine/ . – New York, 2015. – 13.04. 58. Colás . Vuelve la guerra al este de Ucrania / Xavier Colás [Electron- ic resource]. – Mode of access: http: www.elmundo.es/internacional/2015/06/04/ 556f9873e2704e7e538b4594.h tml. – Madrid, 2015. – 04.06. 59. Barotte N. L’Ukraine au cœur des préoccupations du G7 / Nicolas Barotte [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: http: www.lefigaro.fr/international/2015/06/07/01003-20150607ARTFIG001 73-l-ukraine-au-coeur-des-preoccu- pations-du-g7.php . – Paris, 2015. – 07.06. 184 60. Manley S. Rusia y Ucrania: mantener el rumbo / Simon Manley [Elec- tronic resource]. – Mode of access: http://www.elmundo.es/internaciona- l/2015/06/18/558280be268e3e4a588b 4574.html – Madrid, 2015. – 17.06. 61. This is Ukraine today – October 19: Malaysian aircraft Boeing-777 flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine was brought down by pro-Russian separatists [Elec- tronic resource]. – Mode of access: http: http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/ukr/authors/ voznyak/544537c43ac87/view_print/ 62. Ukraine crisis: an essential guide to everything that’s happened so far [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: http: https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/apr/11/ukraine-russia-crimea-sanctions-us-eu-guide-explainer 63. McPhedran Charles, Anna Arutunyan. Crimea votes to join Russia; Ukrai- nians prepare for war / Charles McPhedran, Anna Arutunyan [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/16/ crimea-referendum-ukraine-russia/6484251 64. Savchuk T. What Putin tried to hide by the annexation of the Crimea? (World Press) [ukr.] [Савчук Т. Що Путін намагався при овати анексією Криму? (Світова преса)] [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28597813.html 65. Ukraine conflict has left more than 9,000 dead, says UN [Electron- ic resource]. – Mode of access: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/09/ ukraine-conflict-9000-dead-says-un. – London, 2015. – 09.12. 66. Chase S., Mackinnon M. Harper leads charge to expel Russia from G8, ramp up sanctions / Steven Chase, Mark Mackinnon [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-leads-charge- to-expel-russia-from-g8-ramp-up-sanctions/article17631725/?ref=http://www. theglobeandmail.com& 67. Hybrid war – hybrid response? [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Russia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Russia- Ukraine-crisis-war/EN/index.htm 68. Putin conducts a hybrid war in Ukraine - General Kappen [ukr.] [Путін веде в Україні гібридну війну – генерал Каппен] [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/25363591.html 69. There is no such thing as a «crisis in Ukraine», there is a Rus- sian-Ukrainian conflict, – Vaschikovsky Kappen [ukr.] [Немає такого поняття «криза в Україні», є російсько-український конфлікт, – Ващиковський] [Elec- tronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/takogo-ponyati- ya-krizis-ukraine-rossiysko-1502097572.html 185 70. U.S. Delivers Radar Systems to Ukraine [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603700/ 71. Disorientation on the ground [ukr.] [Дезорієнтація на місцевості] [Elec- tronic resource]. – Mode of access: http://tyzhden.ua/Society/109873 (23 травня 2014 р.). 72. Western media have no illusions about Putin, Swedish writer Peter Jonsson [ukr.] [За ідні медіа вже не мають ілюзій щодо Путіна, – шведський публіцист Петер Йонссон] [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: http://zik. ua/news/2015/02/16/zahidni_media_vzhe_ne_mayut_ilyuziy_shchodo_putina__ shvedskyy_publitsyst_peter_yonsson_564777 73. Kramerfeb A. E. Despite Ukraine Truce, a Battle That Continues / An- drew E. Kramerfeb [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.nytimes. com/2015/02/18/world/europe/battle-for-debaltseve-despite-ukraine-cease-fire. html?action=click&contentCollection=Europe&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article 74. Kramerfeb A. E. Ukraine Cease-Fire Goes Into Effect, but Rebel Leader in Key Town Repudiates Accord / Andrew E. Kramerfeb [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/world/europe/us-says-images- show-russian-armaments-near-embattled-ukraine-town.html?action=click&con- tentCollection=Europe&module=RelatedCoverage®ion=Marginalia&pgtype=article 75. Kalb М. Putin won his war in Ukraine / Marvin Kalb [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/putin-won-in- ukraine/2015/09/07/02a0283c-5341-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html?utm_ term=.7d54b6bd4141 76. Results of «referendum» were published in Donetsk [ukr.] [У Донецьку оприлюднили результати «референдуму»] [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access:http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2014/05/140512_donbass_referen- dum_results_rl.shtml 77. Donetsk separatists have asked for Russia [ukr.] [Донецькі сепаратисти попросились до Росії] [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: //www.pravda. com.ua/news/2014/05/12/7025131/; Донецька і Луганська самопроголошені республіки очуть об’єднатися [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: http:// ipress.ua/news/donetska_i_luganska_samoprogolosheni_respubliky_hochut_obied- natysya_64110.html Pavlo HAI-NYZHNYK

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE STRATEGY FOR DE-OCCUPATION AND REINTEGRATION OF CRIMEA IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE: ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTION AREAS 187 Chapter 5

Pavlo HAI-NYZHNYK

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE STRATEGY FOR DE-OCCUPATION AND REINTEGRATION OF CRIMEA IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE: ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTION AREAS*

Russian aggression—the annexation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine—caused fundamental changes in bilateral relations of the states: 1) the destruction of contractual-legal framework between Kyiv and Moscow; 2) the elimination of institutional gears of interstate relations; 3) the disablement of contacts at the higher level, the confrontational character of political and diplomatic relations; 4) enormous human, territorial, and economic losses on the part of Ukraine; 5) the unprecedented abridgement of economic cooperation; 6) deep alienation between Ukrainians and Russians [35, p.2]. New political and ideological reality1 emerged in relations between Ukraine and Russia. Thus, we need to reevaluate and reconsider the nature, ideology, and, in general, the institutional system of relations with Russia in key spheres (politics, security, economy, energy, humanitarian field, and so on), taking into account that Russian government in place constitutes a key threat to the Ukrainian statehood. We also should develop a new conceptual model of coexistence with Putin’s Russia, which would reflect modern realia and prospects of bilateral relations, taking into consideration the standpoints of western partner countries and international organizations.

1 See: Hai-Nyznhyk, P. (2017) Russia against Ukraine (1990–2016): From Blackmail and Enforcement Policy to the War of Absorption and the Attempt of Destruction. Kyiv: MP Lesia, 332 p. * Translated by Victoria Kalyna. 188 National security2 is known to function through the system of various relations between the individual and the society, the citizen and the state, society and the state, or different countries. Along with that, it is worth remembering the sharp and generalizing expression by Thomas Hobbes that «national security is not only the core of state-building activity—it is a key sense of the state’s existence.» Thus, we can summarize that national security is the condition of domestic and interstate relations, which determines the effectiveness of the system protecting governmental, legal, and social guarantees for rights and freedoms of man and citizen; fundamental values and interests of the society and sovereign state from inner and outer threats, and functions according to the key principles of national security provision: Zpriority of rights and freedoms of man and citizen; Zsupremacy of law; Zpriority of contractual (peaceful) ways of conflict settlement; Zexpediency and relevance of means for protecting national interests from real and potential threats; Zdistinctive delineation of powers and interaction of all governmental authorities while ensuring national security; Zdemocratic civil control over military organization of the state and other structures of the national security system; Zemployment of interstate systems and gears for international collective security to the benefit of Ukraine [18, p.351]. National security is also one of the levels at which international security functions as the governmental activity aimed at the establishment of relations between the people and the state for disabling the real threats to the development of the society. The fortification of national security also implies the development of strategic partnership relations, which are among the important foreign policy tools, more and more extensively used by lead countries and integration unions as a means for making their activity more efficient on the global arena. Modern Ukraine has faced threats and challenges that require immediate solution. The most acute of them are: Zmilitary aggression, participation of regular troops, counselors, instructors, and mercenaries in the warfare in the territory of Ukraine;

