'Peaceful Rise/Development' As China's Grand Strategy
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Barry Buzan The logic and contradictions of 'peaceful rise/development' as China's grand strategy Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Buzan, Barry (2014) The logic and contradictions of 'peaceful rise/development' as China's grand strategy. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7 (4). pp. 381-420. ISSN 1750-8916 DOI: 10.1093/cjip/pou032 © 2014 The Author This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57113/ Available in LSE Research Online: October 2015 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 1 The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ as China’s Grand Strategy Barry Buzan [Note: This article has been accepted by the Chinese Journal of International Politics, and will probably be published during 2014. It has not been copy- edited, so the published version will differ somewhat from this version once adjusted for house style. Any citation from this version should make these points clear to the reader. This article must under no circumstances be circulated to anyone else without the permission of the author.] Barry Buzan is Emeritus Professor in the LSE Department of International Relations, a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS, Honourary Professor at the Universities of Copenhagen and Jilin, and a Fellow of the British Academy. His writings include: Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (2003, with Ole Wæver); Does China Matter? (2004, co-edited with Rosemary Foot); The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty- First Century (2004); The Evolution of International Security Studies (2009, with Lene Hansen); ‘China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?’ The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2010); ‘China and the US: Comparable Cases of Peaceful Rise?’ The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2013, with Michael Cox). Abstract Despite the widespread view that China does not have a coherent grand strategy, it does not need to invent one. China has already articulated a grand strategy that is based on the home-grown idea of ‘peaceful rise/development’ (PRD). The key issue is whether the logic of this grand strategy, and the contradictions within it, are fully understood, and whether China has sufficient depth and coherence in its policy-making processes to implement such a strategy. Although there are elements of longer continuity in China’s strategic outlook, the transformation from Mao’s revolutionist strategy to Deng’s strategy of reform and opening up, involved a radical shift in China’s perception of itself, the world, and its place in the world. That shift provides a stable and coherent background against which to think about the ends and means of China’s grand strategy. The paper opens by looking at PRD’s status as a grand strategy. It then surveys the ends and the means of China’s foreign and security policy as they have evolved in practice and rhetoric. Finally, it assesses in depth China’s practice against three distinct strategic logics within PRD: cold, warm and hot peaceful rise. The conclusion is that China’s current practice points firmly 2 towards cold peaceful rise, but that warm peaceful rise is perhaps still possible and offers many strategic advantages. 3 Introduction1 There is a lively debate at the moment about whether China has a grand strategy or not.2 The general feeling is that it should have such a strategy, but many think it does not, and there is a fairly widespread view that China’s foreign policy is incoherent, reflecting the lack of a grand strategy. Shi Yihong, for example, has argued that China doesn’t have ‘a system of clear and coherent long-term fundamental national objectives, diplomatic philosophy and long-term or secular grand strategy’, and that this is ‘the No. 1 cognitive and policy difficulty for the current China in her international affairs.’3 More recently Zhu Liqun reaffirms this view, arguing that ‘China has always lacked a global strategy. It is now believed by many scholars that it is time for China to have one’. Not having one is ‘hardly sustainable over the next decade’.4 Westad argues that China has a very limited and conservative view of the world and no grand strategy to speak of.5 I have also argued that China lacks a coherent strategic vision of its place in international society, and fails to align ends and means, combining rhetorics of peaceful development and harmonious relations with several militarized border disputes with its neighbours, a lot of hard realist rhetoric, and political relationships bordering on enmity with Japan, Vietnam and India.6 Zhang makes the reasonable argument that while China has a vigorous debate about grand strategy, the country is evolving very fast, and the consequent continuous redefinition of itself and its interests makes it unsurprising that it as yet has no clear grand strategy. That said, he does find some consistency on the desired ends, but much less agreement about how to pursue those in terms of means. He sees China as muddling along, learning by doing.7 In a subsequent paper Zhang argues that China does have a vision behind its foreign policy in the sense of always seeing itself as a central player in world politics, albeit this is now driven by a defensive, self-centred and self- righteous perspective in which China perceives ‘foreign misunderstanding, 1 All references to Kindle editions use location numbers. 2 I would like to thank Wang Jiangli, Zhang Feng and Yongjin Zhang and two anonymous CJIP reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 3 Shi Yihong, ‘The Rising China: Essential Disposition, Secular Grand Strategy, and Current Prime Problems’, 2001, http://www.spfusa.org/Program/av2001/feb1202.pdf (accessed 31/10/2008). 4 Zhu Liqun, ‘Ongoing debates surrounding China’s identity’, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 27 July 2012, p. 3. http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/ongoing-debates-surrounding-chinas- identity/ (Accessed 1 July 2013.) 5 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire (London: The Bodley Head, 2012), locs. 6727-31, 7180, 7206. 6 Barry Buzan, ‘China in International Society: Is “Peaceful Rise” Possible?’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, pp. 29-33. 7 Zhang Feng, ‘Rethinking China’s grand strategy: Beijing’s evolving national interests and strategic ideas in the reform era’, International Politics, Vol.49, No. 3, 2012, pp. 337-9. 4 prejudice and misapprehension’.8 Wang likewise thinks that there is no official statement of China’s grand strategy, but argues that indications of its components can be found.9 Heath thinks there is more than that. He uses research into Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy documents to tease out ‘guidance on the nation’s desired end state and supporting objectives, ways and means’, and finds a relatively coherent view of ‘national strategy’.10 But American realists are the biggest believers in China already having a grand strategy. Goldstein argues that by 1996 China had evolved a fairly clear grand strategy aimed at pursuing its own development and rising peacefully within a US dominated order.11 He sees this strategy as primarily transitional, to get China through a difficult period of relative weakness without generating ‘China threat’ reactions from other powers. But since he also sees this transition period as being quite long – perhaps several decades – this strategy is likely to be stable for some time so long as there are no big disruptions in the distribution of power. He argues that what will happen after China has risen is too far away to predict. Swaine and Tellis take a similar view and label China’s grand strategy as ‘calculative’.12 The argument in this paper builds on Goldstein’s view, but is neither constrained by the hard realist perspective, nor skewed by the US-centric perspective, that underpin both his and Swaine and Tellis’s analyses. I do not presuppose, as realists must, either that China’s current strategy is necessarily transitional, or that strategy is predominantly driven by the distribution of power. I allow scope for the moral purpose of the state to influence grand strategy, and I try to take a neutral outside perspective. I also have the benefit of an additional decade of China’s foreign policy for looking at how coherently or not this grand strategy is being pursued in terms of the relationship of ends and means. And since the economic crisis beginning in 2008, both Goldstein’s and Swaine and Tellis’s assumption of several decades of unquestioned US hegemony is more under question. China therefore does not need to invent a grand strategy because it has already articulated one that is based on a home-grown idea: ‘peaceful 8 Zhang Feng, ‘The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol 19, No. 2, 2013, pp. 307, 315, 322. See also Shih Chih-yu and Yin Jiwu, ‘Between Core National Interest and a Harmonious World: Reconciling Self-role Conceptions in Chinese Foreign Policy’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.