Conclusion: Post-Jansenist Meditations

The tragedy of the majority of men is by no means that they are weak but that they are too strong – genuinely to be aware of God. Søren Kierkegaard, Papers, §4453

Grace Above All Else

Under the joint tutelage of Paul of Tarsus and Augustine of Hippo, whose infuence can be felt throughout, the works of Pascal and Kierkegaard return constantly to an issue which preoccupied both authors throughout their lives: how should man go about seeking salvation? Through his deeds and subordination to the revealed Law, or in the refuge of divine grace, a necessary prerequisite for all good actions and thoughts? For both authors, grace is the primary requirement. Without grace we are incapable of understanding our own nature, or comprehending our tasks and duties, or escaping the clutches of despair. In Kierkegaard’s Papers we fnd this position expressed in striking terms: “grace frst and foremost, and always before us.”1 The implication is that grace always acts in advance, as if to shorten the distance between the ordinary Christian and the Christian ideal. Kierkegaard and Pascal thus make a fundamental distinction between grace and the law, a thoroughly Augustinian dichotomy: “The law imposed what it did not give. Grace gives what it imposes,2 writes Pascal. The existential fulflment of the Law by Christ coincides with the advent of a new grace which supersedes the Law. The imitation of Christ by Christians is not a matter of respecting the law, it is a consequence of grace, since grace always transcends the law. We might also argue that the imitation of Christ is so demanding, so diffcult, that it is by nature

1 X5 A 101, Vol 4: 420 / §1493. 2 Laf. 824, Br. 522.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 125 G. Deslandes, Antiphilosophy of Christianity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73283-7 126 Conclusion: Post-Jansenist Meditations impossible. Hence the necessity of grace, which is above the law and which acts as a crutch to help us mere humans cope with the overwhelming pressure of this imitation. It is grace which opens up the possibility of following the example set by Jesus. It is through and in light of this effect that we are bade to imitate the example of Jesus Christ, not through the medium of religious and/or theological knowledge. “For Augustine as for Pascal,” Philippe Sellier notes, “cold, dry religious knowledge is not derived from the genuine grace of Christ. Such knowledge was also granted to the carnal Jews, and certain pagans.”3 Does this mean that the effects of grace are detached from all contingency? Not at all. Kierkegaard in fact declares that grace plays a clear role in the actions we decide to undertake. “Grace,” he writes, “is usually understood as a dead, once-and- for-all decision, rather than as something related to striving, because, to recall a saying of Baader, it is an advance payment.”4 Grace can therefore not be considered a beneft or privilege; it is a down payment to be reimbursed by suffering and fear. Its dynamics are complex, since its salvation extends beyond the sacrifce and expi- ation implicit in it, strengthening weak resolve and nurturing the stubbornness of man’s heart. This distinction between the grace granted to us and the additional effort required by our condition brings us back to the quintessential Pascalian theme of suffcient and effcacious grace. One supports the other. One constantly accom- panies and urges on the fulflment of the other. This is always the way of things, Kierkegaard appears to suggest: despite the effects of grace, we must force ourselves to preserve and “use it wisely,” remaining attentive at all times, taking to the task assiduously and with total, infnite concentration, as well as making an effort to consolidate it in the long term. This effort itself is an effect of grace, to the extent that the effect of the effort forms part of the effect of grace, being concomitant with it and impossible without it. The crucial factor is the sacrifce itself, the fact of exis- tentially experiencing this reform of the self, and not the more or less mistaken way in which we might interpret the salvation which lies beyond that sacrifce, nor merit or any other justifcation we might be tempted to apply to this actual, supernatural force. The question of grace is one which continually preoccupied Kierkegaard. He identifed it as the principal point of contention between Protestants and Catholics, divided on the issue of whether man can obtain grace through the action of the Holy Spirit or by his own means – Protestants defending the former position, Catholics the latter. Kierkegaard concludes that Protestants and Catholics could see eye to eye if only they were capable of scrupulously comparing their respective positions on this point. As for Pascal, he contends that “there will always be Pelagians, and always Catholics, and always strife; because the frst birth makes the one, and the grace of the second birth the other.”5 Pascal uses the Pelagians to stand for all opponents of authentic, Catholic Christians, i.e. those faithful to the doctrine of Saint

3 P. SELLIER, Pascal et Saint Augustin, 315. 4 X2 A 223, Vol 3: 264 / §1474. 5 Laf. 662, Br. 521. Grace Above All Else 127

Augustine who represent the true defenders of the Catholic faith. The infuence of Saint Augustine on Pascal is plain to see, indeed there are no fewer than 15 quota- tions from Augustine in the brief Interview with M. de Saci. Like the Bishop of Hippo, Pascal affrms that the grace of God surpasses all human facts and actions. True disciples of the Christian religion reject the idea that they are capable of escaping “slavery to the devil” all by themselves.6 In Pascal’s words, our actions are our own only to the extent that we acknowledge “what Saint Augustine tells us, that our actions are ours in respect of the free will which produces them; but that they are also of God, in respect of his grace which enables our free will to produce them. And, as he remarks elsewhere, God enables us to do what is pleasing in his sight, by making us will to do even what we might have been unwilling to do: a Deo factum est ut vellent quod et nolle potuissent.”7 Left to his own devices, man has full control over his actions, the fruits of his free will. But left to depend upon free will alone, his chances of treading the path of charity without the help of God are slim indeed. Without charity, virtue of virtues, fruit of the grace of God, free will cannot be exercised to its full potential because there will always be actions beyond its ken. With thoroughly Pauline reasoning, Pascal urges us to recognise that the inspiration for any charitable action involves a substantial contribution from God. God infu- ences and guides our will, holding it in his care. So, ultimately, the credit for good actions can be attributed to God. Compromised by original sin, our charitable inten- tions are directed by God. Our merit is merely the merit of God, who grants us the possibility of believing in trust. Even when a man or a woman believes in their heart, the action of God’s grace is the dominant force. God’s infuence is preponder- ant even in faith, because we can never hope to achieve anything without the help of God. It thus falls to God to judge the merit of men in this life, granting grace to those who deserve it most. Pascal highlights the ambiguity of this idea of merit, which is not a property which we can easily claim for ourselves. Such matters remain murky to our mind, we cannot celebrate our own merits since only God has the power to judge. Man’s stubbornness may fnd recompense through prayer; but here again the merit goes to God, since we cannot “hold our own prayers.”8 Prayer is capable of anything, of course, but it is only granted to those whom God has chosen.9 Prayer may have the power to heal, but that requires us to know how to pray, which is only possible for those chosen by God. He illustrates this understanding of grace when he asserts that “the poor in grace are always sure to obtain that which they request, but never con- fdent of having the possibility of asking.”10 This is tantamount to saying that God