2 The «National Security» concept was introduced to the political vocabulary in the 1904 address of President T. Roosevelt to the U.S. Congress, in which he substantiated the annexation of the Panama Canal by the national security interests. 189 Ztemporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol along with further destabilization of Baltic-Black- Sea-Caspian region; Zintelligence and subversive, as well as diversionary activities aimed at stirring up interethnic, interconfessional, and social enmity and hatred, separatism and terrorism; establishment and comprehensive support, in particular military, of puppet quasi-state formations in the temporarily occupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions; Zaugmentation of military formations near the borders of Ukraine and in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, including the perspective of tactical nuclear weapon deployment on the Crimean peninsula; Zinfo- and psychological war, abasement of Ukrainian language and culture, falsification of Ukrainian history, distortion and alteration of the real information picture of the world via Russian media, etc. This context brings about the primary strategic goal of the national security state policy of Ukraine. It includes the restoration of territorial integrity of the country and the complex of its democratic institutes all over its territory; consolidation of Ukrainian political nation; shaping of a nationwide identity; unity of all citizens of Ukraine and all regions of Ukraine; reintegration of temporarily occupied territories after their liberation. The key types of today’s conflicts are asymmetrical and hybrid wars, which occur between strong and weak states or non-state actors. The armed conflict taking place in eastern Ukraine can be characterized as a hybrid-asymmetrical warfare of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Besides, Ukraine is also involved in a network-centric warfare, which is aimed at achieving information advantage by uniting military objects into an information network. Apart from exclusively classic military methods, Russia extensively uses—perhaps, for the first time—the concept of the «three-quarter war.» The concept implies that the modern soldier must be ready to combat on basic terms in one quarter, carry out police functions in the second one, and fulfill humanitarian missions in the third one [13]. It must be taken into account that Russian aggression against Ukraine is conducted not only by direct intrusion but also has several components of modern expansion methods. In relation to the growing global role of information in the armed struggle and the appearance of information society, Ukraine also lives in the state of information war, when the aim of confrontation is achieved exclusively by means of information struggle, thus making information itself—in a certain field of its use—a tool 190 for achieving political goals, a weapon. To solve these issues, Ukraine must, first of all, create effective information policy, targeted at the support of civil thought regarding the fact that the occupied territories, namely the AR of Crimea, are an integral part of the Ukrainian state and their inhabitants are citizens of Ukraine.

Political conflict around Crimea started as early as in the late 1980s, when Ukraine began restoring its independence. It is then that the problem of Crimea’s belonging became very acute and some Russian milieux tried to aggravate it to an ethnonational conflict. As it is known, in the early 1990s, the Crimean question was settled in favor of Ukraine; however, the Russian Federation—part of its political elite—didn’t recognize such political decision as an accomplished fact. Consequently, the ideal game of Russia promulgated the idea of «unfair transfer» of Crimea by M. Khrushchov to Ukraine, thus preparing several possible revenge scenarios. The argument of mythical «historical justice» was used as one of the trump cards for such pseudo-Reconquista along with the cultivation of the pro-Russian regional identity among the majority of Crimean inhabitants, supported by the powerful information and ideological struggle for the mind of an average person and the factor of physical presence of the Russian troops on the peninsula. Then Ukraine managed to stave off the attempts to 191 ignite the ethnonational conflict and overcame a quite deep political crisis3. The proclamation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, despite the unitary system of Ukraine, significantly contributed to that. The autonomy itself voted for the Constitution, which guaranteed the free development of all ethne, the three languages gaining the official status in the AR of Crimea. The axiological, even civilizational, conflict is important in the view of public attitudes of the «Crimean knot.» The Crimea, as no other region of Ukraine, revealed the conflict of values, collision of interests and goals of various ethnonational communities and social groups with the values, interests, and goals of the Ukrainian state in its European advancement. A significant part of Crimean population can be characterized by ideological diffidence, reactionary Soviet consciousness, paternalism, dominating majority opinion and rejection of alternatives. The attitude towards others is shown in the framework of stereotypes «ours–theirs,» with an intolerant treatment of «them.» In this regard, during the expert discussion «Strategy of Reintegrating Crimea: Problems of Development and Prospects of Realization» (October 8, 2014, Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies), Doctor of Political Sciences O. Kalakura quite aptly reminded about several crucial and open conflicts in Crimea, which had ethnonational features. This was the conflict in Morske village near Sudak, where in 2000 a permanent opposition between the Russian Orthodox and Muslim communities took place. It was caused by the decision of the Archbishop of Crimea and Simferopol Lazarus to place a thousand memorial crosses on the peninsula in honor of the 2000th anniversary of Christ’s Birth, the 1000th anniversary of the baptism of Rus, and proclamation of Crimea the «cradle of Orthodoxy.» Another long-lasting conflict referred to the question of territory ownership and the history of Holy Dormition monastery near Bakhchysarai, etc. [22, pp.513–517]. It also must be borne in mind that, in the ethnic sense, Crimea is the least Ukrainian and the only region where ethnic Ukrainians do not

3 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, more than 70% (i.e., ¾) of all global military conflicts of the mid-1990s were interethnic [3, p. 382]. 192 constitute a majority. According to the 2001 All-Ukrainian census, before the occupation, the population of the AR of Crimea for 95% consisted of: Russians (58.5%, 1180.4 thousand persons), Ukrainians (24.4%, 492.4 thousand persons), and Crimean Tartars (12.1%, 243.4 thousand persons) [22, p.479; 34]. Let me also remind you that as early as in 2010, 74.6% of representatives of a so-called Crimean «Slavic community» (Ukrainian citizens that are ethnic Ukrainians or Russians) had their sociocultural orientation geared towards Russian cultural and linguistic identity; 65.7% were convinced that Ukrainians and Russians are one nation, while 44.2% did not consider themselves representatives of the Ukrainian political nation [24, pp.4–5]. A similar situation was proved by the data of other sociological research [36]. Besides, the Ukrainians of Crimea as a regional minority didn’t receive any efficient help for satisfying their needs either from the side of official Kyiv or from the Autonomy’s authority. As a result, part of them have virtually assimilated in the ethnocultural sense with the Russian-speaking Slavic community: according to the survey conducted by Razumkov Center in 2008, a relative majority of ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea related themselves to the Russian cultural tradition [43, p.3]. In the fall of 2013, the majority of pro-Russian inhabitants of Crimea didn’t accept arguments in favor of signing by Ukraine the European Union Association Agreement, didn’t understand the reasons for Euromaidan, All-Ukrainian protests, and the Revolution of Dignity. Thus, in regard to the spheres of manifestation and the reasons of emergence, the ethnopolitical conflict around Crimea is not only an interstate but also a political, territorial, economic, historic and cultural, legal, psychological, and ideological one… Thus, regulation must concern every sphere of manifestation and the reasons for emergence, as the manifold nature of ethnopolitical conflicts stipulates the diversity of ways for their solution. The uniqueness of the 2014 annexation of Crimea also consists in the fact that for the first time since World War II a foreign founding member state of UNO, after resolving a conflict against another 193 founding member state of UNO, has officially announced the occupied territory a part of its country4.

To enter the stage of conflict settlement and be ready for resolving it, Ukraine must, first of all, provide the preparation of reintegration with the social capital it has received as a result of the Revolution of Dignity, direct contacts of the civil society with the temporarily occupied territory and its inhabitants. In particular, these might be the contacts between the NGO «Maidan of Foreign Affairs,» which, by the way, has already presented its own Crimean Reintegration Strategy; the «FreeCrimea» project; other community forces of Ukraine and the representatives of the civil society in Crimea: Mejlis, Ukrainian, and Russian organizations. It is worth remembering that by no means all Crimeans welcomed Russian occupants (there is already such notion as «other Russians»). According to M. Dzhemilev, 35% of the population took part in the so-called «referendum» [7] (i.e., a considerable part of Russians haven’t collaborated in that illicit referendum). At the same time, the results of social surveys testify that 39% of Crimean respondents supported the idea of double citizenship with

