DISAPPEARING PUBLIC SPHERES Copyright © Parvez Alam Book design Edwin Smet Final editing Barry Crooks

ISBN 978-90-823641-•-• www.evatasfoundation.com DISAPPEARING PUBLIC SPHERES PARVEZ ALAM

Translated by xxxxxx

Amsterdam 2016 CONTENTS

7 Introduction

11 CHAPTER 1 NEW PUBLIC SPHERES 11 Rise of Bangla Blogosphere(Title) 14 Jamaat-e-Islami and the War Crimes debate 16 Political Background of the debate 20 From Debate to Confrontation

25 ; Public Square to Public Sphere Bangla blog and activism Shahbag; The political public sphere

CHAPTER 2 REVOLUTION: THE BANGLA SPRING! War Crimes Tribunal and Shahbag The ‘Shahbag Movement’ Movement under Government’s Control controversy and decline

Rise of Hefazat-e- (Protector of Islam) Protector of Islam The Siege of

Censorship and empowerment of the regime Mass Bans and our Paradoxes The Case of Farabi Act 57: Severe Censorship The “Democratic Dictatorship!” CHAPTER 3 UPGRADED AUTHORITARIANISM AND DISAPPEARING PUBLIC SPHERES ‘Authoritarian upgrading’ in Avijit Murder, emergence of Al Qaeda in Bangladesh The ‘Ultimate Polarization’

Disappearing Public Spheres 2015: year of Murder and Terror

INTRODUCTION

Het doel van de staat is de vrijheid – I only managed to read the sentence engraved at the bottom of the Baruch Spinoza monument that stands at Zwanenburgwal, just in front of the City Hall of Amsterdam. I did not understand what it means; it was just my second day in Amsterdam and I had zero knowledge of the Dutch Language. It means “The purpose of the State is freedom”, my Dutch friend translated. Now, that was familiar. It’s a famous quotation from Spinoza’s once infamous and highly controversial book Theologico-Political Treatise (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus). It was also more than familiar; words like ‘State’ and ‘Freedom’ made me wonder. They made me nostalgic, reminded me of lots of things. Reminded me of things that happened in the past, in my own lifetime and in the past when I was not even born. I remembered that Spinoza was expelled by the Amsterdam Municipal Authority after he was censured by the Jewish community of Amsterdam in 1656. And now his statue stands in front of the municipal building of the same city from which he was expelled. Theologico-Political Treatise, the book that contained this famous proclamation “The purpose of the State is freedom”, was also banned by the Dutch government in 1674 along with Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan.1 The state in which Spinoza lived could not provide much freedom for his thought and expression. Things have changed in Europe since then, especially when it comes to freedom of expression. Although many fear the world including Europe is moving in a different direction these days, where I come from freedom has really become scarce recently. For the state that was born in 1971 with the name of ‘People’s of Bangladesh’, freedom was certainly its highest purpose at birth. That’s why we call the war that gave birth to it the ‘Liberation War’. And it was not just liberation from a foreign country or economy, but also from its military rule and sectarian policy that rarely upheld freedom of any kind as a value. I wrote a book called ‘Shahbager Rashtroprokolpo’ (State Project of Shahbag) few years ago, in which I tried to analyze the purpose of founding of our state, where was it supposed to head, and where it is heading now. 7 It was supposed to be a secular state that upholds values like freedom of religion and opinion. was another goal, which was non-existent when the country was called East . Both and democracy became two of the four basic principles of the constitution of the new-born country. The poverty-ridden country has struggled to uphold such values since its birth. But recently values like ‘secularism’ and ‘democracy’ have become vulnerable to an extent quite unprecedented in the history of the country. These values now remain mostly on paper, not in reality. Freedom of religion and expression came under threat from both the ruling regime and Islamist terrorists. The tragic drama that unfolded in the last few years made the life of writers and activists such as me vulnerable, and that is why I was now standing in front of the statue of Spinoza. Otherwise I would have been in Bangladesh right now doing my thing, writing something else rather than this book. As I said, the statue of Spinoza reminded me of so many things, things that also happened in the past when I was not even born. My mind pondered the history of the Spanish inquisition, something that forced Spinoza’s ancestors from their home in Spain to seek refuge in Amsterdam.2 Yes, Spinoza was the descendant of the refugees. Europe should remember such past history while it faces the current refugee crisis born out of the ongoing war in the Middle East. “If you want the present to be different from the past, study the past”, is another famous quotation from Spinoza. Well, this is not the only reason I find it important to study the past. I have written a couple of books about the history of Islam because it was a burden that as a Bangladeshi human being I had to take up. Both the West and Islam hold inescapable discursive hegemony over our lives, and we have to make them a matter of knowledge in our own language if we want to stand any chance in the crisis that is unfolding all over the world. I love reading about the past; I am passionate about the history of ideas. That made it easier for me to take up this burden. That is why I wrote my first book on the history of the Islamic golden age, the rise and demise of the great philosophical and scientific culture in the medieval Muslim world. So, standing in front of the Spinoza monument also reminded me of Ibn Rushd, who is known as ‘Averroes’ in the West. Ibn Rushd lived in the 12th century, in ‘Muslim Spain’ which was 8 called Al-Andalus back then, the land where Spinoza’s ancestors lived. He was a polymath, a great Aristotelian philosopher, an Islamic law expert and probably the first Muslim feminist. He also held the position of chief judge in Cordoba. But Rushd was banished to an island in his old age on a charge of blasphemy, although the real reason behind his banishment was political. Many of his books were burned, only a few of his original Arabic works survive in our time. Fortunately for us, many books written by Ibn Rushd were translated during his lifetime. Michael Scot, a 12th century Scottish scholar, translated his work from Arabic to Latin. During the 13th century Jacob Anatoli translated many books by Ibn Rushd into Hebrew, and was later invited to Naples by the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II. These Hebrew books were later translated into Latin and acquired immense popularity. These Latin translations of Averroes’ work led the way to the popularization of Aristotle. 3 Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle were the foundation for the Aristotelian revival in the 12th and 13th centuries in Europe. Moses Maimonides and Samuel Ben Tibbon were younger contemporaries of Ibn Rushd. Maimonides was also born in Cordoba, Ibn Rushd’s home town. Both of them were immensely influenced by Ibn Rushd4. The Cordoban Caliphate was one of the most multi-cultural and pluralistic societies of its time. The fall of Ibn Rushd also marks the end of the golden age of Islam to some degree. Some similarities between Ibn Rushd and Spinoza’s thought are remarkable. Spinoza was probably familiar with Ibn Rushd’s philosophical claims through the Jewish Renaissance Averroist (follower of Ibn Rushd) Elijah Delmedigo, whose book “The Examination of Religion’’ can be found in Spinoza’s library5. Maimonides is probably another source through whom Spinoza could be familiar with Ibn Rushd’s ideas. However, when it comes to Spinoza’s view on philosophy and religion, his thoughts are closer to Ibn Rushd than Elijah Delmedigo or Moses Maimonides. According to Carlos Fraenkel, Spinoza’s approach to the relationship between philosophy and religion in the writings preceding the critique of religion in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus in a sense radicalizes the stance on philosophy and religion advocated by Ibn Rushd in his chief philosophical-theological work,

9 the Fas.l al-maqâl (Decisive Treatise). We should bear in mind such complex and multicultural history of the development of the ideas of enlightenment, in a world that is now considered by many to be a battlefield for the clash of civilizations. But I do not intend to write the history of such distant past in this book. I would rather write the history of a recent past, which I had to live through. Standing in front of the Spinoza monument reminded me mostly of the people who were my friends and colleagues, people with whom I agreed, disagreed and agreed to disagree on certain points, those who were killed, jailed or had to flee from Bangladesh. This is when I decided to write a book that would contain their history, and the history of the growth and demise of new public spheres in Bangladesh.

10 CHAPTER 1 NEW PUBLIC SPHERES

Rise of Bangla Blogosphere

The rise of a new form of public sphere in Bangladesh in the internet age cannot be talked about without mentioning the birth and rise of the Bangla Blogosphere. It is also one of the main forms of public sphere described in this book. Public spheres are forums where public opinions are shaped.6 Internet-based communities and forums have been considered new public spheres in the early phase of development of such virtual spaces of communication as the internet, and have revolutionized the way people communicate, access information and distribute it. The internet has made it possible for its user to be both the consumer and producer of communication content7. The term ‘Bangla Blogosphere’ to denote the network of Bangla community blogs, which appeared after 2005 when the technology of writing Bangla on the internet came to maturity, is used by several Bangladesh social media experts and researchers. Bangladeshi poet and social media researcher Moiyen Zalal Chowdhury sought to theorize and understand the emergence and future of the Bangla blogging culture around the Habermasian idea of public sphere (Öffentlichkeit). The history of Bangla Blogosphere can be traced back to the emergence of a community blog named Somewhereinblog. The blog came into existence in 2005 and quickly became popular among middle class youth who had internet connection and had the ambition to become writers, and the urge to express themselves and to get into debate about social, religious and political issues. This is the blog where I also started my blogging career. I had been writing in little magazines before I

11 started writing blogs. But I truly became a serious writer when I was in Somewhereinblog, when I had a loyal readership and some serious critics. I also loved to get into debates, another thing that drew me to the Bangla blogging culture. I knew about blogs long before Bangla Blogosphere emerged, but personal blogging culture in blogspot or wordpress did not attract me much. However, Somewhereinblog was something else. It was a community blog where many young came together and it was a place where I could easily write in the Bangla language. It soon became a thriving community where bloggers could comment on each other’s posts, could debate with each other, and become friends or competitors. It was a place where I could be part of a community and a place where I hoped to create new activist groups and communities. Many community blogs emerged in Bangladesh after Somewhereinblog. Although blogging is mainly known as personal blogging worldwide, community blogging is the dominating trend in the Bangla blogosphere.8 This community characteristic of Bangla Blogs brings them closer to an ideal form of public sphere, where people can express themselves, debate each other and form public opinion. And when the public opinion formed in blogs took to the streets, when blog- based activists started successfully mobilizing people for causes and started to influence state policy, the Bangla Blogosphere looked very similar to a Utopia of Habermasian public sphere. According to Jürgen Habermas, many features of our ‘Information Age’ are similar to the primitive social and political forms of the hunting and gathering society, a society which was also the most egalitarian society in human history. Habermas states that there are many striking parallels in the lack of boundaries in hunting-gathering society and modern electronic society. 9 Some experts suggest that social media creates space for political communication and increases democratic capacities for political discussion within a virtual public sphere. According to them, social media can empower citizens to challenge the political and economic power of governments and the corporations.10 Proponents of cyberspace suggested that the decline of the public sphere will be halted by the democratizing effects of the internet which will pave the way for a democratic utopia.11 However, sceptics are less

12 optimistic, even somewhat critical of such wishful thinking. I myself was certainly one among those who hoped for the best. Many internet age young revolutionaries thought that the internet would bring positive change, would pave the way for a more direct form of democracy than the faulty democracy or autocracy that we see in what we call the ‘Third World’, and I was one among them. Regardless of what the experts said, many like us who wanted immediate change in the political environment and the status quo hoped for an internet era revolution powered by mass participation. Most early bloggers in Bangladesh were serious writers, poets and public intellectuals. The Bangla Blogosphere remained mostly a liberal space with a small community of bloggers for its first few years. Some of the most interesting debate on religion and politics occurred during this period. However, debates turning into confrontation between secularists and Islamists was something that happened quite often too, and intensified as years went by. Debate between theism and atheism was another form of common debate that could be seen in Bangla Blogosphere from its very beginning. This kind of debate would often turn ugly. The war crime of 1971 and the involvement of Jamaat-e-Islami in genocide was another central issue. Such debates pushed the limits of freedom of speech and regularly resulted in temporary or permanent bans of certain bloggers. Somewherein and other blogs had their own censorship regulations. Although in the earlier period these community blog admins and moderators were reluctant to enforce regulations and the bloggers had more inclination to maintain a liberal and tolerant atmosphere, things changed pretty soon. As years went by and more members registered in Somewhereinblog, things got more and more complex. Objections to certain blogs, online harassment and trolling emerged to be the dominant culture. Now the blogosphere was becoming a less liberal place with every passing day. Now with hundreds of thousands of registered members, the Bangla Blogosphere was becoming more and more a mirror of reality. Distinction between the virtual and real was rapidly dissolving. The ‘Virtual Reality’ was no less real anymore, and when the virtual debates and confrontation crossed the limitation of virtual sphere and took to the streets, reaching the most rural areas of Bangladesh, it felt more real than anything I have ever experienced. 13 _ Jamaat-e-Islami and the War Crimes debate Debate regarding the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islam and its involvement in the war crimes against humanity during 1971 was one of the most central issues since the emergence of Bangla Blogosphere. In fact, it can be said that it was the most prominent issue of a discursive nature in Bangla Blogosphere. A survey conducted by Fahmidul Haque, a New Media researcher and Dhaka University Assistant Professor of Journalism, concluded that 73.3% of bloggers find this debate to be the most prominent issue. With a highly discursive nature this issue concerned , activism and identity with long term interactivity and participation. 12 To understand the background of this issue, we have to look back to the . Bangladesh was born in 1971 after a nine month long liberation war against Pakistan. The liberation war of Bangladesh is one of the bloodiest wars since the Second World War. According to one estimate, 1.5 million people were killed during the war.13 Between two and four hundred thousand women were raped by the Pakistani military and their collaborators. 14 15 Most victims were of Hindu religion and political supporters of the independence movement. During the liberation war, Jamaat-e-Islami took a pro-Pakistani political position, with their leaders not only collaborating with the Pakistani military regime but also forming several paramilitary forces that took part in genocide and other war crimes.16 The best known of the paramilitary forces that collaborated with the Pakistani military was called , a name that has become a pejorative in independent Bangladesh. Another of these paramilitary forces was Al-Badr, largely controlled by Islami Chatra Shangha (Islamic Student Organization) leaders. This organization played a central role in the kidnapping and murder of many Bangladeshi intellectuals during the final period of the liberation war. Some have suggested that as many as 2,000 such murders were carried out from 11th to 14th December 1971.17 Some of the top Jamaat leaders, such as Motiur Rahman Nijami and Ali Ahsan Mujahid, were Al-Badr commanders. They also took part in the arrest and killing of several young freedom fighters from a group famously known as the ‘Urban Guerrillas’. 18 Some of these Freedom fighters such as Rumi, Bodi, Jewel and

14 others became cultural heroes to the post-liberation Bangladeshi youth. After the liberation war ended, the newly established Bangladeshi government failed to bring the war criminals to trial due to economic and diplomatic limitations. Bangladesh was born as a war-torn country in dire need of economic support and international recognition. India returned the POWs to Pakistan according to the Shimla accord signed by both countries.19 The new Bangladeshi government had to release 193 Pakistani war criminals in return for recognition by Pakistan and economic aid promised by the Middle Eastern countries, mainly Saudi Arabia. Most Jamaat leaders involved in war crimes were either in hiding or were out of the country in this period. After the massive political change in 1975, Islamists returned to the mainstream , as did the war criminals along with them. Some of them had central positions in General Zia’s regime. , the chief of Jamaat, returned to Bangladesh in 1980. After 1990, Jamaat emerged as one of the important players in the Bangladeshi mainstream political arena. Although Bangladesh as a state failed to bring the war criminals of 1971 to trial, a movement asking for their trial was born just after independence. This movement was lead by predominantly secularist civil society members who kept the demand alive for years to come. , a writer and activist, played the most important role in maintaining the demand for justice for war crimes during the early 90s. Jahanara Imam was the mother of Rumi, the most famous member of ‘Urban Guerrillas’. She was known popularly as the ‘Shahid Janani’(Mother of the Martyr). Under her leadership the movement achieved a new dimension. Her book ‘Ekattorer Dinguli’ (Days of seventy one) became a cult classic to many Bangladeshi youths who grew up during the 90s. I myself was one of those youths and kept the demand for a trial of war criminals close to my heart after reading the book. Like many others of our generation, I also took part in protests and events asking for trials for the war criminals. It became a tradition for many of us to commemorate 14th December as the intellectual martyrs’ day, and also to ask for the trials of the war criminals. The movement demanding trials intensified in the post-2000 era, when some of the war criminals came to hold parliamentary and ministerial

15 positions. The fact that JI never tried to re-evaluate their position in the liberation war, and their leaders continuously remarked that they had not made any mistake in 1971, only infuriated their opponents. In the name of Islam they continued to preach Pakistani-era discourses that disregarded the sovereignty of an independent Bangladesh. Anti-Jamaat agitation among the secularists and progressive youth increased after they came to power as an ally of BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party). Large numbers of the Hindu minority were attacked all over the country by JI activists as soon as they came to power,20 which only intensified anti-Jamaat agitation. Within a few years, such agitation only grew. This was a period when students of Jahangir Nagar University would lie on the ground to prevent a government minister from entering their campus. This minister was none other than the then Agriculture Minister who was the president of Islami Chatra Shangha during the liberation war and one of the commanders of Al- Badr. This was also the period when Bangla Blog came into existence. This is when our generation emerged with social and political consciousness. I must give some detailed information about this period as background before we go any further.