6 Laf. 807, Br. 519. 7 Provincial Letters, Letter 18, 463. 8 Laf. 930, Br. 513. 9 “God is only bound according to his promises. He has promised to grant justice to prayers (Matthew 7; 7), he has never promised prayer only to the children of promise.” Laf. 930, Br. 513. 10 Ecrits sur la grâce, L’Intégrale, Seuil, 335. 128 Conclusion: Post-Jansenist Meditations always answers the prayers of those who know how to pray properly, something which is not given to everybody. Our freedom is therefore restricted and underpins the predetermination of his destiny, and not vice versa. Under no circumstances should the doctrine of predestination be used to let us off the hook; the soul must refuse to be “taken in by the blandishments of theories of predestination.”11 We must necessarily have a role to play in the determination of our life to justify the gratuitousness of grace and the generosity of God. Kierkegaard thus retains at least part of the concept of predestination (“if this singling out is understood selfshly by a Christian, we have the des- perate presumption of predestination,”)12 not in our name but in the name of God. Should we thus accuse Kierkegaard and Pascal of the same offence for which Augustine upbraided Pelagius, namely taking away from the grace of God in favour of man’s free will? Do they believe that grace is fundamentally a negation of man’s free will, and that God’s actions on man’s behalf and man’s actions on his own behalf should be understood as two opposing principles? We would be hard pressed to answer either question in the affrmative: while man is theoretically capable of choice, in real life and without grace he will naturally tend towards that which pleases him most. The grace of God alone is capable of converting man to the righ- teous path, not human will: communion with God is thus made possible, and not by “nature.”13 Communion with God is not a natural occurrence; it can only be achieved with special assistance, a singularly supernatural occurrence. This passion is the object of a grace granted by God alone, and which nature cannot provide. Can we thus conclude that, in Pascal’s thought particularly, grace is detached from all contingency? Not at all: grace is directly connected to Jesus Christ and all the prophets who announced his coming. Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are all invoked in the Mémorial. This is why the pardoning of sins by man represents the falsifcation of a power which only God can wield. Self-attribution of grace is not only a travesty of its true meaning; it is also a clumsy way of robbing God of a more fundamental capacity than human freedom.

Addressing Philosophers

“One aspect of antiphilosophy – sometimes overlooked but in my opinion abso- lutely crucial to the antiphilosophical strategy – is that the antiphilosopher always speaks as if there were no point in addressing philosophers.”14 Pascal and Kierkegaard do not set out to address philosophers, and there is certainly a “strategic” element to

11 Either/Or, 4: 209 / III: 232. 12 Postscript, 11: 262/263 / XII: 582. 13 Laf. 149, Br. 430. 14 A, BADIOU. Lacan Antiphilosophy 3, 83. Addressing Philosophers 129 that choice. But should we thus conclude that neither of them saw “any point” in speaking directly to philosophers? Certainly there is a fundamental opposition in play since, as far as the antiphilosophers are concerned, philosophers make no worthwhile contribution to either philosophy or truth. In this respect, the Pascalian and Kierkegaardian critiques of philosophy amount to far more than a polite counter- argument to prevailing philosophical trends, or a relative and fragmentary attempt to point out shortcomings in the great systems of rationalist philosophy. If philosophy aims to “harm stupidity” (a turn of phrase used by Nietzsche and taken up by Deleuze), antiphilosophy sets itself the rather more radical goal of harming philosophical stupidity. And as far as Pascal and Kierkegaard were concerned, this philosophical stupidity was never more apparent than when it turned its attention to Christianity, a truth which it has neither the inclination nor the ability to compre- hend philosophically, and which it ends up representing as virtually the direct opposite of what it actually claims to be. This is particularly true of Christian philosophers, with whom Pascal and Kierkegaard would certainly feel less affnity than with anti-Christian antiphilosophers. These Christian philosophers examine Christianity in the light of avowedly Christian thought, without properly examining the relationship between philosophy and Christianity.15 We might thus ask of Descartes and Hegel: are they unknowing opponents of Christianity? Should we concur with the categorical judgements prof- fered by Pascal and Kierkegaard? Or should we instead locate the source of the confict not in any opposition to Christianity expressed by Descartes or Hegel, but rather in their failure to understand Christianity in the same terms as Kierkegaard and Pascal? Is Descartes as contrary to the Christianity of Christ as he is to the Christianity of Pascal? It seems unlikely: both Descartes and Hegel surely deserve more generous treatment than they receive at the hands of Pascal and Kierkegaard respectively. Nonetheless, it is clear that the two thinkers share a sort of religious rationalism, or more broadly a religious ‘intellectualism,’ which was anathema to Pascal and Kierkegaard. While Pascal and Kierkegaard may or may not be straight- forwardly anti-intellectualist in a general sense, they certainly are when it comes to Christianity.16 In the Papers, Kierkegaard refects on one of Pascal’s maxims: “To know God only speculatively is not to know him at all.”17 In the specifc register of Christianity, both opt for an effort of anti-intellectualist refexivity (rather than a strictly anti- rationalist approach, since their visions of the world clearly cannot do without reason entirely, no more than they can deny the presence of mystery). It is on these same foundations that their antitheologism is constructed, opposing attempts at

15 I A 95, Vol 1: 60 / §416. 16 This does not prevent Pascal, the less anti-intellectual of the pair, from writing that “There is nothing so consistent with reason as this disavowal of reason.” (Laf. 182, Br. 272) On these grounds, Jean Wahl suggests defning him as a “negative intellectualist.” 17 X3 A 640, 3117. “Pascal: To know God only speculatively is not to know him at all.” (Reuchlin, Pascals leben, 243). 130 Conclusion: Post-Jansenist Meditations objectivity in the domain of religious refection and decrying attempts to defend religion solely on the basis of its rational intelligibility. For it is not on the strictly philosophical plane of truth that Pascal and Kierkegaard make their stand against the prevailing traditions; they are more concerned with the meaning of action, the domain of existential praxis. As André Clair remarks, “Pascal does not completely renounce either Epictetus or Montaigne; both come in for criticism, but this criticism comes from two distinct angles.”18 Philosophical discourse may well be valid in terms of truth, and certainly capable of genuine knowledge, but it is ineffectual because it fails to take into account the situation of its practitioners. This is a practical, not simply speculative, requirement. “Kierkegaard sacrifces philosophy” because it “obscures existence in its entirety,”19 as Maurice Merleau-Ponty astutely points out. Moreover the personality of Christ is not that of an ostentatious divinity, but is revealed only gradually as the believer follows the path of existence, the journey of “becoming-Christian” so dear to Kierkegaard. This divinity is to be found within the existence of the believer, in the life which always precedes thought, as demonstrated forcefully by Michel Henry in his material phenomenology. The life of Jesus Christ is an expression of the radical opposition between existence limited by time and the limitless existence of eternity. It is a manifestation of God in time, our connection or bridge to the eternal: “the doctrine of Christ is infnitely above all the discoveries of time and all times, with the most ancient eternity and an eternity above all systems, even the most modern, even the very latest invention ten thousand years from now; because his doctrine is the truth, in the sense that it represents the way.”20 Christianity thus achieves that which Plato never could: the life and person of Jesus are the incarnation of truth. Jesus Christ embodies the Word of God. He is that which no one else could ever be. The humanisation of the fgure of Christ does not amount to a ‘naturalisation’ of God, it is the infnite path towards eternity with which men, even philosophers, are presented. In the Christian event God goes before us, while remaining so far beyond us that grace is required in order for his will to be done. Grace supplants reason as the sole centre of our existential choices. Only grace, as Simone Weil has it, is capable of representing an exception to the weight of the material world. And if grace opens up a place in the heart in the face of reason, a place for that faith which is always in opposition to reason, this is because the difference between knowing God and loving God is still infnitely great. In this context, Arnaud Bouaniche’s analysis of Deleuze seems more pertinent than ever: “The real alternative is not between the different terms available to choose between, but instead between the modes of existence of those doing the choosing (Cinema 1 p. 160). Deleuze thus pits ethics against morality, in the name of those immanent criteria which make it possible to evaluate choices not with reference to transcendent values (Good and Evil) but on the grounds of the mode of existence

18 A. CLAIR, Pseudonymie et paradoxe : la pensée dialectique de Kierkegaard, 79/80. 19 M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Philosophie et non-philosophie depuis Hegel, Textures 8/9, 1974, p88, cité par J. COLETTE, Kierkegaard et la non-philosophie, 10. 20 Practice in Christianity, 17: 186 / XX: 210. Tears of Joy 131 which they imply. The real ethical question here is: what does that change in this life? Is it empty or full, noble or vulgar, sad or joyous etc.?”21 This passage encap- sulates the general ethical orientation of these two antiphilosophers. The true alternative is not between philosophy and non-philosophy, between Good and Evil, between a wager for or against the existence of God, but instead between the mode of existence of him/her who has trust in the word of God and him/her who has no interest in it. It is a question of acts, of life choices, of practical and ethical resolu- tions which allows us to characterise these antiphilosophers as both existentialists and immanentists. In this respect we can only concur with Deleuze when he writes that “faith breaks through the ceiling of religion.”22 The antiphilosophical philosopher, as I have attempted to demonstrate, exists within this movement, which is above all a gesture, an act.