4 Nagorno-Karabakh, Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, «LPR,» «DPR» became unrecognized, but nevertheless, separate quasi-state formations, which officially do not constitute a part of the aggressor state. In such situation it is quite hard to prove the fact of aggression. Their separation can be interpreted as the logical «right of the nations for self-determination»—a legitimate international principle competing with the principle of territorial integrity. However, as D. Matsola reasonably states, there is no international norm to even indirectly justify the annexation of the territory. Moreover, the horrors of World War II generated International law, grounded on the direct prohibition of seizing alien territories. For Germany, France, Japan, USA, and many other countries, the return of Crimea to Ukraine is necessary not even due to its unfair annexation but for the sake of preventing the «Crimean precedent» from causing a chain reaction of «returning native lands» in the entire world [27]. 194 Russia5, while the peninsula itself saw the growth of disappointment with its new status and repression of civil rights. Sociological research clearly testifies that the prevailing majority of Ukrainians consider Crimea a Ukrainian territory. According to the data of Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 69% of citizens recognize Crimea as a Ukrainian territory, annexed by the Russian Federation. Only 14% of citizens determine Crimea as a territory of the Russian Federation. Herewith, 8% of them consider that inclusion of Crimea into Russia happened absolutely lawfully, while another 6% are sure that the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia was illegal. For 10% of Ukraine’s population, Crimea is a territory that neither belongs to Russia nor to Ukraine, while another 8% couldn’t clearly define their opinion regarding the status of Crimea [23]. Russians have an opposite point of view. According to the All- Russian opinion poll, conducted on the 2nd–5th of October, 2015 by Levada analytical center, only 8% of Russians were absolutely positive concerning the return of Crimea to Ukraine; 7% chose «rather positive than not»; 58% Russians were negative about the return of Crimea; 25% of Russians were rather negative than positive [44]. The survey was conducted among the population of Crimea. According to GfK Ukraine, 82% of Crimean inhabitants fully support Russian annexation of the peninsula; 11% of the respondents said that they were rather supportive than not, while 4% were against it [51]. However, the representativeness of this survey is doubtful while under severe persecution from the side of Crimean authority, when even mentioning the annexation of Crimea can lead to arrest and accusation of terroristic activity, people fear speaking the truth. It must be stated that the myopic and haphazard policy of the Ukrainian government in security, humanitarian, ethnonational, and information spheres, with some political leaders occasionally supporting the ideas of the «Russian World,» led to the embedding of these chauvinistic ideas in mass consciousness of some south- and east-Ukrainian population; contributed to the formation of the regional pro-Russian so-called Crimean or Donetsk (Luhansk) identity; and allowed committing criminal expansion into Crimea and spreading separatist moods in the east of the country,

5 European Union and Eurasian Customs Union. The research was conducted from the 23rd of February till the 14th of March, 2013 by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Rating company. The field stage took place from the 27th of February till the 10th of March, 2013. The opinion poll was conducted in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (in 41 inhabited localities) [20]. 195 supported by a certain part of local population, which aimed to unite with the «great Russia.» According to the sociological survey conducted by Razumkov Center, not so long ago citizens of Ukraine related themselves, first of all, to their place of residence. They were characterized by local identity, attachment to a certain locality. 45% of citizens primarily identified themselves with their small motherland; 32%, with Ukraine on the whole; 16%, with their area of living; 7% were undecided. Similar research, conducted in 2013 by the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, confirmed the high level of local identity. Thus, the indexes of local (a village or a city inhabitant) and regional (an inhabitant of a region) identities also were rather high: respectively 28.6% and 7.8% of respondents, although lower than in the previous research. About half of the respondents (50.6%) identified themselves as the citizens of Ukraine; 2.4% called themselves citizens of the world; 1.2%, European citizens; 6.6%, citizens of the former USSR [47, pp.390–391]. It must be stated that the time period of 1992–2013 observed the increase of local identity by 6.4% with a subsequent decrease by 12.3% during the following year. The same time period witnessed the increase of All-Ukrainian identity by 5% and a growth by 13.8% within just a year, with the decrease of post-Soviet identity by 7.3%. It testifies that 2014 saw significant shifts in the decrease of local and increase of All-Ukrainian identity, which was considerably predisposed by the events of Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, as well as the consolidation of the Ukrainian political nation in fighting against Russian occupants and collaborating separatists, repulsing the external aggression of the Russian Federation. However, the pro-Russian identity still prevails in the AR of Crimea and occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It is actively intensified by the information influence from the Russian Federation, imposing imperial values. A number of pro-Russian NGOs in Ukraine impose the ideas of the «Russian World.» According to the data of the representative body of Rossotrudnichestvo, until quite recently, Kyiv has had 142 acting «organizations of compatriots,» 14 of which were national. The majority of regional organizations, 19, were found in Crimea. Ukrainian language and culture haven’t been properly supported and promoted in these regions, which still have prevailing Soviet toponymy and observe the spread of Soviet historical myths. This contributes to the formation of post-Soviet pro-Russian historical narrative. 196 2014 16,1 8 64,4 2,1 5.4 1,1 2,1 0,5 0.3 2013 28,6 7.8 50,6 2,0 6.6 1,2 2.4 0,6 0.2 2012 29,8 7.6 48,4 1,8 8.4 1,2 2.4 0.3 0.1 2010 27.2 6.6 51.2 3.1 6.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3 2008 24.5 9.3 51.7 2.6 9.0 0.4 1.7 0.6 0.1 2006 27.7 6.6 51.6 1.8 7.3 1.3 2.9 0.7 0.1 2005 24.6 6.4 54.6 2.1 8.1 0.8 2.5 1.0 0.1 2003 30.5 6.7 44.2 3.1 10.7 0.7 2.4 1.4 0.2 2002 31.6 5.9 41.0 3.0 12.7 0.7 2.7 1.6 0.8 2000 31.3 6.9 41.0 — 12.2 2.8 5.6 — 0.2 8 45.6 — 12,7 3.8 6.4 — 0.6 1992 24.0 6. (Select one most appropriate answer) (Select one most appropriate What is your primary self-determination?What is your Resident of the village, Resident district, or city in which I live of the region Resident regions) several (or in which I live of Ukraine Citizen of my Representative ethnos, nation of the Citizen USSR former of Europe Citizen World citizen Other Undecided 197

For example, the dynamics of the 1992–2014 identity changes (based on the research of the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine) can be presented in the following table. While Soviet toponymy in western and central Ukraine has lost its positions (the post-Maidan period and decommunization laws have especially accelerated the destruction of monuments symbolizing totalitarian past) the east and south of the country preserved it almost untouched. Thousands of towns, streets, squares keep projecting their names on the historical memory, capitalizing rudiments of totalitarian regime6. Dualism of historical memory is also proved by the results of sociological research conducted by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation together with UkrainianSociologyService in 2015 regarding the attitude of the population towards the key domestic historical events [48]. The lack of the Ukrainian language in the information space of Crimea, media, and higher educational establishments also caused the buildup of the pro-Russian regional identity in the AR of Crimea. The activity of Russian branches in Crimean universities that provide full-time education also contributed to that. They are presented mostly in Sevastopol. This city, in particular, hosted the branch of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Institute of Economics and Law (Moscow Academy of Labor and Social Relations branch), Crimean branch of Novorossiysk State Naval Academy, Sevastopol branch of Saint Petersburg Humanitarian Trade Union University, Sevastopol branch of Saratov State Social and Economic University, etc. The aggressive humanitarian policy of Russia along with nearly a capitulationism on the part of the Ukrainian government also contributed to the creation of the pro-Russian identity. For example, the bill «Basic principles of state cultural policy» of the Russian Federation, developed at the end of 2013 and brought up to extensive discussion in 2014, stated: «The development of the Russian language also implies result-oriented effort for its promotion in the world, its support and expansion of Russian- speaking communities in foreign countries. […] The development of the

