Sarmatia Europæa Volume Ii

SARMATIA EUROPÆA

VOLUME II (2011/2012)

Volume II 2011/2012

Political History

edited by Adam Perłakowski in collaboration with Anna Kalinowska

VOLUME II (2011/2012)

Sarmatia Europaea. Polish Review of Early Modern History annual online journal www.sarmatia-europaea.pl

ISSN 2082–5072

Editorial Board: Maciej Forycki (Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań) Anna Kalinowska (Tadeusz Manteuffel Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences) Dariusz Rolnik (University of Silesia in Katowice) Alan Ross (Humboldt–Universität zu Berlin) Adam Perłakowski (Jagiellonian University in Krakow) Tomasz Wiślicz (Tadeusz Manteuffel Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences) Filip Wolański (University of Wrocław), Editor–in–chief

Advisory Board: Sławomir Augusiewicz (University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn) Marian Chachaj (Maria Curie Skłodowska University in Lublin) Robert Kołodziej (University of Wrocław) Waldemar Kowalski (Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce) Mariusz Markiewicz (Jagiellonian University in Krakow) Mirosław Nagielski (University of Warsaw) Bogdan Rok (University of Wrocław) Maciej Serwański (Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań) Ryszard Skowron (University of Silesia in Katowice) Jerzy Ternes (Maria Curie Skłodowska University in Lublin) Michał Zwierzykowski (Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań)

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Contents:

From the Editor (Adam Perłakowski) 5–6

Anna Kalinowska 7–27 The Polish Match? British diplomacy, Poland–Lithuania and the Stuart–Vasa Dynastic Alliance project

Leopold Auer 29–46 Austrian Political Attitudes towards the Polish Republic during the Great Northern War

Zbigniew Anusik 47–64 Gustav III’s coup d’état of 19 August 1772: The end of the “Age of Liberty” in Sweden

Dariusz Nawrot 65–86 French officials on the east land of the Polish Republic in 1812

Wojciech Krawczuk 87–91 Some remarks on Swedish Historiography of the Northern War of 1655–1660

Adam Perłakowski 93–117 “At the gates of a European policy” Achievements and perspectives for research into the international policies of the Polish Commonwealth during the reign of Friedrich Augustus II Wettin (1697–1733)

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From the Editor

The second volume of “Sarmatia Europea” has been dedicated entirely to political history. In the 19th century this branch of historical science was considered to be the most prestigious and, therefore, it was often argued that other research directions did not deserve as much attention. It was believed that only by studying the mechanisms behind high politics and diplomacy could one answer to the question "what really happened?" This line of reasoning has been of course abandoned with time, although the interest in political history is still very much alive. In this volume we want to present the latest contributions of only few of the researchers interested in the political history of the Polish– Lithuanian Commonwealth and its neighbors in the 17th–19th centuries. During this period Europe witnessed some important changes – the decline of old Powers like Poland–Lithuania and Turkey and the emergance of new ones such as Prussia, Russia and Austria. This clearly had a significant impact on the developments in East Central and Eastern Europe until the early 20th century. Some of our authors focused their texts on complicated dynastic policy – Anna Kalinowska presented a little known 17th –century project of a dynastic alliance between the Stuarts and the Polish Vasas, based on marriage negotiations between Władysław IV and Elizabeth, the Princess Palatine, daughter of "the Winter king" Frederick V and nice of Charles I. In his thought–provoking article, Leopold Auer focused on relations between Poland–Lithuania and the Empire during the so called Great Northern War (1700–1721). One of the key factors in Swedish political history of the late 18th and 19th c. was discussed in the article by Zbigniew Anusik, who

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analyzed the 1772 coup d'état organized by Gustavus III of the House of Holstein–Gottorf and examined its impact on Swedish society. In spite of a negative assessment of the king's actions by Swedish liberal historiography, which accuses him of tyranny and suppressing his subjects' freedoms, Gustavus enjoyed the support of the majority of society who hoped that he would be able to prevent further decline of Sweden's international position and improve the government petrified by the 50–year–long “Age of Liberty”. The link between the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century was established in the text by Dariusz Nawrot, who presented the performance of French officials and their duties on the Eastern territories of the former Polish–Lithuanian State during the French–Russian War of 1812 – a moment of crucial importance for the future of both Poland and Eastern Europe. Two final articles summarized the achievements of Polish and Swedish historiographies: Wojciech Krawczuk analyzed Swedish publications on the second Northern War (1655–1660), so called “Swedish Deluge”, while Adam Perłakowski presented the attitudes of Polish historians towards Augustus II Wettin (1697–1733), from the 19th up to the 21st century. Of course all these texts do not pretend to be the final say in the academic debates on the subjects they address. They aim rather to provoke further discussions and to result in inspiring completely new theories or more fully confirming the ones that have been already presented. We hope, therefore, that just as in the case of the previous volume of Sarmatia Europea, the current one will not stay unnoticed by our colleagues. Adam Perłakowski

Anna Kalinowska (Warsaw)

The Polish Match? British diplomacy, Poland–Lithuania and the Stuart–Vasa Dynastic Alliance project

Although Samuel R. Gardiner famously argued in his monumental History of England that Charles I “had no European policy at all”, modern historians are of a different opinion. The fact is that in the 1630s the king was much more active in the field of foreign relations than it had once been believed. Scholars unambiguously point to the restitution of the Palatinate to the king's sister’s children as the main objective of his diplomatic efforts and the reasoning that stood behind his policy towards major European powers: the Empire, Spain and France1 It has also been recognised that this factor had a huge impact on Britain’s relations with other countries, including Sweden and Poland–Lithuania2. The very fact that Charles I’s diplomacy viewed the Polish– Lithuanian Commonwealth as a partner, both commercially and politically, should not be surprising. Poland’s position in Central and Eastern Europe and its political role in the Baltic region had already been recognized in London, especially after 16033. What may be intriguing is Charles I’s serious involvement in the project that emerged in the early 1630s to build a

1 I. Atherton, Ambition and failure in Stuart England: the career of John, first viscount Scudemore, Manchester 1999, 177. 2 J.K. Fedorowicz, England's Baltic trade in the early seventeenth century. A study in Anglo–Polish commercial diplomacy, Cambridge 1981, 229. 3 Ibidem, s. 40–45. 7

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dynastic alliance between the House of Stuart and the Polish Vasa line, an attempt which framed two countries’ relations for more than a decade. The plans of the match between Polish King Władysław IV (r. 1632–1648) and Charles I’s niece, princess Elizabeth, the eldest daughter of Frederick V and Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia, has been well known to historians. However, the project is usually presented in a rather two– dimensional way. It is usually concluded simply that either the princess declined the possibility to become the queen for she did not want to relinquish her religion4, or that the Polish king saw the marriage only as an instrument to secure Charles I’s military and diplomatic assistance against Sweden5 and part of a scheme to control relations between Catholics and Protestants in the early years of his reign6. The only studies linking it to the British policy of the period, although very interesting, need to be revisited today7. Therefore, this text aims to place this problem in a wider diplomatic context, which must be done in two steps. Firstly, the information available about British diplomacy’s reactions to the plan and the following events should be summarized. Secondly, a possible explanation as to why, contrary to what has been argued, London showed ongoing interest in following the scheme even when it was quite unlikely to succeed, should be presented.

4 E. Godfrey, A sister of Prince Rupert. Elizabeth Princess Palatine and Abbess of Herford, London–New York 1909, 70–73. 5 A. Szelągowski, Rozkład Rzeszy i Polska za panowania Władysława IV, Kraków1907, 55–56, 132, W. Czapliński, Władysław IV i jego czasy, Warszawa1976, 175–199. 6 J. Dzięgielewski, O tolerancję dla zdominowanych. Polityka wyznaniowa Rzeczypospolitej w latach panowania Władysława IV, Warszawa 1986, 98. 7 J.K. Fedorowicz, op.cit, T. Wasilewski, Projekt sojuszu angielsko–polskiego i małżeństwa Władysława IV z Elżbietą. siostrzenicą Karola I Stuarta, „Rocznik Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego”, 46 (1983), 83–85. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

The beginnings of the project remain unclear. Some historians argue that the first steps were taken by the Polish side as early as in late 1632, when Władysław supposedly asked the senators during the royal election if they would consider the possibility of him marrying a Protestant princess8. This was mentioned in a short English description of the electoral assembly that was sent to Britain and probably reached the court soon after the election ended9. There is no evidence, though, that could confirm that this was in fact the first sign of interest in a possible alliance with the Stuarts. As the report’s authorship is not certain one can neither argue that the whole situation was staged to attract attention of the English court, nor can this idea be completely rejected10. It seems almost certain that the diplomatic game was well on by late in the summer of 1633. In February, the first representative of the new Polish king visited London. It was young Duke Janusz Radziwiłł, son of Krzysztof Radziwiłł, one of the new king's strongest supporters and head of the Protestant faction. He was to inform Charles I about Władysław's election, as well as confirm good relations between the two monarchs11 . What seems interesting is that he was accompanied by his father's confidant Aleksander Przypkowski, who was later to play an important role in the matrimonial negotiations and was one of the few people involved directly in the project. Just few months later, in June, another Polish diplomat, Jan Zawadzki, arrived at the British court. He approached the king in Edinburgh, where he witnessed Charles I’s coronation and conducted talks

8 Z. Trawicka, Projekt kalwińskiego małżeństwa Władysława IV, „Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce”, 11 (1966), 93. 9 Opis Elekcji Władysława IV, ed. F. Kuczyński, London 1854, 20. 10 J.K. Fedorowicz, op. cit., 300. 11 Ceremonies of Charles I. The Note Books of John Finet Master of Ceremonies, 1628– 1641, ed. A. J. Loomie, S.J., New York 1987, 134. 9

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with the king himself and the secretary of state, Sir John Coke. Their conversations dealt mainly with the possibility of Władysław mediating in Germany, economic issues and British involvement in the future peace mediation between Poland and Sweden12. There is no evidence that either young Radziwiłł or Zawadzki presented any marriage propositions. It should be noted, however, that as early as at the beginning of July, Venetian ambassador Vicenzo Gussoni informed his government that in London “they would be glad if that king inclined to marry young princess Palatine, his Majesty's niece”, and that Krzysztof Radziwiłł favoured the idea and declared his support for the business13. A few weeks later, on his way back from Scotland, Zawadzki stopped in London, where he kept incognito, and contacted Sir Thomas Roe, a former British mediator and ambassador to Poland. At the beginning, the focus of their talks was on the future mediation14. It appears possible that this was not the only issue they discussed, as in mid–August Roe mentioned the Polish king’s interest in princess Elizabeth to her mother. In early September, the Queen of Bohemia thanked him, as she put it, for “the news of Poland” and she also noted that during his stay in The Hague en route to Britain, Zawadzki had not mentioned the possible match (although he had tried to buy portrait of the young princess). She also informed Roe that her mother–in–law living in Berlin had been approached by a Polish diplomat who had wanted to discuss her grand–daughter’s future with her, but she expressed no enthusiasm about the issue. However, she added that if her

12 The National Archives (thereafter: TNA), SP88/8, f. 151. 13 Calendar of State Papers relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice (hereafter: CSPV 23), vol. 23, ed. Allen B. Hinds, London 1921, 123. 14 TNA: SP 88/8, f. 165. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

brother took the Polish proposition seriously she was willing to give it some consideration15. Within next few months the planned marriage became an issue widely talked about in Europe, but that did not change the Queen of Bohemia’s attitude. Her letter to Roe from January of 1634 expressed serious doubts about the rationality of the plan. Additionally, she stated her belief that “old friends both tied by bond and religion are better than new, that are neither one nor the other”16. Her stance was the same in the spring, when an unofficial representative of the Polish king, Aleksander Przypkowski, who was to start the marriage negotiations on behalf of his master, arrived at The Hague and later in London. There are few details on Przypkowski’s mission, but it seems that he dealt not only with the marriage, but also with Charles I’s involvement in the Polish–Swedish mediation17. In the spring of 1634 the question of the match was finally mentioned in the correspondence of the British diplomatic agent in Poland– Lithuania, Francis Gordon18. Very early on he informed his supervisors about the strong Catholic resistance to the king’s matrimonial plans, particularly that coming from a number of bishops and high–ranking officials, and about their efforts aimed at stopping the negotiations and preventing the wedding, but he also stressed Władysław’s determination to marry princess Palatinate. According to his reports, the king had regularly talked to him about the situation and implied that the opposition was not as strong as it was believed and that even the senators who in public protested

15 Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1633–34, ed. J. Bruce, London 1863, 195. 16 Ibidem, 398. 17 Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1634–35 (hereafter: CSPD 1634–35), ed. J. Bruce, London 1864, 42. 18 TNA, SP88/8, f. 218. 11

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against the match in private admitted that they could change their minds if they were presented with evidence that it would bring serious advantages to Poland–Lithuania19. Gordon seemed to be equally convinced that the marriage was going to take place when he had an opportunity to report the latest events to Charles I himself in July 163520. Gordon’s letters also confirm that his information could have come from officials close to the Polish king and involved in the project, including the royal courtiers Andrzej Rey, Zygmunt Guldenstern and Protestant leaders Rafał Leszczyński and Krzysztof Radziwiłł21. A completely different attitude towards the arrangement was adopted by Sir George Douglas, British special ambassador who arrived in Poland in early in the spring of 1635. During his stay in Prussia (where he was involved in preparations for the Swedish–Polish mediation) and at the Polish court, he discussed the match with the same people as Gordon, i.e. Radziwiłł and Leszczyński and the king himself22. Despite Władysław’s efforts to win the diplomat over, he was far from enthusiastic about the planned marriage. When in March the monarch propounded the issue to the Senate, Douglas was still in Warsaw. He informed his superiors that the senators’ reactions were quite positive, but at the same time, he admitted that he did nothing to advocate the match to those who were opposing it. As he stated, when they approached him trying to talk about the possible marriage he “answered them gently and sparingly, keeping myselfe reserved and aloofe to the end that his Maty my gratious Master not appearing much interested or intentive therein (…)”23

19 Ibidem, f. 244. 20 CSPV 23, 425. 21 TNA: SP88/8, f. 226–7, SP88/9, ff. 12, 86, 229. 22 TNA: SP 88/9, f. 12. 23 Ibidem, f. 18. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Douglas’ actions were to some extent a sharp contrast to his instructions, as Charles I had ordered him to promote the match as well as indicate to Władysław the advantages of a dynastic alliance with the Stuarts, including military support, permission for levying of English, Scottish and Irish soldiers and improvement of commercial relations, all of which could result in increasing Poland–Lithuania’s position in the Baltic region. The ambassador was also to move the king to action by reminding him that it was he who had mentioned the marriage for the first time and now he should act in a honourable way 24. After moving back to Prussia, where he was to take part in the peace mediation in Stumdorf, Douglas’ opinion only worsened. He believed that he was not being treated in a proper way by the Poles and became suspicious about the king’s real intentions. The final straw came during the ceremony of signing the truce when Polish commissioners gave precedence to the French ambassador, Count d’Avoux25. This led the ambassador to openly accuse both the king and his officials of duplicity and send to London a very detailed report concerning the recent events. Regarding the wedding, he wrote that he believed the Poles “(…) fish occasions to break the match. I begin to suspect that they never meant more by it then this to serve their time.” He did not mention, however, on what grounds he had formed this strong judgment, although he repeated his accusations and complains in further letters sent to London26. Douglas’ attitude did not go unnoticed by the Polish monarch, who decided to complain to Charles I about the ambassador’s behaviour. In the

24 Ibidem, f. 3. 25 J. Fowler, The History of the Troubles of Suethland and Poland...concluding with a brief commemoration of the life and death of Sir George Douglas Knight... , London 1656, 230. 26TNA,SP 88/9, ff. 88–88v, 91–92, 94–94. 13

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meantime, Gordon worked to ease the situation. He tried not only to mollify the Poles but also to persuade the secretary of state that he did not believe that Douglas could have behaved in such an improper way and that the whole situation was the result of a misunderstanding and machinations of the French, who were trying to sabotage the match27. Gordon’s efforts, and probably also the gradual change of Douglas’ actions, led to improved relations between the ambassador and the Polish king. By the end of the year, Douglas had informed his supervisors that Władysław had realized his mistake and felt ashamed for his actions, so now he treated him with respect and sympathy. Douglass even suggested that his conflict with the Poles was nothing but a result of “the tricks and machinations of the priests then the fault of the king”28. There was also a change in his position on the match. Douglas was still, to say the least, sceptical about the business. He expressed serious doubts as to why Władysław, who officially declared his determination to marry Princess Elizabeth, did so little to win over his subjects’ support for the plan, and reported that even the Protestants had reservations about the wedding. It should be noted that he did not repeat his previous accusations and complaints again. However, the ambassador was very critical of Gordon. He did not deny that the agent was an honest man, but in his opinion, Gordon “was more credules for these Poles than (for What that I see) He hase causa, and I’m affraid that they work upon that aptnes and facility of his to believe them for I have observed that they find and know him sufficiently”29. By then, Charles I and his secretaries of state must have known not only about Douglas’ suspicions but also about the arrival at The Hague of Władysław’s messenger Pstrokoński, in mid–September, who presented the

27 Ibidem, f. 155f. 28 Ibidem, f. 194. 29 Ibidem, f. 199f. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

princess with a private letter from the king and suggested that it would strengthen her chances to become queen of Poland if she decided to convert to Catholicism30. Moreover, in January, another representative of the Polish monarch, Aleksander Przypkowski visited The Hague and London for the second time31. And although, similarly to his first mission, there is only scarce information about his actions, it seems that Przypkowski made some propositions that were not well received by Charles I and the Queen of Bohemia, as Elizabeth complained about this to Roe32. Despite all of this, the king and his counsellors showed neither signs of anxiety nor plans to give up the project. On the contrary, it was decided that Douglas should be recalled as he was believed to be responsible for some of the problems related to the planned match and accused of trying to ruin it by prompting the Queen of Bohemia’s reservations33. Whether the ambassador really did try to sabotage the planned marriage or not, the Queen herself was showing, at least openly, no interest in it. In March 1636, she wrote to Roe that Charles I was given a much too optimistic picture of the business and expressed regret that the king and his counsellors had been too haste in entering talks with Władysław34. Some of her letters from that time show, however, that she was considering the

30 Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1635, ed. J. Bruce, London 1865, 380 31 CSPV 23, 323, 333–4, 336). 32 Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, URL: http://www.british– history.ac.uk/ Date accessed: 27 July 2010, (hereafter: CSPDa), 283: 497–531. 33 TNA, SP 88/9, f. 166, Hartlib Papers – Sheffield University Library; Image consulted on Early Modern Letters Online: http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/hartlib/ (http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk, 6 October 2012), (hereafter: Hartlib Papers), 14/4/42B. 34 Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1635–36, ed. J. Bruce, London 1866, 268. 15

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possibility that her daughter might one day leave for Poland. For instance, she was planning who could possibly join Elizabeth’s entourage35. It seems that in early 1636 both the king and his secretaries of state were still going on with the business. In February, Gordon received new instructions that showed the way London reacted to the recent events. The agent was to inform Władysław that Charles I agreed the princess Palatinate should move to London, as it had been suggested by the Polish king in December, but only after signing the official marriage treaty. Furthermore he was to declare, on behalf of his master, that Charles I was still determined to conclude the project and did not intent to look for any other match for his niece. Gordon was also warned to stay extremely cautious because of the general opposition to the planned alliance from Rome, the Emperor, Spain and France, as well as Jesuits and some Poles, including chancellor Jakub Zadzik36. About the same time, Douglas, who had just received his letters of revocation, departed for England. He intended to explain his actions in person but died on 25th March, just days after leaving Danzig37. As a result, Gordon, who became the only British diplomat in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, was now practically the only source of information for his supervisors. As usual, in almost all of the reports he described in length his meetings with Władysław, who was to declare that he would marry Princess Elizabeth. He also reported on his contacts with the king’s followers (especially Andrzej Rey), averring that the more obstacles to the match emerged the more Władysław was determined to succeed38.

35 CSPDa, 311: 141–174. 36 TNA, SP88/9, f. 184f. 37 J. Fowler, op. cit., 234–236, C. Ogier, Dziennik podróży do Polski, 1635–1636, ed. Z. Gołaszewski, Gdańsk 2010, 214. 38 TNA, SP88/9, f. 228. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

There may be no doubt that Gordon’s reports were welcomed at the British court with contentedness. This is confirmed by the court's reaction to the long–awaited Polish mission that reached London in early summer. It was generally expected that Polish ambassador Jan Zawadzki, the same person who probably first presented the project to the British, had orders to conclude the negotiations and even to sign the marriage treaty. Instead, he declared that although the Polish monarch kept his intentions to marry princess Palatine, the wedding could not take place unless the bride– to–be would convert to Catholicism. Zawadzki even tried to convince Charles I and Henrietta Maria that they should move Elizabeth to change her religion. The king and the court reacted immediately. The diplomat was boycotted by the courtiers and his complaints about the way he was treated were ignored39. Zawadzki responded by accusing Gordon of being responsible for his troubles and demanding a written explanation from the secretary of state, but to no avail. Finally he left for France, although not without informing his hosts that he would be back within few weeks to complete the mission. Gordon, staying at that time in London, was consulted and argued that Władysław had nothing to do with Zawadzki’s requests and that the ambassador did not represent his sovereign, but the opinions of Polish senators40 . The events were similarly commented on by Sir Thomas Roe, who blamed the problems not on the king but on the diplomat, whom he even accused of treason41. Surprisingly, within days after Zawadzki left England, Charles I decided to send Gordon back to Poland to protest the latest events, but in a way that would not hurt the continuation of the project. This was confirmed

39 Ceremonies of Charles I…, 202, CSPV 24: 11–13, C. Ogier, op. cit., 307. 40 TNA, SP88/9, f. 264. 41 CSPDa, 329: 65–83. 17

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by the letter of Palatine Charles Louis to his mother. Writing about the match to his mother, the young prince mentioned that it had been decided that Gordon would be sent to Władysław to complain about Zawadzki's behaviour, but said nothing about abandoning the plan. However, he admitted that the situation was pretty confusing and he did not know how it would develop42. A very similar opinion was presented by Sir Thomas Roe, who also expressed his confusion and mentioned Gordon's mission, but also added that in London “wee hope well”43. According to the Venetian ambassador, Anzolo Correr, who usually knew a lot about the details of Gordon’s reports and instructions, the British diplomat was to inform the Polish king on behalf of Charles I that, although his monarch was not going to persuade his niece to convert, he would not protest if she decided herself to change her confession. Correr also informed his supervisors that Secretary of State Sir Francis Windebank was not very optimistic about the final outcome of the plan; nonetheless, the British did not want to ruin their relations with Poland–Lithuania. Instead, they chose to take some time to find out what Władysław’s real intentions were and, depending on what they discovered, go on with the match or try to find another way to solve the problem of the Palatinate44. Gordon arrived in Danzig in August and in mid–September he talked to Władysław in Vilnius. The king assured him that from the very beginning his intentions had been absolutely honest and that Zawadzki was not to have mentioned conversion, unless in a private conversation with Henrietta Maria, and then only if the queen seemed well–inclined, but he

42 A collection of original royal letters… from year 1619 to 1665, ed. Sir Charles Bromley, London 1787, 72–73. 43 Hartlib Papers, 14/4/46A/B. 44 Calendar of State Papers relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, vol. 24, ed. Allen B. Hinds, London 1923, 11, 15. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

did not give an answer to Charles I’s letters. Gordon argued that, as he had learned from Krzysztof Radziwiłł, with whom he had discussed the issue, the delay was caused by the fact that the king wanted to consult some of the senators and that he was afraid that the opposition may start a rebellion. Radziwiłł also suggested that some of the senators opposed to the match had been bribed by the Spanish ambassador45. The agent’s subsequent reports carried a very similar tone. For the next few months, he mainly wrote about his meeting with Rey, Guldenstern and other supporters of the match and their insistence that the king was desperate to marry princess Palatinate, but did not want to give the opposition an excuse to start a mutiny. He also mentioned that he was afraid for his personal safety, as many opponents of the match pointed him out as its main architect46. Finally, in winter, the agent started to show some signs of scepticism. In his February report he described a conversation with Władysław, who complained that the senators had demanded he chose his bride and their only requirement was her being a Catholic. Gordon also wrote that the French were pressing the king to marry princess Maria Luise Gonzaga and were eager to pay Władysław “a million livres” upon his decision47. It is possible that Gordon was unaware of the events crucial to the future of the plan, but they were well known to many others, including other British diplomats on the Continent. News on the talks about the marriage between the Polish king and the younger sister of the Emperor Archduchess, Cecilia Renata had probably reached London and The Hague long before Gordon reported them. It seems quite possible that the Earl of

45 TNA, SP88/9, f. 284. 46 Ibidem, ff. 286f, 292f. 47 TNA, SP88/10, f. 2. 19

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Arundel, who acted as Charles I’s ambassador extraordinary at the Imperial Court, knew about it in September48. In November, he reported to the Queen of Bohemia about the arrival of the Imperial Representative, father Magni, who was to complete the negotiation and sign the marriage treaty49. The final act of the arrangement was the mission of Andrzej Rey, one of the people deeply involved in the project. In the summer of 1637 he was to inform in London about Władysław’s marriage to the Hapsburg princess and to explain why Władysław had abandoned his earlier plans. As could be expected, Rey was not warmly welcomed at the British court. He was denied diplomatic status and not allowed to present his letters of credence50. Just a few weeks later, Gordon was recalled from the Polish court (he described his final audience with Władysław in a report written in early October), which in practice meant that London had decided to break diplomatic relations with Poland–Lithuania. These developments lead us to the point where it seems necessary to ask why the project of the match between Władysław and the princess Palatinate dominated British policy towards Poland–Lithuania for so long. Moreover, what were the reasons that Charles I and his diplomats seemed so determined not to give it up until the fact that the Polish king was not going to marry the daughter of Frederic V became general knowledge? The primary question of those above seems to be the issue of Charles I’s diplomacy in Poland–Lithuania. There is no reason to believe that any of the secretaries of state, or the king himself, for a very long time had any serious doubts about the project or that they were worried by the discord between Gordon and Douglas, who presented completely different

48 CSPDa, 331: 110–132. 49 CSPDa, 336: 199–217. 50 A. Kalinowska, Misja Andrzeja Reya w Anglii w 1637 roku, „Odrodzenie i Reformacja”, 101 (2007), 7–20. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

views on its reality. Gordon’s information was assumed to be reliable and the fact that for some time he had been travelling between England and Poland every few months, which could have made it difficult for him to get up–to–date news and to stay in touch with other people involved in the plan, was ignored. The only person who stressed this factor was the Queen of Bohemia, who commented that the agent “rides post in this business”, so he may not be up to date either about the latest events or the Poles’ intentions51. Moreover, it should be quite clear, even without the warnings by Douglas, that Gordon was under the strong influence of Władysław and some of his courtiers. He kept regular contact with the monarch, who sent him with a semi–diplomatic mission to Denmark, and he had close ties to Rey and Guldenstern. Both relationships obviously could have compromised his judgment. It is also worth mentioning that Gordon, who in fact could have been held partly responsible for the collapse of the project, was able to keep his position and was not accused of making any serious mistake. The Queen of Bohemia even tried to excuse him by arguing that he was definitely an honest man but “the King of Poland is too hard for him. They have made a fool of the poor Man, taking advantage of his affection for me, and his extreme desire to have the match proceed”52 . Reservations presented by Sir George Douglas seemed to have been completely ignored, even though they were to some extend supported by the news from The Hague about Pstrokoński’s visit in September 1635 and his suggestions that the princess should convert to Catholicism. This may have been due to the fact that the ambassador did not provide any clear evidence of the Poles’ wrongdoing regarding the marriage proposal.