Tears of Joy

An analysis of the concept of faith, that “foreign entity to speculative philosophy” as Lev Shestov puts it,23 moving from reason to mystery via grace, is of central importance to appreciating the antiphilosophical stature of our two authors. In this analysis, two notions prove to be of decisive signifcance: folly and joy. When he describes folly as a form of supernatural wisdom (one of many mean- ings attributed to the term throughout the Pensées),24 Pascal echoes Saint Paul’s distinction between the wisdom of man and the wisdom of God. Faith is essentially a Christian folly, a concept of which Erasmus was in some ways the pioneer.25 This does not mean that faith is founded on the folly of other Christians – that would be “unchristian,”26 Kierkegaard assures us – but rather the intimately personal madness of the individual Christian faced with the mystery of Christ and the cross. “Our religion is wise and foolish,” Pascal opines. “Wise, because it is the most learned and the most founded on miracles, prophecies, etc. Foolish, because it is not all this

21 A. BOUANICHE, « Faire le mouvement ». Deleuze lecteur de Kierkegaard, 2014, 141. 22 Ibid.. 23 L. SHESTOV, Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 33. 24 “Men are so necessarily mad, that not to be mad would amount to another form of madness.” Pensées, Non-numbered fragment, L’Intégrale, Seuil, 549. 25 Hélène Politis makes an interesting point regarding Kierkegaard’s familiarity with Erasmus’ thought: “Among his books we fnd Erasmus’ In Praise of Folly (ktl 478), referenced in Papirer IV A 32 dated to 1843. Kierkegaard also references Erasmus through other sources, including a work by Hamann which references a letter from Erasmus to Zwingli, or the study of Erasmus published by Adolph Müller. Between 1831/1832 and 1851 there are six mentions of Erasmus in the Papirer but only one allusion in the Vaerker, which is to be found in the Concept of Irony.” H. POLITIS, Le discours philosophique selon Kierkegaard, 548. 26 VIII A 566, Vol 2: 210 / §4044. 132 Conclusion: Post-Jansenist Meditations which makes us believe.”27 Faith is more dependent upon folly than upon wisdom; folly is a form of genial foolishness, surpassing wisdom and showing the way to faith. Folly is the true instigator of faith, outstripping all certainties and “overcom- ing evidence.”28 Was it not folly or madness which drove the father of faith, Abraham? Was that faith not born of the senseless love for God which inhabited him? “We must then put our faith in feeling,” Pascal declares; “otherwise it will be always vacillating.” But what is this feeling, which “acts in a moment, and is always ready to act?”29A form of suffering?30 Of madness? For Pascal, that feeling was joy. But if this were true, would it not be paradoxical to describe suffering as the Christian’s natural condition? How can we now decide that joy is the believer’s dominant sentiment, the force which propels the Christian faith to its rightful place? How do we explain the fact that joy features alongside suffering in the Mémorial? Was Fénelon right after all, when he accused Jansenism of being a philosophy of enjoyment, depicting the Jansenists as engaged in a quest as hedonistic as it was spiritual?31 How, indeed, do we account for the passage of Kierkegaard’s Papers dated 19th May 1838, which constitutes a veritable hymn to the joy of Christianity? The passage reads: “There is an indescribable joy, which burns us all over as mysteriously as the cry of the apos- tle: ‘Be joyous, I tell you: be joyous!’”32 It is almost as if Christian suffering actually leads to a feeling of profound joy. As Walsh explains, “the experience of joy encour- ages them in the strife of suffering by providing them with the vision or perspective that will enable them to endure hardship and at the same time to bear it lightly and proft from it. Suffering contains prospects of joy, but joy elicits suffering in turn. Thus theses determinants are dialectically related in a complementary sort of way. But joy can also signify an inward defeat of suffering even as it serves as suffering’s source of perpetuation.”33 In this dialectical movement, wherein each term is important, suffering is ever- present, especially since Christians are bade not to attempt to avoid or combat it (particularly through detachment, of the ataraxic kind sought by the Stoics). Because suffering is also the condition which makes joy possible, as well as representing (to borrow once again from the lexicon of material phenomenology) a challenge in its own right. A pathos, certainly, but a form of power frst and foremost. A power

27 Br. 588. 28 L. SHESTOV, Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle, p. 33. 29 Laf. 821, Br. 252. 30 Florinda Martins discusses Pascal’s understanding of suffering with reference to Henry: “For Pascal, one of the rare philosophers whom Henry admired, suffering, rather than a form of fragility, is always a power, even if the power is only to suffer oneself. Because suffering oneself requires the ability to combine suffering and ipseity.” F. MARTINS, L’autre : le corps vivant, 71-72. 31 L, THIROUIN, “ Jansénisme et joie de vivre : Quelques réfexions sur la grâce”, 2-7. 32 II A 228, 5324, cited by P. MESNARD, Le vrai Visage de Kierkegaard, p. 66. See also N. VIALLANEIX, Kierkegaard : l’unique devant Dieu, 29. 33 S. Walsh, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian Existence, 122. Tears of Joy 133 which can be construed, as Grégori Jean argues, as “intersubjectivity in the frst person” – i.e. not viewed from the perspective of the person I am, but rooted in the Person that we are. Such is the sense of Henry’s concept of the “mystical body.”34 We might easily accept that Christians’ suffering consoles as much as it crushes, but it also appears to be a source of joy mixed with the sort of pain generally described as sadness, but which for Christians is actually a form of happiness. Because for Christians, suffering is not sad: “Joy, joy, JOY, tears of JOY” exclaimed Pascal in his Mémorial. Pain and pleasure are intimately linked. In emulation of the tribulations of Christ, it is only fair that we should also suffer. Human suffering mimics divine suffering to bring man closer to God. Or in Pascal’s words: “as Tertullian says, it must not be supposed that the Christian’s life is a life of sadness. We forsake pleasures only for others which are greater still. ‘Pray without ceasing’, says St. Paul, ‘in every thing give thanks,’ ‘rejoice evermore.’” (I Thessalonians, 5; 16-18) 35 Although Alain Badiou is certainly not mistaken to suggest that “for the antiphilosophers, great tormented beings as they are, happiness is not made for jovial guys – a certain dose of despair is the condition of real happiness,”36 it is nonetheless important to add that despair is not the real issue here (since despair is not, strictly speaking, a Christian feeling). What is required of the believer in order to achieve genuine happiness is suffering – not the despair or despondency experienced by libertines, but true Christian suffering which must not be confused with sadness. Most contemporary critics dismissed Kierkegaard as a philosopher of bitterness and despair. They were mistaken: throughout the Papers there are moments which amount to the exact opposite (of bitterness and despair), particularly when discuss- ing Christian joy: “not any particular sort of joy, but the over-spilling cry of the soul, escaping via the mouth and tongue from the very depths of the heart;” “I rejoice in my joy, by, in, with, about, on, around and with my joy.”37 Kierkegaard seems here to be describing joy of a different nature than that procured by things that are simply enjoyable. This is a joy superior to joy, an intense joy which surpass all other feel- ings, which “wraps us up” in a passion which is superior, transcendent and sacred. While the vision of Christianity defended by Kierkegaard and Pascal certainly has its fair share of severity, it would perhaps be more accurate to describe it as “gentle severity.”38 This nuance is signifcant in the confict with Christendom, which feigns to forget the dialectic dynamic of severity and would have its parish- ioners believe that Christianity is all sweetness and light. This is why “Christianity is strange. It bids man recognise that he is vile, even abominable,” and at the same

