Conclusion: Post-Jansenist Meditations The tragedy of the majority of men is by no means that they are weak but that they are too strong – genuinely to be aware of God. Søren Kierkegaard, Papers, §4453 Grace Above All Else Under the joint tutelage of Paul of Tarsus and Augustine of Hippo, whose infuence can be felt throughout, the works of Pascal and Kierkegaard return constantly to an issue which preoccupied both authors throughout their lives: how should man go about seeking salvation? Through his deeds and subordination to the revealed Law, or in the refuge of divine grace, a necessary prerequisite for all good actions and thoughts? For both authors, grace is the primary requirement. Without grace we are incapable of understanding our own nature, or comprehending our tasks and duties, or escaping the clutches of despair. In Kierkegaard’s Papers we fnd this position expressed in striking terms: “grace frst and foremost, and always before us.”1 The implication is that grace always acts in advance, as if to shorten the distance between the ordinary Christian and the Christian ideal. Kierkegaard and Pascal thus make a fundamental distinction between grace and the law, a thoroughly Augustinian dichotomy: “The law imposed what it did not give. Grace gives what it imposes,2 writes Pascal. The existential fulflment of the Law by Christ coincides with the advent of a new grace which supersedes the Law. The imitation of Christ by Christians is not a matter of respecting the law, it is a consequence of grace, since grace always transcends the law. We might also argue that the imitation of Christ is so demanding, so diffcult, that it is by nature 1 X5 A 101, Vol 4: 420 / §1493. 2 Laf. 824, Br. 522. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 125 G. Deslandes, Antiphilosophy of Christianity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73283-7 126 Conclusion: Post-Jansenist Meditations impossible. Hence the necessity of grace, which is above the law and which acts as a crutch to help us mere humans cope with the overwhelming pressure of this imita- tion. It is grace which opens up the possibility of following the example set by Jesus. It is through and in light of this effect that we are bade to imitate the example of Jesus Christ, not through the medium of religious and/or theological knowledge. “For Augustine as for Pascal,” Philippe Sellier notes, “cold, dry religious knowl- edge is not derived from the genuine grace of Christ. Such knowledge was also granted to the carnal Jews, and certain pagans.”3 Does this mean that the effects of grace are detached from all contingency? Not at all. Kierkegaard in fact declares that grace plays a clear role in the actions we decide to undertake. “Grace,” he writes, “is usually understood as a dead, once-and-­ for-all decision, rather than as something related to striving, because, to recall a saying of Baader, it is an advance payment.”4 Grace can therefore not be considered a beneft or privilege; it is a down payment to be reimbursed by suffering and fear. Its dynamics are complex, since its salvation extends beyond the sacrifce and expi- ation implicit in it, strengthening weak resolve and nurturing the stubbornness of man’s heart. This distinction between the grace granted to us and the additional effort required by our condition brings us back to the quintessential Pascalian theme of suffcient and effcacious grace. One supports the other. One constantly accom- panies and urges on the fulflment of the other. This is always the way of things, Kierkegaard appears to suggest: despite the effects of grace, we must force our- selves to preserve and “use it wisely,” remaining attentive at all times, taking to the task assiduously and with total, infnite concentration, as well as making an effort to consolidate it in the long term. This effort itself is an effect of grace, to the extent that the effect of the effort forms part of the effect of grace, being concomitant with it and impossible without it. The crucial factor is the sacrifce itself, the fact of exis- tentially experiencing this reform of the self, and not the more or less mistaken way in which we might interpret the salvation which lies beyond that sacrifce, nor merit or any other justifcation we might be tempted to apply to this actual, supernatu- ral force. The question of grace is one which continually preoccupied Kierkegaard. He identifed it as the principal point of contention between Protestants and Catholics, divided on the issue of whether man can obtain grace through the action of the Holy Spirit or by his own means – Protestants defending the former position, Catholics the latter. Kierkegaard concludes that Protestants and Catholics could see eye to eye if only they were capable of scrupulously comparing their respective positions on this point. As for Pascal, he contends that “there will always be Pelagians, and always Catholics, and always strife; because the frst birth makes the one, and the grace of the second birth the other.”5 Pascal uses the Pelagians to stand for all oppo- nents of authentic, Catholic Christians, i.e. those faithful to the doctrine of Saint 3 P. SELLIER, Pascal et Saint Augustin, 315. 