6 European Council expert group, which carried out a survey of cultural policy in Ukraine, stated that out of 150,000 listed monuments, 7,000 (almost 6%) constituted monuments to Lenin and other totalitarian figures. Lately this number was considerably reduced; however, they still prevail in eastern and southern Ukraine. Law of Ukraine No.2558 of April 9, 2015 «On the conviction of communist and national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the prohibition of propaganda of their symbols» has already started contributing to considerable changes of the situation in this field. 198 Russian language includes […] fighting against its substitution by national languages of other countries. […] It is necessary so that modern citizens of the world could have the fullest evaluation of contemporary events from the Russian perspective.» [32] Let me mention that although this passage wasn’t included into the final variant ratified by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 24, 2014, it nevertheless vividly illustrates true goals and tendencies of expansionist humanitarian policy of the Russian Federation. Ratified by the decree of the Russian government of November 19, 2014 No.2321-p the «2015–2017 Program of cooperation with compatriots living abroad» implied organization of various events like annual international campaign «St. George Ribbon,» «Long Live Russia,» «With Russia in Heart,» and so on. Implementation of expansionist humanitarian plans abroad is financed by Moscow from the state budget, as well as by various odious funds, such as the «Russian World» and interstate fund of humanitarian cooperation of CIS. This activity is coordinated by Russian diplomatic institutions abroad and the Federal agency for the affairs of CIS, compatriots living abroad, and international humanitarian cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo). For example, until quite recently, representative bodies of Rossotrudnichestvo in Ukraine have been conducting active open agitprop with various categories and age groups of our citizens and the contest «CIS Is My Motherland» among the students of Ukrainian secondary schools with Russian-language teaching [4]. At the time of Crimean annexation and the beginning of Russian- Ukrainian war, the special-purpose Federal program «Russian Language» for 2011–2015 was the core document for the implementation of the Russian language policy [30]. The goal of the program was determined as follows: «Support, preserve, and spread the Russian language; also, among the compatriots living abroad.» Firstly, it implies «the support of the Russian language as the basis for developing integration processes in member states of Commonwealth of Independent States» and only in the second place—«satisfaction of language and cultural needs» of the mentioned «compatriots.» The problems which constituted the topicality of the program included «recession of integration processes in CIS member states and Baltic countries; deterioration of Russia’s credibility in the global community.» Support and propaganda of the Russian language and culture abroad is also stipulated by the «2015–2017 Program of cooperation with compatriots living abroad.» [40] The implementation of 199 the above mentioned programs is laid upon the non-governmental bodies of the Russian Federation.

On May 20, 2015, the Russian government ratified the concept of Federal special-purpose program «The Russian Language» for 2016–2020 by regulation No.481. Its purposes and tasks do not fundamentally differ from the current one; however, its provisions pay special attention to financial and economic, as well as geopolitical risks related to the events of 2014, namely the introduction of sanctions, which can have a negative impact on the document performance [21]. According to the program, forms, methods of studying and teaching Russian language must meet «strategic priorities of the Russian Federation»… consolidation «of positions of the Russian language in the national education systems of CIS members.» In particular, the program implied that «the extension of geography and spheres of using the Russian language in the world will contribute to Russia’s empowerment, formation of its positive image abroad, reinforcement of its international standing and as a result—protection of Russia’s geopolitical interests.» [21] It is also worth mentioning that even under current circumstances, the share of Russian and Russian language books constitutes around 80% of the Ukrainian book market. Besides, unlike other foreign language books, Russian language editions are presented in all genres (an attempt to satisfy any reader’s demand). Comparing to previous years, the supply of the Russian book in Ukraine has not only remained at the same level but 200 even slightly increased. In July 2014, Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine O. Sych declared the necessity of licensing and quota allocation for the Russian book product to decrease its volume at the market during several next years by 50%. This proposal was extensively discussed in the professional environment, but even its supporters mentioned considerable difficulties in its implementation. Let’s recall that ever since the 1990s, when at the presidential elections of January 30, 1994 73% of electors gave their votes for the leader of pro-Russian forces Yu. Meshkov, the peninsula has already seen the foundation and legalization of separatist organizations («Russian Community,» «Russian Unity,» «Sevastopol–Crimea–Russia,» «Russian Crimea,» «Union of ARC Cossacks») [49, p.110]. Along with that, Crimea had the Ukrainian language extruded from the sphere of education. In 2012, there were only 7 Ukrainian schools out of 563, which constituted only 1.2% of their general quantity and encompassed 7.8% of students, considering that 10.1% of the Crimean population called Ukrainian their mother tongue at that time [26]. Besides, the so-called «optimization» of 2012–2013, allegedly caused by the lack of financing, led to the reduction of Ukrainian classes at Russian-language and bilingual schools. In 2010– 2014, the de-Ukrainization process in disguise took place, as the spread of the Ukrainian language didn’t happen, while the support of the Russian language intensified. Thus, the proportion of students taught in Ukrainian didn’t change, while that of students taught in Russian grew by 8.5%. Number of secondary educational establishments with Russian-language teaching grew by 36; the number of classes with Ukrainian-language teaching reduced by 117 and that of classes with Russian-language instruction grew by 234. Today, Crimean schools do not use Ukrainian, and «History of Ukraine» is a prohibited subject. So, for the attenuation of the pro-Russian regional identity in the AR of Crimea, the Ukrainian government must foresightedly prepare and implement not only information policy but also efficient humanitarian and ethnonational one. Humanitarian factors must, in particular, oppose the creation of the so-called «hybrid identity» (H. Bhabha’s theory). The theoretician of postcolonialism H. Bhabha studied the realms that emerge between different national identities and called them cultural hybrids. Due to mimicry, hybrids can adjust to «hegemonized rewriting of Eurocenter» (in case of Crimean separatists, it is Kyiv). The scholar confirms that from such a perspective, the hybrid nature can turn into the state equal to alienation, 201 homelessness [12; 14]. The destruction of such openly hostile symbolic field in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine requires integrated effort, which will shape new humanitarian, cultural, and information architecture of the local symbolic field. According to the results of sociological research, the Ukrainian civil self-identification of the population has substantially increased during these months—up to 75% of respondents—and, what’s important, this growth happened exactly in eastern and southern Ukraine by means of the Russian-speaking group. As for the status of Donetsk and Luhansk, most respondents think these cities must remain regional centers of Ukraine within the state (51%). The autonomy of Donbas within Ukraine is supported by not more than 20%. Only minor part of respondents endorse independence or annexation of Donbas by Russia (6% and 4% respectively). The establishment of Ukrainian identity in Donetsk and Luhansk regions will primarily depend on putting in place the special order of self-governing and conducting elections according to Ukrainian laws in the region. Local residents need the professional and moral qualities of their candidates for any post to be complemented by the algorithm «ours, native» clear to the working-class society [6, p.10]. Regional identity will lose its fundamental principle—dependence on the territory that satisfies all needs of a person. However, it is worth remembering that Russian propaganda still has a significant impact on the citizens of Ukraine. According to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey, the index of Russian propaganda resulting quality also has considerable regional divergences. Most of all it influences Kharkiv region (50%), Donetsk region (unoccupied territory, 45%), Odessa region (43%), Kherson and Mykolaiv regions (29%), Dnipro region (28%), Kyiv region (19%). North—19%, center—18%, west—12% [19]. It is enough to mention that, for instance, in mid-February 2015, 35 out of 37 Mariupol TV channels were Russian and only 2, Ukrainian. Moreover, from 2014 through 2016, the share of Russian banks in Ukraine increased from 12% of the general volume of bank operations to 42%, and the semiannual commodity exchange between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (the aggressor state!) in 2017 increased threefold! Another front line of the «hybrid warfare» between Ukraine and Russia lies in the national memory realm. Since 2014, Russian propaganda has been using pseudohistoric arguments in public declarations of state figures and official documents to justify the illegal annexation of Crimea and aggressive politics of Russia regarding Ukraine as a whole. The Russian 202 President’s address to the Federal Assembly of 2014 regarding Crimea stated, in particular, that «the territory itself is strategically important, because it is here that we find the spiritual turn in forming a diverse but monolithic Russian nation and the centralized Russian state […].» It is here, in Crimea, in the ancient Chersonese […] that prince Volodymyr was baptized to later baptize the entire Rus. […] It is the spiritual ground on which our ancestors for the first time and forever recognized themselves a unified nation, and this allows us to confirm that Crimea, ancient Korsun, Chersonese, Sevastopol have enormous civilization and sacral meaning for Russia.» [37] Some Russian online publications compare Kyiv to Kosovo: as the latter preserves spiritual origins and sacred objects of Orthodox Serbians, so the first contains spiritual origins and sanctuaries of the Russian people [5]. Thus, the capital of Ukraine gets on the list of the Russian «sacral heritage,» which can serve as a justification for further escalation of aggression. Let me remind you that on December 4, 2014, during his annual «Address» to the Federal Assembly, the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin emphasized the importance of the expression of will in Crimea concerning its annexation by Russia [37]. The Head of the Russian government D. Medvedev is roughly on the same page, insisting on the importance of the referendum of the «people» of Crimea as the reason for «reunification» of Crimea with Russia [38]. At that, it should be mentioned that most arguments as for the «legitimacy» of annexing Crimea, voiced by the top officials of Russia, had been previously formalized in a number of statutory and regulatory acts of the Russian Federation. In such a way, for example, March 21, 2014 saw the adoption of the Federal Constitutional Law «On Incorporation of the Republic of Crimea into Russia and Creation of New Subjects within the Russian Federation: The Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol.» This implied such arguments for annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation: the results of the referendum of the population of Crimea, Declaration of Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on Incorporation of the Republic of Crimea into Russia and Creation of New Subjects within the Russian Federation (further—the Agreement), the proposal of Crimea regarding its incorporation into the Russian Federation [31]. The question of searching for the «legal» reasons for the annexation of Crimea became even more topical when on December 23, 2014, the 203 Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation V. Matviyenko announced the preparation of a new bill on declaring illegal the act of transferring Crimean region from the RSFSR to the USSR [42]. Putin, for his part, stated in the above mentioned «address» that signing of the Agreement «was based on the free and voluntary expression of will of peoples of Crimea at the All-Crimean referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on March 16, 2014, during which the peoples of Crimea endorsed the decision on the reunification with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation» [16]. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the fact that the Supreme Council of the AR of Crimea endorsed local referendums7. Taking this into account, Ukraine must collect counterarguments to the reasons for annexing the Republic of Crimea by the Russian Federation. It should be mentioned right away that the specified regulations of the AR of Crimea Supreme Council on local referendums violated: Zthe Constitution of Ukraine (article No.73), which states that «All- Ukrainian referendum is the only way to change the territory of Ukraine»; Zthe Constitution of Ukraine (article No.134), the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (part one, article No.1), according to which «Autonomous Republic of Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine»; Zpart two of article No.8 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which stipulates that «statutory and regulatory acts are adopted on the basis of

7 On February 27, 2014, at the extraordinary session of the Supreme Council of the AR of Crimea, regulation No.1630-6/14 «On the organization and holding of the republican (local) referendum regarding the issues of improving the status and authority of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea» was adopted. The referendum was appointed on May 25, 2014 and was intended to be held on the question: «ARC has state sovereignty and constitutes a part of Ukraine on the basis of agreements.» On March 4, 2014, Kyiv county administrative court upheld the petition on providing the lawsuit of the General Prosecution of Ukraine on invalidating the decisions of the Supreme Council of Crimea as for holding a local referendum on improving the status and authority of the autonomy. On March 6, 2014, at the extraordinary session, the Supreme Council of the AR of Crimea adopted the regulation «On holding the All-Crimean referendum» on March 16, 2014. Among other things, this regulation already stipulated the appointment of All-Crimean referendum on March 16, 2014. The referendum was to bring about other alternative questions: 1) Do you support the reunification of Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation? 2) Do you support the revalidation of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea and the status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine? On March 7, 2014, the Decree of the President «On Termination of the Regulation of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea No.1702-6/14 of March 6, 2014 ‘On holding the All-Ukrainian referendum’» was adopted. On March 14, 2014, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine declared unconstitutional the Regulation of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea «On holding All-Crimean referendum» of March 6, 2014 No.1702-6/14 and nullified it. 204 the Constitution of Ukraine and must agree with it»; Zpart two of article No.19 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which stipulates that «bodies of state power and local governments, their officials are obliged to act only on the basis and in terms of their powers, as well as in accord with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine»; Zpart one of article No.28 of the Constitution of the AR of Crimea, which states that «statutory and regulatory acts of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea governing the Autonomous Republic of Crimea must comply with the Constitution of Ukraine, laws of Ukraine.» Besides, since November 28, 2012, Ukraine doesn’t have legal prerequisites for conducting local referendums, while by adopting in 2012 the law of Ukraine «On the All-Ukrainian Referendum» the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine nullified the Law of Ukraine «On All-Ukrainian and Local Referendums,» which also regulated the problem of conducting local referendums. Thus, the holding of the specified local referendum was illegitimate, as it contradicted the Constitution of Ukraine, Constitution of the AR of Crimea and referendum legislation. Its results cannot be the reason for committing any lawful acts, including the conclusion of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the so-called «Republic of Crimea» on the incorporation of the latter into the Russian Federation and creation of new subjects within it [33]. Legally groundless is also the statement of V. Putin, made during his speech on October 24, 2014 at the press-conference of the international discussion club «Valdai» regarding the fact that the Agreement between the Russian Federation and «The Republic of Crimea» as for the incorporation of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and creation of new subjects within it of March 18, 2014 provided the people of Crimea with the right for «self-determination» [41]. Also, the President of the Russian Federation unfoundedly identifies the Agreement as the one concluded on the basis of «recognizing the principles of equal rights and self-determination of nations, codified in the UN Charter, […] the necessity to provide respect and adherence to the dignity, rights, and freedoms of a person […] according to the generally recognized principles and norms of the international law, […] codified, in particular, in the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act on security and collaboration in Europe» [41]. The territorial integrity of Ukraine and its state borders is guaranteed by the provisions of a number of international-legal acts, namely: 205 Zclause 4 of article 2 of the UN Charter stipulates that «all Members of the United Nations Organization refrain in their international relations from a power threat or its use as against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state so in any other way incompatible with the Goals of the United Nations» [45]; ZDeclaration on the principles of international law that deal with friendly relations and cooperation between the states according to the UN Charter contains a similar definition and determines that «every state must refrain in its international relations from a power threat or its use as against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state so in any other way incompatible with the Goals of the United Nations» [15]; Zthe Final Act of the Council Board for Security and Cooperation in Europe determines that «Member states will respect the territorial integrity of every member state. According to it, they will refrain from any actions incompatible with goals and principles of the UN Charter, against territorial integrity, political independence, or integrity of any other member state… Member states will refrain from transforming each other’s territory into an object of military occupation or any other direct or indirect way of using power for violating international law, or into an object of acquisition by means of such ways or a threat of their implementation. No occupation or acquisition carried out in such a way will be considered legal» [17]; ZMemorandum on the guarantees of security due to Ukraine’s accession to the Agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapon (Budapest Memorandum) determines that «The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America prove to Ukraine their obligations in accordance with the principles of Final Act of CSCE to respect independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine» [28]; Zaccording to the provisions of Declaration on the principles of international law regarding friendly relations and cooperation between the states in conformity with the UN Charter, «nothing must be interpreted as such that sanctions or encourages any actions which would cause dismemberment, partial or full violation of territorial integrity or political integrity of sovereign and independent states, which conform their activity to the principle of equality and self-determination of nations, and thus have the government that represents the entire nation inhabiting this territory.» [15] 206

Considering the above mentioned, it is worth emphasizing that according to the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, Crimea is the only administrative and territorial entity of Ukraine which had (and still has) autonomous status, its own representative body (Supreme Council of ARC) and Government [33]. Besides, the Constitution of the AR of Crimea secures national and cultural needs of representatives of various ethnic groups of Crimea by guaranteeing «functioning and development of Russian, Crimean Tatar, and other national languages» (articles 4, 10, 11, 18, 26) [39, p.43]. Thus, in keeping with the above mentioned Declaration on the principles of international law in Ukraine, the principle of territorial integrity dominates over the principle of self-determination. At the same time, we should recall, for instance, one of the fundamental monographs, written by the international group of authors, devoted to the problems of self-determination and secession in the international law and published by the reputable Oxford University Press soon after the Crimean events of 2014 [53]. Its last chapter finishes with the analysis of the Crimean crisis [52, pp.293–311]. The author of this chapter Prof. C. Walter states that the development of events in Crimea returned the question of self-determination and secession on the first place of international agenda [52, p.293]. However, K. Walter’s subsequent analysis of the Crimean situation rather quickly leads his research to an absolutely different conclusion: Crimean events of February–March, 2014 were not an example of self-determination and secession, while the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation was illegal. 207 At the beginning of the occupation and the subsequent annexation of Crimea, Ukraine made a fully adequate decision under those circumstances: to draft and adopt the law «On the occupied territories.» However, it didn’t prove successful, as it didn’t consider economic relations with the occupied territories. Lobbied later and adopted in August of 2014, the law on the free economic zone «Crimea» caused even more problems, which are still not solved at the state level. During the expert discussion themed «Strategy of Reintegrating Crimea: Problems of Development and Perspectives of Implementation,» which I happened to moderate and participate in and which took place on October 9, 2015 within the walls of Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies [50, pp.260–265], the experts of «Maidan of Foreign Affairs» stated, in particular, that it (the law) lacked logic of the very definition of the occupied territory as a free economic zone. It is clear that the law was adopted in favor of individuals owing assets in the occupied territories to bring them into the legal framework of Ukraine. However, along with that, the citizens of Ukraine with Crimean registration were territorially recognized non-residents in their own country! By following the above mentioned law and creating such model of economic relations with the temporarily occupied territory «Crimea,» the peninsula was virtually recognized a territory of another country (Russian Federation). This aggravated the situation, namely in the context of evacuating small and medium businesses to the continental part, as well as the process of communication with citizens that were forcedly caught in occupation. At the same time, it was allowed to provide the annexed territory with energy resources, food products, and other goods, which contributed to the development of occupational military bases, as well as partial tax provision of the dummy government of Crimea and Sevastopol. This also called into question the appropriateness of applying sanctions to the occupied territories and the aggressor state itself from the western partners’ side. The state must have a clearer vision of protecting the rights of Ukrainians and those Russians of Crimea that keep their Ukrainian citizenship. It is presumably required to clarify the provisions of the Law on foreign Ukrainians, or to adopt a special Law on the rights of citizens in the temporarily occupied Crimea. It is necessary to fight for a new Ukrainian generation of Crimean inhabitants, who didn’t know realia of the USSR and don’t share Soviet sentiments. It is necessary to provide government 208 support of humanitarian contacts; access to higher education; quotas for those willing to continue their studying in the continental Ukraine; joint cultural events of Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, and Russian national and cultural communities. It is also important to provide Crimeans with access to political influence in all spheres of social life. It is also worth mentioning that even after three years since Crimea was occupied and the war with Russia started, Ukraine still has peacetime legislation in force, except for some changes. Apparently, there is a compelling need for imposing moratorium with the subsequent cancellation of the Law «On creating the free economic zone «Crimea» and specifics of carrying out economic activity in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.» At the same time it is necessary to develop and adopt a redrafted Law on national and cultural autonomies recognizing Crimean Tatars (as well as the Karaites) indigenous people of Crimea and legislating the optimization of administrative-territorial division in the temporarily occupied territories of the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The problems of settlement and social adjustment of those who have temporarily left Crimea or will keep leaving it also require solution. The peninsula is observing the onset of persecution of the Ukrainian language and culture, UOC KP and UGCC (Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church), and everything that preserves the spirit of Ukraine, as well as the Crimean Tatar national movement. Mother tongue education faces everyday restrictions [2]. Thus, Ukraine must support pro-Ukrainian political idea in Crimea. A number of international human rights advocacy groups, particularly OSCE mission assessing the state of human rights observance, has already made several disappointing conclusions about the state of things in the occupied territory [29]. So, for the attenuation of pro-Russian regional identity as in the AR of Crimea so in the east and west of the country, the Ukrainian government must prepare and implement not only information policy but also efficient humanitarian and ethnonational one. Humanitarian factors must, in particular, oppose the creation of the so-called «hybrid identity» (the spaces that emerge between different national identities, or, in other words, cultural hybrids). Due to mimicry, hybrids can adjust to «hegemonized rewriting of Eurocenter» (in case of Crimean separatists, it is Kyiv). From such point of view, hybridity can become a state equal to alienation, homelessness. The destruction of such openly hostile symbolic 209 field in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine requires integrated effort, which will shape new humanitarian, cultural, and information architecture of the local symbolic field. Along with that, the Ukrainian state must avert in the future the creation (even nominal) of any national-territorial entities or bodies of national-territorial governance in its own territory, including Crimean Tatar ones. Thus, after the de-occupation of Crimea, its status as of an autonomous republic must be liquidated! The principle of unitary, unified system must become not only the constitutional pivot of Ukraine’s political order with the single titular nation—Ukrainian—and the only state language—Ukrainian—but also an axiom the citizens will comprehend regardless of their ethnocultural or national identity! So, under modern circumstances, it is necessary to activate the effort of shaping the nationwide identity. Crystallization of the national picture of the world guarantees the fusion of political and cultural identity, which consolidates the people of the country with powerful symbolic and emotional ties. It is the common identity that constitutes the foundation of the respective national community (political nation). If members of the community have a high level of national self-consciousness, then under political regulation of the existing contradictions and problems in the society, they are inclined to limit their personal, group, or corporate interests for the sake of achieving common social concord. In case the state doesn’t take any efficient steps to neutralize the above mentioned threats, this can lead to the loss of the state sovereignty. To a great extent, it can be caused by a critical deterioration of the political system operability, conditioned by external and internal conflicts. At the present stage, shaping national identity is one of the key goals of the Ukrainian state. To achieve it, we must actualize the efforts of the relevant state agencies and NGOs in the sphere of social and, first of all, interethnic relations. The fundamentals of shaping national identity must comprise: the idea of polyethnic, social, and political concord based on the generally accepted goal—provision of the citizens of Ukraine with spiritual and material welfare; the idea of patriotism, love to Ukraine as a determinant and higher value; national self-respect and respect for representatives of other nations and national minorities (on the assumption that they do not show 210 disrespect for the titular nation); protection of human and civil rights and freedoms regardless of ethnic identity and other differences; high level of political and legal culture and public education (demarginalization of human consciousness); development of an efficient civil society. Besides, such measures for shaping national identity must be developed and provided at the state level: provision of the all-round support of the linguistic and cultural renaissance of Ukrainians as the titular nation and other ethnic communities of Ukraine; protection of the information space of Ukraine; favoring free functioning and development of the Ukrainian language and national minorities’8 languages; guaranteeing popularization of native history, culture, and language via mass media; development of historical memory of the Ukrainian people by creating «memory sites»; continuation of de-communization and de-colonization of Ukrainian memory; support of intensive development of domestic cultural industries by building the regime of state protectionism for national producer of cultural products and services; development of national education system, especially teaching of historical disciplines, based on the best samples of the historical past; creation of effective tools for preserving national historic and cultural legacy, in particular those for augmenting responsibility for destruction or looting of cultural monuments; harmonization of relations between the state and the church, as well as different churches; depoliticization of the church (particularly, criminal prosecution for the antistate activity of ROC (Russian Orthodox Church) in Ukraine, which operates under the guise of UOC-MP (Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate))); establishment of morals and spirituality of the nation;