34 G. JEAN, “Présentation de “l’expérience métaphysique d’autrui” à “l’intersubjectivité en pre- mière personne”, 62. 35 Lettres aux Roannez, L’Intégrale, Seuil, 269. 36 A. BADIOU, Happiness, 72. 37 II A 228, 5324, quoted by P. MESNARD, Le vrai Visage de Kierkegaard, 66. 38 XIII A 165, Vol 4: 56 / §2873. 134 Conclusion: Post-Jansenist Meditations time “bids him desire to be like God.”39 No such strangeness is perceptible in the saccharine world of Christendom, dominated by the worldly wisdom shunned by antiphilosophical Christianity. In bringing this study to a close, it is worth returning to the quotation from Michel Henry which forms its epigraph: why indeed should we go to the trouble of writing, or even reading, the latest tome examining the Gospel for answers about salvation, when we know that this book will inevitably be followed by new angles, new “revelations” and new publications on the same topic, without ever glimpsing even the vaguest hint of an answer to the only question that matters? In the architheo- poetic sweep of their antiphilosophical Christian writings, Pascal and Kierkegaard invite their readers to avoid worrying too much about the future, to rally their forces for the present moment: “Yet the world is so restless that men scarcely ever think of the present life and of the moment in which they are living,” Pascal declares, “but of that in which they will live. In this manner we are always living in the future, and never in the present. Our Lord has willed that our foresight should not extend beyond the present day.”40 We know little more about our distant origins than we do about our ultimate end: it is therefore less foolish to wager on the present than to hope to pierce the impenetrable secrets of the future. Only the eternal present offers the genuine possibility of a future as God alone would will it.

Acknowledgments The author wants to express his deepest gratitude to Isabelle Alfandary and the Collège International de Philosophie, Valérie Moatti, Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and her fellow faculty members at ESCP, but also Bernard Bourgeois, Gilbert Maixent, Florence Chapuis, Lloys Lewis, Françoise Pieuchot, Henrik Harpsoe for their signifcant help. He also thanks the reviewers for the value, the benevolence and the accuracy of their comments on earlier versions of this book.

39 Laf. 351, Br.537. 40 Letters to Roannez, VIII, L’Intégrale, Seuil, p. 270. Bibliography

For Kierkegaard:

Søren Kierkegaard, S. (1978–2000) Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed. & trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong et. al., 26 volumes, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) ———. [1843] 1987. Either/Or. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 3. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1843–1844] 1990. Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 5. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1843] 1983. Fear and Trembling. Ed. and tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 6. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1844] 1985. Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 7. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1844] 1980. The Concept of Anxiety. Ed. and tr. R. Thomte. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 8. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1845] 1997. Prefaces – Writing Sampler. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 9. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1845] 1993. Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 10. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1845] 1988. Stages on Life’s Way. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 11. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1846] 1992. Concluding Unscientifc Postscript to “Philosophical Fragments.” Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 12. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1846] 1978. Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 14. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1847] 1993. Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 15. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1847] 1995. Works of Love. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 16. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1848] 1997. Christian Discourses and The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 17. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1849–1851] 1997. Without Authority. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 18. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. [1849] 1980. The Sickness Unto Death. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 19. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1850] 1991. Practice in Christianity. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 20. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1876]1990. For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 21. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1859] 1998. The Point of View. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 22. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. [1855] 1998. The Moment (No. 1–10). In The Moment and Late Writings. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 23. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Original work No. 10 published 1881.) ———. [1872] 1998. The Book on Adler. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 24. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2000. Cumulative Index to Kierkegaard’s Writings. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 26. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kierkegaard, S. A. 1967–1978. Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers. Ed. and tr. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong, assisted by G. Malantschuk. 7 vols. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

French translations:

Søren Kierkegaard. Oeuvres complètes, Editions de l’Orante, Traduction PH Tisseau, Vol 1–20. Søren Kierkegaard. La Reprise, GF Flammarion, translated by Nelly Viallaneix, 1990. Søren Kierkegaard. Crainte et tremblement, Aubier Bibliothèque philosophique, translated by PH Tisseau, third edition, 1984. Søren Kierkegaard. Journal 1834–1846, Vol. 1, translated by Knud Ferlov & Jean-J. Gateau, nrf Gallimard, 1963. Søren Kierkegaard. Journal 1846–1849, Vol. 2, translated by Knud Ferlov & Jean-J. Gateau, nrf Gallimard, 1954. Søren Kierkegaard. Journal 1849–1850, Vol.3, translated by Knud Ferlov & Jean-J. Gateau, nrf Gallimard, 1955. Søren Kierkegaard. Journal 1850–1853, Vol. 4, translated by Knud Ferlov & Jean-J. Gateau, nrf Gallimard, 1957. Søren Kierkegaard. Journal 1854–1855, Vol. 5, translated by Knud Ferlov & Jean-J. Gateau, nrf Gallimard, 1961.

For Pascal:

Blaise Pascal. Oeuvres complètes, Coll. L’Intégrale, Editions du Seuil, 1995. Blaise Pascal. Pensées, édition établie par Léon Brunschicg, Editions de Cluny, 1933. Blaise Pascal. Ecrits sur la grâce, Rivages Poche/Petite Bibliothèque, Paris, 2007. Bibliography 137

Other Works:

Allen Edgar Leonard. “Pascal and Kierkegaard”. London Quaterly and Holborn Review. n°162, 150–164. 1937. Arendt Hannah. Marx, Kierkegaard et Nietzsche, Preuves. n°133. Mars, 1962. Arendt Hannah. Between Past and Future, Penguin, London, 2006. Badiou, A. La philosophie, le théâtre, la vraie vie, interview with Laure Adler, Entre-Vues, Editions Universitaires d’Avignon. Avignon, 2016. Badiou Alain. Saint-Paul la fondation de l’universalisme. PUF Quadrige, 2015. Badiou Alain. Happiness, trad. Bartlett & Clemens. Bloomsbury, 2019. Badiou Alain. Nietzsche, L’antiphilosophie 1 1992–1993. Fayard/Ouvertures, 2015. Badiou Alain. Lacan, Antiphilosophy 3 1994–1995, ed. Reinhard, trad. Spitzer, Columbia 2018. Badiou Alain. L’antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein. Nous, 2009. Badiou Alain. Being and Event, trad. Feltham. Bloomsbury, London 2005. Berlanda Thierry. “Michel Henry : une nostalgie pascalienne”, In. La vie et les vivants. (Re-)lire Michel Henry, UCL Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 35–42, 2013. Bohlin Torsten. Søren Kierkegaard: l’Homme et l’Oeuvre, translated from the original Danish by P. H. Tisseau. Bazogues-en-Pareds, 1941. Bouaniche Arnaud. “Faire le mouvement ». Deleuze lecteur de Kierkegaard”, in Kierkegaard et la phénoménologie française – Figures et réceptions, Eds Joaquim Hernandez-Dispaux, Grégori JEAN et Jean Leclercq. Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 127–152, 2015. Bouchilloux Hélène Apologétique et raison dans les pensées de Pascal. Adapted from doctoral thesis. Éditions Klincksieck, 1995. Bourdieu Pierre. Méditations Pascaliennes. Collection Liber. Seuil, 1997. Boutroux Emile. Pascal. Librairie Hachette, 1951. Brandt Frithiof. Søren Kierkegaard, sa vie, ses oeuvres, translated by Pierre Martens. Copenhagen, 1963. Brezis David. Figures et Concepts dans l’oeuvre de Kierkegaard. doctoral thesis, Université Paris IV, 1988. Brun Jean. La philosophie de Pascal. Collection Que sais-je ? PUF, 1992. Brunschvicg Léon. La solitude de Pascal, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Librairie Armand Colin. XXX, 1923. Brunschvicg Léon, Pascal et Descartes lecteurs de Montaigne. Editions La Baconnière Neuchatel, Collection Etre et Penser. cahiers de philosophie, August 1945. Caputo John D. Vattimo Gianni. After the death of God. edited by Jeffrey W. Robbins,.Columbia University Press, New York, 2007. Caputo John D. La faiblesse de Dieu, une théologie de l’événement, trad. John E. Jackson. Labor et Fides, 2016. Caputo John D. The Audacity of God : Prolégomènes à une théologie faible, Etudes théologiques et religieuses. Tome 90, 317–338, 2015. Caputo John D. How to Read Kierkegaard. New-York: Norton, 2007. Caputo John D. The insistence of God: A theology of perhaps, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013. Caron Jacques. Angoisse et communication chez S.Kierkegaard. Odense University Press, 1992. Carraud Vincent. Pascal et la philosophie. Collection Epiméthée, PUF, 1992. Clair André. Introduction et annotation à Pascal dans De l’esprit géométrique. Ecrits sur la grâce et autres textes, Coll. “G-F”. Flammarion, 1985. Clair André. Kierkegaard : Penser le singulier. Coll. La Nuit Surveillée. Cerf, 1993. Clair André, Pseudonymie et Paradoxe : la pensée dialectique de Kierkegaard, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1976. Clair André. Kierkegaard lecteur de Pascal, Revue Philosophique de Louvain. volume 78(507–532), 4ème série, n°40, November 1980. Colette Jacques. Kierkegaard et la non-philosophie. tel Gallimard, 1994. 138 Bibliography

Cousin Victor. “Du scepticisme de Pascal”. Revue des Deux Mondes, 8(1012–1033), 1844. Davenport John. “Kierkegaard’s Poscript in Light of Fear and Trembling – eschatological Faith”. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofa, 64: 169–198, 2009. Davenport John. “Love and the discipline of philosophy”. In Mooney, E. (ed), Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard: A Philosophical Engagement. Indiana University Press. 196–233, 2008. Delecroix Vincent. Singulière philosophie, Essai sur Kierkegaard. Félin, 2006. De Gandillac Maurice. Kierkegaard, Pascal du Nord. Revue Universelle, n°15: 371, 1934. Deleuze Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement Image. trad. Tomlinson & Habberjam, Continuum, 1986. Deleuze Gilles. Guattari Félix. What is Philosophy? trad. Tomlinson & Burchill Verso, NYC, 1994. Deslandes Ghislain. L’amitié stellaire de trois chrétiens philosophes. Etudes, Juillet-Août 2002, n° 3971–2, p. 53–62. Deslandes Ghislain. Kierkegaard, Pascal, Lequier : convergences de trois chrétiens philosophes. Ph.D. thesis in Philosophy, University of Paris 1-Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2000. Deslandes Ghislain. “Indirect Communication and Business Ethics: A Kierkegaardian Approach”. Business and Professional Ethics Journal. 30 (3–4): 305–328, 2011. Forest Aimé. Pascal ou l’intériorité révélante. Editions Seghers, Paris, 1971. Furtak Rick Anthony. Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. Furtak Rick Anthony. “Love and the discipline of philosophy”. In Mooney, E. (ed), Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard: A Philosophical Engagement. Indiana University Press. 59–71, 2008. Furtak Rick Anthony. “Kierkegaard and Greek philosophy”, in Lippitt, J. Pattisson, G. Oxford: The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard. 130–149, 2013. Gouhier Henri. Pascal : Commentaires. Vrin, 2000. Gouhier Henri. Blaise Pascal : conversion et apologétique. Vrin, 1985. Gounelle André, La Bible selon Pascal, Cahiers d’histoire et de Philosophie religieuses, Presses Universitaires de France, 1970. Grimsley Ronald. “Kierkegaard and Pascal”, Søren Kierkegaard and French literature. Eight comparative studies, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1966. Guardini Romano. Pascal ou le drame de la conscience chrétienne. Editions du Seuil, 1951. Guitton Jean. Pascal/Leibniz, Profls Parallèles. Fayard, 1970. Guitton Jean. « Hommage à Blaise Pascal ». Textes du tricentenaire. Fayard, 1963. Hannay Alastair. Marino Gordon. “Introduction”. In Hannay, A Marino, G. (eds) The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 397–412, 1998. Hatem Nicole. “Le secret partagé : Kierkegaard – Michel Henry”. 195–210, in Michel Henry. Pensée de la vie et culture contemporaine. Beauchesne, 2006. Henry Michel. L’essence de la manifestation, PUF Epiméthée. 4ème édition, 1963. Henry Michel. “Le critique du sujet”, in Cahiers Confrontation. Paris, 141–152. “The critique of the Subject”, Topoï 11, 1988. Henry Michel. C’est moi la vérité – Pour une philosophie du christianisme. Seuil, 1996. Henry Michel. “Discussion sur l’Ontologie de Kierkegaard”. Annales de Philosophie. Université St Joseph. p. 9–13, 1996. Henry Michel. Paroles du Christ. Seuil, 2002. Henry Michel. Phénoménologie de la vie – De la Phénoménologie. volume I. PUF, 2003. Høffding Harald. Pascal et Kierkegaard. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Librairie Armand Colin. trentième année, 1923. Hough Sherdan. Kierkegaard’s Dancing Tax Collector: Faith, Finitude, and Silence. Oxford University Press, 2015. Jaspers Karl. Kierkegaard vivant. Coll Idées, Gallimard, 1964. Grégori Jean. Présentation de “l’expérience métaphysique d’autrui” à “l’intersubjectivité en pre- mière personne, Revue Internationale Michel Henry. n°2, 16–70, 2011. Jerphagnon Lucien. Pascal et la souffrance. Editions Ouvrières, 1956. Jaspers Karl. La Foi philosophique face à la Foi chrétienne. Plon, 1973. Bibliography 139

