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The 1989 Beÿing spring, P. R. China: The events and how they were vveru portrayed purtrayedill in pi-iiiî£u~yj and middle Schuuls In Bêÿlng, August—December 1989
Levitt, Gregory Alan, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1990
Copyright ©1990 by Levitt, Gregory Alan. All rights reserved.
UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106
THE 1989 BEIJING SPRING, P.R. CHINA: THE EVENTS AND HOW THEY
WERE PORTRAYED IN PRIMARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOLS IN
BEIJING, AUGUST-DECEMBER 1989
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
By
Gregory A. Levitt, B.A., M.A.
*****
The Ohio State University
1990
Dissertation Committee: Approved by
M. Eugene Gilliom Merry M. Merryfield |V\» A(wi ser Elsie Alberty College of Education Copyright by Gregory A. Levitt 1990 To my family and friends and to the people of Beijing who asked me to "tell the world what really happened"
n ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I express sincere appreciation to Dr. M. Eugene Gilliom for his guidance and insight throughout my doctoral program and the research.
Thanks go to the other members of my advisory committee, Drs. Elsie
Alberty and Merry Merryfield, for their suggestions and comments.
Special gratitude is expressed to David Carrevello, Brad Simpson, Chen
Lejen, and CBS News Beijing for their support and encouragement.
Sincere appreciation is expressed to the numerous people, who wish to remain anonymous, for their considerable assistance and insight. Special appreciation is expressed to Donald Nicholos and Nancy Graham for their support throughout the research. The technical assistance of Lynn Hockaden is gratefully acknowledged. To Steve Courts, Terri
Ziegle, Melinda Grote, Michael Rohrig, and Steven Winslow I offer sincere thanks for your friendship and understanding. To my son. Josh,
I thank you for understanding my frequent absences.
m VITA
January 12, 1952 ...... Born - Memphis, Tennessee
1975 ...... B.A., Capital University, Columbus, Ohio
1976-1985 ...... Teacher, Father Wehrle High School, Columbus, Ohio
1985-1988 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1988 ...... M.A., The Ohio State Univer sity, Columbus, Ohio
1988 ...... Chinese Language C ertificate, Beijing Language Institute, Beijing, People's Republic of China
1988-1989 ...... Instructor, Beijing Univer sity of Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering, Beijing, People's Republic of China
1989 ...... Consultant, CBS News, Beijing, People's Republic of China
1989-Present ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Social Studies/Global Education
Studies in Curriculum and Instruction, Professor Elsie Alberty Studies in Chinese Politics, Professor Michael Lampton
IV TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iii
VITA...... iv
LIST OF TABLES...... v iii
LIST OF FIGURES...... ix
CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
Statement of the Problem ...... 1 Methodology ...... 5 E t h i c s ...... 23 Limitations of the Study ...... 28 The Trustworthiness of the Study ...... 29 Definition of Key Terms ...... 35 Outline of the Dissertation ...... 40
II. HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN CHINA...... 42
Introduction ...... 42 Education in Traditional China, 1122 B.C.-1911 . . . 43 Educational Policies in China, 1911-1949 ...... 45 Educational Policies under Mao, 1949-1966 ...... 52 Educational Policies under Mao, 1966-1976 ...... 59 Educational Policies in the post-Mao Era, 1976—P re se n t ...... 64 Summary...... 73
III. AN OVERVIEW OF DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS IN CHINA ...... 77
Introduction ...... 77 The Scholars' Protest—1895 ...... 78 The 1898 R efo rm s ...... 81 Reform and Revolutionary Movements, 1898-1911 .... 83 Republicanism (1911-1916) to Warlordism (1916-1927) ...... 92 The New Culture Movementand Nationalistic Fervor . . 94 The May Fourth Movement ...... 96 The May 30th Incident (May 30, 1925) and Its A fterm ath ...... 100 December 9th Movement ...... 107 The Hundred Flowers Campaign ...... Ill The Tiananmen Incident--1976 ...... 118 The Democracy Wall Movement, November 1978— December 1979 ...... 121 Student Demonstrations—1986 ...... 134 Summary...... 154
IV. THE BEIJING SPRING 159
Introduction 159 Apr 15, 1989 . 160 Apr 16-17, 1989 162 Apr 18, 1989 . 163 Apr 19, 1989 . 167 Apr 20, 1989 . 168 Apr 21, 1989 . 169 Apr 22, 1989 . 172 Apr 23, 1989 . 175 Apr 24, 1989 . 176 Apr 25, 1989 . 177 Apr 26, 1989 . 178 Apr 27, 1989 . 179 Apr 28, 1989 . 181 Apr 29, 1989 . 182 Apr 30—May 2, 1989 ...... 185 May 3, 1989 186 May 4, 1989 ...... 187 May 5, 1989 ...... 193 May 6-8, 1989 ...... 194 May 9, 1989 ...... 196 May 10, 1989 ...... 198 May 11, 1989 ...... 199 May 12, 1989 ...... 199 May 13, 1989 ...... 201 May 14, 1989 ...... 204 May 15, 1989 ...... 207 May 16, 1989 ...... 209 May 17, 1989 ...... 215 May 18, 1989 ...... 219 May 19, 1989 ...... 224 May 20, 1989 ...... 236 May 21, 1989 ...... 237 May 22, 1989 ...... 240 May 23, 1989 ...... 241 May 24, 1989 ...... 242 May 25, 1989 ...... 243 May 26, 1989 ...... 244 May 27, 1989 ...... 244 May 28. 1989 ...... 245 May 29, 1989 ...... 246
VI May 30, 1989 ...... 247 May 31, 1989 ...... 248 June 1, 1989 ...... 249 June 2, 1989 250 June 3, 1989 ...... 252 Morning, June 4, 1989 ...... 282 Aftermath: June 4-9, 1989 ...... 285
V. TEACHING ABOUT THE BEIJING SPRING ...... 289
Introduction...... 289 The Process of Reopening the Schools ...... 290 Primary Schools ...... 293 Lower Middle School ...... 298 Upper Middle School ...... 308 Summary...... 328
VI. CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ...... 326
Conclusions...... 326 Summary...... 356 Recommendations for Future Research ...... 361
APPENDICES
A. Listing of Reform E dicts ...... 363
B. Empress Dowager's 1901 List of R eform s ...... 366
C. Words of Communist "Internationale" and Chinese National Anthem ...... 370
D. The April 26 E d i t o r i a l ...... 372
E. Speeches by Deng Xiaoping ...... 375
F. Banners and Slogans, May 17, 1989 ...... 387
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 393
vn LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
1. Contrasting Positivist and Naturalist Axioms ...... 9
2. School enrollments in selected types of schools, 1949-1965 ...... 58
3. Social studies teaching outline for primary schools, 1982 ...... 67
4. Major purges, 1979-1987 ...... 131
5. A chronology of movements ...... 155
v m LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURES PAGE
1. Map of Tiananmen Square and surrounding areas ...... 270
IX CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The 1989 pro-democracy movement in China and, more specifically, the events in Beijing which began in mid-April and ended in June 1989, captured the attention and the imagination of many Americans. The events were portrayed almost daily on television, radio, and in the print media. As one CBS News correspondent in early June put i t , "This is the story of the decade."
This study focuses on the events in Beijing from April 15 to
June 4, 1989 and the way in which those events were portrayed in primary and middle school classrooms in Beijing from June 9 to December 30,
1989. As part of the context for understanding these contemporary events, this study also gives a brief history of previous democracy/ reform movements and of the educational system in China.
In Chapter I the basic problem to be addressed in this study is identified, and sections are included on the significance of the study, methodology, assumptions and limitations of the study, defi nitions of key terms, and the overall outline of the dissertation.
Statement of the Problem
A. Historical Context
Since the scholars' protest in 1895, there have been at least twelve pro-democracy/reform movements in China. During these movements, 1 2 scholars, students, and occasionally other groups called for a variety of changes, including political, social, economic, and educational reforms. While some of the movements succeeded in accomplishing some of th eir demands, for the most part, reform movements in China were unsuccessful. Pro-democracy/reform movements were violently crushed in China by government leaders during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), the
Republican era (1911-1916), the period of warlordism (1916-1927), rule by the Nationalist Party (1927-1949), and rule by the Communist Party
(1949-present).
B. The Problem
Numerous studies have examined previous pro-democracy/reform movements in China. These studies have primarily focused on (1) general historical accounts (Hsu 1983, 1990; Spence 1980, 1990; Fairbank 1976;
Meisner 1986; Pye 1984); (2) an examination of a specific event, such as the May Fourth Movement (Chow 1960; Chen 1971; Schwartz 1972), the
Hundred Flowers Campaign (MacFarquhar 1974; Duke 1985), and the 1986 demonstrations (Kelly 1988; Pepper 1986; Tournebise 1987); (3) indi viduals, such as Kang Youwei (Hsiao 1975; Lo 1967; Chien 1936), Liang
Qichao (Levenson 1953; Chang 1971; Huang 1972; Schell 1988), Sun Yat-sen
(Barlow 1979; Jansen 1954; Wilbur 1976; Schriffren 1980; Hsli 1927; Linebarger 1925), Hu Shi (Grieder 1970), Lu Xun (Huang 1957; Jenner
1982), Li Dazhao (Meisner 1967), Chiang Kai-shek (Lo 1971), Mao Zedong
(Schram 1963: Chen 1970; Lee 1978; Rice 1972; Chen 1975), and Deng
Xiaoping (Bachman 1986); (4) groups, such as students and intellectuals
(Gassater 1969; Rankin 1971; Fang 1986; Wang 1966; Beinal 1976; Goldman 3
1987; Mu 1962), laborers (Chesneaux 1968), and peasants (Harrison 1969;
Baum 1975; Chesneaux 1973; Zweig 1980); and (5) particular issues such as reform (Lampton 1987; Lin 1980; Cameron 1931; Chu 1965; Spence 1969;
Harding 1987; Meijer 1950; Bays 1978; Ayers 1971), democracy (Nathan
1985, 1986, 1990; Solinger 1982; Barmé & Minford 1988; Schell 1988; Link
1984; Goodman 1980; Garside 1981; Fraser 1980; Seymour 1980), revolution
(Wright 1968; Bianco 1971; Isaacs 1951; Chan 1976; Dirlik 1978; Kataoka
1974), rebellion (Meadows 1953; Feuerwerker 1975; Nee & Peck 1975), social change (Bastid-Bruguiere 1980), nationalism (Schneider 1971;
Chan 1976), and modernization (Gasseter 1972; Adshead 1970; Lampton
1987; Ma 1983; Harding 1987). The purpose of this study is to document and analyze the events in the 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement in China and how these events were portrayed in primary and middle school social studies classrooms in
Beijing June 9 through December 30, 1989. In retrospect, the paradigm of naturalistic inquiry was utilized in this study as it allowed for the examination of the process of the Pro-Democracy Movement as i t developed.
The emergent design of naturalistic inquiry redefined the research focus by building from the multiple realities of the pro-democracy movement in China. By grounding research decisions in data, the study grew to focus on students from specific schools, intel lectuals, and various national government leaders within the context of previous pro-democracy movements, rather than the original design of collecting as much information from as many sources as possible.
According to Merryfield, "The value of naturalistic inquiry can be 4 documented by what has been learned through the process of using data to redirect the research design and discover not only answers, but also questions unknown at the outset" (Merryfield 1984, 4). After only a few days of fieldwork it was apparent that the original research questions (stated in the "Methodology" section) were inadequate and reflected a lack of knowledge about mass movements in China. As I continued to collect data about previous democracy movements in China and about conducting research during a mass movement, the original research questions were no longer relevant. The emergent questions reflect a narrower, more realistic focus that allowed the research to provide more accurate and sophisticated answers to the major question:
What were the major events in the 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement in China and how were they portrayed in social studies classrooms in Beijing?
As the research progressed, the following questions emerged:
1. What precedents were there to this movement?
2. How should this movement be characterized—as a
pro-democracy movement or as a turmoil that turned into a counter
revolutionary rebellion?
3. To what extent are the portrayals of the events in Beijing
classrooms consistent with the data collected for this study during
the Beijing Spring?
4. What are the implications of the curriculum changes that
have occurred in response to the Beijing Spring?
B. Significance of the Study
This study w ill: 5
1. Provide social studies educators with information to use
in teaching about the Beijing Spring.
2. Provide readers with information about the events.
3. Provide readers with some information and insights about
the nature of propaganda and news reporting, and therole of the
government and education in Chinese society.
4. Provide readers with a better understanding of social
studies education in China and how schooling has been affected by
the events.
Methodology
A. Background Although I have had a long-time interest in international studies and world cultures, a particular focus on China came about in
1986 after I enrolled in a graduate program in Social Studies Education at The Ohio State University. At that time I decided to include an area outside of education in my graduate program. Through consultations with iny adviser. Dr. M. Eugene Gilliom, and my friend, Terri Ziegle, I decided to pursue an area in Chinese Studies. This decision was based on two factors: (1) Dr. Gilliom's interests in China, which by that time had included leading nearly ten study tours to China, and (2) a question posed by Terri Ziegle asking me in what part of the world I would like to spend several years of my life studying language and other aspects of a particular culture. I narrowed the decision to a choice between the Soviet Union and China, and finally decided on China because 6 it seemed to be an interesting place to live. I then began taking courses in Chinese language, history, and politics.
This study came about, in part, due to circumstance that I was in Beijing for approximately nine months prior to the events in April, during the events, and afterwards until the end of August 1989. I first went to China in December 1986 on a faculty study tour of educational institutions led by Dr. M. Eugene Gilliom of The Ohio State University.
After this study tour, I made three additional trips to China, in part to define my research problem better and to explore the possibilities for conducting a research project in China. On July 14, 1988, I went to Beijing to begin six months of language training and fieldwork.
My original research proposal, written in 1987, was titled "The
Politics of Education: Structures and Decision Making in the Post-Mao
Chinese Educational System." The study was to address two questions:
(1) What is the overall structure of the Chinese educational system? and
(2) How much latitude for choice is available for local-level decision makers? After selecting and visiting several schools for the study in
Beijing, Xian, and Shanghai, I learned that my adviser in Chinese
Politics, Dr. David Lampton, would soon be leaving the university and would, therefore, be unable to supervise the reseach project. However, with the knowledge gained from the school v isits and through discussions with my adviser. Dr. M. Eugene Gilliom, a second research proposal was written. My second research proposal was title d "Social Studies Education in China—National Guidelines and Local Practices." The study was to focus on two questions: (1) What are the national 7 guidelines/requirements concerning social studies education in China? and (2) Are these guidelines/requirements implemented at the local level and, if so, how are they implemented? These two questions represented the focus of the study; however, it was understood that other questions would emerge as the collection of data proceeded. Although I studied
Chinese language for three years at The Ohio State and Indiana Univer s itie s, I planned to live with a Chinese family for two months and then enroll at the Beijing Language Institute for six months of language training before beginning the research project.
After the completion of language training, I taught English on a total of four different campuses. Foreign teachers are given an apartment, a stipend of about $100 U.S. per month, and a residency permit that allows them to remain in China.
From January through April 1989, I collected data for the research project. However, after April 15, 1989, the data collection was interrupted by the events of the Pro-Democracy Movement. I continued to collect data for my research project until after students began to boycott classes on April 23. At that point, I began to concentrate on collecting data concerning the Pro-Democracy Movement.
By this time I had already encountered many difficulties doing research in Beijing. These problems are discussed beginning on page 17.
The events of the Beijing Spring did not become the subject matter for the dissertation until the middle of July 1989. Data was gathered beginning April 15, 1989 and throughout the Beijing Spring; however, it was not until after the events on June 3-4 that the topic came to be one conducive to dissertation research. 8
Many days during April and May, and even on June 1, I thought that the students would vote to leave the Square, the Pro-Democracy
Movement would end, and I would continued my research on the original dissertation project. The events on June 3-4 put an end to those thoughts. The research problem came about as controversy over the events
increased and questions were raised concerning the accuracy of both
Chinese and Western accounts. The research topic became more focused when teaching materials about the Beijing Spring for primary and middle
schools were published in July 1989. Prior to this time, I viewed the research connected with the Beijing Spring as a research project
separate from the dissertation project.
B. A Rationale for Naturalistic Inquiry
Currently there are several paradigms that guide research,
including (1) the positivist paradigm and (2) the post-positivist paradigm (Lincoln & Guba 1985). This section describes these two
paradigms and states a rationale for using one post-positivist paradigm, namely the naturalist paradigm.
According to Lincoln and Guba, a paradigm is "a systematic set
of beliefs, together with their accompanying methods" (Lincoln & Guba
1985, 15). Kuhn describes a paradigm as being similar to normal
science, which he defines as "research firmly based upon one or more
past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scien
tif ic community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for
its further practice" (Kuhn 1970, 10). Kuhn further states that: The study of paradigms . . . i s what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community with which he will later practice. Because he then joins men who learned the bases for th eir field from the same concrete models . . . Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. (Kuhn, 1970, 11)
Lincoln and Guba list the axioms that differentiate the posi tiv is t and naturalist paradigms. Axioms are defined by Lincoln and Guba
"as the set of undemonstrated (and undemonstratable) 'basic beliefs' accepted by convention or established by practice as the building blocks of some conceptual or theoretical structure or system" (Lincoln & Guba
1985, 33). The different axioms are listed in Table 1.
TABLE 1
CONTRASTING POSITIVIST AND NATURALIST AXIOMS
Axioms About Positivist Paradigm Naturalist Paradigm. The nature of reality Reality is single, Realities are tangible, and frag- multiple, constructed, mentable and holistic The relationship of Knower and known are Knower and known are the knower to the independent, a dualism interactive, insepar known able The possibility of Time- and context-free Only time- and generali zation generalizations (nomo context-bound working thetic stantements) hypotheses (ideo are possible graphic statements) are possible The possibility of There are real causes All en tities are in a causal linkups temporally precedent state of mutual simul to or simultaneous taneous shaping, so with their effects that it is impossible to distinguish causes from effects The role of values Inquiry is value-free Inquiry is value-bound
SOURCE: Lincoln and Guba 1985, 37. 10
The choice of paradigm has enormous implications for doing research (Lincoln & Guba 1975). Kuhn describes the three foci for doing factual scientific investigation as:
(1) F irst is that class of facts that the paradigm has shown to be particularly revealing of the nature of things. By employing them in solving problems, the paradigm has made them worth deter mining both with more precision and in a larger variety of situations. (2) A second usual but smaller class of factual determinations is directed to those facts that, though without much intrinsic interest, can be compared directly with predictions from the paradigm theory. (3) A third class of experiments and observations exhausts, I think, the fact-gathering activities of normal science. It consists of empirical work undertaken to articulate the paradigm theory, resolving some of its residual ambiguities and permitting the solution of problems to which it had previously only drawn attention. (Kuhn 1970, 25-27)
Lincoln and Guba, in contrast to the above implications which are characteristic of a positivist paradigm, lis t fourteen characteristics of operational naturalistic inquiry, which are based on the naturalist paradigm. That is , the characteristics of naturalistic inquiry described below are dependent upon the five axioms of the naturalist paradigm listed in Table 1. Below is a lis t of those characteristics.^
1. Natural setting. Research is carried out within the natural environment of the problem under study. Because re a litie s cannot be understood in isolation from their context, cannot be fragmented for separate study, and the act of observation influences what is seen, for the fullest understanding research should take place with the entity- in-context.
Vor a fuller description of these procedures, see Lincoln and Guba 1985, 39-43. n 2. Emergent.design. Research design is allowed to emerge because insufficient knowledge is known ahead of time about the multiple realities. What emerges as a result of interaction is unpredictable in advance, and because various value systems interact to influence the outcomes.
3. U tilization of ta c it knowledge. Tacit knowledge ("unformu lated knowledge, such as we have of something we are in the act of doing" [Polanyi 1958. 12]) is used because i t is the best way to understand the multiple realities. Much of the interaction occurs at this level, and it closely mirrors the value patterns of the investigator.
4. Qualitative methods. The naturalist may use some quanti tative methods; however, qualitative methods are viewed as more appro priate for dealing with multiple realities, observer bias, and the many mutually shaping influences and value patterns that occur in the natural setting.
5. Purposive.sampling. Purposive sampling or criterion-based sampling (Goetz & LeCompte 1984) is used because i t allows for a broader range of data, which increases the likelihood that the full areas of multiple re a litie s will be exposed, and maximizes the researcher's ability to devise grounded theory based on the natural setting.
6. Inductive data analysis. Inductive data analysis is used because that process if more likely to identify the multiple realities in the data, it accounts for the influence and values of the 12 investigator/respondent interaction, and values can be an explicit part of the analysis. 7. Grounded theory. The naturalist prefers to have the guiding substantive theory emerge from or be grounded in the data because no theory could possibly cover the multiple realities that the researcher would likely encounter, and it is more likely to be responsive for contextual values and not only the values of the investigator.
8. Human instrument. The investigator as well as other humans are used as the primary data-gathering instruments because of their adaptability to the multiple realities. They are capable of grasping and evaluating the meaning of the interaction, and they are able to account for biases.
9. Negotiated outcomes. The naturalist includes negotiated meanings and interpretations from the respondents because it is their constructions of reality that the investigator attempts to reconstruct and other respondents are in a better position to understand the contextual factors, shapings, and value patterns that affect what is observed.
10. Case study reporting made. Case study reporting is more likely to be used by the naturalists because i t is more adapted to description of the multiple realities, research activities, and contextual values, and it provides the basis for "naturalistic generali zations" (Stake 1980, as quoted in Lincoln & Guba 1970, 42) and thick description.
11. Idiographic interpretation. The interpretation of data by the naturalist is more likely to be based on the particulars of the 13
investigative case (idiographic) rather than law-like generalizations
(nomothetically) because interpretations are heavily dependent on local context, investigator/respondent interactions, and value systems.
12. Tentative application. The naturalist is not likely to make broad applications of findings because the findings are to some
extent dependent on contextual factors of the site.
13. Focus-determined boundaries. The naturalist is likelyto
set boundaries to the inquiry (bounded system) because i t allows multiple re a litie s to determine the emergent focus. The boundary system
is also dependent on the local context and value systems.
14. Special criteria for trustworthiness. The naturalist uses
a variety of methods to demonstrate the trustworthiness of findings.
Lincoln and Guba lis t these as (a) prolonged engagement, (b) persistent observation, (c) triangulation, (d) peer debriefing, (e) negative case
analysis, (f) referential adequacy, and (g) member checks (Lincoln &
Guba 1985, 301-314). Merriam (1988), in discussing validity and re li ability of case studies, adds (a) clarifying researcher bias and
(b) participatory modes of research.
Merryfield explains these characteristics as follows:
a. Prolonged Engagement—the researcher must spend sufficient time at a site to overcome initial misperceptions, build trust, learn about context and recognize distortions. b. Persistent Observation—the researcher needs to identify the most relevant questions, factors, data in a situation and focus on them in depth. c. Triangulation—multiple sources, methods, investigation and theories should be used to build respondents' constructions of reality, verify emerging issues and concerns, identify additional sources of information and ultimately, to produce an holistic view of the research focus. d. Peer Debriefing—the researcher discusses the day-to-day research decisions, data collection, analysis and tentative findings 14 with a peer in order to explore assumptions, biases, interpre tations. The peer debriefer reacts with questions, comments and suggestions. e. Negative Case Analysis—described as a "process of revising hypotheses with hindsight" (as quoted in Lincoln and Guba 1985:309), this procedure incorporates all cases into the hypotheses by contin ually revising until all instances fit the new hypotheses. f. Referential Adequacy—raw data (in the form of field notes, tapes, etc.) are archived and then compared with findings at the end of the inquiry. g. Member Checks—persons knowledgeable of the research subject react to tentative findings, constructions of reality or emerging issues in order to verify, extend or clarify the research. These persons can include both respondents and persons uninvolved in the study. h. Thick Description—the researcher provides sufficient description so that respondents easily recognize the case, and those familiar with it can learn about its configuration in depth.
j. The Inquiry Audit—similar to a fiscal auditor, the inquiry auditor examines documentation of research—raw data, preliminary and final data analysis, records of inquiry such as logs, reflections, documentary analysis, e tc .—in order to certify the dependability of the process of the inquiry and the confirmability of the study's findings and recommendations. (Merryfield 1986, 107-109).
Soon after the beginning of the pro-democracy movement on
April 15, in order to document and analyze the events, it was necessary to address a variety of questions: Why were people demonstrating? Why were people so obviously grieved over the death of Hu Yaobang? Who were the people involved in the demonstrations? Why did the government leaders allow the protests to continue?
Although I did not plan and organize this study using natural istic inquiry (NI) as the guiding paradigm for the research, in retrospect the study utilized several procedures that parallel the methods of NI. These methods are discussed in the "Trustworthiness of the Study" section (page 29). 15
C. The Research Process
Responding to the spontaneous developments of the movement, I attempted to collect as much information from as many sources as possible. During the first week of the demonstrations, I recorded field notes that were organized and refined each night. However, on April 23, during my absence, my apartment was checked, presumably by the campus
Public Security Bureau personnel. Some research materials were discovered to be missing. After checking into the matter, I was given the following advice: "Even though what you are doing is legal, you should be more careful and not keep things that might get others in trouble" (Anonymous).
At that time I decided to (1) not inform university adminis trators (I was teaching and continued to teach until July) of my activ itie s (even though they were legal), (2) keep as many notes and records on video and audiotape as possible, (3) not leave any materials unattended in my apartment, and (4) do all translations and copying of documents after returning to the United States. It should be noted that my apartment was searched several times; however, the Public Security
Bureau personnel insisted that they were neither involved in nor aware of these searches.
After the first week of the movement, nearly all of the data was kept on videotape, audiotapes, and a note pad that I carried with me at all times. I used the note pad to record events and interpre tations of those events to be used for planning future research activities. 16
By April 23, I had answered some of the original research questions (listed on page 4). I had learned that most of the people demonstrating were students and most of them were from Beijing Uni versity (Bei Da), Qinghua University (Qinghua), People's University
(Ren Da), Beijing University Of Aeronautical and Astronautical
Engineering (Bei Hang), the Law and Politics University (Zhengfa), and
Beijing Normal University (Bei Shi Da or just Shi Da). Each university had an area, usually a wall, that people put posters (dazibao) on.
These dazibao served as a main source of informal information about the student movement. For example, the dazibao often described past events, listed student demands, and announced future activ ities such as marches and meetings. The area around the wall where the dazibao were located also served as a gathering place for people to discuss the current situation.
Based on the above information, I made the following plans:
(1) to concentrate data collection at the five universities listed above, (2) to v isit at least two of these universities daily, (3) to record all dazibao either by taking a photograph, videotaping, or by writing them in my note pad, and (4) to proceed based on information collected at the universities either on the dazibao or through interviews. To keep informed of and document the official or government actions, I (1) kept a daily copy of the People's Daily newspaper (in
Chinese) and the China Daily newspaper (in English), and (2) listened to the daily television newscasts and either audiotaped or kept notes of news items relating to the movement (every night except Sunday, 17 following the regular Chinese news, CCTV English Service broadcasts news in English). However, even before April 23, I had already encountered many difficulties in data collection and data analysis. Most of the diffi culties stemmed from cultural differences in language, beliefs, and values. Other difficulties were related to legal and ethical questions.
A discussion of these problems follows. Problems relating to language difficulties in cross-cultural research have been well documented (Merryfield 1986, 1990; Hamnett &
Brislin 1980; Mead 1972; Hall 1983). As stated by Merryfield, "Language competency goes beyond mere word-for-word translation to understanding of local references, slang, and cultural meanings" (Merryfield 1990, 3).
I had worked hard to prepare for conducting interviews and discussing educational problems with administrators, teachers, and students; however, as I soon discovered, th is language training did not equip me to deal with language relating to the pro-democracy movement.
The Chinese language presented me with many problems. The written language consists of approximately fifty thousand characters, although usually only three to five thousand characters are used in daily life. The characters can be written in either simplified form
(jia n tiz i), which was adopted on the mainland after 1949, or complex- traditional form (fa n tiz i), which is s till used in Hongkong and Taiwan.
Characters can be written in a variety of styles, such as regular printed characters, running hand characters, and grass characters.
These various styles appear differently when written with different instruments, such as a pencil, a fountain pen, a Chinese writing brush 18
(tnaobi), or a magic marker. Written characters with different forms, styles, appearance based on the writing instrument, and a person's indi vidual style often combine to make it extremely difficult for non-native
Chinese to read.
Reading of the many big-character posters (dazibao) and leaflets was further complicated by the use of traditional grammar and poetry, as well as references to historical events, traditional and modern cultural characteristics. Traditional writing does not use punctuation marks and when written horizontally it reads right to left; when written vertically it reads top to bottom and right to left. Modern writing is written horizontally and reads left to right.
Chinese poetry is very d ifficu lt to translate and often is d ifficu lt for many people, both Chinese and foreign, to understand.
Students and intellectuals often used poetry to express their feelings and ideas. These poems were recorded, but many have been le ft untranslated.
Dazibao and slogans included many references to historical events and traditional and modern cultural characteristics. Many refer ences were also made to past emperors of China, the Empress Dowager, and the Nationalists, as well as to more recent events after 1949, such as the Great Leap Forward, the an ti-rig h tist campaign, and the Cultural
Revolution. References were also made to traditional cultural charac te ristic s of "feudalism and backwardness," as well as to modern cultural characteristics of Westernization and examples of popular culture such as modern clothes, behavior, and music. The use of poetry and refer ences to historical events and cultural characteristics further 19 complicated the research. Therefore, even if one could read what was written, it did not follow that one could necessarily understand or grasp the meaning.
Spoken Chinese also presented me with many problems. While the written language is universal, the spoken language is separated by various dialects. Although mandarin (putonghua) is the national dialect in China, the pronunciation varies greatly. For example, i t may be difficult for a non-native speaker (and some native speakers) in Beijing to understand a person from Shanghai. Likewise, i t may be d ifficu lt for a non-native speaker to understand people from rural areas unless he/she has spent time in the countryside. Besides these problems with the spoken langugage, further difficulties are created by local refer ences, slang, and multiple meanings for words, which further complicates a clear understanding of the messages. And, as the student movement grew larger and people from other parts of China went to Beijing, this problem became larger.
Problems relating to cultural differences in values and beliefs have also been well documented (Merryfield 1986, 1990; Weilenman 1980;
Hall 1983; Mead 1972). Chinese values and beliefs about foreigners, males, students, and Americans had an effect on the research. For example, some Chinese refused to discuss the movement with any foreigners, and others refused to say anything critical about China to a foreigner. Many Chinese females were involved in the pro-democracy movement; however, because of the widespread negative view of a Chinese female and a foreign male together in public, interviews with Chinese females were limited. 20 The Chinese legal system is not well established. China is characterized as a personalistic system as opposed to a rational- legalistic system (Lampton 1987; Wilder 1986; Pye 1968, 1981). For this study, this problem manifested itself in the fact that police and security officers exercise a wide range of discretionary power in deter mining legal and illegal behavior. For example, on one campus a security officer took the view that foreigners taking photographs of dazibao was behaving illegally, while security officers at other campuses stated that i t was "no problem" (mei guanxi). While this type of situation was frequent, even during the first week of research, it became more problematic after the announcement of martial law on May 19.
According to Martial Law Decree #3, no foreign reporter was allowed to photograph, videotape, or conduct interviews in schools, factories, and residential areas. However, it was unclear whether this applied to foreign visitors, students, teachers, and/or researchers. This question was never clarified; however, I used extreme caution and discretion because of these and other legal restrictions.
To help overcome these problems related to cultural differences,
I worked with three Chinese persons, two from Beijing and one from outside of Beijing. For example, I often had trouble understanding the dazibao and articles in the People's Daily; these people helped to clarify and explain these and other questions that I could not answer.
Although I often met individually with these people, they did not meet nor were they acquainted with each other. This arrangement was followed for their own protection and as a way of cross-checking information.
As I did not have the assistance of a peer debriefer (Lincoln & Guba 21
1985), the three persons proved invaluable to me during the research
process.
Another method that I used to help overcome some of these
problems was to conduct interviews in Chinese and record them on
audiotape. Therefore, even when I did not understand the answer, I
could continue the interview and discover the meaning later. This
allowed me to interview more people and provided valuable information for the research.
During the second week of demonstrations, i t became clear that the plans for concentrating data collection at the five universities
and on those students needed to be changed. After the publication of the April 26 editorial, the movement enlarged to include workers,
intellectuals, journalists, and citizens (1aobaixing—1iterally old one
hundred names), as well as students from nearly all of the universities
in Beijing and many outside of Beijing.
I decided to attempt to interview people in the other groups.
I planned to conduct most of these interviews at the Square. I realized
that interviewing people on the Square would bias the study because the
people on the Square were, for the most part, supportive of the
students. However, this was the only access that I had to many of these
people.
I also decided to make fewer v isits to other campuses and to
v isit the Square as often as possible. It was, however, sometimes
impossible to go to the Square because of my teaching schedule.
By the end of the third week of the movement, my daily schedule
included (1) checking the dazibao early in the morning for information 22 about previous events or any upcoming events, (2) teaching in the morning, 8:00 A.M. t i l l noon, and (3) if there were any planned activities, I would try to go observe; if not, I would go to one other university to check the dazibao and to talk to people and then go to the Square. I was aware that demonstrations were also occurring in other c itie s; however, because of my teaching schedule and the information that I gathered from interviewees, I decided to do all research in
Beijing. It was clear that the movement had spread to other cities;
however, as I was told, "Beijing is the capital. The rest of China follows Beijing." In other words, I was told that if I wanted to know what was really going on in the movement, stay in Beijing, and I did.
During April and May, for the most part there was a festive
atmosphere in Beijing. People were often very open in discussing the movement, in being seen in public with a foreigner, and in demonstrating their opposition to the leaders. There were, of course, moments when the situation changed and i t appeared that the government would use force to stop the movement, but most of the time the situation did not
appear dangerous to the people in Beijing (excluding the hunger
strikers, who were in danger due to health risks). However, the events of June 3-4 changed the situation drastically. As a consequence, people who were previously open in discussing the movement, in being seen with foreigners in public, and in demonstrating their opposition to the
leaders were suddenly at risk. Therefore, due to the nature of the
present situation in Beijing, some of the research methods, decisions,
and design are not discussed in this study. However, questions 23 concerning methods, design, and decisions are discussed in the "Limi tations" section of the study.
Ethics
Concerns that research be conducted in an ethical manner are common to all areas of study. Much has been written about ethical practices in inquiry (Diener & Crandall 1978; Cassell 1978; Walter 1980;
Bogdan & Biklen 1982; S oltis 1990; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Burgess 1989;
Glesne 1989; Kelman 1982). In fact, much has been written and said about ethical research practices in China (Butterfield 1982; Lincoln
& Guba 1985; Lampton, class notes 1986).
Diener and Crandall offer sound advice to guide one's actions:
There is simply no ethical alternative to being as nonbiased, accurate, honest as is humanly possible in all phases of the research. In planning, conducting, analyzing, and reporting his work the scientist should strive for accuracy, and whenever possible, methodological controls should be built in to help . . . Biases that cannot be controlled should be discussed in written report. Where data only partly support the predictions, the report should contain enough data to let readers draw their own conclusions. (Diener & Crandall 1978, cited in Burgess 1988, 182)
Diener and Crandall (1978) discuss four areas of ethical concern:
(1) physical and psychological harm to the respondent, (2) informed consent, (3) deception, and (4) privacy and confidentiality. Lincoln and Guba (1985) expand on these four areas to include five additional areas of ethical concern for naturalistic inquiry. They are:
(1) face-to-face contacts, (2) anonymity, confidentiality, and privacy,
(3) trust and negotiation, (4) framing case studies—inclusion and exclusion of data, and (5) whose agenda or agenda conflict. The following guidelines were established by the researcher: 24 (1) The safety of the respondents is more Important than
collecting data or publishing results.
(2) The identity of the subjects should be protected. Where
this is not possible, if there is risk to the respondent, results
will not be published.
(3) Informed consent should be received from all respondents.
Respondents should be informed of the nature of the research and
that the results may be published. No hidden cameras or microphones
will be used to record information.
(4) Attempts to build and maintain rapport and tru st with
respondents will be made.
(5) Inclusion and exclusion of data should derive from analysis
in backward-looking fashion. If something must be le ft out in the
final report, it should not be a critical piece of data that would
help explain or give further understanding of where or how I came
by my conclusions (Lincoln & Guba 1985).
(6) The investigator and the participants should negotiate
interpretations of the data (Lincoln & Guba 1985).
(7) To protect the respondents, extreme care should be given
to safeguarding all tapes, records, and other data to not allow them
to "disappear." After my apartment was searched the first time, I kept all tapes and other materials (except for the items that I
carried with me) locked in a safe place. During the Pro-Democracy Movement, I decided to refrain from publicly expressing my opinions, viewpoints, and feelings. This decision was reached based on data collected after the publication of 25 the April 26 editorial. The decision relates to ethical and moral questions; therefore, discussion of this decision follows.
F irst, foreigners have seldom been welcomed to participate in
China's "internal affairs." For example, a fellow teacher was arrested and expelled from China for participating in the 1986 demonstrations.
Second, the traditional role of teacher as authority figure in China, given the past history of student-led movements, made i t dangerous for teachers to express opinions or give advice. For example, if a teacher expressed the view that demonstrations are a good way to force the government to change, then his/her students would be more inclined to participate in the demonstrations. And, if students participated in the demonstrations because of this advice and were arrested—which was highly probable, based on the 1976, 1985, and 1986 demonstrations—the teacher would be partly responsible. Although for foreign teachers the personal risk was primarily the possibility of arrest and expulsion from
China, for Chinese students an arrest could mean the end of their college career, no job placement, and a very bleak future.
If the teacher expressed the opinion that demonstrations are bad and not an effective way to force the government to change, then his/her students would be less likely to participate in the demon strations. And if the demonstrations were successful in forcing a change in the government, these students might be persecuted for not supporting the movement. Traditionally in China a revolution or rebellion is only justified if it is successful. If it succeeds, the people who supported i t are heroes; however, if i t fa ils , the people who supported i t are 2 6
persecuted. There was a joke going around in China after the 1986
demonstrations that further explains this point. The joke was about
three people who were in ja il. One person asked another person, "Why
are you in here?" The person replied, "Because I supported Hu Yaobang."
Then he asked the other person, "Why are you in here?" The person
replied, "Because I opposed Hu Yaobang." These two people then turned
to the third person and asked, "Why are you in here?" The person
replied. "Because I am Hu Yaobang" (Barmi 1989, 349). As the joke
implies, in China it is not safe to support a losing position or to
oppose a winning position. Therefore, giving advice can be dangerous
for the participants.
According to the Chinese system of guilt and punishment, people
in the higher position are responsible for the behavior of people below
them in the bureaucratic structure. If a person at one level commits
a "crime," that person's superior must assign guilt and punish him/her.
If the superior fa ils to punish him/her, then that person's superior will punish him/her. This is repeated until someone in a higher
position punishes someone in a lower position. For example, at a uni
versity, if a student commits a "crime," then his/her teacher should
punish him/her. If the teacher fails to punish the student, then the
department head should punish the teacher. If the department head fa ils
to punish the teacher, then the university president should punish the
department head. If the president fails to punish the department head,
then the director of the State Education Commission will punish the
president, and so on. Therefore, if a teacher "misbehaves," i t puts the
teacher's department head in the position of either punishing the 27 teacher or risking getting punished himself/herself. Most department heads are over forty years old, and, as with most intellectuals, they would probably have gone through severe hardships during the 1957
Anti-Rightist Campaign (see Chapter III) and the Cultural Revolution.
For a teacher to "misbehave" would have likely put the department head in a very bad position. I chose not to take that risk.
The particular case involving the ethical behavior of a researcher (in th is case a journalist) in China is worth noting. This case involved Fox Butterfield, the New York Times correspondent who published interviews with a Chinese woman concerning sexual attitudes and behavior, a taboo subject in China. Although he was unaware of i t at the time of the interviews, the discussion and publication of the interviews placed the woman in great danger. Even though Fox
Butterfield used extreme caution and discretion in conducting the interviews and in maintaining the anonymity of the woman, her superior became aware of the publication and she was severely punished
(Butterfield 1982).
Knowledge of this case proved extremely valuable in making interview-related decisions during the Pro-Democracy Movement. For example, the time and place of many interviews were determined in part by awareness of the Butterfield case. There are two places in Beijing where foreigners and Chinese can meet without drawing much attention: onee is on university campuses and the other is in the university district. Although it was often inconvenient for the interviewees, many interviews took place in these two locations. 28 Limitations of the Study
A delimitation of this study is that research was conducted only in Beijing and, therefore, it is conceivable that the conclusions may not be generalizable to all of China. Although the Pro-Democracy
Movement and the teaching about i t were carried out throughout China, due to constraints of time, available funds, government regulations, and my teaching schedule, data was not collected outside of Beijing.
A basic limitation of this study is that the research focused on students and intellectuals and for the most part did not focus on government. Party, or m ilitary leaders or other social groups such as workers, farmers, private entrepreneurs, etc. Although efforts were made to include people from these groups (purposive sampling), for the most part this was not possible.
Although I was not able to interview any government or Party leaders at the local or national levels, their position was included in the research by collecting data from the official Chinese media.
For example, speeches, interviews, and statements by Zhao Ziyang, Li
Peng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Xitong, He Dongchang, and Li Tieying, as reported in the official media, are included in the report.
Because of government regulations and concern for the safety and welfare of the participants, available resources and data were limited, and some collected data was not used because it might endanger respondents. For example, after June 4, 1989, access to classrooms and interviews with teachers and other individuals was either impossible or, at the very least, dangerous for the respondents. The data on 29 teaching about the events is, therefore, primarily based on publicly available materials and interviews with people outside of China.
The Trustworthiness of the Study
Naturalistic inquiry relies on several procedures and criteria to establish trustworthiness (as outlined earlier in this chapter).
In retrospect, th is study utilized some of these methods. This section discusses these procedures as they relate to this study.
A. Prolonged Engagement
By the time the research was completed for this study, I had lived in Beijing for almost two years. This background helped to overcome many of the initial misperceptions related to being a "stranger in a strange land" and to develop trust and rapport with many respondents.
By remaining in Beijing throughout the Beijing Spring (until late August 1989), I was also able to overcome some of my early assumptions about the movement. For example, at the beginning of the movement I assumed that all students supported the movement. After more extensive research, this assumption proved false. Throughout the process of inquiry, I learned the importance of contextual factors and grounded my hypothesis in emergent data, as I became more aware of and more open to multiple influences that affected the movement. 30
B. Persistent Observations
By persistent observation I was able to identify certain elements that were most relevant to the movement and to pursue and focus on them in detail. For example, I learned that certain people (Zhao
Ziyang, Li Peng, Chen Xitong, Wang Dan, Wuer Kaixi, Chai Ling, and other student leaders) and certain organizations (the various student auton omous unions) were central to understanding the movement, and I was able to pursue and focus on them. A further example is that I learned that people joined the demonstrations as groups and not as individuals.
Students joined with others from their particular university (daxue) and even more specifically, they joined with others from their specific department and class (ban) . Citizens (1aobaixing) joined with others from their work unit (danwei).
C. Triangulation
While it was not always possible to verify all reports by using multiple sources and multiple methods of collecting data, attempts were made to do so. For example, statements made in interviews were checked with additional interviews and other sources such as the official media and dazibao.
Purposive sampling was often used to check the statements by one respondent. For example, i f a student made a statement about a particular event, I tried to interview someone other than a student to help verify the statement. When discrepancies occurred between various sources such as students and other students, and students and government leaders, it was presented as such in the report. 31
In the process of triangulation, a variety of methods were used to collect and confirm data. For example, to collect data on the May 4 demonstration, I (1) videotaped parts of the demonstration,
(2) audiotaped other parts of the demonstration (particularly to record slogans and interviews), (3) took photographs, (4) interviewed students, shopkeepers, and bystanders, (5) kept personal notes (mainly comments by bystanders that helped explain certain situations), (6) interviewed students who participated and others who did not participate after the demonstration, (7) recorded the official news reports concerning the demonstration, (8) checked the Hong Kong newspapers' accounts of the event, and (9) after I returned to the United States, I checked with
Western accounts of the demonstration. While these methods were certainly not used to collect all data, attempts were made to use a variety of methods and sources to collect and analyze the data.
To give the reader a better understanding of the sources of data used in the study, the following list and descriptions are given. The official media (which, except for a brief period in May) is the mouthpiece of the Party. Official media sources used were as follows:
(1) Newspapers: People's Daily and China Daily
(2) Television: CCTV and the local Beijing News
(3) Radio: Radio Beijing
The following foreign media were also utilized:
(1) Newspapers : Ming Pao News from Hong Kong
(2) Videotape
(a) Taiwan version of June 3-4, which tends to be anti
communist 32 (b) Japan video of the man standing in front of the tank
on June 7, 1989
(c) CBS News videotape: I used raw footage collected after
June 9, 1989 from the archives in Beijing
These sources were used primarily to check on or complement other primary sources of information. In daily data collection, the process of triangulation proved very helpful in my understanding of the
Pro-Democracy Movement.
D. Peer Debriefing
Due to the spontaneous nature of the movement and my inability
(due to several factors including lack of funding, awareness of censorship, fear of government wiretapping, and concern for the safety of the Chinese) to maintain contact with Ohio State University personnel nor maintain adequate contact with a Chinese researcher, I was unable to u tilize a peer debriefer during the inquiry process in China.
Therefore, I was unable to discuss day-to-day research activities, data collection, analysis, or tentative findings with a peer debriefer. I found this to be particularly troublesome as I often had many questions relating to data collection and analysis that I was left to answer myself. The reader is encouraged to judge to what extent the lack of a peer debriefer affected the study.
After I returned to the United States, I discussed my research with my adviser. Dr. Gilliom, and several fellow graduate students in Education and Chinese Politics. Based on these discussions, I decided to return to China in December (for four weeks) to do additional checks 33
on my tentative findings and to collect additional information on
teaching about the Beijing Spring. However, the situation in Beijing
was not conducive to further research and many of my research plans were
discarded.
E. Member Checks
During the process of inquiry, I often checked data,
assumptions, and conclusions with members of stake-holding audiences.
This member check procedure was also carried out in the United States
with members of the stake-holding audiences as I translated and reviewed
the data. This procedure proved extremely helpful for me as a person
working in another's culture to help me check and guard against bias
and naivete. For example, prior to April 15, 1989 I knew very l i t t l e
about previous pro-democracy movements, and the insights of people
involved in and observers of these past movements were extremely
helpful. By discussing my research activities and tentative findings with a variety of persons, I learned their perspectives and became more
familiar with contextual factors.
The procedure of member checking was not as open or regular as
i t could or should be in "normal" situations. It was not possible to
include as many people in the process as should be included. For
example, I was not able to include Party or government leaders or, for
the most part, people who opposed the movement in the member checks.
However, a translated copy of this document will be sent to Zhao Ziyang,
Li Peng, and Deng Xiaoping. Their responses, i f any, w ill, however,
not be included in the report. Readers are encouraged to judge whether 34 the effects of the inability to check the findings with these members of the stake-holding audience affected the findings and the trustworth iness of the findings.
F. Thick Description
The extensive description of the subject must stand up as recog nizably accurate by persons knowledgeable of the issues, attitudes, physical environments and other characteristics of the subject under study. Naive readers should be able to grasp the fundamentals of the subject by examining the description. (Merryfield 1986, 170).
The descriptions and accounts of the events during the Beijing Spring and the teaching about those events in Beijing classrooms have been checked by members of the stake-holding audience in the United States as well as others fam iliar with the political situation in China and they were said to be recognizable and accurate by these people.
G. The Inquiry Audit
An inquiry audit, as described by Lincoln and Guba (1985), is not included in this study. After the end of the inquiry and the write-up of conclusions based on data, two independent researchers examined all of the raw data and the preliminary and final analyses.
However, no formal evaluation was provided.
According to Goetz and LeCompte, researchers should establish an audit trail in such a way "that other researchers [could] use the original report as an operating manual by which to replicate the study"
(Goetz & LeCompte 1984, as cited in Merriam 1988, 173). However, due to the sensitive nature of the situation during the Beijing Spring and the current situation in Beijing, and to protect the identities of 35 the respondents, an audit trail is not listed in the study. It is hoped that by examining this document, researchers w ill, however, gain some insights into doing research in similar circumstances.
Naturalistic inquiry is a holistic approach to research.
Likewise, the special characteristics of establishing trustworthiness of naturalistic inquiry also provides a holistic approach to this end.
As Merryfield explained, "The above procedures (the special character istics) work synergistically. complimenting and to some degree overlapping each other" (Merryfield 1986, 171). With this in mind, and given the fact that the content of this study has been extensively covered in the press and in the literatu re (for example, i t was announced at the American Political Science Midwest Association meeting
April 4-6, 1990 that over eighty books were in preparation for or already in publication concerning the Beijing Spring), establishes the trustworthiness of the study.
Definition-of Key Terms
This study uses several terms which require definition and some explanation. Below is a list of these terms and their definitions.
A. Intellectual (zhishifenzi) In imperial China an intellectual was one who passed, at the least, the provincial-level exams and was awarded a bachelor's degree
(xiu chi). After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the term "intel lectual" has mainly been used to refer to college graduates or to those with some college experience. Teachers are usually regarded as 36 intellectuals even though most elementary teachers do not have any college experience.
B. Students (xuesheng)
In this study, "students" refers to people in elementary and secondary schools, as well as those in college. In Chapter III, "An
Overview of Democracy Movements in China," "students" refers only to college students except where noted.
C. Counterrevolutionary (fangeminfenzi)
"Counterrevolutionary" is used in China to describe someone who opposes or goes against the communist revolution, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), or socialism. In actual practice, it has been used as a label for real or perceived opponents of the current leader(s). To perform counterrevolutionary acts is a violation of the criminal law; however, the definition or description of those acts is not clear. For example, Deng Xiaoping was labeled a counterrevolutionary by Mao during the Cultural Revolution and relieved of all of his official posts, only to later reemerge as the top leader in China. This study uses the term only as it is used by government officials in reference to certain indi viduals or groups and their behaviors.
D. Bourgeois Liberalism (zicanjie ziyouhua)
Bourgeois liberalism or liberalization is a term used by Deng
Xiaoping to refer to people or ideas that reject the Party's leadership, i.e ., thinking or acting independently of the Party. Bourgeois 37 liberalism replaced the term "spiritual pollution," which was used in
1983 and 1984 to refer to ideas and literary works that spread "distrust of socialism, communism and the leadership of the Communist Party"
(Balme 1989, 345).
E. Modernization (xiandaihua)
Modernization in the late 1800s referred primarily to military and industrial upgrading and improvement. Chinese intellectuals have debated the meaning of this term as i t applies to China for over one hundred years. Chinese leaders have struggled with trying to import foreign technology without importing foreign ideas; that is, they have tried to become a modern economic and industrial nation while maintaining traditional Chinese values. For example, Deng Xiaoping's argument against multiple-party democracy is that i t is a Western idea and not applicable to the Chinese situation, while at the same time he recommends increasing China's imports of foreign products. For this study "modernization" is used to refer to military, industrial, and technological systems and products.
F. Social Studies
In China there is no word for social studies. In this study,
"social studies" is used to indicate Thought and Moral Education in primary school, and Political Thought Education in secondary schools, as well as Chinese and World history, Chinese and world geography, and politics-government courses. 38
G. Beijing Spring
The phrase "Beijing Spring" is used interchangeably with
Pro-Democracy Movement to refer to the events in Beijing from April 15 to June 9, 1989.
H. Indoctrination To get at the meaning of "indoctrination," one must look for a locus of inference. "Indoctrination" is usually used in reference to p o litic a l, economic, or religious beliefs and ideologies. It does not make sense to talk about indoctrination in the multiplication tables or the chemical compounds of sodium. This study deals with indoctri nation as it relates to education; therefore, this explanation focuses on the content involved in indoctrination as it relates to education and pedagogy.
1. Content of indoctrination. Indoctrination involves the teaching of disputatious or equivocal statements as truths. These statements can be of any of the following types :
(a) Something that is false as true
(b) Anything that truth does not attach its e lf to as true
(c) Metaphysical statements as true
(d) Preference or value statements as true
(e) Theory as true
To teach any of these types of statements as true may involve indoctri nation. To be clear about the content of a statement, one can often use the "principle of falsification"; that is, when someone states something in the informative mode, one would ask, "What, i f anything. 39 will disprove that statement?" For example, look at the following statements :
(a) God loves all His children.
(b) Education involves the realization of the divine potential
of each child.
(c) If parents were on the side of their children, there would
be no young thieves.
What, if anything, will disprove these statements? With these statements, among intelligent persons who have considered the issues, we cannot get general agreement as to the sort of evidence that would count for or against. Therefore, these statements are equivocal and to teach them as truths may involve indoctrination. To determine if teaching involves indoctrination, one must look at both the task
(process) and achievement (product) senses of indoctrination.
2. Task (process) sense of indoctrination. In the task sense, the teacher is trying (intends) to get the students to hold that something is the case when i t is, in fact, equivocal, and to have some understanding of i t and some grounds, but to hope that the students will hold i t in such a way that no matter what counter-evidence is produced, they will continue to hold that i t is the case and not see i t as equiv ocal or false. That is, the teacher is trying to establish in the students a particular belief or set of beliefs, a closed mind on the issue, or a bias that is of a disputatious nature. In the task sense, the teacher may be successful or unsuccessful. That is, in the task sense, a teacher may "indoctrinate unsuccessfully." 40
3. The achievement (product) sense of indoctrination (success sense only). In the achievement sense, indoctrination will have occurred if, either intentionally or unintentionally, the teacher has implanted or established in the student a fixed or closed mind with regard to a belief, or set of beliefs, or a disputatious (equivocal, non-evidential) nature, despite otherwise compelling evidence to the contrary. The teacher may, intentionally or unintentionally, indoc trinate in the achievement sense.
4. The achievement (product) sense of indoctrination (failure sense only). In the achievement sense, a teacher will have failed to indoctrinate if, in respect to a propositional belief or set of beliefs, as a result of teaching, the student does not endorse disputatious beliefs in a fixed and unquestioning manner, but remains open-minded on the issue.
Outline of.the Dissertation
Chapter I provides a statement of the problem and addresses the significance of the study, assumptions and limitations of the study, methodology used in the study, definitions of key terms, and an outline of the dissertation.
Chapter II provides a brief history of education in China from
1122 B.C. to 1989. The chapter focuses on the structure, purpose, and curriculum of the various educational systems during China's long history.
Chapter III provides an overview of democracy and reform movements in China from 1898 to 1986. The chapter gives a brief 41 overview of Chinese history beginning in 1895, describes some of the major movements and demonstrations, and describes the government reactions to these movements. Chapters II and III are included to help provide the reader with a context for understanding the 1989
Pro-Democracy Movement and the subsequent teaching about those events.
Chapter IV begins the presentation of data with a daily account of the events in the Beijing Spring beginning April 15 and ending
June 9, 1989. Accounts of the activ ities and statements of government leaders, students, intellectuals, workers, and others are presented.
Chapter V ends the presentation of data with an account of the materials and methods used in primary and middle schools in Beijing to teach about the events from April 15 to June 9, 1989 in Beijing. The primary sources of information for this chapter are the translated textbooks used in primary and middle schools to teach about the events in the "Beijing Spring."
Chapter VI answers the five research questions proposed in the research problem, presents conclusions based on the research, summarizes the study, and offers recommendations for future research on this topic. CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN CHINA
Introduction
During most of China's long history, education has held a position of importance. While in other Asian nations such as Japan militarists made up the ruling class, in traditional China the ruling class consisted of the scholar/gentry. The Chinese developed a profound faith in education and, by the second century B.C., developed the technique of bureaucratic rule by men of superior education, a form of centralized government that was not adopted by the West until the nineteenth century (Rye 1984). This chapter will trace the educational policies in China from traditional times to the present. For the purposes of this chapter, Chinese history has been divided into five time periods: (1) traditional China (from 1122 B.C. until 1911),
(2) the years between the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, (3) the era between 1949 and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966,
(4) the Cultural Revolution era of 1966 until the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, and (5) the post-Mao era from 1976 until the present.
This chapter will focus on the educational policies during each of these time periods by addressing three questions: (1) What is the structure of the educational system? (2) What is the purpose of
42 43 education? and (3) Who is the educational system designed to include?
While the scope of this essay is quite large, it will focus primarily on the post-Mao era.
Education in Traditional China, 1122 B.C.-1911
Formal education in traditional China was Confucian education, which produced a durable and demanding intellectual tradition. The educational system consisted of long periods of individual-tutorial study and culminated with the taking of a standardized examination.
"Neo-Confucian orthodoxy led to the identification of sacred texts, and the Four Books and Five Classics became the basis of all education and of the examination system" (Pye 1984, 43). The study of these curricula led to the classical Chinese concept of the "eight-legged essay" (pa ku wen; eight-paragraphed) that was required in many examination 1 answers.
The examination or civil service system consisted of three levels of examinations. First were the provincial-level examinations; upon completion, the individual was awarded a Bachelor's degree (xiu cai). The xiu cai qualified the student to take further exams, but could be revoked if the student did not make sufficient progress.
Second were full provincial examinations; upon successful completion, the student was awarded the Master's degree (ju ren). The exam consisted of three full days of writing. The ju ren degree qualified
For a more complete description of the government examination, please see Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 19831. 44 the student for low-level positions in the government and an opportunity to take the next level examination. The third and highest level was the imperial examination; upon completion, the student was awarded a
Doctor's degree (jin sh i), which qualified him for the topmost government
positions. During the 276 years of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), only
24,874 men became jinshi (Pye 1984).
One purpose of the educational system during traditional times was to recruit a ruling class called^the gentry. Mencius (373-288 B.C.)
and later Xun Zi "taught that education was the basis of good
government" (Pye 1984, 40). Whether one took the view that men were
inherently good (Mencius) or basically evil (Xun Zi), the absolute
importance of education was stressed. "The corollary was that educated men were inherently superior to the uneducated, and therefore rulers
and governors should be educated" (Pye 1984, 42).
A second purpose of this educational system was to establish a social order. During the Zhou dynasty (1122-221 B.C.), the teachings of Confucius in regard to ethics, customs, human relations, and social conventions set the boundaries or guidelines for the establishment of a social order. These guidelines established a hierarchy of rela tionships and the role of each person in each relationship. For example, the guidelines for the relationship of the citizen to the ruler stressed that the citizen should be obedient to the ruler. The ruler's
legitimacy and power to rule were derived from the belief that he was the "Son of Heaven" with a mandate to rule on earth. "The mandate of heaven was legitimate as long as the emperor ruled in a righteous way and maintained harmony within the Chinese society and between the 45 society and nature" (Wang 1980, 2). Confucianism, the o fficially
sanctioned orthodox doctrine of the imperial state, became the basic foundation for education in traditional China.
Education during this time period, while perhaps not inten
tional, benefited some groups more than others. Females, for example,
were not permitted to take the exams. During the Qing Dynasty, separate
examinations were given to Manchus (the ruling class, but not ethnic
Chinese) and the higher-class Chinese, and in earlier dynasties heirs
of the founding family took separate—and presumably easiei— exami
nations (Pye 1984). Since preparation involved hiring a tutor and many years of study, it was beyond the means of more than 99 percent of the
people. "The Mandarins obviously had cultural and psychological
advantages because they were brought up in a home environment in which
education and achievement of status were stressed" (Pye 1984, 58). Edu cation was certainly "elitist" and did not provide equal opportunity for all. "At any one time before 185D the total number of the gentry was about 1.1 million, of whom 4,DDD were civil and military Chin-shih,
and the rest were holders of other degrees and title s " (Hsu 1983, 8D).
This system was intended to include only the most capable and the brightest—a very small percentage of the entire population. During this time period there were only 27,DDD official positions in China:
2D,DDD civil and 7,DDD military (Hsu 1983).
Educational Policies in China, 1911-1949
The reform movement carried out by the Qing government
(1644-1912) in the early 19DDs included the abolition of age-old civil 46 service examination system which was followed by an extensive prolifer ation of modern and semi-modern educational institutions (Teng &
Fairbank 1979). The Qing government reform program also encouraged students to study abroad. The Qing government, however, only lasted a few years after the adoption of these reforms.
During the period 1911-1949, China went through many changes: the Republican era, the May Fourth Movement, warlordism, the Guomindang
(nationalist)-communist struggle for power, war with Japan, and civil war. During this period, no group was able to establish itself in control of a united China. However, for the purpose of this paper, the focus for this time period will be on the educational policies of the
Guomindang and the Communist Party. Chow states: "On November 1, 1922, a new educational system, modeled on the American, which actually laid the foundations of Chinese educational institutions for later decades, was promulgated by the
President of the Republic" (Chow 1960, 260). Schools developed during this period in China included vocational-technical schools, military training schools, nonmilitary administrative training schools, as well
as schools based on the American model.
The purposes of education during this period were closely tied to the needs of those in power and therefore changed frequently. Cai
Yuanbei, the first minister of education of the republic, stated,
"Nevertheless, in our country, where strong neighbors are all oppressing
us, we have to plan hastily for self-protection, and our national rights which have been lost during successive years are, in these circum
stances, difficult to recover without relying on military power" (Teng & 47
Fairbank 1979, 235). Cai saw a need for a strong military, but he also feared that the m ilitarists could become a permanent and powerful special caste within the whole country. Therefore, he proposed uni versal military education for citizens. Besides strengthening the mili tary, Cai also wanted education to help enrich the nation by adopting a second policy of "utilitarian education." By this he meant education that taught people useful or practical things such as cooking, sewing, metallurgy, carpentry, and masonry (Teng & Fairbank 1979, 235). A third policy was added to include moral education. Moral education was the morality of citizenship, which included the concepts of "liberty, equal ity, and fraternity." Moral education was to make people work for mutual protection and mutual preservation (Teng & Fairbank 1979).
China needed people to fill administrative positions; the task, however, was not easy, as Tien wrote:
The road to bureaucractic success in China during this time period was unmarked and irregular, given the almost total lack of institutionalized standards. The traditional examination system had been eliminated, and the newly created recruitment system provided only a small number of bureaucrats needed. Above all, after the collapse of the Ch'ing [Qing] dynasty political power had steadily shifted from the literate and land-based gentry to military men. Regional m ilitarists became the key to bureaucratic success in the provinces, and they continued to exercise provincial and local power during the decade after 1927. (Tien 1972, 115)
During the 1920s and 1930s, schools that produced provincial elites were primarily military and nonmilitary administrative training schools. "Most of the middle level and upper level m ilitary officers came from the Japanese Cadet Military Academy, the Whampoa Military
Academy, the Pauting Military Academy, the Military Staff College, and various provincial schools" (Tien 1972, 115). The nonmilitary training 48 institutions included the Central Political Academy, which was created
especially to train cadres for the task of nation building under the
party's dictatorship; its goal was to produce loyal political cadres.
A further purpose of these institutions was to explain the doctrines
of Sun Yat-sen and to suggest ways to improve local activities against
the communists. But given the vast size and population of China and the depth of her administrative problems, efforts in this area fell far
short of the needs. "Thus all levels of government, from local to
central, remained under firm control of m ilitarists in the pre-war
decade" (Tien 1972, 128). Funding for education was a major problem. Chow states,
"Chinese education had to rely on government financing, however, the
primary interest of the warlords regional military leaders (and later
Chiang Kai-shek), who in fact controlled the revenues of the central
and local governments, lay in m ilitary affairs and in the civil wars wherein they hoped to defeat their rivals and seize power" (Chow 1960,
260). Eighty percent of the entire revenue of the nation went to mili tary affairs, and the very small allotment for education was often ille gally diverted by the warlords. "Schools were often closed and occupied
by soldiers as barracks" (Chow 1960, 260). In short, the educational
system that was controlled by the warlords and Chiang Kai-shek during this period received a very low priority.
Meanwhile, following the "Long March" (1935-36), the Communist
Party, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, began a "new education movement for the social, economic, and cultural transformation of the rural society" (Hsu 1983, 592). This new education movement was 49 instituted in Yenan, Shanxi Province, in communist base areas. The period from 1937 to 1945 is often referred to as "the Yenan period,"
"the Yenan way," or "the Yenan experience." During this period the communists were fighting both the nationalists, under the command of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and the Japanese. It was only in the areas under th eir control that the communists were able to implement this new educational program. Education in the communist base areas consisted of two kinds of schools: "those directly under the Communist Party for the training of Party officials and communist army personnel, and those under the educational departments of various border region governments" (Van
Slyke 1968, 136). Despite this distinction, visiting correspondents, in the summer of 1944, found evidence of communist propaganda in primary school textbooks, which were not under the control of the communists
(Van Slyke 1968). The Communist Party schools included the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University in southeast Shanxi Province with branches in outlying areas, and The Communist Party School at Yenan. The Red Army
Political Department also conducted political education classes.
Besides teaching the basic tenets of Marxism, the soldiers were also taught such slogans as "The Red Army is a revolutionary army," "The Red
Army is anti-Japanese," "The Red Army helps the peasants," and "The Red
Army loves the people and the people love the Red Army" (Snow 1981,
287). The public primary schools were under the control of the local governments, and the secondary schools were under the control of the 50 border region governments. There were "also classes for adults who wished to learn to read and write, and in the army, factories, and arsenals, illite ra te s were urged to learn a few characters each week"
(Van Slyke 1968, 137). Mimeographed textbooks, hand-drawn maps, and the communist-controlled newspaper Mass Journal were the main materials used in these schools. Primary school lasted five years, with classes held primarily in winter so as to not interfere with production (Van
Slyke 1968). As pointed out by Van Slyke:
During the winter, schools [were] in session all day with alternate periods of study, song, recreation, and spinning and weaving. Mass education [was] also carried out by means of blackboard newspapers, dramas and so called "Transplanting Songs," which are songs and dramatizations telling the population how to improve production and keep up the anti-Japanese resistance. (Van Slyke 1968, 138)
The purpose or emphasis of education in the communist-controlled base areas changed with time and circumstances. According to Van Slyke, the educational program was designed "to further the war of resistance and train the people to improve agricultural and industrial production"
(Van Slyke 1968, 136). Primary school students were required to learn
1,000 characters during the first two years of schooling, which would enable them to read the Mass Journal (Van Slyke 1968). This would help the students understand Meu Xiau and increase their sense of nation alism. Illiteracy was to be eliminated within five years.
The communists, however, faced enormous problems in trying to fight a war against Japan and prepare for a civil war with the nation alists with an under-equipped, under-educated, and outnumbered peasant army. It was clear that to be successful, the communists needed to win 51 the support of the common people. Their new educational program was
designed to meet th is requirement.
By 1944, the issues of mass versus elite education, of community
versus professional control of the schools, and of the political and
technical context of education (later referred to as "Red versus
Expert") lay at the heart of the educational debate. The popular edu
cation movement, begun in 1944, sought a solution to this debate. It
stressed the spreading of rudimentary literacy skills and practical eco
nomic sk ills which would yield quick and visible returns within each
village (Seldon 1971). The debate was then fa irly won by those
supporting mass education, community control of the schools, and a
political context for education.
The popular education movement brought about new types of
schools and new types of teachers. New schools were designed for the
part-time education of peasants and workers and included night schools,
half-day schools, winter schools, and literacy groups often limited to
production units. "These schools operated on the principle of
'Management by the people with the assistance of the government'
(min-ban-kong-chu)" (Seldon 1971, 271). That is, local communities were
responsible for the daily operation and financing of the schools with
the government offering advice on broad issues of curriculum and help
in providing some teachers. Seldon states:
Just as the party had attempted to bridge the gap between a cadre elite and the people in the Cheng-feng and "to the village" movements, in the popular education movement it sought to redefine the role of the teacher. The all-knowing, unquestioned authority figure was to yield to an instructor whose success rested on his responsiveness to genuine popular needs; frequently he was a peer of his students and indeed often a student himself. Young and old. 52
literate and illiterate, farmers, and cadres, could all be found among the ranks of both teachers and students. The new schools thus played a prominent role in the contemporary effort to overcome barriers between mental and manual labor, to unite thought and action, to bring together those who worked with their hands and those who worked with their minds. (Seldon 1971, 271)
The popular education movement of 1944-45 spread rudimentary
literacy; new ideas of cooperative health, labor, and hygiene; and new
art forms throughout the border region (Seldon 1971). These ideas would reemerge in the Great Leap Forward in the late '50s and again in the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the late '60s in national edu cational policies. The Yenan period can, therefore, be seen as setting the stage for future educational directives. However, as we will see, policies that were successful in a densely populated (approximately 1.5 million persons), rural, poverty-stricken area, may not be applicable or successful as national policies throughout China. It was the principles of mass education, community control of education, and a political context for education, coupled with the principle of the "mass
line" that would reemerge in the following decades.
Educational Policies under Mao, 1949-1966
In determining China's educational policies in 1949, the new leadership faced a dilemma which all developing communist nations must face. "On the one hand, Marxists must at least profess a commitment to the ultimate attainment of a classless society" and if this commitment is taken seriously, then educational policy must be designed
"to erode social, regional, class, and systematic intellectual differ ences between students and within the populace at large" (Lampton 1986, 53
367-68). "On the other hand, China has sought to develop its economy by building a modern industrial, agricultural, and scientific infrastructure" (Lampton 1979, 368). During this seventeen-year period
(and after), Chinese leaders have struggled to find solutions to this dilemma.
The purpose of education at the beginning of communist rule was stated by Guo Moruo, who in 1950 was the Vice-Premier and Chairman of the Committee of the Cultural and Educational Affairs of the State
Administrative Council; he said, "The concrete task of our cultural and educational work today lies chiefly in the 'eradication of feudalistic, compradore, and fa scists' ways of thought, and in the development of the ideology of serving the people' . . ." (North 1963, 250). Or, as
Chairman Mao put it, "Education must serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labor and our education to develop morally, intellectually, and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and culture" (Doughty 1978, 376). To achieve these aims, the new government took control of all schools and institutions and expelled and/or cut off all control by foreigners in all educational fa c ilitie s. In 1952, "reforms were undertaken along the following lines: (1) to make thoroughgoing readjustment and restructuring of institutions of higher education, (2) to carry out reform in teaching in schools of various levels, (3) to set up accelerated secondary schools for workers and peasants, and to stipulate that all schools be made accessible to workers and peasants or their children, (4) to take positive measures to develop adult education and (5) to provide people's stipends to needy students" (Ministry of Education 1985, 9). 54
These policies were included in the First Five Year Plan instituted in
1953. During the seventeen years before the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution, there developed a two-road struggle on the education front.
One road was being taken by Mao and pushed for equality and political consciousness; the other road, taken by Liu Shaoqi, pushed for (in
Marxist terms) the revisionist capitalist road. Liu Shaoqi pushed for a policy of production above everything else, and the creation of edu cational institutions that would create a corps of highly trained professionals and experts who could lead China most rapidly toward modernization (Seybolt 1973).
This time period can be seen as one of fluctuating between the policies of Mao Zedong and those of Liu Shaoqi. The years 1949 through
1957 were characterized by the policies of Liu Shaoqi. The Great Leap
Forward in 1958 brought about the reemergence of the educational policies developed during the Yenan period by Mao Zedong. Following the great disaster of The Great Leap Forward (it is estimated that more than 20 million Chinese died as a direct result of government policies during this period [Lampton 1986]), the policies promoted by Liu Shaoqi once again became predominant, or, as the government now explains it:
Around the year 1961, the national economy was temporarily stuck in difficulties. The central committee of the Communist Party of China formulated the policy of readjustment, consolidation, strengthening and improvement and accordingly in the realm of edu cation corrective measures were resolutely taken to rectify the "leftist" deviations committed previously which violated objective laws and set up unattainable targets during the great and hectic expansion. So a wholesale readjustment of education at all levels was carried out and necessary contraction and retrenchment were made so as to bring the educational enterprise into conformity with the prevailing economic basis. (Ministry of Education 1985, 10) 55
With the establishment of the Socialist Education Campaign in
1962-63, the policies of Chairman Mao once again became national directives. According to Mao:
This Socialist Education Movement is a great revolutionary movement . . . This is a struggle that calls for the re-education of man. This is a struggle for a confrontation with the forces of feudalism and capitalism who are feverishly attacking us. We must nip their counter-revolution in the bud. We must make it a great movement of reforming the bulk of elements in these counter revolutionary forces and turn them into new men. (Hiniker 1977, 175) As a part of their movement, by 1962 over a million cadres had gone to the countryside for education and to implement the policies of the Party Central Committee (mass line). However, there were s till major differences between Mao and Liu Shaoqi (and Deng Xiaoping). Or, as Lin Biao (head of the m ilitary and the chosen successor to Mao) put i t on October 25, 1966:
During the last two days, everyone has clearly perceived the struggle between the two lines. One is represented by Liu and Teng [Deng Xiaoping], which suppresses the masses and is counter revolutionary. The other is Chairman Mao's path of boldness which has faith in the masses and believes in them. It is also the Party's mass line and the proletarian revolutionary line. (Hiniker 1977, 223)
This, of course, was leading to the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution, which shall be dealt with in more detail later.
During this seventeen-year period, schools serving both purposes were established. Some schools were designed as instruments for the inculcation of new values and beliefs to build a new socialist revolutionary society, and others were designed to help implement the shifting policies of economic development (Wang 1980). "The Communists established new schools on all levels, and special efforts were made 56 to set up institutions of higher learning modeled after those in the
Soviet Union and to reorganize old institutions after the same pattern"
(North 1963, 256). Heavy emphasis was placed upon technical schools
and institutions for applied scientific research. "Of utmost
importance—as a point of contact between the party and the masses—was the cadre, and in all parts of China special schools were organized to train personnel for these units" (North 1963, 252).
There were three levels of schooling: primary, secondary, and higher education. Primary schools consisted of six years in urban areas
and three to four years in rural areas. Many of these schools were on a half study/half work basis. The curriculum contained a heavy emphasis
on political and ideological value formation as well as the usual
subjects: Chinese language, math, and general science. There were
several types of secondary schools: (1) general academically-oriented
schools found exclusively in urban areas, (2) three- to four-year voca tional schools that emphasized practical training and teacher education, and (3) specialized polytechnical schools that prepared students to work in industry, agriculture, public health, and commerce and trade that were found almost exclusively in urban areas. Because of the rapid growth in urban populations and increasing unemployment, spare-time
specialized secondary schools were reduced and all graduates of primary
and secondary schools who could neither find jobs nor go on to higher education were sent to the countryside to engage in agricultural
production. After The Great Leap Forward in 1958, expansion of half study/half work schools resumed in both urban and rural areas and 57 political education became even more a part of the curriculum (Wang
1980). The third level of schooling during this period was higher edu cation. There were five types of these institutions: (1) four-year comprehensive universities similar to American and Soviet universities,
(2) polytechnic institutions similar to M.I.T., (3) vocationally- organized, specialized colleges, (4) enterprise-controlled, spare-time, industrialized colleges for workers already employed by the industries, and (5) the low-quality and highly questionable institutions known as workers' and peasants' colleges.
Prior to 1949, education in China was primarily for the elites.
During the period 1949-1966, efforts were made to include more people within the educational arena. "Party leaders were determined to play an active role in deciding the composition of the next generation's technical, industrial, and scientific elites" (Unger 1982, 12). They established three guidelines for educational admissions:
(1) Academic Performance. The government had a firm commitment
to develop and modernize the nation, which meant that high-skilled
posts had to be filled by the most competently educated people.
(2) Family Class Origins. It was argued that since the revo
lution was fought for and would be protected by the proletarian
classes, consideration in school admissions should always be given
to a youth's family class origins.
(3) Political Performance. Attention was also given to a
student's commitment to the revolutionary cause; for example, was
he or she a member of the Communist Youth League (Unger 1982)? 58 During this time period, there were fluctuations in the relative importance of the three admissions criteria. "Sometimes proponents of a stronger 'class line' in educational policy gained a louder voice, as in the Great Leap Forward of 1958-59; sometimes advocates of 'modern ization' and of high academic standards regained the initiative, as in
1962" (Unger 1982, 16).
Significant progress was made in making education available to more people (see Table 2).
TABLE 2
SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS IN SELECTED TYPES OF SCHOOLS, 1949-1965
Schools/Students 1949 1965 Primary schools 346,769 1,681,939 Secondary schools 5,216 80,993* Regular institutions of higher education 265 434 Primary students 24,391,000 116,209,000 Secondary students 1,268,000 14,318,000 Students enrolled in higher education 117,000 674,000
^Includes 61,626 agricultural and vocational schools.
The table shows that (1) primary school enrollment increased from 24 million in 1949 to over 116 million in 1965, (2) secondary enrollment increased from 1.2 million in 1949 to over 14 million in
1965, (3) the number of higher education students increased from 117,000 in 1949 to 674,000 in 1965, and (4) the number of institutes of higher learning doubled from 200 in 1949 to over 400 in 1965. 59 From 1949 to 1966, over 130 million young people attended schools of various kinds and more than half of those were from peasant or worker families (Doughty 1978). While this information does not deal with the issue of the quality of education, it is clear that the Chinese made significant progress in some areas of education.
In short, the purpose of educational policy during this seventeen-year period still favored the "capitalist" path of development promoted by Liu Shaoqi, but Mao's policies of inculcating values and socialist thinking were gaining in importance. In regard to who was to be educated, significant increases were made in terms of numbers of students from previously excluded class backgrounds.
Educational Policies under Mao, 1966-1976
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1968) and the years afterward until the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, a time period referred to by many as the "Decade of Chaos," the Chinese educational system went through drastic changes. The struggle for power within the party and the government was won by Mao, as he was able to have Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping purged from their leadership positions. On August 8,
1966, at the Eleventh Plennum of the Eighth Central Committee, the
Cultural Revolution was o fficially launched with the approval of a sixteen-point guideline for conducting a thorough revolution. Although the Cultural Revolution affected all aspects of life in China, the greatest impact was in the area of education (Wang 1980).
Maoists believed that the revolution in education was subverted by Liu Shaoqi and that education was being conducted almost as i t was 60 before liberation, or according to Soviet (viewed as revisionists at th is time) methods (Doughty 1978). Maoists argued:
The schools were dominated by bourgeois intellectuals. The graduates were estranged from workers, peasants, reality and labor. They had no notion of how the laboring people thought and felt. Clearly, these students fell far short of the requirements of having both socialist consciousness and culture. The trend was toward the creation of an intellectual elite. Furthermore, education was becoming a tool for effecting capitalist restoration. (Doughty 1978, 376)
To stop this trend some believed drastic action was needed, and
Chairman Mao took drastic action. All schools were closed for two years between 1966 and 1968 and most universities did not reopen until 1971
(Lampton 1986). Entrance exams were abolished and admission policies were changed to give family class origins and political education the highest priority. The control of educational policy went to local revo lutionary committees that were to work with the students and teachers to develop curriculum that placed more stress on the study of Mao's thoughts and related education to productive labor (Wang 198D). When schools were reopened in 1968, they were to comply with the following guidelines:
(1) Schools were to teach concepts that were relevant to indus
tria l and agricultural work, and were to downplay the systematic
teaching of theory.
(2) A student's academic excellence was no longer to be rewarded
or even permitted to be an important source of informal prestige
in the classroom. Among other things, learning was to be simplified
and slowed, narrowing the gap between good and poor students. 6 1
(3) Overall, the shaping of attitudes was to carry far greater
weight in the educational system than the imparting of knowledge.
(4) Learning was to be combined with more labor than before.
(5) Urban schooling would be shortened to a universalized eight
or nine years.
(6) School graduates would be assigned directly to jobs, and
work units would hold the right to determine which of their young
personnel deserved a university or technical school training
(Unger 1982).
Chairman Mao's proclamation that "education must serve politics and be combined with productive labor" became the key factor in the development of instructional content in all schools, as all content had to have immediate application to economic production (Wang 1980, 246).
While the radicals s till wanted an increase in development, they did not want i t at the expense of the masses. The radicals wanted devel opment to increase by relying on small, technologically unsophisticated factories and, therefore, the purpose of schooling should be to produce politically reliable "socialist laborers" with on-the-job resource fulness in handling non-advanced technologies. However, the radicals did not want education to focus primarily on vocational education.
Instead, it was to focus on character building—the teaching of morals.
They believed that when linked to political teachings and conducted in the proper group environment, labor (physical labor) had a morally puri fying quality; it helped to instill "proletarianism" (Unger 1982).
The Maoists wanted a leveling off of aspirations. They fe lt that by entirely cutting off at school the routes to upward mobility. 62 they would be in better positions to re-orient achievement-minded youths
away from the "corrupting personal ambition they had absorbed from their parents" (Unger 1982, 142). It was thought that if students went directly to universities and became experts, then they would feel above others and become out of touch with the political interests of the masses (Unger 1982).
Educational policies during this period were intended to benefit
and "serve the interests of the laboring classes—the industrial workers and the poor and lower-middle peasants . . ." (Seybolt 1973, 12). These programs were sort of an affirmative action program for peasants
(Lampton 1986). However, with the new university admissions policies, enrollment of students with inadequate preparation increased and therefore lower academic standards and remedial classes were instituted
(Unger 1982). Some university professors argued that the new policy of no examinations meant there would be no modernization, which was similar to the earlier mistakes made during The Great Leap Forward
(Lampton 1986). But the new policies were not designed to increase development, they were aimed at increasing the recruitment of youths from proper "revolutionary backgrounds," and in this regard they were at least partially successful: between 1970 and 1973, 150,000 peasants, workers, and People's Liberation Army (PLA) members were admitted to colleges and universities (Unger 1982).
In 1985, the Ministry of Education described theeffects of the
Cultural Revolution on education in the following manner:
In the higher education and secondary special education sectors, normal instruction and admission of new students were suspended for four consecutive years, 106 higher schools and a great number of 63
' specialized-secondary schools were closed down. Half-work and half-study programmes as well as agricultural and other vocational schools were largely dissolved. Sparetime educational programmes at all levels and of various types were also suspended. The teaching staff also suffered immensely, a large amount of school buildings were occupied, and heavy losses were inflicted on labo ratory equipment and apparatus and library holdings. Not only a whole generation of youth became the victims of this turmoil, but also the quality of teaching in various types of schools deteri orated seriously. (Ministry of Education 1985, 12)
In short, we can say that although some successes were made p (particularly in the area of equity of education), this "Decade of
Chaos" marked a dark period for education and economic development.
"For Mao, especially in his twilight years, the principal purpose of education was political, to train a successor generation which was to be heir for his own generation's revolutionary values" (Lampton 1979,
368). Education was to serve the masses or, as Liang Xuao put it:
The proletariat has the task of transforming the world. It should create conditions in which it is impossible for a new bourgeoisie to arise. This requires people of many generations to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the prole ta ria t. For this reason, the proletariat should occupy the edu cation front in order to use it to train revolutionary successors who can persist in the dictatorship of the proletariat and strive for the realization of communism. (FBIS, No. 54, 1976) E4
"Mao and his allies argued that education should be the servant of generalized social equality, especially urban-rural equality, and while equality did not always result from their efforts. Cultural Revo lution policies did emphasize universalization of primary education
(shortened in duration to insure that it was achieved), as well as labor for students at all levels, unity of theory and practice, admission
2 For information on inter-provincial and urban-rural equality- equity of education, see David M. Lampton, "Performance and the Chinese Political System: A Preliminary Assessment of Education and Health Policies," China Quarterly (September 1978):509-539. 64 to'institutions-of higher learning only after service in the countryside, affirmative efforts to allow more scholastically less qualified students up the educational hierarchy, elimination of favored
('Key Point') schools, and less attention to formal higher education"
(Lampton 1986, 30). Whatever the merits of these ideas and policies, the next decade was to witness an almost complete reversal of these policies.
Educational Polipi es in the post-Mao fera, I g V f e — Present Whereas the Cultural Revolution era can be viewed "as an attack on the whole 'regular' schooling system with its American, European and
Soviet components, and on the very notion of a university which fostered values of pure scholarship and 'expertise in command,' post-Mao changes in educational policy have seen the reemergence of the old 'regular system' with its residues of foreign models and its acceptance of inegalitarian gaps between those institutions whose main task is to raise quality and strive for international scholarly standards and less prestigious locally oriented institutions" (Hayhoe 1984, 43-45).
After the fall of the "Gang of Four" in 1976, education gradually came to be judged "according to the degree to which it retards or fac ilita tes economic and technical progress" (Lampton 1986, 30).
Speaking at the National Conference on Education, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping and then Minister of Education Liu Xiyao gave straightforward accounts of the purposes of education. Deng said:
Our schools are places for training competent personnel for the proletariat. The demands to bring up workers with high standards 65 ■ in science and culture and create a mammoth contingent of red-and- expert working class intellectuals are in the interests of prole tarian politics Today's speedy economic and technological development demands rapid improvement in the quality and efficiency of education and constant new developments in the content and methods of combining education with productive labor. And Liu added:
The education front bears a major part of the responsibility to fulfill the general task in the new period. We must train millions upon millions of workers so they have socialist consciousness and modern production skills . . . and train experts and cadres able to manage a modern economy and handle modern science and technology. (Quoted in Lampton 1986, 30)
To see how these new policies work, le t us look at each level of school: primary, secondary, and higher education. Presently, the overall system for most regular schools is six years for primary schools and six years for secondary schools. Secondary school is divided into three years for lower middle school and three years for upper middle school.
Primary Schools
"Post-1977 Chinese educational policies show clearly the author itie s ' intention to develop primary education on a two-track basis with urban academic schools on the one hand and rural work-study schools on the other" (Hayhoe 1984, 47). In contrast, primary schools in the
Cultural Revolution era were single-track systems in which children in rural and urban areas were to be educated alike (Hayhoe 1984).
The primary purpose of primary education after 1977 was to lay the foundation for the preparation of future citizens with socialist morality and advanced scientific knowledge. "In terms of specific tasks, primary and secondary education are to fulfill the dual tasks of 66
(1) supplying educational institutes of higher levels with well-qualified students for the training of expertise in various fields and (2) providing a literate labor force for society" (Hayhoe 1984, 50).
In practical implementation, this has led to a two-track system for dual tasks. Urban schools have the task of training talent for higher-level
learning and rural schools are to fulfill the task of training competent labor reserves for society as a whole (Hayhoe 1984).
Primary education was once again lengthened to six years in 1980 and in the area of curriculum, the subject of politics was to be gradually replaced by training in ethics, and history and geography classes were to be reintroduced.
Compared to the study of politics in the earlier periods which was concerned mainly with the eradication of bourgeois tendencies by studying quotations of Chairman Mao and current events as transmitted by official agencies, this shift of emphasis to devel oping good morals and good behavior is quite a big contrast . . . [Today] revolutionary values call on students to study diligently, observe discipline, love labor, take pleasure in helping others, work hard and dare to fight the enemy courageously. (Hayhoe 1984, 61)
While universal education remains an objective in China, this dual system is hindering the quality and quantity of education in rural areas. Rural areas receive minimum government assistance, and with the inequities in the quality of education, rural youth have little opportunity or incentive to attend school and, consequently, dropout rates are very high. Some of the main reasons for the high dropout rates include:
(1) Peasants cannot or are unwilling to pay tuition. Education is by no means free in China. The amount and ways in which tuition is paid vary from place to place. Peasants who now have to invest in agricultural production under the agricultural responsibility system find tuition increasingly a financial strain. 67
(2) The-rural school curriculum is not compatible with the requirements of life and production in the rural areas. No agricul tural or technical knowledge is included in the curriculum. As a result, schools are seen as nothing more than a place to acquire basic literacy. Once students finish grade three and have acquired basic literacy, peasants see no point in keeping their children in school. (3) The agricultural responsibility system makes i t more rewarding for parents to send children to work in the fields than to send them to school. (4) The opinion that girls should not study s till persists in rural communities. Drop-out rates among g irls are particularly high. (5) Peasants have lost faith in education as a means of providing social and economic mobility to their children. They would rather have their children learn some useful skills at home or under apprenticeship than send them to school. (Hayhoe 1984, 60)
In 1982 the Chinese government announced that i t would gradually extend the full-tim e five-year primary schools to six years. The social studies teaching plan for a full-time five-year primary school, as of
1982, is outlined in Table 3.
TABLE 3
SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHING OUTLINE FOR PRIMARY SCHOOLS, 1982
Hours Per Week First Second Third Fourth Fifth Subjects Grade Grade Grade Grade Grade Ideological and Moral Education 1 1 1 1 1 Geography 2 2 2 Hi story 2 Total school hours per week 31 32 33 34 34
SOURCE: Hayhoe 1984, 53.
In 1989, many full-time primary schools did not teach geography or history; however. Ideological and Moral Education was still taught 68 one class hour per week in all six grades. The emphasis in th is course in primary school is on moral education. For those schools that s till taught history and geography, history was taught in sixth grade for two class hours per week, and geography one class hour every two weeks
(Interview 15 May 1989).
As of 1989, a two-track system remained for urban and rural primary schools. The implications of these policies are significant; this two-track system is likely to become a major mechanism for s tr a ti fication in China. A child's place of birth, which one has no control over, is likely to become the major variable in determining his chances for further education (Hayhoe 1984). This is precisely what Chairman
Mao was trying to overcome during the Cultural Revolution.
Secondary Education The purpose of secondary schools, in theory, was similar to that of primary schools. They were to train both qualified students for institutes of higher learning and good laborers for society. The
Chinese Communist Party was committed to restoring an educational system capable of training specialized and high-level technical manpower and returning to the balanced educational structure of the 1900s, with regular, specialist, vocational, and agricultural secondary schools again providing options for students, and training a variety of skilled personnel (Hayhoe 1984). The moderate leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping and their intellectual supporters, sought to build a high-quality edu cation system that would select and train the best students to provide the brain power for the future modern China. To this end, the "Key 69
Point" system—a system whereby certain schools are selected and given
the best available resources and the highest level of funding—was
re-introduced in 1977 (Rosen 1986). By the end of 1979, there were
5,200 key secondary schools in the country, containing about 8.63
percent of all secondary school students. Likewise, the examination
system was also reinstated and promotion within the educational system
was dependent on examination performance. "Unified examinations at the
municipal or county level determine who will move from primary school
to lower secondary and lower to upper secondary," and "a nationally
unified examination determines who will go on to a university" (Hayhoe
1984, 74). Curriculum in Key Point schools has been arranged to help
prepare students for these examinations; p olitics, Chinese language, foreign language, math, history, geography, chemistry, biology, and
physics are to be offered. Key Point schools, however, represent only
a small percentage of secondary schools. Most students are in ordinary
secondary schools, many of which are slated to become vocational and
agricultural schools in the future, and students in ordinary secondary
schools or in vocational schools are not eligible to sit for university
examinations (Hayhoe 1984).
Because enrollment in universities is very limited (300,000 to
350,000 per year), competition throughout one's secondary school years
can be relentless. China's educational policy has sought to guarantee
quality through concentration of resources in Key Point schools, and
at the same time reduce the number of students in regular academic-track
schools and promote vocational education. "By 1990, the number of
students in vocational and technical schools in the countryside is 70 expected to equal or slightly surpass those in regular upper track secondary schools" (Hayhoe 1984, 91). However, a university position remains the goal for most students and their families because only university graduates are guaranteed jobs and placed by the state.
Higher Education
The goals of higher education, established in 1977, are as fo l1ows:
(1) Establish programs "to teach children and young people the most up-to-date science and technology." (2) Establish programs to allow students to "studiously learn advanced foreign science and technology and actively strengthen international science exchanges under the premise of independence and self reliance." (3) To "master the world's most advanced scientific and techno logical achievements as soon as possible to serve as a new starting point for our advance." (Hayhoe 1984, 111)
These programs were necessary to:
. . . rapidly develop the national economy on a new technological basis, greatly increase labor productivity, and equip our national defense with the most up-to-date technology . . . to catch up with and surpass the most advanced world levels in major fields of science and technology by the end of the present century. (Fang Yi, quoted in Hayhoe 1984, 111).
In 1977, Deng Xiaoping stated, "The key to achieving moderni zation is the development of science and technology. And unless we pay special attention to education, it will be impossible to develop science and technology" (Deng 1984, 53). The most important structural changes that have occurred since 1977 are as follows:
(a) The restitution of college entrance exams; (b) Institutional diversification and expansion in higher education; (c) The reform of the curriculum; (d) Intra-university administrative reforms; 71 (e) A new concept of higher education planning. (Hayhoe 1984, 112)
This chapter will cover only the first three topics in detail.
(a) The restitution of college entrance exams. Three major changes were instituted: (1) students were no longer required to have two to three years of practical work experience; (2) all had to succeed in regionally standardized entrance examinations with clearly defined tests in selected specialties, and the marks received became the main criterion for access to higher education institutions; and (3) in contrast to decentralized enrollment procedures up to 1976, now as a first stage of centralization, enrollment quotas were controlled generally by provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, not by the basic levels (Hayhoe 1984).
(b) Institutional diversification and expansion in higher edu cation. As of 1982, there were 715 institutions of higher learning in
China, and "the Chinese government has been quite successful in reorgan izing the structure of higher education in accordance with the antici pated needs of the 'four modernizations'" (Hayhoe 1984, 119). Insti tutions that specialized in finance, economics, and teacher training increased in number, while those in medicine and science and engineering declined slightly. In 1981 and 1982» a total of ninety-six Key Point universities, which are aimed at increasing the quality of students' output, teaching work, and research, were in existence. In comparison to regular universities, these Key Point or priority schools receive 72
higher financial allocations, have a more advanced teaching and research
staff, select students.who scored highest on the entrance exams, are
equipped with better scientific instruments and instructional media,
and are more likely to have an international academic reputation (Hayhoe
1984.
(c) The reform of the curriculum. A number of changes have been
taken to improve the quality of teaching and research: (1) the length
of study has been increased from three years in 1976 to an average of
five to six years in 1983, (2) a credit system has been introduced in
some universities which allows the students a limited choice of optional
courses within their specialty, and (3) improvements are being sought to improve the method of instruction to allow for more student-teacher
interaction and independent research (Hayhoe 1984).
Conclusion
Overall, the implementation of these policies has brought about
a number of consequences. Perhaps the most obvious consequence has been
a return to e litis t education. This can best be represented by looking at the "Key Point" school system. Susan Shirk reported that in 1978,
"The chances of winning college admission were ten times better for a
student from an urban key school than those of an ordinary rural school
I visited" (Susan Shirk, cited in Lampton 1986, 31). Furthermore, Key
Point schools are mainly located in urban areas and more urbanized
provinces. This means, for example, that there was one provincially-
administered key primary or middle school for every 332,000 persons in 73 Beijing, while one existed for every 11.1 million residents of Sichuan
Province (Lampton 1986). To gain admission to a Key Point university, i t is almost a necessity to have graduated from a Key Point middle school. Likewise, to gain admission to a Key Point middle school, it is almost a necessity to have graduated from a Key Point primary school.
In short, the present purpose of education is twofold: (1) to provide a lite ra te labor force for society, and (2) to produce trained specialists and high-level technical manpower who will assist in carrying out the four modernizations. While the goal remains to have universal education, the policy is to have a two-track system which favors the urban population. "With the installation of a meritocratic educational system designed to promote efficiently the talent required for the four modernizations, the secondary schools—in meeting their mobility function—are likely to face increasing difficulty in their socialization function" (Hayhoe 1984, 12). Given the hierarchical nature of the present system, with its limited opportunities, it is likely that those who do not make it up the ladder will once again become dissatisfied. "In the final analysis, the Chinese may discover, as Mao warned, that the pursuit of 'modernization' has heavy social costs" (Hayhoe 1984, 92).
Summary
This chapter presented an overview of the educational system in China from traditional times to the present. The chapter described the purpose, structure, curriculum, and whom the system included. The chapter was divided into the following five time periods: 74
(1) traditional-China (1122 B.C.-1911), (2) 1911-1949, (3) 1949-1966,
(4) 1976-1986, and (5) -1986-present.
In traditional China, two purposes of education were given:
(1) to recruit a ruling class (gentry), and (2) to help establish a social order based on Confucian values and the five relationships. The structure of education was based on three levels of civil service exams, the highest being the national exam. Students studied individually or hired a tutor. The curricululm was based on sacred tex ts. Four books, and Five Classics. No women were allowed to take the exams and, because of the great length of time and the cost of the tutor, it was almost required for one to be able to pass the exams. Less than 1 percent of the population was included in the sytem.
From 1911 to 1949, there were many changes in the educational system. During th is period, a modern educational system based on the
American and Soviet models was established. The system included standard, vocational, technical, military, foreign-controlled, and community-controlled schools. The purposes of education included training a strong military, developing practical skills, training bureaucrats for administrative posts, and recruiting and training a peasant army. The educational system was opened to females and, espe cially in CCP-controlled areas, to peasants. Traditional subjects such as math, science, history, politics, health care, reading, and writing were taught in the schools. In CCP-controlled areas (called "soviets"),
Marxism, socialist ideology, and guerrilla warfare tactics were taught.
From 1949 to 1966, the national government instituted a national system of education under the leadership of the CCP and administered 75 by the Ministry of Education. The national educational system grew to include schools run by.the Ministry of Education, run by provincial level, and run by local communities. The types of schools included kindergarten, primary, secondary, higher education, technical, voca tional, adult, teacher training, special education (schools for the blind and deaf), agricultural, and half-work/half-study schools. Some schools were designated as Key Point schools; they were administered by the Ministry of Education and were given the best facilities, equipment, and s ta ffs. The enrollment of females, minorities, and peasants increased. The curriculum and materials were set by the
Ministry of Education and included the traditional subjects of math, science, and social science, as well as Marxist and socialist ideology and physical labor. During this period there was a balance between the programs called "Red" (ideological training) and "Expert" (academic and technical skill training).
During the "ten years of turmoil" (1966-1976) known as the
Cultural Revolution, the traditional educational system was seriously disrupted. In higher and secondary educational sectors, normal instruction and enrollments were suspended for four years. Most univer sities and secondary, primary, agricultural, and technical schools, as well as special program schools such as Key Point, half-work/ half-study, and special education schools, were effectively closed for several years. Many textbooks, laboratories, and other teaching mate rials were destroyed. Teachers, professors, and other intellectuals were declared the "stinking ninth category" and hundreds of thousands were sent to the countryside for reeducation through manual labor. One 76 purpose of education was to eliminate distinctions between people, including such things as knowledge, sk ills, and economic levels; the inculcation of socialist and communist values and beliefs among the masses; and to meet the needs of economic development through the reliance of unskilled labor. The textbook of the Cultural Revolution was Mao's L ittle Red Book. The school curriculum also included studying the daily directives of the CCP and manual labor. During their time period, the emphasis was on ideological training (Red).
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, China has reestablished most of the educational system that existed prior to 1966.
A two-track system for rural and urban areas emerged. As a part of Deng
Xiaoping's economic reforms of decentralization, provincial and special areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou were granted greater control of educational policies. The purpose of education was to meet the needs of socialist construction and the four modernizations. This included the training of workers with socialist values and modern production skills and the training of experts to manage a modern economy. Education continued to reach more people as a policy of making primary school education universal (available to everyone) in China was adopted. The traditional curriculum was reinstated with an emphasis on the natural sciences. While ideological training was still part of the curriculum, the emphasis was clearly on "Expert" and not on "Red." CHAPTER III
AN OVERVIEW OF DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS IN CHINA
Introduction
In those high-spirited days of May 1989, it seemed that every
Chinese person was talking about democracy. Many Westerners were also asking questions about democracy in China. In an interview with the now famous student leader, Wuer Kaxi, CBS News correspondent Jack
Sheahan asked:
For fifty years, the system in China has been designed to prevent you from thinking about or learning about democracy. How did you find out about it? Why aren't you a nice Chinese robot like the system wants?
Wuer Kaxi answered: Democracy is not a foreign product. Democracy is something that is rooted in the hearts of everyone—i t has just grown here now. Seventy years ago, people also demonstrated right here in Beijing for democracy and science. (CBS News Archives) Indeed, throughout the past seventy years, there have been many demon strations and movements for democracy and reform. China has, however, had a very long history of imperial and autocratic rulers who have not been open to democratic reforms. This chapter, in order to put the 1989 Democracy Movement into a broader perspective, (1) gives a brief overview of modern Chinese history beginning in 1895, (2) describes and analyzes some of the major movements and demonstrations from 1895 to 1986, and (3) describes the government reaction to these events. The chapter begins with the 77 78
scholars' protest in Beijing to the signing of the 1895 peace treaty with Japan. This date.is used as the starting point because many
scholars mark this as the beginning of democratic politics in China
(Nathan 1985).
The Scholars' Protest—1895
China [Zhong GuoJ, which means the "Middle Kingdom," implies
that China is the center of the universe and that the further one gets
from this center, the more the people are viewed as barbaric. Until
1911, China was ruled by an emperor who ruled with unlimited power.
His legitimacy came from the belief that he was the "Son of Heaven" with
a mandate to rule on earth. This "mandate of heaven" was legitimate
as long as the emperor ruled in a righteous way and maintained harmony
within Chinese society. The relationship between the emperor and the
citizens was one of a boat and a river. The river would keep the boat
afloat, but it could also overturn it. In this relationship, rebellions were, if they succeeded, legitimate.
In Chinese history, rebellions fell into two categories:
peasant uprisings and military coups. Twenty-three of China's
twenty-four dynasties were established by a military figure who capi
talized on peasant unrest or by foreign invasion (Wang 1985).
Each of China's twenty-four dynasties followed a similar type
of development and decline; this phenomenon is referred to as the
dynastic cycle. Wang describes it thusly:
At the beginning of a new dynasty, a period of national unity under virtuous and benevolent rule flourished and usually was accom panied by intellectual excitement and ferment; then midway in the 79 ■ cycle, there emerged a period of mediocre rule, accompanied by signs of corruption and unrest. Finally, natural disasters occurred for which the ruler was unable to provide workable remedies, and a successful rebellion or invasion was mounted. A new dynasty was born, and the cycle repeated itself. (Wang 1985, 2-3).
By the late 1800s, the Qing Dynasty (also called Manchu
Dynasty), which was established in 1644, was experiencing numerous
internal and external problems and in danger of losing its mandate of
heaven. Internally the Qing Dynasty was hit with a series of domestic
rebellions and revolutions. The White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804), the
Taiping Revolution (1850-1864) which raged over sixteen provinces and
destroyed over six hundred c itie s , the Ni en Rebellion (1851-1868), the
Moslem Rebellion (1855-1873), and the Tungan Rebellion (1862-1878)
nearly destroyed the dynasty. Externally, the defeat by Western powers
(barbarians) in the Opium Wars (1840-1842) and the Arrow Wars
(1856-1860) were humiliating and nearly disastrous to the Qing regime.
The Qing rulers were, however, able to prevent an overthrow of the
government and to reestablish their power.
Following th eir defeat in the Arrow Wars, the Qing rulers
launched a self-strengthening movement. The period from 1862 to 1874
is called the "Tongqi Restoration," and was an effort to restore tradi tional order through the reaffirmation of the old morality and the
applications of knowledge to practical affairs.^ Overall, the
self-strengthening movement (1861-1898) was an attempt to modernize
China. This modernization included building a strong, modern army and
'For an in-depth analysis of this period, see Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Resto ration, 1862-1874 (Stanford, Ca : Stanford University Press, 1957). 80 navy. The events in 1894-1895 were to shatter these attempts at modernization.
On July 25, 1894, after a generation of modernization in China and Japan, the two Asian powers declared war on each other over Korea.
The defeat was quick and humiliating to the Chinese. The Middle Kingdom
under the Qings had once again been defeated by foreign powers. This time, however, i t was an Asian power—Japan. According to Schwarcz,
"The m ilitary defeat of 1895 had an added edge of shame for [the]
Confucian lite ra ti [who were] used to thinking of Japan as the 'land of the Eastern dwarfs,' a condescending allusion to Japan's extensive borrowing from China as far back as the Tang dynasty (618-907)"
(Schwarcz 1980, 30). The defeat indeed was humiliating to the Chinese; however, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was ratified May 8, 1895, stirred even more criticism of the Qing government.
The treaty provided for "(1) recognition of Korean independence and termination of tribute to China; (2) an indemnity of 200 million taels to Japan; (3) secession of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the
Liaoting peninsula; (4) the opening of Chonqing (Chungking), Suzhou,
Hangzhou, and Xia Shi as ports; and (5) the right of Japanese nationals to open factories and engage in industry and manufacturing in China"
(Hsu 1983, 342). China's intellectuals accused Li Hongchang and his son, the principal peace negotiators, of selling out China to preserve themselves.
Students in Beijing for the Spring 1895 Jinshi examinations collaborated in "righteous indignation" after learning about the details of the treaty. Together they wrote a reform memorial asking the emperor 81 for a modernized army equipped with modern firearms, and suggested that
China should raise taxes, develop a state banking system, establish a railway system, build a commercial fleet, install a modern postal system, build agricultural training schools, and foster industrial inno vation (Spence 1990). The protests and discussions that followed the m ilitary defeat led to two political movements in China: (1) the progressives, who "advocated institutional reorganization after the fashion of Peter the Great and Emperor Meijie," and (2) the radicals, who "demanded a revolution to replace the Manchu dynasty with a Chinese republic" (Hsu 1983, 345). These two currents, also referred to as the
"reformers" and the "revolutionaries," became the main political movements in twentieth-century China. These two groups will be the focus of the following two sections in this chapter. It was, however, the reformers who remained most powerful until after 1898.
Intellectuals in China had, in fact, been speaking of the need for reforms as early as the 1840s. China's defeats by Western powers in the Opium and Arrow Wars, and now by the Japanese (1895), made i t clear to many intellectuals that drastic reforms were necessary. These protests marked the beginning of democratic movements in China.
The 1898 Reforms
By 1898, three different reform positions were advocated. The three positions did, however, have several things in cotranon. The reformers all viewed China as being weak and needing to adopt reforms based on foreign ideas while at the same time maintaining traditional
Chinese values. Another element that the reformers had in common was 8 2 a view that foreign powers were taking over China, as evidenced by the
more than 500,000 foreign missionaries and Communicates in China, the
increasing number of foreign concession areas, and their continued eco
nomic exploitation. The reformers felt that China must either reform, which would enable her to "stand up" to foreign powers, or else perish.
The most radical of the reform positions was advocated by the
great scholar Kang Youwei. The reforms advocated by Kang Youwei were
adopted by the Emperor Guang Xu, who issued four series of edicts
from June 11 to September 20, 1989 to in stitu te these reforms. This
period became known as the "100 Days of Reform." The reforms covered 2 the areas of political administration, education, industry, and law
and were an attempt to meet the growing demands for democratic changes
and thus stave off calls for revolution.
The reforms, however, were too drastic for many Chinese high
officials and many central and local officials, who would have lost
power and prestige if the reforms succeeded. The conflict escalated
into a power struggle between the Emperor Guang Xu and the Empress
Dowager. On September 21, 1898, the Empress Dowager completed a
successful coup d'état, and for the third time in her life "returned to administer state affairs behind a silk curtain, while the emperor
was put under detention on a small island in the Imperial Garden west
of the palace" (Hsu 1983, 377). Ten years later, the emperor, i t is
believed, was killed by the Dowager on November 14, 1908, one day before
her own death. The reform movement was ended after only 103 days.
2 See Appendix A for a listing of the reform edicts. 83 The results of the failed reform movement were swift. While the emperor was put under palace detention, the Empress Dowager ordered his radical advisors arrested and, to the dismay of the reformers and foreigners alike, six were arrested and executed without a trial
(Spence 1990). Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao (another important reform leader) were able to escape from China and, with a price on their heads, began a life of exile, f ir s t in Hong Kong and later in Japan under the protection of the Tokyo government. Within months, most of the imperial edicts were rescinded, Kang's writings were banned, and a total of twenty-two reformers were arrested, imprisoned, dismissed, banished, and stripped of th eir property (Hsu 1983).
Three things were learned from the "100 Days of Reform." F irst, reform can only take place when the government is viewed as weak.
Second, to be even partially successful, reformers must have support from people within the government; in this case, i t was the emperor himself who supported the reforms. Last, to a growing number of people, it was evident that reform from within and above was hopeless. As
Fairbank put it, "The defeat of 1895 and the fiasco of 1898 together gave the f ir s t great impetus toward revolutionary change. From then on political revolution ran parallel to those for constitutional reform"
(Fairbank 1983, 205).
Reform and Revolutionary Movements, 1898-1911
Between 1898 and 1911, there were many reform and revolutionary movements. These movements were influenced by a variety of internal 84 and external pressures, and eventually ended China's long history of imperial rule. In the late 1900s, China was hit with a series of natural disasters. In 1898 there were severe floods in Shandong, Sichuan,
Jiangxi, and Jiangsu Provinces. In 1900 most of northern China, including Beijing, was hit by a severe drought. The superstition connected with these natural disasters, the accompanying economic depression, the growing resentment of missionaries, and the public anger over foreign imperialism culminated in the Boxer uprising in 1900.
The experience of the Boxer catastrophe convinced the Empress
Dowager to initiate institutional reforms. In 1901 she did, in fact, propose a far-reaching program of reforms that was very similar in content to the 1898 "100 Days of Reform." Her reform program, like Kang
Youwei's, also covered political, m ilitary, educational, and social reforms. Although the reform program lasted until 1905, only three of the reforms were carried out: (1) the abolition of the civil service exams, (2 ) the establishment of modern schools, and (3) the sendingof students abroad for study (Hsu 1990).
In 1905 Liang Qichao, whom Orville Schell calls "China's First
Democrat" (Schell 1988, 194), was the driving force behind a new movement to in stitu te major reforms that would establish constitu tionalism in China. Liang advocated gradual political change and opposed violent revolution. He was a strong supporter of nationalism and such concepts as liberty and equality as the inalienable rights of
3 See Appendix B. 85 people. He believed that despotism and autocracy were the root causes of China's weakness and corruption (Hsu 1983). With the introduction of some reforms by the Dowager in 1906, Liang showed support for the
I' .. arm movement in China.
After the return of the Dowager's study group in 1906, she began to in stitu te a reform program; like previous reform programs, i t ran into strong opposition. In 1906, she "issued an edict promising to prepare a constitution and reform the administrative structure of China by reshaping the existing ministries and adding new ones, by curbing the powers of the governors-general and by convening a national assembly" (Spence 1990, 246). Although the reforms were accepted by both Manchu and Chinese officials, they were strongly resisted and the power was usurped by members of the Confucian-educated e lite , who had long ago established their power base in the old bureaucratic structure.
In 1908, the court announced that a full constitutional government would be established within a nine-year period. The deaths of the Emperor
Guan Xu and the Empress Dowager in 1908 increased the urgency for reform because the Manchu regents, acting on the behalf of the new three-year-old Emperor Puyi, tried to manipulate the new system to protect the ruling dynasty. Spence suggests that "the Qing court had now effectively guaranteed that any actions it undertook in the future to strengthen its position would be met with sustained scrutiny from the very social strata that, in the past, has provided the dynasty with its most trusted supporters" (Spence 1990, 249).
Faced with the challenges of foreign domination and internal rebellion, China's intellectuals were going through a period of 86
transition from traditionalism to radicalism. One such scholar. Yen
Fu, who returned from study in England in 1879, embarked on series of
translations of works such as Huley's Evolution and Ethics, Mill's On
Liberty, Montesquieu's Defense of the Spirit of Laws, Smith's Wealth
of Nations, Spencer's A Study of Sociology, and Jevon's Logic. Yen
stated that the West's success was based on the fact that "the West
exalted action, assertiveness, struggle, and dynamism in order to
actualize the unlimited human potential" (Hsu 1983, 422). Yen said that
in China the opposite was true. Hsu stated Yen's position as follows:
The ways of the Sages discouraged the development of the people's capacities and inhibited the free flow of their vital energies. The traditional rulers since the Ch'in dynasty (221 B.C.- 206 B.C.) had all been "robbers," skimming off the cream of the populace and failing to elevate their intelligence. This was the basic trouble of China, Yen pointed out in a ten-thousand-word manual which he prepared for, but did not have time to submit to. Emperor Kuang-hsu (Guang Xu) during the short-lived 1898 reform. He bluntly announced that 70 percent of China's troubles were internal, only 30 percent external. What China needed was not a piecemeal improvement, but a radical change on its view of domestic peace, and order. The traditional rulers, he insisted, had always tried to keep the people weak and ignorant so as to facilitate their control of the country. They deprecated competition and innovation and admonished men to follow ancestral paths in order to achieve stab ility . They encouraged th rift and discouraged the development of resources. They honored antiquity and despised modernity. They deplored aggressiveness and promoted contentment, and they incul cated in the people a habit of meekness to forestall rebellion. All th is. Yen proclaimed, reversed the Western promotion of progress and improvement through competition, release of energies, and ele vation of human capacity and intelligence. (Hsu 1983, 423) Intellectuals like Yen were finding a growing audience for their views as discussion began to include previously unaffected groups such as the poor farmers, whose tax revolts were roughly suppressed by the Qing troops and police forces, and overseas students, women, merchants, and urban workers. 87 A considerable number.of Chinese intellectuals were drawn into the various European socialist and anarchist positions. Although a
Socialist Party was not founded in China (the Japanese Socialist Party was founded in 1906) until after 1911, such scholars as Jiang Kaughn, an ardent feminist, began the scientific study of socialism. The
Anarchist, which founded the anarchist New World Society in Paris in
1906, sought to abolish political authority and the military, abolish
all laws, abolish class distinctions, and abolish private property and capital. The anarchists advocated ways to advance toward revolution: written propaganda, mass associations, strikes, boycotts, mass uprisings, and assassinations. A Tokyo-based anarchist group focused on the plight of women and supported an anti-modernist, agrarian position (Spence 1990). These developments were a clear indication that to many intellectuals, revolution—not reform—was the answer to China's perceived weakness.
Although the constitutional reform movement would continue until 1911, the combination of perceived or real foreign domination and internal corruption had already convinced many Chinese to look to revo lution as the only hope for China. Indeed, the period from 1898 to 1911 was a time of intense revolutionary activity among Chinese intellectuals and students.
One major cause of the increased feelings of nationalism and revolutionary zeal was a reaction to increasing foreign dominance.
Foreign powers were cutting up China "like a watermelon" into spheres of influence. For example, the Russians were in Manchuria, the
Japanese in Korea and Manchuria, the Germans in Shandong Province, the 88
British in Henan and Hubei Provinces, and the French in southern China.
The United States, although hot claiming any Chinese property, insured that all countries could equally exploit China through the open door policy.* This policy, through the provision of Most Favored Nation, guaranteed that all nations would receive the same privileges and rights as any other nation. Therefore, whatever concessions one country received, either through war or negotiation, it was applied to all other countries and resulted in quickly increasing foreign influence.
According to Hsu, "the degree of foreign domination is seen in the fact that 84 percent of shipping, 34 percent of cotton-yarn spinning, and
100 percent of iron production were under foreign control in 1907, while
93 percent of the railways were foreign-dominated in 1911" (Hsu 1983,
436). Foreign domination was not only humiliating to the Chinese, but also caused China great economic losses as the foreign powers obtained their rights as concessions and therefore paid nothing and did not allow the Chinese government to collect taxes on the properties nor their income (Hsu 1983). Many Chinese viewed the Manchu government (itself a foreign government) as too weak and unable to deal with the growing crises. The increasing number of revolutionary organizations and publi cations, the Boxer uprising of 1900, the anti-American boycott of 1905, and the publication of The Revolutionary Army by Zou Rong in 1907 can
be seen as examples of the growing sense of nationalism and the desire to "stand up" to foreigners.
For details about American policy, see James C. Thomson, J r., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry, Sentimental Imperialists The American Experience in East Asia. New YoirRl Harper Colophon Books, Harper and Row Pub 11shers, 1981. 89 Many revolutionary organizations were formed during this time period (1898-1911). The names of some of these organizations are a further indication of the rising tide of nationalism and the desire to stand up to foreigners, for instance, the Resist Russia Society, the
China Arise Society, the Restoration Society, and the Patriotic Society.
In 1902, the Chinese Education Society and its a ffilia te , the Patriotism
Academy, were established in Shanghai and gave new life to the Shanghai revoluti onary movement.
Many overseas students, like their mainland counterparts, organized provincial associations which began to promote and publish revolutionary ideas. According to Gassater, between 1901 and 1905 there was a flood of publications issued from various student organizations, including The Overseas Student Translation, Hubei Student World, and
Twentieth-Century China. Staff members of the Patriotism Academy began writing articles in the newspaper Su-Bao which, according to Gassater, quickly became the most important vehicle of revolutionary propaganda in China.^ Between 1904 and 1905, more than one hundred revolutionary publications appeared in Shanghai alone (Gassater 1969).
One such publication. The Revolutionary Army, was a call to arms by its author Zou Rong. Zou believed that Chinese should learn from
Western examples that i t was possible to overthrow domestic tyranny and free a country from foreign domination. As Zou wrote, "I do not begrudge repeating over and over again that internally we are the slaves
For a detailed description and analysis of these organizations and their publications, see Michael Gassater, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism (Seattle: university of Washington Press, 1969). ' ' 90 of the Manchus and suffering from their tyranny, externally we are being harassed by the [foreign] Powers, and we are doubly enslaved" (Spence
1990, 236). He went on to urge his countrymen to rise up and take control of China. It was, however, a young doctor named Sun Yat-sen
(Sun Zhongshan) who seized this position and became the revolutionary hero of China.
Sun Yat-sen, according to Hsu, "envisioned a three-in-one revo lution propelled by all the people of China: a nationalistic revolution to overthrow the Manchu dynasty and the imperial institution, a demo cratic revolution to establish a republic and popular sovereignty, and a social revolution to equalize the land rights and to prevent the i l l s of capitalism" (Hsu 1983, 454). Like many other Chinese intellec tuals, Sun believed that the source of Western wealth and power was to be found not in its formidable warships and efficient guns (an attack on the self-strengthening movement, but in the maximum use of human talent, the fullest exploitation of the benefits of land and resources, and the unrestricted flow of coranodities. And, according to Schriffin,
Sun also believed that if China would adopt these views, i t could
"gallop swiftly" and "ride abreast of the West" (Schriffin 1969, 56).
Until 1894, he believed this could be accomplished working within the
Qing government; however, when his reform proposal to Li Hongchang, a top government official, was turned down, his thoughts and energies turned toward revolution and the overthrow of the Manchu regime.
Sun Yat-sen's efforts to build a revolutionary movement centered around overseas Chinese (hua qiao) communities, and manifested its e lf 91 in the founding of the Revive China Society (Xing Cheng Hui). In 1905,
Sun was able to gather together several revolutionary organizations under the name Revolutionary Alliance (Tongminhui), which became a very active organization. For example, between 1906 and 1908, thé Revo lutionary Alliance directed or instigated at least seven uprisings, all of which were, however, suppressed by the Qing troops (Spence 1990).
The membership in this organization did, however, continue to grow.
For example, by 1911 the number of active Revolutionary Alliance members had increased from approximately four hundred in 1905 to over ten thousand. Spence added:
Many of these were students who had been recruited in Japan by Sun or his affiliates, and had then returned to their home provinces to continue secret agitation against the state. Some had risen to be members of the new provincial assemblies and others were soldiers or officers in New Army units, where they actively canvassed for further support with revolutionary rhetoric and by offering material incentives. The mix of anger, frustration, dreams, and hard cash was an explosive one. (Spence 1990, 262)
However, when the outbreak of violence that led to the overthrow of the
Qing Dynasty began on October 9, 1911 in Wuhan, Sun Yat-sen was fund raising in the United States. It was, however, members of the Revolu tionary Alliance and recruits inside the Qing's New Army units that led the uprising. The uprising was ultimately successful in overthrowing the Manchus because of their success in gaining support of soldiers within the New Army units.
During this time period. Sun's biggest success was to gain the support of the Chinese intellectuals in Japan. Sun accomplished this by convincing them that the revolution would be swift and that it would forestall foreign intervention. As Schriffin (1969) points out, the 92 students and Intellectuals chose Sun as their leader not so much for his knowledge as for his assumed competency in action. That is, they did not accept all of his views (particularly land reform), but simply viewed him as one person who could provide the means for achieving their goals. With the acceptance of these intellectual Chinese in Japan and his previous successes in recruiting the overseas Chinese in America,
Europe, and other Asian countries. Sun was elected director (zong l i ) of the Chinese United League (the second organization that he helped found) in 1905. This organization and the Revolutionary Alliance were to be the main revolutionary force that led to the fall of the Qing
Dynasty. Sun was rebuffed, rejected, and criticized at different times throughout his career by family, friends, the Chinese literati, the Qing government leaders, foreign government leaders, intellectuals, reformers, and other revolutionaries; nevertheless, he endured to become the leader of the revolution and to later be admired by both the nation a lists and the communists. It was, however, the Army General, Yuan
Shikai, who took over as head of the government on February 12, 1912 to organize a provisional republican government.
Republicanism (1911-1916) to Warlordism (1916-1927)
The change to a republican form of government was neither smooth nor without trouble. Fighting among revolutionaries, regional army units, "bandits," and rebels continued throughout the Republican era
(1911-1916) and the time period known as the Warlord (warlords were regional army commanders) period (1916-1927). The viciousness of this period can be seen by an excerpt from Shen Conquio's 93 autobiography, describing an event in Hunan Province in 1911 when he was nine years old. Shen wrote:
The arcade was covered with heads, and more were hanging from the slats on the scaling ladders. These ladders were made of new bamboo—the rebels used newly cut bamboo from the mountain, and nailed slats horizontally across the ladder poles. I was amazed and did not understand why all these people had been killed; I didn't understand why all these people had had their heads cut off. Not long after I discovered strings of ears, a strange-looking sight which not many see in a lifetim e. My uncle asked me, "Little one, are you afraid?" I answered as best I could, "No, I'm not." I had heard many stories of battles and killings which always mentioned "heads piled up like mountains, blood flowing to become a river," and when I went to the opera, I heard songs about "thousands of troops and horses, both sides fighting to the death." I had seen a wooden human head on a red tray in the opera in which Qin Qieng, a legendary hero, wept over his friend's head, but I had never seen a real human head severed in battle. Now there were so many heads in such a big heap, and everyone of them dripping blood, freshly cut from human necks. I was not afraid, but I didn't understand why those people had let the soldiers behead them. I suspected there had been some mistake. (Shen Conquio, cited in Spence 1981, 125)
This incident was not an isolated case, as the "cycle of violence to which Shen and others grew accustomed, violence that had been prevalent enough in the nineteenth century but seemed to grow ever worse in the years after 1916" (Spence 1981, 141). Kang Youwei, using
Japanese figures which may have been exaggerated, assessed the death toll of the first two years of China's revolution at twenty million.
Liang Yi, an outstanding scholar and minor official, stated before his suicide in 1918 that the old Confucian values of loyalty, f ilia l piety, chastity, and righteousness, had been replaced by the new values of eating, drinking, amusement, and pleasure (Spence 1981).
The new republican government headed by Yuan Shikai continued to have problems, highlighted by a treaty that he signed (illegally) with Japan on May 25, 1916. The acceptance of Japan's so-called "21 94 Demands," which-included Japanese control of Shandong, Manchuria, Inner
Mongolia, the southeast coast of China, the Yangtze valley, joint operation of China's iron and steel industries, and control of China's several important domestic administrations, set off new waves of protest in China (Hsu 1983).
The protests took many forms. Many Chinese students in Japan returned home, merchants organized boycotts of Japanese goods, and among intellectuals developed what was later called the "New Culture
Movement."
The New Culture Movement and Nationalistic fervor
The New Culture Movement was led by Chen Duxiu, who proposed the following six principles: (1) to be independent and not servile,
(2) to be progressive and not conservative, (3) to be aggressive and not retrogressive, (4) to be cosmopolitan and not iso latio n ist, (5) to be utilitarian and not impractical, and (6) to be scientific and not visonary (Hsu 1983). When Cai Yuanpei was appointed Chancellor of the
National University of Beijing (Bei Da) in November 1916, Hu Shi was appointed Professor of Literature, Chen Duxiu was appointed Dean of the
School of Letters, Li Dazhao was appointed Librarian (with a young assistant, Mao Zedong); the New Culture Movement had taken root.
Hu Shi, who received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, was greatly influenced by John Dewey and Thomas Huxley. Hu strongly believed in agnosticism and pragmatism, in liberalism, individualism, science and democracy, and the evolutionary improvement of society. 95
Hu’s most important contribution, however, was to introduce plain language (bai hua) in writing instead of the old classical style, which he claimed was a dead language. He encouraged students to write with meaning, substance, and genuine feelings. New magazines such as
The New Youth, New Tide, and The Weekly C ritic, which attacked old literature, old ethics, old human relations, and Confucianism, and supported science, democracy, technology, agnosticism, pragmatism, liberalism, pariiamentarianism, and individualism, gained widespread acceptance (Hsu 1983). John Dewey, who visited China in 1919, said,
"There seems to be no country in the world where students are so unani mously and eagerly interested as in China in what is modern and new in thought, especially about social and economic matters, nor where the arguments which can be brought out in favor of the established order and the status quo have so little weight—indeed, are so unuttered"
(Dewey 1921, 584). And indeed, the catchwords of this generation and for generations to come were "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy."
Many intellectuals continued to look at Western nations as models for development, and gained inspiration from the examples of the
American and French Revolution and the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in
Russia. Many Chinese were also swept up in the belief that the long-awaited age of world democracy had arrived and supported Wilsonian idealism and the Fourteen Points.
China entered World War I on the side of the Allies and over
200,000 Chinese laborers went to Europe where they, among other things, helped dig trenches. The Chinese delegation went to the Versailles
Conference with the belief that it would be dedicated to the principles 96 of democracy, self-determination, and protection of the weak (Hsu 1983).
The delegates were seeking ah end to the unequal treaties and to reclaiming Shandong Province, which had been controlled by Germany and was now controlled by Japan. The peace settlement, however, did not address the "unequal treaties" and agreed to Japan's claim over Shandong
Province.
When news of the treaty reached China, the reaction was quick and unequivocal. Hsu stated:
On May 4, 1919, about 5,000 students in Peking [Beijing] held a huge demonstration against the verdict of the Versailles Peace Conference on Shandung (Shandong Province). It was at once an explosion of public anger, an outburst of nationalism, a deep disappointment in the West, and a violent indictment of the "traitorous" warlord government in Peking. So powerful and so far-reaching was the incident that it evoked an immediate national response and pressured the Chinese delegation at Versailles to reject the peace treaty. Nationalism, public opinion and mass demonstration had emerged as new forces in Chinese politics. Some historians today hail the May Fourth incident as the f ir s t genuine mass movement in Chinese history. (Hsu 1983, 501-2) The May Fourth Movement, which began as a demonstration in Beijing and later spread to other cities throughout China and incorporated the broader themes of the New Culture Movement, has become one of the most important movements in Chinese history.®
The May Fourth Movement
Near the end of April 1919, Chinese student organizations, upon learning about China's failure in the Paris Conference, agreed to hold
For a complete description of the May Fourth Movement, see Chow Tse-Tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1960) and Vera Schwarz, The Chinese Enlightenment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 97 mass demonstrations in Beijing May 7, National Humiliation Day, the fourth anniversary of Japan's ultimatum in the Twenty-One Demands (Chow
1960). The date was moved to May 4 so as to avoid another planned rally in Beijing. The demonstration was well-planned as John Dewey, who was
in China at the time, wrote:
I find, by the way, that I didn't do the students justice when I compared the first demonstration here to a college boys' roughhouse; the whole thing was planned carefully, it seems, and was even pulled off earlier than would have otherwise been the case, because one of the other political parties was going to demonstrate soon, and they were afraid that th eir movement (coming at the same time) would make i t look as if they were an action of the political faction, and they wanted to act independently as students. To think kids in our country from fourteen on, taking the lead in starting a big cleanup reform politics movement and shaming merchants and professional men into joining them. This is sure some country. (John Dewey 1920, 296-97). The demonstration did not remain peaceful.
On the afternoon of May 4, over 3,000 students from thirteen colleges and universities in Beijing met at Tiananmen (the Gate of
Heavenly Peace). A circular, "Manifesto of All the Students of Peking," which called for Chinese to stand up and oppose foreign domination and the action of Qingdao (capital of Shandong Province), pledged an oath stating that (1) China's territory may be conquered, but it cannot be given away, and (2) the Chinese people may be massacred, but they will not surrender. Following the meeting at Tiananmen, the students began an orderly march to Chongwenmen. The students carried banners written in Chinese, English, and French. Some examples of the slogans are as follows:
Return our Tsingtao LQingdao] We may beheaded, but Tsingtao must not be lost Aboli sh the Twenty-One Demands China has been sentenced to Death 98 Return to sign the Peace Treaty Boycott Japanese goods Protect our sovereignty China belongs to Chinese Self-determination International Justice (Chow I960,. 108-9)
and others aimed at the warlord government that helped negotiate the terms:
Down with the traitors Death punishment for the traito rs The people should determine the destiny of the traito rs
After marching past Chongwenmen, the students headed for the Diplomatic
Quarter but were turned away by the police. Chow describes the reaction of the Beijing citizens:
The people of Beijing were deeply impressed by the demon strators. Many spectators were so touched that they wept as they stood silently on the streets and carefully listened to the students shout their slogans. Many Western spectators greeted them with ovations and by taking off or waving their hats. The students paraded along the streets in order. Boy Scouts and students from elementary schools joined in and distributed leaflets. Even the police and secret agents, who were sent out by the government to patrol, did not find any signs of intended violence on the part of the students. (Chow 1960, 109) The students then headed to the home of Cao Rulin.
Cao Rulin was the director of the Chinese State Bank, and he was known to be pro-Japanese. More importantly, however, he had nego tiated the Twenty-One Demands in 1915 and was now urging Chinese r a tif i cation of the Treaty of Versailles. By the time the students reached his house, he had already slipped away; however, members of his family were beaten and his house set on fire. The police arrested thirty-two students. A British correspondent reported that the students:
. . . arrived at Cao Rulin's house in an orderly procession, quite worthy of the students of an enlightened nation. But the wrath of the demonstrators was raised by the repressive measures taken by 99
■ the police, whereupon they broke out into acts of unbridled violence. (North China Herald 10 May 1919, 397).
Some students and police were injured. Guo Qinkuang, a student, died three days later due to injuries from the .incident (Chow 1960). After the events, martial law was proclaimed in the area surrounding the
Diplomatic Quarter. The incident its e lf might have been forgotten had i t not been for the determination, leadership, and organization of the students and th eir ab ility to gain support from many groups within and outside China.
The students, with the help of their teachers, organized an immediate strike and further demonstrations. Demonstrations quickly spread throughout major c ities in China. In some areas, the demon strations were quickly suppressed. For example, in Wuhan, the pro-Japanese governor ordered his troops to break up all large assemblies; hundreds of students were beaten up by his troops and one student was shot. Public protests stopped in Wuhan after the governor's order that any student making further anti-Japanese speeches would be executed (Spence 1981). The demonstrations in other c itie s, however, continued to grow. As demonstrations continued in Beijing, arrests increased. When the Beijing jails were full, the authorities converted university buildings into jails. Students began to carry bedding and food in backpacks as they demonstrated in preparation for their ja il time
(Spence 1981). At the beginning, most demonstrators were male; this situation changed as time went on. In Tianjin, female students organized an 100 Association of Women Comrades» and in Beijing more than one thousand
female students protested in front of President Xu's home on June 4-5
(Spence 1981).
The student strike also spread to other cities and was joined
by shopkeepers, industrial workers, and employees in commercial estab
lishments all over China. According to Chow (1960), there were
sixty-six workers' strikes in 1919. A successful boycott of everything
Japanese also took effect. People stopped buying Japanese goods and
taking Japanese steamers, and dock workers refused to unload Japanese
goods (Hsu 1983). Student demonstrations also broke out in Japan, but
were suppressed by the authorities.
The students achieved great success. Cao Rulin was forced to
resign, and on June 28 there were no Chinese representatives present
at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The May Fourth Movement,
however, continued on into the 1920s under the broader title of the New
Culture Movement. The May Fourth Movement was used by both the
communists and the nationalists as examples of support for each of their
parties.
The May 30th Incident (May 30, 1925) and Its Aftermath
In February 1925, Chinese workers at a Japanese cotton weaving
mill in Shanghai went out on strike to protest low wages. A settlement
by the Chamber of Coirenerce was rejected by the Japanese owners. The workers went out on a second strike, and on May 15 sent eight represent
atives to negotiate with the Japanese management. The confrontation 101 led to a violent clash; one worker was killed and seven others were wounded (Hsu 1981). The British-dominated Municipal Council further angered the public by not only not arresting the Japanese who opened fire , but also by arresting several Chinese workers for disturbing the peace. The police further outraged many people by arresting a large number of college students and workers on May 22 while they were holding a public memorial service for the workers who were killed and making speeches attacking the Japanese owners. These actions led to a large demonstration on May 30.
Approximately three thousand students staged a demonstration to protest British and Japanese atrocities. During this demonstration on May 30, a British police lieutenant ordered his men to open fire; at least eleven students and workers were killed, twenty others wounded, and fifty or more students were arrested (Hsu 1981; Chow 1960).
The "May 30th Atrocious Incident" (wu san ts'an an) provoked nationwide protests. On June 1, 100,000 workers in Shanghai went on strike. Sympathy strikes and demonstrations in twenty-eight other
Chinese cities and in British Hong Kong were held to protest the British and Japanese actions. A boycott by students, workers, and merchants lasted for nearly sixteen months following the May 30th incident (Hsu
1981; Chow 1960). The government in Shanghai was, however, quick to respond.
As a result of these protests, over twenty foreign warships entered the Whangpoo River and marines from five nationalities landed.
At least eight more Chinese were killed and forty-four wounded after May 30 (Chow 1960). Violent clashes continued until December, 102 when the Municipal Council was paid a Ch$75,000 to the deceased and wounded and the British police inspector and his lieutenant were fired.
A rash of nationalistic agitation continued to break out in different parts of the country and clashes with foreigners occurred in many places (Hsu 1981).
Some historians, mostly communists such as Chen Duxiu, included the May 30th incident as a part of the May Fourth Movement. Whether the May 30th incident was or was not included as a part of the May
Fourth Movement, i t had some of the characteristics of the May Fourth
Movement. For example, i t was led by students and nationalists.
Anti-imperialistic in nature, it exerted far-reaching political influence on Chinese society and demonstrated the growing feelings of nationalism and the growing intolerance of imperialism in China.
While on the surface these protests may not seem to be a democ racy movement, some protestors did demand democratic political changes.
For example, demonstrations in Shanghai protested against "taxation without representation" because no Chinese were allowed on the nine- member Municipal Council. In 1926, the foreign voters conceded to having three Chinese on the Council; the offer was rejected until 1930, when they allowed five Chinese to be on the Council (Hsu 1981).
Furthermore, the May 30th incident can be seen in the overall demo cratic tradition of mass movements using the political tools of demon strations, strikes, and boycotts to effect political change. The pattern of public outrage, student demonstrations, arrests, beatings, killings, further strikes and demonstrations, and boycotts that was seen in the May 30th incident was repeated over and over again 103 on into the 1930s. Whether the demonstrations were aimed at the foreign im perialists such as the Japanese or B ritish, the Guomindang, the communists, the landlords, the peasants, a particular warlord, or capi talists, the pattern and the violence, as we will see from the following examples, continued and often became more grotesque.
On March 18, 1926, students in Beijing held a demonstration to protest Chinese officials who continued to give in to Japanese demands for more economic privilege in northeast China. As the students marched past Tianan Gate toward the government offices, troops opened fire and forty-seven students were killed. Lu Xun, China's most famous revolu tionary writer, writing perhaps for a whole generation of intellectuals who were feeling shock, sorrow, and hopelessness at the increasing violence that was becoming so common in China, immortalized the event in the following essay written for one of his students who, despite her extreme poverty, saved money to buy the journal in which he contributed most often. The essay is title d "More Roses without Blooms":
Liu Hezhen, one of the more than forty young people killed, was my pupil. So I used to call her, and so I thought of her. But now I hesitate to call her my pupil, for I should present to her my sorrow and my respect. She is no longer the pupil of one dragging on an ignoble existence like myself. She is a Chinese girl who has died for China. . . . On the morning of the eighteenth I knew there was a mass demon stration before Government House; and that afternoon I heard the fearful news that the guards had actually opened fire, that there had been several hundred casualties, and that Liu Hezhen was one of the dead. I was rather skeptical, though, of these reports. I am always ready to think the worst of my fellow countrymen, but I could neither conceive nor believe that we could stoop to such despicable barbarism. Besides, how could smiling, gentle Liu Hezhen have been slaughtered for no reason in front of Government House? . . . I did not see th is, but I hear that Liu Hezhen went forward gaily. Of course, it was only a petition, and no one with any conscience could imagine a trap. But then she was shot before Government House, shot from behind, and the bullet pierced her lung 104
- and heart. A mortal wound, but she did not die immediately. When Zhang Jingshu, who was with her, tried to lift her up, she, too, was pierced—by four shots, one from a pistol—and f e ll. And when Yang Dezhun, who was with them, tried to l i f t her up, she, too, was shot; the bullet entered her left shoulder and came out to the right of her heart, and she also fell. She was able to sit up, but a soldier clubbed her savagely over her head and her breast, and so she died. . . . Time flows eternally on: the streets are peaceful again, for a few lives count for nothing in China. At most, they give good- natured idlers something to talk about, or provide malicious idlers with material for "rumors." As for any deeper significance, I think there is very little; for this was only an unarmed demonstration. The history of mankind's battle forward through bloodshed is like the formation of coal, where a great deal of wood is needed to produce a small amount of coal. But demonstrations do not serve any purpose, especially unarmed ones. Since blood was shed, however, the affair will naturally make its e lf more fe lt. At least it will permeate the hearts of the kinsmen, teachers, friends, and lovers of the dead. And even if with the flight of time the bloodstains fade, the image of a gentle girl who was always smiling will live on forever amid the vague sorrow. The poet Dao Jian wrote: "My kinsmen may s till be grieving. While others have started singing. I am dead and gone—what more is there to say? My body is buried in the mountains." And this is quite enough. (Lu 1957, 267-72)
While this event may have increased Lu Xun's already negative views about his fellow countrymen, i t also increased his anger at the government officials who committed the massacre and were now shifting the blame to others, primarily the communists, although there were no communists or Guomindong members among the demonstrators. Lu Xun expressed his anger in the following statement:
China is being devoured by tigers and wolves, yet no one cares. The only ones who care are a few students, who should be devoting all their attention to study, but who are too disturbed by the situ ation to do so. If the authorities had any conscience at all, should they not have admitted their fau lts, and summoned up what remained of their sense of right? Yet they slaughtered them! . . . Lies written in ink can never disguise facts written in blood. Blood debts must be repaid in kind. The longer the delay, the greater the interest. 105
All this is empty talk. What relevance has anything written by the pen? Bullets shed the blood of young people, true. And this blood can neither be hidden by written lies, nor soothed by written dirges. (Lu 1947, 259-60).
Lies could not hide the violence, written words could not soothe the pain of the violence, and nothing, it seemed, could stop it. The violence continued as Chiang Kai-shek chose to end the 1st United Front with the communists in 1927 by attacking the communists in Shanghai.
As a part of the Northern Expedition, whereby Chiang was attempting to re-unite all of China under the Guomindong, Chiang attempted to take control of Shanghai, which was controlled by a local warlord.
Due to Chiang's lack of sufficient power to gain control of certain areas of China, he often made deals with various warlords and other important individuals. According to Spence (1990), i t is possible that Chiang was able to strike a deal with Zhang Zuolin, the Manchurian warlord who controlled Beijing and had mobilized 150,000 troops to stop the Guomindang's northern advance and the Japanese, who were anxious about the communist-backed labor unions and resulting strikes that were disrupting their businesses in Shanghai, to protect his flanks as he attacked Shanghai. By the time Chiang's forces entered Shanghai in late
March 1927, the city had already been hit by a number of strikes. For example, in February, strikers managed to bring Shanghai to a standstill for two days, closing docks, municipal services, cotton mills, public transport, and commercial centers (Spence 1990). The strike, led by communists in support of the advancing National Revolutionary Army 106 (Guomindong and communist forces), was broken by warlord forces who beheaded twenty strikers and arrested three hundred strike leaders.
Despite this setback, union leaders, who controlled nearly 499 unions, represented 821,287 workers, and had an armed workers' m ilitia of 2,700 men, planned further strikes (Spence 1990). Chiang, perhaps reacting to pressure from foreign and Chinese in d u strialists whom he needed for increased support to fund the Northern Expedition and to his fears and distrust of the conmiunists, supported an attack on the unions and the communists in April 1927.
At 4:00 A.M. on April 12, troops loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, working closely with paramilitary groups and local secret society organ izations, moved quickly to break up and disarm the workers' pickets and to take control of the local headquarters of the General Labor Union
(Spence 1981, 1990). Many union members were killed and hundreds arrested. When townspeople, workers, and students staged a demon stration the following day, they were fired upon by Guomindang troops and nearly one hundred were killed. Although no official count of the dead was given, contemporary estimates are that as many as five thousand people were killed in the violence (Spence 1981).
This was followed by Zhang Zuolin's raid on the Soviet embassy in Beijing on April 28 to arrest all the Chinese who had sought shelter there. After a short examination, twenty communists, including former
Beijing University librarian and co-founder of the Communist Party Li
Dazhao, were hanged (Hsu 1980; Spence 1981, 1990).
The violence also spread to the countryside, where the communists were exploiting rural grievances of the peasantry, whom they 107 were assisting in forming peasant associations to attack the landlords.
Once the communists were forced to withdraw, the landlords, with the assistance of local militarists, struck out to smash the power of the peasant associations. According to Spence (1981), more than ten thousand people were executed in the area around Changsha (Hebei
Province) and thousands more in Wuhan, Among those killed were demo cratically elected delegates to local assemblies, members of local peasant associations, and "young radical women who bore the badge of cropped hair as a sign of their recently won emancipation" (Spence 1981,
248). Lu Xun continued to be sickened not only by the violence but also by the masses of Chinese people who came to see the naked bodies of the beheaded female revolutionaries (Spence 1981).
Lu Xun was commenting on his belief that the Republican revo lution never really changed anything except the names of the autocrats controlling China, and the continuing lack of freedom of thought and of the press, when he stated, "John Stuart Mill declared that tyranny makes men cynical. He did not know that a republic makes them silent"
(Lu 1957, 2:237). The pattern of outrage, demonstrations, and violence, however, continued on into the 1930s.
December 9th Movement—December 9, 1935
Four years after the Japanese invaded Manchuria and one day before the Chinese General Sung (who controlled most of northern China) was to announce (under strong pressure from the Japanese General
Doihara) the separation of north China from the south and declare his independence from Chiang Kai-shek, and in the midst of the Chinese civil 108 war between the nationalists and the communists, students from Yenching
University (later the site of the Beijing University campus) sponta
neously staged street demonstrations in Beijing which touched off
nationwide protests. These student demonstrations were directed against
the official Guomindang government and its policies of appeasement to
the Japanese.
On December 9, 1935, Yenching University students gathered at
various gates and memorial arches throughout Beijing and at a designated
time marched through the streets for a rally at the Winter Palace, where
a high Guomindang official had offices. The police were caught off
guard by the presence of many Westerners and made only half-hearted
attempts to interfere. When the police attempted an arrest, they
quickly found themselves surrounded by students shouting patriotic
slogans. Then the fire department was called out and the demonstrators
were sprayed with the fire hoses. Despite the cold weather, the
students continued their march. At one point a group of political
gendarmes riding on motorcycles with sidecars, wearing black leather
jackets, and carrying machine guns, stopped in front of the demon
strators. However, with a large foreign press corps and cameramen on
hand, the guns that were pointing at the students were put away. Only
a few shots were fired in the air. Chinese shopkeepers, housewives,
artisans, monks, teachers, merchants, and rickshaw coolies applauded from the streets, and ran out to get political leaflets from the
students. Some shouted the forbidden slogans; "Down with the bogus independence movement! Down with the Japanese Imperialists! Save
China!" (Snow 1981:103-4). 109
On December 17, 1935, a second massive demonstration swept
Beijing and Tianjin. Thirty thousand marched in Beijing, while thousands were protesting in the Nationalist capital of Nanjing, Wuhan,
Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Canton (Spence 1990). This time students were joined by women, peasants, and some police (Snow 1981).
Even though over two hundred people were arrested and numerous people beaten with clubs, a week later a third demonstration was held, this time calling for an end to civil war and a "united front" to resist
Japan. The December 9th Movement had struck a national chord.
The movement began as a patriotic, anti-imperialistic, nation a listic movement. Students demanded that General Sung reject General
Doihara's demands, end civil war, unite all factions for resistance to save China, begin mass training and mobilization, and give people freedom to know the truth and prepare for i t (Snow 1981). The movement led to the end of China's nonresistance policy. Chiang Kai-shek, however, did not consent to the end of civil war and a second "united front" until after his capture by his own troops and communists in Xian, and his release on Christmas day 1936.
The government's attempts to suppress the demonstrations by police force failed in part because many people, especially the educated youths, had a total loss of confidence in the existing regime.
According to Snow, "The profound failure of the [Guomindang] to play any dynamic role of guidance or inspiration in this critical period made i t a symbol of pessimism, stagnation and repression, and in the years of decisions that lay ahead drove hundreds of the ablest and most no patriotic young men and women to the Red banners as China's last hope"
(Snow 1981, 105).
The leaders of the movement were not pro-communist nor were they pro-Guomindang; they were merely pro-China or nationalistic. Although not one of the student leaders was a communist, within a few years nearly all of them would have joined the communists in the patriotic war against Japan. For example, two siste rs, Kung Peng and KUng
Pusheng, went from student leaders to revolutionary leaders, and Wang
Jumei went from student leader to Foreign Minister and Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China (Snow 1981).
Perhaps Chiang's greatest failure was his inability to take the leading role in the anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist, and nationalistic movements. Mao Zedong's greatest achievement and, to a large extent, the reason for the communists' ultimate victory in 1949, was his ability to take the leading role in what he called "the Great Patriotic War" and the anti-im perialist, nationalistic movements. And on October 1,
1949 Mao, standing on the Tianan Gate, declared that thé Chinese had finally "stood up."
The communist victory in 1949, however, ended all grass-roots movements for democracy and freedom until the 1957 Hundred Flowers campaign. There were other movements between 1949 and 1957; however, they were initiated at the national level and not at the grassroots or local level. I T l The Hundred Flowers Campaignr-1957
After nearly eight years of Communist Party rule in China, Mao
Zedong, through a number of speeches in early 1957, launched what has 7 become known as the Hundred Flowers Campaign. In these speeches, Mao
argued for "letting a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools contend"
(Mao 1971, 462). Mao suggested that the party had made some mistakes,
primarily bureaucratic, and should not only not be afraid of people's
criticism , but should also welcome i t (MacFarquhér 1989).
On February 27, 1957, in a speech to the Supreme State Soviet
titled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,"
Mao explained his position on the issue of "letting a hundred flowers
blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" (Mao 1971, 432-79;
MacFarquher 1989, 131-90). Mao stated that the condition in China was much better than the condition in Hungary (deferring to the Hungarian
revolt in 1956) and the Soviet Union. Mao explained the Hungarian situ
ation this way: "Hungary for instance, Hungary basically did not elim
inate counterrevolutionaries. They killed Rajk; [they] actually killed
some revolutionaries but very few counterrevolutionaries. Thus emerged the Hungarian Incident" (MacFarquher 1989, 143).
To Mao, Hungarians revolted because, when the Communists came
to power they did not kill enough counterrevolutionaries. In China this was not a problem. According to Mao, in the years 1950-52 there were
For a complete text of these speeches, please see Roderick MacFarquher, The Secret.Speeches of Mao Zedong (Cambridge: The Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard university, 1989). (Note: the text of this speech was not published in China until after 1985; an o fficial, abridged version appeared in The People's Daily 19 June 1957.) 112 between 770,000 and 780,000 people killed (Mao 1971, 142). He does not give a number for the years 1952-56; however, he states that "Since last year, basically we have not killed people; only a small number of indi viduals have been killed" (MacFarquher 1989, 142). Luo Ruiging, one-time Minister of Public Security, was reported to have said in 1964 that four million people had been executed from 1948 through 1955
(MacFarquher, 1989). Western and Hong Kong reports of executions have ranged from two million to twenty million. While the precise figure of executions is not known, according to Mao, "The campaign against counterrevolutionaries basically eliminated the counterrevolutionaries; only a few remained, only a very, very few" (MacFarquher 1989, 143-44).
Mao said the situation in China was very stable, and that the recent strikes and demonstrations were both a good thing and a bad thing.
In this speech Mao explained the causes of the strikes and demonstrations and proposed a plan to deal with the problem. Mao stated that in 1956, based on partial sta tistic s, there were seven thousand students in twenty-eight cities involved in disturbances and fifty workers' strikes. Mao stated:
I say contradictions constantly occur within the ranks of people. Strikes, student strikes, peasants hitting out with their carrying poles, [these] happened last year, [and] they are likely to happen this year, too. They [also] took place several years ago, [so] they all can't be blamed on Hungary. . . . You see thousands of students on strike, a portion of the workforce on strike, demon strations: What [should we] do? . . . [I will] pose four points; see if they are right or not. Point one. Work hard to overcome bureaucratism, then people won't strike! Point two. If bureaucratism has not been overcome [and] they want to make a disturbance, what [should you] do? Permit the disturbance or not? I say it's better to permit disturbances. After all, workers want strikes; peasants want to make a din; 113 ' students want strikes; the peasants want to hit someone with their poles! Point three. When a disturbance occurs [and there's a confron tation], is it right to call it off in a hurry? . . . I say let them agitate to their heart's content. . . . If one week is insufficient, two weeks; i f two weeks are not enough, three weeks; if three weeks are not enough, four weeks. In sum, [when they've] satisfied themselves, [they] won't agitate any more. . . . [Point four.] Should the chiefs and leaders of a disturbance be expelled or not? I think they shouldn't be expelled. Aside from a few exceptions, if they kill someone then [they] should be put in jail at the Public Security Office. . . . Expelling leaders of strikes and student strikes is a bourgeois method; in general they shouldn't be expelled. . . . Expulsion is the method of the Nation alist party; we want to proceed in opposition to the Nationalist party's ways. . . . (MacFarquher 1989, 174-77)
Mao continued to support the policy of "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend" in a series of speeches throughout
China, leading him to refer to himself as a "wandering lobbyist"
(MacFarquher 1989, 321). Mao tried to calm opposition to this policy and fears that communism would become just one school of thought by stating that the party had made mistakes, but criticisms and competition among ideologies will only make the party better. As Mao stated:
The proletariat can only develop by means of struggle against bourgeois ideology; Marxism can only develop in the struggle against non-Marxism. This is why the policy of "Let a hundred flowers bloom, le t a hundred schools contend" is needed. The development of art in its various forms cannot be achieved without letting a hundred flowers bloom, nor can the various forms of art be compared with each other if there is no competition. Only by letting a hundred schools contend and compete with one another, only through criticism and discussion, can we develop what is correct. So we mustn't fear those things. Don't be afraid. (MacFarquher 1989, 294) However, intellectuals were afraid. Perhaps due to the previous rectification campaigns in 1942 in Yunnan which were directed at in te l lectuals, or the other mass campaigns during the previous five years whereby intellectuals were forced to undergo self-criticism sessions 114 and to confess their anti-proletarian sentiments, and campaigns against counterrevolutionaries, most intellectuals were reluctant to criticize abuses within the party (Pye 1989). Only after months of foot-dragging did the full weight of the press and other propaganda organs swing in favor of the campaign. In late April the rhetoric was of a full re c ti fication campaign against the CCP's own "bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism" (Spence 1990, 569-70). Convinced that permission to air their grievances was now official, and that they would be treated gently, intellectuals responded with enthusiasm (Spence 1990).
From May 1 through June 7, 1957, intellectuals and others openly criticized abuses of the Communist Party. They criticized Party control over in tellectuals, the harshness of previous mass campaigns, the low standard of living, the proscription of foreign literature, the economic corruption within the Party, the old feudal attitudes toward women that still persisted, and the current voting system for ratifying Party slates that they claimed was a farce (Spence 1990; Messner 1986).
Students at Beijing University created a "Democracy Wall" and placed
"big-character posters" on it that were critical of the CCP. Students began to expand the movement into ra llie s and demonstrations and outdoor meetings in an area of campus renamed the Democracy Plaza (Meisner 1986) and, like the May Fourth Movement, this example was spread to univer sities throughout China. One student, Lin Xiling, who acquired a national reputation, argued that China could not become a genuine socialist society until China became genuinely democratic. There were also calls for legal changes and constitutional rights such as freedom of speech, press, residence, and of the person of citizens. Examples 115
of violations of these freedoms were widely discussed. A former friend
of Lu Xun stated that there was more freedom in Chonqing [Chungking]
under Chiang Kai-shek than in present-day Beijing. Peasants also complained about being forced to join cooperatives and said that i t was time for their liberation.
The criticisms became very damaging to the CCP for they implied that the communists had betrayed their own revolution, or at least they
had failed to practice their own so cialist principles (Meisner 1986).
As a leader of a democratic party put it: In leading the masses to carry through the revolution in the past, the Party stood among the masses; after liberation it felt the position had changed and, instead of standing among the masses, i t stood on the back of the masses and ruled the masses . . . [leaders] should differ in duties, not in status. Some are deeply conscious of being officials; they occupy special positions even when taking meals and seeing operas. (MacFarquher 1960, 49)
Criticisms such as this implied that the communist officials and cadres were adopting the attitudes of previous feudal leaders and Guomindong o fficials. Fex Xiantong, a prominent sociologist whose studies of the conditions of peasant life in the 1930s was used by the CCP to support their "Peasant Revolution," published new studies on peasant life that
implied that the conditions in those same areas were no better now than they were in the 1930s. He pointed out numerous problems that s till
existed, such as irrational planning practices, disregard for local industries, failure to raise livestock suited to the local environment,
and total neglect of children's education (Spence 1990).
These criticisms that the Communist Party failed to institute
its socialist principles, that it was as oppressive and removed from the masses as all earlier government leaders, and that it was extracting 116 more from the peasants than the landlords ever did, along with calls for more freedom and democracy, were too much for many Party officials.
In early June, Mao, realizing that the hard-liners were going against
him, sided with them to put an end to the "Hundred Flowers" campaign.
A revised version of his earlier speech, "On the Correct Handling of
Contradictions among the People," which stated that intellectual freedoms were to be used only i f they contributed to the strengthening of socialism, was widely circulated.
In early July, a massive "anti-rightist" campaign began which called the participants of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign anti-Communist counterrevolutionaries. Within five months, over 300,000 intellectuals were branded "rightist," a label which not only ruined their careers but also the careers of their family members (Spence 1990; Messner
1986). Among the leaders of the an ti-rig h tist campaign were Deng
Xiaoping and Peng Zhen. Among the victims of the campaign were some of China's most brilliant intellectuals in all academic fields, such as the writer Ding Ling, the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, the journalist
Liu Binyan, the leaders of democratic parties such as Li Lengchi and
Chang Pozhu, and the editors of newspapers such as Zhu Anping.
For many the label "rightist" meant a long period of psycho logical torture which would end in a self-confession and included a public denouncement, sometimes by family members and always by oneself.
Some student leaders were sent to the countryside for reform through labor, but most were allowed to continue with their education under
Party supervision. Three middle school students in Wuhan were, however, accused of leading a rio t and were publicly executed at the beginning 117 of the school year in front of ten thousand observers, many of them fellow students (Messner 1986; Spence 1990).
The harshest treatment was given to writers and artists, who were often expelled from the Party, forced to suffer severe public criticism, and often sent to the countryside for labor reform.
The "Hundred Flowers" campaign that was launched by Mao lasted only five weeks. The anti-rightist campaign that ended it lasted for over two years. During this time, certain officials within the Party were also singled out for intense criticism and punishment. For example, Wang Han, a Deputy Minister Of Control (State Economic Planning and Control) and twenty-five-year Party member, was subjected to sixteen mass meetings where he was publicly criticized, and thousands of wall posters containing criticisms of him were put up. He was forced to confess his crimes against the Party and the people, to declare himself a rightist, and then fined. This tactic, called "killing the chicken to intimidate the monkey" (sha ji gei hou kan) by Chinese, was used as a warning to others who had thoughts of criticizing the party (Rice
1974).
The a n ti-rig h tist campaign effectively ended any hope that the
Communist Party's transition to socialism in China would include some form of popular democracy and include some real measure of intellectual freedom (Messner 1986). To the intellectuals who only reluctantly joined the campaign after many assurances that their criticisms were approved and welcomed by Mao and other Party leaders, the an ti-rig h tist campaign was extremely painful. Many intellectuals now felt that the whole campaign was a trap laid by the communist leadership to allow 1T8 dissenters to expose themselves so that they could easily be wiped out.
The fragrant flowers that sprouted during the five weeks of the Hundred
Flowers campaign and that had now, according to Party leaders, become stinking poisonous weeds, had learned their lesson well and would be very reluctant to sprout again for a very long time. The calls by the leadership for open criticism of the Party were now replaced by calls for increased ideological education and policies that would climax during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution decade of 1966-1976, a time period that we will not deal with in this chapter.
The Tiananmen Incident—1976
Perhaps as a signal that things were not stable in China, even after eight years of the Cultural Revolution, three people using the pseudonym Li-Yi-Zhe wrote a manifesto which was posted in Guangzhou
(Canton) on November 7, 1974. The poster accused the Communist Party of becoming a party of elites with special privileges and access to scarce goods and resources while the people are forced to work long hours with low pay and expected to perform grotesque loyalty dances to the leaders. The poster also stated that during the Cultural Revolution forty thousand people had been killed in Guangdong Province alone and hundreds of thousands more were herded into "scum-hole types of cow O pens." The question was posed, "How could one distinguish such actions from those of foreign imperialists, warlords, or the Guomindang on
O A widely accepted figure of 400,000 total deaths for all of China during the Cultural Revolution is consistent with this figure. See, for example, Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 19851. 119 those once famous dates. May 30, 1925, March 18, 1926, or April 12,
1927?" (Spence 1981, 401). Li-Yi-Zhe's poster went on to call on the
Fourth National People's Congress to restore some levels of socialist
democracy. The current policies of the Cultural Revolution had become
the focal point of a political struggle that publicly surfaced in the
Tiananmen Incident of 1976.
In late 1975, with Mao and Zhou in failing health, there
developed an intense power struggle at the top levels of party power.
Jiang Qing (Mao's wife), Zhang Chungiao, Yao Wenyan, and Wang Honzwen,
later known as "the Gang of Four," represented the radical left forces;
Deng Xiaoping, who was labeled a "capitalist roader" and a counterrevo
lutionary during the Cultural Revolution and dismissed from all of his
posts in the party, was brought back and rehabilitated by Zhou Enlai
as Vice-Premier and as Chief of Staff of the PLA, represented the
conservative right forces.
The radicals launched an immediate attack on Deng Xiaoping and
his policies that hard work and not ideology was what was important.
Wall posters were put up calling Deng a "Capitalist Roader" and
accusing him of reinstituting bourgeois rights. And when Zhou Enlai,
Deng's strongest supporter, passed away on January 8, 1976, the attacks
against him intensified. Deng was accused by the radicals of being
"China's new Khrushchev," a capitulationist for advocating trading
China's natural resources for foreign technology, and by Jiang Qing as
"an international cap italist agent" (Messer 1986, 424; Spence 1981,
1990; Wang 1985). 120
The new acting premier to replace Zhou was, however, neither
Deng Xiaoping nor a member of the Gang of Four; i t was a relative unknown named Hua Guofeng. The criticism of Deng, however, continued and climaxed at Tiananmen Square in April 1976.
On April 4, 1976, one day before Qing Ming, the annual holiday to honor the dead in China, thousands of people went to Tiananmen Square to lay wreaths at the Monument of People's Heroes in honor of
Zhou Enlai. That evening, presumably, government workers removed all the wreaths. Crowds the next day that reached more than 100,000 were angered by the removal of the wreaths. Spontaneous demonstration turned into disorder as the crowd became even more outraged. There was some violence and damage to public property. Violence, however, was minimal, in part because many members of the police and security forces sympa thized with the demonstrators. Most protestors had left the square by nightfall; however, several thousand remained. They were seen raising their right hands in the communist salute and singing the "Inter nationale." These protestors were attacked by the Urban Militia (a military force organized by Jiang Qing) and some people were injured, many arrested, and several hundred put in ja il (Wang 1985; Messer 1986).
The demonstration was labeled a counterrevolutionary incident and blamed on Deng Xiaoping who, on April 7, was for the second time removed from all his Party and government posts. A mass campaign to c riticize Deng Xiaoping was launched (it, however, received very little mass participation), which was accompanied by a new wave of secret police repression, whereby tens of thousands of people were arrested as alleged counterrevolutionaries (Messner 1986). 121 The April 5th Movement, as this demonstration was to be called, became, as Messner put i t , "a powerful political symbol over the years to come—symbolic of the sp irit of popular resistance to a despotic state" (Messner 1986, 425). it was also seen as public support for the moderate policies of Zhou Enlai and the economic policies of Deng
Xiaoping and an attack on the le ftis t policies of the Gang of Four.
This demonstration was effectively crushed, but the sentiments expressed by the protestors would be aired again in a few years in what became known as the Democracy Wall Movement.
The Democracy Wall Movement, November 1978—becember 1979 ■ - ' ' ' ■ ■ " ■ J Ml ■ II» In March 1978, a series of wall posters attacking Beijing Mayor
Wu De was posted on a brick wall which was located less than one mile west of Tiananmen Square on Changan Avenue (Avenue of Eternal Peace) near the Xidan intersection. Wu De was the person who publicly read the order to arrest the demonstrators during the Tiananmen incident on
April 5, 1976. This attack on Wu De, which may have had official sanction, seemed to be a signal of the events to come. Between November
1978 and December 1979 this wall, which came to be known as Democracy Wall, became the focal point of yet another grass-roots political movement in China.
The Democracy Wall Movement grew out of the discontent and hostilities over the radical policies of the Cultural Revolution and the anger over the Tiananmen incident in 1976, and gained its momentum from factional infighting among the radicals, the conservatives, and 122 the reformists within the party. Deng Xiaoping, rehabilitated for a third time and restored to all of his posts in July 1977, was the leader of the reformers. Deng was locked into a power struggle with Hua
Guofeng, who became China's top leader in 1976 after the death of Mao
Zedong. Hua had risen to power during the Cultural Revolution and was, therefore, linked to the radical policies of Mao. Hua was also the
leader of the government during the 1976 Tienanmen incident. Deng was
able to use both of these situations against Hua in Deng's own quest for power (Pye 1984; Wang 1986).
Deng Xiaoping was able to use the Third Plenum of the Eleventh
Committee in November 1978 to help the reformers gain power. At the
Third Plenum, Deng Xiaoping backed the revised constitution that guaranteed freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, demonstration, and the freedom to strike and granted the "Great Four Freedoms" of
"speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big-character posters." Deng, perhaps as Pye stated,
"encouraged public criticism , which he assumed would be directed against the more ideological supporters of his opponent, Hua Guofeng" (Pye 1984,
28) and, therefore, benefit him and the reformers. The public criticism that was allowed through the granting of the "Great Four Freedoms"
allowed the Democracy Movement to develop.
The Third Plenum, as many wall posters were already suggesting, rehabilitated party veterans Peng Dehuai, Bo Yibo, and Yang Shangkun,
and stated that Mao, a Marxist revolutionary leader, could not be free of shortcomings and mistakes, and reversed the official position on the
1976 Tiananmen incident (Wang 1985; Pye 1984). 123 The announcement on November 15, 1978 th at the Tiananmen incident was a "revolutionary event," and the reversal of convictions
and subsequent release of 388 persons arrested and charged as counter
revolutionaries, was the spark that ignited the Democracy Wall Movement
(Nathan 1985; Wang 1985).
In 1978 there were other signs that the reformers were gaining
ground. Deng supporter and new head of the party Organization
Department, Hu Yaobang, launched a massive rehabilitation campaign to
review and correct the cases of those who had been prosecuted,
convicted, labeled, or othérwise penalized since the beginning of the
communist regime. Hu told a group of Yugoslav journalists that the
total number of people affected in their campaign was over 100 million,
or roughly 10 percent of China's population. This number included more than 500,000 persons labeled "rightist" in 1957 and over 3 million
persons wrongly convicted (mostly as counterrevolutionaries) or labeled
during the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, there were many tele
vision shows and written stories (referred to as "literature of the wounded") depicting the horrors and tragedies that occurred during the
Cultural Revolution. And on October 11, 1978, Wu De, the hated Beijing
major, was dismissed.
At the beginning of the movement, there were signs that Deng
and the reformist faction were getting some public support. Some people
expressed the belief that the reformists would not only benefit them
personally by reviewing their cases, but also benefit the entire
nation. For example, one victim of the Cultural Revolution wrote: 124 ' Putting heaven and earth in order, opening the doors, establishing order, discipline, and great democracy. Vice Premier Deng is open minded. . . . [under him] the nation will be rich and strong, and the economy will be pushed ahead. (Nathan 1985, 9)
As Deng's group was gaining power and the reformist policies were being instituted, many people felt that the time was ripe to air their grievances. Democracy Wall became the place to air their grievances.
Following the reversal of the Tienanmen verdict on November 15, the movement began to rapidly gain momentum. On the f ir s t weekend after the verdict was read, hundreds of students, workers, junior officials, and others gathered at the wall to post, read, copy, and discuss the growing number of political posters. On the following Saturday, the discussions became more organized and, according to one participant, the discussions had three purposes:
(1) To put into practice the freedom of assembly and expression which was now guaranteed in the constitution. (2) To demand socialist mass democracy. (3) To eliminate superstition and emancipate people's thinking, so as to eliminate obstacles to the realization of the Four Moderni zations and thus play the role of pioneers in science and democracy. (Nathan 1985, 10-11)
The crowds as well as the number of meetings, often called "Democracy
Forums," continued to grow. On November 27, the crowd grew too large for the area around the wall and about ten thousand people marched to
Tiananmen Square. Some of the marchers shouted slogans demanding democracy and freedom.
In other cities such as Hangzhou, Xian, and Shanghai, as well as in Beijing, the Democracy Movement was becoming mixed with the activities of petitioners seeking redress for wrongs committed during the Cultural Revolution. Many people had been arbitrarily demoted. 125 transferred, fired, jailed, and, under the new government program, were to be p o litically rehabilitated or reemployed, and given back their former homes. Others included youths who had been "sent down" to the countryside for years of physical labor and were demanding jobs. In early February, demonstrations in Shanghai by sent down youths ended with a sit-in on the tracks of the railway station. In Beijing, the petitioners posted their individual stories on Democracy Wall or told them to passers-by (Nathan 1985). On December 17, twenty-eight people, claiming to represent fifty thousand youths who had been "sent down" to do farm work in Yunnan Province and had, since December 9, been holding a general strike to protest human rights abuses by local CCP officials, demonstrated in Tiananmen Square to protest living and working conditions in rural southwest China. On January 8, 1979, several thousand people who had been "sent down" to the countryside demonstrated and carried banners that read "We don't want hunger" and
"We want human rights and democracy" (Spence 1990, 664). In late
January, approximately th irty thousand more "sent down" workers and their children went to Beijing to petition the government and were forced to camp out at the railway station in sub-zero weather. Of this group, at least eight people died from exposure to the cold (Spence
1990). Meanwhile, at Democracy Wall, the posters continued as demands and ideas began to get bolder and more radical.
A study of the wall posters during the Democracy Wall Movement, according to Wang (1985), reveals three main themes: (1) the condemna tion of political persecution authorized by Mao, (2) petitions for the redress of personal grievances inflicted upon those who were persecuted 126 during the Cultural Revolution, and (3) the advocacy of democracy, ju stice, and human rights. Democracy Wall was not only a place for displaying wall posters, it was also a place for the posting and distri bution of an ever-increasing number of periodicals called "people’s publications," as opposed to government-controlled publications.
In Beijing there were at least fifty-five different periodicals published; however, the democracy movement also spread to other cities in China. According to Nathan, "Besides those in Shanghai and Canton
[Guangzhou], there were Democracy Walls or people's periodicals in at least twenty-six other cities, and at least 117 titles were published outside of Beijing" (Nathan 1985, 24). This number does not reflect the many campus periodicals not on the democracy walls or other periodicals that sprang up in towns and cities throughout China that were never reported to the outside world.
Among the many publications that appeared, April 5th Forum,
Enlightenment, Peking Spring, Today, This Generation, Science, Democ racy, and Law, and People's Voice became the most famous. While most of the publications were supportive of Marxism, socialism, and Deng's reformist group, many articles began to appear which questioned the present and past policies and practices of the Communist Party, the benefits of socialism, and reported on present and past abuses within the Party. Most if not all publications, however, expressed the goals of democracy and science, political reform, economic modernization, and made every attempt to stay within the law by attempting to register with the authorities, publishing the names and the addresses of the publishers and attempting to pay taxes on any profits (Nathan 1985, 16). 127
April 5th Forum even sent copies to Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, Beijing
Mayor Lin Hujio, and several libraries. The boldest of the people's publications was Wei Jingsheng's Explorations.
Wei Jingsheng attempted to stay within the law by trying to register and pay taxes, and citing the constitutional rights of freedom of the press to publish; however, he did not profess his loyalty to
Deng, the reformers, the party, or any faction. In the first issue in
January 1979 Wei stated, "We do not recognize the absolute correctness of any theory or any person" (Nathan 1985, 22). Wei Jingsheng is, however, remembered for his wall poster that he posted on Democracy Wall on December 5, 1978 title d "The Fifth Modernization." Wei coined the term "The Fifth Modernization" to argue that Deng's Four Modernizations were insufficient and that without a fifth modernization based on democ racy and human rights, the others cannot be achieved.
Although the democracy advocates viewed themselves as patriotic,
Deng Xiaoping viewed them differently. And in March 1979 Deng began the crackdown on the Democracy Wall Movement. The crackdown began with a subtle statement by Deng that wall posters that upheld the Four
Cardinal Principles could still be posted. Later, on March 30, 1979, in a speech at a forum on the principles for the Party's theoretical work, Deng outlined his opposition to the Democracy Wall Movement and his justification for requiring adherence to the Four Cardinal
Principles, and he stated that the four principles are:
(1) We must keep to the socialist road. (2) We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat. (3) We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party. (4) We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. (Deng 1984, 172) m Deng stated that without adhering to these principles, China would be g unable to realize the four modernizations. Deng, now firmly in power, had no further use for the democracy advocates and now viewed their activities as detrimental to his economic policies.
Fu Yuehua, a young woman, was the f ir s t victim of the crackdown.
She was arrested and accused of having instigated and organized the demonstrations of "sent down" youths in Beijing. She was given a two-year jail sentence.
Other arrests followed, including Wei Jingsheng and th irty other dissidents on March 29, 1979.
Wei Jingsheng was charged with several crimes, including passing state secrets to foreign newsmen about China's invasion of Vietnam on
March 5, 1979. At his tr ia l, Wei denied that he had access to any military secrets (he was employed as an electrician at the time) and explained that he was not a counterrevolutionary.^® The government prosecutor summed up the case against Wei thusly:
Our Constitution clearly stipulates extensive democratic rights. However, our democracy should be a democracy protected by law. . . . Freedom of speech of the individual citizen must be based on the four [cardinal] principles. . . . The citizen has only the freedom to support these principles and not the freedom to oppose them. . . . The defendant Wei Jingsheng hid his criminal aim of overthrowing the dictatorship of the proletariat and changing the socialist system under the guise of democracy. If such individualistic freedom of the minority is allowed to run rampant, the freedom of
g For the complete text of Deng's speech, see Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Fress, 1989).
complete transcript of the tria l is given in James D. Seymour, ed.. The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978-1979 (StanfordviI le, Ny : Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980). 129 the majority will be lost.. The people will sink into misery and the nation will be damned. (Seymour 1980, 45-46)
Wei defended his right to speak and publish based on Article 45 of the
1978 constitution. Wei stated his position in this manner:
I must point out that freedom of speech is not a wild allegation but is stipulated in black and white in the Constitution. It is a right which every citizen should enjoy. The tone in which the prosecutor talks about that right shows not only that he is prejudiced in his thinking but that he has forgotten his responsi bility to protect the democratic rights of citizens. . . . (Seymour 1980, 51-52) Wei Jingsheng was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for counterrevolutionary crimes and leaking state secrets. On December 6,
1979 the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee issued a notice banning posters on "Xidan [Democracy] Wall." This decree, along with the arrests of many writers and the closing down of their journals, ended the Democracy Wall Movement. It did not, however, mark the end of the crackdown on the democracy movement.
The campaigns under Deng Xiaoping to s tifle dissent in China took on the names of "Anti-Spiritual Pollution" and "Anti-Bourgeois
Liberalization" over the next decade, but regardless of the name, the goal was always the same: do not allow any opposition to the Four
Cardinal Principles and deal harshly with anyone who does violate these principles. In June 1979, the Four Basic (also referred to as Cardinal)
Principles were added to the constitution. In 1980, Deng stated:
One must not take such things lightly, thinking that they won't cause disturbances. Even a handful of persons could undermine one great undertaking. . . . We have recently taken measures to crack down on them, with preliminary results. . . . In this struggle against crime all Party members and cadres, and the higher cadres in particular, must take a firm, clear-cut stand. It is absolutely impermissible to propagate freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of association in ways implying that 130 counterrevolutionaries may also enjoy them, and it is absolutely impermissible to make contacts with counterrevolutionaries and other criminal elements unbeknownst to the Party organization. {Deng 1984, 237-38)
It was, however, difficult to ascertain who was a counterrevo
lutionary. The Democracy Wall activists claimed to be p atriotic. The
government was not very helpful in this regard either, as it was in the
process of rehabilitating millions of people falsely accused of being
counterrevolutionaries. Even the demonstrators during the Tiananmen
Incident who were at the time called "hooligans" and "rioters who
wantonly smashed and burned public property," were just two years later
called "revolutionaries." Deng Xiaoping himself was called a counter
revolutionary during the Cultural Revolution. A counterrevolutionary
is apparently whatever the people in power deem it to be, a position
which defies any definition. Regardless of any definitional problems,
Deng was intent on quelling any disturbances and stifling any dissent.
In June 1979, the Four Cardinal Principles were added to the consti tution and in 1980, Deng had the "Great Four Freedoms" removed from the constitution.
The purges that began in 1979 that ended the Democracy Wall
Movement continued under various names into the 1980s. A list of the
purges is shown in Table 4.
With all the purges and campaigns against ideological impu
ritie s , dissent s till remained. People s till questioned government
policies, including adherence to the Four Basic Principles, as evidenced
by the following article by Hah Gong, the Hong Kong columnist whose 131
TABLE 4
MAJOR PURGES, 1979-1987
Date Events
1979 Arrest of many Democracy Wall activists
1980 Hu Yaobang in itiates a campaign against freedom of expression in literature.
1981 A nationwide campaign to arrest and jail democratic activists is launched and Deng stresses the need for more ideological work to s tric t adherence to the Four Cardinal Principles. Deng warns: "Some people are raising a banner in support of Comrade Hua Guofeng, while actually trying to overthrow you know who. Watch out!" (Deng 1984, 370)
1983 Anti-Spiritual Pollution campaign is launched—the largest political campaign since the Cultural Revolution. This purge was not only against ideological waywardness but also against innovative and popular literature, cinema, pop music, long hair, and Western-style dress. This mini-Cultural Revolution, as it was dubbed, ended in early 1984.
1985 Campaign against Bourgeois Liberalization is launched. Hu Yaubang reminds editors and writers that all news publications must serve the interests of the Party, and that journalists are the mouthpiece of the Party.
1986 Second Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization campaign is launched. Deng calls for the dismissal of Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang, and Liu Binyan from the CCP.
1987 Deng orders a nationwide campaign against Bourgeois Liberali zation. CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang is dismissed from office. (Barmé & Minford 1989) journal, Emancipation Monthly, was a forum for dissident writings. Hah wrote:
What then are the Four Basic Principles? The very idea is ludicrous, they are like manacles and irons on the arms and legs of every Chinese. What is "the socialist road"? Although Comrade Marx couldn't define it we're expected to believe that these comrades who've locked themselves away in Zhongnanhai divorced from the people—men 132
who spend their time quadrupling per capita income by the turn of the century—know what it is all about. What is "the people's democratic dictatorship" (also known as "the dictatorship of the proletariat")? It's all about a country having been turned into a police state by the PLA, the Ministry of Public Security, the militia and a network of spies. What is "the leadership of the Communist Party"? It's all about a pack of Party cadres, illiterates or semi-illiterates, people decried for having "no better than a primary school education," leading the people like a blind man on a blind horse racing towards an abyss. What is "adhering to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought"? It's the situation you're faced with when the nation has been impoverished in the name of a pack of blue-eyed red-bearded foreign devils like Marx, Engels, Lenin and S tailin —men whose portraits have been put up in Tiananmen Square as though they were the ancestors of the Chinese people. (Barmé & Minford 1989, 344)
While articles like this could not be published in China, they give a glimpse of the deep-seated disagreements with government policies that were shared by many people. Dissatisfaction was also expressed in demonstrations in Changsha and other cities in 1980 related to running independent (persons other than those chosen by the CCP) candidates for local National People's Congresses. At Hunan Teachers College in
Changsha, the students' protests over the election procedures included demonstrations, a hunger strike, and appeals to the national government to intervene. Protests over election procedures also broke out in several other areas as independent candidates attempted to exercise their constitutional, right to run for election. This right was removed from the constitution in 1 9 8 2 .One can also see the dissatisfaction in the writings of Xu Wenli, an active participant in the Democracy Wall
Movement. In February 1980, Xu wrote:
For an in-depth analysis of these elections, see Anderew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), pp. i93-'zn: 133
Some people say that the main thing now is to work to modernize China, and that there will be time to discuss civil rights after that. For the time being we should not bother with the affairs of state. But in that case, how are the people to express their power? Is the aim to turn the Chinese into conveyor-belt workers, like in Chaplin's Modern Times? What then is the point of human in tel ligence . . . It is Impossible to modernize the country unless you let the intelligence of a thousand million individuals unfold. (Barmé & Minford 1989, 304-5)
Xu Wenli went on to point out that since the open policy was instituted, many intellectuals went abroad and many have never returned. He viewed this phenomenon as a clear signal that China's current policies were not effective. He appealed to the government leaders to change their policies to allow more openness and input by ordinary people. Like many people at the time, he once saw Deng Xiaoping as the hope for in sti tuting these policies; however, as time went on it became very clear that Deng was not open to these suggestions. Xu called for all polit ical prisoners like Wei Jingsheng, Ren Wanding, and Liu Qing to be set free and, as he stated, "The freedoms to speak, assemble, associate, publish, march, demonstrate and strike, which citizens have on paper, should be guaranteed in practice" (Barmé & Minford 1989, 305). Xu's ideas were not welcomed by the Chinese leaders. On April 10, 1981 Xu was arrested for organizing a counterrevolutionary group and for counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation. Xu, like Wei Jingsheng, was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. By 1981, more than fifty activists, including the editors of unofficial journals such as Liu
Qing, were arrested (Far Eastern Economic Review [15 December
1988]:38-39). Voices of dissent continued, and in December 1986, they erupted briefly in pro-democracy demonstrations in several Chinese c itie s. 134 Student. Demonstrati onsrr1986
In December 1986, student demonstrations once again erupted in
China. Students in at least fifteen major cities took to the streets demanding their constitutionally guaranteed rights. The students’ message was clear: they wanted what the constitution guaranteed and what the leaders said they had, but what they insisted they didn't have
—the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and real political p artici pation. That is , they wanted "genuine democracy." While student demon strations were not new to China, eight years of Deng Xiaoping's economic and open policies produced many new things, and many changes in China.
In some ways these changes helped set the stage for this new round of demonstrations.
Regardless of previous campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalism , or the often-heard desire to only import science and technology and warnings not to import foreign ideas nor approve of wholesale Westernization, in China in 1986 there were ample signs of both wholesale Westernization and foreign ideas. Just a walk down any street in a major city would awaken anyone to this phenomenon.
The brightness of the clothes, especially children's clothes, was perhaps the f i r s t sign a casual observer might notice, but there were 12 others. Deng proclaimed, "To get rich is glorious," but for so many
Chinese this was only a dream; however, i t seemed that everyone wanted to look and act rich and that usually required something foreign.
12 For an in-depth and entertaining look at China in the mid-1980s, see Orville Schell, Discos and.Democracy: .China-in.the Throes of Reform (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 198S). 135 Western (foreign) fashion was very popular. Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang was fond of Brooks Brothers, but for most Chinese this only meant that dresses, skirts, sun hats, nylons, sunglasses, makeup, designer jeans, turtlenecks, and joggers' shoes became popular for women and
Western-style suits became popular for men. In winter, brightly colored parkas and colorful knitted scarfs replaced the old khaki-colored or blue heavy overcoats.
China also had an abundance of foreign consumer goods, not only
Western fashions but also electrical appliances, cigarettes, color tele visions, radios, children's toys, cosmetics, Coca-Cola, and Kentucky
Fried Chicken. For entertainment there were discos and concerts. The English rock group "Wham" and the American duo "Jan and Dean" both gave performances in China in 1986. China also had its own rock group led by the talented Sui Jian. There were also fashion shows, body-building contests, video game parlors, roller rinks, bowling alleys, coffee houses. Western movies, books, and television shows (including
"Dallas"). Even advertisements were using Western models or foreign languages to help sell their products. Some Chinese women were also choosing cosmetic surgery to make their eyes larger. The message was clear: if it is foreign or if it looks foreign—it is good, or at least better than Chinese. To appear rich, one needed only to wear Western clothes, perhaps ride to a Western movie in a taxi (a foreign—usually
Japanese—car), and if you were a male, smoke foreign cigarettes. But there were also other changes.
Private businesses were booming—everything from open markets where farmers could sell their goods to clothing stores selling foreign 136 products. China also began experiments with a stock market and
bankruptcy laws. It may have been glorious to get rich, but the
government wasn't going to guarantee i t .
In politics, there were also changes. Deng Xiaoping stated:
Whenever we move a step forward in economic reform, we are keenly aware of the need to change the political structure. If we fail to do that, it will stunt the growth of the productive forces and impede our drive for modernization. (Deng 1987, 149)
In the economic sphere this meant a shift away from central
planning to give enterprise managers more decision-making powers
(Ma 1983). Party Secretary Hu Yaobang launched a new policy stressing
three points: (1) kuanrong (tolerance), (2) kuansong (relaxing
control), and kuanhou (benevolence). This policy initiated the
government position of tolerance for unorthodox views. In the political
sphere, one change was to establish a system of elections based on
eastern European systems (Nathan 1985). On the county level, this meant
that there were to be electoral precincts established in factories,
schools, and offices. People were free to nominate, run for, and
campaign for election. Voting was to be on secret ballots. Elected
officials would represent their constituents in the National People's
Congress and the Local People's Congresses at all levels. This plan was put into law in the 1979 Electoral Law of The People's Republic of
China. The task of conducting the elections was le ft to county and
local Party secretaries (Nathan 1985). Democracy, i t seemed, had come to China.
Not only were there great changes taking place in China, there were also developments outside of China that were impacting on the 137
Chinese. Although the CCP s till controlled the media, Chinese could now get access to outside Information from a variety of sources. There was the Voice of America (VOA) and the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC), which broadcasted dally programs. Including International news; there was growing access to foreign news magazines and newspapers; there was the Chinese media (by the end of 1986 there were 5,240 periodicals published In China [Schell 1988]) that provided more and more Inter national programming.and news; there were, of course, the tourists (by
1986, almost 1.5 million foreign tourists and over 20 million overseas
Chinese visited China [Schell 1988]); and there were 60,000 Chinese students and scholars, and thousands of officials who had gone abroad to study or visit (Hsu 1990). With these sources of Information, the
Chinese people had access to news about International events.
Several International events contributed to many people's under standing and feelings about democracy and the role of the people In a democracy. For example, the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos by people power In February 1986, the expulsion of Haitian dictator Jean-Claude
Duvalier by popular revolt, the student strike In France to protest the adoption of an elitist educational policy and, even closer to home, the creation of multiple parties In Taiwan, were all widely reported In
China. And as knowledge about other countries Increased, comparisons to their neighboring countries were not favorable, especially compar isons to Japan and the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea.
The apparent wealth and high standard of living In the capi talist countries was especially shocking to people who were students 138 during the Cultural Revolution. A Chinese teacher told the researcher about one day when she-was in high school and was given a long lecture about the terrible conditions in capitalist countries. She was told about terrible pollution that made it difficult to even breathe, and the high crime rate that made it unsafe to leave one's home. The picture that her teacher painted was so bleak that when she left the classroom, she explained to her friend how lucky they were to live in so cialist China, and that i f they were born in Japan or America she would probably just kill herself. She went on to explain that when, in the early '80s, she began to see foreign shows on TV and saw that life abroad was not as bad as her teacher had described it, she felt shocked at f ir s t, then began to question what she had learned and later, as she learned more about life in capitalist countries, she began to question the virtues of socialism and communism. To this generation of Chinese, the information about the NICs, capitalism, democracy, and the news about "people power" would have a great impact.
To casual observers, China was becoming Westernized and Deng
Xiaoping was seen as a champion of democracy and capitalism; however, to many Chinese, especially students and intellectuals, many of the changes were seen as merely cosmetic or as too l i t t l e too late, and they saw China as s till backward. To a growing number of Chinese, the cause of the backwardness was the political and social system its e lf. Three of the most outspoken critics were the brilliant astrophysicist Fang
Lizhi, and the journalists Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang. And in the p o litically relaxed environment of the mid-1980s, all three had the opportunity and a willing audience to air their views. 139
Fang Lizhi, dubbed "China's Sakharov," was, unlike most Chinese intellectuals, willing .to openly criticize government leaders and their policies. Like many intellectuals. Fang had joined the CCP when he was young and suffered during the anti-rightist campaign and the Cultural
Revolution but, unlike most other intellectuals. Fang was not afraid or cautious about his stirring criticisms.
After receiving the majority of votes three times and still being rejected, in 1984 Fang became Vice-President of the University of Science and Technology (Keda) in Hefei City, Anhui Province. Fang and President Guan Weiyan instituted a plan for academic reforms that allowed for the redistribution of power at the university based on their own concepts of democracy. Guan explained i t thusly: "Monopolization of power invariably leads to corruption. As soon as power comes into the hands of any one individual, it signifies a loss of democratic rights for the people" (Schell 1988, 129). Among the policies advocated by Fang was that of free speech. He expressed the belief that academic freedom was necessary for both faculty and students. Fang also sought to make Keda an international center for study. By 1986, more than nine hundred students and faculty had gone abroad, and over two hundred foreign scholars had visited Keda (Schell 1988).
Fang was also concerned with other issues that faced China, which led to many speaking engagements throughout China (and several trips overseas) discussing various issues. Fang's ideas can be best explained by his own words. In one speech. Fang explained:
As intellectuals we are obligated to work for the improvement of society. . . . This requires that we break the bonds of social restrain t when necessary. . . . China has yet to produce work worthy 140
of consideration for a Nobel Prize. Why is this? One reason for this situation is our social environment. . . . Foreigners are no more intelligent than we Chinese. Why, then, can't we produce first rate work? The reasons for our inability to develop our potential lie within our social system. . . . There is a social malaise in our country today, and the primary reason for i t is the poor example set by Party members. Unethical behavior by Party leaders is especially to blame. This is a situ ation that clearly calls for action on the part of intellectuals. . . . Another cause is that over the years our propaganda about communism has been seriously flawed. In my view this propaganda's greatest problem has been that i t has had far too narrow an inter pretation—not only too narrow but too shallow. I, too, am a member of the Communist Party, but my dreams are not so narrow. They are for a more open society, where differences are allowed. Room must be made for the great variety of excellence that has found expression in human civilization. Our narrow propaganda seems to imply that nothing that came before us has any merit whatsoever. This is the most worthless and destructive form of propaganda. Propaganda can be used to praise Communist heroes, but i t should not be used to tear down others. . . . We Communist Party members should be open to different ways of thinking. We should be open to different cultures and willing to adopt the elements of those cultures that are clearly superior. . . . We must not be afraid to speak out openly about these things. In fact it is our duty. If we remain silent, we will fail to live up to our responsibility. (Schell 1988, 131-33)
Speeches like these certainly shocked many students, faculty members, and Party members alike. When adherence to the Four Cardinal
Principles was still the watchword, these ideas—expressed openly—were testing the limits.
In other speeches. Fang went on to criticize socialist practices and Party leaders by name whenever he fe lt that they were detrimental to China. Fang never expressed that he fe lt he or his opinions were always correct, and he was aware of the loosening political climate that allowed him to voice his dissent. He stated:
All I can say now is that at a minimum, people should explore and make use of their rights. . . . What I am saying is that at least I can now engage in some criticism . . . . Democracy means that I 141
am allowed to express ny views. If I criticize your opinions as being wrong, you can refute me. . . . Although i t cannot be said that democracy has been realized, there are at least signs of a trend. (Schell 1988, 138) This freedom to express his views would soon come to an end.
Fang Lizhi was certainly the most visible and outspoken polit ical dissident in China, but he was not the only intellectual who openly raised a voice of dissent. Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang were also very outspoken. Like Fang, Liu and Wang were both CCP members, and had suffered during the anti-rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution.
Liu Binyan was born in Manchuria which, when he was six years old (1931), was invaded by Japan. He was forced to grow up in very turbulent times under very poor conditions. A vociferous reader, he taught himself Russian, Japanese, and a little English so that he could read literature in its original form. He also read many articles from
China's May Fourth literatu re. During his younger years he developed a strong sense of nationalism which, in 1944, led him to join the CCP.
Professionally, Liu turned to journalism and experimented with literary reportage, which was a mixture of journalism and literature.
He investigated re a l-life situations, but wrote about them in the form of a novel. Many of his articles—for example, "On the Bridge
Construction Site" and "Inside Story"—exposed his readers to the realities of life in communist China. His stories often did not have a nice ending with the CCP as the saviour. Liu supported and believed in the CCP; his message was simply that after liberation (1988), many
Chinese s till suffered. 142
Liu remained a Party member and his faith in the Party continued even after his harsh treatment during the anti-rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution. During the 1980s, Liu continued to write articles exposing official wrongdoing and at the same time support and defend Deng's reform policies.
In 1985 Liu published an artic le , "A Second Kind of Loyalty," which contained a story about a loyal Party member who dared write letters to Mao criticizing Mao's policies and asking him to change them.
This person, knowing the risk in doing th is, wrote to Mao, "After you have finished reading this letter, there is a possibility that, moved to fury, you will order my execution. In the forty-two year history of the Chinese Communist Party, examples of this kind have certainly not been few" (Schell 1988, 117). Liu was expressing the belief that there are two kinds of loyalty: one is safe, whereby you follow everything and don't speak out; the other is risky, whereby you stand up and speak out. Liu was clearly advocating thi. second type of loyalty.
Wang Ruowang, born in 1918, grew up in Shanghai. His f ir s t work of journalism—a criticism of Chiang Kai-shek for giving away part of
China to Japan—landed him in a nationalist prision with a ten-year sentence. As war broke out with Japan, he was released after serving three years. He joined the communist revolution to fight evil, autoc racy, and oppression. It was this strong conviction to fight injustice that led him to speak out against abuses by Party members.
After being rehabilitated in 1962 for anti-rightist activities,
Wang was once again attacked as a rig h tist in late 1962. His wife Li 143
Ming, also a Party member, was at the struggle session where Wang was attacked. The fear and pain of this attack on her husband caused her to suffer intense mental difficulties. The pain was so intense that
she begged her husband, for the sake of th eir children, to never write
again. She, along with her family, had already suffered through the
a n ti-rig h tist campaign, and this latest attack was too much. She died
in 1964. Wang did not write again until 1979, when he wrote:
Li Ming, forever gone! Your life was given in sacrifice for my scribblings. My dying a hundred times over could never atone for the sense of regret I bear now in my winter years. Unable to comply with your plea . . . I have taken up n\y pen again for the sake of the children, hoping that perhaps they will be able to create a more ideal world for the next generation, a land of gladness and peace of s p irit. Perhaps th is pen of mine with its meager powers can make a contribution yet. (Schell 1988, 170) He began his writing where he left off, exposing and criticizing
evil, autocracy, and oppression wherever he found i t . In November 1986
Wang wrote an article called "My Views on Polarization: A Discussion with Comrade Deng Xiaoping." In this article, Wang stated that Deng's
economic reforms would lead to polarization, which he defined as the
rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. In a country that is
based on the ideals of socialism, the accusation that China was devel
oping the characteristics of a capitalist society with a definite class
system was very damaging to the CCP leadership.
Wang, in his writings, also criticized the policy of dicta
torship. He wrote:
The lack of democracy within the party and the system of arbi trary rule by one person has nurtured a deformed sort of adminis trative talent. It is a system in which power and hierarchy determine the pros and cons of any question. If you have power the truth is on your side. The leadership is eternally correct; nobody is permitted to doubt i t or express differing views. . . . This kind 144 of "rule from the Bureau" is the result of a system that permits personal arbitrariness, it stems from a belief among those in power that they are always correct and far superior to everyone else. (Barmê & Minford 1988, 361)
The writings and speeches of Fang liz h i, Liu Binyan, and Wang
Ruowang expressed a deep-seated dissent and anger that was perhaps shared by many Chinese. This dissent and anger manifested its e lf in
China again in the winter of 1986 as student demonstrations once again swept through the nation.
On December 9, 1986, on the fifteenth anniversary of the anti-Japanese demonstrations (there were also demonstrations in 1985 protesting what was called a second occupation or invasion by Japan, 13 referring to the increased imports of Japanese consumer products),
Keda students in Hefei staged a demonstration to protest the method of selecting candidates to the county-level People's Congress—candidates who, despite the 1979 election law, were still selected by the Party.
Some three thousand students marched to the government offices to demand that candidates not selected by the Party be allowed to run for office in the upcoming election. Signs were posted and banners were raised that read:
Government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
Almost every day the newspapers talk about democracy. But where can we actually find any?
We want democracy. We want liberty. We want freedom of the press. No democratization, no modernization! (Schell 1988, 213-14; Spence 1990, 723; Hsu 1990, 874)
13 The authors of China Spring Digest state that the protests were much larger than reported and claim that the demonstration was part of a broader pro-democracy movement. See, for example, China Spring Digest 1 (January/February 1987) (founding issue). 145 The demonstrators were successful in getting the election postponed and being allowed to submit non-Party candidates.
Vice-Premier Wan Li went to Keda after the demonstrations, where he met with Keda's Vice-President, Fang Lizhi. At one point at a public meeting, the two engaged in a public debate. Fang insisted that "democ racy is not a favor bestowed from above, i t should be won through people's efforts. . . . loosening someone's bonds is not democracy," but Wan Li insisted "that democracy [was] something that [could] only be handed down" (Schell 1988, 214, 217). Wan's v isit did not, however, crush the student movement, and Fang quoted Article 45 of the constitution, which gives the students the right to freedom of speech and assembly, and insisted that the students had done nothing illegal.
Wan Li left shortly thereafter (Spence 1990; Schell 1988).
Students in Shanghai learned about the demonstrations in Hefei, and during the second week in December big character posters (dazibao) appeared at Fudan, Tongji, and Jiaotong Universities. Posters
"criticized the slowness of political reform, university living standards, boring curricula, inflation (which had hit students on fixed stipends particularly hard that year), and the stultifying bureaucracy of the Party. . . ." (Schell 1988, 224). Students were also still angered over an incident at the "Jan and Dean" rock concert two weeks earlier, when they claimed police beat a student who had been dancing during the concert. The students demanded that Jiang Zemin, the head of the Party in Shanghai (currently Party Secretary who replaced ousted leader Zhao Ziyang), intervene. 146 Jiang Zemin, on December 18, went to Jiaotong University to discuss the situation with the students. Jiang, instead of having dialogue with the students, lectured the students to stop putting up wall posters and engaging in activ ities that would create political in stab ility and disunity. Jiang was "unceremoniously hooted out of the hall" (Schell 1988, 224).
Following the meeting, thousands of students marched to People's
Square in the center of Shanghai. They carried banners and put up wall posters declaring:
When will the people be in charge?
Jiang Zemin, who elected you to office?
If you want to know what freedom is, just go ask Wei Jingsheng.
I have a dream, a dream of freedom. I have a dream of democ racy. I have a dream of a life endowed with human rights. May the day come when all these are more than dreams.
To hell with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. (Schell 1988, 225)
The demonstrations continued. On December 19, more than 30,000 students joined an estimated 100,000 workers in a march to the municipal government. They shouted for Jiang Zemin to come out and address their questions. At around midnight, Jiang addressed the crowd. The crowd was not satisfied with his statement that he understood their appeals for quicker implementation of socialist democracy and his charges that they were disrupting public order and stab ility (Schell 1988).
Perhaps buoyed by reports that certain government officials were sympathetic and supportive to the students' demands for socialist democ racy and their right to voice their opinion, students and others in 147
Shanghai continued to demonstrate on December 20 and 22. The protestors continued their calls for democracy and freedom and also held banners expressing their displeasure with the Shanghai mayor's responses. Some shouted, "Jiang Zemin is a coward" (Schell 1988, 226). Meanwhile; demonstrations were also taking place in Beijing (Schell 1988; Spence
1990; Hsu 1990). Despite a news blackout concerning the demonstrations, students in Beijing learned about the Hefei and Shanghai demonstrations through word-of-mouth, the VOA, and the BBC, and on December 23 held th eir own demonstrations. Students assembled at Qinghua University to demand school officials discuss the question of democratization with them, and angered when they refused, they marched to People's University and others marched all the way to Tiananmen Square (about a two-hour walk).
They shouted:
Maintain Solidarity with Our Fellow Students from Shangai
Long Live Freedom and Human Rights
Recognize Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Publication (Schell 1988, 231) Official reaction was mild. There were no arrests and only a few conmients in the official newspaper admonishing students not to disrupt political stability and destroy all that eight years of reform had brought to China. However, by December 26, even though students in Shanghai had returned to classes, demonstrations had spread to at least eleven other cities (Schell 1988; Spence 1990).
The official press began to print stronger statements against the demonstrations. On December 29, the People's Daily printed an 148 article discussing the terrible suffering, turmoil, and chaos that was caused during the Cultural Revolution by the posting of big-character posters that nearly caused the destruction of the economy and the culture. Government leaders such as hard-liners Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, and Hu Qiaomu openly criticized the demonstrations and blamed them on bourgeois liberalism. Others within the Party were more supportive of the students. General Secretary Hu Yaobang took the position that youthful idealism should not be blunted, but guided toward constructive goals. He Dongcheng, Vice-Minister of the State Education Commission, called the students patriotic and well-meaning but added that they were misguided by Western liberalism. Jian Zemin acknowledged that the student actions were patriotic and legal. Police and security guards were also very mild in their treatment of demonstrators. While the police did photograph and videotape demonstrators, there were few accounts of violence (Hsu 1990; Schell 1988; Spence 1990).
The o fficial press began to use language reminiscent of the
Cultural Revolution and the anti-rightist campaign, such as "counter revolutionaries," "rightist," "capitalist roader," "anti-Party element," that certainly brought back many unpleasant memories and fears to many intellectuals. There were announcements reiterating the fact that a new law was passed that required persons to get prior permission for all demonstrations, that posting big-character posters was illegal, and that adherence to the Four Cardinal Principles was required by law
(Schell 1988).
Despite these announcements, that were taken as warnings, students continued to demonstrate. Students were angered by university 149 officials who tore down th eir wall posters. Some students demanded "an end to new rules banning demonstrations, the right to distribute the magazine Chinese Intellectual (edited in New York by the expatriate
Liang Heng), the right to establish an association to promote democracy, and an end to one-party dictatorship in China" (Schell 1988, 236).
Reflecting student anger and antagonism, on December 31, new posters appeared in Beijing: Dictatorship by one party has monopolized the entire legis lative, judicial, executive, foreign policy, military, and propa ganda machinery of our country. . . . The wantonly distorting propaganda has unceasingly cheated the people. This is our polit ical system: lit t l e better than feudal despotism and even more ruthless, dictatorial, and terroristic. In every respect it is identical to the most tyrannical feudal despotism we've had.
Beijing University comrades: The circumstances for democracy are ripe. Raise your hands in an iron fis t. What we must now do is act like heroes.
When we began our struggle for freedom and democracy, you panicked and now consider us terrible animals. This shows that your democracy is fake. It is astonishing that the government has so rapidly taken off its mask and is so scared. The one billion Chinese are but a toy in the hands of the rulers. . . .
In the United States there is the false freedom to support or not support the Communist Party. In our country we have the genuine freedom of having to support the Communist Party. In the United States there is the false freedom of the press. In our country we have the genuine freedom of NO freedom of the press. (Schell 1988, 236-37) On January 1, students began a march to Tiananmen Square; however, when they arrived the square was surrounded by police. After long hours in the freezing weather, some students managed to get on the
Square, which had been sprayed with water and was covered with alayer of ice. Some students were arrested and this, however, only served 150 to heighten the students' anger. They shouted, "Return our comrades!" and "You are the people's police, you should be on our side" (Schell
1988, 239). Student representatives claimed that they would stage a class boycott if the arrested students were not freed. The next morning, based on the news that all the arrested students would be released, which supposedly came from consultations between Beijing Uni versity President Ding Shi sun and Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong, the demon strations quietly came to an end. There were, however, occasional flare-ups; for example, on January 7 students gathered and burned copies of the People's Daily. However, the government's mild response and giving in to some student demands ended the nationwide boycotts (Schell
1988; Hsu 1990; Spence 1990).
Deng Xiaoping, while quiet through most of the demonstrations, declared on December 30:
The recent student unrest is not going to lead to any major disturbances. But because of its nature it must be taken seriously. Firm measures must be taken against any student who creates trouble at Tiananmen Square. . . . People who confuse right and wrong, who turn black into white, who start rumors and spread slanders can't be allowed to go around with impunity stirring the masses up to make trouble. A few years ago we punished according to law some exponents of liberalization who broke the law. Did that bring discredit on us? No, China's image was not damaged. On the contrary, the prestige of our country is steadily growing. . . . We cannot do without dictatorship. We must not only affirm the need for it but exercise it when necessary. Of course, we must be cautious about resorting to dictatorial means and make as few arrests as possible. But if some people attempt to provoke bloodshed, what are we going to do about it? We should f ir s t expose their plot and then do our best to avoid shedding blood, even if that means some of our own people get hurt. . . . If we back down, we shall only have more trouble down the road. . . . (Deng 1987, 161-64)
Deng did not back down. He launched a campaign against bourgeois liberalism and gave an ominous warning to intellectuals. Deng 151
stated, "The struggle against bourgeois Rightists in 1957 was carried
somewhat too far, and the mistakes made should be corrected. But that
doesn't mean that we have negated this struggle as a whole" (Deng 1987,
165). Deng also stated that the struggle against bourgeois liberalism would last at least twenty years. One can only imagine how in te l
lectuals who suffered through the a n ti-rig h tist campaign, a campaign
that Deng himself led, reacted to this pronouncement.
Deng, obviously siding with the hard-liners, demanded that Fang
Lizhi, Liu Binyan, and Wang Ruowang be kicked out of the CCP. A massive
propaganda campaign was launched to discredit the three dissidents;
however, none of them was arrested. There were a few arrests, but
only a few. In the now common practice of "killing the chicken to scare
the monkey," Beijing television announced that one unemployed worker was arrested for impersonating a student and causing trouble, and that
Shi Guantu, an alleged ringleader of a counterrevolutionary organi
zation, was arrested for inciting students and plotting to set up an
organization called the Chinese People's Party for the Defense of the
People (Schell 1988). Yang Wei, who had received his Master's degree
from the University of Arizona, was arrested in January 1986 in
Shanghai.
While the 1986 student demonstrations did not leave any martyrs
or focus world attention on the case of any student leader, the case
of Yang Wei set a precedent that was to be followed for years to come.
Yang Wei's case was widely reported in China Spring Digest, a magazine
published in the United States for, as the cover states, "A Better
Understanding of China" was founded by overseas students and scholars. 152
Some of the writers are members of the Chinese Alliance for Democracy and have as th eir stated purpose to encourage the development of democ racy in China. By their coverage of Yang's tria l in 1 9 8 7 , where he was sentenced to two years for counterrevolutionary activity and inciting, China Spring Digest helped bring a watchful eye to the previously unknown workings of China's legal system, a practice that would continue for years to come.
While there were few other arrests, the students and workers did not escape punishment. The government reinstated m ilitary training and political indoctrination on campus and also renewed the policy of sending college graduates to the grass-roots level for one year prior to any job assignment. The workers, who the government leaders may have feared would form a Polish-style union, were strictly prohibited from joining any demonstrations.
The major victim of the new campaign was CCP Secretary-General
Hu Yaobang. Hu, who had been hand-picked by Deng, and one of the leading reformers, had not been seen in public for over two weeks. When the rhetoric of the anti-bourgeois liberalization intensified and Deng joined in the harsh criticism, it was feared by Western China-watchers that Hu would be ousted (Lampton 1987). On January 16, 1987 at the end of an enlarged Politburo meeting, i t was announced that Hu Yaobang, who had been in office for six years, had resigned.
Hu Yaobang was replaced by Zhao Ziyang. It was Hu's death on
April 15, 1989 that set off the next round of student demonstrations
^*See, for example, China Springs Digest 2 (January/February 1988). ------153 and Zhao who was to be ousted because of his lenient policies toward the demonstrations. Hu Yaobang was viewed by intellectuals as a champion of their fight for democracy and freedom. For example, in
September 1986, less than two months before the student demonstrations,
Hu, speaking to a group of foreign students, said:
For years the image of socialism hasn't been good, and not only in China. This is a fact. The rate of economic development has not been fast. And there have been some problems, politically speaking, in the fields of democracy and human rights. (Beijing Spring 1990, 25). During the next few months of 1987, the anti-bourgeois liberali zation campaign continued. A Media and Publications Office was created to oversee media broadcasts and all publications. The hard-liners also revived the Cultural Revolution hero. Lei Feng, for a "Learn from Lei
Feng" campaign.
Lei Feng was a model worker and PLA soldier. After his death, his diary (many scholars believe that this diary was a creation of the
Propaganda Department) was published; i t recounted his unquestioned following of and devotion to-the CCP. This "Study Lei Feng" campaign was an attack on the students, workers, and intellectuals who were questioning and criticizing the policies of the CCP and its leadership.
By mid-sunroer 1987 the campaign was dying down, the purges of people sympathetic or supportive of the demonstrations had slowed down, and the students were no longer demonstrating; however, the underlying dissent and anger of the students had only been suppressed. The desire for genuine democratic changes s till remained, and less than two years later demands for the constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of 154 speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly would be heard once again in citie s and towns throughout China.
Summary
This chapter described eleven major reform and democracy movements from 1895 to 1986 (see Table 5). Despite the fact that during this time China was ruled by the old imperial system, a republican system, various warlords, the Nationalist Party, and, since 1949, the
Communist Party, the various movements and the government reactions to them have had many sim ilarities. The sim ilarities in these movements include the overall pattern, the characteristics of the participants, the major themes, the tactics, and the reaction of the government o fficials.
The overall pattern for the movements has been outrage, followed by petitions or other forms of protests including demonstrations, then the protests expand to major cities throughout China, and finally a government crackdown involving arrests and sometimes executions. Most movements, although not all, began in Beijing, the capital city and the center of power in China.
An underlying theme throughout this nearly one-hundred-year period has been the view of China as weak either m ilitarily, economically, or culturally in relation to foreign nations. The reform movements were attempts to make China stronger. The causes of the weaknesses were either external domination, internal corruption, backward culture, or backward ideas, or a combination of the two. 155
TABLE 5
A CHRONOLOGY OF MOVEMENTS
D a te ...... - Event/Movement
1895 China's peace treaty with Japan and the scholars' protest in Beijing
1898 Hundred Days of Reform
1905 Empress Dowager's reform program
1911 Overthrow of the Qing Dynasty
1916 New Culture Movement
1919 May Fourth Movement
1925 May 30th Incident
1926 March 18th Massacere
1935 December 9th Movement
1956 Hundred Flowers Campaign
1976 Tinanamen Incident
1978-79 Democracy Wall Movement
1980 Demonstrations, including a hungerstrike, in Changsha and other cities over county election procedures
1985 Anti-Japanese products demonstrations and pro-democracy movement in Beijing, Xian, and Shanghai
1986 Student demonstrations
1989 Pro-Democracy Movement
The proposals to deal with China's weaknesses ranged from reforms to revolution. The early reformers such as Kang Youwei sought to establish a constitutional monarchy, while others such as Sun Yat-sen wanted to overthrow the imperial system and in stitu te a republican form 156
of government. During the Republican and warlord eras, reformers such
as Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi tried to in stitu te a new culture based on the
ideas of independence, aggressiveness, utilitarianism , pragmatism, and
science and democracy. The reforms during the Nationalist era sought
to unite China in fighting the Japanese. After 1949, the reformers such
as Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan, and Wang Ruowang sought to increase China's
strength by reforming the structure of the government to allow more
input by people outside of the top party leadership.
For the most part, all of the leaders and participants of these movements have been intellectuals and students. At times workers,
shopkeepers, and other citizens joined or supported the movements, but
supporters were mostly limited to major c itie s.
These movements were e litis t in nature. For the most part, the
leaders and the participants were intellectuals and students from the major cities in China. While some movements did win the support of some workers, shopkeepers, and other citizens, the vast majority of Chinese— the farmers—did not actively participate in the movements. The
students and intellectuals received the most support when their protests
involved economic issues or foreign imperialism. Efforts aimed at political reform have received limited mass support.
Similar tactics were used by the reformers during the various movements. Petitioning the government, mass demonstrations, boycott
of classes, strikes, and sometimes boycott of foreign products were used
during the movements.
The major demands or themes of the movements were also similar.
The reform programs of Kang Youwei, Sun Yat-sen, Chen Duxiu, Fang Lizhi, 157
Wei Jingsheng, and Xu Wenli all have similar points. For example, all favored democracy over.autocracy, science over "feudalistic" ideas such as superstitions, and their calls for reform included the areas of government and education.
The various governments' methods to stop these movements had many similarities. The police or army was used to arrest the demonstrators and afterward the leaders were arrested, executed, or fled the country. In a method known as "killing the chicken to scare the monkey," government leaders singled out a few people and gave them harsh treatment as a warning to others. The government also banned the protest leaders' publications and often arrested people who published their works; for example, the works of Ding Ling, Fang Lizhi, Liu
Binyan, and Wang Ruowang were periodically banned.
Overall reform movements have not been successful in China.
Occasionally they have succeeded in getting a government official fired, such as Gao Ruilin in 1919, but overall their success has been very limited. Reform movements that were able to continue for even a short period of time, even if they didn't achieve their goals, were either supported by people within the top levels of government such as the emperor Quang Xu in 1898, Mao Zedong in 1956, and Deng Xiaoping in
1978, or they took place when the government was viewed as weak and unable to deal with the situation as in 1919 and 1935. The two reform- revolutionary movements that were successful—the Nationalist revolution in 1911 and the Communist revolution in 1949—succeeded because they had the support of the m ilitary. Reform from within the government has not been very successful, regardless of the size or length of the 158 demonstrations. As Lu Xun put it in 1926:
The history of.mankind's battle forward through bloodshed is like the formation of coal, where a great deal of wood is needed to produce a small amount of coal. But demonstrations do not serve any purpose, especially unarmed ones. . (Lu Xun 1957, 194) CHAPTER IV
THE BEIJING SPRING
Introduction
The beginning of the 1989 pro-democracy movement had its roots in the scholars' protest of 1895, the 1898 reform movement, and the May
Fourth Movement of 1919. These early movements established in tel lectuals and students as a leading force in pushing for reforms. In more recent times, intellectuals and students also dominated the reform and democracy movements such as the "Hundred Flowers Campaign" of
1956-57, the April 5th Movement of 1976, the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-79, the Election Reform Movement of 1980, and the 1986 demon strations. Likewise, the themes of the 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement— freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, greater participation in the political process, and opposition to corruption—and the protest tactics of petitioning the government, mass demonstrations, class boycott, and hunger strike had their precedents in the earlier movements. The 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement can, therefore, be viewed as a continuation of the previous movements.
The 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement had its origin prior to
April 15, 1989, for example, in the 1986 demonstrations and ther 1988 demonstrations following the beating death of a Bei Da student and the democracy forums that became popular in Beijing in 1988 and 1989. Many
159 160 of the people who were involved in these previous demonstrations and
forums, such as student leaders Wang Dan, Chai Ling, and Li Lu, were
also involved in the 1989 movement (Chai Ling, discussion at The Ohio
State University, 7 July 1989; notes 10 November 1988). These events,
however, will not be dealt with in this chapter.
This chapter gives a day-to-day account of the major events of
the 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement beginning on April 15, 1989 and ending on June 4, 1989. Although this movement had roots prior to April 15,
it was the death of Hu Yaobang on that date that served as the impetus
for the movement. Therefore, this chapter begins with that date.
April 15, 1989
At 7:45 A.M. April 15, 1989 Hu Yaobang, then a Politburo member
and former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), died.
Hu was forced to resign as Party Secretary following the student demon
strations in 1986. His death at the relatively young age of
seventy-three was a shock and a b itter disappointment for many Chinese who, despite his often eccentric behavior, viewed Hu as a symbol for genuine political reform, tolerance for outspoken intellectuals, and
a strong supporter of education, intellectuals, and minorities.
Hu Yaobang had joined the CCP at the age of thirteen, and,
unlike most younger leaders, had participated in the Long March. Like many Chinese, Hu suffered severe treatment during the Cultural Revo
lution. Wang (1985) describes his treatment thusly:
When the Red Guards dragged him in front of the Young Communist Youth Headquarters in 1966, they shaved bis head and wrapped him in a wooden chain. He was beaten repeatedly and daily; he was 1 6 1
verbally abused in public. Hu remained composed and told the shouting Red Guards that he had committed no wrong. Following this ordeal, he was banished to the countryside for almost three years, and then placed under house arrest for another five years. (Wang 1985, 38-39).
Hu survived this ordeal to become one of China's top leaders.
His rise to power and his career were closely related to the fortunes of Deng Xiaoping. Hu, like Deng, was purged and rehabilitated twice; however, unlike Deng, Hu was purged for a final time in 1986.
Perhaps because of his courage and his ab ility to rise from defeat, many Chinese had hopes that Hu would reemerge as an important leader for political reform or at least once again wield important influence on the top leaders. These hopes were dashed on April 15,
1989.
Just a few hours after his death, dazibao (big-character posters) were posted at Bei Da (Beijing University). One poster stated:
All Beijing University mourns! See who prospers, who despairs. In 40 years, China has failed to rise. In 70 years, democracy remains unfilled. Deng Xiaoping s t ill has his health at 84. Hu Yaobang dies f ir s t at 73. The politicians come and go. Can there be no cure? (Collins Publishers 1989, 207)
Many posters simply expressed grief and mourning for Hu, while others expressed the feeling that the wrong person had died.
The fact that dazibao were posted without any public announcement, within a few hours of Hu's death, was an early indication that there was some support for a student movement within the government.^ A second clue that there might be people in the government
^Although i t was widely reported in the Western press and also 162 who would support a student movement was the statement by Chinese
Premier Li Peng while on a state mission to Tokyo. Li Peng stated that
China was politically stable and that there were no major differences between current General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and himself. Li added,
"I don't know that Zhao has the idea of resigning from the post" (China
Daily 15 April 1989, 1). This statement was a clear indication that there was a split in the Party or at least Zhao Ziyang or Li Peng was in some political trouble that could, perhaps, benefit from mass support.
April 16-17, 1989
Sunday, May 16, official newspapers announced the death of Hu
Yaobang. The China Daily Business Weekly the the People's Daily (Renmin
Ribao) both ran short articles listing his current position as a member of the Politburo and stating that he resigned the post of General Secre tary on January 16, 1987. The China Daily article stated, "He was hospitalized after he suffered an earlier heart attack on April 8 and was given all possible medical attention" (China Daily 16 April
1989, 1).
As the news of Hu Yaobang's death circulated, posters appeared at several univerisities and thousands of people went to Tiananmen
Square to place wreaths on the Monument to the People's Heroes.
According to the China Daily, two hundred students from Bei Da and expressed by many students that posters went up within hours of Hu's death, there is some doubt about this because the government announced that Hu died at 7:45 A.M. and Western reports stated that the first posters went up around midnight. 163
Zhengfa Daxue (Politics and Law University) went to Tiananmen to pay their respects to Hu and to lay wreaths on the monument (China Daily
17 April 1989).
Bei Da and Bei Hang (Beijing University of Aeronautical and
Astronautical Engineering) campuses were quiet. Several additional posters mourning Hu had been posted, and a few groups of people stood around discussing Hu's career. However, nothing really extraordinary occurred on this day. It should be noted that the right to post big- character posters (dazibao) was deleted from the constitution, and, therefore, posting them was illegal. The authorities, however, did not make any arrests.
April 18, 1989
There was increasing activity on campuses and increasing numbers of people went to Tiananmen Square to pay respects to Hu and to lay wreaths on the Monument to the People's Heroes. Despite the fact that posters were illegal, increasing numbers of posters appeared and increasing numbers of people went to read and copy them. The posters began to reflect an increasing variety of themes.
The vast majority of posters were about Hu and his life. The posters reflected the people's great respect and sorrow for Hu and expressed regret that the people had previously criticized and misun derstood him. Many posters praised Hu's efforts at political reform and his attempts to get people to respect intellectuals. Hu, who was portrayed as honest and not involved in corruption, was, therefore. 164 compared to other leaders past and present who were not viewed as being
honest. For example, one poster read:
Hua Guofeng, maybe he had no ab ility , but he was honest. Hu Yaobang, maybe he didn't always, act like a gentleman, but he didn't use his power to help himself. How about the others? (Notes 18 April 1989)
One lengthy poster expressed regret for criticizing Hu's
eccentric behavior, stating that now they understood that if a person
loves his country, his behavior isn't important, and that Hu was much
greater than those hypocrites who act properly but use their power to
benefit themselves and their family members.
Each university seemed to have a designated area for posting
dazibao. The triangle (sometimes called Democracy Triangle) at Bei Da
and the large wall near the student dorms at Bei Hang became univer
sities' designated places for posting dazibao and meeting places for
discussing current information.
The dazibao also began to serve as people's newspapers. They
included news about past and future events. For example, one poster
stated that the previous night ten thousand went to Tiananmen Square to mourn for Hu Yaobang, and early this morning (the 18th) they
attempted to deliver a petition to the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress. The petition contained the following seven
demands :
(1) Reevaluate Hu Yaobang's achievements. (2) Renounce the 1983 campaign against spiritual pollution and the 1987 campaign against bourgeois liberalization. (3) Allow freedom of the press and end censorship. (4) Reveal the financial status of Party and government leaders and their families. (5) Cancel Beijing's municipal government's "Ten Provisional Articles Regulating Public Marches and Demonstrations." 165
(6) Increase funding for education. (7) Allow objective coverage of the student movement. (Notes 18 April 1989)
This petition was, however, not accepted by a member of the standing
committee. The fact that no committee member would meet them angered
the students. Students pointed out that Article 76 of the constitution
states, "Deputies to the National People's Congress should maintain
close contact with the units which elected them and with the people,
heed and convey the opinions and demands of the people and work hard to serve them" (PRC 1987, 50). No deputy met with the students; therefore, the students—just as in 1978, 1980, 1985, and 1986—fe lt
that the government was, once again, not following its constitutional
duties. This event, along with the euphoria over the support by the
general public, strengthened the students' desire to continue the demon
stration. And, indeed, hundreds of students did continue a sit-down
demonstration in front of the Great Hall of the People until early
evening.
The demonstrators had promised to go back to their campuses if a deputy would receive the petition. Since no deputy came out, the
protests continued and the government lost an opportunity to contain the growing demonstrations. The leader of the petition march was a young Beijing University student named Wang Dan, who would become one of the top leaders of the 1989 Democracy Movement.
Toward evening, more dazibao were posted at Bei Hang; some of them were written by Bei Hang students while others were copies of dazibao that were posted at other universities. This was an indication that even without official media coverage, the students—many of whom 166 had participated or learned about earlier student demonstration in 1978,
1980, 1985, and 1986, and had developed their protest methods, tactics, and sk ills—were capable of spreading the news. As will be seen later, the students were able to spread the news not only to Beijing campuses, but also to campuses throughout China. Through the dazibao, students expressed their desire to use normal and legal actions to mourn Hu.
It was hoped that th is would win the support of the teachers (Dazibao
18 April 1989). There were calls for the establishment of an exhibit of Hu's accomplishments on campus, donations to buy wreaths to place on the monument, and the question, "What should we do?" (Dazibao 18
April 1989).
There were also indications that the protests would be used to express deeply-held frustrations and complaints about a variety of topics. Many dazibao, for example, called for improved conditions for students and teachers and increased funding for education. Others expressed dissatisfaction with the student cafeteria and the election of student members to the official student organization. This last complaint about the election of student representatives would, in the days to come, prove to be an important point of disagreement with the government.
Near evening, another dazibao was posted describing the situ ation when Hu Yaobang suffered his heart attack. The dazibao stated that at a Politburo meeting, Hu was making a speech about freedom and democracy and that other leaders were very cold and not interested.
Hu became very excited and asked them why they were not more interested.
It was at this point that Hu suffered a heart attack (Dazibao 18 April 167 1989). It was clear that the author of this dazibao blamed the current leaders for Hu's death.
April 19. 1989
The first clash between students and police occurred at
Xinhuamen, the main entrance to Zhangnanhai, where many important government offices and the residences of many top leaders are located.
Shortly after midnight more than a thousand students went to Xinhuamen to send a funeral wreath and a petition into Zhangnanhai. There were many different versions of what took place at this time; however, several things are clear. There was an altercation, at least one policeman was injured, and order was restored by early morning (Notes
19 April 1989).
By evening, thousands of people were gathered around the monument at Tiananmen Square (hereafter referred to as the Square).
Students and teachers made speeches, and people continued to place wreaths around the monument. People carried posters declaring, "Reject
Autocratic Rule," "Long Live Democracy," and "Long Live Freedom," as well as others declaring Hu Yaobang "The Soul of China" (Levitt, videotape, 19 April 1989). Meanwhile, several thousand demonstrators once again gathered at Xinhuamen. This would lead to the second clash between police and students. 168 April 20. 1989
According to student reports in the early morning hours, several thousand students, including some who had been holding a sit-in demon stration since the 15th, were gathered outside Xinhuamen. The students were shouting slogans asking for dialogue with a high government o fficial. For example, the students shouted, "Li Peng, come out!" (Li
Peng is the Chinese Premier) (Notes 20 April 1989).
The students felt that their demand for dialogue was reasonable and that the Premier should talk with them. Li Peng is the adopted son of former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who, even after his death in 1976, remains one of the most respected of all Chinese leaders. Zhou, according to the students, often went to schools and other places to talk to the people. The students felt that if Zhou were still Premier, he would certainly talk to the students. Li Peng, however, wouldnot, and this would continue to be a point of criticism and friction between the students and the government (Interviews 21 April 1989).
No government leader came out to meet the students; however, the armed police did. According to student accounts, several thousand police blocked the entrance to the Xinhuamen, and suddenly the police attacked the students with metal belts and clubs. Students threw glass bottles at the police. In a ll, over 100 students and 4 policemenwere injured and perhaps as many as 150 students were arrested (Dazibao and interviews 20 April 1989 and 21 April 1989).
Early in the afternoon on many campuses, students began collecting money for the injured students. Teachers and laobaixing 169 (citizens—lite ra lly , old one-hundred names) donated money for the injured students.
Students also began posting dazibao describing the events of the "April 20th Incident" at Xinhuamen. Several dazibao gave details of police beating students. One student described how police had kicked and dragged a female student by her hair some th irty yards back to the Xinhuamen (Notes 20 April 1989).
Angered by the police brutality and the government version of the two incidents at Xinhuamen which stated that the students shouted anti-Party slogans and rushed the police, injuring four policemen, students at Bei Da called for a boycott of classes. It is not clear how many students boycotted classes; however, at least at Bei Hang few students agreed with the boycott (Interview 20 April 1989).
As rain fell in Beijing, one student remarked, "We are not allowed to mourn for Hu; therefore, the heavens are crying for us"
(Conversation 20 April 1989). Later that evening the government announced that the funeral for Hu Yaobang would be held at the Great p Hall of the People on Saturday, April 22. The announcement also stc that Tiananmen Square would be closed to the public.
April 21, 1989
By noon, several thousand people were gathered in Tiananmen
Square around the monument. Students were discussing the April 20th
p The government controls all radio and television broadcast and all print media. University campuses, as well as other work units and different locations throughout every city and town in China, are equipped with loudspeakers that are also controlled by the government 170
Incident with the laobaixing and explaining their demands. In an obvious sign of support for the students, many laobaixing clapped and shouted encouragement to the students as they entered the Square
(Levitt, videotape and interviews, 21 April 1989).
Several hundred students gathered outside the east door to the
Great Hall of the People to protest what they claimed was police brutal ity at Xinhuamen. Later in the afternoon, a group of people marched into the Square carrying a sign declaring that journalists should te ll the truth. This was a protest against a New China (Xinhua) news story about the Xinhuamen incident. Students also circulated pictures of the incident which showed soldiers with thick belts with large buckles in th eir hands, pushing and shoving with some students.
By 10:00 P.M., nearly twenty thousand people were gathered in the Square making speeches and placing wreaths and dazibao on the monument.
As evening passed, more and more students entered the Square.
Students marched from their universities (it took over three hours to reach the Square from some universities) in large groups, carrying their school and their department flags. For example, some signs read
"Qinghua University Physics Department," "Bei Da History Department,"
Bei Hang Foreign Language Department," etc. The students also carried signs proclaiming: and the Party. These speakers are used to broadcast a variety of programs, including the news, special announcements, and music. 3 Later there were also pictures from the foreign media that were circulated and posted along with the dazibao. See, for example, Ming Pao News, Time, and Newsweek, 21 April 1989). 171
Long Live Democracy Long Live Freedom Hu [Yaobang] Lives Against Privilege Don't care about ourselves—we are willing to spill our blood for democracy [Yuxue Minzhu] (Levitt,.videotape, 1989)
Students, as they marched, shouted patriotic slogans and sang the
Communist "Internationale," the song of proletarian international solidarity and struggle/* The "Internationale" and the Chinese national anthem, both of which call for people to rise up and overthrow the oppressors, would become theme songs for the democracy movement.
In an attempt to defy the ban on gathering in Tiananmen Square, thousands of students decided to spend the night camped out near the
Monument to the People's Heroes. During the demonstration in 1986, police had surrounded the Square and only a few students managed to enter it. This time the students outmaneuvered the police by arriving before they could block off the Square.
By midnight, several hundred thousand students and laobaixing had entered the Square. As students from various universities continued to enter the area, people continued to cheer them on. The biggest cheers were for several students from Nankai University in Tianjin (Zhou
Enlai's alma mater). These were the first students to arrive in Beijing from another city—an indication that (1) the students' communication network was functioning effectively, and (2) support for the Beijing students was spreading to other cities. The demonstrators, although they appeared disorganized, were orderly and peaceful. The students held hands as they marched to
*See Appendix C for complete text of this song. 172 prevent any outsiders from entering their group. This was done to prevent government "spies" from infiltrating the student groups
(Interview, 20 April 1989). Students were well aware that government officials were in the crowd taking photographs and videotaping the demonstrations. The students were also aware that there were government cameras mounted on many posts in the Square and along the major streets in Beijing. Several people warned foreigners (mostly journalists and students) to be careful of the government spies and the cameras, but no attempt was made to cover or destroy the cameras. By 1:00 A.M. i t appeared that the Square, which is the largest public square in the world and capable of holding nearly one million people, was more than half-filled with demonstrators (Levitt, videotape, 21 April 1989, 22 April 1989).
At the end of the f ir s t week, the student movement was gaining momentum. The students' communication network was established within the Beijing area campuses as well as throughout many parts of China.
The students and the government were engaged in an information campaign, and i t was clear the students were winning the support of many laobaixing.
April 22, 1989
Over two thousand students spent the night on Tiananmen Square in preparation for Hu Yaobang's funeral and in defiance of the government ban on people in the Square. For many Chinese people, this cold, chilly night must have brought back memories of April 5, 1976 when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators mourning the death of Premier 173
Zhou Enlai on the Square were surrounded and then attacked by the police. After the April 5th incident, it was rumored that perhaps as many as several hundred protestors were killed.® Now, in 1989, some wondered i f they would meet the same fate.
The students, who were in effective control of the Square, tried to prevent any incident that would give the government an excuse to crack down. The students, for example, would only le t students with their student ID cards enter the Square. This procedure, which would also be used during the hunger strike, was an attempt to prevent government spies and/or trouble-makers from mixing with the students.
By morning, students and teachers on many campuses who had not already gone to the Square were preparing to do so. A dazibao announced the formation of an unofficial student union formed by students at
Bei Da. According to the dazibao, one of the purposes of the union was to organize the growing student movement. It also called for each uni versity to send representatives to an upcoming organizational meeting (Dazibao 22 April 1989).
Hu Yaobang's funeral ended around 12:00 noon, as several hundred thousand students and more than one million others stood outside the
Great Hall of the People on the Square and along Changan Avenue.
Although there were police in front of the Great Hall, three students were allowed to pass through to the steps of the main entrance. There, on the steps, in a gesture reminiscent of petitioners kowtowing to the
5 See Han Minzhu, ed.. Cries for Democracy Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 19901, pp. 61-62. 174 emperor, the three students, kneeling with their petition held over their heads, presented their petition to the government. After more than fifteen minutes passed without a government official coming out to receive the petition, the students returned to the Square.
The students in the Square were deeply moved by the courage of the students offering the petition in that manner and were outraged by the government leaders for not receiving the petition. Shouts for Li
Peng to come out went unheeded. This further angered the students.
There was a rumor that Li Peng had promised to come out and speak to the students, and when the funeral was over and he didn't emerge, the students' anger turned to pushing and shoving with the police. There were, however, no reports of violence (Notes 24 April 1989).
Hu Yaobang's body was taken out of a side door and the funeral motorcade exited to the north instead of the planned route around
Tiananmen Square. The students on the Square, who were saddened by Hu's funeral, deeply moved by the actions of the three petitioners, and outraged by the actions of the government, announced a major boycott of classes, to begin on Monday, April 24.
According to government reports, riots broke out in Changsha
(birthplace of Hu Yaobang) and Xian following the national broadcasts of the memorial services for Hu Yaobang. It was reported that in
Changsha looters broke into shops in several areas of the city and one hundred hooligans and criminals were arrested. In Xian, i t was reported that lawbreakers shouting anti-government slogans clashed with police while attempting to break into government offices. Ten vehicles and 175 twenty houses were set on fire and 130 armed police and security police were reported injured (China Daily 24 April 1989).
A different version of the events in Xian and Changsha would soon be reported by students from those cities. Dazibao appeared depicting the police attacking the soldiers.® More convincing and more moving, however, were several pictures that had been photocopied,
showing police beating and arresting a very young student (perhaps a middle school student). The caption read: "How old were these rioters?" (Levitt, photocopy, 28 April 1989). The students also distributed photocopies of the April 22 events. There were pictures of the three students kneeling, and police and students pushing and shoving, which contradicted the China Daily article claiming there were no altercations between students and police (Levitt, photocopies; China
Daily 24 April 1989). The students, using modern technology and their established communication network, appeared to be effectively countering official government propaganda.
April 23, 1989
Sunday was, in many ways, just like any other Sunday. It was peaceful and quiet, and many students with families living in Beijing went home for their Sunday meals. The main differences were the posting of numerous dazibao and the discussing of the planned :lass boycott by students and other people.
®Ibid. 176 Numerous dazibao appeared urging students to boycott classes.
One poster read, "Boycott classes, not studies" (Dazibao, 23 April
1989). Most dazibao, like this one, implored students to continue to study. Others encouraged the students to remain on campus, not to go on any unauthorized marches, to follow the normal school rules, and to watch for further announcements (from the unofficial student union).
It was clear that many students did not want to defy the government orders to attend classes.
April 24, 1989
Some students began a boycott of classes. Many students, however, continued to attend classes.^ By evening dazibao appeared criticizing students who continued to go to classes.
Students also continued their campaign to inform and enlist the support of Beijing citizens. Dazibao and some mimeographed handbills were posted and distributed explaining (1) the purpose of the student union, (2) the purposes of the student movement, (3) the solidarity between the people and the students, and (4) their reasons for boycotting classes, forming the student union, and promoting a mass movement. A dazibao put it thusly:
Citizens of the capital: We are students of Bei Hang. Our sacred mission is to uphold the people's interests. We have no choice under the current circum stances. Under circumstances that has pushed our patience beyond
No accurate count of class attendance has been given. This may be in part due to teachers' unwillingness to report absences to protect the students. 177 its lim its, we feel compelled by sadness and fury to declare a class boycott will commence on April 24. Our action is by no means an action of blind impulse; we have a reasonable program, clear and definite objectives, and a well-disciplined and powerful organization. We will not accept the control or manipulation of any person,nor will we stoop to compromise. We have no selfish motives or hidden ambitions. Our actions these last few days sprang from our patriotic hearts, from our pure and loyal love for our great motherland. We do not "desire to plunge the world into chaos" [as has been alleged] nor are we a "small handful" of bad people with ulterior motives. All we want is to do our best to push forward the process of reform and democ ratization, to try to obtain for the people the most practical benefits possible. Citizens, our interests are now closely bound together. We swear to stand with the people to death, to struggle to the very end! We ask for all the citizens of Beijing to give us their support! We are one with the people! Down with bureaucracy! Down with Bureaucrats! Long Live China! Long Live the People! (Dazibao, 24 April 1989; translation from Han 1990, 75-76)
The feeling that this was a patriotic movement based on love of the motherland was widespread among the students. Government actions
and news reports to the contrary were intensely resented by many
students. Even students who did not participate in the boycott expressed their view that this was a patriotic movement, but did not agree that a boycott was a proper or effective method. Others expressed O fear of government reprisals.
April 25, 1989
Qin Benli, editor of the Shanghai-based World Economic Herald,
defied Shanghai Party Secretary (Mayor) Jiang Zemin's order to stop publication of an article that praised Hu Yaobang and was critical of
O College graduates are given assigned jobs by the government. Some students feared that if they participated, they would be assigned a low-level job in a desolate area or not assigned a job at a ll. 178
Party leaders for dismissing him. Qin had the paper printed with a blank space, letting readers know that something had been censored.
The newspaper Science and Technology Daily News went even further and published pictures and articles about the student movement. These developments were discussed in dazibao at various universities, and copies of the articles were also posted (Notes 26 April 1989).
April 26, 1989
The April 26 People's Daily contained an editorial urging people to take a firm stand against turmoil (also translated as "resolutely oppose turm oil"). The editorial stated that a handful of people with ulterior motives had used the grief of the students to create turmoil.
The editorial also stated:
Their purpose is to poison people's minds, create national turmoil and sabotage the nation's political stability. And this is a planned conspiracy which, in essence, aims at negating the leadership of the Party and the Socialist system. (China Daily 26 April 1989) (For the complete text, see Appendix D)
The editorial concluded with a call for the whole Party and the whole nation to unite in a firm stand against public disturbances.
Many Beijing residents and students were outraged over the edi to ria l. The wording and the language in the editorial were reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. Dazi bao appeared on campuses and at the
Square attacking the editorial.
One dazibao announced that students from forty universities in
Beijing, representing the Provisional Students' Federation of Capitol
Universities and Colleges, met on the morning of the 26th, and it listed their demands and a plan of action. The major demands were dialogue 179 with the government, punishment for the leaders responsible for the
April 20th Incident, an apology by the editor of Xinhua News to the students for distorted reports, and a guarantee of accurate press coverage of the movement. The student association announced April 27 as the date for students to march from their universities in demon stration and peaceful protest (Han 1990).
Despite the strong warning by the government against public disturbance, the students continued to make plans for the demonstration.
The student federation made a list of slogans to shout and write on banners. The slogans stated:
Support the Communist Party and socialism! Support reform! Long Live Democracy! Oppose corruption in government, oppose special privileges! Patriotism is not a crime! Pledge to defend the Constitution to the death! The press must speak the truth—oppose slander! Stabilize prices! Every person is responsible for the fate of the nation The people's army protects the people Oppose violence! No persecution! Demand Dialogue! Reform, patriotism, enterprise, progress! (Han 1990, 73)
Many of the slogans, such as calls for democracy and freedom, reflected previous student movements, but some reflected the tension and perhaps the students' fear as rumors spread that army units were being called to Beijing. Some students prepared their wills in preparation for the march (Interviews 26 April 1989).
April 27, 1989
Students representing most Beijing universities participated in the largest demonstration in the history of the People's Republic 180 of China.^ As the students marched, hand in hand, they were joined and cheered by the citizens of Beijing. In addition to the recommended slogans, others read:
People's police loves the people News should tell the truth Take a clear-cut stand; oppose the April 26 editorial Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death
Many residents and workers along the demonstration route cheered and shouted support for the students and their slogans.
Support for the students was shown in various ways. The residents not only shouted, cheered, and clapped as the students went past, they also set up water stations and offered food to the students.
Shopkeepers and private merchants also donated water and food to the students. Some private entrepreneurs, who sell sodaon three-wheeled carts, donated their supplies to the students (Levitt, videotape, 27
April 1989).
Government officials, in an effort to prevent the demonstrators from marching, sent police and the 38th Army divisions to block major intersections. The students and citizens, working together, were able to continue the march. Students carried signs declaring their love for the people's police, and others saluting the police in an effort to avoid a confrontation. Citizens responded to the news that the army had entered the city to stop the demonstrations by coming out in force and blocking the soldiers and the police, thus allowing the students
Q This does not include government-sponsored demonstrations such as those during the Cultural Revolution.
^^This banner was written in EEnglish, setting a trend that would continue throughout the demonstrations 181 safe passage. People yelled, "Chinese! Do not hit Chinese!" and "The
People's Liberation Army loves the people!" There were no clashes between the army and the citizens. The government's failure to prevent the demonstrations was a tremendous morale booster for the students.
As the day ended, the students returned to their campuses.
Weary and excited, the students expressed satisfaction that they had succeeded in making history. A poster at Bei Da read: "April 27, 1989 will never be forgotten." In the f ir s t major confrontation with the government leaders, it was clear that many Beijing citizens supported the students and that the students had gained the upper hand.
April 28, 1989
The government announced a proposal to enter into direct dialogue with the students at any time. The government spokesman outlined the terms of the dialogue and urged the striking students to return to classes in order to create a suitable environment for the dialogue to take place (China Daily 28 April 1989).
At Bei Hang, students were divided as to what they should do now. While classes and the class boycott were continuing, some striking students expressed a desire to return to classes. Other students expressed their feeling that the boycott should continue until the government met the seven demands. Dazibao were posted expressing their position; for example:
Boycott to the end (Ba ke dao di) We haven't succeeded as yet and a quote from Sun Yat-sen: 182 The revolution hasn't succeeded— Comrades should work hard. (Interview notes 28 April 1989)
A petition was also circulated on campus to prove that the newly formed student union, and not the official student organization, was the real representative of the students. The petition also stated that the proposed dialogue should be widely reported in the media and that student leaders from the new student unions must not be prosecuted after the events are over ([qiu hou bu suan zhang]—pay after the autumn harvest).
As week two ended, the students, with the support of Beijing laobaixing, had succeeded in defying the government's strong warning against creating public disturbances and demonstrations. The government leaders had agreed to the students' demand for dialogue, and it appeared to many students that the government was going to meet their demands and that the tense situation would be diffused. As night fell on Beijing, the campuses were quiet (Interviews 28 April 1989).
April 29, 1989
Government leaders, perhaps surprised by the large number of protestors and the support given to them by the laobaixing, were eager to diffuse the situation. Li Peng authorized State Council spokesman
Yuan Mu to conduct a dialogue with student representatives which was nationally televised (one of the students' demands) in its entirety several times. Besides Yuan Mu, He Dongchang, Vice-Minister of the
State Education Commission; Yuan Li ben, Secretary-General of the Beijing
Party Committee; and Li Ximing, Beijing Vice-Mayor, represented the 183 government. The students were represented by more than forty students
from sixteen universities in Beijing.
The dialogue, which lasted approximately three hours, was a
11 ■ bitter disappointment to many students. Wuer Kaxi, the leader of the
Autonomous Student Union, was invited to attend but was told he could
not speak; therefore, he boycotted the meeting. The students stated
that they only represented themselves and not their schools. Following
the meeting, students stated that the meeting could not resolve the
issues because no state or Party leaders were present and the student
representatives were not elected by the students. Some students stated that the meeting was a trick by the government leaders to divide the
students, and not a sincere or good-faith attempt to establish real dialogue with the students designed to diffuse the tension (Levitt, videotape, 29 April 1989; interviews, 29 April 1989 and 30 April 1989).
During the meeting. Yuan Mu and He Dongchang responded to
student demands and questions and expressed the government position thusly:
(1) The April 26th editorial was not aimed at the students. It was referring to a very small group of individuals who took illegal actions. (2) The students' desires to further reforms and democracy, punish bribery, and eliminate corruption are the same as the Party's and government's positions. (3) There is freedom of the press. There is no news censorship in China. (4) Laws against demonstrations are not unconstitutional and do not violate the constitutional guarantees of the freedoms of speech, association, demonstration, and assembly. (5) Army troops were brought into Beijing because (a) the police were not sufficient to control the demonstrations, (b) the police
^Vor a translated copy of highlights, see Ming Pao News 1989. 184
were sent out first but they could not stop the demonstrators because they thought they were confronting their brothers and sisters, and (c) to show the government's disapproval of the illegal demonstration so as to prevent others from taking similar actions. (6) Hu Yaobang's resignation was normal and in the way of self-criticism for his mistakes. (7) The students should return to class as soon as possible and submit th eir demands/proposals through proper channels. (Para phrased from televised coverage and China Daily reports 1 May 1989)
At Bei Hang, students complained that the o fficials did almost all the talking and failed to answer the real questions, and claimed that the masses of people could see through their tricks. Students claimed that their patriotic movement should be seen as the successor to the May 4th
Movement of seventy years ago and not compared to the Red Guard movement during the Cultural Revolution, as the government leaders were implying (Interviews, 29 April 1989, 30 April 1989; Han 1990, 112-18).
However, Bei Hang student representatives sent a letter to the Auton omous Student Union suggesting that they (1) stop the class boycott,
(2) uphold justice, and (3) support the Four Cardinal Principles. The letter also called for obeying the constitution and getting rid of
Beijing Vice-Mayor Li Ximing. Their letter was an indication that, although the students were unhappy with the government, they were not opposed to i t (Bei Hang Autonomous Student Union le tte r 29 April 1989). The meeting, which the government leaders had hoped would diffuse tensions, served to increase tensions. Dazibao were posted attacking the official student union representatives and the meeting its e lf. These types of dazibao appeared on campuses for several days and undoubtedly gave added support to the Autonomous Student Union. 185 April 30— May 2, 1989
From April 30 through May 2 it was fairly quiet in Beijing.
May 1 is a national holiday, and many students went home. Some students carried information about the student movement to their home provinces, and when they returned they brought news with them about student activ itie s in other areas. For example, on the evening of May 2 a dazibao appeared at Bei Hang that stated that students from Shanghai would join the May 4 demonstration in Beijing (Interviews 30 April 1989 through
2 May 1989; dazi bao 2 May 1989).
The government, meanwhile, was waging a massive propaganda campaign to inform people that government leaders were calm and willing to have dialogue with the students. The meetings on April 29 and 30 were broadcast nationwide several times. Chinese news reports praised the government leaders and their efforts to hold good-faith talks with the students.
The Autonomous Student Union reacted quickly. They sent a petition to the government and Party on May 2. The petition established guidelines for carrying out a dialogue. It stated that the dialogue should be broadcast live, that Chinese and foreign journalists be present, that a joint communique be issued concerning the results, and that the government representatives be high government and Party o fficials (no lower than deputy premier of the State Council). The students also stated that they reserved the right to hold demonstrations on May 4 and that the government had until noon May 2 to respond to their petition. The deadline passed without a government response 186
(Interviews 2 May 1989, 3 May 1989; Han 1990, 131; China Daily 30
April“ 4 May 1989).
May.3, 1989
Student leaders held secret meetings to plan the May 4 demon
stration. This type of meeting (fei xing ji hui) was called by the same name as the OOP secret meetings in the days of Nationalist rule in
China. Meanwhile, students at Bei Hang (and presumably at other campuses) were busy making headbands and banners for the next day's demonstrations.
Yuan Mu, in a televised press conference, rejected the Auton omous Student Union's framework for dialogue, calling the preconditions for talks "unreasonable, emotionally impulsive and menacing to the government in the form of an ultimatum" (China Daily 4 May 1989). Yuan also stated that the government would not recognize illegal student organizations and that "many signs and facts have proved that a handful of people are organizing the student movement" (China Daily 4 May 1989).
Yuan went on to say that he believed most students were not involved, although a few were. He then added that the U.S.-based Alliance for
Democracy had been playing a role in the disturbances. He concluded by saying that he hoped the students would not demonstrate on May 4 and would not disrupt the meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), also scheduled for May 4 (China Daily 4 May 1989).
Speaking at a meeting commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the May 4th Movement, Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang called for students to maintain stab ility . He told the audience that "stability does not 187 mean the elimination of democracy but democracy should be channeled into order and legality" (China Daily 4 May 1989. Overall, his speech seemed softer than the harsh words of the April 26 editorial and those of
Yuan Mu.
May.4. 1989
In the early morning hours, under a cloud of fear and excitement, students on many campuses began their preparations for the march to Tiananmen Square. University administrators and professors,
perhaps fearing the consequences of a clash between the students and the police or army, tried to persuade the students not to leave their campuses. Word had reached the campuses that the police had set up barricades at major intersections and that troops from the 38th Army had entered the city.
At Bei Hang, Fang Fuzhi, University Vice President and Party
Secretary, and brother of outspoken and b rillian t astrophysicist Fang
Lizhi (who, along with his wife, were in hiding at the American Embassy in Beijing) made a speech on campus warning the students of the dangers
and possible consequences of participating in the march. The exits from the university were locked to prevent the students from leaving.The
students, however, upon learning that Bei Da and Shi Da (Beijing Normal
University) students had already le ft their campuses, became angered
and forced their way out through other exits. Bei Da students were led
by Wang Dan; Shi Da students were led by Wuer Kaxi. Both led the
students skillfully through police barricades and were able to maintain
a peaceful demonstration (Levitt, videotape, 4 May 1989). 188
Perhaps due to the strong government warnings, the conciliatory speech by Party leader Zhao Ziyang, the possibility that many students had not returned from vacation, or just a lack of interest, the May 4 demonstration was not as large as the one on April 27. Nevertheless, the demonstration attracted nearly one million participants and spectators and received enthusiastic support from citizens and workers.
The marchers were greeted at every main overpass and intersection by cheering crowds and, as before, were given food and drink by the spectators. At one point near Fuxingmen (about two miles west of
Tiananmen Square), workers at a construction site, upon seeing the marching students, stopped work, took off th eir hats, whistled, clapped, and yelled support for the demonstrators (Levitt, videotape and photographs, 4 May 1989).
As marchers from nearly every Beijing University headed toward
Tiananmen, they encountered police barricades and troop trucks in many areas. As the main group of students from Haidian D istrict (Bei Da,
Ren Da, Bei Hang, Qinghua, etc.) reached Liubukou intersection (about two blocks west of the Square), they were stopped by several thousand armed police (wujin) and regular police (jingcha). As the demonstrators tried to continue their march, some altercations between the police and demonstrators (or perhaps spectators) broke out. At this point, the thousands of spectators, many of whom had climbed on top of houses, buildings, walls, stores, etc., began to shout, "You don't need to hit people!" ("Bu xu da renl") over and over. After about forty-five minutes the marchers, with the help of many spectators, were able to break through the police line and continue th eir march to the Square. 189
This incident, which was repeated many times at different inter
sections during the march, was a strong indication that many Beijing
residents were willing to risk their own safety to assist the students.
People helping the students were not only risking physical harm, but
also—because the police, army, and security forces were photographing
and videotaping the demonstrations—they were risking arrest and prose
cution. People who had lived through the Cultural Revolution and the
subsequent crackdowns on previous democracy movements were well aware
that they were not only risking severe punishment for themselves, but
also for their entire families.
As the marchers arrived at the Square, they were met by several
troop trucks (38th Division). Thousands of spectators stood between
the trucks and the marchers, and the marchers were able to pass by without incident. It was rumored that many residents had surrounded
a troop truck east of Tiananmen, and, because the soldiers were carrying guns, the people would not let them leave until after the demonstrators IP had passed by (Levitt, photographs and interviews, 4 May 1989).
During the entire demonstration, there were no reports of violence.
The May 4 demonstration included people from a wide range of
locations and occupations. Students had come from Shanghai, Tianjin,
Sichuan, Xinjiang, and other cities. Students also came from Hong Kong
—the f ir s t time students from outside mainland China had participated
in demonstrations on the mainland. The students from Chinese
12 There were many rumors circulating that were impossible to verify. This incident, however, is also reported in Liu Binyan, "Tell the World" What Happened in China and Why (New York: Pantheon Books, 7!«J'9'),"pp"'2'4-28'. 190
University in Hong Kong were a great morale booster for the students, who, after weeks of demonstrations, were showing signs of fatigue. In a gesture of kindness and support, many workers, taxi drivers, and private vehicle owners allowed many marchers to ride in and on their vehicles to and from the Square. Besides students, there were demon strators representing workers. Party and government offices and m inistries, and journalists (Levitt, photographs and videotape).
In past democracy movements, as well as the present one, students had often called for freedom of the press and for the press to report the truth. However, journalists and editors have always been controlled by the Party, which has always viewed the media as its mouthpiece. Journalists and editors (and writers) who have deviated from the Party line were among those most severely punished during the a n ti-rig h tist campaign (1957), the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
(during which they were classified as part of the "stinking ninth category" of enemies of the people), and various other rectifications and anti-bourgeois liberalization campaigns dating back to the 1930s.
Despite this historical record and without regard for their own personal safety, many journalists and editors, according to the famous journalist
Liu Binyan, for the " firs t time in fifty years, decided on th eir own to join the ranks of the demonstrators" (Liu 1990, 22). They carried signs that read:
The media must speak the Truth, Do Notforce us to Fabricate Rumors! (Liu 1990, 22) Open Journalism! News belongs to the People! People Have the Right to Know! We Want to Tell the Truth! Don'tForce Us to lie! We want to speak but can't! 191 Journalists and editors from Xinhua News Agency, the People's Daily, the Workers Daily, the Peasants Daily, and others joined the demon strations (Levitt, photographs and interview; Ming Pao News 5 April
1989).
Other banners carried during the demonstration reflected on the past tradition of the 1919 May 4th Movement as well as more imme diate concerns. For example, some banners read:
carry on the Spirit of the May 4th Movement Democracy and Science Without Democracy there can be No Stability Down with corruption Reform of the Government System Can Stand No Further Delay Long Live the Communist Party Patriotism is Not a Crime (Levitt, videotape, 21 May 1989)
When the students reached Tiananmen Square, they shouted various slogans that reflected their frustration with the position Of the government leaders. For example, they shouted:
We want Dialogue, not scolding Equal Dialogue not idle talk Down with censorship Not chaos Not the Cultural Revolution (Ming Pao News 1989) 13 Student leader Wuer Kaxi also read the Npw May Fourth Manifesto which was inspired by the May 4, 1919 Manifesto of All Beijing Students. The
Manifesto traced the historical context of building and fighting for
"Democracy and Science" in China. In putting the present movement in historical context and speaking for the future, it declared that "This student movement has but one goal, that is, to facilitate the process of modernization by raising high the banners of democracy and science.
1 ? For a complete transcription of the Manifesto, see Han 1990, 136-37. 192 by liberating people from the constraints of feudal ideology, and by promoting freedom, human rights and rule of law" (Han 1990, 136). The
Manifesto also stated that the students' views were not in conflict with the government and called on the government "to accelerate the pace of political reform, to guarantee the rights of the people vested in law, to implement a press law, to permit privately run newspapers, to eradicate corruption, to hasten the establishment of an honest and demo cratic government, to value education, to respect intellectual work, and to save the nation through science" (Han 1990, 136-37).
Meanwhile, across the Square in the Great Hall of the People,
Zhao Ziyang delivered a speech to the members of the Asian Development
Bank. In this speech, Zhao was conciliatory toward the demonstrations.
He stated that the students supported the Four Cardinal Principles and that their demands were reasonable and in agreement with the goals of the Party. He suggested that the government must use democratic and legal means to resolve the students' demands, and he called for consul tative dialogues with all sectors of society including students and workers (China Daily 5 May 1989; Han 1990).
Zhao Ziyang's speech was broadcast several times during the afternoon and evening. The students at Bei Hang (and presumably elsewhere) reacted very favorably to the speech. The student boycott of classes was called off and there was talk on campus that the movement had succeeded in reaching its goals, and that now i t could come to an end. It was now up to the government leaders to make the next move
(Interviews 4 May 1989). 193 May 5, 1989
The People's Daily published Zhao Ziyang's speech and reported a little news about the demonstrations. This was seen by many students as an important step in ending the demonstrations. Some students, however, wanted to continue the movement (Dazibao and student interviews
5 May 1989). Student leaders were sp lit over whether to expand the movement or to keep it limited to students. Some radical leaders, upon learning of Gorbachev's v isit at the upcoming summit and realizing that hundreds of foreign journalists would be present to cover this major historial event, proposed to establish relations with the journalists and continue the movement. The leaders called for continued boycotts of classes until the government agreed to hold a dialogue with representatives of the Autonomous Student Union. Despite these calls for a continued boycott, most students returned to class (Interview 5 May 1989).
Besides the students' own communication network, another source of information was becoming very useful to the students and others--the
Voice of America (VOA) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).
These news sources, which broadcast in English and Chinese, helped to make the students aware of events not only in other cities in and outside of China, but also within Beijing. In China, without the benefit of official media coverage, many people (including foreigners) are unaware of events that take place in their own city. The VOA and the BBC provided this important link in the communication network—a link that was to become more and more important as the movement proceeded. For example, through the VOA and BBC, students in Beijing 194 were able to learn that large demonstrations, many supporting the students in Beijing, took place throughout China and Hong Kong
(Interview 5 May 1989).
At the end of week three, the student movement was running out of steam. The students had been able to form a powerful student union, had skillfully organized a mass demonstration, had gained the support of many lapbaixing, and had gotten the Party leader Zhao Ziyang to state that the movement was a patriotic movement and not turmoil. In encounters with the government leaders, the police, and the army, the students—with the support and help of the 1 aobaixing—seemed to have gotten the best of the situation. With these many accomplishments, it appeared that the movement would come to a peaceful and quiet end.
May 6-8, 1989
The Student Dialogue delegation (Dui Hui Tuan), a separate student organization that was formed on May 3 by democratically elected representatives at Beijing area universities, delivered a petition to the Central Committee, the NPC Standing Committee, and the State
Council. The petition set forth two conditions for dialogue: (1) the students would select their own representatives, and (2) the dialogue would be broadcast live on television and radio. The delegation set
May 8 as the deadline for a government response (Han 1990).
At the same time, the leaders of the Autonomous Student Union were also planning strategies for a dialogue. Their three basic demands were: (1) the government's acceptance of their organization as legal,
(2) repudiation of the April 26 editorial, and (3) dialogue. 195
Meanwhile, student representatives of Bei Hang's Autonomous
Student Union met with university leaders to discuss their grievances.
At the end of the meeting, the students were angry and said that
"nothing was resolved" (Dazibao, 6 May 1989). For several days afterwards, dazibao on campus reflected criticism of and displeasure with their treatment by the university officials during the dialogue.
At Bei Da, students voted to continue the boycott of classes; however, most students returned to classes. Some students were hopeful that the government leaders would act in good faith and hold a dialogue very soon. Other students argued that the boycott should continue in order to put pressure on the government; otherwise, the government leaders would not agree to a dialogue. This issue continued to split the students for several days (China Daily 6 May 1989; dazibao and interviews, 6 May 1989, 7 May 1989).
There was hope that the government leaders would hold a dialogue with the students. Premier Li Peng, viewed by many as a hard-liner, continued Zhao Ziyang's conciliatory manner with the students at a meeting with ADB representatives on May 5. China Daily quoted Li as stating, "Now that the students have resumed classes and the dialogue between the government and the students will continue, I am happy"
(China Daily 6 May 1989, 1). Li also expressed that the students' demands were similar to the government's or, as Li stated, "With our positions basically identical, mutual understanding can certainly be improved through more dialogues" (China Daily 6 May 1989, 1). Li went on to say that the political situation in China was stable. Did this mean that the government leaders would enter into substantial dialogue 196 with unofficial student representatives? Some students felt that it indeed meant exactly that; others disagreed (Interviews, 6 May 1989,
7 May 1989).
May-9, 1989
A petition demanding a sincere and equal dialogue on press freedoms with o fficials in charge of the media that was signed by 1,013 journalists from more than thirty news organizations in Beijing was presented to the All-China Journalist Association.^^ The petition stated that (1) there was not enough news coverage of the student movement and that the reports were not accurate, (2) the statements by
Yuan Mu during the April 29 meeting with the students concerning freedom of the press and censorship do not conform to the facts, and (3) they wished to discuss the reorganization of the Shanghai-based World Eco nomic Herald and the dismissal of the chief editor, Qin Benli (China
Daily 10 May 1989; Han 1990; dazibao 9 May 1989, 10 May 1989; interview
10 May 1989).
Approximately one thousand students demonstrated outside the association's headquarters in support of the journalists. Some students shouted:
Journalists, don't be afraid, demand democracy and report the facts Support the Economic Herald Long Live Qin Benli Open Journalism (Ming Pao News 1989)
^*For a complete transcript of this document, see Han (1990). 197 The students then marched to Tiananmen Square and to the gate of the People's Daily compound (China Daily 10 May 1989; Ming Pao News
1989),
The joining together of the journalists and students established a broad-based force for the student movement. The importance of this linkage should not be underestimated, for without the support of the journalists (representing the official media), information about the movement could not have been as easily spread to people throughout
China. Without th is information, i t is doubtful that the movement could have gained as much support as i t did. The importance of the media in controlling information can be seen from the following dazibao:
Castro to Napoleon—"If you would have had the P.L.A. you would not have lost at Waterloo!"
Napoleon to Castro—"If I had control of C.C.T.V. [China Central Television] and the Central People's Radio Station no one would know that I lost!" (Dazibao, sometime in May) The journalists, like many students, expressed the belief that their demands were consistent with the constitution. Journalists and others speaking on their behalf often referred to Article 35 of the constitution regarding freedom of the press and Article 38, which states, "Insult, libel, false accusation or false incrimination directed against citizens by any means is prohibited" (Constitution 1982), and the report of the Thirteenth Party Congress which states the principle of informing the people about important events. The journalists fe lt that the restrictions put on them by government and Party leaders violated the law. Journalists in Shanghai and Beijing, as well as law students at Bei Da, went as far as to state that they were going to 198 bring lawsuits against authorities for violating the constitution
(Dazibao 10 May 1989, 11 May 1989; interview 10 May 1989; Ming Pao News
1989; Han 1990).
May 10, 1989
Thousands of students bicycled to major media offices in support of the journalists and freedom of the press. This was the largest demonstration since May 4. The students' slogans included the following:
People's reporters speak for the people Freedom of the Press Support the Journalists Support the Economic Herald People's DaiJy Lies to the People deform People's Daily Censorship NO, Press freedom YES (Ming Pao News 1989, 52)
Leaflets distributed by the demonstrators stated:
Bureaucrats use the State Treasury as their own, destroy the country's economy, and cause terrible inflation. Is this not turmoil? (Ming.Pao News 1989, 52)
Following the demonstration, the students returned to their campuses
(Interviews 10 May 1989; China Daily 11 May 1989; notes 10 May 1989).
At Bei Hang, a dazibao announced that 3,000 students from
Tianjin would bicycle to Beijing to meet President Gorbachev. This was perhaps the first indication of the immense excitement and hope that many Chinese attached to the upcoming Gorbachev v isit (Dazibao 10 May 1989). 199
May 11,-1990 The upcoming Gorbachev v isit was very important to the students. The students decided to send a telegram to Gorbachev inviting him to address the students at Bei Da. They also planned to hold a mass demonstration to welcome him to the Capital. It was also announced that
a group of students from Shanghai would come to Beijing to welcome
Gorbachev (Interviews 11 May 1989; Ming Pao News 1989).
The government leaders did little to help calm the situation.
Their response to the students' demands for dialogue, which was to be given on the 8th but was postponed until today (the 11th), was postponed again. Some students who had supported the government's position now began to question the sincerity of leaders' words (Interview 11 May
1989).
May.12, 1989
The Gorbachev v isit was only three days away and the government leaders through Yuan Mu and the press expressed concern about the demon strations. Yuan Mu, speaking at a press conference, expressed hope that the students would consider the political and social stability and the reputation of China in the world and would therefore not cause disturbances during Gorbachev's visit. The People's Daily asked students to consider Zhao Ziyang's appeal that attitudes of calm, restrain t, and order prevail and that problems be handled in a demo cratic and legal manner (Ming.Pao News 1989).
The government, however, in its response to the students' calls for dialogue, did not meet the students' preconditions. The 200
government's response^® called for an informal discussion meeting to
be held May 15, but not for a dialogue. The Autonomous Student Union
issued a response that called the government's answer nothing more than
a rerun of the April 29 meeting and a repetition of their cheap tricks.
The statement called for the youth to "rise up once more" and to protest
this "answer . . . which is to tally devoid of sincerity" (Han 1990,
194). The students would rise up once more, but this time their tactics would change.
At around 2:00 in the afternoon, about one hundred students, many on bicycles, came to Bei Hang to announce a hunger strike that would begin the next day (May 13) and to request that students sign up to participate. The students said they had hoped to get at least two
hundred students to participate. After about th irty minutes the
students, now joined by many Bei Hang students, left to go to other uni
versities (Notes 12 May 1989).
The fourth week of demonstrations, while it seemed to be very calm on the surface, with only one major demonstration involving several thousand students, witnessed two important events: the broadening of the movement to include intellectuals and the announcement of the hunger strike. These two events would become extremely important to the overall movement.
The moderate students who had hoped to have a sincere dialogue, after two delays by the government and then their apparently insincere
proposal, were left without much support. The more radical of the
^^For a complete transcript, see Han (1990, 193). 201 students, who had all along been skeptical of the leaders' sincerity, and whose decision i t was to begin a hunger strike, now met with l i ttl e resistance. Many students had come to view the hunger strike as the only effective way to deal with the government. A dazibao appeared at
Ren Da (People's University) that compared the present government and party structure to the old imperial system, and the present student movement to the 1898 reform movement. The dazibao concluded that the present system, which includes public ownership of property, is even more constraining than the old system. Recalling the earlier reform movement and China's plight, it stated:
There is no course open to us except to rise in a struggle for reform. A century has gone by since the Reform Movement of 1898, and it seems we are stuck at the starting line, trying to change our old.ways and make our country strong. I seem to see Tau Sitong, the vanguard of reform, who, "drew his sword and sent his laughter into the sky," raising his arms and calling out to this generation: "Burst through the net." (Han 1990, 170)
How were the students to "burst through the net"? Many students felt that the hunger strike was the only thing left for them to do.
May 13, 1989 In these bright and beautiful days of May, we are beginning a hunger strike. We are young but we are ready to give up our lives. (Handbill, 13 May 1989) Thus began the May 13 Hunger Strike Declaration by the Beijing
University Hunger Strikers' Group [Jueshi Tuan], and with i t a hunger
Tau Sitong was a young radical reformer and pupil of Kang Youwei. When the Empress Dowager cracked down on the reformers, Tau was one of the "six martyrs" of reform who were executed without trial. Although he could have escaped, as did Kang and others, he chose to stay, proclaiming that since time immemorial no revolution had succeeded without bloodshed (Hsu 1985). 202
strike that quickly escalated the urgency for resolving the nearly
one-month-old student movement. In this declaration the students
proclaimed that they were ready to die in order to "brighten the skies
of the Republic" (Handbill, 13 May 1989). Although the students Claimed
to be prepared to die, they were not prepared for an extended stay at
the Square. Thousands of Beijing citizens were, however, ready and
willing to give them assistance.
Two hundred or so students le ft Bei Da for Tiananmen around
10:30 A.M. A banner at the triangle read: "You Warriors are expected
to Return Victorious" (Ming Pao News 1989, 55). They were joined by
over one thousand students who met at Shi Da, and together they marched
(some were on bicycles) to the Square. Once they arrived at the Square,
they settled around the base of the Monument to the People's Heroes,
which was also the site of the April 5, 1976 Incident. The hunger
strikers were surrounded by a protective ring of people. By evening,
there were between one and two thousand hunger strikers, which was a much larger group than the two hundred the leaders had hoped would turn
out for the strike.
The hunger strikers carried with them only the clothes they were wearing. They wore head bands stating: "Fasting" or "Hunger Strike"
(jueshi), "Democracy," and "Grief," among other things (Levitt,
videotape). The students were not prepared for the chilly and windy
Beijing nights. However, many Beijing residents, upon learning about
the hunger strike either through handbills or dazibao that were posted
throughout Beijing, official news sources, or word-of-mouth, quickly
responded to the students' needs. 203
Thousands of people went to see the students. Doctors and nurses from various hospitals went to offer their assistance. Some people only went to see, while others brought blankets and pillows for the students.
Banners were placed around the students and the monument. One banner quoted Mao Zedong:
Whoever opposes [suppresses] the student movement will come to no good end.
Another quoted Deng Xiaoping:
A Revolutionary Party is a Party That listens To The People, not one That keeps Them silen t. (Translation by Ming. Pao News 1989)
Others had a more ominous sound:
Without Democracy we would rather die. Give me Freedom or give me Death. We love truth more than food. (Notes 13 May 1989)
Although thousands and later hundreds of thousands of people would visit the Square, the students were able to maintain order. Ropes were put up to cordon off the students and later other areas, such as the printing tent, the broadcast station, the student headquarters, and the press area. To enter, students (and others) had to show their IDs.
A lifeline was also established to allow vehicles to come and go either to take students to the hospital or to bring supplies to the Square.
The students, who had earlier listed seven demands, now listed only two; they were: (1) that the government leaders carry out a substantial and concrete dialogue with the students, and (2) recognize the student movement as a patriotic student democracy movement
(Handbill 13 May 1989). Many people expected the government leaders to respond quickly. 204 The timing of the hunger strike, three days before the Sino-
Soviet summit, which brought hundreds of foreign reporters and media personnel to Beijing, made some people think that the government would respond very quickly to end the hunger strike and the demonstrations
(Interviews 13 May 1989 to 15 May 1989). The f ir s t government response, however, was to repeat an earlier call for the students to consider the honor and interests of the country and to be reasonable during
Gorbachev's v isit (Ming Pao News 1989). There were no immediate attempts to meet the students' demands.
May 14, 1989
On the second day of the hunger strike and the day before
Gorbachev was scheduled to arrive in Beijing, government leaders made two attempts to solve the deepening c risis. At 2:00 A.M., the Minister of Education Li Tieying and Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong went to the Square and promised the students that a dialogue would be held and tried to convince them to leave the Square (Ming Pao News 1989). The students did not leave. In the afternoon a second attempt at dialogue was arranged.
At around 4:00 in the afternoon approximately th irty student representatives met with Van Mingfu, member of the Secretariat of the
OOP, and Li Tieying, Minister of the State Education Commission, for a dialogue at the United Front Department building. The students agreed to the meeting with the condition that the meeting be broadcast live.
After presenting the first demand that the April 26 editorial be repu diated, a discussion about the nature of the movement, and the reading 205 of the hunger strike document by a small group of students, the students were informed that the meeting was not being broadcast live. This issue could not be resolved, and the meeting ended. The students once again felt that they had been tricked by the officials. After an attempt by
several intellectuals to solve the dispute ended without success, the
students returned to the Square shortly before midnight. The students,
angry and disappointed, explained their reasons for walking out of the meeting to people gathered at the Square (Han 1990; Ming Pao News 1989;
interview 15 May 1989). The students did, however, agree at the meeting
not to hold any demonstrations the following day.
Support for the students increased. During the day thousands
of people, teachers, writers, journalists, workers, and others went to the Square to give support to the students. Twelve intellectuals, while
supporting the democracy movement, signed a letter requesting that the
students temporarily vacate the Square.The government had issued
an 8:30 P.M. deadline for the students to leave the Square, and some
people feared that force would be used (Ming Pao News 1989; interviews
14 May 1989, 15 May 1989).
Many hunger strikers were already showing signs of weakness.
In the afternoon, several students fainted. It should be noted that
university students survive on a minimal diet and, therefore, their
health was not sufficient to sustain a long period of fasting (Health
worker 17 May 1989). By the time the students agreed to move to the
east side of the Square (away from the Great Hall of the People) to
^^For a complete transcript of this le tte r, see Han (1990, 207-8). 206 allow for Gorbachev's arrival the next day, many students were already weak and unable to walk and had to be carried. Nearly ten students became ill and were taken to the hospital (China Daily 16 May 1989).
It was rumored that three students had prepared gasoline and were going to set themselves on fire if the government did not agree to a dialogue soon. This news, the deteriorating health of the hunger strikers, and the uncompromising position of the government were alarming to many people, including the student leaders. As the situ ation became more dangerous, both from a medical standpoint and from the threat of violent suppression by the army, the student leaders felt a heavy burden of responsibility for the safety of the students (Wuer
Kaixi, CBS Tape Archives, 5 May 1989; interviews, 16 May 1989 and 14
June 1989). It was learned that two student leaders, Chai Ling and Li
Lu, seeing the lives of three thousand hunger strikers in danger and feeling immense responsibility, had been the ones who offered to die first by self-immolation (Liu 1991).
The students, in an attempt to keep control of the situation on the Square, elected representatives to staff a student headquarters.
Chai Ling, a twenty-three-year-old graduate student at Shi Da, was elected commander-in-chief; her husband, Feng Congde, a former student at Beijing Remote Sensing Institution, and Li Lu of Nanjing University were elected vice-commanders. The situation was, however, quickly getting out of hand. The hunger strikers, now numbering three thousand, along with the thousands of students and citizens who went to the
Square, made the situation difficult to control. The students, however, worked diligently to avoid any conflicts that would give the government 207 any justification for bringing in the police or the arny to suppress the movement (Interviews, 14 May 1989 through 16 May 1989).
The government deadline to vacate the Square passed without incident. The students, joined by teachers, workers, and other concerned citizens dissatisfied with the government's inaction, prepared for another night on the Square.
May 15, 1989
President Gorbachev's v isit to Beijing was disrupted by the demonstrations. The official welcoming ceremony that was planned for the Square was moved to the airport. Other plans for Gorbachev to v is it the Square were also canceled (China Daily 16 May 1989).
The students, who had voluntarily moved to the opposite side of the Square to allow Gorbachev's welcoming ceremony to take place on the Square, continued to make friendly overtures to Gorbachev. Banners in Russian, welcoming Gorbachev and calling for democracy and reforms, were erected on the Square. People carried banners proclaiming, "We need Glasnost," "Welcome Gorbachev," and carried portraits of Gorbachev with characters that said:
Salute to the ambassador of democracy Democracy is our common IDEAL The Soviet Union has Gorbachev, who do we have? (Ming Pao News 1989, 64; Levitt videotape 15 May 1989)
Several student representatives took a letter inviting Gorbachev to visit the students to the Soviet Embassy. The invitation was politely rejected (Ming Pao News 1989). 208 As the health of the hunger strikers became more critical, the calls for the government leaders to do something to end the strike became more numerous, more urgent, and more emotional. Five hundred
Bei Da faculty members signed a letter asking the leaders to adopt all possible measures to prevent the situation from getting worse. They requested that the leaders hold a dialogue with the students as soon as possible. The China Daily quoted a Bei Da professor as saying, "My students have been fasting here for three days, so I must come to see them. Why don't government officials come?" (China Daily 16 May 1989,
1). As the Bei Da professors marched to the Square, they carried a banner that read:
The students love us; and we love the students. Students are fasting, and our hearts ache. The government is cold-hearted, and takes no notice. The lives of three thousand students are hanging on a string. We call on the whole world to protest against the government, and demand that it return us our students, return our human rights! (Liu 1989, 32-33). Emotional pleas were also made by other citizens. One old woman standing on Changan Avenue west of the Square carried a sign that read:
I don't know anything about government or democracy, but I do know that our children are starving on Tiananmen Square and the government doesn't care. Please help save the children. (Levitt, notes, 15 May 1989)
By the evening of the third day of the hunger strike, 103 strikers had fainted and were hospitalized (China Daily 16 May 1989).
The constant sounds of ambulances going between the Square and various hospitals sent alarm, fear, and anger into people's hearts. And it seemed as though all of Beijing was pouring their hearts out to the students. People from all walks of life continued to bring blankets, pillows, and water to the students. Workers brought materials to erect 209 tent-like coverings for students. Medical workers set up emergency shelters on the Square to fa c ilita te health care for the hunger strikers. People also brought food for the thousands of students and others who were camped out on the Square along with the hunger strikers.
At Bei Hang many other people, including professors and workers, waited until evening, perhaps remembering the harsh punishments during the
Cultural Revolution and fearing being seen by security o fficials, before they sent supplies to the students. However, as the situation became more serious, people became more open in expressing their anger at the government and in showing their support for the students.
Li Tieying and Van Mingfu once again met with student represen tatives in an attempt to end the crisis. Li Tieying said that conflicts brought about by the reforms were causing the present upheaval, a position that was echoed by State President Yang Shangkun in his meeting with President Gorbachev. Van Mingfu's classification of the movement as patriotic and calls for the students to act reasonably were not sufficient to break the impasse (Ming Pao News 1989).
Three thousand hunger strikers and thousands of students from thirty-three Beijing universities, Nankai and Tianjin Universities in
Tianjin, and East China Normal University in Shanghai, along with thousands of other people, prepared for yet another—their third—night on the Square (China Daily 16 May 1989; Levitt videotape 15 May 1989).
May 16, 1989
Several thousand people from all walks of life went to the
Square to show their support for the students and their anger and 210 frustration at government leaders for not making sincere efforts to end the hunger strike or calm the situation, a situation that was becoming difficult for the government or the students to control.
Teachers, students, journalists, writers, workers, represen tatives of China's democratic parties, medical workers, and citizens went to the Square. The number of demonstrators, while very large, possibly represented even more people. In China, everyone who is employed or in school belongs to a work unit (danwei). The demon strators carried signs representing many work units; however, all of the people who belong to a work unit could not, did not, or were afraid to physically participate in the demonstrations. It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain the number of people within a work unit who actu ally supported the demonstrations. A person's work unit controls most aspects of a person's life. It controls not only housing, but also medical care, social services, schooling for children, food and other ration coupons, birth control, etc. Without a work unit, very few of these services are available to a person. The protestors, therefore, put themselves and their families in great danger by risking getting kicked out of their work unit. Their work unit also was put in danger of losing government funding and other government privileges. Still, people representing numerous work units demonstrated.
Educators, including teachers from nursery, primary, middle, and high schools, university professors from Beijing as well as many other parts of China, went to the Square and wrote letters to government officials in support of the students. One group carried a sign reading,
"Teachers from Eleven Provinces." Bei Da professors, some of whom 211 formed a "League to Protect the Students," wrote a "Letter to the
Nation" demanding that the government leaders hold a dialogue, not repress the movement, and not persecute the leaders. Presidents from ten Beijing universities released a statement in support of the students and warning that the hunger strike was reaching a c ritical point and that only a dialogue would end the crisis (Notes 17 May 1989; Ming Pao
News 1989).
Workers, journalists, and intellectuals continued to support the students. Workers carried signs proclaiming, "We support the students" and "Workers with the students" (Notes 16 May 1989). One thousand intellectuals signed a "May 16 Declaration" that declared that the present movement "carries on and surpasses the May Fourth Movement."
The demonstration, although neither anti-Party nor anti-government, called for the government to meet the students' demands and criticized the leaders for mishandling the situation. In particular, they criticized the threat of force to suppress the movement. The decla ration stated:
The lessons of history are worth remembering: the Beijing government of 1919, the Kuomintang government of the 1930s and 1940s, and the Gang of Four of the late 1970s, and other such dicta torial regimes all resorted to violence to suppress student movements, and as a result, all without exception were nailed to history's p illa r of shame. History has proven that those who suppress the student movements will come to no good end. (Han 1990, 215). The declaration ended with a call for intellectuals to step forward and struggle for a "politically democratic, economically developed, modernized country!" (Han 1990, 220-21). 212
College students were joined by middle and high school students. One group carried a sign stating: "You may fall, but we will come"
(Ming Pao News 1989, 65). Citizen groups and democratic parties also went to the Square to support the students. People formed the "Beijing
Citizens' Support Group" and the "Unemployed Youth Support Group," the latter being reminiscent of the 1979 petitioners' protests. For the f ir s t time since the "100 Flowers" campaign in 1957, two of China's democratic parties--the China Democratic League and the China Associ ation for Promoting Democracy—sp lit from the CCP and voiced support for the students.
Medical personnel also went to the Square in large numbers.
Some personnel went to the Square after their regular hours. Many patients also offered their assistance. Many patients, even some who were very ill, voluntarily left the hospitals to allow for more room for the students and to allow the health care workers to devote their time to saving the students. One very ill elderly man who was attempting to leave the hospital but was prevented by doctors, weeping, said, "I'm old. I have no other way to help [the students]" (Notes 17
May 1989). Throughout the hunger strike there were many reports of patients voluntarily leaving the hospital and health workers going for up to three days without sleep to help the students.
By the evening of the 16th, there wer 3,147 students taking part in the hunger strike, and for them and others on the Square health risks were becoming very serious. According to China Daily, 342 students had already been hospitalized and strikers were fainting at a rate of one every six minutes (China Daily 17 May 1989). Even though 213 student leaders organized people to clean up and take away refuse, the
Square was become cluttered with trash, which posed a health threat to everyone on the Square. The situation for the students was becoming critical. Teh to twelve hunger strikers from the Central Drama Institute announced that i f the government did not give them an answer to the student demands by 3:00 in the afternoon, they would also refuse any water. For the students already weak from the hunger strike, i t was extremely dangerous to stop taking in liquids. Many people feared for their safety. Still, the government gave no response and the hunger/water strike (xueshi) began as planned in the northwest corner of the Square.
At around 5:30 P.M., Van Mingfu once again went to the Square in an effort to get the students to agree to leave. Speaking on behalf of the Party Central Committee, according to the China Daily, "he
assured the students that they would not be punished in any way in the future—nor would any of their hundreds of thousands of supporters"
(China Daily 17 May 1989, 1). Van, however, was not able to meet any of the student demands. Therefore, the students voted not to end the
hunger strike.
As the health of the strikers became more critical and sounds
of ambulance sirens filled the air, anger for the leaders increased. Banners appeared denouncing the "old men" and criticizing Premier Li
Peng. Some banners read: We are through with politics of old men. If he [Li Peng] can't talk to the people he better step down (Ming Pao News 1989, 65). 214
The longer the situation continued, the more angry the people became and the more vicious the banners and shouts became.
Meanwhile, during the Summit, Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang discussed the current situation with President Gorbachev. Li Peng said China was prepared to improve its record on freedom, democracy, and human rights in the process of political reform. He also stated that capitalist countries do not have a monopoly on freedom, democracy, or human rights and that citizens "in socialist countries were also entitled to enjoy such things" (China Daily 17 May 1989, 1).
Zhao Ziyang discussed China's political system and political reforms. Zhao, for the first time, publicly announced that although
Deng Xiaoping had quit all his Party positions in 1978, since the 13th
National Party Congress in 1987 the Party had always reported to and consulted him on major issues. By revealing publicly what nearly every informed Chinese and China scholar already knew—namely, that Deng is and has been the supreme leader in China despite the fact that his only official post was Chairman of the M ilitary Commission—may not have been alarming to most people; however, i t was alarming to Deng Xiaoping.
Deng was outraged that Zhao had revealed a Party secret and the fact that decision-making power in practice is different from that stipulated in the constitution. (Chapter V will deal more specifically with this event.) Zhao also stated that China must follow the leadership of the
CCP and not introduce a multi-party system. He went on to say that the party must abide by the constitution and laws in carrying out its duties; in that way "Chinese citizens can enjoy genuine democracy [a 215 term used during the 1986 demonstrations] and freedom under the leadership of the Party" (China Daily 17 May 1989, 1).
Neither Li Peng nor Zhao Ziyang specifically addressed the student demands, nor did they offer to meet any of the demands. The students, meanwhile,' prepared for their fourth consecutive night on the
Square. China Daily quoted one student as saying, "I will keep on fasting until the government acknowledges that this student demon stration is patriotic and democratic in spirit, and agrees to hold substantive dialogue with us" (China Daily 17 May 1989, 1). Another student added, "I won't stop until I fall down and am taken to the hospital" (China Daily, 17 May 1989, 1). The government leaders and the students were locked into a situation where neither side was willing to or was perhaps capable of compromise.
May 17, 1989
In an attempt to end the c ris is. Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang, on behalf of the entire Politburo, in a written statement broadcast to the students on the Square at around 2:00 A.M., made an appeal for the students to end their hunger strike. Zhao said the government recognized the students' patriotic spirit in calling for democracy, law, further reforms, and an end to corruption. He went on to say, "We also hope that all students will exercise calm, reason, restraint, and order, take the interests of the whole country into account, and safeguard stab ility and unity" (China Daily 18 May 1989, 1). He also promised that the students would never be punished for their actions. Zhao 216
Ziyang did not address the students' demands and, therefore, the major ity of voting students rejected this plea (China Daily 18 May 1989).
Despite early morning rains, between one and two million people marched in Beijing in the largest mass demonstration in at least one month and perhaps stnce the founding of the People's Republic of China
(Ming Pao News 1989; China Daily 18 May 1989). The demonstrators included workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, government bureaucrats, and noncombatant officers of the People's Liberation Army.
As the masses of people marched by and/or through the Square carrying banners and shouting slogans, other people standing by applauded and shouted support and encouragement.
The marchers carried banners and shouted slogans supporting the students and th eir demands, calling for democracy and reforms, c r iti cizing the government leaders and their policies, criticizing 18 corruption, bureaucratism, and other governmental problems. Banners, dazibao, and artwork were posted on flagpoles, the monument, and other places on and around the Square. Banners near the hunger strikers read:
The Soul of China Hunger Strike The People will never forget—1989 (Levitt, videotape 17 May 1989; photo 1989) A giant poster with two people on one side and a naked woman kneeling with her arms raised and looking upwards on the other side, and two large characters in the middle that read:
SAVE THE CHILDREN (Videotape 17 May 1989) was set up near the students who were on the hunger and water strike.
18 For a more complete listin g , see Appendix E. 217 There was also a huge poster with a very large eyeball with tears falling down that was carried through the Square.
Besides the demonstrations, a growing number of individuals and groups wrote and sent public le tte rs to government and party leaders.
Many of the letters were (in part) published in official papers and/or broadcast by the official media. Letters were sent by persons repre senting democratic parties, government and party offices, departments and ministries, media organizations, party members, intellectuals, and others. Most letters requested that the government meet the students' demands in order to end the hunger strike as quickly as possible. While most of the le tte rs were respectful and polite in conveying their urgent appeals, some were not. The "May 17th Declaration," signed by twelve IQ intellectuals, was representative of the more critical letters. The
May 17th Declaration stated, "The Qing Dynasty has already been extinct for seventy-six years [sic]. Yet China still has an emperor without a crown, an aged, fatuous dictator" (Han 1990, 221). It went on to claim that due to the absolute power enjoyed by a dictator, China had lost its sense of responsibility and its humanity. Similar to this attack on Deng Xiaoping was a large painting of Deng dressed to look pQ like the Empress Dowager. These and other attacks on various leaders, primarily Premier Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun, continued throughout the movement.
IQ For a transcript of this and a few other le tte rs, see Han (1990, 221-22). ^^he Empress Dowager, even though she was not the legal ruler of China, nevertheless ruled China "behind a silk curtain" during the latter years of the Qing Dynasty before its fall in 1911. 218
There were continued reports in the official news media and from unofficial sources of demonstrations in other Chinese cities in support of the Beijing hunger strikers. Sixty thousand students in Shanghai were reported to be staging a sit-in demonstration in front of the municipal headquarters and in the People's Square, including five
hundred hunger strik ers. Ten thousand students were reported to be
staging a sit-in that was blocking the Yangzi River bridge in Wuhan.
CCTV showed pictures of demonstrations in Xian, Shanghai, Nanjing,
Guangzhou, and Chenadu. Students in other cities were not only demon strating in support of the Beijing students, many were also going to
Beijing to participate in the demonstration (China Daily 18 May 1989;
CCTV 17 May 1989; notes 17 May 1989).
Students who came from other parts of China to Beijing, while benefiting the movement in many ways (e.g., demonstrating widespread support, giving psychological support to the students, and later helping inform people outside of Beijing about the events), also added to the already difficult problem of decision making for the students. By the
17th, there were already several groups of students who had formed various organizations, and as more groups arrived, instituting demo cratic decision-making procedures became very difficult for the student
leaders (Notes 17 May 1989 through 20 May 1989).
By the end of the day, the situation for the hunger strikers became even more c ritic a l. Many health care workers who were working frantically to save the students, many of whom had been taken to the
hospital and then returned to the Square to continue their hunger
strike, were warning that many of the students' health was reaching a 219 c ritical point and that they were in danger of permanent health damage
or death. According to news reports, between 1,100 and 2,000 students
had already been taken to the hospital. The ambulances, despite the mass numbers of demonstrators, were able to go to and from the hospitals
because the students were able to set up passage lanes, called
"lifelin es," from the Square throughout the center of Beijing. And as
night settled on the Square, the hunger strikers, students, and many
other people prepared for their fifth night on the Square.
May 18, 1989
At around 5:00 in the morning, Politburo members Zhao Ziyang,
Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Hu Qili went to Xiehe Hospital to v isit several
hospitalized hunger strikers. The leaders, according to televised
coverage, spent most of their time talking individually with students
and health care personnel about the students' health. Near the end of
the visit, one student sat up in bed and asked permission to say a few things to the leaders. They agreed, and he said:
I would like to say a few things—is that OK? [The leaders nodded their heads.] Some say that the demonstrating students are against the leadership of the Communist Party. That is nonsense, because China has four major problems and whoever is in power couldn't solve these. One is overpopulation, two is an energy shortage, three is economic backwardness, and four is a low level of education. Whoever is in power, it is impossible to eliminate these problems in the near future. We need the Communist Party to lead the country because no other party in China is strong enough to be in that position. In the beginning the party had hope and China had hope. Now many people feel that the party is hopeless and therefore the country is hopeless. Therefore, in college there are four groups of students: (1) wang pai—those who like to play Chinese chess [majianj]; (2) tou pal--those who want to pass TOEFL te st so they can go abroad to study; (3) xian pai—those who like to dance; and (4) jiu pai—those who like to have fun and travel (so they waste th eir col lege years because they think the situation 220
is hopeless). It is important for the party to restore its tarnished image. Do you agree with everything I said? [They all said that they agreed.] . . . What the people hate most is official corruption [guandao]. If yoii want to do something about th is you should start with your own sons. If the son is engaged in corruption, the father should punish him right away. . . . I think many Chinese have lost hope for the Chinese government. We should learn from America how to rebuild the people's hope (i.e., after Vietnam) or China has no future. (Tape of CCTV broadcast 18 May 1989) The leaders nodded in agreement, quickly shook his hand, and then, after thanking the health care workers, left the hospital. This hospital visit was broadcast several times during the day on local and national television stations (CCTV 18 May 1989).
Did the leaders agree with everything this student said? Did they agree that the students did not oppose the Communist Party or its leadership? Did they agree that many people were disillusioned and felt like the Party and the country were hopeless? From the broadcast it appeared that they did.
At around 11:00 in the morning. Premier Li Peng, Politburo member Van Mingfu, Minister of Education Li Tieying, Beijing Mayor Chen
Xitong, and Beijing party leader Li Ximing met with several student representatives in the Great Hall of the People. The student repre sentatives included student leaders Wuer Kaixi (Shi Da), Wang Dan (Bei
Da), Xiong Yan (Bei Da), Shao Jiang (Bei Da), Wang Zhixin (Zheng Fa), and Wang Chahua (postgraduate, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences).
The meeting, the f ir s t between the Premier and the students, began in an atmosphere of hope that the hunger strike could be ended and the situation resolved. However, in the premier's opening remarks i t was clear that the students' demands were not going to be met. 221 During the meeting some students threatened to walk out, and, Li Peng, talking in a voice and manner that resembled a stern lecture, was at times visibly angry. Below are a few excerpts from the nearly one-hour meeting:
Li Peng: I am glad to see you. Today we will talk only about one thing: how to get the fasting students out of their present plight. The party and government are deeply concerned and worried about the matter of their health. Let's solve this problem first and other matters can be discussed later. . . . You are all young, no more than twenty-two or twenty-three years of age. My youngest son is older than you. . . . To us you are like our own children. Wuer Kaixi [interrupting]: Premier Li, if we go on like this, it seems we won't have enough time. We should enter substantial talks as soon as possible. Just now you said we would discuss only one thing, but in fact it was not you who invited us here but rather i t was so many people on Tiananmen Square who asked you to come out and talk with us. So, as to how many questions we should discuss, it is for us to decide. Fortunately, our point of view is unanimous. . . . F irst, we think Comrade Zhao Ziyang or Comrade Li Peng had better go to Tiananmen Square and talk directly with the students there. Secondly, the People's Daily should put out another edito rial to negate its editorial on April 26, and apologize to people all over the country and acknowledge the great significance of the current student movement. . . . As for the dialogue, it should be an openly, equal, direct, and sincere one with representatives of the masses of students. . . . Wang Dan: We representatives here actually represent the fasting students on Tiananmen Square and assume the responsibility for the safety of their lives. So we hope every leader can make known his opinion on the two questions we have raised. As in iti ators and organizers of the hunger strike, we are all worried about our fellow fasting students' lives. . . . Based on such a thinking, we hope the two questions can be expounded as soon as possible. . . . Wang Zhixin: The slogan of democracy and science has been chanted for seventy years, but it has never been materialized. Today we are chanting the slogan again. . . . How does the government feel now that people from all walks of life , including kindergarten teachers, have joined the demonstrations? Wang Chauhua: I believe that the students are staging a demo- cratic movement of their own accord to gain the rights stipulated in the constitution. . . . Li Peng: . . . neither the government nor the Party Central Committee has ever said that the students are arousing turmoil. We have been affirming the students' patriotic enthusiasm, and many 222 things you've done are right. . . . But, the development of the situation does not depend on your best intention, desirable expec tation, and patriotic enthusiasm. . . . Beijing these days is in a state of anarchy. I say it again. I have no intention of letting the students be blamed. . . . We cannot ignore the present situ ation. We will protect the students' lives, factories, the achievement of socialism as well as our Capital. . . . Turmoils have happened many times in Chinese history. In the beginning, many people did not intend to arouse turmoil but finally i t happened. . . . I hope that they end the hunger strike and receive treatment in hospital earlier. . . . Wuer Kaixi: . . . the key to solving the problem lies not in persuading us here to leave, but in persuading those out in the Square to leave. I have made it clear the conditions for their leaving. . . . Let us stop squabbling and give a quck answer to our demands, because students are s till suffering from hunger in the Square. Otherwise, we will say that the government has no sincerity at all and it is unnecessary for us representatives to sit here any longer. Wang Dan; If Premier Li thinks that the students' protests will lead to social upheavals, I say, in the name of all the students, that the government should shoulder the blame. (From excerpts in China Daily 24 May 1988, 4)
This meeting was later broadcast on radio and television.
Following the meeting, Li Peng, while shaking a student's hand, said,
"I never said this was turmoil" (Wo mei shou zhe.shi dong luan) (CBS
News tape archives 18 May 1989). This scene was not broadcast; however, if it represented his personal feelings, it was not clear from his remarks during the meeting.
The meeting highlighted the great distance between the position of government leaders and that of the students, and the fact that neither group was willing to compromise. The government leaders were not willing to meet or even address the students' two demands, and the students were not willing to stop the hunger strike nor leave the Square until those demands were met. As the meeting ended, i t appeared that there was no hope for a quick solution to the situation. 223 In the early morning hours, the Beijing Red Cross mobilized
ninety public buses to shelter the hunger strikers from wind and heavy
rains. The rain, the unsanitary conditions on the Square, and the
students' weak condition created a life-threatening situation to the
hunger strikers.
Despite the health risks, many students returned to the Square
(after a brief hospital stay). One student had been in and out of a
Beijing Emergency center eighteen times (China Daily 19 May 1989).
Doctors warned that the students were risking permanent health damage
and noted "that some students had already been diagnosed as having
kidney deterioration, pneumonia, and bleeding in the stomach" (China
Daily 19 May 1989, 1).
During the day, heavy rains fell on Beijing; s t i l l , hundreds
of thousands of people once again marched to the Square, including
increasing numbers of students from outside Beijing. Students from
outside areas, according to a China Daily report, were "flooding into Beijing by train at a rate of 50,000 a day to back their fellows on
hunger-strike in Tiananmen Square and they are travelling free with the
support of the railway workers" (China Daily 19 May 1989, 1). Students were arriving from most of China's large cities and were often accom
panied by th eir teachers. Seventeen thousand of a total twenty thousand
students from Tianjin's Nankai and Tianjin Universities and over forty
thousand total people had already arrived in Beijing, according to the
report. The number of demonstrators and hunger strikers in other cities
had also increased. For example, in Shanghai 400,000 people were 224
participating in the sit-in demonstrations and 300 were on a hunger
strike (China.Daily 19 May 1989).
As people continued to go the the Square, work slow-downs and
high rates of absenteeism were seen in some Beijing factories. Nearly
one-third of the workers in the No. 1 Machine Tool Factory were taking
part in the demonstrations, which caused the factory to "basically cease
production" (China Daily 19 May 1989, 1). Workers from the Beijing
General Internal Combustion Engine Plant and the Beijing Jeep Corpo
ration Ltd. also participated in the demonstrations. The China Daily
article quoted a factory leader as saying, "Things will become even
worse i f the students' demands are not met" (China Daily 19 May 1989,
1). The students' demands were not met and by evening more than two
thousand students had been taken to the hospital. CCTV interviewed
people on the Square about the situation. One mother of a hunger
striker, in tears, said that her son had not eaten for five days and was very ill. She said that she supported her son but was sick with worry. She also said that she hoped the government would meet with the
students as soon as possible. The report also stated that strikers were
being taken to the hospital at a rate of one every two minutes
(Videotape recording of TV broadcast 18 May 1989). As night fe ll, the
students voted to continue their hunger strike.
May.19, 1989
Shortly before dawn, Zhao Ziyang, followed by Li Peng, went to
Tiananmen Square to meet the students, as had been requested by 225
literally millions of people. Zhao Ziyang entered a bus holding
students from Beijing Normal University and talked with the students.
Li Peng did not address the students and le ft after about two minutes
(CCTV 20 May 1989).
As Zhao addressed the students, he appeared very emotional and
at times seemed to be on the verge of tears. Zhao said, "We came too
late. You have criticized us; this you should have done." Zhao praised the students' patriotism and said that he knew all the students wanted the country to improve. He said he did not come to have a dialogue, but that the channels for dialogue were open; however, he added, i t may be too late for many students if they wait for the dialogue before they end the hunger strike. He pleaded with the students to end the hunger strike. Zhao said, "You are still young, not like us, we are already old. We don't matter." He then added, "You should live to see the realization of the four modernizations" (Translation from videotape of
CCTV broadcast 19 May 1989). Zhao ended his talk by telling the students that the current situation should not continue in the capital of the nation. After shaking hands and signing autographs, Zhao left the Square (CCTV broadcast 19 May 1989).
Students on the Square had already heard rumors that the government was preparing to announce martial law in Beijing and discussed strategies throughout the day. At around 6:00 P.M., the northern part (bei bu) of the hunger strike delegation (jueshituan) voted to end the hunger strike. The southern part (beibu), which included Bei Da and Shi Da, s till continued the hunger strike. Students from the Autonomous Student Union (Gao xiao lian he zizhi hui or Gao 2 2 6
Lian), who some students argued really wanted democracy and freedom, and students from the Dialogue Delegation (Dui hui Tuan), who some students argued really wanted power and close connections with government leaders (possibly Zhao Ziyang), could not agree on a strategy. Some students/people argued that the students should leave the Square and wait for the convening of the National People's Congress in late June to hold further demonstrations i f necessary. Others argued that they must hold the Square until the government met th eir demands
(Notes 20 May 1989, 24 May 1989). Some students, knowing that Li Peng and the conservatives
(hard-liners) had won the power struggle, argued that the hunger strike would no longer be effective. Some other students acknowledged that after one week the hunger strike would have been difficult to sustain.
An agreement was reached, and at 9:00 P.M. the students announced that the hunger strike was over and that it would be replaced by a sit-in demonstration (Notes 20 May 1989, 24 May 1989).
The discussions continued. Many students,primarily Beijing students, agreed to leave the Square. Other students, primarily from outside Beijing who had just recently arrived, wanted to continue the sit-in on the Square. Some students, perhaps fearing violence by the army, continued to argue for all students to leave the Square. Most, but not a ll, students fin ally agreed to leave the Square; however, it was too late. The government acted f ir s t (Notes 20 May 1989, 24 May
1989).
21 There were also professors, teachers, school administrators, etc. who were trying to help bring an end to the crisis. 227 At around 10:00 in the evening, Li Peng, in an emergency meeting of the Party, government, and army cadres, in a fiery speech that resembled the April 26 editorial declared, "We must take resolute measures to put an end to the turmoil" (CCTV 19 May 1989). Li called on all cadres to unite as one and to strictly obey party discipline.
He also called on all government office workers, security police, armed police, manufacturing and commercial workers, and people in all aca demic levels to do their duties and maintain their normal routines. Li stated:
What we decide will surely receive the support of all Party members, all members of the Youth League, all the workers, peasants, and intellectuals, people from all walks of life, and members of all democratic parties. It will also receive support from the People's Liberation Army, which is delegated by the Constitution to defend the country and the people. Meanwhile, we hope that the majority of people will give their full support to the PLA and the police in restoring order in Beijing. (China Daily 20 May 1989, 1 ) ------During the speech, Li appeared angry and often shouted and raised his f is t. Li's speech was followed by a short speech by President Yang
Shangkun.
Yang Shangkun explained that the situation in the capital had deteriorated and that it was impossible for the government or the State
Council to function. He said that because the police had been working overtime for almost a month, i t was impossible not to ask the army to restore order in the capital. Yang stated, "We moved the troops in precisely for that purpose: to maintain order, not to suppress the students. You will see that I am right in the next few days" (CCTV
19 May 1989). He concluded by stating that he hoped everyone would understand and support this action. 2 2 8
It was then announced that by order of Premier Li Peng, and in accordance with the constitution, martial law would be carried out in certain areas of Beijing beginning at 10:00 in the morning (May 20,
1989). Martial law was to be imposed by the Beijing municipal government.
Beijing was surrounded by army troops and vehicles, and when i t was known that the troops were going to enter the city, people from all walks of life went out to the streets to stop their advance.
This, the fifth week of the pro-democracy movement, was the most dramatic. With the declaration of the hunger strike, the movement, which had primarily been a student movement, became a nationwide "people movement" as people from all walks of life demonstrated their support for the students. The expansion of the movement was, in part, due to the five days of uncensored reporting about the demonstration in the official media.
There were, perhaps, several explanations for the unprecedented openness in the official media coverage of the demonstrations.
(1) Freedom of the press had long been a demand of intellectuals in
China (see Chapter IV); therefore, in these, the largest ever demon strations in Chinese history, i t was natural that there would be more demands for freedom of the press. (2) Many media workers supported the students, as evidenced by the fact that thousands of journalists marched in demonstrations throughout China. (3) There was resentment among media workers about Yuan Mu's comments during the April 28 meeting with students, when he stated that there was no censorship of the media in China. There was also resentment over student criticism 229 of the media during the demonstrations. In fact, one of the major student demands was the retraction of the April 26 editorial. As a reaction to this, journalists carried banners during the demonstration stating, "We want to speak the truth but can't" and "We didn't write the April 26th editorial" (Videotape and photographs 4 May 1989).
(4) The presence of the foreign media also influenced some media workers. Students were more friendly and open to foreign journalists than to Chinese journalists, who many fe lt were not or could not accurately report their views. Foreign networks used CCTV fa c ilitie s to satellite their stories to their respective countries, and Chinese and foreign journalists often worked in close proximity to each other; therefore, Chinese journalists were exposed to foreign methods of journalism. This caused resentment among some Chinese journalists and a desire in some to duplicate these foreign methods (Interview, American journalist, 15 June 1989). (5) According to Liu Binyan (1990) and Han
(1990), supporters of Zhao Ziyang used the media to gather support for the reform faction. That is , the openness in the media was due to the power struggle within the party. The fact that once the hard-liners
(Li Peng, Yang Shangkun) gained control of the power struggle and announced martial law on May 19, 1989, the open coverage of the demon strations virtually ended, perhaps supports their views.
During the week, over two thousand hunger strikers had been hospitalized, but no progress had been made by the students or the government to end the c ris is. As portraits of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai appeared on the Square, and calls for Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping to step down increased, i t seemed as i f the pro-democracy movement was really a 230 movement to kick out "bad rulers" and replace them with "good rulers."
While i t is true that the portraits of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were insulting to Deng Xiaoping (Mao had purged Deng twice) and Li Peng, they also expressed some people's view that Mao and Zhou were not involved in corruption and were willing to admit their mistakes and talk to the people—things that Deng and Li were criticized for not doing. Never theless, there was still no clear definition of the students' or the people's view of democracy and how i t should be instituted in China.
For many, i t seemed to be no more than guaranteeing by law existing constitutional rights, to some it was perhaps an end to autocratic rule, and to others it was forcing "bad rulers" to resign. This lack of understanding about democracy was to be addressed later with the creation of a Democracy University on the Square.
As the week ended, so did hope that a compromise between the government leaders and the students could be reached. The imposition of martial law was an ominous ending to a week that was highlighted by the hunger strike and failed attempts to end the c risis. The citizens and students who were showing signs of fatigue and were turning out in decreasing numbers were, however, stirred once again to come out in force to take action against government policies.
May 20, 1989
After the announcement of martial law and the acknowledgment that troops had been ordered to enter the city proper, people from all walks of life rushed out to the streets to stop them. The night was fille d with rumors of troop movements in a certain areas, followed by 231 a mobilization of people rushing to those areas. People went by bicycles, cars, trucks, and on foot. Bicyclists and motorcyclists rushed from one area to another, informing people of the latest devel opments. Intersections were blocked by buses, large coal trucks, cement tra ffic dividers, and anything else that people could find. Signs were posted on many barricades that read, "The People's Army Loves the
People. The People Love the People's Army" (Levitt, videotape, 20 May
1989). Throughout the night, people gathered at major intersections.
All tra ffic was stopped and IDs checked. No army or police were allowed past the barricades (Videotape and notes 20 May 1989).
At around 2:30 A.M., word was passed that army troops heading for Bei Da campus had been blocked on a road out by the Summer Palace, which is northwest of the city. A group of people from an area around
Bei Hang immediately le ft to help stop the troops. All roads leading to the Summer Palace were blocked by people and barricades. The roads around Bei Da its e lf were blocked by several public buses that were taken from a nearby bus terminal. At about 4:00 A.M., several buses full of soldiers, which had been surrounded by civilians, were blocked about two miles northwest of the Sunmier Palace. People talked to the soldiers, asking them what their orders were and what they were going to do. The soldiers appeared frightened and surprised, and they never answered. The troop buses were blocked by several large trucks, heavy road repair equipment vehicles, and farm tractors. The people were determined not to let the troops past them (Videotape 20 May 1989).
This scene was repeated throughout Beijing as people, angered by the 232 imposition of martial law by Li Peng and the bringing in of the army to Beijing, were determined to stop the advance of the army.
During the day, three martial law decrees were issued by Beijing
Mayor Chen Xitong. The decrees were broadcast on radio and television and printed in the People's.Daily. Below are excerpts from those decrees.
Martial Law Decree No.-1 (1) Starting at 10:00 A.M., May 20, 1989, martial law will be imposed in certain areas of Beijing. (2) Protests, petitions, demonstrations, student and worker strikes, and other mass activities are strictly forbidden. (3) It is stric tly forbidden to create and spread rumors, establish contacts, make speeches, distribute leaflets, and to foment turmoil. (4) Attacks on Party, Government, and m ilitary leaders and organs are s tric tly forbidden. . . . (5) If any of the above activities occur the armed police and the PLA have the power to adopt any method necessary to deal with the situation.
Martial Law Decree No. 2 (1) Foreigners must obey all martial law orders. (2) Foreigners are forbidden to become involved with activities of Chinese citizens that violate martial law. (3) O fficials have the power to use any method to prevent the violation of martial law.
Martial. Law Decree No. 3 (1) Chinese and foreign journalists are strictly forbidden to issue stories that incite the masses. (2) Foreign journalists are forbidden to collect information in the street or in official institutions, organizations, schools, factories, neighborhoods, take photos, videotape, or other activ ities without the permission of the Beijing Government.
With the issuance of these decrees and empowering the army and the armed police to enforce them, the leaders must have expected a quick
22 The above decrees were translated from news reports and CCTV broadcasts 20 May 1989 and 21 May 1989. 233 end to the democracy movement. The leaders must have been shocked, as were the students, that so many people were willing and capable of stopping the troops and willing to disobey the martial law orders. The seriousness of the government position was made clear by stating that the police and the army could use any method necessary to enforce martial law. However, the fact that they did not enter the city proper, for whatever reason, made the decrees unenforceable (Notes 20 May 1989).
People gave two main reasons for stopping the advance of the
army: (1) to protect the students on the Square, and (2) anger over
Li Peng's declaring martial law and sending troops to Beijing to restore order. Many people, even though they expressed confidence that the
People's Army would never harm the people, expressed a need to protect the students. It was also clear to this researcher that the pride
(which often borders on arrogance) of the Beijing citizens was hurt as they vented their anger over the actions of Li Peng. Beijing residents have a saying that "all of China follows Beijing" (Bei Da students often add, "and all of Beijing follows Bei Da"), and the residents often express their feelings of superiority over the rest of China. For many people, Li Peng's martial law speech stating that it was necessary to bring in the PLA to establish order was humiliating and they were consumed with a desire to prove him wrong.
During the week, without the PLA entering the city, order was maintained. Within a few days, people went back to work, tra ffic systems were restored, and food supplies were normal. The imposition of martial law did, however, in fact, change the outward character of the residents, as an atmosphere of friendliness and cooperation settled 234 over Beijing. Residents were seen helping each other, and even after the bicycle accidents which often lead to heated arguments and sometimes fights, people just got up and said, "No problem, i t doesn't matter"
(mei wenti, mei sh i) (Videotape and notes 20 May 1989 through 28 May
1989). Thieves were even rumored to have said, "The students have been
on strike, workers have been on strike, now we are on strike" (Interview
24 May 1989). CCTV seemed to confirm these rumors by indicating that
crime during the week had decreased (CCTV 24 May 1989).
The anger of the citizens and the students was displayed through
banners and slogans that became more vicious as the week passed. Most
attacked Li Peng and martial law, while others attacked Deng Xiaoping; for example, some stated: Li Peng step down. If Li Peng doesn't step down, we will come here [demonstrate] every day End Martial Law Oppose Martial Law Everyone Opposes Martial Law
The period of fooling the people has ended.
What is Democracy? Where is Freedom? We earnestly search but are blocked by wolves.
We want Democracy not Tanks!
One of the hateful characteristics of the "Stalin Model" is using force to wantonly punish the people.
Li Peng musters the army to make turmoil. People request him to scram quickly or else be driven out of office Eradicate Fascism, Freedom belongs to the people
Hooligan Li Peng, we will see who laughs last
The "Gang of old" excludes outsiders, criticizes people with lofty ideals. They always consider themselves correct and look at 235
themselves as triumphant. But sooner or later there will be a sudden change and thunder will storm against them.
Deng Xiaoping: Think three times before you act. If you resolutely retire at the height of your official career You will be crowned with eternal glory. If you obstinately cling to your course. You will stand condemned through the ages.
They have moved God, but not the emperor [after a heavy rai nstorm]
Thirty years east side of the river [one policy—guominadang or rightist] Forty years west side of the river [another policy--CCP or le ftis t] Tolerate, Tolerate, Tolerate. Seventy years. Eighty years. When will i t end? Give up. Give up. Give up. [Chinese antithetical couplet written on scrolls]
Government Alienates the People [a serious charge because, according to Marxist theory, this is not possible in socialist countries]
There is no government in China Li Peng is involved in a conspiracy Now we are looking at Zhao Ziyang Deng Xiaoping is jobless And the National People's Congress is watching And we hope this bad eggs will be stepped on.
Convene the National People's Congress Promote Democracy, Depose Li Peng End Martial Law
Li Peng I want to chop you to pieces
[Sung to the tune of "Frère Jacques"] Down with Li Peng, Down with Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Yang Shangkun. There is s till one more hooligan There is s till one more hooligan Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping. (Levitt photographs, videotape, and notes, 25 May 1989)
A strong feeling among the students and some others was that the crisis could be resolved through a legalconstitutional method. 236
As can be seen 1n the above banners and slogans, many people demanded that the National People's Congress (NPC), the highest organ of state government with the power to rescind martial law and expel Li Peng, convene in emergency session. In practice, the NPC had always been merely a rubber stamp for Chinese leaders; however, perhaps due to
ignorance, pressure from forces loyal to Zhao Ziyang, or their own
idealism, many people expressed the belief that the NPC would convene and then rescind martial law and expel Li Peng. To convene, the NPC people called for Wan Li. the chairman and close ally of Zhao Ziyang, to cut short his v isit to Canada and the United States and return to
Beijing (Notes 20 May 1989).
Although there were rumors that martial law troops had entered
Party, government, and media offices and open reporting about the demon strations was virtually ended, people were able to continue a "people's media" to pass on information. Students at many universities set up
student broadcast centers to offset official media reports that many people believed were inaccurate. At some universities, speakers were set up so that people off-campus could also hear the broadcasts.
Students on the Square had set up a printing center and handbills were posted throughout the city. Even during the night, when people would often gather at major intersections to talk and plan strategy to stop the army when and if i t entered the city, people on bicycles passed
information and handbills to the people (Notes 20 May 1989 through 25
May 1989). People also began posting dazibao, including maps of Beijing with the location of army troops and m ilitary equipment (Notes and
pictures 20 May 1989 through 25 May 1989). 237
The students on the Square, although they were exhilarated because "people power" was able to stop the army, were also tired, scared, and becoming increasingly disorganized. Stopping the advance of the army was, without a doubt, exciting and uplifting to the thousands of students who s till remained on the Square, some for more than a month. Many, however, were also scared, and tensions remained high as various reports of troop movements reached the Square. Upon hearing the news of troop advancements, many students rushed to those points to help reinforce the blockades. This not only contributed to the problem of organizing the remaining students on the Square, most of whom were from outside of Beijing, but also, in part, accounts for the fact that the number of students on the Square decreased as the week passed (Interviews and notes 21 May 1989 through 26 May 1989).
May 21, 1989
An eerie calm enveloped Beijing. Except for roadblocks, which mainly appeared at night, heightened tensions as rumors of troop movements circulated, and demonstrations, Beijing seemed calm and almost normal (at least in comparison to the previous six weeks).
Students and intellectuals continued to push for the NPC to convene and for a dialogue with government leaders. A telegram was sent to Wan Li requesting that he return immediately to convene the NPC. po In a "Letter to the Nation," students called on members of the
Standing Committee to hold an open dialogue with the students to end
^^For a translation of this le tte r, see Han (1990, 290). 238
"the current crisis and the severe antagonism between the government
and the students" (Ming Pao News 1989, 100).
Buoyed by public support, some students, while maintaining they
would use only peaceful means, formed a "dare-to-die" corps to protect
the Square. Many of the students also vowed to defend the Square t i l l
death if necessary (Notes 23 May 1989). The students attempted to keep the movement peaceful and
limited. The student broadcast station that was set up on the Square
repeatedly broadcast that the purpose of the movement was to call for
democracy and freedom and to oppose corruption and autocracy. People were told to remain peaceful even if attacked by the police or soldiers
(Audiotape 25 May 1989). The movement, however, did not always remain peaceful. A
student broadcast gave the details of an incident on May 20 at Fengtai, where over one hundred students, mainly from Bei Da, were beaten by
police and soldiers. The names and departments of the injured students were given, and pictures of some students were posted on many campuses.
As the week passed, there would also be more incidents of violence
(Audiotape and notes 21 May 1989 through 25 May 1989).
A speaker war developed on the Square and in other student
broadcast stations as the students attempted to correct what they felt were inaccurate reports in the official media. The student broadcasts
stated that the government was attempting to justify the imposition of martial law by claiming that there were food shortages and disorder in
Beijing. The broadcasts stated further that the government was
attempting to create food shortages and disorder by ordering traffic 239
police not to go to work. However, i t was claimed that students and
citizens were effectively keeping the streets and tra ffic fairly normal
(Audiotape 20 May 1989 through 25 May 1989).
The students also broadcast many letters written by various
people describing how the people stopped the army and gave them food
and warm clothing, and how students were informing the troops about the
real situation in Beijing. It was rumored that the troops had not been
allowed to read newspapers or listen to any media broadcast for several
weeks, and that they were being told only that they were being brought
to Beijing to protect the capital from a rebellion. Thebroadcasts
described how shocked and saddened the troops were when they learned
about the "real situation" in Beijing. There were reports of soldiers
crying as citizens and students talked to them. There were also reports
about anti-martial law activities of people, including one elderly lady who lay down in front of a military vehicle to prevent it from moving
(Audiotapes and notes 21 May 1989 through 26 May 1989). While, as previously stated, Beijing appeared fairly normal during the daytime, the nights were not. At night people continued to
set up roadblocks, stood around talking, passed along information, and waited for something to happen. Students continued to travel to and from the Square, and now drivers, private vehicle owners, public trucks, and other types of vehicles carried them to their destinations. As the vehicles filled with students passed, people standing by would clap and
shout encouragement and support. 240 May.22, 1989
The propaganda war between the government and the people inten sified . Government announcements described the situation in Beijing as very serious, and said that trash was building up and that medical supplies were running low. The student broadcasts and handbills countered these reports. Fifteen intellectuals issued a "Declaration in Defense of the Constitution," which stated that demonstrations were legal according to the constitution and demanded that the government cancel martial law and call a meeting of the Standing Committee to end the present situation (Ming Pao News 1989, 104). Other letters^* requesting that the NPC convene, that the troops leave Beijing, and that martial law be lifted were written by students and others and given to various government organs, including the NPC Standing Committee (Ming
Pao News 1989; Han 1990).
The martial law headquarters issued a statement in an attempt to win support for martial law. The statement said that the task of the troops was to maintain order in the capital and not to suppress the students. The statement said that Beijing was in a state of chaos and that there were traffic jams, food shortages, and incidents of destruction of public properties. It said that the PLA would do everything to defend the principal interests of the country and the people (Ming Pao News 1989). There were rumors that several retired army generals opposed to martial law wrote a letter to their headquarters requesting that the
^^For a translation of some of these letters, see Ming Pao News 1989, and Han 1990, 225-328. 241 25 army stay away from the city. Other rumors circulated that a crackdown was imminent and that Zhao Ziyang had been placed under house arrest (Notes 22 May 1989). Clearly, tensions were increasing.
In the evening, there was a brief clash between citizens and soldiers in Fengtai.- Although government and student reports of the incident do not agree, students displayed pictures of injured soldiers and students. CCTV reported that students assisted in stopping the fighting and that several were injured (Tape of CCTV broadcast 23 May
1989; Notes 24 May 1989).
May 23, 1989
Despite heavy rains, there was a large anti-Li Peng, anti- martial law demonstration. The demonstration was joined by approxi mately one thousand students who arrived on foot from Anhui Province in southeastern China.
During the afternoon, the large portrait of Mao Zedong on
Tiananmen Gate was defaced. According to CCTV, three men who were responsible for th is act—a journalist, a teacher, and a worker from
Hunan Province—were immediately caught by students and turned over to the police. According to Ming Pao News, the incident may have been staged by the government because the three people arrested spoke fluent
Beijing dialect (not Hunan dialect) and a large canvas (five meters by three meters) was put over the portrait almost immediately after the incident. Ming Pao News said that students were suspicious of this
25 A copy of this le tte r can be found in Ming Pao News 1989, 105. 242 because that large a canvas would have been very d ifficu lt to find if i t were not ready beforehand (Ming Pao News 1989).
There was a small clash between students and policemen at Dong
Gao Di. Some people were injured, including two policemen (Levitt photographs 23 May 1989). Rumors continued to circulate. One rumor claimed that two hunger strikers had already died. There were rumors that the tanks and various military units were brought to Beijing to protect various leaders as the power struggle at the top levels continued. There were also rumors that hospital workers had been ordered not to treat any students or offer them any help except as volunteers (Notes 23 May
1989).
Although only some buses were back in operation, traffic appeared to be fa irly normal. Workers were busy repairing street dividers that had been removed and used as barricades (Notes 23 May
1989).
May 24, 1989
CCTV opened the evening news with the statement, "Tensions in
Beijing have relaxed five days after the imposition of martial law, tra ffic is getting back to normal, and parts of the army have withdrawn from positions on the outskirts of Beijing" (Tape of CCTV 24 May 1989).
The report stated that army roadblocks had been removed and most buses and the subway system were back to normal. The report also stated that supplies in stores and businesses were at about the same level as before the imposition of martial law (CCTV News 24 May 1989). 243 There were reports that increasing numbers of troops were surrounding the city and that six out of seven military regions had announced th eir support for Li Peng. Support for Li Peng was also given by various individuals and organizations that were repeatedly broadcast on television (Notes 24 May 1989).
Although students continued to camp out on the Square, many from outside Beijing were beginning to go home. Although Beijing train station was packed with students who were returning home, other students continued to arrive in Beijing (Notes 24 May 1989; CCTV 24 May 1989).
The NPC Chairman Wan Li was thought to be returning to Beijing and hundreds of students went to the airport, carrying flowers, to greet him. Wan Li, however, was detained in Shanghai for what CCTV later said was medical reasons (Notes 24 May 1989).
May 25, 1989
The seventh military region, that of Beijing, announced its support for Li Peng. Meanwhile, letters of support for Li Peng continued to be read on television broadcasts.
Rumors about a power struggle continued to circulate, while students continued to debate their next move. Some students wanted to increase the movement by calling for a general workers' strike, while others wanted either to continue the hunger strike or to attempt further negotiations with government leaders. By evening, there was not a consensus among the students (Notes 25 May 1989; Ming Pao News 1989).
In the evening, i t appeared that fewer people were in the streets. Students and teachers from the Law and Politics University 244 continued their sit-in demonstration at Xinhuamen, but fewer students were camping out on the Square (Videotape 25 May 1989).
May.26,-1989
Support for Li Peng was publicly announced by top government
leaders and organizations. The Standing Committee of the CCP, as well
as top leaders Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Peng Zhen announced their
support for the measures adopted by the government to deal with the current situation (CCTV 26 May 1989).
Students agreed to continue their occupation of the Square and to call for a general workers' strike (Ming Pao News 1989). It was not
clear how much support there was for this policy.
As the first week of martial law ended, it was still a standoff
between the students and the government. The government was s till unable to enforce martial law and the students were not able to realize
any of their demands. By week's end, however, it appeared that the government was beginning to get the upper hand.
May 27, 1989
Student leaders announced that they would leave the Square on
May 30, eleven days after the imposition of martial law. Many students, mostly from outside of Beijing, however, did not agree to leave the
Square on May 30 (Notes 27 May 1989).
While the students were arguing over strategy. Wan Li announced
his support for Li Peng and stated that the NPC would convene on
June 20, 1989. Official news continued to report growing support for 245
Li Peng. CCTV reported that PLA troops were encamped on the outskirts of Beijing and were being fed and given gifts by Beijing citizens (Notes
27 May 1989).
May 28. 1989
There was a mass demonstration in Beijing to mark the World
Protest Day; however, as control of work units tightened, the crowds were much smaller than previous demonstrations. Many of the banners and slogans were merely repeats of previous demonstrations. New banners, however, did reflect the anger that some people fe lt toward the government. Below are some “Sxamples of these banners:
New Great Wall of Flesh & Blood Growl China Li Peng, Yang Shangkun Are Fascists Hooligan + Son of a Bitch = False Government Power to the People [in English] Liberty or Death [in English] Freedom or Death Autocracy must End When the Military is involved in Politics the Country Suffers Tibetans Hate Martial Law Improve Democracy, kick out Li Peng [There were also caricatures of Li Peng dressed as a Nazi.] Even Dogs would not eat Li Peng Historical Law, Dictators must die. Natural Law, OLD Devils must die. —IF WE DIE WE GO, If we live we come [40 demonstrate] (Levitt, videotape, 28 May 1989)
As the demonstrators passed through the streets, they were greeted with unenthusiastic politeness. When they arrived at the Square, the reaction was similar. Even with the new demonstrators, however, the
Square appeared almost empty. The students who were there were mainly from outside Beijing. There were student banners atop tents, indicating that there were students from Harbin, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, 246
Shanxi, Sichuan, Xian, Hong Kong, and other c itie s. The looks on their faces reflected their long journey and their weariness (Levitt, videotape, 28 May 1989). The students from outside Beijing did not want to leave the
Square without getting some concession from the government. Later, the decision was made to stay on the Square until June 20, 1989, when the
NPC was scheduled to convene. Not all students, however, agreed with the decision (Notes 29 May 1989).
Some students, mainly from the Law and Politics University, continued to camp out at Zhongnanhai in front of Xinhuanmen. As on the
Square, vendors sold food and drink to students and passers-by. On the red brick wall that surrounds the compound, someone wrote in white chalk the characters: "Deng Xiaoping Step Down." However, i t now did not appear as though many people thought th is was likely to happen (Levitt videotape, notes, 28 May 1989).
May 29, 1989
Chai Ling and other student leaders resigned because they felt they could no longer represent the students. It was announced that the students had agreed to postpone leaving the Square until June 20, 1989.
Students at the Central Academy of Fine Arts finished the construction of a 10 meter "Goddess of Democracy" that they planned to unveil at noon. May 30, 1989. The statue was carried on flatbed carts to the Square late in the evening (Notes 30 May 1989). 247
There were signs that a crackdown was underway. Work units were 26 holding meetings for party members. Work units also requested that everyone who participated in demonstrations sign a paper. Several motorcyclists (people who were going to various locations, reporting on troop movements, and passing on information) were arrested for "Going to factories to incite workers and stealing gasoline" (Notes from CCTV
News 29 May 1989).
May 30, 1989
In the early morning hours, several hundred people went to the
Beijing Public Security Bureau to protest the detainment of three workers who were members of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Union. It was rumored that one of the workers, Sheng Yingeng, was kidnapped on his way to the Square (CBS videotape 30 May 1989).
Thousands of people gathered in Tiananmen Square for the 27 unveiling of the "Goddess of Democracy." There was music, speeches, and the singing of the national anthem and the Communist "Inter nationale." Although the people on the Square seemed excited and supportive of the statue, the government reaction was much different.
The municipal government issued a statement that the statue was erected illeg ally and must be removed. The media broadcast extremely
26 The usual procedure is that, first, unit leaders (who are in the Party) are informed of a policy. Secondly, a meeting is called for Party members and the policy or rules are explained to them. Lastly, a meeting of all unit members is called. 27 For a description of the background and the making of the statue, see Han (1990, 342). 248
harsh criticism of the statue, supposedly written by a wide variety of people (knowing the slow pace of mail in Beijing, i t is at least suspi cious that so many letters from so many people and locations could have 28 arrived at media offices so quickly). Many of the letters stated that the statue was a disgrace to all Chinese. The letters stated that
it resembled the American Statue of Liberty and was, therefore, an
insult to the dignity and image of Chinese^^ (Notes 30 May 1989).
May 31, 1989
The first of several demonstrations against turmoil was organized by the government on the outskirts of the city. The demon strators shouted pro-government slogans and such things as "Down with
Fang Lizhi" (CCTV 31 May 1989). Peasants, workers, and middle school students participated in the demonstrations. It was believed that the demonstrators were ordered by their work units and given ten yuan apiece
(about $2.00) to participate (Interview 31 May 1989). Fang Lizhi was burned in effigy, but when asked by a student who Fang Lizhi was, the student was told, "I don't know" (Interview 1 June 1989).
28 The reading of letters by the media was a tactic used during the Cultural Revolution to attack various people. For example, there was supposedly a le tte r written by a middle school student attacking her teacher for bougeois ideas and methods that became a campaign against certain educational practices. The teacher was severely punished, but the authorship of the letter is now believed to have been someone other than a student. (Notes 30 May 1989) pq The statue was actually taken from a model of a previous statue and its inspiration came not from the Statue of Liberty, but from the work of a Soviet artist. 249 On the Square, the students continued to show signs of weariness. Their numbers also continued to decline. The students were
s till determined to carry out their movement for democracy, but the movement was increasingly d ifficu lt to sustain (Notes 31 May 1989).
The flag-raising and -lowering ceremonies were s till well-attended and often accompanied by the singing of the national anthem (Videotape 25
May 1989 through 30 May 1989).
June 1, 1989
At a morning press conference on the steps of the monument, Chai
Ling, who was now the commander of the Protect Tiananmen Square
Headquarters, and her husband, Feng Congde, described the previous night's kidnapping attempt that was foiled by Feng's resistance. The attempted kidnappers were described by Chai Ling as two students from outside Beijing and a person who looked like a worker. Chai also said that government and Party workers had offered rewards to any student who helped them (CBS tape library, Beijing, 1 June 1989).
June 1 is Children's Day in China, and, although official cele brations did not take place in the Square, many parents brought their children to the Square. The Square appeared much cleaner, as students and workers cleared away much of the garbage that had piled up (Notes
1 June 1989).
In the weekly Foreign Ministry press briefing, it was announced that the Beijing municipal government had reiterated its ban on news reporting of any activities prohibited by martial law in Beijing. The announcement also stressed that it was illegal to photograph, videotape. 250 or report on troops enforcing martial law without prior government approval (China Daily 1 July 1989).
June 2, 1989
As 200,000 troops surrounded Beijing and reports of troop movements at the railway station, the Great Hall of the People, and other areas circulated, four prominent Chinese declared a 48- to 72-hour hunger strike on the Square.The four hunger strik ers—Taiwan singer
Hou Dejian, Shi Da lecturer Liu Xiaobo, journalist and party member Gao
Xin, and a Si Tong company representative—said they opposed all forms of violence, but felt that intellectuals must not only speak out, they must also act. They said they were protesting martial law and stated that marches, hunger strikes, and demonstrations were democratic forms of protest and did not constitute turmoil. They also spoke about democ racy, and, although admitting that the concept is not well understood in China, stated that people should learn from their mistakes and therefore learn to govern democratically (CBS tape library, Beijing,
2 June 1989).
It was widely acknowledged that people in China were not well-informed or clear about the meaning of democracy. Even some of the student leaders were criticized for undemocratic behaviors. To help clarify these misunderstandings, a Democracy University was to be established on the Square on June 3, 1989. It was hoped that people
30 For a transcript of the "Declaration of a Hunger Strike," see Ming Pao News 1989, 137. 251 from all walks of life would participate in the university (Notes 3 June
1989). China Daily carried an article that urged students to end their class boycott. The article stated, "Government officials are urging college students nationwide to end their demonstrations and strikes and
return to class 'for their own good'" (China Daily 2 June 1989, 1).
The article stated that most of the undergraduate and graduate students
in China's more than one thousand institutions of higher learning had
boycotted classes in support of the 8eijing students. The article also
stated that more than 300,000 students from outside of Beijing had gone
to the Capital to support the estimated 160,000 Beijing students who
had been boycotting classes since mid-April. In order for the students
to be able to graduate and allow the nearly 600,000 would-be freshmen to enter the universities on time, the article urged the students to
return to classes. The article concluded by stating that graduating
students in three provinces had already returned to classes and that
there was still sufficient time to complete the necessary requirements for students to graduate on time (China Daily 2 June 1989).
In a separate article, it was reported that martial law troops
had begun entering the city and were now stationed at more than ten key
locations, including the telecommunications building and the Capital
Airport. This article also stated that martial law troops had been
assisting railway workers to send "some 100,000 students back home and,
in general, [to get] things back to normal" (China Daily 2 June 1989,
1). 252
These two articles seemed to confirm what many people were
stating, namely, that students were tiring of the demonstrations,
outside students were returning home, and that Beijing was getting back
to normal.
In the evening, around 10:45, there was a car accident near
Muxidi, an area about four miles west of the Square on Changan Avenue.
Four people—two bicyclists, one three-wheeled cart driver, and one
pedestrian—were struck by a m ilitary jeep going at a high rate of speed
heading toward the Square. After the accident, the police took the
driver and three passengers away. Witnesses said that the people in
the car were soldiers and that the jeep was the last of several jeeps to pass by the Muxidi intersection. A crowd of people gathered and
surrounded the vehicle to keep the the scene of the accident intact
(Notes 3 June 1989).
June 3, 1989
There was s till a crowd at Muxidi later in the morning as
several buses and other vehicles with soldiers were stopped and
surrounded by angry citizens and students. Neither the jeep involved
in the accident nor any of the other vehicles had proper license plates.
Around 11:30 A.M., a crowd was s till gathered around the jeep.
One student described the situation:
Yesterday evening at ten o'clock a military jeep had an accident and four people were killed in the accident, and they are ordinary people. After the accident the policeman took the soldiers from
31 Interviews that were conducted in English are transcribed as recorded and marked by an [E] in the citation. 253
the jeep and went away. This morning almost all the people go to the street to show their anger and there will be a big procession today at 3:00 on Changan Avenue. [Why are the people angry?] Because the speed of the jeep was very fast—over 120 kilometers. Ordinarily on this type of street, I think i t should be about 60 kilometers. (CBS tape library, Beijing, 2 June 1989).
Meanwhile, at Xidan, an area approximately one mile west of the
Square on Changan Avenue, three tourist-type buses were stopped and surrounded by people. