Exchange-Rate Stabilisation in Greece and South-East Europe Between Economic and Political Objectives and Fiscal Reality, 1841-1939
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European Historical Economics Society EHES WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY | NO. 84 Any lessons for today? Exchange-rate stabilisation in Greece and South-East Europe between economic and political objectives and fiscal reality, 1841-1939 Matthias Morys University of York SEPTEMBER 2015 EHES Working Paper | No. 84 | September 2015 Any lessons for today? Exchange-rate stabilisation in Greece and South-East Europe between economic and political objectives and fiscal reality, 1841-1939 Matthias Morys* University of York Abstract We add a historical and regional dimension to the debate on the Greek debt crisis. Analysing the 1841-1939 exchange-rate experience of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia/Yugoslavia, we find surprising parallels to the present: repeated cycles of entry to and exit from gold, government debt build-up and default, and financial supervision by West European countries. Periods of stable exchange-rates were more short-lived than in any other part of Europe as a result of “fiscal dominance”, i.e., a monetary policy subjugated to the treasury’s needs. Granger causality tests show that patterns of fiscal dominance were only broken under financial supervision, when strict conditionality scaled back the influence of treasury; only then were central banks able to pursue a rule-bound monetary policy and, in turn, stabilize their exchange-rates. Fiscal institutions have remained weak in the case of Greece and are at the heart of the current crisis. A lesson for today might be that the EU-IMF programmes – with their focus on improving fiscal capacity and made effective by conditionality similar to the earlier South-East European experience – remain the best guarantor of continued Greek EMU membership. Understandable public resentment against “foreign intrusion” needs to be weighed against their potential to secure the long-term political and economic objective of exchange-rate stabilisation. JEL classification: N13, N14, N23, N24, E63, F34 Keywords: fiscal dominance, gold standard, financial supervision, South-East Europe Acknowledgements: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, the Wirtschaftshistorischer Ausschuss (Verein für Socialpolitik) and at the Banque de France. We are grateful to the participants for their spirited discussion and helpful suggestions. We owe a special thanks to the following people in helping us collect the data, sharing their data and/or explaining country-specific idiosyncracies for which knowledge of the local languages was often essential: Adriana Aloman, Rumen Avramov, Elisabeta Blejan, Olga Christodoulaki, Brandusa Costache, Sofia Lazaretou, Stefan Nikolic and Michael Palairet. Last but not least, the paper owes a great deal to discussions within the South-East European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) on how best to interpret the SEE monetary experience. The usual disclaimer applies. * Matthias Morys, University of York, E-mail: [email protected] Notice The material presented in the EHES Working Paper Series is property of the author(s) and should be quoted as such. The views expressed in this Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the EHES or its members Any lessons for today? Exchange-rate stabilisation in Greece and South-East Europe between economic and political objectives and fiscal reality, 1841-1939 Matthias Morys Department of Economics University of York August, 2015 Prepared for 9th Bi-annual Meeting of the European Historical Economics Society, held in Pisa, Italy, 4th – 5th September 2015 10th Annual Conference of the South-East European History Network, organised by the Österreichische Nationalbank and the University of Vienna and held in Vienna, Austria, 1st – 2nd October 2015 Abstract We add a historical and regional dimension to the debate on the Greek debt crisis. Analysing the 1841-1939 exchange-rate experience of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia/Yugoslavia, we find surprising parallels to the present: repeated cycles of entry to and exit from gold, government debt build-up and default, and financial supervision by West European countries. Periods of stable exchange-rates were more short-lived than in any other part of Europe as a result of “fiscal dominance”, i.e., a monetary policy subjugated to the treasury’s needs. Granger causality tests show that patterns of fiscal dominance were only broken under financial supervision, when strict conditionality scaled back the influence of treasury; only then were central banks able to pursue a rule-bound monetary policy and, in turn, stabilize their exchange-rates. Fiscal institutions have remained weak in the case of Greece and are at the heart of the current crisis. A lesson for today might be that the EU-IMF programmes – with their focus on improving fiscal capacity and made effective by conditionality similar to the earlier South-East European experience – remain the best guarantor of continued Greek EMU membership. Understandable public resentment against “foreign intrusion” needs to be weighed against their potential to secure the long-term political and economic objective of exchange-rate stabilisation. Keywords: fiscal dominance, gold standard, financial supervision, South- East Europe JEL classification: N13, N14, N23, N24, E63, F34 _____________________________ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, the Wirtschaftshistorischer Ausschuss (Verein für Socialpolitik) and at the Banque de France. We are grateful to the participants for their spirited discussion and helpful suggestions. We owe a special thanks to the following people in helping us collect the data, sharing their data and/or explaining country-specific idiosyncracies for which knowledge of the local languages was often essential: Adriana Aloman, Rumen Avramov, Elisabeta Blejan, Olga Christodoulaki, Brandusa Costache, Sofia Lazaretou, Stefan Nikolic and Michael Palairet. Last but not least, the paper owes a great deal to discussions within the South-East European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) on how best to interpret the SEE monetary experience. The usual disclaimer applies. 1 1. Introduction The on-going Greek financial crisis has laid bare serious economic fragilities in the South- Eastern corner of the 19 member strong euro area: a government debt stock of 170% of annual economic output of the Greek economy, a dangerous bank-sovereign embrace seriously undermining financial stability, and an economy in its seventh year of recession which has declined more than a quarter since its 2008 peak. In tandem with the process of weakening economic data, politics has become more difficult to navigate: torn between creditor demands for structural improvements of the economy and domestic reform fatigue, the Greek government attempts to please simultaneously the international and the domestic audience yet frustrates both in the process. As a result, the scenario of Grexit over the medium term – i.e., the exit of Greece from the euro area coupled with the reintroduction of a national currency – looms large, though few observers expect it to be imminent given the 12th July 2015 accords between Greece and its creditors. Yet while the Greek financial crisis boasts several superlatives – largest international bail-out ever, highest European Union debt-to-GDP ratio (and second only to Japan among the OECD countries) and a GDP decline of Great Depression proportions – and has generated an extraordinary academic and media attention since it broke in autumn 2009, several dimensions of it remain either completely unexplored or, at best, dangerously neglected. More specifically, a better understanding of Greece’s current travails requires adding both a regional and historical dimension. Not only has Greece itself suffered more than its fair share of financial crises since political independence in 1830, but these apparently recurring events have been embedded in a regional context prone to financial instability. To begin with the present: Greece’s economic problems – a twin deficit (budget and current account) financed by capital inflows before the 2008 global financial crisis which was brought under control thereafter only by outside financial help – are widely shared regionally, though on a lesser scale. Romania, the second largest South-East European (SEE in the following) economy after Greece, for instance, received 20 billion euro between 2009 and 2011 as part of the European Union balance-of-payments assistance programme (in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund) and has since then followed two similar programmes (2011-13, 2013-15), yet without drawing actual funds.1 Serbia (since 2009) and Kosovo (2010-2013) both required IMF stand-by-arrangements (with funds drawn) in the wake of the 2008 global 1 ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/romania/index_en.htm (last accessed 21st July 2015). 2 financial crisis. Similarly, most other South-East European countries were under IMF stand- by-arrangements (with funds drawn) either at some point before the 2008 crisis (Croatia 1994-2006; FYROM 1995-2013; Bulgaria 1997-2004; Turkey 1999-2008; Bosnia- Herzegovina 1999-2015) or have joined the regional “trend” since then (Albania: IMF extended fund facility 2014-2017).2 The only SEE country to have completely avoided foreign financial – which has always come together with politically sensitive conditions attached to the loans – is tiny Montenegro; though this partly