Jolivet Régis. L’anticartésianisme de Pascal. Etudes sur Pascal. Gabriel Beauchene Editeur, Paris, 1923. Jolivet Régis. Aux sources de l’existentialisme chrétien. Coll. Les idées et la vie. Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1958. Kangas David. Errant Affrmations : on the philosophical meaning of Kierkegaard’s religious discourses. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018. Klein Zivia. La notion de dignité humaine dans la pensée de Kant et Pascal. Bibliothèque d’Histoire de la Philosophie. Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1968. Kodalle Klaus. M “The utilitarian self and the “useless” passion of faith”. In Hannay, A Marino, G. (eds) The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 397–412, 1998. Landkildehus Søren. “Kierkegaard and Pascal as Kindred Spirits in the Fight against Christiendom”, In Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Tradition, Steward, J. (ed) Farnham: Asgate, 129–146, 2009. Le Guern Michel. Pascal et Descartes. A.G. Nizet, 1971. Leveillé-mourin G., Pascal et Nietzsche, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1978. Lowrie Walter. Kierkegaard. Harper & Brothers. New-York, 1962. Magnard Pierre. Nature et Histoire dans l’Apologétique de Pascal. Publications de l’Université de Dijon, Société Les Belles Lettres, 1975. Martins Florinda. “L’autre : le corps vivant”, in Michel Henry. Pensée de la vie et culture contemporaine. Beauchesne, 67–80, 2006. Meillassoux, Quentin. Après la fnitude – Essai sur la nécessité de la contingence, Seuil, Paris, 2012. Mesnard Jean. Pascal. Desclée De Brower, 1965. Mesnard Pierre. Kierkegaard aux prises avec la conscience française, Revue de littérature com- parée. n°4. Librairie Marcel Didier, 1955. Mesnard Pierre. Le vrai visage de Kierkegaard. Beauchesne. Bibliothèque des archives de la Philosophie, 1948. Michon Hélène. L’ordre du cœur : Philosophie, Théologie et Mystique dans les Pensées de Pascal. Thèse de doctorat, 1994. Mooney Edward. Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard: A Philosophical Engagement. Indiana University Press, 2008. Nietzsche Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. Walter Kaufmann. tr. New York: Vintage Books, 1969. O’Neill Burns Michael. Kierkegaard and the Matter of Philosophy – A fractured Dialectic. London: Rowman and Littlefeld, 2015. Paul Jean-Marie, Pascal et Kierkegaard : les enigmes de la foi, Actes du colloque tenu à la Sorbonne Paris IV. Pascal au miroir du XIXème siècle, Mame Editions Universitaires, 1993. Phelps Hollis. Alain Badiou. Between Theology and Anti-theology. Acumen, Durham, 2013. Politis Hélène. Le discours Philosophique selon Kierkegaard. Thèse de Doctorat ès-Lettres de Paris I, 1993 (dont Annexes Pascal, 271–277). Politis Hélène. Kierkegaard ou la pure cérémonie du mouvement fctif. Critique, n°321, volume XXX, 27ème année, Février 1974. Purkarthofer Richard. “Suppose I would die tomorrow”, Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 202–213, 2003. Sartre Jean-Paul. Kierkegaard vivant. Coll Idées, Gallimard, 1964. Roos H. SJ Kierkegaard et le catholicisme. translated from the Danish by André Renard O.S.B., E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain, 1955. Walsh Sylvia. « The dear Self : Self-Love, Redoubling, and Self-Denial”. In Rudd, Anthony. Davenport, Jean. (eds.). Love, Reason, and Will: Kierkegaard After Frankfurt, Bloomsbury, 117–136, 2015. Sartre Jean-Paul. Situation IX, Gallimard, 1972. Shestov Lev. Kierkegaard et la Philosophie existentielle. translated by T. Rageot & B. de Schloezer, third edition, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1972. 140 Bibliography

Shestov Lev. La Nuit de Gethsémani, la Philosophie de Pascal. Les Cahiers Verts. Grasset, 1923. Slok Johannès. Kierkegaard penseur de l’humanisme. Bibliothèque Kierkegaardienne. Editions de l’Orante, 1995. Thirouin, Laurent. « Jansénisme et joie de vivre : quelques réfexions sur la grâce ». Le Collègue Supérieur. 34: 2–7, 2008. Vattimo Gianni. Belief, Seuil, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999. Vergote Henri-Bernard. Sens et Répétition : essai sur l’ironie kierkegaardienne. volume 1 & 2. Cerf/Orante, 1982. Vergote Henri-Bernard. Lectures Philosophiques de Søren Kierkegaard. PUF, 1993. Viallaneix Nelly. Kierkegaard, l’Unique devant Dieu. Coll. Horizon Philosophique, Cerf, 1974. Wahl Jean. Hegel et Kierkegaard. Revue Philosophique. Librairie Félix Alcan. 56ème année, nos. 11 & 12, Nov–Dec 1931. Wahl Jean. Jules Lequier. Coll. Les classiques de la liberté, Editions des Trois Collines, Genève- Paris, 1948. Wahl Jean. Etudes kierkegaardiennes. Deuxième Edition, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1949. Walsh Sylvia, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian Existence, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005. Walsh Sylvia. “The dear Self : Self-Love, Redoubling, and Self-Denial”. In Rudd, Anthony. Davenport, Jean. (eds.). Love, Reason, and Will: Kierkegaard After Frankfurt, Bloomsbury, 117–136, 2015. Webb Carson. “Kierkegaard’s critique of Eudaimonism: A reassessment”. Journal of Religion Ethics. 45(3): 437–462, 2017. Index

A Anti-Climacus, 72 Absolute theological authority, 111 Anti-dialectical dialecticians, 11 Abstraction of existence, 35 Anti-intellectualist refexivity, 129 Absurd, 61, 109 Antiphilosopher, 2, 24, 29 Acts alone before God, 68 Antiphilosophical act, 75, 109 Adam, 48 Antiphilosophical act par excellence, 109 Adam forma futuri, 47–49 Antiphilosophical action, 85 Adam’s sin, 50 Antiphilosophical Christian, 47 Aesthetics, 68 Antiphilosophical enterprise, 100 Alain Badiou, 77, 85, 95 Anti-philosophical philosopher, 113 antiphilosophy, 2, 42 Antiphilosophical posture, 21 category of antiphilosophy, 20 Antiphilosophical strategy, 128 category of truth, 16 Antiphilosophical tradition, 110 Christian antiphilosophy, 2 Antiphilosophical writing, 42 Christianity notion, 17 Antiphilosophy, 2, 4, 75–77, 120 Christian message, 3 Anti-Protestant, 85 interpretation, 3 Antitheology, 114 Kierkegaard’s conceptuality, 3 Anxiety, 95 Kierkegaard’s ethos, 3 Apologetics, 116 methodology, 21 Apology, 17 philosophical apparatus, 108 a priori assumptions, 19 philosophical discourse, 16 Archimedes, 107 political views, 3 Archi-philosophical act, 51 Alpha and Omega, 106 Atheism, 38, 111 Ambivalence, 71 Atheists, 41 Anagrams, 42 Atheists blindness, 37 Ancestral objects, 122 Augustinian density, 49 André Clair, 20, 32, 116 Augustinian themes, 50 André Clair’s work, 42 Augustinians, 110 Anti-Cartesianism, 31 Authentically ambiguous characters, 46 Anti-Christian antiphilosophers, 129 Authentic Christianity, 79 Anti-Christian contrarian, 111 Authentic pathos, 30 Anti-Christian philosophies, 1, 112 Authorized judge, 15