_ Political background of the debates Since 2001, shifted towards coalition politics. BNP made an electoral coalition before the election of 2001 to ensure its return to power, defeating a well organized . This coalition included Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Oikko Jote and Bangladesh Jatio Party, and stood as the ultimate right wing political formation in the country. The coalition won the election, but soon became a very controversial regime. The controversies during the rule of this coalition government still haunt not only the victims of the regime but also the leaders of the coalition themselves. The coalition was tainted with accusations of supporting terrorism, communalism, attacks on religious minorities, assassination and attempted assassination of Awami League leaders and for hosting leaders accused of war crimes in 1971. BNP had a history of ending their term in an unruly manner. Before ending

16 their term in 2006, the coalition government made a road map for returning to power by any means possible. This road map included putting loyal people in important positions. The Awami League, at that time the main opposition party, claimed that the last retired Chief Justice who would head the subsequent caretaker government was a BNP loyalist and would serve the cause of BNP in the upcoming election. They started a movement against it, and it turned violent. 21 It should be noted that both these parties actually lost their legitimacy as people’s parties and their protests and movements against the ruling regime rarely gathered any mass support in the new millennium as they had in the 80s and 90s. As a result, AL’s movement did not gather much momentum as long as the BNP-led coalition was in power. However, the ruling regime was weakened by several successive movements initiated by general people in different localities. Mass movements in Kansat, Phulbari and Shanirakhra made the regime crumble in its final days. Although AL was unsuccessful in creating a popular movement against the BNP-Jamaat led government, they were successful enough to expose its electoral road map. They are the largest party in Bangladesh in terms of activist numbers, and as soon as BNP-Jamaat ended their term in government, AL activists took to the street in large numbers. They refused to recognize the appointed head of the caretaker government. The protest they started was an aggressive one. Several parts of Bangladesh, including the capital Dhaka, were effectively under the occupation of AL activists wielding bamboo sticks and oars. Fights broke out between Awami League and BNP-Jamaat activists around the country and many lost their lives. The country was in anarchy for several days, after which the military intervened. A state of emergency was declared and a new caretaker government headed by was installed and actively supported by the military. The Awami League supported this new government, but things did not go as they were hoping. A caretaker government was supposed to rule for 3 months and its main objective was to hold the general election impartially. But this military-backed caretaker government had something different in mind: they ruled for two straight years. As soon as they established themselves in power, large numbers of

17 leaders and activists from almost all major parties were arrested and put into jail on charges of corruption, arson and even murder. Many of these arrested leaders were heavyweights, including and , both ex-prime ministers. Sheikh Hasina was later released but had to leave the country. , the son of Khaleda Zia, who was arguably the most powerful person behind the BNP-Jamaat coalition, was also arrested, allegedly tortured and later released and forced to leave the country. He is still living in exile. Most people were initially happy to see some of the notoriously powerful and corrupt leaders behind bars. They also gave passive moral support to the military-backed government since they were tired of the continuous squabbling between the two major political entities. But they also soon realized that they cannot live under a state of emergency ruled by a military-backed government for too long. Some popular protests led by university students in 2008 marked the end of public support for the regime. It was under this regime that I discovered myself as an activist. Although I participated in activism for the first time in the Shanir Akhra (which is my own neighbourhood) movement in 2006, back then it was a one-time thing. Later that year, I and some of my high school friends established a community library where we tried to understand and form opinions on social, political and religious issues. The birth of our library movement almost coincided with the military government coming to power. We were trying to understand what had caused our democracy to fail and bring a ‘state of emergency’ upon us. As young people, we did not have a happy experience with the military. Bangladesh was under military government from 1975 to 1990. Our generation did not have to taste the bitterness of that direct military rule. When Ershad fell in the early 90s, I was just a kid without any understanding of politics, but I remember the rejoicing. I even remember one day creating a tiny grave for Ershad just in front of my house. It was a time when there was no internet or even satellite TV in Bangladesh. The one and only TV Channel, was a government- run channel and nothing more than a government media front (it still is). The movement against Ershad’s military regime was a very popular one, the

18 second most popular after the liberation war movement. People had to wait for the morning newspaper to get updated about the movement, but it was not enough for them. So news and updates spread from person to person in the shape of gossip and even mythologies. It was not just a decade before 2000, it was a different century and different millennium, both literally and figuratively. As a young boy, my knowledge of that movement was based on such gossip and mythologies. I did not truly understand the nature of the movement, but I knew that Ershad was the bad guy. I used to see him and his first lady on television every day, I felt like I was watching a King and Queen. But I knew that he was the bad guy and I do remember the terrifying moments rushing from school to home with my aunt when curfews were announced. We were not supposed to leave home, go to school or play outside during those curfews. I did not understand what curfew was, but I could feel how it took away my freedom. So one day when I heard that a grave (symbolic) was being dug for Ershad by the protesters in the Gulistan region of Dhaka, I dug a fresh one too just in front of my house. So when the curfew was once again upon us in 2007, that memory of my childhood came back. So did some other bad memories involving the military. It was not just me; almost everyone of my generation had such memories. Bangladesh went through a democratic period from 1990 to 2006, but it was not easy going. The Awami League and BNP, the two major parties, rarely find any political compromise between them and were often in conflict. The BNP brought the military out of their barracks in 1996 in an attempt to preserve their faltering regime. Both the Awami League and the BNP had used the military for temporary periods, and these were difficult periods for young people like us. We would be stopped in the street, harassed or even physically assaulted by military personnel just for having long hair or for something that they found immodest. But in 2007, we were old enough to have some idea of civil rights and we fought back. Like many other young people, I would also often find myself breaking emergency law by arranging or participating in protests and rallies. Especially after 2008 (give the month), several university campuses became virtually free of restrictions imposed under the state of emergency. (We can also put in one or two lines

19 about what we did in our own neighbourhood). Such popular uprisings were seen as a message to the military and the caretaker government that they should not make things more difficult. They were already losing popularity and support; they could not risk a safe exit. However, the government did try to change the political scenario in Bangladesh. AL and BNP were sidelined, especially most of their top leaders. The government also backed reformist tendencies and promoted those leaders who wanted reform and would also try to get their respective parties out of the grasp of the two most powerful political families in the country, the Sheikh and the Zia families. This step taken by the caretaker government and some political leaders from AL and BNP are infamously known as the ‘minus two formula’. This ‘minus two formula’ did not work, on the contrary the reformist leaders were sidelined when the caretaker government resigned. All these social and political backgrounds were current when Bangla Blog emerged. It should be noted that Bangla Blogosphere emerged as a popular alternative medium during a period when the country was under a state of emergency. Our generation had to go through the historical experiences that led to the ‘State of Emergency’, and everything that was going under the emergency had affected what was also going on inside the Blogosphere.

_ From Debate to Confrontation During the two year rule of the caretaker government, the demand for a war crimes tribunal gained popularity as the government also resumed the Bangabandhu murder trial. Bangabandhu was the leader of AL (Awami League) during 1971 and was seen as the Father of the Nation in Bangladesh. He was murdered with many of his family members in a military coup in 1975. The reign of the caretaker government (January 2007-December 2008) was highly controversial, but also had the support of many people since the two main parties had brought the whole nation to a stalemate. Many politicians, including the top leaders from both parties were arrested for corruption and other charges. The Bangabndhu murder trial had

20 begun when AL ruled from 1996-2001. The trial had popular support, and an initial verdict was handed down just before the end of the government’s term, but as the new BNP-Jamaat alliance came to power in 2001, the trial went cold. Despite popular support AL had managed to put the trial in jeopardy by using it for their political purposes. It was central to their major electoral agenda in 2001 that the people give them the chance to return to government so that they could continue to finish what they had started, and that the BNP-JI coalition would not let this trial go on due to their historical connection with those responsible for the murder. When BNP-JI came to power in 2000, they did not abandon the trial, but did make it go cold. So, when the caretaker government resumed the trial there was a sense of hope, since it was considered to be a neutral government. A hope for the trial of war criminals also became high in this period, and the Bangla Blogosphere played a vital role. I started writing blogs in Somewhereinblog when the caretaker government was in power and found myself in the middle of a huge debate looming in the whole Bangla Blogosphere between the pro-trial and anti-trial bloggers, with the pro-trial bloggers being more popular and in the majority. There had been pro-Jamaat bloggers since the inception of the Bangla Blogosphere who would promote pro-Jamaat discourses and downplay the criminal activities of the party in the liberation war. Such propaganda only intensified the pro-war-crimes trial stance of the majority of bloggers. I took a pro-trial position in this debate, and this virtual position was nothing different from my position in real life. I had been regularly participating in pro-trial movements since 2006. These debates had a positive effect on Bangladeshi youth in developing a consciousness of the liberation war and its secular ideals. However, these debates did not take the path of constructive solutions, but rather provided more fuel for exclusion, bans and polarization. It was a common thing for such debates to become ugly and for bloggers from both sides to be banned by the blog authority as a result. A certain socially exclusionary policy regarding Jamaat activists and anti-trial supporters in the blogosphere was developed by more radical anti-Jamaat and nationalist bloggers. became the dominating

21 political ideology in the Bangla Blogosphere.22 But that does not mean there was no real discussion or attempt at reconciliation. Bangla Blogosphere also had been a place where many healthy and productive discussions and debates took place that did not promote exclusion or alienation, but rather promoted understanding and exchange of different opinions. My first book was the result of one such debate. An ex-Shibir (JI’s current student wing) member who used to be a blogger in Somewhereinblog once started writing a series blog about Muslim philosophers and scientists and their achievements during the golden age of Islam. It was a common trend among the Islamist activists to promote ideas such as Islam and science not being contradictory, and how there was a time when the world’s greatest scientists and philosophers were Muslim. Writing about the great philosophers and scientists of the golden age of Islam serves two Islamist arguments. First, they want to answer the modern polemic against Islam that this religion is anti-science, which, although a simplistic argument, is not problematic. But their second argument has nothing to do with science, but only with faith. They claim the are not succeeding in the fields of science and philosophy anymore because they have moved away from their religion. They have a preconceived idea that all the greatest philosophers and scientists in the Muslim world were faithful and pious Muslims according to their idea of piety and what they consider to be faith. They think or at least want to promote the idea that there is no difference between their version of Islam and the Islam practiced by these thinkers of antiquity. They completely negate the diversity of religious and philosophical views of medieval Muslim scholars, or their bitter competition and opposition to orthodox fideism. This trend was common among the JI and Shibir activists and many blogs with similar claims were posted since the emergence of Bangla Blogosphere. So when this ex-Shibir blogger went on to write a series blog about the Muslim scientists and philosophers, I immediately sensed that it was going to be a new product of the aforementioned trend. The first few parts of the series also proved my point. It was all about the names of the scholars and their achievements in different fields of science and technology. He was a popular blogger, so I felt obliged to intervene and start a debate. The debate

22 started in the comment section, then I went on writing my own series on the topic where I investigated the historical background of the Islamic golden age, the reasons behind the rise and fall of the rationalist culture of that age, and where I gave a brief history of the battle that the most famous Muslim philosophers and scientists had to go through with the scholars and jurists who supported a more orthodox version of Islam and opposed in theological inspection. An interesting debate between him and me continued for months in which many others also joined. It was one of those healthy debates that enriched all of us. My fellow blogger stopped writing his series half way through, but I went on to finish my project. These series blogs became my first book, which is entitled ‘Epistemological Battle of The Muslim World’. It was a time when I lacked patience and focus to write a book. But I loved debate, and if not for this debate, I might not have been able to write a book that gave me the confidence to write more books. This kind of debate and environment for discussion in the Bangla Blogosphere encouraged many young writers like me to continue writing. However, as time went by, confrontation rather than debate became the norm. JI and Shibir activists as well as other Islamists were alienated by radical nationalists and secularists. The pejorative ‘Razakar’ became highly popular against them along with a new term called Chagu (literally “Goat”). AL supporters also started to use such pejoratives against everyone who did not agree with them. On the other hand, JI supporters and their allies played in a way they knew best, by using the terms ‘atheist’ or ‘anti-Islamic’ as a pejorative for anyone who opposed them or demanded a war crimes trial. When AL and its allies came to power in Bangladesh on 29th December 2008, the Bangla Blogosphere was already being influenced by and was also influencing public opinion. Although corruption charges were laid against leaders of all major parties by the caretaker government, BNP suffered the most since they were the party ruling just before the emergence of the caretaker government. So, when the caretaker government went for a general election, the Awami League recovered faster than the BNP. The result was a landslide victory for the Awami League. The Awami League was also intelligent enough to understand what the emerging youth wanted and

23 this was reflected in their election manifesto. The establishment of a war crimes tribunal was in their manifesto, which also helped them to secure support from the younger generation who wanted justice for the war crimes committed in 1971.

24 Shahbag: Public Square to Public Sphere

One of the main reasons I became a blogger was to use the Bangla Blogosphere for social and political activism. I knew how blogs have played a part in internet era activism and realized that the community-based nature of Bangla Blogs had great potential for activist networking. Since blogs and forums served as alternative media and Bangla Blogosphere had little or no control over it by any dominant mainstream political or corporate interest, I thought it was a great place for alternative voices which do not have much access to the mainstream media. Since I was already an activist before I became a blogger, using blogs for my activism was one of the main focuses of my blogging activity. Bangla Blogosphere did not discourage me when I tried to use my new-found popularity as a blogger to mobilize supporters for social and political activism, since there were many like me who wanted to take part in activism. It was just a matter of time to find likeminded bloggers who wanted to fight for common causes. There were many bloggers in the Bangla Blogosphere who thrived on activism but lacked platforms. These politically conscious young people had great enthusiasm for taking part in social and political change but lacked platforms. Most of them were non-partisan people with no affiliation with any particular political groups. That was good for me as I was also non-partisan. However, I had experience in activism, and I used that to mobilize others. It was certainly not a one man job; I was fortunate to have help from some other likeminded and experienced activists who also joined. However, for activism, the virtual space is not enough. You have to be in the street with banners and effigies in your hand and slogans in your mouth to truly fight for your cause. Fortunately for us, we had just the place to gather outside of the blog and take our cause to the street. It was the Shahbag Square, an old and busy intersection of Dhaka, close to the campus of the . Shahbag became the physical public sphere we needed outside of our virtual existence. Soon it became the internet era centre of activism in Dhaka, the Tahrir Square of Bangladesh.

25 _ Bangla Blog and activism Since 2010 the Bangla Blogosphere gradually turned in to a place from where many social and political movements were mobilized. This was part of the global trend of young people using blogs and social networks to mobilize for different social and political issues. The distinction between online and real life activism decreased in this period and both became interdependent. New activists and a new way of activism emerged. Social and political movements that emerged from Bangla Blogosphere mobilized people through blogs and social networking and dealt with diverse issues such as violence against women, the right to education, military land grabbing, border killings, and energy and environment policy before 2013. Since 2013, almost all forms of social and political activism in Bangladesh are now more or less dependent on people’s mobilization in the online sphere. The year 2011 can be recognized as a year of activism in Bangla Blogosphere, as Moin Zalal Chowudhury puts it. Political issues such as Indian border killings and environmental issues like saving the Titas River and Ariol Beel (billabong) gathered popular support. It is also the year when the platform ‘Blogger-Online activist on national interest’ emerged.23 As an activist platform that organizes them and mobilizes people through social networking, it was the first of its kind in Bangladesh. The platform emerged out of a movement against a production sharing contract between the Bangladesh Government and the US energy giant Conoco Phillips. It was a contract that did not protect Bangladesh’s interests. According to this deal, Bangladesh would own only 20 percent of the gas to be found and would have to buy the other 80 percent from Conoco Philips at a high price. If Bangladesh failed to buy, they could export the gas elsewhere.24 Such unequal energy deals with giant multinational corporations are common in our part of the world. It is the neo-colonial relationship that exists between third world countries and the multinational corporations. Not only do countries like Bangladesh lack the power and resources to secure deals that serve its interest to the utmost, but its political leaders and government officials often work for such deals for their personal benefit. Disregarding national interest for personal favour or bribe is also common.

26 One famous example was when the Canadian company Niko Resources bribed a BNP-Jamaat era Energy Minister A.K.M. Mosharraf Hossain with a Toyota Land Cruiser to minimize the compensation they were supposed to provide to the villagers whose water and agriculture was impacted by the explosions at the company’s drilling site.25 News and information of such contracts and dealings were largely unknown to the general populace of Bangladesh in the past. But after an organization called “The National Committee on Protection of Oil, Gas and Mineral Resources, Power and Ports” (NCBD) emerged, finally there was growing consciousness of such issues. The organization had led several successful movements in the past. The most famous of these was the Phulbari movement, in which several protesters were shot dead while protesting an open coal mine project that would have devastated the life of the people and the environment of North . Phulbari since then has become a rallying cry for any such energy and environment related issue. Although NCBD was originally a platform for several left wing organizations, it soon gathered mass support, especially among the youth. The platform has a large support base among non-partisan activists concerned with energy, environment and national interest. I was one of these non-partisan activists who supported such movements, and there were many like me. When NCBD called for a nationwide half day strike on 3rd July 2011 against the contract with Conoco Philips, we were blogging in support of it, and as the campaign gained mass support among the bloggers we decided it was time to organize ourselves to take to the streets. We called a demonstration in Shahbag Square in Dhaka to protest against the contract and to take part in the strike. Although the first day of our street protest was quite hopeful as many showed up, on the day of the strike it was disastrous for us. It was a day when the government and police were on high alert; they arrested hundreds of protesters as soon as they took to the streets and beat others mercilessly.26 I remember running and climbing walls so as not to get caught or beaten on that day. It was the day when for the first time a blogger in Bangladesh got arrested for activism. Blogger Dinmojur, a very popular blogger in energy and environment related issues, was arrested that day while protesting.

27 After the strike, we decided to form a platform for blog and social network based activists under which we could continue doing activism for the national interest and social justice in the future. This is how the platform ‘Blogger Online Activists on National Interest’ was formed. It initially had four coordinators. One of them was , who was attacked by some extremists from the banned terrorist organization in 2013. Asif survived, was later arrested and is now living in exile. Two other coordinators also had resigned earlier. The only coordinator left after 2013 was me. I continued to serve till early 2015. After that, I had to withdraw from activism due to a life-threatening situation. When we started the platform, we had no idea that we would have to face such situations. It was a very hopeful period in 2011 when we started. The platform enjoyed wide support from the blogging community. It gathered momentum in September 2011 after we took to the street supporting a movement started by the students of Jagannath University. They demanded equal rights to education like other public university students in Bangladesh, and protested the move to increase tuition and other fees. The movement was not solely for JNU students though, since there were other public universities facing a similar crisis. The event that we organized supporting them was under attack, with mass arrests of protesters from Shahbag by the police in an attempt to disperse us. Twenty-seven Jagannath University students were arrested on the spot,27 but we managed to organize a successful event with a large number of students joining us. After this event, Asif Mohiuddin was taken into custody by the Detective Branch as his blog post promoting the event was shared by thousands of JNU students and others on . However, all this only made the movement more popular and gathered support for the cause. The movement was ultimately successful, as the government agreed to meet our demands.28 However, after this our lives had changed forever. We were happy to be able to influence state policy, but the state was not happy with us. In 2011, the gap between online and offline activism in Bangladesh was narrowed. We continued organizing events, protests and awareness raising on diverse issues regarding social and political rights. We organized and mobilized via blogs and Facebook, and we had a physical space in which

28 to gather. It was Shahbag, the public square that turned into a political space for internet era young activists. Soon it was to become the most dominant political space in Bangladesh for some period, before eventually going into decline. Will it rise again? I can only hope for the best.