8 Language preferences among inhabitants of the west: Ukrainian language—98%; of the center: Ukrainian language is a mother tongue for 78%; of the south and east: Ukrainian language is a mother tongue for 35% and 38% respectively; Ukrainian and Russian, for 37% and 34% respectively. Those who barely understand Ukrainian prevail in the south—2% and the east—5%. 211 establishment of long-term programs of the intercultural and interregional dialogue; creation of gears contributing to satisfying linguistic, cultural, and educational needs of Ukrainians abroad; improvement of the ways for effective social adaptation of refugees to the Ukrainian society; increase of control over migration processes. National security policy in the humanitarian sphere must be aimed at overcoming threats in the fields of education, culture, science, religion and maintenance of conditions aimed at fortification of national identity, particularly languages, culture, traditions, and beliefs of all ethnic communities. It must be based on the ideas of ethnic pluralism, the possibility of coexistence and symbiotic development of various ethnic groups in terms of polyethnic space and state nation-centricity of Ukraine. The ethnonational sphere requires formation and codification of the Doctrine of ethnonational policy of Ukraine, which would develop conceptual provisions and clearly determine basic concepts of ethnonational policy: «titular nation,» «nationality,» «indigenous peoples,» «ethnic group,» «ethnic community,» etc., as even the current Constitution of Ukraine does not contain their precise definition. It is necessary to provide further improvement of domestic legislation for securing the rights of ethnic minorities and guarantees that the Ukrainian nation, as well as its cultural and historical heritage, will keep its leading position, while the Ukrainian language will preserve its non-conditional state status. If considered, the Strategy of returning Crimea and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions must be comprehensive and include a number of various measures in different spheres: 1) creation of the central body dealing with the Crimean issues— an agency, a center, or a committee, which would coordinate the work of public authorities and NGOs dealing with the return of Crimea; 2) development and approval of the state Strategy for reintegration of Crimea with the focus on international-legal, economic, cultural, and humanitarian aspects of the problem; 3) intensification of the foreign policy activity of the nation, aimed at the global growth of pro-Ukrainian coalition of democratic states which recognize the actions of the Russian Federation regarding the annexation of Crimea as illicit and support the aggravation of economic sanctions 212 against it; 4) further implementation of European integration strategy. Exertion of all possible efforts regarding Ukraine’s performance of all international agreements for the implementation of democratic standards in the context of signing European Union Association Agreement, especially in the aspects of overcoming corruption and improving welfare of the population; 5) development and mounting of legal actions in international courts and respective international organizations over the Russian Federation in order to bring it to justice for the annexation of Crimea, support of separatists and collaborators in Donbas, violation of human rights, rights of Ukrainians and national minorities in Crimea; 6) contribution to the preparation of legal actions from foreign and Ukrainian jurisdiction to international courts over the enterprises that were nationalized by the illicit power of Crimea with the requirement for compensation for the caused damage; 7) provision of adoption of relevant statutory and regulatory acts aimed at the facilitation of activity of public authorities and NGOs dealing with the return of Crimea; 8) establishment of the system cooperation of state institutions with expert environment and society for the preparation and implementation of the programs for reintegration of Crimea; 9) development and implementation of effective state programs for social integration of Crimean refugees; 10) development and implementation of an active information campaign by organizing steady broadcasting of central Ukrainian channels in the Ukrainian, Russian, and Crimean Tatar languages to Crimea to objectively cover the events in Ukraine and debunk the myths spread by the Russian Federation; 11) development of our own national information and cultural project («Ukrainian World,» «Great Ukraine,» and so on) aimed at consolidation of the Ukrainian nation and counteracting the influence of ideas of the so- called «Russian World»; 12) carrying out of an information and educational campaign to popularize history and culture of Crimea among all population categories; creation of the unified online library of editions on the history and culture of Crimea; 13) creation of the domestic mass media system for the information 213 coverage of initiatives and projects on the reintegration of Crimea, in particular by means of new rubrics, TV and radio programs devoted to this topic; 14) facilitating attraction of international attention to the problem of repressions and violation of human rights on the peninsula, particularly by use of trade, food, energy, and water blockade of the peninsula; 15) ensuring the creation of logistic centers on the administrative border with the AR of Crimea so that its inhabitants could shape a positive image of Ukraine in their consciousness; 16) development and adoption of the Law of Ukraine «On collaborationism.» To be able to return the lost territories and restore sovereignty, Ukraine must make every effort as within the country so at the international level. It must convince the entire society and international community that the part of Donbas (so-called separate districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, or SDDLR) and Crimea are the Ukrainian territory temporarily occupied by Russia, which Ukraine will never abandon and will ultimately return. It is also important that the discourse about the return of the lost territories (as within the country so at the international level) should comprise not only Donbas but, undoubtedly, Crimea as well. Donbas and Crimea must be always considered together. Unfortunately, today Russia managed to separate the discussions about these two regions. The «Minsk process» must be regarded as the gear for diminishing the intensity of the military component of the conflict and recategorizing it as a «frozen» one, which has almost exhausted itself and was a priori erroneous, doomed to play a role of a trap for Ukraine. The distorted implementation of the Minsk agreements is disadvantageous (no-win) for Ukraine. It «returns» Ukraine ruined territories fully controlled and governed by local bandit-collaborative groups and Russian occupants, as well as a huge number of exasperated electorate, brainwashed with Russian propaganda. Thus, it is necessary to agree upon the use of other formats, particularly the extended and updated «Normand» format, resuscitated on the new basis of the «Geneva» one, or even demand the return of the «Budapest» format or creation of a new one, which will enable development of more effective ways to settle the conflict diplomatically [9; 13]. Of course, it is important to draft and adopt a Law on the Strategy for de-occupation and reintegration of the Crimean territory and a state program regarding this question, involving respective financing to 214 complement it. At the legislative level, it is necessary to solve the question about the possibilities of conducting a state-legal experiment on making the model of Kherson region development a linchpin in dealing with the issues of de-occupying and reintegrating the seized territory of Crimea. It is essential to draft and adopt a Law on collaborationism, which will determine the irreversibility of punishment, i.e. criminal, administrative, civil, and constitutional responsibility depending on the level of guilt. It can also have an economic component and imply punishment for enrichment in the temporarily occupied territories by means of Ukrainian state and private property, as well as motivate certain part of the population in these territories to take balanced decisions. The laws on the status and enforcement of rights for Crimean Tatars in Ukraine, on the specifics of economic relations with the temporarily occupied territories, and enforcement of the right for ownership in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine are also to be drafted and adopted. This will help solve many issues that bother modern society and foreign investors. Besides, future reintegration of Crimea will require considerable financial resources (restoration of the economic system, liquidation of ecological problems, and so on), that’s why it is high time the budget of Ukraine were drawn up with a respective reserve fund. The problem of creating the Fund for reintegrating occupied territories of Ukraine constitutes a separate problem. The struggle for the outlook of the Crimean youth is of no lesser importance, so it is necessary to create the Crimean educational and scientific center in the free territory of the country for the children and youth of Crimea (pre-school establishments, orphanages, boarding schools, a university, a research institute, and so on), as well as the e-learning center for the Crimean students that stay in the occupied Crimea, providing further issuing of diplomas and certificates. The goal consists in forming the future personnel management reserve in the de-occupied territory. Since the development of the first bill «Strategies for returning Crimea» (2014), the government of Ukraine has taken only several planned steps. However, even this advancement is late for a year or even two. Meanwhile, it is necessary to understand that to regain control over Crimea, Ukraine must have such state of affairs when Russia refuses its ownership of ARC, cancels adopted legislative acts and withdraws its troops from the peninsula. As of today, no matter what happens, we should either defeat Russian army, wait until Russia disintegrates as a state or witnesses the 215 coup d’état in the Kremlin, or cooperate with the entire world to exhaust the enemy. We must acknowledge that today Ukraine doesn’t have any possibility to liberate Crimea by means of a full-scale war operation. Thus, the strategy on regaining control over Crimea must be mirroring that of Russia, i.e. be a police-stabilizing instead of a classical military operation. For that purpose, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have unique agencies— subdivisions of military-civil cooperation. To regain powers and means for carrying out such strategic operations in Ukraine, we need around 5–10 years of intense work. Along with that, Ukraine must already initiate certain calculations, develop and plan a respective military mission, that is, virtually, a comprehensive de-occupying operation of Crimea mirroring the one it had in February–March of 2014. Thus, Armed Forces of Ukraine, whose numerical strength remains within the terms of peaceful time (i.e., does not overcome 1% of the total number of population), must bring it up to around 400 thousand soldiers of various troops and groups, appropriately drilled and financed, armed according to the modern warfare rules and needs, etc. This will suffice only for fulfilling the so-called peacemaking-stabilizing operation (i.e., exclusively when the adversary isn’t able to provide proper resistance and only in the territory of the Crimean peninsula). Besides, Ukraine must restore, renovate, and fortify its own military and industrial complex so that it could produce not only defensive but also offensive weapon! We should immediately form detachments of so-called cyber troops and electronic resistance troops, initiate the creation of space troops and relative science and technology labs, establish production of antitank weapons, renew the Navy, which shouldn’t be entirely stationed in Crimea, and the 2014 experience proves that. The current need consists in coordinating the entire state’s effort in renovating modern Air Forces and the so-called strategic system of air defense, in particular, by putting into service the intermediate-range missile. This refers to the creation of, for example, a high-precision and powerful non-nuclear weapon/complex of means able to deal an immediate and crushing blow to the critical infrastructure of the possible aggressor (chemical plants, dams, nuclear and other power plants, important government and military objects, command and control centers, communications and supply centers, etc.). Ukraine already needs to start constructing non-nuclear rocket systems with a potential action range of 216 2500 km–4000 km, and so on. This program also must imply mastering tactical nuclear weapon as soon as possible. In general, military organization of the state, its military-industrial complex, system of armament of AFU, etc. require rebuilding from scratch according to the norms and standards of the new time. Diplomatic, trade and economic, humanitarian, and other relations with the aggressor state must be broken! Ukraine must act not only symmetrically but also asymmetrically, not only defending itself in its own terrain but also standing against the enemy at the information, humanitarian, politic and diplomatic, diversionary fronts, etc. It must consider the strategic perspective of dealing a final all-round lethal blow to the enemy, including his territory! The entire political elite and all citizens of the country must bear in mind: to buy the foe off, to stop the aggressor by concessions or to just partially satisfy his appetite is impossible! Thus, it is vitally important to develop our own national comprehensive doctrinal strategy for liberating the territories occupied by the aggressor, which would include not only diplomatic, humanitarian, or social and economic but also military-aggressive components and have several potential (as positive so possibly negative) scenarios and consequential factors both of the local and geopolitical scale. The experience of other states and modern wars must not only be thoroughly learned but also analyzed in regard to its appropriateness in the practical domestic military-political reality. However, it must not be used as tracing or a determining plan without any current consideration and without modeling our own (different but preconditioned) short- and long-term tactics and strategy for fighting this hybrid warfare. Currently, it is also necessary to provide trade, energy, and resource blockade of the temporarily occupied and annexed territories to weaken the infrastructure and morale of the enemy. Isolating Crimea from electricity and drinking water supply can be among the elements of such blockade. Will the Crimean peninsula manage to solve the problem of fresh water without Ukraine? The objective answer is «no»! 217 Temporary occupation of Crimea by Russian troops, factual isolation of the peninsula from Russia, absence of necessary water supply piped from the territory of the Russian Federation and the long-term practical impossibility of its provision enables Ukraine to fully block electrical energy and fresh-water supply in the annexed territory. The actions of Ukraine can justifiably acquire two directions, caused both by military-political and financial-economic incentives. 218 Such payback «sanctions» for the annexation and collaborationism (whose implementation, undoubtedly, was expected from the Ukrainian government) will not only deal a smashing blow to the Crimean economy and infrastructure but will also rock the boat of the ecological and social- political situation in the occupied peninsula to considerably undermine the mythologized reputation of the Kremlin and favor the growth of pro- Ukrainian mood among local population9. Without Ukrainian electricity and water, the thirsty peninsula will appear on the verge of survival both metaphorically and literally [10; 11]. Consistent, firm, and no-concession stand of the Ukrainian authority will expedite the obvious collapse of the Russian occupational power in Crimea and the return of the peninsula. The Biblical principle of giving water to the thirsty will be appropriate in case the beggar doesn’t spit in the face of the giver but confesses his sins. Ukraine should apply symmetrical and bold measures in economy, finance, good commodity, energy spheres, etc… Obviously, Moscovia isn’t able to solve energy, food supply, and ecology problems in the occupied territories to avoid its shameful final defeat. Thus, it won’t give up on solving this and other issues by further destabilization of Ukraine from within: by blackmailing its political elite, setting up social and political revolts, sponsoring separatists and collaborators, waging trade-and-resource warfare, aggravating its terroristic activity, and

9 First of all, let me mention that total water consumption by Crimea constitutes from 700,000 to 1ª500,000 cbm per day; on the average—around 1 mn cbm per day. For arranging water supply in Crimea, today there are above 20 water reservoirs of regular collection, 9 off-channel basins, and around 400 wells. The full volume of water in Crimean water reservoirs constitutes more than 400 mn cubic meters. Thus, Crimea lacked fresh water even before Russian occupation. Moreover, the water-supply system of Crimea already required modernization and was never self-sufficient. Let me concurrently remind you that in 2014, fresh-water consumption in Crimea was reduced five-fold—up to 310 mn cbm (up to 16 mn cbm losses). In 2015, total volume of water intake constituted 253.46 mn cubic meters, including 138.47 cbm (55%) from fresh-water sources; 95.13 mn cbm (37%) from underground sources; 19.86 mn cbm (8%) of sea water. The volume of losses constituted 13 mn cbm, or around 6% of water. The production needs required 50% of water volume; economy and consumption needs, 39%; irrigation, 6%. Thus, during 3 years, the Crimean peninsula lost 74% of its fresh-water sources. In 2015, water withdrawal in Nyzhnohirskyi raion emptied wells in many villages and gave rise to numerous reports to public authorities from resentful farmers. People complained, but their appeals were ignored. The scale of water crisis in Crimea is characterized by the state of Taihan and Bilohirsk water reservoirs. They stopped discharging water from Taihan reservoir, which had also nourished Feodosiya and Kerch. However, it happened not because eastern Crimea didn’t need any more water, but because there was nothing more to discharge—the reservoir didn’t have the useful capacity of water and became a pond. The upstream of Bilohirsk reservoir dried out as far back as in September 2016 [46]. In 2016, Nyzhnohirskyi raion saw the beginning of active capillary salting of soil; salt marsh spots appeared, and the soil was no more available for farming. 219 finally, by beginning a new stage of Russian aggression. These actions of Moscow will be triggered by the Crimean trap, which could objectively be neutralized only by Ukraine. Along with that, it is also necessary to create «knots of exchange» in the territory of Kherson region adjacent to the administrative border of the occupied Crimea and along the front line of Donbas. Thus the citizens (!) of Ukraine who stay under occupation will be able to receive personal essentials for living (food products, medicine, state and legal service, etc.). It is high time Ukraine developed and offered the package deal (and compromise package). To attract inhabitants of Crimea to the Ukrainian orbit, favorable conditions should be created in the Ukrainian spheres of education, healthcare, social policy, legal paperwork, real estate, and so on. Ukraine can be favorably different from the Russian occupation authorities; among other things—by civilized observance of human rights in the spheres of education, security, civil rights, etc. Along with that, human rights are indispensable of responsibilities for one’s deeds. Crimes committed by occupation authorities and their collaborators or local separatists must be properly documented and submitted for consideration as to the Ukrainian law enforcement system so to international courts. We should also ensure active educational work in near-front areas along with simultaneous development of social and economic infrastructure. It is especially important that the developmental programs be implemented with a broad engagement of European organizations in order to debunk any myth regarding the EU and NATO in particular, and Kyiv authority in general. Also, migrants from the occupied territories that are loyal to Ukraine and those who contribute to its interests in the southern-eastern periphery must be fully favored. It will mean that Ukraine cares for its citizens as a state. Besides concrete measures as for the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories, the comprehensive solution of this problem will be possible only after the key spheres of life in the Ukrainian state are successfully reformed. In this regard, such factors are crucial: Zovercoming the corruption phenomena (corruption in Ukrainian supreme bodies of power remains the major threat to national security and stability of the nation); Zde-oligarchization of the state (removal of oligarchs from power) and implementation of the fundamental institutional reform; 220 Zsystem decision of questions in economic, social, political, and other spheres of the country’s life; Zelectoral legislation reform; Zequating of political populism to political corruption, which is a threat to national security; Zcreation of modern capable army; Zeffective international policy; Zdefeating the fifth column—collaborators in disguise in the bodies of power and governance; Zgoal-oriented Ukraine-centric and conservative-natiocratic humanitarian policy of the state. Unfortunately, the efforts of the Ukrainian authority to provide both practical and fruitful tactics and strategy for de-occupying and reintegrating the Crimean peninsula, as well as separate terrains in Donetsk and Luhansk regions invaded by Russia do not correspond to the challenges of time. Finally, I suppose it would be appropriate to create in the continental part of Ukraine the de-occupational government (center) for reintegration of the Crimean peninsula, as well as other state-governmental institutions, which would deal with the questions of temporarily occupied Crimea. It is high time we created an expert group from the representatives of the executive power, community, scientists, etc. to develop the strategy of state policy of Ukraine in this direction. Such strategy must contain clear goals, assignments, performance indicators, and deadlines for the completion of goals. Tentative results must be clear not only in continental Ukraine and to the Crimeans but to the global community as well. Ukraine will be ready to effectively and justly settle the conflict with Russia in a diplomatic way, benefit from this, force Russia to de-occupation of the invaded territories by means of sanctions and blockades, as well as defeat Moscovia both at the local Ukrainian arena of warfare actions and at the more global level, only provided that all of the above mentioned actions and measures are fully and ultimately developed and implemented together with the course for inevitable modernization of state administration, radical and fundamental reforms in all, without exclusion, spheres of the country’s life, and non-concessional policy as for the capitulation of the aggressor. Unity and devotion of the entire society to the idea of integrity and independence of its Homeland, its unbreakable will to win, cleansing of the government, demarginalization and enlightenment of the entire society, institutional and economic reforms, renovation of judicial-legal system 221 will create conditions for powerful and swift advancement of Ukraine, fortification of its humanitarian, economic, and military power. This will unite the people to restore the territorial integrity of their state in its historic and ethnographic realm; solidify, as a result, its national security and transform Ukraine into a modern global power.

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Pavlo HAI-NYZHNYK Leonid CHUPRIY Yuriy FIHURNYI Iryna KRASNODEMSKA Oleg CHYRKOV

AGGRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE: ETHNONATIONAL DIMENSION AND CIVILIZATIONAL CONFRONTATION

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