B Christian message, 41 Background of my life, 83 Christian metaphysical theology, 114 Beatitude, 71 Christian mumbo-jumbo, 21 Becoming, 120 Christian philosophers Being and Event, 110 a priori positions, 9 Belief, 32 authentic philosophy, 10 Believing God, 117 de facto, 11 Benefcent, 59 Enlightment, 10 Berlanda, 121 enthusiasm, 10 Bloated verbiage, 13 human experience, 12 The Book on Adler (Publication), 28 intimate simultaneity, 11 Jacques Colette, 8 Kierkegaard, 7, 8, 10 C objective knowledge, 11 Cannibalism, 4 Pascal, 8 Carelessness, 25 Pascal’s work, 13 Cartesianiam, 33 Paul Ricoeur, 11 Cartesian critique, 33 philosophical perspective, 11 Cartesian metaphysics, 121 religious authors, 10 Cartesian system, 35 single solitary chord, 12 Catharsis, 70 Socrates, 14 Catholic Church, 77, 78, 87 Vergote’s formulation, 8 Catholic institution, 77 Vergote’s proposal, 10 Catholicism, 86–88 Christian philosophies, 1, 8, 9, 112 Catholic theology, 78 Christian preaching, 108 Choice, 91, 96, 102, 103 Christian revelation, 39 Christendom, 91, 94 Christians, 94 Christian, 2 Christian striver, 7 Christian antiphilosophers, 19, 59 Christian suffering, 71 Christian antiphilosophy, 20, 51 Christian thinkers, 8 fact of being alone, 69 Christological infection, 106 journals, 20 Christology, 106, 108 philosophical reason, 4 Christ’s aphorism, 120 sacralisation, 108 Christ’s humility, 106 theology, 110 Christ’s nature, 106 tradition, 2 Church, 79 and weak theology, 114 advocate-corruptor, 78 Christian becoming, 109 aegis, 88 Christian believers, 58 authorities, 79 Christian condition, 69 Catholic, 77, 78, 87 Christian countries, 79 confation, 79 Christian doctrine, 114 Danish, 77, 86 Christian event, 108 Danish National, 80, 91, 92 Christian faith, 4, 58 delicate balance, 77 Christianity, 89, 94 Denmark, 79 antiphilosophical orientation, 2 depraved condition, 93 dissension and division source, 12 duty of, 80 eternal question, 57 history, 77 Pascal’s vision, 114 hypocrisy, 89 phenomenon, 113 institutional, 77 scandal, 107 militant, 80 tradition theology, 1 National, 88, 92 vision, 5 and practicing, 80 Christian life, 41 secularised, 78 Index 143

separation of, 81 Disheartenment, 19 State, 92 Diversion, 95, 96 triumphant, 80 Division, 71 Clarifcation of Christianity, 116 Dramatic tension, 60 Classical antiphilosophers, 2 Dualist anthropology, 47 Classic antiphilosoper, 16 Duplicity, 47 Clericalism, 108 Coalman’s faith, 58 Colette’s analysis, 21 E Community of intellect, 82 Ecclesiastical authorities, 77 Community of intelligence, 82 Eloquence/social skills, 91 Comparative analysis, 44, 114 Emile Boutroux, 107 Complex scientifc/mathematical system, 31 Equivocation, 71 Comprehensiveness, 26 Eternal refection, 56 Concept of Anxiety, 48 Eternal salvation, 55 Concept of faith, 60 Eternal youthfulness, 39 Contemporary Christianity, 40 Eternity of concepts, 26 Contemporary Danish Hegelianism The Essence of Manifestation, 120 embodiment, 16 European Parliament, 119 Contemporary Danish professors, 34 Excessive zeal, 29 Contemporary “libertine” thinkers, 121 Existence/non-existence of God, 64 Contemporary philosophy, 14 Existential wager, 55 Continual reference, 14 Exteriorisation, 83 Conversion, 77, 82, 90 Corsair affair, 66 Critical rationality, 29 F Critical reason, 40 Faith, 80, 81, 85, 86, 95, 101, 102 absurd, 61 Believing God, 62 D boundaries, 60 Danish Church, 77, 78, 86 burden of proof, 62 Danish National Church, 80, 91, 92 concepts, 59 Danish poet-philosopher, 32 existence, 59 Darkness and shadows, 123 exploration, 61 Defnitive formula, 5 historically-amassed proof, 64 Derisory science, 26 historically-proven events, 58 Descartes, 32 internal convictions, 61 Christian, 35 intimate/incomparable relationship, 60 disavowing philosophy, 32 judgement, 65 Hegel, 34 leap, 63 interpretation, 31 movement, 59 and Pascal, 33 subjective disposition, 65 Pascal’s critique, 34 transreason, 61 philosophical survey, 35 true fear, 65 philosophy, 35 voluntary submission, 61 salvation, 36 False commensuration, 55 thinker, 32 Falsehoods, 54 Desire for eternity, 56 False risk, 56 Destitution/subversion, 35 Family resemblance, 119 Deus absconditus, 98–100 Fanatical temerity, 87 Diabolical pride, 30, 31 Fear and Trembling interpretations, 28 Discontinuous writing style, 44 Feuerbach, champion of health, 40 Discredit, 41 Formal traits, 21 Discursive system, 24 Fortune’s favourite, 118 144 Index

Freedom, 123 I Freedom’ ordinary, 68 Icelandic philosopher Magnus Eiríksson, 109 Free-thinkers, 40, 55 Idea of oneness of spirit, 6 Frontiers of refection, 18 Idlers, 69 Fully-fedged philosophers, 114 Illusion, 12 Immanence, 120, 123 Immediacy, 59 G Impatient reactions, 13 Genuine individuality, 34 Impenetrable, 46 German Protestant, 85 Improbability, 57 Gethsemane, 72 Incarnation, 36 Gianni Vattimo, 111, 112, 119 Incommensurability, 54 God-as-man, 106 Incredulity, 113 God of Love, 100 Indirect communication, 98 God of metaphysical proof, 63 Individual, animal, plant/human, 26 God of the Old and New Testament, 62 Individuality, 46 God of the philosophers, 119 Infnite immanent possibilities, 124 Grace, 125–128 Ingenuousness, 56 Gravity, 25 Inner kinship, 6 Institutional Christendom, 111 Institutional Church, 77 H Institutional preservation, 68 Half-sinners, 50 Intellectualism, 129 Hannah Arendt, 58 Intelligence, 11, 57 Happier memories, 72 Interior dialectic in relation to ideality, 96 Harm stupidity, 129 Interior/exterior, 77–85, 91, 98, 100 Hear God Interiorisation, 80–82, 91, 93 Deus absconditus, 98–100 Interiority, 80 external/internal, 77–84 Internalisation, 15, 67 paradox, 100–103 Internal knowledge orientation, 15 the public on the throne, 85–93 Intoxicated concepts, 26 world, 93–97 Invisibility, 120 Heart, 120 Hegel, 83 Hegelian philosophy, 34 J Hegelian system, 33, 34 Jacques Colette, 44 Hegelian tradition, 28, 34 Jacques Lacan, 16 Hegel’s assertion, 67 Jean Brun, 24, 35 Hegel’s philosophy, 33 Jean Wahl, 5, 20, 31, 118 Hegel’s system, 34 Jesus Christ, 106, 107, 119 Hegel’s systematic view of history, 34 John D. Caputo, 110, 112, 113, 119 Heidegger’s interpretation, 120 Hélène Politis, 23, 36 Henri Gouhier, 20 K Henry’s system, 120 Kierkegaardian ethos, 3 Heraclitus vs. Parmenides, 16 Kierkegaardian research, 3 Hidden God, 99, 100 Kierkegaardiologists, 3 Hidden manna, 100 Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegelianism, 31, 32 The history of truth, 77 Kierkegaard’s antiphilosophy, 4, 17 Holy Scripture, 62 Kierkegaard’s characters, 99 Human freedom, 118 Kierkegaard’s conceptuality, 3 Humanity, 98, 121 Kierkegaard’s criticism, 5, 18 Humanity’s spiritual horizon, 58 Kierkegaard’s critique, 32, 69 Human sensitivity, 60 Kierkegaard’s dialectic, 36 Human singularity, 42 Kierkegaard’s equivocal nature, 45 Index 145