51 CSPDa, 318: 348–372. 52 CSPDa, 331: 110–132. 21

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Instead, in his reports he mainly complained about the way he was being mistreated, especially about the precedence given to the French ambassador, Count d’Avoux. One can also expect that some complications may have been caused by the strong disagreement between secretaries of state Sir Francis Windebank and Sir John Coke. Windebank, promoted to the secretaryship in mid–1632, was one of Charles I’s closest ministers and was involved in the most important activities of the Caroline diplomacy, as he dealt with the Spanish diplomats during negotiations in early 1630s and, at least for some time, strongly supported the Spanish alliance. Coke, secretary from 1625 and supporter of the 'Protestant line', had been in charge of foreign correspondence at same time in 1632 and tried to keep this prerogative even after Windebank’s arrival53. Officially, he succeeded, but in practice he was not involved in the decision making process. Despite attempts to involve himself and increase his influence through the diplomats he was friendly with, he was often unaware of the king’s diplomatic plans and strategies 54. This led to a situation in which the work of the Secretary of State could have been seriously compromised by the secretaries’ competition and by problems with communication between the diplomats on the Continent, the secretaries and the king. However, Coke’s position improved slightly in 1636 as he was not excluded from the diplomatic game with the Hapsburgs, especially during the Earl of Arundel’s mission to Ferdinand II55. Concerning the match, as Coke was officially responsible for diplomats working in Catholic countries, Gordon and Douglas generally

53 M. B. Young, Servility and Service. The Life and Work of Sir John Coke, London 1986, 210. 54 Ibidem, 230. 55 Ibidem, 241. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

wrote to him. Douglas, however, also addressed some of his reports to Windebank and even to Sir Francis Cottington, Chancellor of the Exchequer, another influential royal counsellor56. It seems possible, although it cannot be supported by any strong evidence, that this could have increased tensions at the Secretary of State and influenced the way the ambassador’s behaviour was later interpreted and assessed in London. However, this does not explain why the British seemed to be determined to go on with the match even when other signals, not only Douglas’ “premonition”, indicated that Władysław had decided to withdraw from the marriage negotiations. Although some historians have argued otherwise57, it seems impossible to determine if, for Władysław, the match was from the very beginning only an instrument in his efforts to recover the Swedish throne. Whatever the Polish king’s real intentions were, Charles I must have been aware of Władysław’s aspirations as it was well known in Europe that the newly elected monarch was focused on dynastic ambitions. Even Gordon clearly indicated this in one of his early reports dealing with the marriage “that in this Alliance He [Władysław] hath good hopes to come to his heritable crown and kingdome of Sweden”58. Therefore, Charles I could have (and probably did) suspect that Władysław might have been using the Stuart alliance as an element of his diplomatic game with the Swedes and the Hapsburgs. If Charles I had decided to go on with the plan, it must have been because he believed it would be to his advantage to do so. But to what ends did the king wanted to use the possible Vasa alliance? The answer can be discovered by looking at Charles I’s foreign policy from this period. As it has already been mentioned, there is no doubt

56 TNA, SP88/9, ff. 39, 41. 57 W. Czapliński, op.cit., 191, H. Wisner, Władysław IV, Wrocław–Kraków–Warszawa 1995, 94. 58 TNA, SP88/8, f. 226f. 23

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that in the late 1620s and through the1630s, the king’s activities concentrated on efforts to restore the Palatinate and the electoral title to his nephew. However, he tried to achieve his goals without getting involved in the military conflict on the Continent or provoking any of the main Continental powers, i.e. Spain and France. His strategy was to follow the events and to manoeuvre between Madrid, Vienna and Paris, trying to come to agreement with those who seemed to be more willing to solve the problem of Frederick V’s patrimony. In the early 1630s, Spain seemed to be a much more attractive partner. In 1631 Francis Cottington concluded the first agreement and in 1633 England and Spain signed a maritime treaty that was to regulate their relations. Further talks with Madrid dragged on and the Spaniards presented new requests; at the same time they avoided making any declarations that Charles I could find satisfactory, especially on the issue of the Palatinate. This behaviour caused some serious frustration in London. As a result, with time even the supporters of the Spanish alliance became disheartened and started to look for other options. The obvious choice was to turn to France. It was not an easy decision as the French were trying to strengthen their position in the Netherlands. In the spring of 1635, Charles I learned about the secret treaty between Louis XIII and the Dutch, who had planned the partition of the Spanish Netherlands. They had also allied with Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, who took over the electoral title of Frederick V59. The situation became even more complex when in mid–1635 Saxony and the Emperor signed the Peace of Prague and the Duke of Bavaria married the sister of the Emperor, as both of these events made the restitution of the Palatinate and the electoral title even less probable. The

59 K. Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I, New Haven–London 1992, 509–513. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

only factor that Charles I could use to Britain’s advantage in this diplomatic game was his navy, financed by the ship money that had been collected the previous year, whose negotiating power increased in May, when France declared war on Spain. The king could not get Britain involved in any land military campaign (one must remember that he had not called the Parliament since 1629 and his financial resources were restricted) nor was he very eager to risk his ships without any guarantees that it would solve the problem of Palatinate once and for all. As a result, the only solution seemed to maintain neutrality and to try to use all possible means to strengthen Britain’s position in Europe and continue diplomatic efforts to restore the Palatinate. To some extend this did work as both France and Spain were afraid of Charles I approaching their opponent60. The king decided to use this opportunity by sending three major diplomatic missions to Paris, Madrid and Vienna in the spring of 1636. His diplomats, respectively the Earl of Leicester, Lord Aston and the Earl of Arundel, were to present his propositions and demands, as well as to learn whether any of the rulers they were sent to was ready to accept any accessions61. The turn of events indicates that London had planned to use the possible marriage between Władysław and Elizabeth, although not as a trump card, at least as one of the arguments showing that Britain’s position was in fact stronger that believed by the Hapsburgs and France. Hints that this was in fact one of the factors behind the British interest in the project appeared as early as in 1634. There is no doubt that Sir Thomas Roe's vision of a great northern league formed of Poland and other neutral countries and headed by Charles I, which he had presented to some of his correspondents,

60 L. Bienassis, Richelieu and Britain, 1634–1642 in: The Contending Kingdoms: France and England, 1420–1700, ed. G. Richards, Aldreshot 2008, 136. 61 K. Sharpe, op. cit., 518f. 25

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was much too optimistic; however, it shows that at least some people connected to the British court believed that closer contacts with Władysław could be useful for future diplomatic moves62. This can be confirmed not only by the fact that the match was to become an issue in the discussion between Charles I's agent in Vienna, John Taylor, and the Austrians63,but also by Charles I's action after the Zawadzki's mission. The king, regardless of the personal feelings responsible for his initial reaction, did not decide to risk serious deterioration of relations with Władysław, probably because he still believed that even if the match was unlikely to succeed, keeping the negotiations and theoretical possibility of a wedding could be a useful diplomatic playing card. Unfortunately for British diplomacy, early in 1636 Władysław accepted the Hapsburg proposition presented by father Magni, who was also supported by Spanish diplomats, and entered marriage negotiations with Vienna64. Confirmation of this event by Arundel, who from June had negotiated with Ferdinand II in Linz and then moved to Ratisbon, meant that from London's perspective there was no point in trying to create the impression that the project could still be followed through. In fact, any such attempts were now completely in vain. To conclude, it seems almost impossible to decided what Władysław's and Charles I's real intentions were concerning the match and to what extend it failed because of the Polish king's double–dealing (something he was accused of not only by Douglas, but also by historians), or just because of the changing international situation. One can only assume

62 CSPD 1634–35, 80, CSPDa 287: 32–51, CSPVa: 317–327, Hartlib Papers: 14/4/42A. 63 Calendar of State Papers relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, vol. 23, URL: http://www.british–history.ac.uk/ Date accessed: 27 July 2010, 497–508. 64 R. Skowron, Dyplomaci polscy w Hiszpanii w XVI i XVII wieku, Kraków 1997,165– 168. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

that the fact that British diplomacy in Poland–Lithuania was sometimes less efficient than it should have been had some impact on the project’s failure. It may be argued, however, that it was not only Władysław who was interested in continuing the negotiations and using the planned marriage to achieve his own goals, as it is beyond doubt that the project of the Vasa–Stuart dynastic alliance was generally very much in tune with Charles I's foreign policy of the period. The king aimed to recover the Palatinate by the diplomatic means and military involvement in the Thirty Years War was considered in London to be an extreme that was best to be avoided. Subsequently, any scheme that could strengthen Britain’s position in its negotiations with the Hapsburgs was welcomed as potentially useful. Whether this was to be from the perspective of a tight alliance, confirmed by family ties, between Britain and the still neutral Poland–Lithuania, or only a factor that could have been used to put pressure on the adversaries in the diplomatic game, was to depend on the circumstances.

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Leopold Auer (Vienna)

Austrian Political Attitudes towards the Polish Republic during the Great Northern War

For the Habsburg Monarchy the Polish Republic was, apart from its close dynastic ties1, not only the largest neighbour after the Ottoman Empire but also a potential ally against the Swedes and Turks. It was therefore important to maintain a relationship2 which would ensure Austrian interests and influence and keep at bay the influence of other powers, especially that of France3, in order to prevent a possible threat from the North East. The intervention of the Austrian army in the wake of the alliance of 16564 saved the Republic from Swedish occupation; the coalition

1 Between the 15th and 18th century, eight Polish queens were of Habsburg origin, the first being Elizabeth, daughter of Roman king Albrecht II and wife of Casimir IV, the last being Maria Josepha, daughter of emperor Joseph I and wife of king Augustus III. As a result of his marriage with Anne of Bohemia and Hungary, all successors of Emperor Ferdinand I were descendants of Casimir IV which explains later Habsburg candidacies for the Polish throne. 2 For a general overview on Austro–Polish relations see Jerzy Gaul, Zur Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen Polen und Österreich vom 14.– 20. Jahrhundert, [in:] Weiß–Rot – Rot–Weiß–Rot. Historische Momente polnisch–österreichischer Beziehungen vom 14.– 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna 2005, 3–18, with references to additional literature. Cf. also Österreich–Polen. 1000 Jahre Beziehungen, Studia Austro–Polonica 5, 1996, ed. by J. Buszko and W. Leitsch and Polnisch– österreichische Kontakte sowie Militärbündnisse 1618–1918, ed. by Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, Vienna 2009. 3 For Franco–Polish relations since the early modern period see the recently published volume by O. Chaline, J. Dumanowski, M. Figeac (eds.), Le rayonnement français en Europe centrale du XVIIe siècle à nos jours, Pessac 2009. 4 The alliance of 1 December 1656 was between Emperor Ferdinand III and King John II Casimir. The respective originals of the treaty are kept in the Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych Warsaw [AGAD], Crown Archives and in the haus–, Hof–, und Staatsarchiv Vienna, [HHStA], Allgemeine Urkundenreihe. Cf. L. Bittner, 29

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army under king John Sobieski saved Vienna from Turkish conquest in 16835. The relief of Vienna was the climax of Austro–Polish relations. Sobieski’s subsequent campaigns in Hungary were not equally as successful, and as early as the negotiations at Karlowitz, the weakness of the Polish Republic was made obvious despite the territorial gains in the peace treaty6. The attitudes of Austria towards Poland during the Great Northern War have so far met with little interest by researchers7. The following remarks shall examine these attitudes on the basis of discussions at the

Chronologisches Verzeichnis der österreichischen Staatsverträge, 1, Vienna 1903, 63 n. 332 and Weiß–Rot… , 27, n. 15. 5 For an introduction to the abundant literature on the second Turkish siege of Vienna see K. Vocelka, 1683:1983. Ein Jubiläum? Fortschritt oder Stagnation der historiographischen Aufbereitung der zweiten Wiener Türkenbelagerung, Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 92, 1984, 165– 194; B. R. Kroener, Wien 1983. Internationale Politik und Kriegführung im 17. Jahrhundert – Probleme der Forschung, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, 12, 1985, 181–216; and M. Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence. War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy 1683–1797, London–New York et al. 2003, 166f. 6 For negotiations at Karlowitz see J. Bérenger, La paix de Karlowitz, 26 janvier 1699. Les relations entre l’Europe centrale et l’Empire ottoman, Paris 2010; see also G. Barany, The Anglo–Russian Entente Cordiale of 1697–1698, New York 1986, 55ff. and the remarks by B. Spuler, Die europäische Diplomatie in Konstantinopel bis zum Frieden von Belgrad (1739), [in:] Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven NF, 11, 1935, 53–115, 171–222 and 313–366, here at 56–65. 7 This is pointed out by Jacek Staszewski, Die polnisch–österreichischen Beziehungen im 18. Jahrhundert. Anmerkungen zum Stand der Forschung, [in:] Österreichische Osthefte, 32, 1990, 229–239. A recent contribution to the topic has been made by L. Schilling, Der Wiener Hof und Sachsen–Polen (1697–1764), [in:] Sachsen und Polen zwischen 1697 und 1765), Dresden 1998, 119–136, here at 121–124, Cf. also the remarks by J. A. Gierowski, The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the XVIIIth century. From Anarchy to Well–Organised State, Cracow 1996, esp. 94f. Very surprisingly, there are no references to Austrian attitudes towards Poland during this period in the article by C. Augustynowicz, Habsburgisch–polnische Beziehungen vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert, [in:] Polnisch–österreichische Kontakte…, 41–76, and only very few in the article by T. Ciesielski, Österreichisch–polnische Militärkontakte in der Zeit der polnisch–sächsischen Union 1697–1763, ibid., 141– 152. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Viennese court and of instructions and correspondence with Austrian diplomats sent to Poland. Political strategies were discussed by the members of the Privy Conference8 and then recommended to the emperor for further decision. Discussions on Poland and on which policy to pursue towards the Republic were mainly conducted by the heads or other representatives of the Court Chancery, the Aulic War Council (Hofkriegsrat) and, if necessary, the Bohemian and Hungarian Chanceries, who were also responsible for implementing imperial decisions. Instructions for the diplomatic representatives were drafted according to the conclusions recommended by the Conference and the decisions of the emperor; thus, they are another main source for our knowledge of attitudes towards the Republic. Ambassadors and envoys who were sent to Poland had to deal with both the king and nobles as every agreement had to be confirmed by the diet in order to be binding for the Republic. Consequently, ambassadors or envoys also received credentials presented to various ecclesiastical and secular nobles such as the Primate of Poland or the crown hetmans9. It is not without interest in this context to mention that the king and the republic were addressed in a different way. Whereas the king was entitled to be addressed in the same way as fellow monarchs of the period, as “serenissimus”, the Republic and her aristocratic representatives had to content themselves with the slightly lesser rank of “illustrissimi”10.

8 See for this body S. Sienell, Die Geheime Konferenz unter Kaiser Leopold I. Personelle Strukturen und Methoden zur politischen Entscheidungsfindung am Wiener Hof, Frankfurt am Main et al. 2001. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Sienell for making available to me his yet unpublished manuscript on the protocols of the Conference under Leopold I. 9 Cf. e.g. the credentials of count Erdödy (as below) for the Primate and the Estates, HHStA, Staatenabteilung [StAbt] Polen III, box 1, fol. 20–22v. 10 Cf. the instructions for Count Damian Hugo Virmont of 6 May 1716, fol. 7, and for the Hungarian Vice–Chancellor Count Adam Ladislaus Erdödy of 31 August 1720, fol. 4, HHStA, StAbt, Polen III, box 1. For questions of diplomatic ceremonial in 31

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Personalities at the Viennese court instrumental in the shaping of Austro–Polish relations and in the formulation of a policy towards the Republic were – apart from the emperor himself – the Court Chancellor and the president of the Aulic War Council (Prince Eugene from 1703), together with their respective advisers and, depending on the case, their fellow members in the Privy Conference. Sometimes special committees or commissions were also established to discuss questions relating to Poland11. Periods during which such questions arose were the outbreak of the war, the first Swedish victories and the reign of King Stanislas, the return of King August to power, his constitutional settlement with the Polish aristocracy in 1716/17 and the final phases of the war, the alliance of 1719 between Austria, Hanover and Saxony, and the Polish diet of 172012. Since his election in 1697, the new Polish King, Augustus II13, struggled to strengthen royal power and to establish his descendants as a

general see W. Roosen, Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach, [in:] The Journal of Modern History, 52, 1980, 452–476 and – for the imperial court – L. Auer, Diplomatisches Zeremoniell am Kaiserhof der Frühen Neuzeit: Perspektiven eines Forschungsthemas, [in:] Ralph Kauz et al. (eds.), Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der frühen Neuzeit, Vienna 2009, 33–53. 11 During the last years of the reign of Leopold I this was the commission of Turkish affairs which usually consisted of Counts Harrach (Lord High Steward), Öttingen (Imperial Aulic Council), Mansfeld (Aulic War Council), Kaunitz (Imperial Chancery) and Buccelini (Court Chancery); cf. e.g. HHStA, Staatenabteilung Saxonica box 15, fol. 116–123v (after 19 May 1702). Under Charles VI special conferences in nordicis were held. 12 For an overview on these events see R. I. Frost, The Northern Wars. War, State and Society in Notheastern Europe 1558–1721, Harlow–London et al. 2000. Cf. also D. McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648–1815, London–New York 1983, 78–93 and J. Black, The Rise of the European Powers 1679–1793, London et al. 1990, 21–28. 13 For his reign as king of Poland see J. Staszewski, August II Mocny, Wrocław 1998. For the European context of the election cf. also L. Auer, Das europäische SARMATIA EUROPAEA

hereditary dynasty in Poland14. To achieve this aim he sought to gain Livonia by an agreement with some of the local nobility and to abolish Swedish dominance of the eastern Baltic with the help of Denmark and Russia. When in pursuing this plan, he attacked Livonia at the end of 1699, thus provoking war with Sweden, neither the emperor nor his chief advisers were very happy about it. In the midst of discussions over the partition treaties of the Spanish monarchy15 and with the prospect of yet another impending war, they feared an impact on the issue of the Spanish succession and an eventual merging of the two conflicts. Not least, discussions among Austrian ministers and diplomats of the period reveal both their distrust of Augustus, who was known for his duplicity16, and their anxiety as to the ability of the Polish Republic to wage a successful war: the Republic’s constitutional structure with the predominant role of the aristocracy affected the efficiency of its military system17.

Staatensystem im Zeitalter Prinz Eugens, [in:] Erich Zöllner and Karl Gutkas (eds.), Österreich und die Osmanen – Prinz Eugen und seine Zeit, Vienna 1988, 69–87, 74. 14 J. Black, Rise of the European Powers…, 21f. 15 L. Auer, Europäisches Staatensystem…, 76 and id., Österreichische und europäische Politik um das spanische Erbe, [in:] Archiv und Forschung. Das Haus–, Hof– und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte Österreichs und Europas, ed. by E. Springer and L. Kammerhofer, Vienna 1993, 96–109, here at 99f. 16 In a letter of 22 December 1706 to the Imperial Vice–Chancellor Count Schönborn Prince Eugene stressed this fact by the words “indem der König Augustus kapabel ist, dasjenige heute zu brechen, was er gestern versprochen“; cf. M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, vol. 2, Vienne 1964, 187 and n. 7. His duplicity was also shown after the first treaty of Altranstädt when he led a Saxon– Russian army only one month after secretly ratifying this treaty, which included his abdication as king of Poland; cf. R. Frost, Northern Wars…, 230. 17 On the impact of the aristocratic liberties and privileges on the Polish military system see the perceptive remarks by R. Frost, Northern Wars…, 244–258, and J. Topolski, La réforme militaire en Pologne au XVIIIe siècle, [in:] Jean Bérenger (ed.), La révolution militaire en Europe (XVe–XVIIIe siècles), Paris 1998, 139–148, here at 139–142. Cf. also the report of the Austrian ambassador Count Stratmann of 2 33

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News about the Saxon forces crossing the Dvina reached Vienna via Berlin in March 1700 together with information on the Danish attack on Holstein18. While mandata avocatoria were sent to the Danish king and talks for a planned alliance suspended19, no rupture with Poland occurred. Quite the contrary, the exigencies of the Northern War and the War of the Spanish succession became intertwined. After negotiations led by Count Stratmann, the Austrian ambassador in Warsaw20, an alliance between the emperor and Augustus the Strong was signed on 16 January 1702 and ratified by both parties one month later21. Augustus was to supply 12,000 men from his Saxon troops to the Maritime Powers. In two secret articles, Poland was to be included in the alliance in case of an attack and the king to be assisted against rebel forces. At the same time, Augustus promised to refuse support to the Hungarian rebels under Ferenc Rakoczi22. However, after the battle of

March 1702, HHStA Polen II, box 1, 1702, fol. 82v, in which he asks himself “ob aber die Cron Armee ins Feldt zu gehen, so baldt in standt gesetzt wirdt werden können, alß man es gern sehen thät, daran ist desto mehr zu zweiflen…“. 18 HHStA, Reichskanzlei [RK], Diplomatische Akten, Berichte aus Berlin box 7a, folder Jan/May 1700 and Weisungen nach Berlin box 2c, folder 1695–1700, fol. 172–173v; HHStA, StAbt Dänemark box 20, Varia, fol. 42–44 and 56–58v. 19 HHStA, RK, Vorträge box 6a, folder 1697–1702, fol. 174–179; HHStA, RK, Kleinere Reichsstände box 209, fol. 290–293v. 20 See his reports between first and 26 January 1702, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 1, 1702, fol. 2–2v, 5–5v, 19v, 44–49. Count Heinrich Stratmann was a son of Court Chancellor Theodor Althet Stratmann. 21 L. Bittner, Chronologisches Verzeichnis…, 119, n. 620. Copies of the treaty are kept in HHStA, Allgemeine Urkundenreihe and ibid., Kriegsakten box 244, fol. 10r–37r and 81r–87v. One important reason for signing the alliance had been the wish to keep Augustus from concluding an alliance with France; cf. the report of Stratmann, 12 January 1702, loc. cit. fol.19v. 22 When the alliance was signed, Rakoczi stayed in Warsaw with the French resident; cf. the rapport of Stratmann ibid. fol. 19. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Kliszów in which Augustus suffered a crushing defeat23 and after the occupation of large parts of Polish territory by Charles XII, these secret articles do not seem to have been applied, most likely because the Republic had not adhered to the treaty24. The election of King Stanislas in 1704 and the Swedish invasion of Saxony two years later changed the political situation completely. After the election there were practically two kings with their respective supporters fighting each other. Stanislas was generally not accepted; part of the nobles, especially those who were united under the confederation of Sandomierz25, declared themselves in favour of Augustus. This situation left the emperor, at first Leopold I and then his successor Joseph I, with a dilemma. 1704 was a crucial year for the emperor because of the campaign against Bavaria26, which rendered any interference in Polish affairs quite impossible. Hence, strategic interests of the War of Spanish succession and of the Great Northern War once again conflicted with each other. Furthermore, to annoy

23 Report of Stratmann, 20 July 1702, loc. cit. fol. 219r–220v. Attached to this report, though with erroneous folios (185–192v), is a lengthy description of the battle. For the aftermath of the battle cf. Staszewski, August II Mocny…, 134f. 24 There were, however, negotiations with the Saxon envoy count Wackerbarth in Vienna during which the latter claimed assistance with reference to the treaty; cf. HHStA, StAbt Polen I, box 82, folder 1701–1710, fol. 13 and 24–29. 25 A copy of the printed manifesto of the Confederation of 28 July 1704 is kept in HHStA, Collection diplomatique box 10, fol. 385–392v. The confederates declared war on Sweden, concluded an alliance with Russia and refused to recognise Stanislas as legally elected king even after Altranstädt; cf. J. A. Gierowski, Polish– Lithuanian Commonwealth, 91f. For the constitutional role of confederations in Poland see K. Baran, The Constitutional Uniqueness of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, [in:] Die Reiche Mitteleuropas in der Neuzeit. Integration und Herrschaft, ed. by A. Perłakowski, R. Bartczak and A. Schindling, Cracow 2009, 97–108, here at 99 and 106. 26 Cf. L. Auer, Zur Rolle Bayerns in der Anfangsphase des Spanischen Erbfolgekrieges, [in:] M. P. Schennach et al. (eds.), 1703. Der „Bayerische Rummel“ in Tirol, Innsbruck 2005, 39–50. 35

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the Tsar would have been as dangerous as to annoy the Swedish king, thus calling for a cautious course of action. The same attitude recommended itself after the Swedish invasion of Saxony and the first convention of Altranstädt27. Despite Augustus’ abdication from the throne of Poland, the emperor and his advisers hesitated, for the same reasons, to recognize Stanislas until February 170728. Even then, Prince Eugene, at this period president of the Aulic War Council, had his doubts as to whether it was a wise decision, fearing that it might endanger Russian support if needed29. However, his position may have been influenced by the tsar’s decision to suggest the Prince as a candidate for the Polish throne30. By his recognition of Stanislas as King of Poland the emperor had hoped to gain some concessions by Charles XII, such as the recognition of his brother as King of Spain or a Swedish contingent for the imperial army, but new problems quickly arose which led the Swedish King to demand the surrender of Russian troops under Saxon command and the restoration of

27 For a detailed discussion on the negotiations at Altranstädt see Ch. W. Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis. Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy, West Lafayette, Ind. 1979, 54–59. Cf. also H. Kretzschmar, Der Friedensschluß von Altranstädt 1706/07, [in:] J. Kalisch and J. Gierowski (eds.), Um die polnische Krone. Sachsen und Polen während des Nordischen Krieges 1700–1721, Berlin 1962, 161–183, here 179–183. 28 Discussions in the Privy Conference after autumn 1706 are described by Ch. W. Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis…, 56f. Frederick I of Prussia had recognized Stanislas as early as in 1706, Queen Anne did so one year after the emperor; cf. Ch. W. Ingrao ibid. 67f. and 191 and 196. 29 Cf. his letter to Schönborn, M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen…, vol. 2, 187 and n. 8 and the letter of 21 February from Count Wratislaw to king Charles III, published by A. von Arneth, Eigenhändige Correspondenz des Königs Karl III. von Spanien (nachmals Kaiser Karl VI.) mit dem Obersten Kanzler des Königreiches Böhmen Grafen Johann Wenzel Wratislaw, [in:] Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, 16, 1856, 1–224, here at 33. 30 For this surprising suggestion cf. M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen…, vol. 2, p. 203f. and Ch. W. Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis…, 67 with n. 190. The emperor was not in favour of a new election and finally rejected the idea of a candidacy of Prince Eugene. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Protestant faith in Silesia. Thus, the negotiations with the emperor dragged on despite the efforts of the Duke of Marlborough during a brief visit to Altranstädt in April 170731. It was only when Joseph I sent his Bohemian chancellor, Count Wratislaw, to Charles XII that a final agreement was reached. The stipulations of the second treaty of Altranstädt, signed on 1 September, freed the Swedish King from his obligation to provide a contingent to the imperial army, recognized a Holstein cousin as bishop of Lübeck and restored Lutheran religious freedom in Silesia32. Two weeks later Charles XII marched to Poland to resume his military activities. Austrian relations with king Stanislas developed in quite a satisfying way for the Viennese cabinet33. The position of the new king was too weak to pose a threat to the Habsburg Monarchy. Stanislas himself was interested in maintaining a good relationship and even refrained from giving any support to Ferenc Rákóczi and his followers34. However, due to the ongoing war in Poland, it seems to have been difficult to sustain regular diplomatic contacts. Stanislas was not represented by an ambassador of his own at the Viennese court; only towards the end of his reign did he envisage to send the starost of Cracow to Vienna. On the other hand, the Austrian ambassador, Count Zinzendorf, had left Poland and maintained contact with

31 Ch. W. Ingrao ibid. p. 58. 32 For the negotiations on this second treaty of Altranstädt see Ch. W. Ingrao, ibid. p. 62ff. and N. Conrads, Die Durchführung der Altranstädter Konvention in Schlesien 1707–1709, Cologne–Vienna 1971. 33 Unfortunately, much of the Austrian material on the relations between king Stanislas and the Viennese court seems to have been lost or even willfully destroyed. At least there is a significant gap in HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 1 for the correspondence of 1703–1709. 34 Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis p. 200. In fact, Rákóczi made several attempts to win Stanislas for joining forces with him against the emperor; cf. Ingrao ibid. p. 55 with n. 116. See also G. Kiss, Franz Rákóczi II., Peter der Grosse und der polnische Thron, [in:] Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas NF, 13, 1965, 344–360. 37

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Stanislas from Breslau/Wrocław35. Nor had the emperor much to fear from Augustus, who, due to his defeat against Charles XII, had to be docile. As a result, no danger was to be expected from the northeastern frontier. However, after Poltava and the return of Augustus to Poland, the situation changed once again. Denmark, Saxony and Russia renewed their coalition which gave new impetus to the war, both in Poland and in the Baltic36. Neither the emperor nor his advisers were too happy about this development which threatened to lessen commitments to send supplies to the imperial army in the War of the Spanish succession. After the death of Joseph I, Austrian diplomats also regarded with suspicion the close understanding between Augustus II and the Tsar, as demonstrated by their meeting in Jaroslaw,37 and feared Russian predominance in Poland, and eventually even in the northern parts of the Empire, as one of its results. Moreover, Augustus and his son were possible rivals of the Habsburgs in a future candidacy for the office of emperor38. To counterbalance such contingencies early on, Joseph I kept in contact with members of the Polish aristocracy, encouraging them in their opposition against the king and

35 See the report by Zinzendorf from Breslau, 11 July 1709, HHStA, StAbt Polen I, box 82, folder 1701–1710, fol. 32r–35v. Only Franz Tiepolt seems to have remained in Poland from 1702–1715 without major interruption. 36 J. A. Gierowski, Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth…, 92f.; R. Frost, Northern Wars…, 294f. 37 Reports of Count Heinrich Wilhelm Wilczek to Prince Eugene from Jaworow, 12 May 1711, Kriegsarchiv [KA] Vienna, Alte Feldakten [AFA] box 272, folder May 1711, and to the emperor from Jaroslaw, 7 June 1711, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 1, folder 1711, fol. 107–111v. Cf. G. Jonasson, Schweden, Sachsen und Polen 1697–1706, Schsen und Polen…, 102–118, here at 112–118, and the remarks by M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen, vol. 3, Vienna 1964, 43, and L. Schilling, Wiener Hof…, 123 with n. 13. 38 See the letter of Joseph I to Prince Eugene of 1 September 1708, HHStA, Große Korrespondenz [GK] box 90b, quoted by M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen…, vol. 2, 459 n. 17 and by L. Schilling, Wiener Hof…, 122 n. 9. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

against the outrages committed by Saxon and Russian soldiers39. There were also wide–spread rumours in Poland, perhaps not completely unfounded, that the Viennese cabinet supported the Turkish war of 1711 against Peter the Great and the Polish followers of Augustus40. In any case, during the months before and after the death of Joseph I relations between Augustus and the Viennese court were at a low, making the latter anything but keen to come to the rescue41. Charles VI, annoyed by Augustus’ attempts to be elected emperor42, initially continued his brother’s policy and, after ongoing altercations with Hungarian rebels43, even seemed to have encouraged members of the nobility to put up resistance against the king at the time of

39 For complaints about these military outrages see the report of the Austrian envoy Baronet Franz Tiepolt from Danzig, 25 February 1711, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 1, folder 1711, fol. 27–27v. 40 Report of Count Johann Ernst Herberstein from Danzig, 28 February 1711, as above fol. 31–35, here at fol. 31v. By a letter of 15 April 1711 Prince Eugene had informed the Grand Vezir of the Austrian neutrality in the Russian–Turkish war; cf. B. Spuler, Europäische Diplomatie…, 80 n. 171. 41 Cf. the instructions to Herberstein by Joseph of 24 December 1710 and by his mother Eleonora of 13 June 1711, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 66, fol. 6–7v and 13– 15 according to which the ambassador should mainly gather information about the relations between Augustus and Peter the Great and, –at the very least/if necessary offer Austrian mediation. The Viennese court was above all aggravated by Augustus and Peter the Great contacts with Hungarian rebels and even had hired the services of a French officer, Sacilly, to countermine them. Cf. various reports by Tiepolt and Herberstein, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 1, folders 1710 and 1711. 42 For aspirations of Augustus of this kind see M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen…, vol. 3, 48. Augustus had also raised difficulties in convening the electors for electing a new emperor; cf. Eleonora to Herberstein 8 July 1711, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 66, fol. 19–23v. 43 One of the main issues was a visit of the Hungarian rebel Bercsenyi to Lwów and Warsaw; cf. the instruction to Franz Tiepold of 8 February 1713, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 66, fol. 39–39v. 39

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the confederation of Tarnogród44. But when in 1716 a new war broke out between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, the Viennese court tried, though without much success45, to enlist Polish support. A member of the Aulic War Council, Count Damian Hugo of Virmont46, who was later to be the Austrian plenipotentiary in the peace negotiations at Passarowitz47, was sent to Warsaw to achieve this aim48. To facilitate a decision for Polish participation he also received orders to assist in the talks between the king and his opponents held in Lublin49 in order to bring about a general reconciliation. However, all his endeavours to achieve the accession of the king and the republic to an anti–Turkish alliance between the emperor and Venice were without success, despite the fact that the Holy League of 1684 was nominally still in existence. After all the damages the country had suffered during the still ongoing Northern War, the Polish nobility was not at all interested in another military enterprise. Virmont’s negotiations continued until March 1717 due to lengthy discussions for, as had been observed by an Austrian diplomat on a previous occasion, every

44 This is argued by J. Staszewski, Polnisch–österreichische Beziehungen…, 234f. Cf. on the confederation of Tarnogród J. A. Gierowski, Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth…, 93 with n. 66. 45 In a letter of 25 July 1716 to the Austrian envoy in Warsaw, Baron Martels, Prince Eugene expressed his doubts “viel Gutes und Fürträgliches zum Behuf der hiesigen Kriegsverfassung loswirken zu können“; cf. M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen…, vol. 3, 306 and n. 27. Eugene maintained a regular correspondence with Martels of which large parts for the years 1717–1725 are kept in HHStA, GK box 99a and b. Previous correspondence with Tiepolt and Herberstein 1711–1713 is kept in KA, AFA boxes 272, 273 and 314. 46 For count Damian Hugo Virmont see the article in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, vol. 55, 338–341 and B. Spuler, Europäische Diplomatie in Konstantinopel…, 341. 47 Cf. M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen…, vol. 2, 370 and 372–377. 48 Cf. his instruction of 6 May 1716, HHStA, StAbt Polen III, box 1. 49 A copy of the proceedings of the so–called Lublin congress is kept in HHStA, StAbt Polen I, box 87, fol. 266–277v. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Pole loves to make a speech50. The only success was his contribution to the settlement, the so–called pacification of February 1717 between Augustus and his opponents, which was finally reached at the Lublin congress51. Despite the failure of Virmont’s mission, a reorientation of Austrian policy towards Poland began to take shape. Since the Russian intervention in Mecklenburg52, the Tsar was a far greater danger than the Polish king. Once again ministers in Vienna cherished the idea to rely upon the Polish Republicas a barrier against Russian predominance. At the same time, the conclusion of the Turkish war left the emperor free to turn his attention to the North. His wish to come to the rescue of Sweden coincided with the British policy to limit Russian expansion in the Baltic. When, in 1718, the Polish diet at Grodno called on the tsar to withdraw his troops

50 Cf. the report of Stratmann, 18 February 1702, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 1, folder 1702, fol. 81r: “weil aber ein jeder Pohl haranguiren will….“. This is one of the few remarks which may be claimed as example for the “view of the other“, so cherished by modern research; cf. V. Jarren, Die Vereinigten Niederlande und das Haus Österreich 1648–1748. Fremdbildwahrnehmung und politisches Handeln kaiserlicher Gesandter und Minister, [in:] H. Gabel, V. Jarren (eds.), Kaufleute und Fürsten. Außenpolitik und politisch–kulturelle Perzeption im Spiegel niederländisch– deutscher Beziehungen 1648–1748, Münster–New York–Munich–Berlin 1998, 39– 354; S. Malfèr, Immagini dell’altro: austriaci e italiani, [in:] Il Risorgimento, ed. by A. M. Banti and P. Ginsborg, Turin 2007, 825–856; J. Eibach, Annäherung–Abgrenzung– Exotisierung: Typen der Wahrnehmung des Anderen in Europa am Beispiel der Türken, Chinas und der Schweiz, [in:] Europäische Wahrnehmungen 1650–1850. Interkulturelle Kommunikation und Medienereignisse, ed. by J. Eibach and H. Carl, Hanover 2008, 13–73; J. Pirożyński, Das Polenbild der Deutschen in der Renaissancezeit, [in:] Die Reiche Mitteleuropas…, 233–244. 51 Cf. the instructions to Virmont 6 May, 9 September and 19 December 1716 and of 3 and 20 March 1717, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 66, fol. 44–48v and 50–55v. 52 For the Russian intervention in Mecklenburg and its impact on European affairs see D. McKay/ H. M. Scott, Rise of the Great Powers…, 88f. and L. Auer, Europäisches Staatensystem…, 82f. with references to additional literature. Cf. also M. A. Hughes, Law and Politics in Eighteenth–Century Germany: The Imperial Aulic Council in the Reign of Charles VI, Woodbridge 1988. 41

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from Polish territory and supported the king’s firm stance towards Russia53, the Polish option of Austria and Britain seemed to materialize. Beginning in August 1718, the Privy Conference under the chairmanship of Prince Eugene discussed the English proposal of an alliance54, and after negotiations in Vienna between Eugene, the Court Chancellor Sinzendorf, Saint–Saphorin (England/ Hanover) and Flemming (Saxony/ Poland)55, a treaty between the Emperor, (England–) Hanover and Saxony (–Poland) aimed at putting pressure on the Tsar to end the Northern War56 was signed on 5 January 171957. Ratifications having been exchanged by April, the struggle began for obtaining the accession of the Polish Republic. At first, Augustus tried to convince the members of the council of the Senate that it would be sufficient if they declared Polish adherence to the treaty. When they protested, it became clear that a general diet could not be avoided58. In the meanwhile, the tsar’s intervention to prevent the Polish accession and the marriage of the electoral prince to the emperor’s niece, Maria Josepha, in August 1719

53 Cf. L. R. Lewitter, Poland, Russia and the Treaty of Vienna of 5 January 1719, [in:] The Historical Journal, 13, 1970, 3–30, here at 13. 54 Cf. the protocols of the Privy Conference of 6 August (without Eugene), 1 and 30 September, 18 October, 6, 17 and 25 November 1718, HHStA, Staatskanzlei [StK], Vorträge box 22, folder 1718 VIII–XII. 55 The Austrian material on the negotiations is kept in HHStA, StK Friedensakten, box 24. A still useful account is provided by J. G. Droysen, Die Wiener Allianz vom 5. I. 1719, [in:] Abhandlungen zur neueren Geschichte, Leipzig 1876, 283–305. Cf. also M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen, vol. 4, 39 with notes 69 and 70; L. R. Lewitter, Treaty of Vienna…, 14f.; J. Staszewski, August II Mocny…, p. 204ff. 56 That restraining Russia was the principal motive is shown by the instruction of 7 August 1718 to Penterriedter in London, HHStA. StK Protokoll 1718, fol. 138v. Cf. also R. Lewitter, Treaty of Vienna…, 14ff.; D. McKay/ H. M. Scott, Rise of the Great Powers…, 89f. 57 Cf. L. Bittner, Chronologisches Verzecihnis…, 136 n. 720. 58 L. R. Lewitter Treaty of Vienna…, 22. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

had aroused suspicion among the Polish nobility and created a climate of general distrust about the intentions of the king59. Consequently, the Austrian ambassador, Count Josef Lothar Königsegg, who was delegated to represent the emperor at the diet which opened in January 172060, found it impossible, despite being seconded by the English envoy Scott61, to overcome the difficulties caused by parts of the nobility and by the Russian representative, Prince Dolgorukij. After little more than a month, the diet broke up without reaching a decision. In the autumn of 1720 the last Polish diet before the end of the war was to be held. Charles VI sent the Hungarian vice–chancellor and bishop of Neutra, Count Adam Ladislaus Erdödy, to Warsaw to make another attempt to obtain the accession of the Republic to the Vienna alliance62. In a comment written in his own hand the emperor stressed the importance at the coming diet of assuring the Polish nobles of Austria’s respect for and adherence to their traditional liberties, a rather characteristic comment for the emperor’s attitude towards long–standing traditions and privileges, which he tended to uphold notwithstanding the need for reforms63. Other

59 The Viennese cabinet was well aware of these circumstances and tried to counteract. Cf. e.g. the protocol of the Privy Conference of 1 September 1718, HHStA, StK Vorträge, box 22, folder 1718 VIII–XII, fol. 27: Cui (scil. rei publicae Polonicae) quoque eximere oportet scrupulum seu suscipionem, quae istis inhaeret, Caesarem intendere per nuptias Archiducissae cum Principe electorali saxonico Regnum Poloniae Domui Saxonico hereditarium efficere. Ablegandus proinde legatus Caesareus ad imminentia comitia. 60 Cf. his instruction of 8 December 1719, HHStA, Polen III, box 1. 61 L. R. Lewitter, Treaty of Vienna…, 24. 62 See his instruction of 31 August 1720, HHStA, Polen III, box 1. 63 For this characteristic political behaviour of the emperor see L. Auer, Carlos VI: Tema y materia de las ciencias históricas, [in:] Cuadernos de Historia Moderna, 15, 1994, 191–198, here at 193f. and, with regard to his Italian dominions, F. Gallo, La Sicilia di Carlo VI: riforma amministrativa e ricerca del consenso (1719–1734), [in:] Marcello Verga (ed.), Dilatar l’Impero. Asburgo e l’Italia nel primo Settecento, Rome 43

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errands contained in Erdödy‘s instructions consisted in the reclamation of the thirteen pawned towns of the Zips, an issue to become important during the first partition of Poland, in determining the chances of a candidacy of the electoral prince to the Polish throne, and in resolving demarcation issues between Hungary and Poland. A separate instruction by the Bohemian Chancery charged Erdödy to raise complaints against the violation of the Silesian border by members of the Sapieha family and the starost of Gnesen, and against the discrimination of Silesian merchants in Poland. The diet which opened on 30 September64 very soon became the scene of a persistent tug–of–war between the representatives of Austria, Britain and Russia with regard to the Polish accession to the Vienna alliance. Despite all endeavours, neither the members of the diet nor Prussia were willing to accede65, leaving the alliance to crumble without having reached its main purpose of restraining the expansion of Russia. As the tsar had withdrawn his troops from Poland in 1719, the Polish nobility felt no need to continue the war. Due to the instigations of the Russian representative, Dolgorukij, and, once again, for fear of a hereditary monarchy emerging in the wake of the marriage of the electoral prince66, many participants of the diet maintained a firm opposition to ratifying the alliance67. As Augustus himself, once more changing sides, was taking pains to become reconciled

1994, 187–226. However, it goes without saying that in the present case this attitude was also prompted by the wish to overcome Polish fears about the establishment of an absolute hereditary monarchy; cf. above n. 53. 64 L. R. Lewitter, Treaty of Vienna…, 28. For this diet in general see J. Staszewski, August II Mocny…, 222ff. 65 Prussia had concluded a treaty with Russia in February 1720 by which both powers agreed to prevent Poland’s adhesion to the treaty of Vienna; cf. L. R. Lewitter, Treaty of Vienna…, 25 with nn. 171 and 172. 66 L. R. Lewitter ibid. p. 29 speaks of a mistimed marriage. 67 L. R. Lewitter ibid. p. 28; J. A. Gierowski, Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth…, 95. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

to the tsar68, the emperor saw no realistic chance for an anti–Russian league without Poland and Prussia69. Consequently, Russia succeeded in concluding a peace with Sweden according to her own conditions. As a result, the international position of Poland was considerably weakened. Although the territorial integrity of the Republic could be preserved and plans for a partition did not materialize70, she was no longer in a position to play a decisive role in military or diplomatic initiatives. This was also shown by the fact that it proved to be rather irrelevant that the state of war with Sweden did not ended until 1731: neither Poland nor Sweden was any longer in a position to fight each other71. Furthermore, the emperor did not have any part in the peace negotiations at Nystad. Hence, apart from the Russian troops leaving Polish territory, the Vienna alliance was a complete failure. When the news of the signing of the peace agreement reached Vienna, Austrian ministers were at a complete loss as to how to react72. In the long run, however, they decided to rearrange their strategies and to turn to a new alliance system which included Russia73, the only real winner of the Northern War. As Klaus

68 The English representative Scott complained to the Austrian envoy Martels in November 1720: “Cette cour se mocque (sic!) de Vous et de Nous“; cf. the report of Martels to Prince Eugene, 13 November 1720, HHStA, GK, box 99a. 69 L. R. Lewitter, Treaty of Vienna…, 27. 70 Rumours for plans of partition were spread as early as 1702; cf. the report by Stratmann of 12 January 1702, HHStA, StAbt Polen II, box 1, folder 1702, fol. 11– 11v and 24r–25v, and L. R. Lewitter, Zur Vorgeschichte der Teilungen Polens (1697– 1721), [in:] Österreichische Osthefte, 32, 1990, 333–357. For partition plans in 1706, 1710 and 1721 cf. M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen…, vol. 4, 100 and n. 235; Ch. W. Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis…, 67f. with n. 192, and J. A. Gierowski, The PolishLithuanian Commonwealth…, 98 and n. 74. 71 J. Black, Rise of the European Powers…, 27f. 72 M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen…, vol. 4, 99–101 and L. Schilling, Wiener Hof…, 124. 73 This seems to have been at least the strategy of the Imperial Vice–Chancellor Schönborn; cf. M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen…, vol. 4, 101 and n. 237. 45

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Zernack very ably put it in an article published in 197474, the Great Northern War thus constitutes a crucial turning point in early modern history. With regards to Austrian political attitudes towards the Polish Republic, the ministers of the Viennese cabinet, after all their wasted endeavours, may have come to a conclusion very similar to that of Cambridge historian L. R. Lewitter, who remarks: “The republic’s failure to accede to the treaty of Vienna could only have shown her up as an unreliable and unrewarding partner in the game of international power politics and it is surely no coincidence that her status on the European chess–board was henceforth reduced to that of a mere pawn“75.

74 K. Zernack, Das Zeitalter der nordischen Kriege von 1558–1809 als frühneuzeitliche Geschichtsepoche, [in:] Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, 1, 1974, 55–79, here at 71–77. Cf. also L. Auer, Europäisches Staatensystem…, 83 and L. Schilling, Wiener Hof…, 122 with n. 12. 75 L. R. Lewitter, Treaty of Vienna…, 30. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Zbigniew Anusik (Łódź)

Gustav III’s coup d’état of 19 August 1772: The end of the “Age of Liberty” in Sweden

Gustav III was without doubt one of the greatest rulers of Sweden in the eighteenth century. His personality left a powerful mark on the history of this country, just as Charles XII’s had. The eldest son of Adolf Frederick (king of Sweden in the years 1751–1771) and Lovisa Ulrika of Prussia, Gustav III was born on 24 January / 4 February 1746, in Stockholm. From an early age he was strongly connected to his mother, who greatly contributed to the formation of her son’s personality. The little prince inherited most of his character traits from his mother’s family – the Hohenzollerns of Prussia. Throughout his life he was very violent, impulsive, quick–tempered and irritable. He was fit by a nature with a very active imagination. His mind was always filled with thousands of projects and activities; he could never sit still in one place. He was always moving, forever experiencing eternal fervor and anxiety of the soul. Nothing was able to keep his attention for long. Another dominant feature of his character was his loyalty and sincerity towards his friends. At a young age, however, he learned to hide his true feelings, initially in fear of his harsh and overbearing mother, and later, due to the echoes of political intrigues and violent party fighting which reach the royal court. Closing in on himself and hiding secrets from those around him even gave one of the biographers

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of Gustav III cause to reach the conclusion that he had never told the truth and had never taken off his mask, not even to himself1. Gustav’s unmistakable happiness was due to the fact that, from his earliest childhood, he was under the influence of outstanding teachers and tutors (Carl Gustaf Tessin, Olof von Dalin, Carl Fredrik Scheffer, Samuel Klingerstierna). Although the young prince was not a very diligent student and did not attach too much importance to learning areas that did not interest him, he devoted a lot of time to studying history and learning the French language. This language was mastered over time, although congenital dyslexia caused him continual difficulty with spelling. Very early he began to reveal a deep interest in literature, theater and visual arts, which undoubtedly resulted in the subsequent awakening of his tutors the aesthetic inclinations he had inherited from his mother. As successor to the throne (1751) Gustav was thoroughly prepared to take the government of the country. In addition to a practical look at the actions of the army and fleet (despite being refused military studies in the army of his uncle – Frederick II of Prussia, by the Swedish Parliament – the Riksdag – who saw it as a threat to the Swedish Constitution). By participating in the deliberations of the Senate (the Council of State), the young prince also gained firsthand experience of the functioning of the state administration. Initially, he was romantically involved with the party of „caps”. In the

1 Cf. E. Lönnroth, Gustavus III of Sweden: the Final Years. A Political Portrait, in: idem, Scandinavians. Selected Historical Essays, Göteborg 1977, 101; B. Hennings, Gustav III, in: Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon [SBL], Bd XVII, Stockholm 1967–1969, 458–459; G. v. Proschwitz, Introduction, in: Gustave III par ses lettres, ed. par G. v. Proschwitz, Stockholm–Paris 1986, 12–13; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja szwedzka wobec kryzysu monarchii we Francji w latach 1787–1792, Łódź 2000, 35; idem, Edukacja oświeconego księcia. Wychowanie i wykształcenie szwedzkiego następcy tronu, królewicza Gustawa (późniejszego Gustawa III), in: Między barokiem a oświeceniem. Edukacja, wykształcenie, wiedza, ed. S. Achremczyk, Olsztyn 2005, 261–263. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Riksdag of 1762, under the influence of Carl Fredrik Scheffer, he came, however, over to the party of „hats”, gradually loosening his ties with the „caps”. On April 5, 1762, the heir to the throne of Sweden’s formal education was officially completed as the Kronprins reached the full age of sixteen years old2. His Mother and two of his tutors (Tessin and Scheffer) ensured that Gustav was brought up in the French spirit. He was interested in the literature and philosophy of the French Enlightenment and read avidly. He had a huge library, which included the latest releases. The ambassador of Sweden in Paris, Gustav Philip Creutz, maintained regular correspondence with the prince on cultural issues and sent him consecutive volumes of the Great French Encyclopedia. It is also worth noting that the absolutist beliefs that Gustav formed, among others, were developed under the influence of the French Physiocrats (their works lead him to read Carl Fredrik Scheffer) who thought the most appropriate form of government was an „enlightened despotism”. A book by Paul Pierre Mercier de la Rivière, “L'orde actuel et essentiel des sociétés politiques”, had a great impact on shaping the political views of Gustav. Reading “Henriade” by Voltaire and the French classical tragedies also contributed significantly to the formation of the literary tastes of the young prince. His fascination with France and its culture meant

2 Cf. B. Hennings, Gustav III som kronprins, Uppsala 1935, 20–49, 50–98, 143 f., 159– 184, 270 f., 308–349; eadem, Gustav III. En biografi, Stockholm 1957, 12–38; eadem, Gustav III, 458–459; G. v. Proschwitz, op. cit., 15; B. Sallnäs, Tessin Carl Gustaf, in: Svenska Män och Kvinnor. Biografisk Uppslagsbok [SMoK], Bd VII, Stockholm 1954, 491; O. Sylwan, Dalin von Olof, in: SBL, Bd IX, Stockholm 1931, 50–65; H. Ehrencrona, Scheffer Carl Fredrik, in: SMoK, Bd VI, Stockholm 1949, 542; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 35–36; idem, Edukacja..., 263–274; idem, W cieniu rosyjskiego imperium. Zarys dziejów wewnętrznych i polityki zagranicznej Szwecji w latach 1718–1751, „Acta Universitatis Lodziensis”, Folia historica 69, 2000, 5–36; and idem, Partia „czapek” i początki liberalizmu w Szwecji, in: Liberalizm w Europie, ed. E. Wiśniewski, Łódź 2008, s. 21–39. 49

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that Gustav used the French language more easily than Swedish. So, in relation to his interest in French culture and his love for France itself, he can be compared with his uncle, Frederick II of Prussia, and his older cousin, Empress Catherine II (the queen mother of Russia, Joan Elizabeth was a sister of Adolf Frederick, father of the Swedish successor of the throne); however, Gustav’s love for France was, if not more honest, at least more stable. Looking into the patterns of Versailles, reading the history of the reign of the kings of France – Henry IV and Louis XIV, admiring Gustav Vasa, Charles XII, and – above all – Gustav II Adolf, the Swedish Kronprins also strove consistently for a significant strengthening of royal power in his own country. His close political relationship with France, however, concerns the period of the 1765–1766 Riksdag, when there was a definitive break of the royal court with the party of „caps”3. Stockholm court decisions on the reorientation of its domestic policy coincided with the emergence of new political plans in the French capital. One of the roads leading to the empowerment of the court of Versailles in the North had become the restoration of the international importance of Sweden by the restitution of a strong Swedish royal power in the country. In this situation, prince Gustav, dreaming about the strengthening the position of the Crown, could count on strong support from the Louis XV. Furthermore, in April 1766, the decision was made at

3 Cf. B. Hennings, Gustav III. En biografi, 80; A. Geffroy, Gustave III et la cour de France. Suivi d’une étude critique sur Marie–Antoinette et Louis XVI apocryphes, vol. I, Paris 1867, 74–101; R.N. Bain, Gustavus III and his Contemporaires 1746–1792. An Overlooked Chapter of Eighteenth Century History, Vol. I, London 1894, 13–27; 35– 40, 216–220; H.A. Barton, Gustav III of Sweden and the Enlightenment, „Eighteenth Century Studies. An Interdisciplinary Journal”, Vol. VI, No 1, Berkeley (University of California) 1972–1973, 1–5; G. v. Proschwitz, op. cit., 9; N. Forsell, Gustav III:s politiska debut. Bidrag till belysning av 1766–1769 års kris i Sveriges historia, „Personhistorisk Tidskrift”, Bd XXI, 1920, [print: Stockholm 1921], 111–131; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 36–37; idem, Edukacja..., 274–275. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Versailles to strengthen the Swedish Crown at the expense of both of the parliamentary parties. In March 1768, Prince Gustav, under the influence of incentives from the court of Versailles initiated work on a new monarchist constitution. In May of the same year, Adolf Frederick, pushed by his son, asked the French minister of foreign affairs (Etienne François prince de Choiseul) in a personal letter to send to Stockholm a new diplomat (the former ambassador, Louis Auguste Le Tonnelier baron de Breteuil, did not enjoy the confidence of the royal family) with full powers to act in the monarchist spirit. The request of the King of Sweden was of course cordially received at the court of Louis XV. Instructions for the new French ambassador in Stockholm, François Charles de Raimond count de Modène, directly advised him to maintain the friendship of the king of Sweden. As it was also desirable from the point of view of Versailles, instructions pointed to „unite all attributions of supreme power in the person of the king over all branches of the government”4. After his arrival in Stockholm, count de Modène quickly became a confidant and close collaborator of the successor to the Swedish throne. The latter decided to take advantage of the growing internal crisis to conduct a monarchist coup d’état. December 12, 1768, the heir to the throne read before the Council of State (Riksråd) a statement containing the royal protest against a further reduction of the monarch's power. Prince Gustav also demanded, in the name of his father, the immediate convening of the Riksdag. In view of the refusal of the Council dominated by the „caps” party, the king himself appeared in the Senate on December 15, threatening

4 Cf. W. Konopczyński, Polska a Szwecja. Od pokoju oliwskiego do upadku Rzeczypospolitej 1660–1795, Warszawa 1924, 194; W. Kalinka, Ostatnie lata panowania Stanisława Augusta, vol. I, Kraków 1891, 54; A. Geffroy, op. cit., 48–53; B. Hennings, Gustav III. En biografi, 45; H.A. Barton, op. cit., 4; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 38; idem, Edukacja..., 276–277. 51

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abdication and declaring that henceforth he would cease to perform his constitutional duties. At the same time, prince Gustav, in agreement with the French diplomat, was preparing for a violent overthrow of the constitution. Gustav’s parents, who remembered the humiliation which they had suffered after the detection of anti–constitutional conspiracy in 1756, were, however, staunch opponents of any violent measures. Adolf Frederick and Lovisa Ulrika demanded only the convening of States, hoping that together with the „hats” they could cause the failure of the party of „caps” in the election. The attitude of the royal couple forced the heir to the throne to cancel his significantly advanced preparations for the coup. However, as the demand made by the king for the immediate convening of the Riksdag was supported by officials of the central government and the troops stationed in the capital, the State Council was forced to make concessions. On 20 December 1768, it finally decided to announce the election of a new state assembly. This being the situation, Adolf Frederick again proceeded to carry out his constitutional duties the next day5. The French Embassy promised a few million livres to the „hats” for the cost of the election campaign, provided that after the victory they would make modifications of the Swedish constitution in the monarchical spirit. A huge disappointment was awaiting both the French and the Swedish royal family. The „hats” gladly accepted the court’s help in the fight against the „caps”, but after the victory they did not fulfill their previous commitments. Moreover, against attempts to strengthen royal power in Sweden, representatives of Russia, Denmark and England protested in solidarity in

5 Cf. R.N. Bain, op. cit., 45–49; A. Geffroy, op. cit., 107; I. de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, New Haven–London 1981, 215; J. Brown, Les cours du Nord ou mémoires originaux sur les souverains de la Suède et le Danemarck depuis 1766, vol. II, Paris 1820, 22; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 39; idem, Edukacja..., 278–279; idem, Między Rosją i Francją. Zarys dziejów wewnętrznych i polityki zagranicznej Szwecji w latach 1751–1772, „Przegląd Nauk Historycznych” 2002, R. I, nr 2, 49–50. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Stockholm. Back in power, the noble party of „hats” also led to the re– tightening of social antagonisms by reviving the age–old dispute between the nobility and the three other lower States. Quarrels between the representatives of the nobility with the three lower States completely dominated the last years of the reign of Adolf Frederick. In Sweden, a serious internal crisis was growing. The government of the “hats” increased common discontent. The admission of the representatives of the three lower States to hold higher offices was commonly called for. This drew widespread criticism of the unfortunate decisions of the State Council on social and economic policy. Against the „hats” were supporters of the court and the party of „caps” financed by the Russian court. The party fight led Sweden to a state of complete anarchy in late 1770 and early 17716. In the tense atmosphere of rampant corruption and an unproductive struggle with the government and representatives of the opposition, Adolf Frederick died suddenly on 12 February 1771. At that time, the successor to the throne, Prince Gustav was travelling in the countries of Western Europe. The news of his father's death reached him on 1 March in Paris (he was in the French capital incognito – as the count of Gotland from 4 February 1771). In Paris the monarchist coup d’état in Sweden was also being planned. Before leaving the French capital, Gustav

6 Cf. R.N. Bain, op. cit., 49–51; H.A. Barton, Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era 1760–1815, Minneapolis 1986, 64–65; I. de Madariaga, op. cit., 216–218; L. Stavenow, Geschichte Schwedens 1718–1772, Gestamtgeschichte Schwedens, Bd. VII, Gotha 1908, 405 f.; idem, Frihetstiden, Sveriges historia till våra dagar, utg. av E. Hildebrand och L. Stavenow, Bd IX, Stockholm 1922, 419–429; W. Kalinka, op. cit., 55; C.G. Malmström, Sveriges politiska historia från konung Karl XII:s död till statshväfningen 1772, uppl. 2, Bd VI, Stockholm 1901, 98–187; B. Hennings, Gustav III som..., 350–373; eadem, Gustav III. En biografi, 50; E. Amburger, Russland und Schweden 1762–1772. Die Schwedische Verfassung und die Ruhe des Nordens, Berlin 1934, 194 f.; A. Geffroy, op. cit., 38–40, 42–43; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 39–42; idem, Między Rosją..., 50–53. 53

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III was encouraged in the violent overthrow of the constitution and – more importantly – he was given the promise of a payment of 10.5 million livres unpaid subsidies and the promise to transfer directly to his hands 1.5 million livres of annual subsidy. Since the new ruler’s ascension to the throne required his formal election by the Riksdag, Gustav III sent a written oath of allegiance to the constitution to the Council of State on 15 March 1771. Three days later, on 18 March, the young king left the capital of France, and in early June he returned to Stockholm7. His position was quite difficult. In the spring of 1771, the election to the Riksdag was held, which confirmed Gustav III’s election. The Knights Chamber had almost exclusively been dominated by the party of „hats”. In the other three chambers, however, the party of “caps” had gained an advantage, which had occurred under close cooperation with the Russian ambassador in Stockholm, Ivan A. Ostermann. On 25 June 1771, Gustav III opened the meeting of the States, calling for harmony and patriotism among the members of Riksdag gathered in Stockholm. He sincerely hoped that he could strengthen his own position without needing to resort to force to overthrow the existing political and legal order. At the outset, however, the king was met with great disappointment. The party of „caps” broke an

7 Cf. C.T. Odhner, Sveriges politiska historia under konung Gustaf III:s regering, Bd I (1771–1778), Stockholm 1885, 1–13; L. Stavenow, Frihetstiden, 439 f.; idem, Geschichte..., 405–410; A. Söderhjelm. Sverige och den franska revolutionen. Bidrag till kännedom om Sveriges och Frankrikes inbördes förhållande i slutet av 1700–talet, Bd I (Gustav III:s tid), Stockholm 1920, 36–37; B. Hennings, Gustav III. En biografi, 53; A. Geffroy, op. cit., 107–125; R.N. Bain, op. cit., 53–60; H.A. Barton, Gustav III..., 6– 10; I. de Madariaga, op. cit., 218; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 43–44; idem, Między Rosją..., 54. Let us add here that even in Paris, prince Gustav arranged the collaboration with the monarchic disposed part of the “hats” party led by Fredric Carl Sinclair. It was because the confidence of the new ruler lost, fighting for a long time against the concept of extending the power of the Crown, the official leader of the party count Fredrik Axel von Fersen. Cf. B. Hennings, Gustav III som..., 374–389. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

agreement with the “hats” which had been agreed upon under his own patronage and they took a majority of seats in the Secret Committee of Riksdag. The States also could not agree in any way about the views of the newly elected ruler’s commitments and the text of his coronation oath. The representatives of the three lower States began a massive attack on the system of aristocratic privilege. In an atmosphere of quarrels, confusion and growing tensions between the House of the Knights and the three other chambers, the Riksdag debate dragged on unproductively for several months. The fierce debate continued until 24 February 1772 without bringing any resolve to the struggle between the nobility and the representatives of the three lower States. It was only due to pressure from the Russian diplomat, when members of the “caps” party who sat in the House of the Knights agreed to some concessions that a slightly more modified compromise could be push through this chamber. A compromise it may have been, but the text of the new royal obligations was still very good for the three lower social classes. On 4 March Gustav III signed their commitments, not even bothering to read them carefully8. On 29 May 1772, Gustav III was solemnly crowned in Stockholm’s Storkirkan. But this did not in any way change his position in the state and did not led to an increase of the king’s influence on the course of the sessions of the Riksdag. The „caps” governed the country independently and began persecuting their opponents. The defeated party of „hats” definitely

8 Cf. C.T. Odhner, op. cit., 18, 23, 25–69; R.N. Bain, op. cit., 61–80, 99–100; A. Geffroy, op. cit., 139–144; B. Hennings, Gustav III. En biografi, 55–56; H.A. Barton, Scandinavia..., 77–80; idem, Gustav III..., 11; D. Michellessi, Rewolucya szwedzka sprawą Gustawa III dzisiejszego króla szwedzkiego w roku 1772 utworzona z przydatkiem formy nowego rządu i pism zaciągających się do tey odmiany, przez Xiędza ... napisana a z francuzkiego na oyczysty (j)ęzyk przełożona, Warszawa 1778, 23; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 44–46; idem, Między Rosją..., 55–57. 55

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lost the support of France and was in a state of total decay. Gustav tried to come to terms with the new government and tried to follow the principles of the constitution, but he encountered stiff resistance at every turn. Decisions were taken against the will and wishes of the monarch both in the Riksdag and in the Secret Committee. To make matters worse, in early August 1772, the ruling „caps” joined with the Russian ambassador to lay a draft treaty with the court of St. Petersburg, in which Russia had to guarantee all the Swedish freedoms9. Gustav III was obviously not going to tolerate governments not liked by him: the „caps” and the highly influential Russian ambassador in Stockholm. When he realized the impossibility of reconciling the interests of the nobility with the aspirations of the disadvantaged classes, he decided to hold a coup d’état. The young king found his allies mainly among courtiers and officers of his own guard. Those around him gradually focused on a Swedish aristocracy, who did not intend to allow themselves to be pushed by a government run by the representatives of “caps”, derived largely from the plebeian classes. In the face of threats to their current position, the nobility were ready to look back at a king. Given the choice to protect their privileges of state or defend of the current system of government, a significant part of the nobility chose the former. On 19 August 1772, Gustav III held a bloodless coup d’état in Stockholm. On 21 August the king summoned a plenary session of the Riksdag in the Stockholm castle. The States’ meeting place was surrounded by the army so that members could not show the appearance of the slightest resistance. Terrorized States not

9 Cf. C.G. Malmström, op. cit., 210–343; L. Stavenow, Frihetstiden, 439–454; R.N. Bain, op. cit., 90–91; H.A. Barton, Scandinavia..., 80; B. Hennings, Gustav III som..., 365 f.; D. Michellessi, op. cit., 41–42, 51, 160–165; W. Konopczyński, op. cit., 204; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 46–47; idem, Między Rosją..., 57–58. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

only performed the oath of allegiance to the king, but even sent a deputation to him with thanks for extracting the kingdom from anarchy. No wonder that in this atmosphere the members of the Riksdag accepted in its entirety the collapse of the existing system of government and on the same day, 21 August 1772, passed the proposal for a new constitution presented to them by the king10. Two days later, Gustav III wrote about the incident to his mother: „I had absolute power in my hands by a voluntary submission of each of the States, but I thought it nobler, more generous and more appropriate to what I said before, and certainly better for my future government, if I limit the scope of royal power, leaving the people fundamental rights and freedoms, and retaining for myself only what is necessary to prevent of abuses”11. After the totally submissive States fulfilled all the demands put forward by Gustav III (the king was most anxious to establish its tax proposals), he dissolved the Riksdag on 9 September 1772, making a solemn promise to

10 Cf. L. Bonneville de Marsagny, Le comte de Vergennes: son ambasade en Suède 1771–1774, Paris 1898; Mémoire pour servir d’instruction au sieur comte de Vergennes allent en Suède pour y résider en qualité d’ambassadeur du Roi, 5 mai 1771, in:] Recueil des instructions donnés aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu’à la révolution française, vol. II (Suède), ed. par A. Geffroy, Paris 1887, 432–442; A. Geffroy, op. cit., 131–135, 137–138, 150–154, 156–158, 160–166; A. Söderhjelm, op. cit., 37–39; H.A. Barton, Scandinavia..., 78–79, 81; C.T. Odhner, op. cit., 89 f., 95 f., 114–154; D. Michellessi, op. cit., 60, 62–91, 214– 217; R.N. Bain, op. cit., 81–126; B. Hennings, Gustav III. En biografi, 57–65; eadem, Gustav III, 458–460; L. Stavenow, Geschichte..., 426–433; G. Iverus, Hertig Karl av Södermanland, Gustav III:s broder, Bd I (Till ryska kriget), Uppsala 1925, 56–80; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 47–53; idem, Między Rosją..., 58–66. 11 Gustav III to Lovisa Ulrika, Stockholm 23 VIII 1772, Gustav III:s och Lovisa Ulrika brevväxling, utg. av H. Schück, Bd II, Stockholm 1919, s. 255. 57

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re–convene it in the next 6 years12. The new constitution (form of government) presented by Gustav III and approved by the Riksdag on 21 August 1772 fundamentally transformed the political system of the kingdom. The parties of „caps” and „hats” ultimately disappeared from the political scene of the country. Parties were prohibited from any activity. The young king did not intend to create a full autocracy. His dream was for the renewal of the political institutions in Sweden from the time of Gustav II Adolf. The constitution of August 1772 (full indeed of vague wording and internal contradictions) was therefore a compromise between the concept of enlightened absolutism and the old Swedish parliamentary tradition. Ideas of natural rights of man present in the document reflected that they were living in the age of Enlightenment. We can also find in it the clear influence of the legal and political views propounded by Mercier de la Rivière and Montesquieu. Gustav III’s form of government restored the balance between the throne and freedom. The king, who was responsible only to God and posterity, again became the highest organ of executive power. The State Council (Senate) lost its character of government and its role was limited to a consultative function. Gustav III introduced into the State Council a number of lawyers, because the new form of government gave the Riksdag the authority of a high judicial tribunal. Although the constitution also included a phrase that

12 Cf. C.T. Odhner, op. cit., 155; R.N. Bain, op. cit., 127–131, 136–138; A. Geffroy, op. cit., 166–167; H.A. Barton, Scandinavia..., 82–83; Konung Gustaf III:s skrifter in politiska och vittra ämnen tillika med dess brefvexling, Bd I, Stockholm 1806, 88; Collection des écrits politiques, littéraires et dramatiques de Gustave III, roi de Suède, suivie de son correspondance, ed. par J.B. de Chaux, vol. I, Stockholm 1803, 103–107; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 53; idem, Między Rosją..., 65–66. Cf. also C.G. Malmström, op. cit., 344–411; C.F. Sheridan, A History of the Late Revolution in Sweden, London 1788; L. Stavenow, Frihetstiden, 454–465; and H. Schück, Gustaf III:s statsvälvning 1772 i berättande källor och äldre literratur, Historisk Archiv 4, Uppsala 1955. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

appointments to all important government offices were to be made at the meetings of the Senate, in fact the Council of State did not have any impact on the staffing of ministerial posts. The same constitution granted the king unquestioned rights to appoint all officials according to his own wishes and appreciation13. The functioning of the regime imposed in Sweden by Gustav III assumed harmonious cooperation between the executive power and legislature. The latter was in fact divided between the States and the king. The constitution of August 1772 introduced a number of changes in the organization and competence of the Riksdag. Their goal was to reduce the role of the States and strengthen the impact of the king on the course of events in all four chambers. The king was entitled exclusive rights regarding the States’ assembly and its resolution, and the role of the Riksdag was seriously limited by the fact that the king decided to convene the States assembly, without being bound by any statutory deadlines. The king regained the right to appoint a marshal of the Knights Chamber and the chairmen of the House of Clergy, Burgesses and Peasants. Riksdag’s Secret Committee was abolished. A similar fate befell all the other Riksdag’s Committees determining the face of the Swedish parliament in „the Age of Freedom”. The Riksdag only had authority over two committees: the state and banking, both made up of representatives of the three higher classes.

13 Full text of the Swedish Constitution granted by Gustav III on 21 VIII, 1772, (57 Articles) translated into Polish Cf. D. Michellessi, op. cit., 102–159. Translation of the same text into English Cf. W. Coxe, Travels into Poland, Russia, Sweden and Denmark, Vol. IV, London 1787, 429–447. Cf also H.A. Barton, Gustav III..., 11–12; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 56–57; idem, Czy na pewno pierwsza? Kilka uwag o konstytucjach szwedzkich XVIII wieku, in: Konstytucja Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki. Reminiscencje w 220. rocznicę uchwalenia, ed. J.A. Daszyńska, Łódź 2009, 198–199. 59

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The reformed Riksdag retained the right of legislative initiative (sharing it with the king), sovereignty over the Riksbank (State Bank), and part of the old power regarding tax policy (Riksdag enacted taxes for a fixed period, and the king was obliged to submit before it the reports of government’s expenditure). Without the consent of the Riksdag, no new rights could be established, nor any old rights or privileges removed. In domestic affairs, however, the king could give administrative regulations, and there was not a strict boundary between the king’s regulations and Parliamentary Acts. Consent of the States was also required if the ruler intended to launch an offensive war. Without the consent of the Riksdag, the monarch also could not change the privileges granted by him in the constitution. Since in the State assembly he only had the right of precedent veto, he was forced to seek the support of the chambers for legislative proposals presented to them14. Gustav III, for whom the ideal political system was an enlightened absolute monarchy, was a follower of the principle that political balance is based on a hierarchical social system. Therefore, he felt that a close alliance of the Crown with the nobility was an essential element of political and social stability of Sweden. Another reason for the king closeness to the nobility was his interests in chivalry and reading chivalric literature. We also cannot forget that he made a coup d’état with the full support of the

14 Cf. C.T. Odhner, op. cit., 155–157; L. Stavenow, Den gustavianska tiden 1772–1789, Sveriges politiska historia till våra dagar, utg. av E. Hildebrand och L. Stavenow, Bd X, Stockholm 1925, 12–17; R.N. Bain, op. cit., 131–132; H.A. Barton, Scandinavia..., 82–83; G. Landberg, Den svenska riksdagen under den gustavianska tiden, in: Sveriges riksdag. Historisk och statsvetenskapling framställning, Bd VII, Stockholm 1932, 24–41; F. Almén, Gustav III och hans rådgivare 1772–1789. Arbetssätt och meningsbrytningar i rådkammare och konseljer, Uppsala 1940; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 57–58; idem, Czy na pewno..., 199–200. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

aristocracy, based on the noble officer corps. Thus, one cannot say that the court of Gustav III, the ruler with vast ambitions and romantic fantasy, lover of theater, writing his own historical dramas, who continued correspondence with D'Alembert, Diderot and Voltaire, was devoid of elegance and fashion. There was the French spirit, and the compelling personality of the young ruler meant that it was one of the finest, in cultural terms, of European courts. The Stockholm court ceremony was closely modeled on Versailles, which was not so much the result of fascination with the court of Louis XV, but an intention to follow French political solutions. From the beginning of his reign, Gustav III flirted with and gave favours to the representatives of the nobility, clearly hoping to ensure that the Swedish aristocracy would be changed into court nobility and became a sort of Praetorian Guard for the monarchy. The opposition from the disadvantaged States increased with time; Gustav deftly disarmed the systematic knighting of its potential leaders. A new constitution granted the king the right to confer nobility on the people who had contributed to the state and the Crown. The real paradox in this situation was the fact that the aristocracy and nobility in Sweden were mostly a Republican and conservative political force, which was to be the biggest obstacle in the future when it came to implementing the widespread political plans of Gustav III – “king–knight–philosopher”15. The bloodless coup d’état on 19 August 1772, brought to an end in the history of Sweden the „Age of Liberty” which had endured for over 50 years (1720–1772). This period played such a large role in the history of this country that we have to devote to it a few sentences of further

15 Cf. H.A. Barton, Scandinavia..., 99–100; A. Geffroy, op. cit., 338–339; R.N. Bain, op. cit., 138, 213–215; E. Rostworowski, Historia powszechna. Wiek XVIII, Warszawa 1977, 751; Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., 59–60; idem, Czy na pewno..., 200. 61

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comment. The opinion of the „Age of Liberty” in Swedish historiography oscillates between extremely critical judgments on one hand, and opinions directed at the total rehabilitation of the image of political life in that era on the other. Formerly, historiography generally accepted unreservedly the monarchist propaganda of Gustav III. „The era of political parties” was condemned as a dark period in the history of Sweden. It was exposed as a time of corruption, anarchy and the interference of the foreign powers in the internal affairs of the country. According to many prominent Sweden historians, Gustav III, by holding a coup d’état, saved Sweden from succumbing to the fate of the Polish Republic, and the loss of independence resulting from partition between Russia and Denmark16. Attempt to rehabilitate the „Age of Liberty” has only taken by the representatives of the liberal and democratic mainstream of Swedish historiography. In their opinion, in 1772, there was no real threat to the independence of Sweden from Russia, Prussia or Denmark. A system of international relations decided in the final analysis of the success of the

16 A sharp judgment about the „Age of Liberty” gave especially C.G Malmström, whose work is still essential, the most comprehensive study of political history of Sweden at that time. L. Stavenow, student of Malmström, in its entirety shared the views of the master. Cf. C.G. Malmström, op. cit., Bd I–VI, Stockholm 1893–1901, passim; L. Stavenow, Frihetstiden, 465–474; A. Kersten, Historia Szwecji, Wrocław 1973, 275; G. Olsson, “Epoka wolności” w Szwecji (1718–1772). Przegląd problematyki badawczej, “Zapiski Historyczne” 1970, vol. XXXV, z. 3–4, 49–50. Position definitely reluctant to political system of the „Age of Liberty” on the ground of Polish historiography represents mainly W. Konopczyński. It should be immediately noted that he mainly affects all the excesses of the system, which consequently led to the degradation of the importance of Sweden in the international arena. It is through the prism of international relations Konopczyński also assess coup d’état of Gustav III, which undoubtedly contributed to the strengthening of the state and confirmed sovereignty of Sweden in relations with its powerful neighbors. Cf. idem, Geneza i ustanowienie Rady Nieustającej, Kraków 1937, 357. Cf. also Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., s. 54. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

coup d’état of 19 August. Proponents of a positive evaluation of the „Age of Liberty”, condemn the coup d’état carried out by Gustav III, exhibiting in their works the gradually progressive blurring of distinctions among the classes, the introduction of the freedom of the press, the proclaimed limited tolerance for Calvinism, or governing responsibility given to society. They also stress the undeniable fact that at that time, Sweden was experiencing a period of economic prosperity and from the 1730s had opened wide to the ideas of the Enlightenment17. Recognizing all of the positive developments that have occurred in the history of Sweden, in the present era it should be immediately noted that the fierce rivalry between the warring political factions led to serious distortions of the system and in fact resulted in the disintegration of Swedish state institutions. There is also no doubt that during this time Sweden roles the course of international politics decreased. We must look at this era as objectively as possible and reject any extreme views; both positive and negative effects of party government in Sweden must be considered. We have to state that this period was a very important experiment in the history of this state and nation. However, regardless of

17 This trend was initiated in the Swedish historiography by F. Lagerroth in 1915. A positive opinion about the “Age of Liberty” was recited also by the representatives of the younger generation of Swedish historians. Cf. F. Lagerroth, Frihetstidens författning. En studie i den svenska konstitutionalismens historia, Stockholm 1915, passim; G. Olsson, op. cit., passim; idem, Hattar och mössor. Studier över partiväsendet i Sverige 1751–1762, Studia historica Gothoburgensia No 1, Göteborg 1963. Balanced and objective assessment of this period in the history of Sweden gives M. Roberts. Cf. idem, The Age of Liberty 1719–1772. Sweden 1719–1772, Cambridge 1986, passim. On the basis of Polish historiography a thorough supporter of “Age of Freedom” period rehabilitation was primarily A. Kersten. Cf. idem, op. cit., 275. In terms of cultural and scientific achievements of Sweden in the “era of parties” Cf. among others A. Geffroy, op. cit., 54–74; F. Arnhem, Schweden, Gotha 1917, 106–110. Cf. also Z. Anusik, Dyplomacja..., s. 55. 63

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any subsequent evaluations of the „Age of Freedom”, one fact remains indisputable – the vast majority of the Swedish population does not regret the toppled political system18.

18 H. Valentine makes a wide review of the historical literature devoted to the judgments of the “Age of Liberty”. Cf. idem, Frihetstiden inför eftervärlden. Med kompletterande efterskrift av Birger Sallnäs, uppl. 2, Stockholm 1964; With regard to the need to make an objective assessment of the “parties era” Cf. S. Carlsson, J. Rosén, Svensk historia, Bd II (Tiden efter 1718), Stockholm 1964, 198–202; and I. Andersson, Dzieje Szwecji, Warszawa 1967, 210–212. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Dariusz Nawrot (Katowice)

French officials on the east land of the Polish Republic in 1812

In preparing for confrontation with Russia in 1812, Napoleon had hoped for a quick victory through a decisive battle with the army of Alexander I on the territory of Lithuania. The first week of the campaign brought to ruin of the French emperor’s plans as the Russian army retreated east. In such a situation Napoleon found it necessary to form a system of government for the occupied east lands of the former Republic of Poland so as to use its resources in the subsequent military campaign in Russia. He decided on the formation of the Lithuanian authorities on 1st July 1812, establishing the Commission of the Temporary Government as well as governing bodies of gubernyas: vilenski, minski, grodzienski and bialostocki. The members of both the Commission of the Government and local authorities were elected by the representatives of the Lithuanian society who had gathered in the capital. Napoleon agreed on that form of election so as to incapacitate the Lithuanian authorities. The leading power was nominally held by the Commission of the Government; however, the emperor’s commissioner played the decisive role in managing the French intendants that governed the administration of those departments. Accordingly, the French military administration, including commanding officers of gubernyas and commanders of place were established in the

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country1. What is most significant is that the French military administration did not have to obey the Commission of the Government or the emperor’s commissioner, who was appointed to the commission. The major general, Marshal A. Berthier, had authority over the governors. Their competences together with duties of their submissive military administration were clearly included in the Lithuanian authorities’ tasks, which focused on the Lithuanian mobilization, feeding to the Great Army, and providing police and security personnel. The pursuit of the Russians, as well as Napoleon and Berthier’s departure from Vilnius, led to the establishment of a new position of the general governor of Lithuania, appointed by the order of 8th July, who was supposed to wield military power over the four departments as the head of the governors and the military administration which was subject to them2. The system of civil and military authorities in Lithuania, formed by Napoleon, was a temporary solution and functioned according to the same rules as other systems formed in other countries captured by the French emperor’s army. The characteristic feature was the centralization of hierarchical authority based on representatives of the country, who were

1 Ordre du jour, 1 VII 1812 Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter: AN), AF IV 671, pl. 5354; B. Dundulis, Napoléon et la Lituanie en 1812. Paris 1940, 122–123; J. Iwaszkiewicz, Litwa w 1812 roku. Kraków 1912, 130–135, 282–283; D. Nawrot, Litwa i Napoleon w 1812 roku. Katowice 2008, 273–364. 2 Nomination, 8 VII 1812 in, Correspondance de Napoléon I–er, publiée par ordre de lÈmpereur Napoléon III. Paris 1857–1870 (Corr.) 1892; Service Historique de LÀrmée de terre w Vincennes (hereafter: SHAT). C–17, 111; A. Berthier do D. van Hogendorpa z 11 VII 1812 r. – SHAT. C–2, 128; G. Fabry, Campagne de Russie. Publié sous la Direction de la Section Historique de l`État–major de lÀrmée. Paris 1900– 1903, vol. 3, 6–7; vol. 5, 921; D. van Hogendorp, Mémoires. Paris–La Haye 1887, 307; P. Melon, . Paris 1938, 155; B. Dundulis, Napoléon..., 284. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

completely subjective to the French officials’ control3. Nevertheless, the fact that Napoleon was willing to incapacitate the Lithuanian authorities and take control over them through his officials led to the formation of three competing powers. The first was the Commission of the Temporary Government, which, according to the order of 1st July, officially held the superior power over the four departments of Lithuania. The second authority was the emperor’s commissioner, Eduard Bignion. Although the emperor did not describe the commissioner’s competences in the order of 1st July, article 2 of the subsequent order of the same day which nominated him, gave Bignion superiority over the intendants who led the administrative commissions of the four departments. By this order, Napoleon appointed a commissioner who co–governed together with the Commission of the Government and had to gain Bignion’s approval for all activities. The third power was the general governor of Lithuania, general Dirk van Hogendorp. In order to control such a complicated situation Napoleon decided upon his departure from Vilnius on 16th July to give the supervision over all Lithuania and the three authorities to foreign affairs minister Maret, the duke of Bassano, who stayed in the capital. Maret was supposed to watch the rear of the Great Army and coordinate all activities serving the mobilization of Lithuanian resources. All levels of the Lithuanian administration and all French officials staying in Lithuania were subject to him. The minister was supposed to cooperate with the Commission of the Government and supervise their actions as well as the activity of the emperor’s commissioner and the general governor of Lithuania4.

3 D. Nawrot, Litwa i Napoleon..., 285–287; V. Pugačiauskas, Napoleono administracja Lietuvoje. Vilnius 1998, 46–49, 192. 4 A. Ernouf, Maret, duc de Bassano. Paris 1884, 394–397; A. Fain, Manuscrit de 1812 pour servir à l`histoire de l`empereur Napoléon. Paris 1827, vol. 1, 218; C.F. Menéval, Mémoires pour servir à l`histoire de Napoléon Ier depuis 1802 jusqu’à 1815. Paris 67

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Who were Napoleon’s officials that found themselves on the eastern lands of the Polish Republic in 1812? The leading figure among them was 49–year–old Hugues–Bernard Maret, who for years had been Napoleon’s closest collaborator, regarded as the éminence grise at the emperor’s side. Before he took the position of foreign affairs minister in April 1811, he had been managing the main organ of the governing machine of France as the minister state secretary, regulating and coordinating all inter–ministry activities. Since his first stay at the Vistula River in 1806, Maret was known for his interest in the Polish issue. He co–formed the Governing Commission in 1807 and edited the constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw. At that time he already had a reputation for to approving solutions favorable to the Poles. He started his career at the time of the revolution as a journalist and became a diplomat under the protection of the minister Pierre Henri Lebrun. He attached himself to Napoleon after the general’s return from Egypt in 1799. While staying Maret’s staying at the emperor’s headquarters in Kamieniec Suski in 1807 he made friends with Alexander Sapieha, the actual leader of the Lithuanian authorities5. 51–year–old Dirk van Hogendorp became the general governor of Lithuania because he had been staying in Królewiec, close to the Lithuanian territory, since June 1812, as governor of Eastern Prussia. Hogendorp was Dutch but as a young man he started his military service in the army of Friderick the Great. He abandoned the Prussian army when Holland entered the U.S. War of Independence. He connected his future career with colonies in the Dutch East Indies and became the governor of Java in 1794. Hogendorp was influenced by liberal ideas enlivened by the French Revolution and began some reforms in his colony. He declared that the

1893–1894, vol. 3, 39; Ch. Sor, Le duc de Bassano. Paris 1843, s. 74; B. Dundulis, Napoléon..., 126. 5Dictionnaire Napoléon. ed. J. Tulard. Paris 1999, vol. 2, 271. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

feudal management of the Dutch East India Company did not relate to the ideas of Enlightenment and proposed thorough reforms, even including awarding the Java people the right to possess land. The projects met with hard opposition from conservative officials and Hogendorp was imprisoned in 1798. However, Dirk escaped from Java and returned to Holland so as to continue the fight for reforms in the Dutch East India Company. His activity in this field towards this goal was interrupted by his diplomatic service and, among other things, his mission to Russia and his holding the position of war minister in the Kingdom of Holland for a short period of time in 1807. After the incorporation of Holland into the French Empire, Hogendorp entered the French army at the rank of major general6. In 1812, together with Barthomeuf, who was a French official, Hogendorp was assigned the post of the main Lithuanian ordonator. He was directly subjected to the general intendant of the Great Army and appointed to take superior power over the French ordonators in the four departments7. 33–year–old Swiss brigadier general baron Antoine Henri Jomini, a well–known war theoretician, re–organiser of the Swiss army and the author of Traite des Grandes Operations Militaires from 1805, became the governor of the Vilenski department. He started his military service in the

6 J.A. Sillem, Dirk van Hogendorp, (1761–1822), naar grootendeels onuitgegeven bronnen bewerkt. Amsterdam 1890, 54–70, 112; D. Clive, The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java. New York 1904, 134–142; A. Sens, La révolution batave et l'esclavage. Les (im)possibilités de l'abolition de la traite des noirs et de l'esclavage (1780–1814). Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 326 (2001), D. van Rinus, Dirk van Hogendorp in Sint–Petersburg 1803–1805, een Fransgezinde diplomaat in actie voor de Bataafse onafhankelĳkheid. in, Noord– en Zuid– Nederlanders in Rusland 1703–2003. Red. E. Waegemans, H van Koningsbrugge. Groningen 2004, 93–121; Repertorium der diplomatische Vertreter aller Laender. Hrsg. O.F. Winter. Graz–Koeln 1965, 266, 268, 271; Corr. 18775. 7 E. Bignon to Barthomeuf, 19 IX, 3 X and 12 XI 1812 – AN. 136 AP 9; Akty izdavaemye Vilenskoû arheografičkoû Komissieû. Vil`na 1912, vol. 37, 405. 69

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army of the Helvecka Republic and from 1804 served in the Great Army as the aide–de–camp of Marshal Ney and finally in marshal Berthier’s staff. 51– year–old brigadier general Jean Antoine Bruno became the governor of the Grodzienski department. He had served in the revolutionary wars and the Egyptian campaign, and later as the military governor of Cherbourg and, in 1812, as the governor of Pilawa in Eastern Prussia. The Bialostocki department was governed by Italian campaign veteran and later aide–de– camp of Dutch king Ludvik, 41–year–old brigadier general Jacques Ferrier. From 1810 he had served the army of the Italian Kingdom as the commander of the cavalry brigade. Although initially the two departments, Grodzienski and Bialostocki, were to be united under one governor, due to the size of the bialostocki department, the nomination of separate governors was preferred. In the Minski department, 45–year–old Polish the brigadier general Mikołaj Bronikowski became the governor. He had served in the French army and been awarded with the Virtuti Militari cross after the battle of Zieleńce. He also participated in the 1974 insurrection in Lithuania and Great Poland. In 1809 he was the organizer of the II Vistula League. He fought in Spain as the brigadier general of the 1st division of the Aragon army of Marshal Suchet. He was considered to have “no particular skills and no power of spirit”8. 41–year–old Luis Pierre Eduard Bignon, who in December 1810 had been nominated the emperor’s representative in the Duchy of Warsaw, became the emperor’s commissioner at the Commission of the Government.

8 A. Berthier to J. Bruno,10 VII 1812 ; A. Berthier to J. Ferrière, 10 VII 1812; A. Berthier to KRTWKL, 10 VII 1812 – SHAT. C–2, 128; B. Dundulis, Napoléon..., 284; Dictionnaire Napoléon. Ed. J. Tulard. Paris 1999, Antoine Henri Jomini – vol. 2, 83– 84; Jean Antoine Brun – vol. 1, 330; Jacques Ferrière – vol. 1, 797; G Six, Dictionnaire biographique des generaux & amiraux francais de la Revolution et de l'Empire (1792– 1814). Paryż 1934; A. Skałkowski, Mikołaj Bronikowski. Polski Słownik Biograficzny, Kraków 1936, vol. 2, 470. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

He belonged to diplomats of the medium level and was often entrusted unusual tasks demanding a lot of discretion. He was a great friend of the Poles, whom he had first had contact with as a secretary of the French embassy in Milan in 1798–1799. Then he worked for the French diplomatic missions in German states. In 1806–1808 he organized the administration of occupied Prussia. After Napoleon’s subsequent victory over Austria in 1809, he took on similar duties on the land captured by the French army. He also dealt with the organization of the French administration personnel in Illyria provinces. Bignon gained a great knowledge of administrative and statistic–economic issues. His mission in Warsaw was to strengthen the relationship between Poles and Napoleon, to encourage the authorities to make a greater effort to enlarge the treasury income, to prepare for the unavoidable war with Tsar Alexander I and, most importantly, to organize intelligence against Russia. His closest collaborator in the field of intelligence became the above mentioned Alexander Sapieha9. 32–year–old Scipion Cyprien Luis Martin Marie Elisabeth Louis Nicolai, auditor of the State Council in 1810, and from 1811 auditor of the second class at the forest administration and then auditor of the first class at the ministry of justice in the legislation section, became the intendant in

9 F.A. Mignet, Notices historiques sur la vie et les travaux de M. Bignon. in, E. Bignon, Souvenirs d`un diplomate. La Pologne 1811–1813 par le baron... Paris 1864; J. Iwaszkiewicz, Wstęp. in, E. Bignon, Polska w r. 1811 i 1813. Wspomnienia dyplomaty. Wilno 1913, vol. 1, 5; E. Bignon Papers – AN. 136 AP 9, vol. 7–9; M. Handelsman, Rezydenci napoleońscy w Warszawie 1807–1813. Kraków 1915, 164–193; Idem, Pod znakiem Napoleona. Warszawa 1913, 217–218; B. Grochulska, W obliczu klęski. Edwarda Bignona traktat o przyszłości Francji i Europy. in, „O roku ów...” Epoka napoleońska w polskiej historiografii, literaturze, sztuce i tradycji. Red. M.M. Drozdowski, H. Szwankowska. Warszawa 2003, 75–80; J. Henri –Robert, Dictionnaire des Diplomates de Napoléon. Paris 1990; Dictionnaire Napoléon…, vol. 1, 228. See:. H. Maret to A. Sapieha, 19 I 1811 – BCzart. Ms. 3763 III, k. 83, i z 21 II 1811 r. – BCzart. Ms., ew. 641 (ADCz. Ms. 7041); A. Ernouf, Maret..., 229–231. 71

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the Vilenski department,. In 1812 he was delegated for the extraordinary service to the military administration10. 32–year–old François Casimir Duval Chassenon de Curzay, the auditor of the State Council of the first class from 1810, who later found himself in the territory of Illyria at the time of marshal Marmont’s rule as the intendant of Rijeka, became the intendant in the Grodzienski department. He was very quickly involved in a competence conflict with the French authorities. Marmont wrote at that time about Chassenon’s reprehensible behavior, complaining about “the superior reproaches which the auditors are making against the generals.” After Chassenon’s return from his leave in France the marshal forbade his deputy to hand his responsibilities over to him. In 1811 he was nominated the sub– prefect of Nantes and in 1812, similarly to the former intendant, he was delegated to the military administration11. In the Minski department, Pierre’s Saulnier’s son, the prefect of Moza and the general secretary of the ministry of justice, 22–year–old Sébastien Louis Saulnier, became the intendant. In 1810 Sébastien was nominated as auditor of the third class at the police prefecture and then auditor of the third class for the extraordinary service. In 1811 he held the position of the police general commissioner in Wesel and in 1812 he was delegated to the Great Army12. In the Bialostocki department, 24–year–old Adrien Louis Cochelet became the intendant. He had been the auditor at the ministry of finance and the

10 A. Robert, G. Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires français de 1789 à 1889 comprenant tous les membres des Assemblées françaises et tous les ministres français depuis le 1er mai 1789 jusqu'au 1er mai 1889. Paris 1889, vol. 4, 494; Dictionnaire Napoléon..., vol. 2, 393. 11 Dossier. AN. F1bI 157/38; Dictionnaire Napoléon…, vol. 1, 425; M. Senkowska– Gluck, Rządy napoleońskie w Ilirii 1809–1813. Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1980, 42–43; Ch. Durand, Les auditeurs au Conseil d’Etat de 1803 à 1814. Aix–en–Provance 1958, 146–147. 12 Dossier. AN , F1bI 173/9; Dictionnaire Napoléon..., vol. 2, 731 SARMATIA EUROPAEA

public treasury from 1809, then was nominated the intendant of Gorica in 1809. In 1810 he entered the extraordinary service and became auditor of the first class in the financial section. His career was aided by his sister’s relationship with queen Hortense. In 1812 he was delegated to the Great Army13. Deciding on the formation of the Lithuanian authorities and how to include French officials in its structure, Napoleon wished to avoid the situation in which he would lose control over the freed land of the Russian partition. Thus, he prevented any case in which the new Lithuanian authorities could start a spontaneous uprising in order to form a Polish Kingdom uncontrolled by France. Indeed, the directive regarding the condition of the captured territory of the former Polish Republic as part of the land captured from Russia and subjected to occupation rules was still in force. Apart from the directive, or even according to it, Napoleon carried out an experiment of forming new civil authorities for the local society. Appointed at Napoleon’s direction such a complicated structure of authorities in Lithuania lead to competence and personal conflicts and after the first month the full extent of these conflicts was revealed. The competence conflicts and misunderstandings between the French and Lithuanian authorities concerned not only the central authority organs, but also administration at all levels, both in the capital and in the provinces. The lack of clear division between the military and civil authorities, or the French and Lithuanians, made the situation more complicated and very often brought about a paralysis in decision making. Those conflicts were also generated by the French intendants, who, on one hand, were dependent on the emperor’s commissioner Bignon, but on the other,

13 Dossier. AN. F1bI 157/26; J.B.J. Boulliot, Biographie ardennaise, ou histoire des hommes du Depart., ou Histoire Ardennais qui se sont fait remarquer. Paris 1830, vol. 2, 462; Dictionnaire Napoléon..., vol. 1, 448. 73

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presided over the three–person administrative commissions, which in fact were the authorities in each department theoretically submissive to the Commission of the Government. This condition led to frequent arguments, in which the issue of the superiority of a particular council or the wish to increase prerogatives played the main role14. The administrative commissions worked in difficult conditions. The French authorities imposed on Lithuania such stringent demands that they could only be met with great effort15. A specific case is presented by the Grodzienski department and particularly the relationship between intendant Chassenon and the administrative commission which consisted of former colonel Ignacy Lachnicki, Jan Niemcewicz and Ludwig Pancerzyński. That relationship even led to violent scenes16. Chassenon tore apart the reports of the commission meetings or took money by force from the department treasury. He even sent military execution orders to the commission members. As member of the Commission of the Government Alexander Potocki wrote that the intendant played the role of “a little monarch,” who agreed with or rejected the commission’s proposals depending on his moods. He ordered his secretary, functioning as his “chancellor” to give his speeches and then he publicized them in print. He bombed the members of the department authorities with his own decrees,

14 Report of A. Chreptowicz, K. Daniłowicz in, K. Voenskij, Akty, dokumenty i materialy dla političeskoj i bytovoj istorii 1812 goda Sankt–Peterburg 1909–1912, vol. 1, 409, 411; Akty…, vol. 37 , 224–225, 440; Podprefekt upicki to Komisja Administracyjna Departamentu Wileńskiego (KADW) ,27 IX 1812 – Lietuvos Valstybes Istorijos Archyvas w Wilnie (hereafter: LVIA). F. 1532, a. 1, b. 14, k. 144. 15 V. Pugačiauskas, Napoleono administracija..., 65, 194. 16 K. Voenskij, Akty..., vol. 1, 435; J. Iwaszkiewicz, Litwa..., 144; E. Bignon do H. Mareta z 26 XII 1812 r. z Warszawy – Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères w Paryżu (hereafter: AMAE). Corr. Pologne 332, k. 578; A. Ernouf, Maret..., 447. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

delaying in that way the works of the administrative commission17. The case was reported to Duke Bassano. The Commission of the Government and the Committee of Home Affairs intervened in the case of Chassenon, the Grodzienski department intendant, who demanded the governor charge the members of the Administrative Commission of the Gorodzienski Department officially in court. The Committee presented the opinion that the charges concerning the mess in military hospitals and delays of provisions related to the town authorities of Grodno. The problem was to decide about the proportion of finance that the whole department and the town should give to hospitals. According to the intendant’s demand, the proposal of signing the contract for hospital provisions with the appointed Mr. Salur was accepted. A special commission led by Antoni Lechnicki was also established, whose purpose was to analyze any complaints about hospital maintenance18. Bignon presented the conflict at the Commission of the Government session in a different way. He stated that to the best of his knowledge, the members of the administrative commission gave the intendant a document in Polish answering his questions and when he demanded explanations, they told him he had all explanations in front of him. The furious intendant closed the session after that incident. However, as the reports from the Commission of the Government session proved, the members of the administrative commission sent the torn sheets of the report, which denied Bignon’s version mentioned above19. As one of the

17 A. Potocki, Pamiętnik – Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie (hereafter: AGAD). APP 284, 205. 18 Komitet Spraw Wewnętrznych (KSW) to Komisja Rządu Tymczasowego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, 27 XI 1812 ; KSW to Komisja Administracyjna Departamentu Grodzieńskiego (KADG), 4 XII 1812 r. – AGAD. APP 144, vol. 2, k. 34, 51. 19 Sesja KRTWKL, 29 IX 1812 – Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Arhiv Drevnih Aktov v Moskve (hereafter: RGADA). F. 12, b. 262, part 5. 75

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sources of conflict in Grodno was presenting the intendant with a document in Polish, the Commission of the Government decided to include a secretary translator to the office of administrative commissions20. Finally, intendant Chassenon was shot as the result of argument with an officer from the Austrian Corps. In his diaries Victor de Broglie wrote about Chassenon’s tendency for arguments and duals, which justifies the assumption that the source of conflicts in Grodno lay in Chassenon’s violent personality21. What finally led to his dismissal was his recuperation. As a result, Cochelet, who was the intendant of Bialostocki department was temporarily rewarded the additional responsibilities. After consulting Maret, Bignon admitted that the management of the small Bialostocki department could be joined with the Grodzienski department, which for some time satiated conflicts22. Nevertheless, at the end of November the Administrative Commission of the Grodzienski Department requested the Commission of the Government to “protect them from the distress they received” from intendant Chassenon23. At that time, the report concerning the Grodzienski intendant’s abuses reached Bignon, but there was no time to solve the problem24. Nonetheless, the two other French intendants, the above mentioned Cochelet in Bialystok and Saulnier in Minsk, managed to earn the respect of the local Lithuanian authorities25. As Alexander Potocki wrote, it was due to the fact that they did not disturb the activity of the administrative commissions which they

20 Sesja KRTWKL z 21, 24, 29 IX 1812 r. – RGADA. F. 12, b. 262, part 5. 21 V. De Broglie, Souvenirs. Paris 1886–887, vol. 1–4. 22 E. Bignon to A. Berthier, 1, 2 XI 1812 – SHAT. C–2, 133; Sesja KRTWKL z 2 XI 1812 r. – RGADA. F. 12, b. 262, part 5. 23 Sesja KRTWKL z 27 XI 1812 r. – RGADA. F. 12, b. 262, part 5. 24 Sesja KRTWKL z 30 XI 1812 r. – RGADA. F. 12, b. 262, part 5. 25 E. Bignon to H. Maret, 26 XII 1812 , Warsaw – AMAE. Corr. Pologne 332, k. 572, 578; J. Iwaszkiewicz, Litwa..., 144; M.K. Ogiński, Mémoire sur la Pologne et les Polonais depuis 1788 jusqu`à la fin de 1815. Paris 1826–1827, vol. 3, 217–218. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

managed; thus, they saved themselves scenes similar to those in Grodno26. Saulnier was remembered as a good and righteous man, who donated a quite a large sum of money for improving the condition of hospitals in the town. Even Ogiński viewed him as just in his activity, although Saulnier controlled every little step of the members of the administrative commission in the department administration. Vilenski intendant Nicolai rarely took part in the sessions of the administrative commission. “A friendly and sweet man,” as Potocki described him, he only engaged himself in the workings of the department from time to time. He only intervened personally in key and urgent matters. He did not appeal to Lithuania, which influenced his involvement in the state issues27. The governors of the four departments left a similar impression. They were in charge of the garrisons in the area of the departments as well as forming Lithuanian military units, the gendarmerie and the National Guard. They guarded the safety of the departments. The most crucial responsibilities of the governors were the organization and maintenance of the postal service, which was devastated by the retreating Russians, and watching the roads for the marching army, which included demarcating the stages on the roads and supplying the soldiers. The governors were also responsible for gathering the injured soldiers who stayed behind and forming them into marching squads. The governors took direct control over military commissioners and one official supervising military depots and hospitals – demarcating stages in each department. They also had authority over the French officials of lower ranks, who helped them28. In carrying out

26 A. Potocki, Pamiętnik – AGAD. APP 284, k. 205. 27 Ibidem, k. 205. V. Pugačiauskas, Napoleono administracija..., 57–59, 193. 28 Report of A. Berthier for Napoleon, 3 VII 1812– (SHAT). C–2, 128; Corr. 18939; G. Fabry, Campagne…, vol. 3, 6–7; A. Ernouf, Maret…, 411; D. van Hogendorp, 77

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those duties, governor Brun was regarded as a restrained man. Ferriér did very little due to his frequent absence from the department. Bronikowski made a good impression of being involved in the works of the Minski department. Jomini was described unfavorably by Potocki as being as worthless as his supervisor, Hogendorp; however, being at a lower position, he could do much less harm29. The most serious source of conflict was the central authorities in Lithuania and its beginning was connected with the general governor’s arrival in Vilnius on 29th July. Hogendorp regarded himself to be the new emperor of Lithuania from the very beginning. In his diary, which he wrote after some years, he repeatedly wrote that at Napoleon’s command, he was made the most important authority in Lithuania. At the same time as he emphasized his peacefulness, he accused all people who doubted his competences of unfavorable or even hostile activity against him. Hogendorp’s attitude evoked immediate conflicts with Vilenski governor Jomini, the emperor’s commissioner Bignon, The Commission of the Government, and above all with the president of the Military Commission, Alexander Sapieha.30 Not telling anybody in advance about his arrival, Hogendorp bore grudges that he was not welcomed cordially. While staying at the Vilenski governor’s house he awaited an official reception from the authorities. As there was some rumor in the town about his arrival, some single representatives turned up at the house. They were immediately told off for not giving a proper welcome. He complained that he had been

Mémoires…, 314–315; Wiadomość o wewnętrznej organizacji Komisji Rządu Tymczasowego w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim – LVIA. F. 1532, a. 1, b. 1, k. 56. 29 A. Potocki, Pamiętnik – AGAD. APP 284, k. 204; J. Iwaszkiewicz, Litwa..., 144, 360; B. Dundulis, Napoléon..., 124–125, 134. 30 D. van Hogendorp, Mémoires..., 314; „Kurier Litewski” ,1 VIII 1812, nr 59. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

welcomed by neither Bignon nor Jomini31. Undoubtedly, the governor general of Lithuania, in fulfilling Napoleon’s orders, had wished from the first day to force the pace of organizing the Lithuanian army and that is why he intervened in works of the Military Committee more and more often. However, he felt removed from real decisions. Above all there was no clear division of competences between Bignon, whom the Commission of the Government sympathized with, and Hogendorp, whose position was not anticipated in the order of 1st July. From the beginning, these two sides fell into deeper and deeper conflict about the extent of their power and Hogendorp complained about being kept in the dark and not being allowed to deal with military issues. He had grievances that he was not delivered daily reports from the Commission of the Government sessions as Maret was. He did not like the fact that Lithuanian authorities tried to keep some independence. Every day the conflicts intensified. Hogendorp continuously treated the members of the Commission of the Government contemptuously and publically showed his disrespect towards Lithuania and the Lithuanians. He also put forward an idea to treat the Lithuanian territory as an occupied land. He stated that in order to collect indispensable financial resources, the French should take all church silver and the treasury of Vilenski University and force the Jews to donate additionally. Maret in vain explained to the general governor that the scope of his power did not include the relationships with the Commission of the Government and that he should contact it by means of the emperor’s commissioner. Hogendorp did not accept these explanations and in his letters to Napoleon and Berthier he complained that his role was being diminished. He also accused the Lithuanian authorities of delays in tasks given by the

31 M. Handelsman, Rezydenci…, 278; D. van Hogendorp, Mémoires..., 314–315. 79

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emperor32. Alexander Potocki confirmed that general Hogendorp very rapidly started his “guerilla warfare” with the Commission of the Government. He had expected the position of general governor to be connected with great honors, excellent command and a fortune. It soon turned out that his command was limited to marching troops; furthermore, he was not given any salary and lacked clear, formally described competences. All that brought about a situation in which nobody was willing to regard him as the leading figure in Lithuania. He was dissatisfied about not being honored or paid suitably. As Potocki wrote, Hogendorp was “an arrogant and the greatest animal”; in accusing others with allegations about poorly managed armed forces or hospitals that were in fact included in his responsibilities, he discredited himself. The fact that the general governor firmly demanded suitable representative funds for himself was not to his credit33. As the new general governor, Hogendorp who initiated conflicts with all potential partners within a couple of days, neither knew the complex situation in Lithuania nor understood it; thus, his orders led to more frequent arguments with the Military Committee and its leader, Alexander Sapieha. Hogendorp regarded count Sapieha to be a man of no personality, surrounded by the same dullards, which slowed down the country’s military effort. He criticized the method of recruitment to Lithuanian regiments and accused his commanders of inefficiency. One of the contentious questions was the issue of the officers’ assignments that Hogendorp wanted to appropriate for himself, appointing officers after

32 E. Bignon to H. Maret , 3 VIII 1812– AN. AF IV 1650, pl. 3, nr 10; A. Ernouf, Maret..., 411; G. Fabry, Campagne..., vol. 3, 533–536 – instruction for A. Berthier, 1 VIII 1812 ; vol. 4, 262, 263, 302–303; D. van Hogendorp, Mémoires..., 314–316. Por. E. Bignon, Polska…, vol. 2, 16–17; M. Handelsman, Rezydenci..., 278–279. 33 A. Potocki, Pamiętnik – AGAD. APP 284, k. 203, 231. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

gaining Maret’s and Bignon’s opinion. Conversely, Sapieha demanded keeping the regulation, according to which the Commission of the Government put forward nomination proposals to the emperor. Bignon, who was befriended by Sapieha, supported the count. More and more frequently, the dispute was witnessed by Maret, whose support was sought by both parties. After one violent argument, the minister wrote that he was afraid for his furniture. Attempts to prevent the dispute were unsuccessful. In such heated arguments between the general governor, the emperor’s commissioner and the Lithuanian authorities, Napoleon’s support became necessary. In his letters to the emperor, Maret backed up Sapieha and accused Hogendorp of rudeness. He proposed a clear division of the governor’s military authority and the Commission of the Government’s civil powers, as he considered it to be the only way to avoid further conflicts. Accordingly, Maret wished to appoint Bignon as the highest superior of the Lithuanian civil authorities, which would create two independent power centers: a military administration in Hogendorp’s hands and a civil administration in Bignon’s hands34. A few years of cooperation between Bignon and Sapieha and the commissioner’s good relations with other members of the Commission of the Government indicated that such a solution would facilitate harmonious cooperation between the Lithuanian authorities and Bignon. The commissioner being engaged in working with the Lithuanian authorities, he had to understand the entire complex situation in Lithuania. Thus, the minister needed to be sent precise instructions about the general governor’s competences from Napoleon,

34 H. Maret to Napoleon, 12 VIII 1812 ,Vilnus – AN. AF IV 1647, pl. 2, nr 51–53; G. Fabry, Campagne..., vol. 4, 135–137; A. Ernouf, Maret..., 412–414. 81

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which would finally delineate the boundaries of his power. He even demanded Hogendorp’s dismissal35. In reply to more frequent conflicts concerning the relationship between the French military administration and the Lithuanian civil authorities, which was personally connected with general governor Hogendorp, the emperor decided to cut the Gordian knot of competence and facilitate the activity of the Lithuanian authorities. Eventually, the emperor made a decision that astonished everyone. On 24th August he nominated Hogendorp as the president of the Commission of the Government, which meant the superior of the Lithuanian civil authorities, stating that it was the general governor who deserved the complete authority over the Lithuanian administration and army organization36. The position of emperor’s commissioner, which Maret wanted to be the head of civil administration, was now subject to Hogendorp. The emperor, who was in favor of vertical management, ordered Bignon to support the general governor and not to reject his activity. The commissioner was supposed to be Hogendorp’s secretary, supporting him in his efforts37. In that new situation the intendants subject to Bignon carried out the orders of Hogendorp, who was simultaneously the emperor’s commissioner’s superior and the president of the Commission of the Government. The emperor also dismissed governor Jomini, who was in conflict with Hogendorp. In his place the emperor nominated 51–year–old brigadier general Rock Godart, who had been a

35 H. Maret to Napoleon, 12 VIII 1812– AN. AF IV 1647, pl. 2, nr 51. 36 Ordre du jour, 24 VIII 1812– AN. AF IV 685, pl. 5480; Corr. 19133. 37 Corr. 19136, 19119, 19135, 19137; G. de Chambray, Histoire de l`expédition de Russie. Paris 1825, vol. 2, 46; M. Handelsman, Rezydenci..., s 281; A. Chuquet, Ordres et apostilles de Napoléon Ier. Paris 1903, vol. 2, 396. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

participant of revolutionary and Napoleonic wars since 1792 and the commander of Tarn department from 181138. Most importantly, after the changes in the wake of Napoleon’s orders, Hogendorp’s and Bignon’s influence on the issues of the Commission of the Government sessions increased. Its members became mere executors of the orders of the French authorities’ representatives, although the general governor very quickly realized that he lacked the appropriate qualifications and knowledge to cope with his new responsibilities as the president of the Commission of the Government. Hogendorp did not know Lithuania and most issues discussed were unfamiliar to him. As a result, he stopped participating in the sessions of the Government Commission. Nevertheless, he ruled in a harsh and aloof way. He liked others to feel his superiority in solving even the most trivial issues and disrespected collaborators. Certainly, the governor’s curtness resulted not only from his habits as Java’s governor, but also from his experience in the army of Friderick II in his youth. A significant factor that influenced Hogendorp’s attitude towards Lithuania might also have been his negative opinion if the Lithuanian elite, whom Hogendorp accused of keeping feudal relationships on Lithuanian land. On that issue, the Lithuanian authorities were in constant conflict with general Hogendorp, about whom Potocki wrote to his father “(…) he is a man of no reason, skills or courtesy, bear it in mind, my father, what coincidence it must be, fortunately so far we’ve had everything our own way as count Bassano and Bignon are supporting us”.39 Nevertheless, when the Commission of the Government dared to alter the instructions for the intendants concerning demands for wheat, its members

38 H. Maret to Napoleon, 25 VIII 1812 – AN. AF IV 1647, pl. 2, nr 97; D. van Hogendorp, Mémoires..., 308, 309, 311–313; X. Courville, Jomini. Paris 1935, 164– 170. Corr. 19157, 18925; A. Chuquet, Ordres..., vol. 2, 406. 39 A. Potocki to S.K. Potocki, late October 1812 from Vilnus,– AGAD. APP 285. 83

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were forced to put forward a written statement that they had no intention, and in the future they would have no intention, to change the orders of the French authorities40. The administrative commissions were unconditionally obliged to carry out the orders of the highest French authorities, even those that were not confirmed by the Commission of the Government41. During that period, the role of the intendants increased. The Commission of the Government told the authorities of the four departments to inform them immediately about every act of the members of administrative commission when the intendants were absent from the sessions. They also confirmed that the commission consisted of an intendant and its three members42. Undoubtedly, the basic problem was the fact that the French officials arrived in Lithuania already prejudiced and having no knowledge about the country. They did not know the language, which resulted in translating every document that was put forward into French. It was not only costly, but also time–consuming, which delayed the activity of the authority43. Officials of lower rank in particular did not leave a positive impression in Lithuania. They were accused of maltreating of the country that they regarded as an occupied territory.44 Some French also realized how responsible such behaviour was. However, most of the French officials, being paid very irregularly, lived at the expense of Lithuania45. J. Iwaszkiewicz wrote that the French officials demanded to be provided with the most expensive wines and liquors. B. Dundulis emphasized that those

40 Sesja KRTWKL, 12 XI 1812– RGADA. F. 12, b. 262, part 5. 41 Sesja KRTWKL, 5 X 1812– RGADA. F. 12, b. 262, part 5. 42Sesja KRTWKL, 21 and 26 XI 1812– RGADA. F. 12, b. 262, part 5. 43 A. Potocki, Pamiętnik – AGAD. APP 284, k. 205. 44 V.G. Krasnânskij, Minskij departament Velikogo Knâzestva Litovskogo. Sankt– Peterburg 1902, 22; J. Iwaszkiewicz, Litwa..., 114. 45 KRTWKL, 29 IX 1812. RGADA. F. 12, b. 261, nr 1097; K. Voenskij, Akty..., vol. 1, 412; J. Iwaszkiewicz, Litwa..., 144. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

officials should not have any special privileges concerning accommodation and military supplies. However, Dundulis forgot that the competences of the French authorities duplicated the responsibilities of the Lithuanian authorities in the most important issues46. The final task of the French officials in Lithuania in 1812 was to cover the withdrawal of the Great army through the Lithuanian territory. Thanks to the Lithuanian’s generosity in December 1812, the depots for Napoleon’s army in Lithuania were full and allowed the army to survive the whole winter. The Lithuanians also managed to take out their last money to pay taxes and over 90% of the collected fund subsidized the formation of a Lithuanian army, whose troops could stop the Russian army’s pursuit. The impending disaster could not be avoided, however. The French officials in Vilnius witnessed the most atrocious moments of the withdrawal from Russia as the chaos approached. Vilenski governor Godart looked on with horror upon seeing only the remains of the whole army coming back. Even though there were a few marshals and over 100 generals in the city, nobody could put everything back in order. As Hogendorp reported, there was a lot of bread and meat, but soldiers did not go to the places of accommodation they were directed to. Every one chose accommodation freely. The strong threw away the weaker and robbed food and vodka depots. Citizens became victims of robbery once again. Streets and squares of the city were crowded with people, horses and carts. For many soldiers who found accommodation, the warmth became the cause of their death47.

46B. Dundulis, Napoléon..., 134–135. Por. L. Brotonne, Dernières lettres inédites de Napoléon Ier. Paris 1903, vol. 2, 282. 47 M. Lignieres, Souvenirs de la Grande Armée et de la Vieille Garde impériale. Paris 1923, 129–130; M. Fézensac, Souvenirs militaires de 1804 a 1814. Paris 1866, 351– 353; R. Godart, Mémoires. Paris 1895, 185–187; D. van Hogendorp, Mémoires..., 337. 85

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It is difficult to state explicitly, how Napoleon’s mistakes, which he made when initially constructing the authorities in four departments influenced Lithuanian military effort in 1812. Nevertheless, the results of the war seem to have been determined by objective factors as well as an overly optimistic forecast concerning Lithuania’s resources, which were drastically diminished by both the Russian policy and the devastation of the country by the troops of the Great Army. Napoleon’s political concepts, which eventually determined his policy towards Lithuania, also had a significant influence. A lot of people blamed the failure on the French officials’ lack of competences as Dominik Dziewanowski accused “(…) foreign Governors, especially in Vilnius, neither allowing the natives to do any administration nor doing it by themselves in any other way, but by the suppliers, made all things highly expensive and thus, ripping off the poor citizens, who seeing such bargains with the Jews to be their doom and failure, finally cooled down their readiness”.

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Wojciech Krawczuk (Kraków)

Some remarks on Swedish Historiography of the Northern War of 1655–1660

The Northern War of 1655–1660 was, until recently, a secondary topic for Swedish historians, and Swedes in general. It is not that the deeds of Charles X Gustav from the House of Zweibrücken were ever forgotten: the southern provinces of Sweden such as Scania and Blekinge became incorporated into the kingdom as the spoils of this war. But there were other kings who received greater acclaim: some more popular, like the great founder of the modern state – Gustav Vasa; others more “noble” like the protector of protestants – Gustav II Adolph; or still others more romantic and wild – like Charles XII. In general, the Swedes are (or were) not especially interested in this part of the old history of their kingdom – full of blood and wars and invasions. Meanwhile, in recent years, it has been possible to see a change in this attitude, something like the rebirth of a long forgotten myth. The situation in Poland is different. Thanks to Henryk Sienkiewicz’s historical novel The Deluge from 1886, the struggle against the Swedish invasion of 1655 has become one of the pillars of the Polish national consciousness. The Poles do love history, but when it comes to the 17th Century the only vivid and still discussed topics are linked with this author and his “Trilogy”: With Fire and Sword, The Deluge, and Pan Wołodyjowski (known in English as Fire in the Steppe). There is one person, in the very beginning of modern historiography, who marks the whole Swedish research on this period:

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Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694), the outstanding philosopher, jurist and, last but not least, historian. He was the Historiographer Royal of Charles XI, King of Sweden and later Historiographer of Frederick William, Duke of Brandenburg. Pufendorf wrote the history of Charles X Gustav in seven books, under the Latin title De rebus a Carolo Gustavo Sveciae Rege, gestis commentariorum libri septem, elegantissimis tabulis aeneis exornati cum triplici indice. The work, with superb illustrations by Erik Dahlberg, was printed in Nürnberg in the year 1696, two years after Pufendorf’s death. Swedish high officials and King Charles XI, son of Charles X Gustav, were so pleased with it that as early as in the year 1697 two translations into German and French followed. Translation into Swedish had to wait until 1912, and now, after more than 300 hundred years, the translation into Polish is ready and will be published soon. This work is both a blessing and burden for Swedish historians. About 600 pages, (more than 60 printed sheets by today’s measure) are tightly packed with various documents, which were only slightly adjusted by Pufendorf into fluent narration. This is even the greatest advantage of the work – many of the letters and acts were later scattered or destroyed, and some of the information is to be found nowhere else but in the Seven books. Pufendorf, who of course was obliged to praise the king, still managed to criticize some of his actions. He did it with caution and used devices such as quoting opinions of the king’s enemies extensively. In his view, a king’s deeds should legitimize his right to the crown, and the reader should have the tools to judge Charles X Gustav by his actions. Pufendorf’s work as a historian is not widely known today. There are only few texts on his work as a historiographer – most of which are in SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Swedish or German with a few in English. But the impact of Pufendorf’s historical studies was great and it is still felt. Recently, Lars Ericsson Wolke wrote the book 1658. March over the Bält straits. There we can find a short, but convincing summary of the evolution of the Swedish historiography of the Northern War of 1655– 16601. Wolke divided the history of the research in this field into periods. In the first epoch, which ended around the first half of the 19th Century, the validity of Pufendorf’s work was undisputed. The critics during the Romantic period did attack Charles X Gustav for ethical reasons and Pufendorf was also attacked for flattery. This negative attitude towards the warrior–king is still dominant. The best example comes from Swedish novelist Frans G. Bengtsson (1894–1954) – who planned to write a book on Charles X Gustav. In 1940 he changed his mind – I do not want to write the biography of the king who made blitzkrieg on Poland and occupied Danmark any more – stated Bengtsson2 Even as we are sorry that Bengtsson did not write his book, we can be grateful for the profound scientific work done by Swedish historians. The “peak” of this research came in the 1960s and 70s in the form of a very fine series under the title Carl Gustaf Studier. The eight volumes of this work are indispensable for everyone working on the era of Sweden’s presence as great power (den svenska stormaktstiden)3. But it is not only strict warfare

1 L.E. Wolke, 1658. Tåget över Bält, Falun 2008, 196–212. 2 Ibidem, 211. 3 Carl X Gustaf och Danmark, ed. Arne Stade, Kristianstad 1965, [in:] Carl Gustaf Studier, vol. 1, A. Stade, Erik Dahlbergh och Carl X Gustafs krigshistoria, Kristianstad 1967, [in:] Carl Gustaf Studier, vol. 3, Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660, (ed.) Arne Stade i Jan Wimmer, Kristianstad 1973, [in:] Carl Gustaf Studier, vol. 5, A. O. Johnsen, Krabbekrigen, Kristianstad 1967, [in:] Carl Gustaf Studier, vol. 2, H. Landberg, Carl X Gustaf inför polska kriget, Kristianstad 1969, [in:] Carl Gustaf Studier, vol. 4, F. Askgaard, Kampen om Östersjön på Carl X Gustafs tid, Kristianstad 1974, [in:] Carl Gustaf Studier, vol. 6, R. Fagerlund, J. T. Lappalainen, Kriget på Östfronten, 89

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history that has been analysed. We can name here Stellan Dahlgren’s book from 1964 Karl X Gustav och reduktionen, with a superb description of the monarch’s very difficult undertaking of returning the gentry fiefs to the Crown. This was one of the most important issues in constructing the early modern fiscal – military state. There have been many projects on the Northern War of 1655– 1660 pursued in the last decade. Claes Göran Iscason presented a synthesis of the recent studies on Charles X Gustav’s campaigns4 Andrej Kotljarchuk wrote a book on the complicated relationship between Sweden and Lithuania during this epoch5 Anna Maria Forssberg published a study in English and Swedish on different aspects of war propaganda in Sweden at the time of the Northern Wars6. These are the only examples of the work done to date. But the most successful attempt to revive this epoch came from Peter Englund. This gifted author reminded Swedes of crucial moments in their early modern history. His most famous book portrays the Poltava battle in 1709. In 2000 Englund published a story about the Northern War of 1655–1660, under the title Den Oövervinnerlige (The Invincible). Englund’s book was criticized by Robert I. Frost, among others, in his

Kristianstad 1979, [in:] Carl Gustaf Studier, vol. 7, Carl X Gustafs Armé, ed. A. Stade, Kristianstad 1979, [in:] Carl Gustaf Studier, vol. 8. 4 C.–G. Icascon, Karl X Gustavs krig. Fälttågen I Polen, Tyskland, Baltikum, Danmark och Sverige 1655–1660, Lund 2004. 5 A. Kotljarchuk. In the Shadows of Poland and Russia. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid – 17th Century, Södertörn 2006. 6 A. M. Forssberg, Nationalist Arguments as Instruments of War Propaganda in Sweden, 1655–80, in: Statehood Before and Beyond Ethnicity: Minor States in Northern and Eastern Europe 1600–2000, (ed.) Linas Eriksonas and Leos Müller, Peter Land, Brussels 2005, 127–146. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

convincing study about the Northern Wars7. The greatest problem is Englund’s narrow perspective as in his book on Poltava he mainly uses Swedish and German sources. Englund’s description of the world of Charles X Gustav is vivid and dramatic, but his far reaching conclusions – such as comparing the winged hussar cavalry with medieval knights – are often untenable. Quarrels aside, Englund’s merit lies in the field of popularization. Sienkiewicz’s previously mentioned historical novel “The Deluge” gave, and continues to provide, impulses to the forming of new historical projects in Poland. We can see here positive feedback: wide publicity has increased the desire for research in this topic. Hopefully, Englund will do the same for Sweden.

7 R. I. Frost, The Northern Wars. War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721, Harlow (Essex) 2000, 16–17. 91

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SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Adam Perłakowski (Kraków)

“At the gates of a European policy” Achievements and perspectives for research into the international policies of the Polish Commonwealth during the reign of Friedrich Augustus II Wettin (1697–1733)

When in 1971 the eminent historian Emanuel Rostworowski expressed the view that the period of the rule of the Wettins (1697–1763) in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was an era of inertia and the beginning of the Russian protectorate, he made use of weighty arguments to support this thesis. He saw the inception of the Russian protectorate as taking place in 1686 when, on the authority of the Grzymułtowski Treaty, the Muscovite Tsars received a guarantee of freedom of religion for people of Orthodox faith in Poland, as well as the right to intervene in their defence1. In Rostworowski’s opinion, that system was significantly strengthened during the Great Northern War (1700–1721) when subsequent events, including the Narev Treaty (1704), the Toruń accord of Peter I and Augustus II Wettin (1709), and thereafter the Tarnogród Confederation (1715–1716) and the “Silent Sejm” (1717), sealed Poland’s dependence on its Eastern neighbour and precluded the hopes of the Polish king to establish a sovereign policy. Attempts to break free of Peter I's domination fizzled out, which was visibly evident in Wettin’s spectacular

1 E. Rostworowski, Polska w układzie sił politycznych Europy XVIII wieku, [in:] Polska w epoce Oświecenia, państwo–społeczeństwo–kultura, ed. B. Leśnodorski, Warszawa 1971, 11–59. 93

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defeat in the question of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’s entering into the Vienna accord during the years 1719–17202. Emanuel Rostworowski was undoubtedly correct, but as it always is in such instances, only partially. Russia had of course painstakingly solidified its position in the Commonwealth, taking advantage of opportunities as they arose. The problem is, however, that today we tend to see this phenomenon (the Russian protectorate) more as one of the second half of the eighteenth century, during the reign of Stanisław August Poniatowski, when nothing on the banks of the Vistula could happen without the knowledge and consent of the Russian emperors and, by extension, their proxies in Poland. This example shows how the more than seventy years of the Saxon dynasty’s rule in Poland has been traditionally viewed. But for at least the past decade, numerous works have been published that diametrically alter the image of the internal history of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth during the first half of the eighteenth century. Józef A. Gierowski cast light on this in outlining the academic works of his tutor, Władysław Konopczyński, according to which it was possible to draw optimistic reflections on politics, society and culture. Afterward, the Polish Enlightenment eagerly seized upon these reflections, as a contrast to the period of decline and stagnation in the second half of the seventeenth century and the rule of the two “Piasts” to sit on the Polish throne: Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669–1673) and Jan III Sobieski (1674–1696)3. Rostworowski is unquestionably among the most eminent of Polish historians to research the Saxon period: the main focus of his

2 E. Rostworowski, Polska w układzie sił politycznych…, 11–59. 3 J.A. Gierowski, Władysław Konopczyński jako badacz czasów saskich, „Studia Historyczne”, 22, (1979), 1, 71–74. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

interests was the rule of Stanisław August Poniatowski4. Meanwhile, an overarching study of diplomacy covering the years 1697–1763 was produced by the eminent representative of the Cracow historical community, Józef Andrzej Gierowski. Writing a section on the history of Polish diplomacy during the Saxon years in 1982, he referred not only to the current literature on the subject, but also to a solid foundation of source documents to present a thesis surprising for that time. He had a favourable view of Polish diplomacy on the threshold of the personal union between Poland and Saxony, claiming that it did not differ fundamentally in quality from the majority of diplomatic policies of Europe, and that it was only in the 1750s and 60s that it found itself lagging behind others, in contrast to the efficiently managed and modern diplomacy of the Saxons5. This thesis was to a certain extent a creative extension of his earlier views, as he had already seen this element of authority, that is a strong, effective, and sovereign international policy dependent on effective diplomacy, as key to achieving absolute power in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, which ultimately Augustus II did not achieve6. This study is, perhaps to this day, the only chronicle of international events in which Polish, or rather Saxon, diplomacy had a part, and may be the only presentation of the organization of diplomacy: the structure of the diplomatic service, its logistical support

4 J.A. Gierowski, Czasy saskie w badaniach Emanuela Mateusza Rostworowskiego, „Wiek Oświecenia”, vol. 8, (1992), 223–226; J.A. Gierowski, Emanuel Mateusz Rostworowski, „Nauka Polska”, No 2–3 (1993), 211–214. 5 J.A. Gierowski, Dyplomacja polska doby saskiej (1699–1763), [in:] Historia dyplomacji polskiej, 2, 1572–1795, ed. Z. Wójcik, Warszawa 1982, 331–481. 6 J. Gierowski, J. Leszczyński, Dyplomacja polska w dobie unii personalnej polsko– saskiej, [in:] Polska służba dyplomatyczna XVI–XVIII w., ed. Z. Wójcik, Warszawa 1966, 369–431; J.A. Gierowski, Sytuacja międzynarodowa Polski w czasach saskich, Polska, Saksonia i plany absolutystyczne Augusta II, [in:] Polska w epoce Oświecenia…, 60–104. 95

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structure, and the role of private diplomacy (e.g. that of the Hetmans) in the old Commonwealth. I am consciously omitting here the Polish historical literature on the interregnum after the death of Jan III Sobieski, as well as the stormy election of Wettin himself to the Polish throne in 1697. I believe that to be a separate problem, deserving to be analysed in its own right. Some Polish historians feel that it was 1699, with the complete subjugation of a country torn by conflict during the Warsaw Sejm between the supporters of Augustus II and those of François Louis de Bourbon, Prince of Conti and the political camp headed by the Primate Michał Radziejowski, that marked the new era of sovereign and secure Saxon governments in Poland. The reign of the first of the Wettins (1697–1733) has been studied in several works. Due to the way in which the subject was treated and the current state of research, those studies that have been published over the past decade or so should be counted as the most meritorious (including those published in English), written by Józef A. Gierowski7 and by Mariusz Markiewicz8. The problem of the relationship between the two states (Poland and Saxony) has been the subject of numerous, if brief, works. One that was certainly a breakthrough, not only from the perspective of Polish historiography, was the text by J.A. Gierowski entitled Pesonal– oder Realunion? included in a volume dedicated to Saxony and Poland during the Great Northern War9. Gierowski de facto resolved the issue of the

7 J.A. Gierowski, The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the XVIIIth century. From anarchy to well–organised state, Kraków 1996; Rzeczpospolita w dobie złotej wolności (1648–1763), [in:] Wielka Historia Polski, ed. S. Grodziski, J. Wyrozumski, M. Zgórniak, Kraków 2001, 217–290, 327–335. 8 M. Markiewicz, Historia Polski 1492–1795, Kraków 2004, 589–625. 9 J. Gierowski, Personal– oder Realunion? Zur Geschichte der polnisch–sächsischen Beziehungen nach Poltawa, [in:] Um die Polnische Krone. Sachsen und Polen während SARMATIA EUROPAEA

relationship between Saxony and the Commonwealth, accentuating its personal character, which made a real union between the two nations impossible. This volume also contained articles by Polish and German historians (from East Germany) and was essentially the first attempt made by the two nations at creating a common view of that period of history. Its publication in 1962 was more than a major academic event: to this day, arguments continue over the supposed political motives and inspirations of the authors, thanks to which the publication was able to see the light of day10. Unfortunately, book’s publication went completely unnoticed in East Germany, where only a few copies were sold (the same number as in Japan). Sales were little better in Poland, where, aside from the legal deposit for academic libraries, only a dozen or so copies were sold. The rest of the edition went to waste, and one of the German editors, Johannes Kalisch was „punished” by the East German authorities, who sent him from Berlin, where he had worked at the Academy of Sciences, to Rostock where he was forced to set aside his interest in the Polish–Saxon union in favour of Polish–German relations after the World War I11. The authors of the short works attempted to compare the relationship between Poland and Saxony to the Polish–Lithuanian union des Nordischen Krieges 1700–1721, bearb. von J. Kalisch, J. Gierowski, Berlin 1962, 254–291. 10 R. Groß, Elektorat saski i jego związki z Polską. Opinie i oceny, [in:] Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów i jej tradycje. Materiały z konferencji „Trzysta lat od początku unii polsko–saskiej. Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów i jej tradycje”, Kraków 15–17 IX 1997 r., ed. A.K. Link–Lenczowski, M. Markiewicz, Kraków 1999, 59–65; J.A. Gierowski, Rzeczpospolita jako zwornik Europy środkowowschodniej, [in:] Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów i jej tradycje… 217–226. 11 J. Staszewski, Badania Józefa Andrzeja Gierowskiego nad epoką saską, [in:] Profesor Józef Andrzej Gierowski jako uczony i nauczyciel. Materiały z konferencji dedykowanej pamięci Profesora i wspomnienia o Nim, ed. M. Markiewicz, A.K. Link– Lenczowski, J. Maroń, K. Matwijowski and L. Ziątkowski, „Prace Historyczne”, 40, Wrocław 2008, 46–50. 97

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(after 1569)12, the Hannover–English relationship after 171413 and English– Scottish relations after 170714 from the viewpoint of the interests of Polish citizens and their rulers15. They also investigated these relationships in the context of the Anglo–Saxon concept of the “composite state” popular in historiography16. A portion of the publication brought to the foreground during a conference on the 1997 occasion of the three hundredth anniversary of the personal union of the Commonwealth and Saxony17 and sketches presenting the international position of Poland in the eighteenth

12 J.A. Gierowski, Die Union zwischen Polen und Litauen im 16. Jahrhundert und die polnisch–sächsische Union des 17./18. Jahrhunderts, [in:] Föderationsmodelle und Unionstrukturen. Über Staatenverbindungen in der frühen Neuzeit vom 15. zum 18. Jahrhundert, Hg. von T. Fröschl, 1994, 63–82. 13 J. Lukowski, Hanover/England, Saxony/Poland. Political Relations between States in the Age of Personal Union: Institutions and Procedures, [in:] Die Personalunionen von Sachsen–Polen 1697–1763 und Hannover–England 1714–1837. Ein Vergleich, Hrsg. von R. Rexhauser, 2005, 417–430. 14 A.K. Link–Lenczowski, Unie angielsko–szkockie i związek Rzeczypospolitej z Saksonią. Wokół perspektyw i zagrożeń, [in:] Rzeczpospolita w XVI–XVIII wieku. Państwo czy wspólnota?, Zbiór studiów, ed. B. Dybaś, P. Hanczewski and T. Kempa, Toruń 2007, 249–258. 15 J.A. Gierowski, Ein Herrscher–zwei Staaten: die sächsisch–polnische Personalunion als Problem des Monarchen aus polnischer Sicht, [in:] Die Personalunionen von Sachsen–Polen 1697–1763…, 87–102. 16 M. Markiewicz, Stosunki między Rzeczpospolitą i Saksonią za panowania Augusta II i Augusta III, [in:] Europa unii i federacji. Idea jedności narodów i państw od średniowiecza do czasów współczesnych, ed. K. Ślusarek, Kraków 2004, 83–90. 17 J. Staszewski, Trzysta lat po zawiązaniu unii polsko–saskiej, [in:] Polska–Saksonia w czasach unii (1697–1763). Próba nowego spojrzenia, ed. K. Bartkiewicz, Zielona Góra 1998, 9–21; 300 Jahre nach dem Entstehen der polnisch–sächsischen Union, [in:] Sachsen und Polen zwischen 1697 und 1763. Beiträge der wissenschaftlichen Konferenz vom 26. bis 28. Juni 1997 in Dresden, Dresden 1998, 9–16; Unia polsko– saska z perspektywy trzystu lat, [in:] Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów i jej tradycje…,15–21. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

century with all of the consequences of being situated between the Russian state and the Habsburg Empire18. One cannot complain about a lack of biographies of the monarchs who reigned in the Commonwealth during the first three decades of the eighteenth century. By the time of the Second World War, Józef Feldman had completed his editorial work on the biography of Stanisław Leszczyński (king of Poland from 1706 to 1709 and from 1733 to 1736), which was published in 1948, two years after its author's death. It would be nearly fifty years before Gdansk historian Edmund Cieślak would publish the next biography of that ruler19. The late 1980s and 1990s finally brought a serious exchange on the perception of the Saxon era in the Commonwealth. Discussion within the historical community in Poland was generated by the biographies of Augustus II and Augustus III. In both cases the author was Jacek Staszewski. The biography of Augustus III was published in 198920, with the biography of Augustus II following nine years later21. In the first of these, Staszewski presented his subject in an entirely different light from that in which he had been seen to date: hardworking, completely dedicated to his royal duties, concerned about the cultural development of Poland and Saxony. Furthermore, he emphasized Augustus III’s introduction of a new model of state management based on significant prerogatives for the first

18 J. Staszewski, Union mit Polen–Chancen ohne Realitäten?, [in:] Sachsen und die Wettiner, Chancen und Realitäten. Internationale wissenschaftliche Konferenz. Dresden vom 27 bis 29 Juni 1989 „Dresdner Hefte” (1990) 123–131; J. Staszewski, Między Wiedniem Petersburgiem. Uwagi na temat międzynarodowego położenia Rzeczypospolitej w XVII i XVIII w., [in:] Między Wschodem a Zachodem. Rzeczpospolita XVI–XVIII w. Studia ofiarowane Zbigniewowi Wójcikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin, ed. T. Chynczewska–Hennel, M.Kulecki, H.Litwin, M.P.Makowski and J. Tazbir, Warszawa 1993, 169–177. 19 E. Cieślak, Stanisław Leszczyński, Wrocław 1994. 20 J. Staszewski, August III Sas, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1989. 21 Idem, August II Mocny, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1998. 99

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minister (Heinrich von Brühl), and leaving to himself the deciding word in key issues for the kingdom. The biography of Augustus II is also of vital importance to us, because it shows de facto the problems that remain unresolved, the best example of which is the limited information in print on the subject of the political activity of the King and his court in the 1720s. The new work by Jacek Kurek on the final years of the reign of August II does not, unfortunately, fill in these gaps, despite its title22. The undoubted precursor of research on the Saxon period was the Poznan historian Kazimierz Jarochowski, writing in the second half of the nineteenth century. His abundant historiographical writings deserve particular attention, as he was perhaps the first professional historian to use original sources from Dresden. J. Staszewski doubted the autonomy of Jarochowski’s archival research in Dresden, claiming that he had made use of paid copyists from the archives23. While Jarochowski’s findings are currently in need of many clarifications and require extensive review, it should at least be noted that he was the first to undertake research on many previously unstudied themes of the history of the Saxon dynasty in Poland including the famed “Rakoczy episode”: the matter of the election of Franciszek II Rakoczy, Duke of Transylvania, to the Polish throne and his contacts with the anti–Stanisław opposition24. Also worth noting are the works dedicated to diplomatic missions undertaken by the Polish side during the Great Northern War, including those of Franciszek Poniński, the starost of Kopanica, to Russia in 1717 and 1718, and of Jan Jerzy Przebendowski, the Grand Treasurer of the Crown at the court of Frederick

22 J. Kurek, U schyłku panowania Augusta II Sasa. Z dziejów wewnętrznych Rzeczypospolitej (1729–1733), Katowice 2003 23 J. Staszewski, Badania Józefa Andrzeja Gierowskiego nad epoką saską, [in:] Profesor Józef Andrzej Gierowski jako uczony i nauczyciel…, 46–50. 24 K. Jarochowski, Epizod Rakoczowy w dziejach Augusta II, [in:] idem, Z czasów saskich spraw wewnętrznych polityki i wojny, Poznań 1886, 187–325. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

I Hohenzollern of Prussia from 1704 to 170925. A separate set of problems mentioned in the historical writings of Jarochowski includes the question of the relationship between Augustus II and Peter I Romanov following the “Silent Sejm” (1717)26, the intrigue of the Prussian envoy to Warsaw, Friedrich Wilhelm Posadowski, as a result of which the Warsaw Sejm of 1720 was broken27, and the policy of the courts of Dresden and Vienna after the Treaty of Altranstädt28. Thanks to Jarochowski, many sources on the history of Polish diplomacy during the Saxon era were found in a collection entitled “The Portfolio of Gabriel Junosza Podoski…”29. The historical achievements of Kazimierz Jarochowski deserve, as I have mentioned, particular recognition, even though today his findings would be shocking due to their oversimplifications and lack of criticism, not to mention for succumbing to the undue influence of foreign historiography, which is especially evident in his discussion of Posadowski’s role in a plot aimed at breaking off the Sejm. Jarochowski, not having the information stored in the Russian archives concerning the diplomatic activities of the Tsar during the stormy year of 1720, based his writings uncritically on the History of Prussia by Johann Gustav Droysen, which handed him a ready answer to the plot “on a platter”.

25 Idem, Polityka brandenburgska w pierwszych latach wojny Karola XII i misya Przebendowskiego do Berlina w roku 1704, [in:] Nowe opowiadania i studia historyczne przez Kazimierza Jarochowskiego, Warszawa 1882, 251–317. 26 Idem, Car Piotr i August II w trzechleciu po sejmie niemym z roku 1717, [in:] idem, Rozprawy historyczno–krytyczne, Poznań 1889, 39–130. 27 Idem, Próba emancypacyjna polityki Augustowej i intryga Posadowskiego rezydenta pruskiego w Warszawie roku 1720, [in:] idem, Nowe opowiadania i studia historyczne, Warszawa 1882, 321–376. 28 Idem, Polityka saska i austriacka po traktacie altranstadzkim, [in:] idem, Opowiadania i studia historyczne. Seria Nowa, Poznań 1884. 29 Idem, Teka Gabriela Junoszy Podoskiego, arcybiskupa gnieźnieńskiego, vol. I–VI, Poznań 1850–1864. 101

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It is not difficult to see that relations with Russia have been set by a certain „canon of interests” of the historians working to research the rule of Augustus II. This can be seen in particular in the works of Józef Feldman, one of the most eminent experts on the history of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the first decade of the eighteenth century. He presented his main theses, including that of the high significance of the Polish–Russian treaty signed in Narva in 1704 for the future of the relations between the two states, in a study of the role of Poland during the period of the Great Northern War30. Today, many of Feldman’s views, however grounded they may be in solid source materials for their times, provoke a lively discussion in the academic community. The basis of the thesis that asserts that Russian influence in the Commonwealth was grounded in the first years of the Saxon government is called into question, and the findings on the role and the importance of Reinhold Patkul, the Livonian anti–Swedish opposition leader, at court Russian and Polish courts are accepted with very significant reservations. However, Feldman’s work is an important contribution to the understanding of relations between Poland and Russia at a pivotal moment for both countries whose military resolution took place in Poltava in 1709. A continuation of the study of the problem of Polish relations with the Russian state appears in Feldman's work on the policy of the Commonwealth toward Moscow in the post–Poltava period31 and the influences and diplomatic games of Russia in the period preceding the Tarnogród Confederation. As a result of these activities, pro–Swedish and pro–Russian camps joined in resistance to the policies of Augustus II Wettin, rendering impossible the pacification of the nobles’ movement according to the King’s desires. Furthermore, the Russian proxies (including

30 J. Feldman, Polska w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej 1704–1709, Kraków 1925. 31 Idem, Polska a sprawa wschodnia 1709–1714, Kraków 1926. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Alexei Dashkov) flagrantly incited crowds of nobles into opposition to the monarch 32. Twenty years ago Andrzej Leon Sowa took up the subject of Polish opinions on the activities of representatives of Russia in the Commonwealth33. The first part of the Great Northern War, which took place directly on Polish soil, the Tarnogród Confederation, and the period immediately prior to it enjoyed a great deal of interest on the part of Polish historians. This continued even after the Second World War. J.A. Gierowski repeatedly addressed the subject, analysing the internal and external situation in the period following the signing of the treaty at Altranstädt (1706), and immediately following the battle of Poltava. He magnificently underlined that in the political situation of that time, there was no other alternative for the Sandomierz Confederation, being as it was a close ally of Russia. It gave them the opportunity to survive on the political stage and gave hope to the restoration of the reign of August II in Poland34. Exactly ten years later, Gierowski’s student Andrzej Kamiński returned to the problem. Painstakingly investigating the Russian sources (including the collections of the Archive of the History Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Leningrad), he came to almost identical conclusions as Gierowski, indicating

32 Idem, Geneza konfederacji tarnogrodzkiej, „Kwartalnik Historyczny”, 42, (1928), 493–531. 33 A.L. Sowa, Stosunki polsko–rosyjskie w opiniach ministrów Augusta II. Refleksje o kształtowaniu się mechanizmów zależności, [in:] Studia z dziejów Europy, Polski i śląska. Prace ofiarowane Józefowi Andrzejowi Gierowskiemu w 70 rocznicę urodzin, ed. K. Matwijowski, „Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka”, 47, (1992), Nr 1–2, 155–162; A.L. Sowa, Świat ministrów Augusta II. Wartości i poglądy funkcjonujące w kręgu ministrów Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1702–1728, Kraków 1995, 113–125. 34 J. Gierowski, Pol’sza i pobieda pod Połtavoj, [in:] Pol’tavskaja pobieda. Iż istorii mieżdunarodnych otnoszenij na kanunie i posl’e Poltavy, „Institut Slovianovedenija Akademii Nauk Sojuza Sovietskich Socjalisticzieskich Respublik”, Moskva 1959, 13– 70. 103

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that the Battle of Poltava entirety invalidated the provisions of the treaty of Altranstädt and directed Polish–Russian relations onto the road of cooperation. The battle of Poltava was, however, the end of the concert of the Commonwealth with Moscow and from that point forward Poland came under growing pressure from Russia, but not under its protectorate35. Józef A. Gierowski ‘s writings have also been exceptionally valuable to current work referring to the events immediately preceding the Tarnogród Confederation and the contacts of the Polish elites with Russian diplomats with the aim of seeking the Tsar's protection36. Several decades after the publication of J. Feldman’s work, Gierowski discussed the problem of Russian influence on the Confederation’s actions, indicating that the hopes of the camp of supporters of Russia and Sweden for the cooperation of those two nations in the interests of the Confederation were not groundless, taking in to account the international situation, but that it would not have taken place quickly enough to impact directly the final success of the Tarnogród group37. In another article, Gierowski indicated the initiatives taken by Augustus II in the period preceding the Confederation and during its existence that, in his opinion, were the most important when the monarch attempted to increase the range of his authority in the Commonwealth through beneficial international

35 A. Kamiński, Konfederacja sandomierska wobec Rosji w okresie poaltransztadzkim 1706–1709, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1969. 36 J. Gierowski, Między saskim absolutyzmem a złotą wolnością. Z dziejów wewnętrznych Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1712–1715, Wrocław 1953. 37 J.A. Gierowski, Konfederaci tarnogrodzcy wobec możliwości porozumienia szwedzko–rosyjskiego, [in:] Słowianie w dziejach Europy. Studia Historyczne ku uczczeniu 75 rocznicy urodzin i 50–lecia pracy naukowej prof. H. Łowmiańskiego, ed. J. Ochmański, Poznań 1974, 251–261. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

agreements. These resulted in a quick reaction from the Russian side38. Finally, the events of period of the Confederation itself are discussed in two important articles by Gierowski, one of which is on “describing” (opisanie), or the incorporation of the activities of the most important government offices in the country into legal norms: the treasury offices, chancellors and crown and Lithuanian hetmans39. It also addresses the discussions with the Tarnogród Confederates, the results of which was the signing of the Warsaw treaty in December 1716 between Augustus II and the leaders of the nobility. The second text is worthy of particular attention. In it Gierowski puts forward a description of the diplomatic activities of the confederates, counting not only on aid from Russia, but also from the Ottoman Porte (the mission of Dominik Bekierski, then later of Stefan Potocki in Istanbul), the Habsburgs (the delegation of Stafan Morsztyn) and Prussia (the activities of Georg Friedrich Lölhöffel40. In recalling the achievements of J. A. Gierowski, it is impossible to omit one of his most important works, which can without exaggeration be said to be a comprehensive study of the international policies of Poland during the second decade of the eighteenth century. The book, published in 1971, was entitled W cieniu Ligi Północnej [In the Shadow of the Northern League], and brings to the fore many key questions from the period, beginning with the winter campaign by the Swedish king, Charles XII

38 J. Gierowski, Między Francją a Rosją. Z dziejów polityki zewnętrznej Augusta II w latach 1712–1717, „Sprawozdania Wrocławskiego Towarzystwa Naukowego”, 1962, 91–93. 39 J. Gierowski, „Opisanie” urzędów centralnych przez konfederatów tarnogrodzkich, [in:] O naprawę Rzeczypospolitej XVII–XVIII. Prace ofiarowane Władysławowi Czaplińskiemu w 60 rocznicę urodzin, ed. J. Gierowski, A. Kersten, J. Maciszewski, Z. Wójcik, Warszawa 1965, 193–211. 40 J. Gierowski, Wokół mediacji w Traktacie warszawskim 1716 roku, „Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne”, 26, (1969), 57–68. 105

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Wittelsbach, in the lands of the Duchy of Lithuania between 1708 and 1709, the strengthening of the alliance between the Sandomierz Confederates and Tsar Peter I, the change in policy by Augustus II after the defeat of the Swedes at Poltava, and the efforts of the monarch and his closest associate, Jakub Henryk Flemming, to reinforce the union with Saxony, which met with objection from the nobility and from the anti–Augustus opposition of Russia. It can be seen, therefore, that Gierowski’s principal line of discussion was focused on Polish–Russian issues. Of course, W cieniu Ligi Pólnocnej quickly moves beyond that single aspect, touching on such problems as those of the planned support by the Kingdom of Prussia for an absolutist coup in Poland in 1715, as well as the efforts of the Habsburg court to renew the participation of the Commonwealth in the Holy League in order to oppose Turkey 41. A separate direction of study that has interesting potential is the “Vatican direction”: taking a closer look at the diplomatic contacts between Poland–Lithuania and the Apostolic See. One of the first works on this subject was the brief outline by Kazimierz Piwarski of the initial period of contact between the Wettins and the Apostolic See Papacy 42. Jacek Staszewski analysed the relations between Augustus II with the Roman Curia between 1704 and 170643. Also deserving mention is the thorough monograph describing the policies of Rome toward the abdication of

41 J.A. Gierowski, W cieniu Ligi Północnej, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk 1971. 42 K. Piwarski, Pierwsze stosunki Augusta II ze Stolicą Apostolską. Nieznana karta z dziejów dyplomacji polskiej, Warszawa 1937, 3–35. 43 J. Staszewski, Stosunki Augusta II z Kurią Rzymską w latach 1704–1706 (Misja rzymska), „Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu”, 71, (1966), 1, Toruń 1965. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

Augustus II and the succession to the Polish throne by Jan Kopiec44, preceded by several important exiguous works by the same author45, and the article by Józef A. Gierowski on the activities of the nuncios of the Vatican in the Commonwealth during important internal (the cancelled Sejm) and external crises (the possibility of a Turkish attack on Poland) in 171346. The problems in the cooperation between the Commonwealth and the Vatican can also be understood with the help of the valuable source edition from the Series Acta Nuntiaturae47. The „Italian” theme also appeared in the historical writings of Gierowski in his brief analysis of the activities of Daniel Dolfin, the last Venetian ambassador to the Commonwealth (1715–1716), whose mission was intended to renew the connection of the Polish nation with the Holy League, to secure military

44 J. Kopiec, Między Altransztadem a Połtawą. Stolica Apostolska wobec obsady tronu polskiego w latach 1706–1709, „Opolska Biblioteka Teologiczna”, 22, Opole 1997. 45 J. Kopiec, Śląski epizod w dziejach nuncjatury polskiej w czasach Augusta II, „Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka”, 47, (1992), 331–336; Echa polskich wydarzeń z lat 1704–1709 w środowisku hospicjum św. Stanisława w Rzymie, „Nasza Przeszłość”, 82, (1994), 373–380, Dyplomacja papieska wobec sporu o tron polski w latach 1704– 1709, „Nasza Przeszłość”, 88, (1997), 203–225. 46 J.A. Gierowski, Sejm z 1713 r. w relacjach nuncjusza Odeschalchiego, [in:] Studia Historyczno–Prawne. Prace ofiarowane K. Orzechowskiemu w 70 rocznicę urodzin, ed. K. Matwijowski, S. Ochman–Staniszewska, „Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka”, 48, (1993), 2–3, 259–266; idem, Stolica Apostolska wobec groźby tureckiego najazdu na Polskę w 1713 roku, [in:] Religia, edukacja, kultura. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana Profesorowi Stanisławowi Litakowi, ed. M. Surdacki, Lublin 2002, 97–108; idem, Nowe spojrzenie na genezę kryzysu politycznego Rzeczypospolitej w 1713 r., „Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka”, 59, (2004), 3, 291–301. 47 Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae, Tomus XLIII. Benedictus Odescalchi–Erba (1711–1713), vol. 1 (5 IX 1711–31 XII 1712), collegit et paravit Iosephus Andreas Gierowski †, supplevit et edidit Ioannes Kopiec, Cracoviae 2009; Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae, Tomus XLIII. Benedictus Odescalchi–Erba (1711–1713), vol. 2 (4 I 1713–17 I 1714), collegit et paravit Iosephus Andreas Gierowski †, supplevit et edidit Ioannes Kopiec, Cracoviae 2011. 107

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reinforcements for the Venetian Republic in the war against Turkey, and to create a diversion on the border with the Principality of Moldavia48. Unfortunately, the literature on the problem of Polish–Turkish relations is still limited. As much as the period of Jan III Sobieski is associated, justifiably, with the victorious Vienna campaign (1683), and the successive Moldavian campaigns pursued by the Polish King, it is this aspect that has not received satisfactory examination in relation to the Wettin governments. To date, the basic work on this subject is the monograph by Władysław Konopczyński, covering the period from the victory at Vienna in 1683 to the war in defence of the Constitution of the Third of May (1792)49. I have already mentioned the exiguous works by J.A. Gierowski, based on Vatican sources, which examine the internal and external crises of the Commonwealth in 1713 in the context of the Turkish threat. A separate theme that can be distinguished in Polish historiography after the Second World War, and that is almost exclusively related to the relations with Turkey and from there with the Crimean Khanate in studies on the diplomacy of the crown’s hetmans. At first glance it could appear that we have a large amount of knowledge on this subject, as would be suggested by the work of Wacław Zarzycki50. However, deeper analysis leads to the conclusion that the author’s statements are altogether inconclusive as the foundation of source material used is extraordinarily thin. The aspect of Polish–Turkish–Tatar contact was raised in several important works by Andrzej Krzysztof Link–Lenczowski. His doctoral thesis on the diplomacy of

48 J.A. Gierowski, Ostatni ambasador wenecki w Rzeczypospolitej polsko–litewskiej, [in:] Muner Polonica et Slavica, S. De Fanti curante, Udine 1990, 69–84, Cillana dell’Instituto de lingue e letterature dell’Europa Orientale–Università di Udine, 2. 49 W. Konopczyński, Polska a Turcja 1683–1792, Warszawa 1936. 50 W. Zarzycki, Dyplomacja hetmanów w dawnej Polsce, „Bydgoskie Towarzystwo Naukowe. Prace Wydziału nauk Humanistycznych”, Seria E, Nr 8, Warszawa– Poznań 1976. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

the great crown hetman Adam Mikołaj Sieniawski was not, however, published in print51. The other works refer to equally weighty problems of official diplomacy: the financial aspects of the hetman diplomacy with the Ottoman Porte and the Crimean Khanate52; intelligence reaching 40–50 km into neighbouring territory, which at the Sieniawski’s initiative was directed by Colonel Konstanty Turkuł53 ; and the interesting, highly exotic, diplomatic ceremonies held during contacts with Turkish and Tatar delegates in the Commonwealth54. The historian on the Saxon period has at his disposal a relatively well–developed discussion of Polish–French contacts. Without question,

51 A.K. Link–Lenczowski, Dyplomacja hetmana wielkiego koronnego Adama Mikołaja Sieniawskiego w latach 1706–1725, Archives of Jagiellonian University, Ms. Dokt. 77/80. 52 Idem, Hetman Adam Mikołaj Sieniawski a niektóre aspekty finansowe polityki polskiej wobec Porty i Krymu w początkach XVIII w., [in:] O Nowożytnej Polsce i Europie. Prace ofiarowane Józefowi Andrzejowi Gierowskiemu w 60 rocznicę urodzin, ed. K. Matwijowski, „Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka, 37, (1982), 3–4, 457– 465. 53 A.K. Link–Lenczowski, W kręgu ograniczonych możliwości. Wywiad hetmana wielkiego koronnego Adama Mikołaja Sieniawskiego po restauracji Augusta, „Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka”, 47, (1992), 1–2, 145–155 (Studia z dziejów Europy, Polski i Śląska. Prace ofiarowane Józefowi Andrzejowi Gierowskiemu w 70 rocznicę urodzin, ed. K. Matwijowski); Idem, Wokół ceremoniału hetmańskiego w czasach saskich, [in:] Theatrum ceremoniale na dworze książąt i królów polskich. Materiały konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej przez Zamek Królewski na Wawelu i Instytut Historii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego w dniach 23–25 marca 1998, ed. M. Markiewicz, R. Skowron, Kraków 1999, 297–305. 54 A.K. Link–Lenczowski, Wokół kryzysu wschodniego z lat 1711–1713. Tureccy i tatarscy dyplomaci w Rzeczypospolitej, [in:] Między Zachodem a Wschodem. Studia ku czci Profesora Jacka Staszewskiego, II, ed. J. Dumanowski, B. Dybaś, K. Mikulski, J. Poraziński and S. Roszak, Toruń 2003, 355–367; Idem, Południowo–wschodnie pogranicze Rzeczypospolitej u schyłku wojny północnej. W kręgu aktywności hetmana wielkiego koronnego Adama Mikołaja Sieniawskiego po Połtawie, [in:] Między Lwowem a Wrocławiem. Księga Jubileuszowa Profesora Krystyna Matwijowskiego, ed. B. Rok, J. Maroń, Toruń 2006, 1149–1163. 109

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Józef A. Gierowski, Emanuel Rostworowski and Jack Staszewski deserve enormous credit for this. The earliest period of Saxon–Polish–French relations was the subject of works by J. Staszewski, alluding to the origins of the electoral reign of Frederick Augustus I (beginning in 1694), the conception of the dependence by the Habsburgs and the development of closer ties with France (the plan of Field Marshall Johann Adam Schöning) as a result of behind–the–scenes Austrian diplomatic games, attempts to paralyse Saxon attempts on the Polish throne in 1697, closer ties with Dresden in 1700 ending with an internal fracturing in the Commonwealth following the Altranstädt treaty, and the formal abdication of Augustus II55. Thanks to Gierowski, we know a great deal about the behind–the–scenes manoeuvring in the development of closer ties between the Commonwealth and France in the autumn of 1713, which bore fruit in the form of a signed treaty of friendship in August 1714. This treaty was not duly accepted by the French side, whose unpredictable moves (support for the Swedish king Charles XII Wittelsbach) led in reality to a missed opportunity to take advantage of the benefits of closer ties between Warsaw and Versailles56. A supplement to the works of J.A. Gierowski relating to the question of relations between Poland and Versailles was the short text on the opinions of French diplomats about Stanisław Leszczyński between 1707 and 1709 – the period during which he was the sole ruler of the Commonwealth. Unfortunately, these opinions were not favourable to the king, who was blamed for the weakness of Poland and a lack of the kind of leadership that

55 J. Staszewski, O miejsce w Europie. Stosunki Polski i Saksonii z Francją na przełomie XVII i XVIII wieku, Warszawa 1973. 56 J. Gierowski, Traktat przyjaźni Polski z Francją w 1714 r. Studium z dziejów dyplomacji, Warszawa 1965. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

might keep the country from failing57. A separate question that Gierowski touched upon in analysing the diplomatic correspondence of the French emissaries in Constantinople (Charles de Ferriol, Marquis d’Argental) found in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris was the relationship between France and the Crimean Khanate at the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century and the Versailles’ conception of a union between Turkey and Russia. Subsequently, E. Rostworowski published an excellent monograph in 1958 showing the policies of the monarchy of Louis XV Bourbon toward the Commonwealth at the end of the reign of Augustus II (1725–1733). To this day it remains the fundamental work demonstrating the diplomatic moves made by Augustus II at the end of his life58. Those moves were intended to rend Saxony from the grips of pragmatically sanctioned tight relations with France and, with its help, to take over the heritage of the Habsburgs. When, however, that the plans for a Saxon– French alliance fizzled out, the king of Poland withdrew from negotiations, and, aware of his impending death, decided to give his successor a free hand in conducting international policy. Five years later, Rostworowski supplemented his findings, this time based mainly on sources from Dresden (not previously used), showing the mission of the Saxon diplomats Karl Heinrich von Hoym to Paris in 1725, with the intention to sign a treaty with France at all costs59. Later historians also cited Rostworowski in an attempt to investigate the source of the so–called Secret du Roi, which as we know was a secret diplomatic undertaking by Louis XV intended to create an anti– Russian coalition in Europe in the 1750s consisting of Poland, Sweden,

57 J.A. Gierowski, Stanisław Leszczyński i latach 1707–1709 w opiniach dyplomatów francuskich, „Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis”, 543, Historia 36, 1981, 155–164. 58 E. Rostworowski, O polską koronę. Polityka Francji w latach 1725–1733, Wrocław 1958. 59 Idem, Jeszcze o ślubie Marii Leszczyńskiej i polskiej koronie, [in:] Legendy i fakty XVIII w., Warszawa 1963, 10–65. 111

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Prussia and Turkey under the guidance of France. The aim was to place on the Polish throne a candidate who enjoyed the acceptance of Versailles60. Despite popular stereotypes and opinions, this plan should absolutely not be tied to the Saxon–French initiatives of the 1730s, except in that some of its assumptions were identical to those accepted during the lifetime of Augustus II. A review of the state of research on Polish–French relations is supplemented by Edmund Cieślak on the role of the French consulate in Gdańsk in the eighteenth century61. This monograph was based on the publication several decades earlier of a diplomatic report of the French mission, whose authors were E. Cieślak and Józef Rumiński62. The relations between Poland and England have been relatively poorly researched. From the works penned to date, certainly worthy of attention are a few articles by J. A. Gierowski on the relationship of Great Britain and Gdańsk between 1717 and 171963, and by Grzegorz Chomicki, who thoroughly presents the most important problems in political contacts between the monarchies of George I of Hanover and Augustus II Wettin in

60 J. Staszewski, „Sekret królewski” bez tajemnic, [in:] „Jak Polskę przemienić w kraj kwitnący…”. Szkice i studia z czasów saskich, Olsztyn 1997, 169–173. 61 E. Cieślak, Francuska placówka konsularna w Gdańsku w XVIII wieku. Status prawny–zadania–działalność, Kraków 1999. 62 Raporty rezydentów francuskich w Gdańsku w XVIII wieku (1715–1719), ed. E.Cieślak and J. Rumiński, Gdańsk 1964, [in:] Studia i materiały do dziejów Gdańska, ed, E. Cieślak, 2, Gdańskie Towarzystwo Naukowe. Wydział I. Nauk Społecznych i Humanistycznych. Seria Źródeł, 6; Raporty rezydentów francuskich w Gdańsku w XVIII wieku, (1720–1721), ed. E. Cieślak and J. Rumiński, Gdańsk 1968, [in:] Studia i materiały do dziejów Gdańska, ed. E. Cieślak, 2, Gdańskie Towarzystwo Naukowe. Wydział I. Nauk Społecznych i Humanistycznych. Seria Źródeł, 8. 63 J.A. Gierowski, Z dziejów stosunku Anglii do Gdańska w początkach XVIII wieku, [in:] O Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej XVI–XVIII w. Prace ofiarowane Władysławowi Czaplińskiemu w 70 rocznicę urodzin, ed. J. Leszczyński, „Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka”, 30, (1975), 2, 333–342. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

the years 1714–172164. This event, which echoed loudly throughout Europe, was the conversion of Prince Frederick Augustus II (son of Augustus II, later to be ruler of Poland as Augustus III Wettin) to Catholicism. The relationship to the English monarchy outlined by J. A. Gierowski was based on the correspondence of delegates to Queen Anne Stuart: Charles Mordaunt Earl of Peterborough, George McKenzie and James Scott, on the Public Record Office65, and on the Vatican’s Archives of the Secretary of State66. A text by G. Chomicki on the repercussions of the conversion in the London court also had his own input in presenting this problem to the Polish reader67. As poorly understood as the relations in the first decades of the eighteenth century between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and England are, the contacts between Poland and the Habsburgs nearly completely “lie fallow”. This does not mean that Polish historians knew nothing about the sources produced by the Imperial chancellors, nor that they had no idea about the role of Habsburg diplomats in the court in Warsaw or Dresden. Quite the contrary, the majority of the monographs as

64 G. Chomicki, Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec problemów politycznych Rzeczypospolitej (od wstąpienia na tron Jerzego I do zawarcia pokoju w Nystadt), [in:] Rzeczpospolita w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej, pod ed. J. Muszyńska, Kielce 2001,167–183. 65 J.A. Gierowski, Anglia wobec konwersji królewicza Fryderyka Augusta, [in:] Kultura staropolska–kultura europejska. Prace ofiarowane Januszowi Tazbirowi, ed. S. Bylina [et al.], Warszawa 1997, 127–138. 66 Idem, Interwencja królowej Anny przeciw konwersji królewicza Fryderyka Augusta w świetle materiałów Archiwum Watykańskiego, [in:] Czasy nowożytne. Studia Poświęcone pamięci Profesora Władysława Eugeniusza Czaplińskiego w 100 rocznicę urodzin, ed. K. Matwijowski, „Prace Historyczne”, 36, (2005), 129–135. 67 G. Chomicki, Dyplomatyczne reperkusje konwersji królewicza Fryderyka Augusta w świetle raportów posłów brytyjskich, [in:] Rzeczpospolita wielu wyznań. Materiały z międzynarodowej konferencji, Kraków 18–20 listopada 2002, ed. A. Kaźmierczyk, A.K. Link–Lenczowski, M. Markiewicz, K. Matwijowski, Kraków 2004, 525–540. 113

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well as short and long works are to some extent based on Viennese sources. Lacking, however, is a systematisation of research on the political relations between Poland and the Empire. The necessity of changing this situation was postulated in 1983 by Józef A. Gierowski in his short article, wherein he indicated the need for research not only on political relations, but also on those of an economic and cultural nature, of which we have only a very fragmentary understanding68. This understanding was not improved by the publication by J. Staszewski, however interesting, which systematically looked at that (Saxon) period in the history of both nations69, nor by the article by the Viennese historian Christoph Augustynowicz70. The state of the work in the field of Polish–Hungarian relations appears significantly worse. Aside from the article by Jarochowski previously mentioned, we can only make very cautious recourse to the introduction the memoires of Francis II Rákóczi71. Similar dissatisfaction is felt in analysing Polish–Brandenburg relations. There has, however, been a recent publication of a synthesis of the history of the Prussian Kingdom from 1701–180672, in which the

68 J.A. Gierowski, Stosunki polsko–austriackie w czasach saskich, „Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka”, (1983), 4, 517–526. 69 J. Staszewski, Die polnisch–österreichischen Beziehungen im 18. Jahrhundert. Anmerkungen zum Stand der Forschung, [in:] W. Lukan, M. Demeter Peyfuss (Hg.), Aus polnisch–österreichischer Vergangenheit, (=Österreichische Osthefte, 32, Wein 1990), 7–35. 70 Ch. Augustynowicz, Habsburgisch–polnische Beziehungen vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert, [in:] Polnisch–österreichische Kontakte sowie Militärbundnisse 1618– 1918. Symposium und Abendvortrag 11. und 12. September 2008, Acta Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, Wien 2009, 41–76. 71 Franciszek II Rakoczy, Pamiętniki. Wyznania, ed. J.R. Nowak, Warszawa 1988, 5– 43, Biblioteka Pamiętników Polskich i Obcych, ed. Z. Lewinówna. 72 Prusy w okresie monarchii absolutnej (1701–1806), ed. B. Wachowiak, Poznań 2010. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

relationship of Poland to the Hohenzollern nation is discussed73. Also helpful may prove to be the short articles by Józef A. Gierowski on the Prussian plans to support a coup in Poland in 1715 in the aim of increasing royal authority, an intention which in any case had accompanied Prussian policy since at least 1710 (the famous grand dessin for the subjugation of the North at the expense of Poland)74. Articles of Wanda Klesińska on the takeover of Elbląg by Brandenburg in 1698 and the repercussions in diplomatic contacts with Poland are equally of interest75. The work of Jacek Staszewski should also be remembered, addressing the unsuccessful attempt to draw Augustus II into a Prussian partitioning scheme in 1733 and its later consequences in 19th century historical literature. It attributes to Wettin the foiling of plans to partition the Commonwealth, a notion that was “swallowed” without a shadow of doubt by Communist propaganda of the twentieth century76. It is the duty of the chronicler to remember the work of Władysław Konopczyński concerning the relations of the Commonwealth with Sweden. This was published over 80 years ago and covers the period between the treaty of Oliva to the third partition of Poland in 179577. Zbigniew Anusik joined the discussion on Polish international policy through his biography of the king of Sweden Charles XII of Wittelsbach78.

73 A. Kamieński, Polityka zagraniczna Prus 1701–1740, [in:] Prusy w okresie monarchii absolutnej (1701–1806)…, 210–219. 74 J. Gierowski, Pruski projekt zamach stanu w Polsce w 1715 r., „Przegląd Historyczny”, 50, (1959), 4, 753–767. 75 W. Klesińska, Okupacja Elbląga przez Brandenburgię w latach 1698–1700, „Rocznik Elbląski”, 4, (1969), 85–121. 76 J. Staszewski, Ostatni „wielki plan” Augusta Mocnego, „Rocznik Gdański”, 46, (1986), 1, 45–67. 77 W. Konopczyński, Polska a Szwecja: od pokoju oliwskiego do upadku Rzeczypospolitej 1660–1795, Warszawa 1924. 78 Z. Anusik, Karol XIII, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 2006. 115

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Unfortunately, Polish historiography still lacks classic biographies that would bring international issues into focus rather than simply chronicling the lives and achievements of rulers. We have practically no understanding of the diplomatic operations of the Polish and Saxon ministers. Thanks to Władysław Konopczyński, one of the most important ministers of Augustus II, manager of foreign affairs, Jakub Henryk Flemming, was discussed in an article of several dozen pages in the Polish Biographical Dictionary79, and his biography was refreshed relatively recently in a short article by Teresa Zielińska80. This necessarily brief review offers many reflections on the subject of the state of Polish historiography related to the thirty–year reign of Augustus II Wettin. We see an important difference in the state of the works on specific stages of his reign. The first of them, coming during the Great Northern War with its tremendous importance for the region (up to the victory at Poltava in 1709) is well documented. The first important gap appears after the return of the king from Saxony and his reclaiming of the throne. Those years, 1710–1714, are in my opinion treated unjustly by some historians as the prelude to the Tarnogród Confederation (1715– 1717) and the nobles’ movement directed by the Saxon forces stationed in Poland. Thanks to the work of J. A. Gierowski, these events are not a “blank spot” to us. A real problem appears in the analysis of the 1720s and 1730s, known in historiography as the “mild rule” of Augustus II. Here we are practically helpless as partial study does not clarify the most important internal and external problems of the Polish state. These periods, therefore,

79 W. Konopczyński, Flemming Jakub Henryk, „Polski Słownik Biograficzny”, 8, (1948), 32–35; Feldmarszałek Flemming, „Roczniki Historyczne”, 18, Poznań 1949, 163–180. 80 T. Zielińska, Feldmarszałek Jakub Flemming w środowiskach magnatów polskich, [in:] Polska–Saksonia w czasach unii (1697–1763). Próba nowego spojrzenia, ed. K. Bartkiewicz, Zielona Góra 1998, 115–128. SARMATIA EUROPAEA

constitute an immeasurable field of study for future generations of historians. The thesis put forward in 1978 by Emanuel Rostworowski remains valid today: the Commonwealth of the time became a stage upon which costumed people played their games, pretending to take action81. Could that assessment, however, be too severe?

81 E. Rostworowski, Polska w układzie sił politycznych Europy XVIII wieku, [in:] Polska w epoce Oświecenia, państwo–społeczeństwo–kultura…, 11–59.

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