4 X2 A 223, Vol 3: 264 / §1474. 5 Laf. 662, Br. 521. Grace Above All Else 127 Augustine who represent the true defenders of the Catholic faith. The infuence of Saint Augustine on Pascal is plain to see, indeed there are no fewer than 15 quota- tions from Augustine in the brief Interview with M. de Saci. Like the Bishop of Hippo, Pascal affrms that the grace of God surpasses all human facts and actions. True disciples of the Christian religion reject the idea that they are capable of escap- ing “slavery to the devil” all by themselves.6 In Pascal’s words, our actions are our own only to the extent that we acknowledge “what Saint Augustine tells us, that our actions are ours in respect of the free will which produces them; but that they are also of God, in respect of his grace which enables our free will to produce them. And, as he remarks elsewhere, God enables us to do what is pleasing in his sight, by making us will to do even what we might have been unwilling to do: a Deo factum est ut vellent quod et nolle potuissent.”7 Left to his own devices, man has full control over his actions, the fruits of his free will. But left to depend upon free will alone, his chances of treading the path of charity without the help of God are slim indeed. Without charity, virtue of virtues, fruit of the grace of God, free will cannot be exercised to its full potential because there will always be actions beyond its ken. With thoroughly Pauline reasoning, Pascal urges us to recognise that the inspiration for any charitable action involves a substantial contribution from God. God infu- ences and guides our will, holding it in his care. So, ultimately, the credit for good actions can be attributed to God. Compromised by original sin, our charitable inten- tions are directed by God. Our merit is merely the merit of God, who grants us the possibility of believing in trust. Even when a man or a woman believes in their heart, the action of God’s grace is the dominant force. God’s infuence is preponder- ant even in faith, because we can never hope to achieve anything without the help of God. It thus falls to God to judge the merit of men in this life, granting grace to those who deserve it most. Pascal highlights the ambiguity of this idea of merit, which is not a property which we can easily claim for ourselves. Such matters remain murky to our mind, we cannot celebrate our own merits since only God has the power to judge. Man’s stubbornness may fnd recompense through prayer; but here again the merit goes to God, since we cannot “hold our own prayers.”8 Prayer is capable of anything, of course, but it is only granted to those whom God has chosen.9 Prayer may have the power to heal, but that requires us to know how to pray, which is only possible for those chosen by God. He illustrates this understanding of grace when he asserts that “the poor in grace are always sure to obtain that which they request, but never con- fdent of having the possibility of asking.”10 This is tantamount to saying that God 6 Laf. 807, Br. 519. 7 Provincial Letters, Letter 18, 463. 8 Laf. 930, Br. 513. 9 “God is only bound according to his promises. He has promised to grant justice to prayers (Matthew 7; 7), he has never promised prayer only to the children of promise.” Laf. 930, Br. 513. 10 Ecrits sur la grâce, L’Intégrale, Seuil, 335. 128 Conclusion: Post-Jansenist Meditations always answers the prayers of those who know how to pray properly, something which is not given to everybody. Our freedom is therefore restricted and underpins the predetermination of his destiny, and not vice versa. Under no circumstances should the doctrine of predes- tination be used to let us off the hook; the soul must refuse to be “taken in by the blandishments of theories of predestination.”11 We must necessarily have a role to play in the determination of our life to justify the gratuitousness of grace and the generosity of God. Kierkegaard thus retains at least part of the concept of predesti- nation (“if this singling out is understood selfshly by a Christian, we have the des- perate presumption of predestination,”)12 not in our name but in the name of God.