Kierkegaard’s grievances, 30 Oneness of spirit, 6 Kierkegaard’s invocation, 61 Ontological dualism, 45 Kierkegaard’s irrationality, 28 Opposing truths, 54 Kierkegaard’s journals, 7 Original sin, 49 Kierkegaard’s Pascalian affliation, 6 Otherness, 9 Kierkegaard’s philosophy, 20 Outright for their elimination, 91 Kierkegaard’s realism, 5

P L Paganism, 50 Lamentation, 73 Pagans, 37, 48 Leap, 65 The pagans and Epicureans, 35 Legitimisation, 123 Paradox, 77, 80, 100–103 Lesser evil, 47 Paradoxical perhaps, 111 Libertine cynicism, 89 Parametron, 121 Life and death question, 26 Pascalian apologetics, 115 The life of Christ, 64 Pascalian notion of sickness, 71 Linguistic form, 27 Pascalian system, 103 Love, defnition of, 83 Partial ostracism, 15 Lucien Jerphagnon, 71 Pascal, 4, 24 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 16 Pascal’s anti-Cartesianism, 31 Luther, M., 85, 86 Pascal’s antiphilosophical action, 68 Pascal’s approach, 38 Pascal’s arguments, 37 M Pascal’s assertion, 25 Mark of predetermination, 79 Pascal’s despair, 46 Masters of Christianity, 92 Pascal’s disavowal, 32 Material subjectivity, 3 Pascal’s distinction, 24 Mathematical reasoning, 90 Pascal’s fragmentary notes, 44 Metaphysical proofs of God, 63 Pascal’s maxims, 129 Michel Henry, 120–122 Pascal’s Pensées, 115 Militant Church, 80 Pascal’s philosophy, 7, 33 Mocking, 71 Pascal’s principle, 38 The Moment, 92 Pascal’s Provincial Letters, 42, 43 Moral, 70 Pascal’s theology, 88 Morality, 97 Pascal’s vision of Christianity, 37 The Movement Image, 103 Pascal’s writings, 36 Movement in faith, 59 Pascal vs. Kierkegaard, 5 Multiple guises, 42 Pascalo-Kierkegaardian style, 111 Pascalo-Kierkegaardian system, 118, 119 Paul Ricoeur, 19 N Pedants’ gowns, 29 Narrow-chested, asthmatic conceptions, 11 Personal edifcation, 27 National Church, 79, 88, 92 Personalism, 66 Natural God, 37 Phenomenology of life, 120 Natural theology, 27 Philosopher of gambling, Pascal, 55 Negative determinant, 109 Philosophers, 14, 36, 128–131 Nietzsche, 39 Philosophical agnosticism, 19 Philosophical arguments, 17 Philosophical Christians, see Christian O philosophers Objective truth, 25 Philosophical contemporaries, 27 Objective uncertainty, 61, 82 Philosophical Fragments, 62 Objectivity, 82 Philosophical intelligence, 59 Obscurantism, 24 Philosophical language, 25, 27 146 Index

Philosophical operation, 21 Reconciliation, 123 Philosophical reasoning, 109 Recovery, 122 Philosophical refection, 27, 76 Reductive reason, 28 Philosophical scandal, 101 Reduplication, 28 Philosophical systems, 77 Refexive rediscovery, 20 Philosophical tradition, 24 Reform, 126 Philosophical treatises, 27 Religion and philosophy relationships, 11 Philosophical truth, 16 Religious authors, 10 Philosophy, 26, 75, 76 Revelation, 98 Philosophy vulnerable to religion, 119 Risk is truth, 55 Pierre Bourdieu rephrases, 26 Romantic movement, 46 Polemical strategies, 39 Polemical writings, 78 Political hero, 85 S Post-Hegelian, 34 The Sacraments, 93 Postscript, 34, 44, 59 Scandinavian Pascalian, 20 Practice in Christianity, 101 Sceptical philosophers, 36 Praxis, 24, 117 Scepticism, 36, 45, 111 Pride of philosophers, 30 Sceptics, 45 Primary dilemma, 54 Schelling’s lectures, 37 Probabilistic calculation, 56 Scientifc reason, 17 Probability, 56 Scientifc wager, 55 Problem solving-strategies, 57 Secularisation, 2 Professionalism, 47 Self-abnegation, 72 Professional philosophers, 29, 30 Self-death, 111 Proof, 62, 63, 91, 102 Self-declared Christians, 89 Proposition, 118 Self-love, 83, 84 Protestant, 51 Self-refection, 67 Protestantism, 86–88 Self-sacrifce, 99 Proto-Kierkegaardian, 20 Sense of trouble, 70 The Provincial Letters (Journal), 13, 65, 78, Shestov, 24 79, 89, 96, 97 Shunning the world, 96 Proximity, 65 The Sickness Unto Death (story), 43 Pseudo-commensuration, 55 Side-lining intentionality, 120 Pseudonymous avatar, 43 Single solitary chord, 12 Pseudonyms, 43 Singular-individual, 3, 42, 47, 84 Psychosomatic phenomenon, 31 Singularity, 46, 83, 84 Pure event, 3, 108 Skills, 61 Pure reason, 17 Sneaky moralism, 97 Pyrrhonism, 30 Social experiences, 90 Social life, 90 Socially correct, 95 Q Socrates, 14 Quasi-mathematical structure, 18 Socratic infuence, 113 Solitude, 66, 100 Sophism, 12 R Soteriology, 106 Radical immanence, 120 Specialisation, 47 Radical phenomenology, 120 Speculative realism, 121 Realisation, 123 Speculators, 57 Reason, 62, 75, 82, 87, 96, 99, 102 Spirit, 101 Reasoning, 29 Spirit of reciprocity, 45 Recharge immanence, 124 Spiritual anxiety, 41 Index 147

Spiritual enthusiasm, 111 Triangular machinery, 20 Spiritual freedom, 68 Triumphant Church, 80 Spiritual numbness, 37 True Christianity, 38 Stages on Life’s Way, 66 True Christians, 68 State Church, 92 True fear, 65 State of solitude, 65 True philosophy, 54 St. Augustine, 45 True reformers, 85 Stoicism, 30, 31 Truth and sincerity, 67 Stoic “peace of the soul”, 31 Stupidifcation, 61 Stupidify, 58 U Suffering, 70, 73 Ultra-one event, 108 Super-being, 111 Unilateral specialist, 47 Superstition, 24, 65 Upbuilding Discourses, 59 Supreme understanding, 25 Suspensive movement, 60 System, 35 V Systematic philosophy, 45 Vergote’s formulation philosophical Systematic reason, 29 Christian, 8 Vigilius Haufniensis, 50 Vincent Carraud’s expression, 63 T Vincent Delecroix, 59 Tactic, 55 Violent and superb, 110 Tears of joy, 131–134 vox populi, 107 Temporality, 72 Terrestrial goal, 69 Terrible difference, 92, 93 W Terrifying genius, 5 Wager, 54, 102, 103 Testimony, 64 Wagering, 122 Theologico-philosophical theses, 96 Weakness of God, 118 Theopoetics, 110 Weak theology, 112, 113, 119 Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 124 Western philosophy and Christianity, 1 Totalisation of the real, 36 Works of Love, 83, 122 Transreason, 29, 61 World, 93–97 Transvaluation, 107 Writing, 27, 35, 42, 43