_ Shahbag: The political public sphere Bangla Blogosphere and social networking platforms had become what Jurgen Habermas has called Literary Public Spheres (or public spheres in the world of letters), and also something more than that powered by interactive technologies. What is a public sphere? Habermas describes the public sphere as a society engaged in critical public debate29. In his famous book ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’, Habermas gave an historical-sociological account of the emergence of public spheres in Europe. Early bourgeois public spheres provided space for rational debates and discussions. It was the result of the emergence of a new civil society in the eighteenth century. The bourgeois public sphere was the sphere of private people coming together as the public who claimed and turned the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves. 30 It was a sphere between the civil society and the state in which critical public discussion of general interest was guaranteed. Now the ruler’s power was represented before the people with a sphere in which state authority was publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse of the people.31 Literary public spheres had been in existence in Europe before the 18th century, and at the turn of the 18th century the political public sphere arose first in Great Britain.32 Early examples of such public spheres were coffee houses, salons, and table societies (Tischgesellschaften). However, over time this sphere was destroyed by the same forces that established it. With citizens becoming less concerned about politics and more concerned about consumption, with uneven distribution of wealth in the capitalist economy, the emergent media became a tool for manipulation by the economic and political powers.

29 Literary Public Sphere is a precondition for the emergence of Political Public Sphere (Or Public Sphere in the realm of Politics). The Bangla Blogosphere and social networking sites were where young Bangladeshi writers and activists met, discussed and debated on social and political issues, formed groups and mobilized others for their activism. But they had to meet somewhere outside of the online sphere to bring their activism outside its virtual limit. They needed a political public sphere to support the growth of these new literary public spheres. Shahbag provided the space. Shahbag had been one of the central areas of Dhaka’s cultural and progressive political life long before the arrival of the internet. Besides being an area adjacent to Dhaka university campus and a historic centre for many movements, several places surrounding Shahbag had also been a destination for writers, poets, artists, cultural and political activists even before the birth of Bangladesh. Temporary and limited forms of public sphere were in existence in different book shops, tea stalls, and study circles in different places around Shahbag. The Aziz Super Market in Shahbag, which was once predominantly a book market, had been the most famous destination for artists, writers and poets in the 80s and 90s. Over time, this place became a centre of pop culture thanks to the soap opera promotion of the market after the emergence of satellite TV culture. The book market became predominantly a fashion market. And the internet era young intelligentsia looked for a place elsewhere. It was the (Suhrawardy Park), at least a part of this historic park, which became the centre for intermingling between internet-era artists, writers, musicians and activists. This area is predominantly known as Chobir Hat (Image Market), but that’s not its only name. Suhrawardy Udyan is a historic place in the centre of Dhaka, which once was a park that belonged to the of Dhaka and then a race course from the British colonial to the Pakistan period. This is the place where Sheikh Mujibur Rahman gave his historic speech on 7th December 1971, which played a vital role in the independence movement of Bangladesh. It is one of the very few open public spaces left in the centre of Dhaka. For a long time most parts of this historic park were inaccessible,

30 as construction of historical monuments was going on for many years. The accessible parts of the park mostly provided space for the homeless and drug addicts. However, from the middle part of the last decade, the park went through almost revolutionary transformations. Chobir Hat (Image Market) played a vital role in such transformation. Originally Chobir Hat is the name for an open air auditorium for young artists in a small open area that stands just in front of one of the gates of Suhrawardy Park. The place is very close to Shahbag Square, the national museum, and the public library, and is just opposite the fine arts faculty of Dhaka University. Later the name ‘Chobir Hat’ was adopted by people for a large area behind the gate, inside the park itself. It is mainly the students from the arts faculty who first made this area a social centre. Other groups of young people followed, and many bloggers and online based activists also made this place their centre of offline social mingling and networking. The place emerged as a new public sphere, and it was unlike anything else that existed before in Dhaka. We have mentioned Aziz Super Market before; it could at best be called a literary public sphere. It was mostly a place for literary activities; politically conscious activists who thrived for social change did not have much influence there. For political activities another place existed in the area, a famous canteen inside Dhaka University called the ‘Madhur Canteen’. It’s a historic public sphere that has provided the students with a political public sphere for years, but it was mostly limited to students, not the general public. Chobir Hat was different. Here all kinds of young people came together. The artistic, the literary and the political intermingled here. Many temporary tea stalls (Tong Dokan in Bangla) came into existence inside the park, in and around the Chobir Hat section that provided the seating area for the ever growing number of young people. Chobir Hat also provided support and a sense of security to an emerging large public space. Suhrawardy Udyan was once not a very safe space for the city’s citizens. At night, it was a dark and murky place hosting thugs and drug addicts. But Chobir Hat gave Suhrawardy Udyan a new life. The ever growing number of temporary tea stalls and other street food vendors lit up the place at night, making it the favourite destination for the citizens of Dhaka. Other places

31 in the park also linked up to the growing safe public space, including two auditoriums called Lalon Moncho and Mukto Moncho and several newly built monuments commemorating the history of the space. The place also became a destination for the city dwellers who had nothing to do with social or cultural movements, but would go there to spend some time in an open space or attend all the cultural activities that went on in this place. It also became one of the safest and most comfortable places for unmarried couples, who do not have too many public places in Dhaka where they can spend time together without being stared at or harassed. Such was the environment of Suhrawardy Udyan, provided by the liberal atmosphere of the Chobir Hat community. It was a place in Dhaka where women could smoke a cigarette without unwanted stares. It became the most liberal space in Dhaka where social, political and cultural events went on throughout the year, and was the centre of several annual festivals. Soon the park became the location of the Ekushey book fair, which was previously confined to inside the walls of . There was a time when I would go to the Chobir Hat almost every afternoon or evening and spend hours with friends, co-activists and with people I barely knew. I was just one of the thousands who did that. Although Chobir Hat became the meeting place for young activists, it was the street in front of the National Museum, adjacent to the Shahbag Square, that turned into the ultimate public sphere. The street was previously used occasionally by some cultural activists to mount protests. From 2011, blog and social networking based activist groups started to use this place to voice their social and political opinions, which also represented a larger group of people connected through social networks. Soon it became a place where new activist platforms arranged events and protests every week. Most of the issues they promoted were largely ignored by mainstream political forces that were mostly busy in an endless and bloody power struggle. I remember being in at least one of such protests or events every week in Shahbag from 2013 to 2015. It became the preferred political space that belonged predominantly to the young people, most of whom had liberal, left or at least secular inclinations. Other than protests, it also hosted a large number of people who would sit around temporary tea shops and street food

32 stalls every evening and debate, discuss urgent social and political issues, have meetings and do networking. While Chobir Hat was the place where young people with varied specializations and interests gathered most often, Shahbag Square was the more accessible place for diverse groups and social classes of people since it stood at one of the busiest intersections in Dhaka. The place was dominated by social and political activists. Shahbag Square as a political sphere became the centre of Bangladeshi national politics in February 2013, when hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered there to protest a verdict of the war crimes trial. The public square remained a crucial political space in Bangladesh for the next couple of years, though it has suffered a decline since then. We will talk about these years of dominance of this public sphere and the reason for its decline in the next chapter. It is also a personal story, and a history of revolutionary utopia coming to an end. It is a history of death and persecution, censorship and autocracy; more precisely it is a history of power. A combination of various public spaces in and around the Shahbag region of Dhaka for a few years looked like an ideal Habermasian public sphere. During this period Shahbag also resembled a heterotopia. ‘Heterotopia’ is a concept first elaborated by Michel Foucault. In his essay ‘Of other Spaces,’ Foucault used the term heterotopia to describe spaces that resemble and physically approximate a utopia. According to Foucault, in such counter-sites, the real sites and all the other sites that can be found within a culture are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted33. But there are several objections to Foucault’s use of the concept, namely that it is ambiguous and confusing. Others describes heterotopia as liminal spaces of possibility where ‘something different’ is not only possible but fundamental for the defining of revolutionary trajectory. Farha Ghannam argues that there are no heterotopias per se but only heterotopic spaces. They “are not stable entities” but are “contingent qualities” and it is the use of a particular space that makes them heterotopic.34 Shahbag was re- appropriated and re-arranged by the unconscious and conscious use of numerous people where social classes and genders pushed the limits of their boundary, especially in Chobir Hat. It is the only public place in Dhaka where

33 homosexual people have dared to come out of their closet. After 2015, Chobir Hat and Suhrawardy Udyan have also been in decline. Now an evening curfew forbids people from entering the park after 5 pm. Large numbers of armed police guard the gate of Chobir Hat after sunset, as if they were guarding something very sacred or very dangerous.

34 CHAPTER 2 REVOLUTION: THE BANGLA SPRING!

War Crimes Tribunal and Shahbag

The year 2013 in the recent history of Bangladesh was a decisive one. When the year started, many of us were planning for a long march in February called by NCBD to the , the largest mangrove forest, to stop a coal power plant from being built in close proximity to the forest. But for most people in Bangladesh, the year started under uneasy political circumstances. It was the last year for the Awami League-lead government before the general election. BNP, JI and their allies were sensing a return to power. This is how Bangladeshi democracy had been working since the 90s. A party would come to power and rule for five years and then the people would become so tired of their incompetence and also afraid of their growing power that they would choose the other party or faction to rule for another five years. The Awami League and BNP were the two major parties, people could not find any other party to choose, and letting one of them and their allies rule for five years was the only way they could participate in democracy.

_ The ‘Shahbag Movement’ As I have mentioned before, establishing the war crimes tribunal was central to AL’s electoral agenda, which ensured them a strong support base among the youth. But there were many among those supporting a war crimes tribunal who also did not trust AL with the task. They feared that

35 AL might also use the tribunal for their political agenda. I was one of them. The international war crimes tribunal was set up in 2009. AL leaders were giving speeches claiming that they were the only party which could ensure that the trials would go on, and it was evident that they would put forward this argument before the general election, so that the supporters of the war crimes trial would re-elect them. The popularity of AL was soon in decline, and at the start of 2013 it seemed likely that such arguments might not help them get re-elected. However AL’s argument was highly problematic, since the government and the judiciary in Bangladesh are theoretically separate entities. There was genuine cause for concern among the supporters of the war crimes trial, since JI had never politically recognized the trial and would do everything to stop it if they were returned to power. For them, the AL government was playing with their emotions and demands for justice, while BNP Jamaat were soon going to make the trial go cold. The first verdict was given in January 2013, just a year before the next general election. It was against an ex-JI member, Abul Kalam Azad, who was infamously known as Bachchu Razakar. He had fled the country as soon as the tribunal begun. He was given the death penalty in absentia.35 (It should be noted that Bangladesh has not yet abolished the death penalty, and many death penalties are handed down every year.) The issue of the death penalty in Bangladesh could never become a big human rights concern, as little or no campaign to abolish it exists within Bangladesh, and the international community could never put much pressure on the government over this issue. As of 2013, more than one thousand prisoners were on death row36. The international community also remained indifferent to the verdict in the trial of Abul Kalam Azad. He was a minor Jamaat-e-Islami leader and had already fled the country. But the second verdict was a little different. It was against Abdul Qader Molla, one of the top leaders of JI who was known as the ‘Butcher of Mirpur’ in 1971.37 He was convicted for several heinous crimes committed in 1971 including the rape of a minor and genocide. He was also connected to the brutal murder of Meherun Nesa, a 21 year old female poet who supported the liberation war through her poetry.38 Young people in Bangladesh were emotional about his crime against Meherun Nesa. But everything that was going on just before

36 his conviction was an ominous sign for the people who wanted justice. As I have mentioned before, JI never recognized the war crimes tribunal politically. According to them, the tribunal was just a tool to persecute their leadership. However, it should be noted that a large part of JI leadership and activists did want this matter to be resolved. For them, this trial could free their party from war crimes accusations by trying the criminals within the party. Recently accounts of unsuccessful attempts within the party since the 80s to re-evaluate its 1971 position have surfaced in Islamist blogs in Bangladesh. Such a trend was popular among the post- Islamist factions of the party, but was sidelined by the top leadership, among whom there were many war criminals. So, politically JI was opposed to the tribunal and they started a violent movement against it. JI declared one after another general strike and resorted to violence to jeopardize the trials, and many lives were lost in their violent campaign. The party was encouraging its activists to wage jihad for Islam and embrace martyrdom. By waging jihad they actually meant violent activities to disrupt the trials of their leaders. With a discourse of martyrdom they were encouraging their activists to die for their cause. It was originally a calculated political manoeuvre as they wanted to subject the AL government to accusations of crimes against humanity by sacrificing their members. They were calling one after another strike during which their members engaged in violent activities, including attacks on the police which resulted in deaths among their members and also the police.39 The day when Qader Molla’s conviction was announced was also one such strike day. People were scared to go out, but the young people who wanted justice for war crimes were restless. There were rumours that the government and JI had reached some kind of mutual understanding. JI activists and police were seen to face off violently in the street, but on the eve of Qader Molla’s verdict JI activists were seen giving flowers to the police as a token of peace. That night many wrote on Facebook and in blogs that JI might have spent a lot of money to influence that verdict and AL also might comply since they would need safe exit from power before the election. However, AL came to power in a landslide victory, although they saw their popularity plummet as all Bangladeshi ruling parties do at the end of their

37 term. The people of Bangladesh do not have too many options, and it was expected that BNP-Jamaat might return to power in the next election, so many thought that AL would not jeopardize a safe exit from power by letting the judge deliver a death penalty to a top Jamaat leader who is not in absentia. When Qader Molla was given a life sentence and he showed a victory sign with his fingers to the television camera, the young people realized that their worst fear had come true. The crimes Qader Molla was convicted of were no less brutal than those committed by Abul Kalam Azad, who was given a death sentence, even those who knew nothing about law could understand that. Qader Molla’s trial has become an embarrassment for the Shahbag movement and Bangladesh in the West. But why the young people took to the street and shouted slogans demanding the death penalty for Qader Mollah cannot be understood without the historical and political context of the country as a background, and certainly not without the victory sign shown by Molla after he was given a life sentence. What kind of innocent man would show a victory sign after he was given a life sentence? We should ask this question, for it was this victory sign that enraged the youth who took to the street. It is impossible to understand their famous slogan ‘Hang Qader Mollah’ without understanding this background. For them, it was about a war criminal getting away. Not getting away with his life, but getting away from justice itself. They feared that this man was going to walk free in a year or two. And when he and his friends were out they would hunt down those young people who wanted to try them for war crimes. If you know the history of Bangladesh you will not find this fear irrational or such a scenario implausible. The history of the judicial system in Bangladesh is not a very clean one. A complete separation between state and judiciary is still not a reality. We have already mentioned about the Caretaker Government system, in which a former Chief Justice would serve for three months with the power of a prime minister to insure a fair General election. Even some of their political neutrality was quistioned by different parties.We have also mentioned the trial for the killing of Sheikh Muzibur Rahman and his family members. His murderers were given immunity in the national parliament40 and it took more than 20 years to even start a trial. That trial had very good

38 national support and no international objection against it, and yet it went cold when BNP-Jamaat came to power. Murderers and criminals escaping justice by using their political affiliations or with the change of government is nothing uncommon in Bangladesh. Criminals getting out of jail and then harassing the victims or the people who asked for justice is also not too rare. The movement that started opposing the sentence given to Qader Molla on 5th January 2013 is now famously called the ‘Shahbag movement’. However, considering the Shahbag movement as being merely a movement for the death penalty for war crimes is based on slogans by angry people, and is also highly misleading. Although the death penalty for war crimes and genocide is a common practice internationally, the Shahbag movement had other motivations rather than just asking for death sentences. Those who participated in the movement both in Shahbag and other parts of the country were a diverse group of people with various motives. I myself participated in the movement along with my organization for several reasons. It is not that we were a group who supported the death penalty. Even the official platform of the Shahbag movement, the ‘Gonojagorn Moncho’ (Peoples Awakening Movement), does not have an official demand for the death penalty. One of the main demands of the movement that gathered strong support from the people was to make changes in the war crimes tribunal law to give the plaintiff a chance to appeal. The prosecuted could appeal according to the war crimes tribunal law, but the plaintiff could not. Many of us also participated in this movement to protest against the politicization of the trial by AL, and we wanted to put the government under pressure. Some of us also saw in the mass gatherings a revolutionary potential for social and political change. Many ordinary people expected that from Shahbag too. They wanted change and Shahbag gave a glimpse of something new for a few days. However, the most vocal in the leadership of Shahbag were careful about crossing boundaries in terms of their motivations and ambitions. Those who showed revolutionary tendency were soon sidelined by the filtering process established by government agents, and were sidelined. The most common thing about the activists of this movement was that they all wanted a more secular Bangladesh, as it was envisaged during the 1971 liberation war and

39 stipulated in the first constitution of independent Bangladesh. Secular voices and the religious minorities were already feeling the heat in early 2013. Several attacks on religious minorities occurred during 2012, something JI and other Islamist activists were known to do when they were in trouble or needed to show off their sectarian strength. However, it is not only the Islamists who commit such crimes in Bangladesh; I will discuss this in a later part of this book. Blogger Asif Mohiuddin, one of the coordinators of our organization was brutally attacked by radical Islamists. He was stabbed 9 times, but luckily survived the assault. The Buddhist community was attacked in Ramu, , after a rumour of defamation of the prophet was spread, and 12 temples and 50 houses belonging to the Buddhist community were attacked, burned and looted in September 2012.41 Such a massive attack on a religious minority group had not been seen for many years in Bangladesh. It was a well planned attack that put the secular identity of the country at risk. Such incidents also effected the Shahbag movement, which openly expressed its position against religious politics and in favour of a secular Bangladesh, and not just on paper. It was also an emotional thing for many of our generation, who hoped to see a Bangladesh built on the spirit of the liberation war, where people irrespective of their faith, opinions and religion could live in peace. There was clear support among the youth for a state that was dreamed of before, but never achieved in reality. Although the Shahbag Movement was full of nationalistic fervour, the liberal environment of Shahbag forced nationalistic discourses in the movement to become more accommodating and pluralistic in nature. Several slogans of 1971 were brought back in Shahbag and later changed to include the ethnic diversity of the country in the slogan. The Shahbag movement also saw a large degree of female participation and leadership, breaking down many barriers to female participation in politics. I personally tried to understand this underlying motivation for a secular and pluralist state in the Shahbag movement, which I explored in my book ‘State project of Shahbag’.

