Strategic and Related Considerations in the Development of a Northwest Passage Norman E
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University of Rhode Island DigitalCommons@URI Theses and Major Papers Marine Affairs 4-6-1970 Strategic and Related Considerations in the Development of a Northwest Passage Norman E. Larsen University of Rhode Island Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds Part of the Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology Commons Recommended Citation Larsen, Norman E., "Strategic and Related Considerations in the Development of a Northwest Passage" (1970). Theses and Major Papers. Paper 115. This Major Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Major Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TH:E UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE "'~ SCHOOL OF NAVAL WARFARE THESIS STRATEGIC AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS IN '!HE DEVELOPMENT OF A NORTHWEST PASSA GE by Norman E. Larsen Captain, U.S. Navy This paper is a student thesis prepared at the Naval War College and the thoughts and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or the President, Naval War College. Material herein may not be quoted, extracted for publ ication, reproduced or otherwise copied without specific permission from the author and the President, Maval War College in each instance. MASTER OF ~~ARINE AFFA\RS UNIV. OF RHODE ISLAND - . ~~_.__~ • , :.---. II-:..----"---...__ ,._~~__.._:....____..,-,~ •..~:. ...... If'VAL WAR COLLEOF' 'Newport, R.I. THESIS STPATFOIC AND RELATED CONSTDERATIOtfS HI THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NORTHWEST PASSAGE by Norman E. Lapsen Captaln, U.S. Wav, The contents or this paper reflect my own personal view. and are not nece8s8r117 endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department or the Wavy. stgn~~ /--- ~te: 6' ~I' /770 6 April 1970 '--- ~-'---- ---- ~-_._-. -. - "--- -----------------' A supervi.ed writing aubmitted to the faculty of the Univeraity of Rhode Island In partial aattafactlon of the requirements for the degree of Maater of MarIne Affairs. ABSTRACT Environmental factors whioh bave lmp.ded actirlty In the Arcttc, in the past, remain slgnlrtcant barriers to the development or the Northwest Passage. Consequ.ntly, enormous oapital as well •• bilateral planning and cooper atton between United States and CanadIan publio and private agencies .111 be required if significant pro~e88 18 to be achieved. The re.ource wealth of the Arctic proml••s the eeonomlc inoentives es.enttal to the even~lal development or a tran. portatlon system to permit explo'tatfon or theae re.ources. 1.'he economtc potential or Alaakan 01.1 motivated the Arcttc tanker test or the S.S. Manhattan, an alMost purely private venture. Thl. teat demonstrated the engineerins feasibIlity of penetrating an ••••nti.lly ice-covered deep water thor oughfare, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific, .1th larp'e commeroial surrace ves8els. Establt.hlng economic feasI bility will be lIlUoh more difficult. Development or a commercially rea8fble Northwest PassaR. 1. both eoonomioally and strategically desirable. How8ver, imm8nse physical and eng1neerlng problems rema1n to be solved. Tn addition to severe envIronmental challenpes and the requi'reftlent t"or large public and privat. capttal co","1t ment t9 the need for operable pollution control procedures 11 to proteot the delicate Arctic ecology. Pbrthermo~., sensitive legal and politteal problema need to be .atts raetor1ly resolved. All thea. factors 8u~~e.t the early formulation or a bilateral planning and coordlnat'on "Council" to resolve mutual proble.a and optimize limited resources. ltl TABLE OT-" CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE ABSTRACT • • • •• • • •• •• • • • • • •• • • • • • 11 r INTRODUCTIOll • • • • •• ••• • •• •• 1 II FACTORS WHICR HAVE LIMITED DEVELOPMENT • 3 Historical Analyais ••••• •• •• :5 Pertinent Features or the Region • • • 4 tIl MANHATTAN TRANSIT OF THE PASSAGE •• •• 8 Planning Conaiderattons ••••••• 8 Project Support ••••••••••• 10 Test Vehicle and Objeotives ••••• 11 Phys10al Desorlpt1on or the Northwest Passage •••••••••••• •• 13 Evaluation or Transit •• •••• •• 16 IV ECONOMIO IMPLIOATIONS •••••••••• 20 United States P8troleum Situation •• 21 Markets for Arcttc 011 • • • • • • • • 22 Implications for Shipbuilding Industry ••••••••••• •• 23 Probl8ms of Loading FacilIties. • •• 25 V LEGAL--POLITTCAL CONSIDERAT!ONS ••• •• 28 Basic Legal Issues •••••••• •• 29 Pollution Control Problems •••• •• 35 VI INFLUENCE ON ARCTIC SECURITY •••• • • 40 Impaot of CommercJal Potential on Strategic Importance •• ••• • • 41 VII INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS ••••• •• 44 Potential Effect on World Trade Patterns •• ••••••••••• 45 VIII IMPACT ON U.S. POLICY. ••• •• • • • • 48 Cllrrent Inter-agency Aotivity • • • • 49 IX CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMRlfDATIONS ••••• 55 Conclusions ••••••••••••• 55 Recommendat1ons ••••••••••• 58 BIBLIOGRAPHY ••••••••••••••••••••• 61 1v CHAPTER I IJIlTRODUCTrOtf In 1968 the private oil industry of the United States discovered crude 011 deposits on the North Slope or Alaska believed to be the larp,est all field deposit tn North America. Lying entirely within the harsh environment be yond the Aretlc Circle this area has been essentially Inaeeesslble except by air. The difficulties and potential eost or developin~ a transportation system necessitated extenslve investigation into competitIve methods of trans portlnF thl. otl to eastern United States' markets. One method considered potentially feaatble was by larFe lee-breaking tanker through the historically difficult and inhospitable Northwest Pa88a~e. Tht. method promised ~r.ater economies than a trans-Canadian-United Stetes pipe lIne .hloh poses unique and expensive probleMS. Aecord tnpt,., an operat10nal test '.nvolvlng an tee-breaker tanker was considered e8sential 1n order to establish the eeonomic feaslbility of developinp, a year-round tanker operation. The S.8. Manhattan successrully transited the Nopth west Pa••ape in both direotions between 24 August and 14 November 1969. The tranalt focused internat10nal attentt OD ' .. on the key locatIon or the Arettc as a trade route for internatIonal commerce and attmulated an awareness or the 1 implioit potential for the exploitatIon of the vast mIneral resouroe. 01' the Canadian Arctic. Concurrently. l.portant and complex questions of' natIonal and international slgnifioanoe were raised. It Is the purpose of this stu~ to examine the transit. Ita slpnlfioanoe In pioneerln~ an eoonomically teasible 9ystem for the exploitation of Arotio resouroes and the inherent national and internattonal eoonomic, le~al-polltical and strategio implications In the eventual development of. an international route for surface maritime oommeroe. This venture generated an unusual number or periodical articles and publio speculations of varying degrees or us.rulness. Because or oonstraints or apace many detail. bave neoessar ily been ellmtnated In favor of a broad examination of the complex problem. involved. An apolop:y must be ofrered f"or the two charta included at Appendix T. They are the only one. readIly avallabl. through the grapbio art. divIsion of the Naval War College without r ••ortinF to expensive photographic reduction. Whil. inadequate in detsil they do suftice to generally orient the reader. 2 CHAPTER TI FACTORS nICH RAVE LIMITED DEVRLOPMFtf'1' Historical Analysis. "!he near route to the Far East Is 1 north". Ouided by this maxim and motivated by the riches of the ortent neorly every probe or the Arcttc or sub Arctic up to the 18th Century w.s financed by merchants. These men, lIke the sponsors of the Manhattan test, were primarily interested in the potential profits promised by the establishment of shorter trade routes. The extreme rigors encountered by the early voyagers convinced ~lropean merchants that even if' a Morthwest Passage existed and could be successfully negot1.a.ted the route W88 too hazard ous to be economical. R.tions tnterested In overaeas expansion and the Canadian fur trade continued to encoura~. voyages tbrou~h the 18th C~ntury. These excursions provided the stimulus for systematic study by increasIng numbers of scientists and geographers Who helped map the Arctic Islands. 'fhe cha11eng8 of conqutltr1ng the lce and the search for knowledpe oontinued to motivate expedlt10ns throup,h the 19th Century. It was not until the beg1nntn,. or the ~Oth 1 Vl1hjalmur Stefansaon, Worth.eat to FOrtune, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pieroe, 1958), p. 46. Century, In 1906, that the Rorw~~lan explorer Roald Amundsen climaxed four centuries or exploratt on by suceeasfully 1 • navigating the passape during 8 three-year voyage In the 47 ton herring sloop Ojoa. 2 Even this hi8tor~c voyage was of minor praotical signifioanoe because the route he followed skirts the continental land mass, Is studded with islands and shoals and 18 limited 1n places to depths of 5-6 fathoms. The route followed b,. the Manhattan (See Chart I, Appendix T) was first negotiated by 8 deep draft vessel, the Canadian Ice-breaker Labrador, In 1954. ThIs route, called ~he Parry Channel, divides the Canadian Arctic Ielands and is the onl,. navigable route for deep draft vesse18. It 1s divided at its western end by Banks Island where the relattve1,. narrow Prince or Wales Strait passes to the south. The first vessel to transit the ~ntire lenpth or the more dtfrl~llt McClure Strait north of Banks Island W8S the USCG tce-breaker Northwlnd. The UBS Seadrsgon extensively Bounded Parry Channel