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Keynes X Hayek [Recurso Eletrônico] : a Origem E a Herança Do Maior Dueloeconômico Da História / Nicholas Wapshott ; Tradução Ana Maria Mandim

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Keynes X Hayek [Recurso Eletrônico] : a Origem E a Herança Do Maior Dueloeconômico Da História / Nicholas Wapshott ; Tradução Ana Maria Mandim Tradução de Ana Maria Mandim 1ª edição 2016 CIP-BRASIL. CATALOGAÇÃO NA PUBLICAÇÃO SINDICATO NACIONAL DOS EDITORES DE LIVROS, RJ W225k Wapshott, Nicholas Keynes x Hayek [recurso eletrônico] : a origem e a herança do maior dueloeconômico da história / Nicholas Wapshott ; tradução Ana Maria Mandim. - 1. ed. - Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2016. recurso digital Tradução de: Keynes x Hayek: the clash that defined modern economics Formato: epub Requisitos do sistema: adobe digital editions Modo de acesso: world wide web Inclui bibliografia e índice Sumário, nota ISBN 978-85-01-0918-0 (recurso eletrônico) 1. Keynes, John Maynard, 1883-1946 . 2. Hayek, Friedrich A. von (Friedrich August von), 1899-. 3. Economia. 4. Política econômica. 5. Livros eletrônicos. I. Mandim, Ana Maria. II. Título. 16-33984 CDD: 306.4 CDU: 392.6 Copyright © Nicholas Wapshott, 2011 Título original em inglês: Keynes x Hayek: the clash that defined modern economics Todos os direitos reservados. Proibida a reprodução, armazenamento ou transmissão de partes deste livro, através de quaisquer meios, sem prévia autorização por escrito. Texto revisado segundo o novo Acordo Ortográfico da Língua Portuguesa. Direitos exclusivos de publicação em língua portuguesa para o Brasil adquiridos pela EDITORA RECORD LTDA. Rua Argentina, 171 – Rio de Janeiro, RJ – 20921-380 – Tel.: (21) 2585-2000, que se reserva a propriedade literária desta tradução. Produzido no Brasil ISBN 978-85-01-0918-0 Seja um leitor preferencial Record. Cadastre-se e receba informações sobre nossos lançamentos e nossas promoções. Atendimento e venda direta ao leitor: [email protected] ou (21) 2585-2002. A Anthony Howard Sumário Prefácio 1. O herói glamoroso Como Keynes se tornou o ídolo de Hayek, 1919-27 2. Fim do império Hayek experimenta a inflação diretamente, 1919-24 3. As linhas da batalha são traçadas Keynes nega a ordem “natural” da economia, 1923-29 4. Stanley e Livingstone Keynes e Hayek se encontram pela primeira vez, 1928-30 5. O homem que matou Liberty Valance Hayek chega de Viena, 1931 6. Duelo ao alvorecer Hayek critica severamente A Treatise, de Keynes, 1931 7. Devolver fogo! Keynes e Hayek entram em conflito, 1931 8. A empreitada italiana Keynes pede a Piero Sraffa que continue o debate, 1932 9. Rumo à Teoria Geral A cura grátis para o desemprego, 1932-33 10. Hayek pisca A Teoria Geral convida a uma resposta, 1932-36 11. Keynes arrebata os Estados Unidos Roosevelt e os jovens economistas do New Deal, 1936 12. Irremediavelmente empacado no capítulo 6 Hayek escreve sua própria “Teoria Geral”, 1936-41 13. A estrada para lugar nenhum Hayek vincula as soluções de Keynes à tirania, 1937-46 14. Os anos no deserto Mont Pèlerin e a mudança de Hayek para Chicago, 1944-69 15. A era de Keynes Três décadas de prosperidade americana inigualada, 1946-80 16. A contrarrevolução de Hayek Friedman, Goldwater, Thatcher e Reagan, 1963-88 17. A batalha reiniciada Economistas de água doce e de água salgada, 1989-2008 18. E o vencedor é... Evitando a Grande Recessão de 2008 em diante Agradecimentos Notas Bibliografia selecionada Índice Prefácio Foi, talvez, o episódio mais incomum no longo duelo entre os dois gigantes do pensamento econômico do século XX. Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, John Maynard Keynes e Friedrich Hayek passaram a noite toda juntos, sozinhos, no telhado da capela de King’s College, Cambridge.1 A tarefa deles era olhar para o céu e procurar bombardeiros alemães com a missão de despejar bombas incendiárias nas pequenas cidades pitorescas da Inglaterra. Na primavera e no verão de 1941, em retaliação ao bombardeio britânico das cidades medievais Lübeck, que abrigava um covil de submarinos, e Rostok, terra natal das oficinas do bombardeiro Heinkel, aviões alemães bombardearam uma série de cidades inglesas sem valor estratégico. Exeter, Bath e York suportaram tempestades de chamas que puseram em risco construções antigas. Os redatores britânicos das manchetes dos jornais criaram a expressão “A blitz Baedeker”, porque parecia que os aviões alemães selecionavam os alvos britânicos consultando o guia de viagens alemão que classificava as cidades de acordo com seu valor cultural. Embora tivesse poucas indústrias de guerra importantes, Cambridge garantiu seu lugar no cardápio nazista de devastação por sua universidade fundada na Idade Média. Noite após noite, a faculdade e os estudantes de King’s, armados de pás, faziam rodízio para vigiar o teto da enfeitada capela gótica, cuja pedra de fundação foi lançada por Henrique IV em 1441. Os que vigiavam a Catedral de St. Paul’s em Londres haviam descoberto que não existia remédio contra uma bomba incendiária, mas que, se a bomba pudesse ser empurrada por cima da beirada do parapeito antes de pôr fogo no telhado, o dano seria mínimo. E, assim, Keynes, perto dos 60 anos, e Hayek, com 41 anos, sentaram-se e esperaram o iminente ataque