Furthermore, Shahbag cannot be understood only in the local context of Bangladesh. The movement had some

40 strong similarity with several other movements born out of the internet and led by the youth in many parts of the world in recent years. Some of these movements arose in the Middle East and are now famously known as the Arab Spring. These movements mark the emergence of a new young middle class in those countries. Slavoj Zizek has described the participants in such movements as Salaried Bourgeoisie. Although participation and support for the movement came from all social strata, it is this young middle class that led those movements. Their ability to use the internet for social and political mobilization was novel and effective. In the case of Bangladesh, it is a young group of people who mostly grew up in the 90s, a relatively more democratic period of the country. The political leadership that still leads the country is mostly from the 60s, a period when Bangladesh was not even born. On the other hand there is an emerging generation in the country that grew up in an independent Bangladesh. This new generation is more secular, liberal and democracy-friendly. Many of them are romantic revolutionaries who hoped for rapid and radical change in their society and politics. However, some of them were also more pragmatic with their political ambition. They also had serious concerns about the civil and political rights of the people and would often fight for it through social and political activism.

The Shabag movement was in many ways an emotional experience for me, mostly because of the large number of participants I knew personally. Many of them were veterans of previous movements for social and political rights on different issues. Some of those movements were successful. These are the people who had fought for the right to education, equality for women, energy and environment and so many other issues. Bloggers, artists, musicians, cultural activists that I had known or been friends with

41 were there. I wrote on Facebook during the early days of the movement that I have never seen so many familiar faces together in my whole life, nor had I seen so many unfamiliar faces as I have seen in Shahbag. It was also not difficult to know or feel connected with the unfamiliar faces. It was a moment when urban youth of my generation came together and declared their coming of age. However, like other internet mobilized movements led by the youth in recent years, this movement and its participants also had some huge limitations. The spontaneous nature of such movements also lacked an organized formation of political structure and central leadership. The young people who led such movements did not have the raw political strength that they needed to wield to overthrow the socio-political status quo that they challenged. The regime that they opposed was well entrenched in the society and its leadership was ready to do anything to protect the status quo, as was their established opposition. This is why the revolutionaries of Egypt or the Shahbagi activists of Bangladesh are now largely scattered after their glorious mass movements, with many of them hunted, jailed, killed or fleeing for their life.

_ Movement under Government’s Control Shahbag looked like a successful movement when it started, with hundreds of thousands participating in it and with virtually no visible opposition other than the JI. Even BNP, the closest ally of JI was initially cautious in opposing the movement. The first official statement about the movement issued by BNP was supportive of the movement’s aims. It’s not easy to go against popular mass movements, and BNP did not want take the difficult path as soon as the Shahbag movement appeared. But the party had nothing to gain from this movement. The mass gathering of Shahbag had the potential to overthrow the regime, or at least to threaten it, which could be beneficial for BNP, the then opposition party. However, BNP was so deeply mired in Islamist politics in the recent past, its policy and fate so much entangled with that of the JI, that it was in no position to use the movement for its own benefit. The party lacked both theoretical and practical resources to do that.

42 AL on the other hand was in a much better position and also capable enough to exploit the situation for their benefit. They are the political party that led the country during the liberation war. They tend to represent themselves as the only pro-liberation force (which is historically untrue) and the only secular option for the people. Mass gatherings in Shahbag unnerved the government. Although the Shahbag movement initially was ripe with anti- government slogans and attitude, AL was soon successful in infiltrating the movement, with its student and cultural wings supporting and taking part in it. These Pro-government forces played a vital role in keeping the movement under control and in a comfort zone for the government. The so called safety cordon that surrounded the movement became its prison. Several leaders of the movement were sanitised by the government and the pro-government forces that took part in the movement did everything to keep the movement under control and refine its ideological discourse in a comfortable alliance with the political discourse of the ruling party. The popular movement failed to fulfil the expectations of the people. A large part of the movement also tried to oppose the pro-government forces, especially the activist groups which operated from Chobir Hat. I belonged to more than one of such groups. We faced a massive dilemma during this period. We supported the Shahbag Movement because we thought judicial process was influenced by political compromise. We were opposed to that. But we did not want to oppose the tribunal itself, as JI was doing. We knew our judicial system was not perfect; we wanted change, but not destruction. We had to support the movement, but at the same time oppose the empowerment of the government. However, any groups or movements that originated in Shahbag during February 2013 criticising the Government or showing revolutionary tendencies were sidelined, censured or filtered by a complex process of intimidation and media manipulation. Media blackout on certain bloggers, writers and activists was enforced to maintain a government-friendly narrative of the movement. A spontaneous mass movement of people was now being hijacked by the government. The Egyptian revolution in Tahrir Square survived for 18 days. My personal opinion is that the original Shahbag

43 movement only survived for less than a week. After that it was effectively under government control and only operated within the comfort zone of the government. Revolutionaries in Tahrir Square fought for immediate change and overthrow of the autocratic regime. On the other hand, the Shahbag movement resulted in an immediate empowerment of the ruling regime. However, we should keep in mind that the Egyptian revolution resulted in Islamist autocracy in power, and then a military dicatorship. Bangladesh is now ruled by a one party dictatorship. Sometimes I ponder, what would have happened if the Shahbag movement had strived to oust the regime? The only possible scenario that comes to my mind is other forms of autocracy. Maybe we would have suffered a similar fate to Egypt. Are we suffering a very dissimilar fate now? Autocrats have different names, faces and colours, and the present day seems to be a high time for them throughout the world.

_ Atheism, controversy and decline The good fortune of the Shahbag movement ran out in the middle of February 2013. , a blogger member of the Shahbag movement was killed on 15th February. I still remember that night very clearly. I was standing in front of one of the gates of Udyan. A bandage-clad Asif Mohiuddin, having survived a brutal attack a month earlier, was also there. Asif had just been released from hospital a few days earlier and still could not move his head properly. I got a message from a friend that Rajib Haider had been hacked to death in front of his home. My friend asked me if I knew him. I knew him. I remember debating him a few months earlier and the news was difficult to believe. He used to write in several Bangla blogs in his pen name Thaba Baba and was both famous and infamous in the blogging community for his satirical writing on Prophet Muhammad and God. There were not many things we would agree on, but I knew him well. He was almost my age, he belonged to our generation. Razib’s murderers were later arrested. According to police, they and the attackers of Asif Mohiuddin belonged to a new extremist group called ‘Ansarullah Bangla Team’ which was linked with Al-Qaeda.42 Rajib’s death was mourned in

44 Shahbag. His murder also affected the trajectory of the Shahbag movement. It happened the same night that GM announced they were going to cancel a 24/7 protest and reschedule it. Razib’s murder caused them to change the plan again and they decided to carry on the demonstration as originally planned. Although Razib was an atheist, a Janaza (Islamic Funeral Prayer) for him was performed in Shahbag with thousands attending. Shahbag’s fortune had changed dramatically after the death of Rajib Haider. Till then many media portrayed the bloggers as heroes. Now Rajib was portrayed as a martyr. The prime minister herself went to his house and claimed in front of the TV cameras that Rajib was a martyr. I am not sure if Rajib would have wanted the age-old religious concept of martyrdom to be used to denote his murder. Although the country of Bangladesh is historically rich in secular martyrs, many of our generation are more inclined towards justice rather than martyrdom mythology or salvation theology. But the heroic portrait of Rajib was soon pulled down from the wall, and he became the devil incarnate. First a blog site of dubious ownership emerged containing the most vulgar satirical writings of Rajib. He had written some satiric blogs on the prophet of Islam and God. Soon several mainstream newspapers started publishing those satiric blogs. Most of them were pro-JI newspapers, and the motivation was clear: they were trying to shock the people of Bangladesh, who had little or no knowledge about what the internet or a blog was. Rajib Haider was not a very famous blogger and not too many people were familiar with his writings. He wrote mostly on some of the satirical atheistic blogs and websites which did not even have a large online audience. Now these were read by people from the remotest corner of Bangladesh. Suddenly it was not his death but his writings that became the talk of the country, and a huge propaganda campaign against Shahbag began to take shape. The religious funeral prayer for Razib was also questioned by the Islamists. An Islamist blogger named Farabi Shafiur Rahman even issued a fatwa on Facebook that it was permissible to kill the Imam who led the prayer for Rajib. Farabi had a feud with many atheist bloggers. His vicious remark enraged many and Farabi was also later arrested by the police.

45 There was a campaign to turn public opinion against Shahbag and it was led by one of the pro-JI newspapers called ‘’. The editor of the newspaper, Mahmudur Rahman, and other staff launched a crusade against Shahbag. They created a demonic picture of something called the ‘Atheist Blogger’, whose sole objective was to vilify the prophet of Islam and destroy the religion of Islam. The newspaper lacked any kind of social responsibility or honesty regarding the Shahbag movement. They published much news about the Shahbag movement that contained little or no truth. They also published a series featuring some of the bloggers and activists in Shahbag who were known to be atheist. They were quoting some of their comments out of their personal blog or Facebook profile which they found anti-Islamic or offensive to the prophet of Islam. Many of these comments were taken out of context. The mission of ‘Amar Desh’ and some other newspapers was clear: they wanted to tell the ordinary people of Bangladesh, who have only recently learned the word blogger because of the Shahbag movement, that these bloggers are originally atheists who always work against Islam and are very offensive toward God and the Prophet. Since most people in Bangladesh have little or no idea about what a blog is, this ploy was successful. Soon blogger, Shahbagi and atheist became synonymous to many people, and a movement against the ‘atheist bloggers’ started to form. Some of us had realized the danger as soon as Amard Desh started publishing the series on Atheist Bloggers. Several hit lists of atheist bloggers and activists supporting the Shahbag movement started to appear. On 23rd February 2013 protests emerged from several mosques nation-wide asking for the death penalty for bloggers who committed blasphemies. It was Friday, the day of the weekly religious prayer of Jumaa, and it is the day in Bangladesh when most Muslims attend the mosque. Several Islamist groups called for protests just after the prayer and incited violence. Parts of Dhaka became a battlefield as protesters attacked police with bricks, sticks and homemade bombs and the police responded with gunfire. Four people lost their lives in different places.43 Such incidents only fuelled hatred against ‘atheist bloggers’ and the Islamists used them to win support.

46 The month of February 2013 ended with nationwide political violence that continued till early March. Violence broke out after JI leader Delwar Hossain Sayidee was sentenced to death by the War Crimes Tribunal. JI and Shibir called a series of strikes during this period. Mosques were used to incite violence and strange rumours such as Sayidee’s face seen in the moon spread like wildfire. Public transport vehicles were burned and vandalized. Attacks by JI activists on religious minorities, their temples and properties escalated. They damaged more than 50 temples and burned 1,500 houses in just a few days.44-45 JI and Shibir activists fought pitched battles against the police in different parts of the country. Such violence resulted in about 60 fatalities, most of them JI activists, but many were also police and civilians. Several police had suffered a brutal death at the hands of JI activists. It is ironic that the death sentence for Sayidee was later changed on appeal. So many lives had been lost in the meantime. While BNP was maintaining some distance from this violent movement officially, they were providing moral support and were also waging a parallel movement asking for the return of the caretaker system for the upcoming general election, the system having been previously abolished by AL after they came to power. Khaleda Zia, the Chairman of BNP, also joined the ranks of those who took part in the anti-atheist discourse that developed over this period.46

47 Rise of Hefazat-e-Islam (Protector of Islam)

_ Protector of Islam As the anti-atheist discourse gathered momentum, a relatively new Islamist group called Hefazat-e-Islam (Protector of Islam) entered the arena with a fully fledged movement bearing a 13 point demand. The first and foremost of these demands was the death penalty for blasphemous bloggers. The centre of this anti-atheist movement was the Hat Hazari Madrasa, where Allama Ahmad Shafi, the Amir of Hefazat-e-Islam, held the position of principal. HI was not a well known platform before the Shahbag Movement. The Qaumi Madrasa-based organization was formed in 2010 to oppose secular education policy and new policy towards women adopted by the Bangladeshi government to eradicate gender inequality. According to them, the new Bangladeshi law on women’s development does not reflect the spirit of Islam and does not go well with the predominantly Muslim population of the country. This movement could not attract much attention. Although predominantly Muslim, Bangladeshi people did not find it problematic to have two women prime ministers since the 90s. Nor was it an obstacle for the large number of women working mostly in the textile industry; on the contrary their contribution is well appreciated in the country, society and their families. Not by Allama Shafi though. In a sermon he compared women with tamarind that will water your mouth at sight (i.e. not safe for work), and working women with prostitutes. However, such misogynistic remarks were confined to the remote areas of Chittagong before 2013 and their movement could not gather any momentum. But things were different for them in 2013. The anti-atheist movement provided HI with a dramatic boost. Their movement put a sword to Shahbag’s throat and there were political parties like BNP and Jamaat to support their growth and ready to provide them with whatever was necessary: money and logistics. Supported by both mainstream and social media propaganda and with backing from some of the largest and most powerful political parties of the country, their anti-atheist movement gathered momentum. However, the real factor behind their growing numbers was the involvement of Qawmi

48 Madrasa students. Most leaders of Hefazat-e-Islam were Qawmi Madrasa teachers. From this position it was easier for them to mobilize the Madrasa students. The Qawmi Madrasa students themselves also found a platform in Hefazat-e-Islam to unite themselves. It should be noted that a large number of Qawmi Madrasa students come from underprivileged backgrounds. They also do not have too many options for getting a good job or a better life from the education they receive in the current status quo of Bangladesh. It is one of the main motivations for their desire to change the social and political status quo of the country in their favour. Apart from being underprivileged and vulnerable to radicalism, they lack social and political platforms to represent and unite themselves. In comparison to the large number of Qawmi Madrasa students in Bangladesh, the number of radicalized militants emerging from them is not very large, especially if we compare Bangladesh with Pakistan or Afghanistan. It is also a sign that the Bangladeshi Qawmi Madrasa students are more supportive of mass democratic movements than radicalism. But they lacked any platform where they could unite in large numbers, and in HI they thought they had found just what they were looking for. To understand the rise of HI, we should keep in mind this socio-political background of Madrasa students. The movement led by HI demanded the death penalty for atheist bloggers, but to understand it as a movement for the ‘death penalty’ would be just as misleading as seeing the Shahbag movement as a one campaigning for the death penalty. That a large number of students coming from secular educational backgrounds support the Shahbag movement, while HI’s main support base is drawn from among the Madrasa students, is a direct result of the divided education system of the country. However, we should also keep in mind the diversity of the support base for both movements. HI also had support among students and people with a secular educational background. Rajib Haider’s murderers and Asif Mohiudding’s attackers came from the secular educational system. Both of their attackers were arrested and found to be members of a new terrorist outfit called ‘Ansarullah Bangla Team’, mostly comprised of private university students. On the other hand, madrasa students (even Qawmi) supporting the Shahbag movement in its

49 initial period was not rare. I even know of people who participated in both movements, and then rejected both when they could not get along with either of them. One such example is an organization from Sylhet led by Qawmi Madrasa students. Sylhet is one of the most religious areas of Bangladesh, home to many Qawmi Madrasas. Qawmi Madrasas are infamous in secular circles in Bangladesh for their lack of commitment to the cultural and national identity of the country. Many of these madrasas are accused of not raising the national flag and not properly celebrating the national days, but the main problem is a lack of education in the language, culture and history of the country in their syllabus, and there no culture of promoting these in the madrasa campuses. The organization in Sylhet I am talking about was doing something fascinating if we keep this in mind: it was an organization promoting Bangla literature among the madrasa students. Now, activists from this organization participated in the initial period of the Shahbag movement, but were soon disenchanted. And when HI emerged, they went to participate in that movement but also soon became disenchanted by the lack of honesty of the leadership and by their individual ambitions. I do not have any excuse or support for their involvement in a movement that asks for the heads of bloggers. I am only giving this example to provide some idea of the younger generation of Bangladesh who supported either Shahbag or Hefazat. They were in search of identity and platform. Some find that in Shahbag, others in Hefazat, and others do not find it anywhere. Many of those who found themselves initially in those movements were later disenchanted. Many lives were lost by then and the country was left dangerously polarized. Allama Shafi, the supreme leader of HI, declared anybody who opposed his movement to be atheist. He called Bangladesh the country of God, and no unbeliever should be allowed to live in the country of God. Declaring something in the name of God is one of the oldest and most powerful expressions of power. And Allama Shafi turned out to be the perfect candidate to do that. He is in his mid 80s, the principal of one of the oldest Deobandi Qawmi Madrasas in the Indian subcontinent and also the chairman of the Qawmi Madrasa education board of Bangladesh. In a

50 country where no single Islamist leader enjoys widespread popularity, he turned out to be the perfect anchor for younger leaders of the movement. Hefazat-e-Islam declared their movement to be a non-political one, but BNP-Jamaat saw a great potential for political gain in it, even the possibility of overthrowing the AL government. What HI did in 2013 was nothing less than participate in power politics, but when they claim their movement to be non-political we need to understand what they actually mean by politics. Bangladeshi Qawmi Madrasa academia is traditionally Sunni, and for them politics is synonymous with governance. For them, as long as they don’t have any ambition to rule the country, they are not participating in a political movement, even if it empowers one of the main political factions of the country. Although HI grew up as an anti-atheist and anti-Shahbag movement, GM (Gono Jagoron Moncho), the official platform for the Shahbag movement initially chose not to confront it. However, they felt the heat when they were unable to organize a mass meeting announced for Chittagong. It was part of the nationwide tour planned by GM to promote their movement and create awareness of the issue. The tour came to an abrupt end in Chittagong, in the face of fierce opposition from HI. HI declared that they would stop GM in any way possible if they tried to go on with their planned meeting and the police intervened by sending the GM delegations back to Dhaka.47 By this time, GM had realized that they could not just avoid HI anymore. At this point, Imran H Sarkar, the spokesman for GM, tried for a dialogue with HI, but was refused by Allama Shafi. HI would not sit down with the atheists for any dialogue, according to Shafi. HI realized they had the upper hand in Chittagong, and they were eager to take their movement on to the next level and they were not ready for peace. It was in Chittagong that the tables were turned. From then on HI only grew and Shahbag Movement was in decline. Confident of success, HI declared a long march to Dhaka, the cosmopolitan capital city which was the main support base for the Shahbag movement. It was scheduled for 6th April 2013. They also called for their supporters from all over the country to come to Dhaka and join them. With the help of the nationwide Qawmi Madrasa network and with the support of BNP-Jamaat and their allies, they were able to mobilize

51 a huge gathering of people on 6th April, when the long march reached Dhaka. Seeing waves of HI supporters wearing religious attire coming towards Dhaka, the pro-Shahbag and secular forces in Dhaka realized that they were going to be overrun, but they realized the danger too late. They started to show some reaction and vowed not to surrender their beloved city to a militant Islamist outfit led by someone who they considered to be nothing more than a medieval cleric. But it was too late and when waves of HI activists entered Dhaka, the people who vowed to stand in their path had to flee. Several installations and meeting sites set up by pro-Shahbag groups came under attack and were destroyed, several civilians and police were injured.48 HI activists gathered in ‘Motijheel shapla chattar’ at the centre of Dhaka, which was their main meeting place, but large groups of their activists also occupied other parts of the city. The city was now effectively under HI’s control. Supporters and activists of the Shahbag movement had to remain in their homes or gather in Shahbag, which they still believed could be defended if the mass gathering of Motijheel decided to attack them. Isolated groups from Motijheel did try to attack Shahbag, but were confronted and fought back. I was in Shahbag that day. The movement was already in decline and since the whole of Dhaka city was under HI occupation, not many supporters of the Shahbag movement showed up for fear of a direct assault by HI activists on Shahbag Square. Shahbag is not far from Motijheel, so it was a nervous moment for the people who were in Shahbag, as they feared they could come under attack anytime and the large number of HI supporters so close to Shahbag was a sign of impending doom. Largely outnumbered, Shahbagi activists feared the worst. Over-enthusiastic mobs of HI activists did make several attempts to launch attacks on Shahbag, and at one point activists from Shahbag were even forced to get into a skirmish with them to defend themselves. It was a moment of panic for many of us as we saw large numbers of HI activists advancing towards us. For a few moments we thought it could be the end of many of us, and some tried to defend themselves with whatever they could grab. Luckily large numbers of Dhaka University students came out from their dorms to defend Shahbag, which saved the day. 52 _ The Siege of Dhaka HI ended their rally in the afternoon as promised and left Dhaka that evening. However, it turned out to be just the warm up for what they were planning to do. HI’s meeting in Dhaka on 6th April was a successful showdown and a huge confidence boost for them. Confident of success and backed by major political forces they declared they would occupy Dhaka on 5th May unless their 13 point demands were met. These demands included the death penalty for blasphemy, change to the women’s development policy, religious restrictions on the Ahmedia Muslim community, etc. JI also continued their violent activity during this period as did BNP with their demand for an election under a caretaker government. When HI occupied Dhaka on 5th May, Shahbag as a popular movement was already over. What was left of it by then was just a few temporary installations established by several groups who had participated in the movement. Supporters had left the square and only a handful of them were still continuing to sit there or shout occasional slogans, and the place was almost empty by 6th May. It was understandable. Many of the Shahbag activists feared to go out of their homes. Hundreds of thousands of HI activists took to the streets of Dhaka. They occupied not only Matijheel but also all the entry points to Dhaka. I was unable to leave our house for fear of being attacked. I was already among those branded as atheist blogger and could easily face mob violence and even execution if recognized. The city had come to a standstill since the morning and soon it was clear that HI was not planning to leave as they did a month ago. As I have already mentioned, Shabag as a popular movement was already dead and no longer a threat to the Islamists. Several bloggers were also arrested by this time on charges of offending religious sentiment. Several government officials even said that some of HI’s 13 point demands would be met. But these were not enough for HI anymore; they had something else in mind. More precisely, the political forces that were backing them had much grander ambitions. JI activists in the midst of the HI occupation did everything to turn the protest into a violent one and the city was on fire by noon. Cars and buses were burned, bullets were shot by police, mobs burned street book stalls, threw Molotov cocktails and burned

53 a large number of vehicles in Motijheel and regions, and for some peculiar reason the Communist Party office was bombed. Clashes between the police and the protesters resulted in many deaths on 5th and 6th May of 2013. The day of 5 May 2013 remains controversial in the recent history of Bangladesh. What HI, JI and BNP leadership were expecting on that day is difficult to understand and the incidents that occurred in Motijheel in the early hours of 5th May are still a hotly debated issue. Khaleda Zia had urged BNP activists and people to come out and join in protest with HI. It was evident that BNP and JI (especially) were hoping to overthrow the government through an Islamist uprising led by HI. They probably thought that even if the government could not be overthrown by such an uprising, it would create enough chaos and anarchy to force the military to intervene. They were hoping for a coup d’état that never occurred. Even the BNP activists ignored the call to join the protest, let alone the general populace. It turned out to be a clash between violent protesters and the police. The combined forces of police, RAB and BGB forced the HI activists out of Motijheel during the early hours of 6th april and then from Dhaka. The number of fatalities is highly debatable, but according to most sources it is somewhere between 30 and 50.49 50 The violent movement of HI at the end of the day only legitimized AL’s authoritarian use of state power. At the same time hatred against the ‘atheist bloggers’ only increased. HI initially claimed that thousands of their activists had been killed by police during 5th and 6th May. They were blaming atheists for these. There are still many uninformed people in Bangladesh who believe thousands of religious scholars died protesting against the bloggers. The atheism controversy initially hurt AL’s government, but they soon recovered by persecuting bloggers who were critical of religion or their regime. They have also managed to create a good relationship with HI over the last couple of years by providing them with material benefits.51 The AL dictatorship in Bangladesh now gets vital support from HI and other Islamist groups. Allama Ahmad Shafi has declared several times over the last couple of years that they support the current government and

54 have no quarrel with them. They consider Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to be a pious Muslim and have nothing to say against her. They only have a problem with the atheists, who according to Shafi have no right to live in Bangladesh, which is the country of God. Shafi recently said they have no conflict with Sheikh Hasina but they will fight against the atheists till the day of resurrection. 52 Ironic, when you know that 30-50 people died in Motijheel joining their protest and at the hands of Hasina’s regime. HI’s movement succeeded in empowering the government and popularizing their own brand, and later in gaining material benefits. The movement also seriously wounded the image of a blogger in Bangladesh. Media propaganda led by newspapers such as Amardesh and anti-atheist movements of HI and JI have severely damaged the lives and security of many bloggers who maintained an atheist identity or had written critical blogs on religion. A blame game against the atheists had begun and many participated in it. The atheists were now demonized and dehumanized. Allama Shafi once even declared that it has become a duty (wajib) to kill the atheists.53 We have mentioned BNP and Khaleda Zia’s involvement in such ‘atheist bashing’ activities. Many AL leaders and government officials also took part in it. The then Law Minister Kamrul Islam even claimed that Rajib’s writings were the work of the devil.54 As soon as HI took to the street demanding the death penalty for blasphemy, another organization also emerged as a vital player. It was the ‘Awami Ulema League’, an organization of Islamist scholars aligned to the AL government. They are popularly known as the ‘Islamist wing’ of the ruling party. They were also demanding persecution of bloggers. The government created a committee to identify the bloggers who were offensive to the prophet of Islam and a delegation led by Ulema League leader Allama Muhammad Mahbub Alam submitted to the committee a list 84 bloggers.55 The list was immediately published in several mainstream newspapers and went viral in the social media. This was how the infamous list of 84 bloggers was born. The list later became a hit list for the terrorists. Four bloggers from the list have been killed so far, one survived a murder attempt. Some others were Jailed, others had to go in hiding or flee the country. Every time a blogger is killed, the list gets widely circulated in the media again, putting the lives of those still alive at greater risk. 55 Censorship and empowerment of the regime

Among all this turmoil, death and suffering, a slow suffocation of freedom of speech had already begun. No one addressed the problem or fought against it unequivocally and irrespectively of their ideological or political position when the ominous cloud of censorship started to gather over the public media. When the ‘atheist blogger’ controversy was taken to a dangerous height by newspapers like ‘Amar Deash’ and platforms like HI, the government took drastic steps that only empowered them and weakened everyone else.

_ Mass Bans and our Paradoxes A mass ban on blogs was imposed in March 2013, when the government blocked about a dozen websites and blogs.56 They also sent strict orders to the community blog administrators to ban bloggers who hurt religious feelings. As a result, many atheist bloggers such as Asif Mohiuddin, who the HI demanded be hanged for blashphemy, were banned on their respective blogging platforms. It was not a good time to stand up against the government when blogs and bloggers had a very negative PR throughout the country, and the blog administrators remained silent. Little did they know that they would have to stand up against the government in a couple of weeks under harsher persecution. Some of us protested against it and criticized the blog administrators, but it was in vain. It was the start of the strict ‘self censorship’ culture in Bangla community blog. Then on the night of 2nd April, the Detective Branch arrested bloggers Russell Parvez, Subrata Shuvo and Mashiur Rahman Biplob, under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for ‘hurting religious sentiments’ with their ‘derogatory’ postings on blogs and social networking sites.57 They were paraded in front of the media as criminals for their photos to be taken for the news. The charge sheet against them was not even written at that time. Such harassment has ruined the lives of these bloggers forever. On the day of 3rd April, Asif Mohiuddin was also arrested. According to a police

56 statement, everybody enjoys the freedom of speech, but ‘hurting anyone’s faith’ is not freedom of speech. All the bloggers were charged under the ICT (Information and Communication Technology) act of 2006 that criminalizes any inflammatory write-ups on sensitive religious issues, and if found guilty the bloggers could face ten years of imprisonment.58 The Bangla blogging community immediately came together to protest, as 13 Bangla community blogs came together and went for a blog blackout in protest for days.59 Some of us started protesting both online and offline from the day of their arrest and continued till they were released. Many bloggers, activists and human rights defenders worked together to provide the bloggers with legal support, campaigned for their release and pressured the government. Yet it was a difficult situation for all of us. It was a time when HI was on the rise. My own life was also not out of danger, and I realized if we were not vigilant, then more would be arrested. Many others feared the same, and we protested, campaigned and lobbied for the arrested bloggers regardless of the threat to our own lives. It was a time when we had not yet decided to back down. After the bloggers, the government decided to take care of Amar Desh. The newspaper played a vital role in the demonization of bloggers and was behind the subsequent rise of anti-atheist politics. The Amar Desh press was sealed and its editor Mahmudur Rahman was arrested on 11th April 2013.60 The forced closing down of Amar Desh is a controversial issue, not many secularists in Bangladesh seemed to care about the newspaper’s banning, and not too many of them were critical against it. Only a few intellectuals like Farhad Mazhar, who had friendship, political or ideological ties with Mahmudur Rahman raised concerns about freedom of speech over the banning of Amar Desh and the arrest of its editor. The bloggers and activists who were vocal for ‘freedom of speech’ in the case of the bloggers’ arrest were now silent. What Amar Desh did was unethical. It was participating in the power politics of Bangladesh without any regard for people’s lives. It helped the Islamist radicals to pick their target, and published false news about the Shahbag movement and its activists. It even Photoshopped images to create false news. It spearheaded a powerful propaganda campaign against Shahbag to create a political environment that might help BNP-

57 Jamaat to get back to power, and did that without any journalistic integrity and without showing any regard for innocent lives. What Amar Desh did and what happened to it raises some serious questions on the value and limitations of freedom of speech. It is difficult to blame Amar Desh for publishing some blogs in their newspaper that incited violence without blaming the bloggers themselves for posting them in their personal blogs. We did argue that bloggers were blogging in online spaces with a limited audience; on the other hand Amar Desh published them for a very large audience. But can we also talk about the journalistic responsibility of Amar Desh without talking about a modicum of blogging responsibility? All over the world, we are asking similar questions these days. Are there any limitations to freedom of speech? How do we decide such limitations? What Amar Desh and its editor did was morally wrong. Yet the ban on a media is a ban, and if it can be done easily and with moral support, then it creates more opportunity for the regime in power to ban more media. Why were most secularist writers, bloggers or intellectuals silent when Amar Desh was banned? They also kept silent when some Islamist blogs were banned that were publishing blog posts written by Rajib and inciting hatred. It is understandable why some of them were silent. I can speak for a few because I was one of them. When bloggers were banned and arrested I was one of those who reacted right away. I am a blogger, and a couple of those arrested were my friends. On the other hand, Amar Desh was a newspaper that had put the life of my friends in danger for political gain. I was susceptible to personal and communal judgment. So were the people who protested the ban on Amar Desh, as they were silent when the blogs were banned and bloggers were arrested. To them it was Mahmudur Rahman’s freedom of speech that mattered. Although I did not speak out against the ban on Amar Desh and some Islamist blogs, I did recognize the paradox we were living in when it comes to freedom of speech. Inciting violence and endangering people’s lives by demonizing or dehumanizing them are immoral acts, but banning a whole blog or newspaper is not the solution. Unequivocal opposition was necessary, regardless of whose speech was being repressed. But we were living in a different kind of situation. It

58 was a highly polarized situation and speaking not according to your political line or strictly on behalf of your friends and allies was a dangerous thing, and very few took the risk.

_ The Case of Farabi As I was busy protesting the arrest of bloggers and campaigning for their freedom I was forced to face another dilemma. Many asked me on Facebook (especially those who had Islamist or pro-Islamist sympathy) why I didn’t call for the freedom of a certain Islamist blogger named Farabi Shafiur Rahman. They asked me was Farabi not a blogger? I have mentioned Farabi before. Farabi was still in jail for declaring an online fatwa in which he claimed that it was permissible to kill the Imam who led the funeral prayer for Rajib Haider. It was indeed a crime, but not something that should put you in jail indefinitely. He certainly deserved bail. This is when I decided to get rid of all the dilemmas and paradoxes surrounding us. One day, after calling for the freedom of all the arrested bloggers, I also mentioned Farabi’s name and asked what was the legal justification for keeping him in jail without trial or bail. This was something for which I was scolded by my friends and also rudely criticized by many atheists and secularists. A few months after he came out of jail, Farabi put a fatwa on my head. When he wrote on Facebook that it was permissible to kill me, he already had more than thirteen thousand followers, among whom there were many radical Islamists. Among all the things that had put my life at risk during 2013, this fatwa was one of them. Farabi is in jail now for threatening on Facebook. In 2014, he declared on Facebook that Avijit would be killed when he is in Bangladesh. Avijit was killed the next year when he was in Bangladesh. The police could not arrest any of the murderers or planners. On the other hand, shocked and angry friends and followers of Avijit were demanding Farabi’s arrest since he openly threatened his life on Facebook and had put a fatwa on his head. So the cops arrested him, and he is still in jail.61 Since no direct link between him and Avijit’s murder had been established so far, Farabi will come out of jail one day. This long jail period will probably take him to a very different level. 59 Farabi’s evolution as a lone wolf online Islamist had been a very interesting one and might provide valuable insight for many. He first appeared in the Bangla blogosphere as a religious blogger who was eager to get into debate with atheist bloggers. Most well known atheist bloggers saw him as an immature writer with little depth in what he was writing about. But he was not easily ignorable. He would share his blog links all over the place and would send them to people through private messages. He also had an uncontrollable tendency to hit on all the atheist girls he could find on Facebook. Some found it funny, others irritating. But he became a laughing stock and an object of troll for younger atheists. Once he was in Dhaka, some young atheists (mostly girls) even invited him to meet with them and they hung out together. Photos of their fun time together was posted by both those young atheists and Farabi himself. Farabi even showed an overwhelming feeling of joy in his Facebook status about meeting all those young, smart and progressive people. His predominantly Islamist followers did not like it and called him names. I am recalling these events to show how Farabi started his blogging career as a harmless fellow and more of a joke. He gradually became famous through being trolled by young atheists. Since atheists made fun of him, many young people who came from a more conservative or Islamist background started to follow and support him. And soon he had some dangerous friends. Having thousands of Facebook followers made him valuable for Islamists who might have influenced him to become more radical. Farabi also comes from a poor and underprivileged background. He was quite famous for his relentless requests for 21 Taka balance on his mobile to all the people who were connected to him via Facebook. He would also ask for money from people to buy books or other stuff. But when he returned from jail he was a new person. Now he was offering people money to share his Facebook posts. Jail turned out to be a great place for networking and increasing opportunity for him. Now he was no more a harmless joke. I wonder what he will become when he gets out of jail. I will not be surprised to see him grown into a Bangladeshi version of Anwar al-Awlaki.

60 _ Act 57: Severe Censorship Freedom of expression in Bangladesh was in serious crisis in 2013 and has still not recovered. As both the secularists and the Islamists remained silent or provided moral support when their opponent’s freedom was under attack, it gave the government more room for persecution. And the media as a whole was under attack. During HI’s occupation on 5th May, the government even shut down two pro-Islamist TV channels. These were Diganta TV and Islamic TV. The government said they had played an irresponsible role in coving the HI siege of Dhaka.62 Another incident was the arrest of human rights activist Adilur Rahman Khan. Mr Khan was the secretary of a human rights organization called Odhikar and was a Supreme Court lawyer. Odhikar claimed that 61 HI activists had died on 5th and 6th May.63 The number was later found to be wrong as several people on the list turned out to be still alive, but it was one of the first attempts to estimate a realistic number of the fatalities as opposed to the 11 dead claimed by the government. But the government did not like it at all and they arrested Khan. He was charged under act 57 of the ICT law,64 the same section that was used to charge the bloggers. Nasiruddin Khan, the director of Adhikar, was also arrested under this law. The ICT act of 2006 already had elements that undermined human rights, but the government refined it to pass a new ICT act in 2013 that shows no regard for rights. The law not only prescribes harsher punishment, it also denies the possibility of bail. The law allows the police to make arrests without a warrant, and the minimum prison term is seven years.65 Under act 57, the offences are posting or publishing material in a website that ‘causes or creates possibility to deteriorate law’, ‘prejudices the image of the state’ and ‘hurts or may hurt religious belief’. With such vaguely described offences and prescription of harsh punishments the ICT act 57 has become a terrible tool of oppression, regularly used by the powerful on those who have less or no power. The ICT act 57 emerged as one of the most powerful tools that the government used to silence whomever they wanted in 2013, and still remain so. The law also is constantly being influenced by the majority of the rich and powerful defenders of the status quo to silence critics and repress minority

61 opinions. Recent erosion of religious tolerance, government’s strict position on the issue, and the existence of such a law have also resulted in a trend towards mob justice and social persecutions. At least 42 incidents occurred from 2013 to 2016 where atheists, , Buddhists, other minorities and non-religious people faced diverse forms of persecution on charges of ‘Hurting religious feeling’. Forms of persecution include murder, arrest, physical assault, mob justice, attack on property and looting, loss of social status and job.66 The majority of those persecuted were not bloggers or human rights activists, but ordinary people who do not get much attention from media or support from national and international human rights groups. Most of them are not closely aligned to any ideology or group. Act 57 was also used on many occasions to arrest people for criticizing or parodying Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in social or any other kind of media. Incidents such as young people being jailed for 7 years under act 57 for sharing a satirical song about Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the father of the nation, have also occurred.67

_ The “Democratic Dictatorship!” JI and BNP hoped for an uprising against the government through the HI movement, which failed. But they did not stop trying to destabilize the country with continuous strikes and acts of violence. While the JI movement focused more on the war crimes tribunal, BNP was focusing more on their demand for a caretaker government before the next general election. BNP in this period also tried to maintain a distance from JI’s movement regarding the war crimes tribunal. One after another strike by both parties followed as the election approached. Such strikes paralyzed the country. The violent tactics to overthrow the government used by the BNP-Jamaat alliance, and mostly led by Jamaat, were not successful and only legitimized the use of brute force by the government. Police became especially vicious towards JI after several of them were brutally killed by JI activists and several police stations were attacked by them. Use of live bullets by police became common. 507 people have died in political violence in 2013, making it the

62 deadliest year in the history of Bangladesh since independence.68 Many who died were ordinary people, innocent victims in the conflict. It was the ordinary people who suffered most, one of the main reasons why the violent movement of JI and BNP could not gather much support among the general populace. Using violent means to overthrow a government is nothing new in Bangladesh, in fact it was too common and had lost its charm. Bangladeshi people had always been hard-working and the 21st century people of Bangladesh care more about peace and development than participating in violent movements to overthrow a regime. Privileged economic classes and industrial leaders despise political instability and violence, so does the civil society. Many people in Bangladesh were ready to vote and change the government if given the chance, since that’s what they always do, but that does not mean they were ready to give and take life to bring the BNP and JI to power. They have done this before, and they know pretty well that although it changes the party in power, it does not change their situation. It is only their hard work that keeps them safe and secure, as it does the country. In fact BNP-JI was able to create anarchy in large parts of the country and was even successful in cutting off the capital city from the rest of the country for temporary periods, but they were unable to gain much ground in Dhaka, the centre of the country where its sovereignty truly resides and which is also the most developed part of the country. The government was hard bent on not giving in to BNP’s demand for a caretaker government and went for a general election in which BNP-Jamaat refused to participate. BNP used to be one of the top two political parties of Bangladesh since it first came into existence. They were also the first party to rule Bangladesh after the fall of the military regime in the early 90s. They formed an electoral coalition with JI in 2001, which rocketed them towards power. JI, although not a very big party, had a voter base all over the country that mattered to BNP, but it was the economic strength of JI that BNP became gradually dependent on. Binding their own fate with JI during the year 2013 was one of their first mistakes, which they tried to fix when it was all too late. Their second biggest mistake was refusing to sit down for a dialogue with the government. The AL government

63 showed interest in a discussion which BNP refused. Sheikh Hasina also offered the possibility of an all-party interim government under which a general election would be held, but this was also refused by Khaleda Zia. However the sincerity of AL’s proposal for a dialogue can be questioned as they hurried towards an election as soon as BNP declined and it was clear that they knew and expected that BNP was going to refuse. They were clever enough to put the ball in BNP’s court. But BNP made the mistake of refusing any alternative suggestions by the government or possibilities for dialogue. This proved to be suicidal for BNP, as the government rushed into an election without its participation. When BNP realized the danger and showed some interest in dialogue, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina made an infamous remark that BNP had missed the ‘electoral train’ and would have to wait for the next one in 2019.69 A general election was held on 5th January 2014. BNP and its allies boycotted it and did not recognize the validity of the election. Begum Khaleda Zia, the then head of the opposition party in parliament called for a ‘March for Democracy’ to Dhaka. She asked both BNP supporters and people from all parts of the country to march to Dhaka to stop the election. This march and other protests announced by BNP failed to materialize due to the mass arrest of BNP activists and a ban on their protests. As well, the inactivity of major party leaders who did not support the political line taken by Khaleda Zia in 2013 was another reason for the failure. Khaleda Zia herself was locked down in her party office which was blockaded by several police trucks.70 She remained as a prisoner in her own party office during and after the election. The election of 5th January will remain one of the dark chapters in the democratic history of Bangladesh. Half of the parliamentary seats were uncontested and the voter turnout was only about 22 percent.71 Violence broke out in many parts of the country on election day. 21 deaths were reported, and over 100 school-based polling stations burned down.72 Religious minorities were attacked by BNP-Jamaat activists in different parts of the country, as they are known to be traditional AL voters. AL and its ally won the election unopposed, but they also needed an opposition party in the parliament. This they found in the Ershad Led Jatio Party, although it took a

64 combined use of intimidation and lucrative offers from AL. After 5th January Bangladesh effectively became a single-party dictatorship which is still the case. Dhaka University Professor Mohammad Anwar Hossain called such governance a ‘Democratic Dictatorship’ in an article of 10th January 2013. I should mention that he is a loyal supporter of the AL regime and wrote the article to prove that democracy and dictatorship are not incompatible and can co-exist perfectly.73 During 2013 and the early part of 2014 attacks on religious minorities became more frequent than at any other period in the history of the country. Attacks on ethnic minorities also increased. The intolerant political environment of the country and a culture of impunity were two main reasons for the continuing attacks. I joined some of my co-activists to form a new platform called ‘Samprodayik Sahingsata Birodhi Nagarik Samaj’ (Citizens Against Communal Violence). We protested against the culture of impunity and demanded the criminals be brought to justice. We also travelled to some of the most affected areas, did research and published our findings. There was a strange similarity in many of these attacks. Rumours of offending the Prophet or the on Facebook were a common reason to incite violence. Many of such rumours were staged only to attack minorities, to loot their property or to grab their land. Those who masterminded or led those attacks were not only JI activists; in many places local leaders or thugs from AL and BNP also took part or led such attacks. Although in national politics AL and JI were seen as mortal enemies, their local leaders or thugs had been found to work together when it came to attacking religious minorities. From 28th February to 28th September, a total of 146 Hindu temples and 262 houses were vandalized, 219 business establishments were looted and set on fire, while five people were killed, 65 were injured and 500 families were affected.74 In early 2014, I also travelled with GM on its road march to the areas where acts of communal violence were common. The road convoy was attacked with Molotov cocktails and bombs in several JI strongholds.75 Shahbag was the centre of our campaign against communal violence, and we also protested from Shahbag against attacks on ethnic minorities. The ‘Shahbag Movement’ practically came to an end in May 2013, but many of

65 those who had come to Shahbag during the life of this movement had not left the political space of Shahbag. The public sphere of Shabag grew bigger and stronger after the movement’s demise, with new-born activists joining older platforms that had their centre in Shahbag and Chobir Hat; a great many new activist platforms were formed too. Some of the Chobir Hat- based platforms and organizations found new vigour from large numbers of new recruits. Shahbag became the ultimate political space where people’s social and political rights were claimed. Issues such as education rights, labour rights, energy and environment policy, extrajudicial murders carried out by law enforcement forces, and crises such as the Rana Plaza collapse found critical and political attention in Shahbag. Even people who had little political or activist affiliation found their ultimate political space in Shahbag. General students, primary school teachers, workers whose rights were threatened, those who had no other place to go or did not know where to go would gather in Shahbag to protest or tell their stories. Shahbag was already a prominent alternative political space before 2013, but after 2013 it became one of the main political spaces in the country, and by 2014 it became one of the very few places where the people’s voice could be heard. However, Shahbag suffered a slow decline as a political public sphere after 2015. Intimidation, murder, bans, oppression, repression played central roles in the decline. We will talk about the story of decline in the next chapter.

66 CHAPTER 3 UPGRADED AUTHORITARIANISM AND DISAPPEARING PUBLIC SPHERES

‘Authoritarian upgrading’ in Bangladesh

Censorship and surveillance in Bangladesh reached a whole new height in 2014. A new media policy was published by the government on 6th August 2014. The new policy provides more opportunity to restrict any form of audio-visual content such as programmes, news, or advertisements inconsistent with the ruling government’s ideology and historical narratives.76

Bangladesh TV and other government-run media have always served the ideology of the ruling party of Bangladesh, broadcasting partisan historical narratives as the official narratives of the state. But since the appearance of satellite and private TV channels in the 90s, Bangladesh TV and other government-run media have become minor media players. Although some private TV channels in Bangladesh had partisan inclination, the emergence of neutral and professional journalism has revolutionized news broadcasts over the last two decades. Private TV channels also created new space for debate and dialogue through talk shows and other programs. All TV channels are now forced to become virtually the same as the government-run media, as is the case with most print media. Those which the government found problematic were brought into line and made an example of. On 7th January 2015 transmission of Ekushey TV was blocked by the government and its owner was arrested by the police just after the channel broadcast from

67 London the speech by BNP ViceChairman Tarique Zia, who is living in exile there.77 In August 2015 an advertising embargo was enforced on the two most prominent Bangla and English-language newspapers in Bangladesh, ‘’ and ‘Daily Star’, because they used the word ‘indigenous’ to describe five men who were killed by the army in . The tribal populations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts are the indigenous population of the region, but the Bangladesh government recently decided that no other word than ‘ethnic minority’ should be used. Because of their use of the word ‘indigenous’, all major advertisers were ordered not to advertise in these newspapers, and they obliged. 78

What has transpired in Bangladesh in recent years can be called an “authoritarian upgrading”. Steven Heydemann, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University used the term ‘authoritarian upgrading’ to describe recent trends and transformations of Middle Eastern regimes to adjust to new global, regional, and domestic circumstances. However trends and techniques of such a form of governance are not limited to Middle Eastern regimes alone. These regimes have adapted to selective economic liberalization and integration of local economies into the global market, and have expanded opportunities for social and economic elites.79 The recent decline of US influence and its war in Iraq have provided both moral and diplomatic opportunities for the regimes to gather support from new emerging global powers, providing authoritarian regimes with more freedom and legitimacy. India and ’s support was vital initially when the current AL government came to power on 5th January 2014. Authoritarian upgrading involves the appropriation and containment of the civil societies, capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms, controlling new communications technologies and diversifying international linkages.80 All these can be applied to Bangladesh. The hybrid approach in managing the internet and new media communications technologies is characteristic of authoritarian upgrading. They are open to new media technologies, but they not only acknowledge their social, political and economic benefits but also use them to enhance and upgrade their own capacity to keep the citizens

68 under control.81 According to a report published on 1st November 2014, the Bangladesh government have bought software worth of 8.2 Crore BDT to spy on private computers.82 Wikileaks revealed that Bangladesh had purchased the infamous spyware Finfisher.83 Telephone conversations of opposition leaders are not only being put under surveillance in Bangladesh, but also used to politically persecute them and are also unlawfully published in social media to socially defame them. Audio records of top opposition leaders that had been circulating in the social media include political plans and plots, private conversations and phone sex. Such records can only be made by the Bangladesh security forces which own the surveillance technology.

_ Avijit Murder, emergence of Al Qaeda in Bangladesh The Ekushey Book Fair of February 2015 marks one of the darkest months in the history of Bangladeshi literary culture. February is a month of pride for Bangla-speaking people, and the Ekushey Book Fair that takes place in February every year is the centre of all the cultural activities that go on in that month. The event is organized by the Bangla Academy, and is held in this month in memory of the Bengali students who died fighting to preserve the rights and status of their mother tongue in February 1952. When the Pakistani government tried to make the official language of Pakistan, in (now Bangladesh) protested. Bangla is the predominant language in Bengal and has a history that goes back a thousand years. Urdu was not a native language of Bengal, nor was it the language of the majority of people in Pakistan. So a language movement was born in Dhaka and other parts of the country to stand up for the right to linguistic and cultural autonomy of different states and cultures in Pakistan. But actually it provided the background for a movement of political autonomy in , which after the language movement witnessed a rise of Bengali nationalism and the birth of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh itself in 1971. The language movement of 1952 thus provided the basic framework of autonomy from which the idea of modern Bengali nationhood was born. It was 21st February 1952 when police fired on the protesters and killed several

69 of them. The day is still commemorated in Bangladesh as Martyrs Day. It is also the UNESCO-declared International Mother Language Day. A month- long book fair is held in Bangladesh every year in February, and is the single most important event in the Bangladeshi literary calendar. Vast numbers of new books are published during this fair, and writers and readers come together to participate in it. Avijit Roy, a famous Bangladeshi writer based in the USA, also loved to attend the book fair. Like every other Bangladeshi writer, this was the place where he wanted to be in February more than any other place in the world. I knew his Father before knowing Avijit. Dr. Ajoy Roy is a famous Bangladeshi physicist. He is also a well known free thinker and secular humanist of his generation. I loved reading his articles when I was in High School. I came to know about Avijit in 2004, from the website ‘Mukto-Mona’ (Free Thinker) that he founded. Mukto-Mona was a revelation for many of us at that time. It was a time when not too much Bangla content could be found on the internet, and Mukto-Mona was a fully-fledged free thinker’s platform where important articles on religion, science, evolution and were published. For founding this great website, Avijit became a hero to many of us. His communicative and well written articles and books were widely circulated during the last decade and still are to this day. He was a very able popular science writer who had also written on important social topics, like homosexuality, love and literature. I have some good memories of Avijit. It was a great moment for me when the hero of my late teens asked me to write in Mukto-Mona. It was not because I was a great writer or anything. Avijit was very supportive of young writers and he did the same with many writers of my generation. He was not just a writer but also a cultural leader who was very active in supporting and motivating young writers. Mukto-Mona and our organization Aroj Ali Matubbar Pathagar and several bloggers also worked together in 2012 to celebrate Darwin Day in Bangladesh. It was a time when online based Bangladeshi free thinkers were coming out of the internet and meeting to organise social events. Avijit Roy, although living in the US, had provided support for such activities and events. I remember it was on this Darwin Day that I meet Niloy Neel for the first time. He was reading a paper

70 at the event by a science blogger with the pen name Horus. Niloy was killed in his home in September last year. I also remember several debates I had with Avijit. I loved debating, and he did too. The last of such debates occurred between September and October of 2014. It was on the subject ‘True Islam’. Avijit Roy remained for years a secular humanist who had put his trust in the ideals of the Enlightenment. I, on the other hand, had adopted a more post-modernist tendency in my understanding of things and a New-Leftist political stance. Avijit was supportive of some New-Atheist discourse regarding Islam and had also written a book called ‘Virus of Faith’ based on Richard Dawkins’ idea of memetics. I was highly critical of this book and the use of memetics in interpreting social conflicts. It resulted in a debate. It was also a time when such debate on ‘True Islam’ was raging all over the world. The debate that was initially between me and Avijit turned into a massive one with many others participating. It was a much needed debate at a time when ISIS emerged as a major brand representing Islam. It was quite an intense debate that lasted almost a month, but it had a negative effect on our personal relationship and we did not have any mutual conversation over the coming months. Unfortunately that debate turned out to be the last real conversation I had with Avijit. In his last blog on 18th January 2014 on Mukto mona, he wrote a final article in the debate. At the end of that article he wished me happy birthday. I was busy editing my book ‘Jihad o Khelafoter Silsila’ (Genealogy of Jihad and Caliphate) which was scheduled for release a month later, so I decided to postpone responding to the article. The month of February is of huge significance in the life of many Bangladeshis, but not just because of the movement and the book fair. It is also the month when students were shot dead on the 14th February 1984, which is still celebrated by many as Counter-Dictatorship Day. Most young people tend to celebrate Valentine Day on that day though, thanks to the satellite TV culture. It is also the month when spring begins in Bangladesh, a time of many celebrations; the first day of spring is somewhat more popular among Bangladeshi young people than Valentine Day as they get to wear more traditional costumes. It is the month when 74 people