germânico, as pás encostadas na balaustrada de pedra calcária. Estavam unidos pelo medo comum de não ser corajosos ou ágeis o bastante para salvar a venerável incumbência de pedra. Foi particularmente coerente que os dois economistas desafiassem o perigo nazista, porque ambos, de diferentes modos, haviam previsto o surgimento da tirania do nacional socialismo e pressagiado a ascensão de Hitler. Keynes era um jovem professor de economia em King’s, quando, na deflagração da Primeira Guerra Mundial, foi recrutado pelo Tesouro, o ministério britânico das finanças, para levantar dinheiro de Wall Street a fim de financiar os esforços aliados. Quando a guerra terminou em 1918, Keynes foi mantido no posto para aconselhar sobre a melhor forma de extrair dos alemães derrotados as reparações de guerra. Keynes ficou chocado com o que descobriu nas conversações de paz em Paris. Enquanto os vitoriosos líderes aliados, incitados pela vingança, saboreavam a miséria que esperavam infligir à nação alemã mediante severas punições financeiras, Keynes via a questão de um ângulo bem diferente. Ele acreditava que levar à miséria uma nação comercial moderna como a Alemanha seria impor uma pobreza paralisante a seus cidadãos e que isso proporcionaria as condições para o surgimento de políticos extremistas, insurreição, até revolução. Keynes achava que, em vez de levar a Primeira Guerra Mundial a um fim justo, o Tratado de Versalhes plantava as sementes da Segunda Guerra Mundial. De volta a casa, escreveu The Economics Consequences of the Peace [As consequências econômicas da paz], uma acusação devastadora da loucura dos líderes Aliados. O livro foi best-seller em todo o mundo e deu a Keynes notoriedade internacional como economista com senso comum. A eloquência cáustica de Keynes não se perdeu com Hayek, um jovem soldado do exército austríaco na frente italiana que regressou para encontrar devastada sua cidade natal, Viena, e abalada a confiança de seu povo. Hayek e sua família sofreram com a inflação súbita que logo atacou a economia austríaca. Hayek viu os bens de seus pais se derreterem, uma experiência que o colocaria permanentemente contra aqueles que advogavam a inflação como cura para uma economia quebrada. Ele estava determinado a provar que não havia soluções simples para problemas econômicos intratáveis, e veio a acreditar que aqueles que defendiam programas de grandes gastos públicos para reduzir o desemprego acenavam não só para a inflação descontrolada como também para a tirania política. Embora concordassem sobre as falhas do Tratado de Paz de Versalhes, Keynes e Hayek passaram a maior parte dos anos 1930 discordando sobre o futuro da economia. Em pouco tempo, o desacordo incluiu o papel do próprio governo e a ameaça da intervenção no mercado às liberdades individuais. O debate esquentou e, malconduzido, assumiu o espírito de uma briga religiosa. Quando o crash do mercado de ações em 1929 desencadeou a Grande Depressão, os dois homens fizeram afirmações concorrentes sobre a melhor forma de restaurar a saúde da estilhaçada economia mundial. Embora o par finalmente fizesse as pazes, seus ardentes discípulos continuaram a batalha feroz por muito tempo depois que os dois homens morreram. Em setembro de 2008, aconteceu outro crash em Wall Street e outra crise financeira mundial estourou. O presidente George W. Bush, partidário ostensivo das opiniões de Hayek sobre a santidade do livre mercado, defrontou-se com uma dura escolha: observar o mercado estabilizar-se em uma depressão que poderia rivalizar com a de oitenta anos antes, ou rapidamente adotar soluções keynesianas para gastar trilhões de dólares emprestados do governo para proteger de maiores danos a economia que naufragava. A perspectiva de deixar o livre mercado chegar a sua pior situação era tão alarmante que, sem pensar duas vezes, Bush abandonou Hayek e abraçou Keynes. A eleição de um novo presidente, Barack Obama, desviou a atenção de novas e vastas injeções de dinheiro emprestado na economia. Mas, antes que os fundos de estímulo fossem completamente esgotados, houve violenta reação popular contra incorrer em tais níveis de dívida pública sem precedentes. O movimento Tea Party levantou-se para exigir que a administração mudasse seu curso. “Hank, o povo americano não gosta de resgates financeiros”,2 foi a repreensão de Sarah Palin, a mais respeitada figura do Tea Party, ao secretário do Tesouro, Henry Paulson, em outubro de 2008. Glenn Beck, comentarista político, fez reviver a reputação de Hayek ao chamar a atenção dos americanos para o negligenciado livro de Hayek, Road to Serfdom [Estrada para a servidão], e, assim, o austríaco há muito esquecido subiu ao topo das relações de livros mais vendidos. Keynes agora estava por fora, e Hayek, por dentro. As discussões em torno de afirmações divergentes sobre as virtudes do livre mercado e da intervenção do governo proliferam hoje tão ferozmente quanto nos anos 1930. Então, quem estava certo, Keynes ou Hayek? Este livro é uma tentativa de responder à pergunta que dividiu políticos e economistas por oitenta anos e mostrar que as inflexíveis diferenças entre dois homens excepcionais continuam a marcar a grande divisão entre as ideias dos liberais e dos conservadores até o dia de hoje.
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