71 were killed, including 57 Bangladeshi military officials, in a coup in 2009, mourned every year since then. The Shahbag movement also started in this month which was termed as an ‘Awakening’. February in Bangladesh has become a month when events and celebrations on the theme of death and rebirth take place, and the main theatre of these celebrations is the Shahbag and surrounding areas of Dhaka. The month is of great significance to me too. Not only because of all the things that go on over this month, but for many personal reasons and memories too. I had high hopes for February 2015: I was excited about my new book. Everything was going well that month with all the celebrations, new publications and good sales before things took a wrong turn on 16th February. A Bengali translation of Iranian writer Ali Dasti’s “23 Years of Muhammad” came out in the book fair just a few days earlier. The translation was done by Saikat Chowdhury and and was published by Rodela Publications. HI and some other Islamist groups found the book to be offensive. They not only attacked the publisher’s main office but also attacked their stall in the book fair. A strange thing happened after that. Instead of protecting the book and the publication, Bangla Academy closed down the stall and banned Rodela Publishers from the fair for ‘hurting religious feelings’.84 It was pretty clear that they had done so in accordance with the government’s wishes, since HI and the government had reached an understanding to protect mutual interest. And the government would not put that at risk for a book or a publisher. However, what was more worrying was that not too many writers and publishers criticized such an attack on freedom of speech. Most senior Bangladeshi writers are supportive of the AL government, considering it the lesser evil or having no other secular options to support. They fear that without AL in power there will be something worse in its place. Many of them are just afraid of being on a government black list or losing the position and status that they enjoy by being friendly to the government. Their stance has left ‘Freedom of Speech’ in Bangladesh in a vulnerable situation. Some of us tried to make a stand against it. Along with writer and activist Baki Billah and editor Robin Ahsan (publisher of Sraban Publications) I co-hosted an event in front of the book fair to protest against the ban on the book and

72 Rodela.85 Adding to our frustration, only a handful of well known writers and publishers showed up. Little did we know that things would take a darker turn in the coming days of that month. Avijit came to Bangladesh to attend the book fair, the place where he loved to be in the month of February. I was at the fair on that evening of 26th February 2015, as there was an event to promote Shuddhashar Publications’ new books, including one by Avijit. Shuddhashar’s publisher, Ahmedur Rashid Tutul, invited me to that event as a couple of my books had been previously published by Shuddhashar. I was happy to learn from Tutul that Avijit was in Bangladesh and was also coming to the event. I thought we might have a chance to talk. When he arrived the event had already started. I saw him standing on the other side of the ceremony, signing books, giving a speech. I was hoping to go and greet him after the event, but it went on for too long and when some of my friends arrived at the book fair I had to leave. It was almost the end of the fair, we bought some books, then I had to leave, as I had to buy a birthday cake for my little sister. When I was on my way home, I got a call from Baki Billah to tell me that Avijit had just been attacked in front of TSC (close to the book fair) and had been taken to Dhaka Medical Hospital. I took a CNG Auto Rickshaw and rushed to the hospital. I remember the night when I had to rush to Dhaka Medical at a similar time of the night when Asif Mohiuddin was attacked. As he had been taken to hospital, I was hoping he would survive like Asif, but when I reached there some student activists I knew informed me of his death. I was in utter shock. I saw Ajoy Roy, who still did not know that his son was already dead and was trying to contact people to take him abroad for better treatment. The trauma I had to go through that night is something from which I still have not managed to recover properly, and it will probably haunt me for the rest of my life. Police were standing not far from the spot where Avijit was killed, yet they did not react. They gave a strange excuse later, claiming they thought some people were fighting and that’s why they did not intervene. So the murderers got away easily. Although no one was arrested for the murder in the subsequent days, the government started to blame BNP-Jamaat for it.

73 The Communications Minister Hasanul Haq Inu immediately made remarks putting the blame on the government’s political opponents. Diverse groups protested against the murder and asked for justice, even some Islamists. Yet the government still chooses to be silent on the matter. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina called Dr. Ajoy Roy personally, yet remained silent in public. Her son Sajeeb Wazed Joy, who is also an AL leader and is now being groomed to be the next leader of the party, when he was asked by Reuters about the government’s silence on the issue, said that they do not want to make any public comment on this issue since they do not want to be seen as atheist.86 After Avijit was killed, a Twitter page called Ansar bangla 7 claimed responsibility. According to police, this Twitter page belonged to none other than the notorious group Ansarullah Bangla Team who previously attacked Asif Mohiuddin and killed Rajib Haider. After that, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) claimed responsibility saying it was their Bangladesh wing that carried out these murders. The AQIS chief Asim Umar also claimed responsibility for some other murders of secular writers, journalists and teachers all over the Indian subcontinent.87

_ The ‘Ultimate Polarization’ There were two distinct battles played out in Bangladesh during the years of 2013 and 2014, but they were connected in a complex relationship between the ideology and identity of the involved people and groups. The polarity that emerged from this turmoil is interpreted by different interest groups according to their interest and ambition. Many see this as an ultimate battle between the secularists and the Islamists of the country. Supporters of this view are diverse, they come from all corners of the land and include both secularists and Islamists. Some supporters of such interpretation are also militant supporters of one of this supposed polarity, and think it is impossible to co-exist with the ‘other’ as long as they do not recognize their own ideological supremacy. However, most supporters of such ‘Secular vs Islam’ narrative are not radically inclined towards any faction; they are worried observers who think such polarity is going to destroy the country.

74 Radicals from both polarities need to keep such a narrative alive to ensure their existence and to empower themselves. It would be wrong to claim that there is no such thing as Secularist vs Islamist in Bangladesh. There is one. But it would also be wrong to call this the ultimate polarity in Bangladesh. This polarity is most popular among Islamists who propagandize it as a battle between Islam and atheism. Some radical atheists also have a similar interpretation of the events. Some secular nationalists have their own propaganda; some of them even interpret it as a battle between the Bengali culture and a foreign form of Islamic culture. However the most popular version of secular interpretation is a pro-liberation vs anti-liberation narrative. According to this narrative, secularism is one of the main platforms of the Bangladesh Liberation Movement, and secularism itself stands for everything that is Bangladesh. Anyone who does not support secularism stands for everything that is anti-liberation, affiliated to things like political Islam or even Pakistan, which also stands for everything that is evil. This pro-liberation vs anti-liberation narrative has been adopted by the ruling AL regime which now claims that all their critics and all opposition groups belong to the anti-liberation polarity. George W. Bush’s War on Terror has provided many authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and other parts of the world with a model for persecuting opposition. Even Bashar al Asad has played the victim of terrorism in Syria, persecuting all his opponents by portraying them as terrorists. Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh has used a similar strategy. One of the main justifications for their authoritarian rule provided by AL to the international community is that they are protecting the country from falling into the hands of radical Islamists and terrorists. At the same time they try to put the blame for terrorism onto the main opposition party BNP, even for those terrorist acts for which such groups as AQIS and ISIS have claimed responsibility. BNP is not an Islamist party, although they are allied with the Islamists. They are simply the ultimate conservative rightist political platform in Bangladesh, but secular at the end of the day. The vacuum left by the decline of the party is huge and can provide space for growing radical . Radical Islamists in the country follow a strategy

75 similar to that of the government, but from the opposite pole. They paint an image of a battle between the secular West and Islam. The government in this narrative is nothing but the representation of secular West (Crusaders according to the Jihadi discourse) which is relentlessly waging war against the Muslim population of the world and their religion, Islam. They justify their terror activities as being for the cause of defending Islam. Narratives from the authoritarian regime and the radical Islamists actually empower each other, and in the process weaken the liberal and secular democratic forces while threatening the religious, ideological and political diversity of Bangladeshi culture. This had happened in several countries of the Middle East where the ultimate political polarity that emerged victorious is between an authoritarian regime and the political/radical Islamists. As the one party rule in Bangladesh becomes more and more powerful, the Islamists are also becoming the most powerful political force, as secular groups other than the ruling party are becoming weaker and weaker under AL domination and persecution. If this goes on for too long, it will be easy for the Islamists to make secularism and AL dictatorship synonymous in the eyes of the people, and they might find the Islamists the only force to turn to. This had happened before during the first five years of the new independent country. The result was the establishment of military autocracy that lasted till the 90s. It would be foolish to think Bangladesh is now immune from a repetition of such a scenario. In fact things might even be worse next time, considering the current global context.

76 DISAPPEARING PUBLIC SPHERES

_ 2015: Year of Murder and Terror The year 2015 will be remembered as a year of tragedy in the history of Bangladesh, especially by secular people. The book ban and murder of Avijit in February, the failure of police to arrest the murderers and the government’s silence, such scenarios only encouraged the murderers and the people who wanted to ban books. The effect was seen as two more writers were killed in the next couple of months. Only a month had passed when Wasiqur Rahman, a young blogger who was also an ardent atheist was killed in front of his home on 30th March on his way to his office. He was also killed in a similar way to Avijit and Rajib, hacked to death with a machete. But this time some people in the street managed to catch a couple of the murderers as they fled, while another one managed to escape. The murderers were handed over to the police; they still remain the only two perpetrators of such murders in 2015 that are behind bars; the police never caught the third killer who had fled. Wasiqur’s murder forced me to question the ultimate meaning of such deaths. Both murderers were madrasa students with radical affiliations. One of them was a student of Hat Hazari Madrasa, home of HI.88 I knew Wasiqur, he was much younger than me. I knew him by his nickname, Babu, which means ‘child’, as he had an innocent and child-like face. I saw him regularly hanging out with his friends at Chobir Hat. He had just finished his education and it was the start of his professional career. His whole life was in front of him, and he had so many things left to do. He was a latecomer in the Bangladeshi online atheism scene and was not a very well known blogger. He did not have any books published, he only wrote on Facebook and in some atheist blogs. There are now thousands of young people like him in Bangladesh. In a country where the murder of atheist bloggers has become the most popular way for terrorist groups to prove their existence, where a culture of impunity on such murders persists, the most vulnerable are these young people who do not enjoy much fame or get much protection. Watching Wasiqur’s sister cry broke many of our

77 hearts and made us wonder, had we started a war that we could not afford, let alone win? Have we encouraged these young people to fearlessly criticize religion without having any regard for their life? It is only the terrorist who terrorizes and the dictator who dictates that could profit from such a murder. What did Wasiqur gain, or his family? What did we gain? We are not even getting justice. I don’t want to call Wasiqur a martyr and value his death as something that will ensure the coming of a golden age of secularism in Bangladesh. I want justice. Responsibility for Washiqur’s murder was not claimed on any Twitter page. Nor did any official AQIS media claim responsibility for any murders after Avijit Roy. But when Ananta Bijoy was killed on the morning of 12th May 2015, a Twitter page called Ansar Bangla 8 claimed responsibility. Before Ananta, all the bloggers had been killed in Dhaka, but Ananta was killed in his home town Sylhet. His death was a big shock for me. Both Avijit and Ananta were writers whom I had known for a long time, but as a writer and activist I felt closer to Ananta. He was a person of my own age, and he also had a leftist background and believed in working through grass roots organizations. He headed a Sylhet-based organization called ‘Science and Rationalist Council’. He was a very good writer and editor, and had several books published on diverse topics. He was also the editor of a magazine called Jukti (Argument). He used to send Jukti to our library and we used to send him our official magazine which is called Jiggashu (Inquisitor). We were thus connected through our work. When Ananta was killed, I had a feeling that my days were numbered. The hit list was getting shorter. The police could not arrest any of his murderers either, but they did arrest some random people on suspicion. One of them was a local photo-journalist named Idris Ali, who was the first person to photograph Ananta’s dead body; how he was there with a camera at that early hour of the day raised suspicion. A couple of other people who had previously threatened Ananta on Facebook were also arrested,89 And police arrested another three people in August in connection with Avijit’s murder. Among these three, a Bangladeshi-born British citizen named ‘Touhidur Rahman’ was the mastermind behind Avijit’s and Ananta’s killing, according to RAB ().

78 90 Later it was found that he had been abducted from his home by security forces three months before he was said to have been arrested, and his sister had filed an abduction complaint.91 No details of his involvement in the murders have been released by the police or RAB since then. Police have claimed several times that they have identified Avijit’s murderer, but no one was ever charged.92 As the culture of impunity persisted after Ananta’s death, we were expecting more such murders in the following months. Considering what happened next, we should feel fortunate that no such murder took place in the period following. But when, one Friday afternoon in September, I heard the news of Niloy Neel’s murder, it was too much for me to cope with. I have already mentioned the Darwin Day when I met him for the first time. Back then he was a student of Philosophy at Dhaka University. When he was killed he had a job and was living with his partner in Dhaka. At that time I got to know him much better. He was a co-activist in Shahbag whom I regularly met at events and meetings. He was passionate about working in his organization called the ‘Bangladesh Rationalist Society’. What was most disturbing for me was that he was killed in his home.93 After Avijit’s death I was forced to withdraw from activism. I was living a life without any daily schedule for security reasons, and by the time Neel got killed I was barely getting out of the house. Protesting against Avijit’s murder was the last time I protested on the streets of Dhaka. I was already living a very low profile life, but I felt safe inside the walls of my home and focused more on reading and writing. Niloy’s death made me realize that I was not safe even in my home. I also had three dogs, which were excellent guards. I read on the news that a couple of dogs were killed in Niloy’s neighborhood before he was murdered. I did not want my dogs to die for me. I realized that my family members were at risk too, as they lived close by. Whenever I went out some friends and co- activists had to come with me for security, which put their lives at risk too. It was too much to risk. So I left Bangladesh a month after Niloy’s death. Niloy was afraid that he might get killed. Some people were following him and he went to several police stations to file a complaint. None of the police stations would accept it, but after hearing about his

79 situation they advised him to leave the country.94 Niloy’s story reflects what is going on in Bangladesh among people who are termed ‘atheist bloggers’; they are demonized and dehumanized by political parties, police do not help but rather persecute them, and the government remains silent when they are murdered. On 31st October, two publishers were attacked in their own offices. They were Ahmedur Rashid Tutul of Shuddhashar and Faysal Arefin Dipan of Jagriti. Both of them had published Avijit Roy’s books. Both of their names along with that of Avijit were on a hit list on Facebook in February. The police and the government knew they could be attacked, yet they failed to protect them. I visited Shuddhashar’s office just a week before I left Bangladesh to meet with Ahmedur Rashid Tutul, as we were planning to bring out a new edition of my first book, Muslim Jogoter Gayantattik Lorai (Epistemological Battle in the Muslim World). When I heard the news that Ahmedur Rashid and two other writers had been attacked in his office by machete wielding terrorists, I realized I could be just one of them if I was in Bangladesh. I feared the worst when I heard Tutul had been taken to hospital and not doing very well. Luckily he survived, as did the other two writers, but Faisal Arefin Dipan, the publisher of Jagriti, was not so lucky.95 Actually it was the two writers Ranadipam Basu and the other who tried to save Tutul and were wounded themselves; the killers had to attack all of them and they left in a hurry when they thought Tutul was dead. But Dipan was alone in his office and they had ample time to make sure that he did not survive. Dipan was killed just an hour after Tutul was attacked. Attacking two publishers in their office on the same day shows how the murderers have grown in confidence. None of those who attacked Dipan and Tutul has been arrested yet, and that means they are still at large. Responsibilty for both Niloy’s and Dipan’s murders was claimed by an organization with a clear name and affiliation. They now call themselves ‘Ansar al-Islam, the Bangladesh division of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)’. After Ananta Bijoy was murdered, the Twitter page Ansar Bangla 8 declared that they should be called Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent. When they claimed responsibility for the murder of Dipan they had already given a name to their leader. He is called Mufti Abdullah Ashraf.96 The transformation

80 from a dubious organization called Ansarullah Bangla Team into a fully- fledged Al Qaeda wing in Bangladesh through police and media promotion and mutual recognition between local and international terrorist groups with the use of internet is a tremendous event in the history of Bangladesh that calls for serious attention and research. The year 2015 not only has seen the rise of a fully-fledged Al-Qaeda wing in Bangladesh but also a competitor affiliated to IS. After several foreigners were killed and a number of Shia mosques and rallies were attacked by this IS affiliate, Bangladesh was also one of the issues featured in Dabiq, the official IS magazine. When the internet arrived in Bangladesh, we thought it would give us an opportunity to unite and bring positive change. We thought it would empower democratic processes. It did initially. But internet-based communications have also given incredible power to terrorist organizations to promote their ideology and their franchise of terrorism. It has created a new space for radical ideology to grow. The year 2015 left a permanent scar in the lives of many people and communities in Bangladesh. Bangladesh never had a history of Shia-Sunni conflict; even the majority Sunni population commemorates Shia religious days like Ashura and shows deep veneration to Ali, Fatima and their children. Sunnism as a religious identity is vague and largely non-existent in the society of Bangladesh. There is no context and history of social and political conflict between Sunni and Shia populations like in Iraq or Syria. In 2015, the Shia minority was attacked for the first time in the history of Bangladesh. Such an attack does not have any local context, it merely mimics what IS is doing in the Middle East. The internet has brought us freedom, it brought us revolutions. Unfortunately it also brought us AQ and IS, and dictatorships.

_ Disappearing Public Spheres Empowerment of polarizations in Bangladesh has served the ruling regime and extremist groups most. As the government became more and more powerful, they became more confident and adept at persecuting opposition. As persecution of one group gets either moral support or passive impunity

81 from other groups, the story of Bangladesh resembles Pastor Martin Niemöller’s famous joke of ‘First they came,’ in which everybody gets purged accompanied by the silence of others. Terror and repression have not only suffocated the ‘freedom of expression’ in Bangladesh but have also endangered the new public spheres where young people used to meet, discuss and express themselves. Not only have many virtual public spheres such as blogs disappeared or barely survive under pressure, but real public spheres like Shahbag Square or the Suhrawardy Udyan are also dying off as public spheres. I have mentioned before how Chobir Hat in Suhrawardy Udyan had become a vibrant public sphere for young people and gave birth to several cultural and political movements. Chobir Hat came under heavy police surveillance even before 2013, and we had to be careful about having any serious discussions related to activism inside the Suhrawardy Udyan, as the place could be full of agents from detective branches before and after 2013. Recently, police and the government took several steps to suffocate the life out of this vibrant public sphere. In 2014, several installations of Chobir Hat were broken by police. Suhrawardy Udyan and Chobir Hat suffered a blow when all the tea stalls, which provided the primary seating area for young people who would spend hours inside the park, were banned by the police. Although they were unsuccessful in capturing Avijit’s killer, after his murder they successfully put a curfew on the park after 5 pm. After the curfew was imposed, the public sphere started to suffer a slow death. The curfew that followed Avijit’s death was soon defied by the young people who for some time gambled on police leniency to stay inside the park in the evening. However, as a large part of the park now went dark at night, the place started to revert to its former status as a paradise for thugs and drug dealers. Now there were muggers preying upon unmarried couples who no longer enjoy the protection of the previous vibrant liberal culture. It was the growing progressive culture and vibrant festive atmosphere inside the park that provided safety to the young couples who had not too many places to go in Dhaka. As the park was dying, it also became unsafe for them. Such attacks became a nightly occurrence as the muggers got support from the student wing of the ruling party and also enjoyed some sort of immunity

82 from the police. Most victims would not file a report in such incidents, that’s how it works in Bangladesh. But when one victim filed a complaint and went to the media after he was beaten by the muggers and his girl friend threatened with rape, the police took immediate action by enforcing the night curfew again. This curfew was also defied again later, but was enforced again by the police as the book fair started in February 2016. Recently the park has become the favourite mass meeting place for the ruling party. The last couple of times I have seen at least 20 police guarding the gate to Chobir Hat in the evening, as if they were guarding something very sacred or something very dangerous. Seeing such a great and vibrant public sphere, where I myself have spent a lot of time with my friends and co-activists causes me immense grief, anger and frustration. Shahbag Square as a political space is also dying. After 2012, Shahbag Square emerged as a new public sphere where new and young groups used to politically express themselves through protests and other forms of activism. Rarely a week passed by since 2013 without some form of protest in Shahbag. The square became the centre of activism for several young activist groups who regularly held events there. It also became a place where non-activist protesters could also gather to express their demands. It became the newest and one of the most dominant public spheres in Bangladesh where mainstream political parties had little or no influence or activity. The year 2015 witnessed a decline of Shahbag as a political space and public sphere. With many activists dead, resigned, exiled, afraid or disenchanted, the place is now slowly going back to its former status as mainly a busy intersection of the city of Dhaka. Other public spheres that had grown over the last decade in different parts of the country are also declining under similar circumstances. In the name of security and development, the ruling regime has successfully throttled the growth of new public spheres. The AL government has successfully neutralized its closest competitors and critics. And if they want to stay in power, they cannot afford the growth of new public spheres and political spaces where their actions would be put under continuous scrutiny. This has happened not only in Bangladesh, but also in many parts of the so-called developing world. The Tahrir Square in

83 Egypt has become known worldwide for the famous eighteen days of the Egyptian revolution. During and after those eighteen days, it was a common slogan that legitimacy comes from the Tahrir. When Morsi and the Muslim brotherhood came to power, they tried to take control of the sphere to prevent any uprising against them. They failed, as a large anti-brotherhood campaign took place there with the support of the military that eventually ousted the government. But after Sisi came to power, the place is under heavy security. The entrance of Tahrir Square is now guarded by tanks to prevent any protesters from entering.97 Such a fate for Shabag Square, Tahrir Square or Chobir Hat is an example of disappearing public spheres and heterotopic spaces in the countries where young revolutionaries of the internet era expressed themselves politically. One of the results of such internet era revolutions is the transformation of heterotopic spaces into something that requires the security measures of a high security prison or a military base, another counter-revolutionary trend that came with the authoritarian regimes now ruling these countries. The Bangladeshi government also blocked Facebook, Viber and Whatsapp for long periods in the name of national security. Bangla Blogosphere as a vibrant public sphere is also barely surviving, with its golden period already gone. The Bangladeshi social media scene itself has become a place more concerned with consumerism than debate or discussion, another sign of the decline of the public sphere. Many bloggers and activists practice self censorship now. Many have stopped writing altogether. Many have also been dissuaded by the government’s argument for suppression of freedom and democracy for the sake of peace and development. We are living in a time when it is claimed that ‘security’ or ‘‘development’ is the purpose of the state, not ‘freedom’. In a country where the ‘State of Nature’ and the ‘State of Exception’ have become the only two options for people in recent times, ‘atheist bloggers’ have become what Giorgio Agamben calls a ‘homo sacer’, a kind of life that can be killed with no hope of justice for such murder. Religious minorities have fallen victim to the land grabbers and thugs, and it is only the powerful who enjoy ‘freedom’ over others. How do we fight for ‘freedom rights’

84 in such volatile situations? We certainly need to find ways for political change through peaceful and democratic means and also without external intervention. We certainly do not want the situation in Bangladesh to become like that of Iraq or Syria where the most fundamental human right, the ‘right to live,’ is disregarded every day. Such peaceful social and political change cannot be achieved without confronting the polarization, questioning the ‘otherisation’ and ‘exclusion’ and fighting for diversity and plurality. We are living in a time of war, a global war. How do we win it amid all the paradoxes it’s putting us through? On this question, I want to borrow the P.C. Principal’s final message from the famous cartoon South Park’s final episode of season 19: “The only way to win this war is to be as understanding, unbiased, and politically correct as possible.” And like ‘Stan’ we should also realize that “This is going to be really hard”.

85 ENDNOTES

1 Zöller.G.(). In Truth the Purpose of the State Is Freedom; Spinoza on the Political Character of the Relationship between Religion and Philosophy. Deutsch-Chinesische Konferenz. http:// philosophie-religion.de/. Free University of Berlin.

2 Magnusson (1990). Magnusson, M (ed.), Spinoza, Baruch, Chambers Biographical Dictionary, Chambers 1990

3 Sonneborn.L. (2006). Averroes (Ibn Rushd): Muslim Scholar, Philosopher, and Physician of the Twelfth Century. The Rosen Publishing Group. p. 89.

4 Majid.F. (2001), Averroes (Ibn Rushd) His Life, Works and Influence, Oneworld Publications

5 Fraenke.C. (2011). Carlos Fraenkel, Dario Perinetti, Justin E. H. Smith (ed) The Rationalists: Between Tradition and Innovation, Springer. p.27.

6 Chowdhury.M.Z.(2011). Conference Paper: “Public sphere and the new media; Bangladesh Context”. Organized by Oslo University College. Sologny 23-26 August 2011. France. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.

9 Habermas. J. (German1962 English Translation 1989), Further Reflections on the Public Sphere, Thomas Burger, Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, p. 456.

10 Loader, Brian D.; Mercea, Dan (2011), “Networking Democracy? Social media innovations and participatory politics”,Information, Communication & Society (London: Routledge) 14 (6): 757–769

11 Chowdhury.M.Z.(2011). Conference Paper: “Public sphere and the new media; Bangladesh Context”. Organized by Oslo University College. Sologny 23-26 August 2011. France.

12 Chowdhury.M.Z.(2012).The Internet as a public sphere: Blogging “Liberation war vs Jamaat” issue in somewherein...blog, a case study. Dissertation presented to the Department of Mass Communication and Journalism, University of Dhaka.P.10.

13 Beachler, D. W. (2011). The genocide debate : politicians, academics, and victims (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 16.

14 Sharlach.L. (2000). “Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda”. New Political Science 1 (22): 89–102.

86 15 Tazreena.S. (2012). “The Post-Genocidal Period and its Impact on Women”. In Samuel Totten. Plight and Fate of Women During and Following Genocide (Reprint ed.). Transaction. pp. 219– 248.

16 Hossain,I & Siddiquee N.A. (2004) Islam in Bangladesh politics: the role of Ghulam Azam of Jamaat-I-Islami, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 5:3, 384-399.

17 The Events in East Pakistan, 1971 A LEGAL STUDY BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS. (1972). pp.44,45.

18 Mujaheed, Nizami tortured me, others. Bdnews24.com. September 20, 2012.

19 The collapse of the Shimla Accord. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reneged on his commitment to Indira Gandhi much earlier than some had anticipated.indianexpress.com. June9, 2014.

20 IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Incidents of harassment or violence carried out by members of the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) (current) [BGD38888.E], 09. Mai 2002 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net) http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/169440/285473_de.html (Zugriff am 15. März 2016)

21 Renewed violence hits Bangladesh.BBC.28 October 2006.

22 Chowdhury.M.Z.(2012).The Internet as a public sphere: Blogging “Liberation war vs Jamaat” issue in somewherein...blog, a case study. Dissertation presented to the Department of Mass Communication and Journalism, University of Dhaka.P.24.

23 Ibid.P.77.

24 Half-day hartal in Dhaka on July 3. bdnews24.com.Published: 2011-06-18.

25 Niko Resources pleads guilty in Bangladesh bribery case. The Globe and Mail. June 24, 2011.

26 Bangladesh: Police and protesters clash during strike. Anbarasan EthirajanBBC News, Dhaka.3 July 2011.

27 31 JNU students have been arrested. Daily Prothom-Alo. 30 September 2011.

28 Jagannath, Nazrul, Universities.Govt funding to continue.The daily Star. 6 October 2011.

87 29 Habermas.J.( German1962 English Translation 1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere; An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.P.52.

30 Ibid.P.27.

31 Ibid. xi.

32 Ibid.57.

33 Foucault.M.(1967). Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias. Translated from the French by Jay Miskowiec. This text, entitled “Des Espace Autres” and published by the French journal Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité in October, 1984,1984.P.3.

34 Ghannam.F. The Rise and Decline of a Heterotopic Space: Views from Midan al-Tahrir. January 2016. Jadaliyya.

35 Ahmed. and Mujtaba.G .Azad gets death for war crimes. Bdnews24.com. 21 January, 2013.

36 HANDS OFF CAIN against death penalty in the world”.Bangladesh. Handsoffcain.info. http://www.handsoffcain.info/bancadati/schedastato.php?idstato=17000495

37 Shahbag protesters versus the Butcher of Mirpur. Tahmima Anam. The Guardian. 13 February 2013.

38 Summary of verdict in Quader Mollah case.The Daily Star.6 February 2013.

39 Strike over war crimes trials hits Bangladesh, 3 killed. The Indian Express. January 31 2013.

40 Islam, Md. N. (2003). “Indemnity Act”. In Islam, Sirajul; Jamal, Ahmed A. Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh (First ed.). Asiatic Society of Bangladesh.

41 “Extremists ‘linked .The Daily Star. 1 October 2012

42 Blogger Rajib’s ‘killers’ linked to al-Qaeda: DB.The Daily Star.15 March 2013.

43 Four killed in ‘blasphemous bloggers’ riot in Bangaldesh. news.com.au.February 23,2013.

44 Hindus under attack6 temples, houses burnt outside Dhaka.The Daily Star.March 1, 2013.

45 Violent Vandalism of More Than 50 Temples of Minority Communities”. Prothom Alo. 4 March 2013.

88 46 Khaleda slams Shahbagh youthsBrands them as atheists; asks govt to stop Gonojagoron Mancha.The Daily Star, 16 March 2013.

47 Shahbag Organizers Sent Back to Dhaka From Feni.Tazakhobor.com.13 March 2013.

48 Hifazat attacks strikers in Dhaka.Bdnews24.com.5 April 2013.

49 Bergman, D.”36 killed in Dhaka as Islamic militants clash with police”. London: The telegraph. 6 May 2013.

50 Political violence in Bangladesh,In hot blood,The killings of Islamist hardliners promise further instability. . May 9 2013.

51 Karim.R.Hefazat getting govt land worth Tk 40cr. risingbd.com. 21 Apr 2014.

52 Shafi: Hefazat has no conflict with Hasina . January 15, 2016.

53 Ghatack.P. Terror tactics aimed to gain political power. The Daily Observer. 14 Augast, 2015.

54 , : . These are not writings of Human but devil. Daily Jaijaidin. February 28, 2013.

55 ‘Atheist’ bloggers to ‘repent’. Bdnews24.com. 31 March 2013.

56 Four bloggers arrested amid crackdown in Bangladesh.Committee to protect journalists. April 4 2013.

57 13 Bangla Blog Portals Blacked Out. tazakhobor.com. 4 april 2013.

58 Bloggers’ to be charged under ICT Act.Bdnews24.com. 2 April 2013.

59 Bangla Blog Portals Blacked Out. tazakhobor.com. 4 april, 2013.

60 Amar Desh press sealed.The Daily Star. April 11 2013.

61 Bangladeshi Police Arrest Suspect in Blogger’s Killing.The New York Times. March 2 2015.

62 Govt closes 2 TV networks.Dhaka Tribune. 6 May 2013.

63 Assembly of Hefazate Islam Bangladesh and Human Rights Violations.Odhikar.org.

64 Bangladesh: immediately release human rights defender Adilur Rahman Khan.Inernational Commision of Jurists. Augast12, 2013. 89 65 Bangladesh: Information and Communication Technology Act draconian assault on free expression. Inernational Commision of Jurists. November 20, 2013.

66 Shuvo.S and Shaykat.C. - . A partial construction of the real picture of arrests for ‘Hurting Religious Feeling’ in Bangladesh. Muktomona.com.February17,2016.

67 Youth jailed for parody on Sheikh Mujib, PM.The . September 25.2014.

68 Over 500 killed in political violence in Bangladesh in 2013. abc.net.au. 31 December 2013.

69 Bangladesh Nationalist Party has missed the train, will have to wait till next polls says Sheikh Hasina

70 Bangladesh ex-PM Khaleda Zia in lockdown ahead of protest. BBC News.4 January 2015.

71 Berry.E. Low Turnout in Bangladesh Elections Amid Boycott and Violence. The NewYork Times.January 5 2014.

72 Bangladesh – political violence. A case study from the 2014 Human Rights and Democracy Report. Human Rights and Democracy Report 2014. Foreign & Commonwealth Office. gov.uk

73 Muhammad Anwar Hossain. .Democratid Dictatorship. Bdnews24.com.10 January 2014.

74 Attacks on Minorities .Citizens find similarity between Santhia, Ramu.Dhaka Herald. November 30, 2013.

75 Mancha for resistance against fanatics. News.18January 2014.

76 Bangladesh: Revoke Draconian Media Policy.September 3 2014.Human Rights Watch.hrw. org.

77 Ekushey TV chairman lands in jail. The Daily Star. 7 January 2015.

78 Bergman.D.In Bangladesh too, the government is making a concerted effort to stifle dissent.The editor of the largest-selling English newspaper, ‘The Daily Star’, is being hounded as part of a prolonged effort to shut down the publication.scoll.in.

79 Heydemann.S.( 2007).Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World. The Saban Centar for Middle East policy at the Brookings Institution. P.1.

90 80 Ibid.P.3. 81 Ibid.P.23.

82 Bergman.D. Govt purchased Tk 8.2cr software to spy on private computers.New Age. November 1. 2014.

83 Wikileaks reveals Bangladesh’s spyware purchase.Bdnews24.comNovember2,2014.

84 Durjoy.N.A. Ekushey Boi Mela: Stall closed for ‘hurting religious sentiments’.Dhaka Tribune.17 February 2015

85 Durjoy.N.A. Publishers, writers protest shutting down of Rodela stall.Dhaka Tribune.18 February 2015.

86 Joy: Situation was too volatile to comment on Avijit murder.Dhaka Tribune.11 May 2015.

87 Local al Qaeda claims February murder of U.S. citizen in Bangladesh – SITE.Reuters.May 3.2015.

88 Khan.M.J & Azad.A. Radical Islamists strike again. Dhaka Tribune - March 30, 2015.

89 Two brothers remanded after arrest in Sylhet over blogger Ananta’s murder.Bdnews24. com.28Augast,2015.

90 Touhidur Rahman: British IT worker accused of masterminding murders of secular bloggers Avijit Roy and Ananta Bijoy Das in Bangladesh. Officials said that Rahman had played a key role in both planning and financing the attacks.Independent.18 Augast,2015.

91 He was picked up 3 months ago. Says sister of Touhidur, a Bangladesh-born UK citizen whom Rab claimed to have detained Tuesday; family filed GD, abduction case, lodged complaint with NHRC.The Daily Star. August 21.2015.

92 A year on, Avijit murder not decoded.The Financial Express.26 February, 2016.

93 Sugam.P; Laura.S.S. “Bangladeshi blogger Niloy Neel hacked to death in latest attack”. CNN. 7 August 2015.

94 Police refused Niloy protection.Dhaka Tribune.7Augast,2015.

95 Secular publisher hacked to death in latest Bangladesh attacks. Faisal Abedin Deepan killed on same day as attacks on publisher Ahmed Rahim Tutul and two writers. Associated Press.31October 2015.

91 96 Ansar-Al-Islam claims responsibility for Niladri murder. The Daily Star. 7Augast,2015.

97 Ghannam.F. The Rise and Decline of a Heterotopic Space: Views from Midan al-Tahrir. January 2016. Jadaliyya.

92

PREVIOUSLY APPEARED IN THE SERIES _ Honduras _ Dina Meza, Kidnapped _ Vietnam _ Bui Thanh Hieu, Speaking in Silence _ China _ Sofie Sun, Drugs for the Mind _ Ethiopia _ Bisrat Handiso, Genocide of Thought _ Macedonia _ Tomislav Kezharovski, Likvidacija/Annihilation

TO APPEAR THIS SPRING _ Cuba _ Amir Valle, Gagged _ Cuba _ Amir Valle, Palabras Amordazadas _ Bangladesh _ MD Parvez Alam, Disappearing Public-Spheres _ Turkey _ Fréderike Geerdink, Bans, Jails and Shameless Lies _ Economics _ Peter de Haan, Censorship Alert

TO APPEAR IN AUTUMN _ El Salvador _ Jorge Galán, The Long Shadow _ Surinam _ Sylvana van den Braak, A Fri Wortu

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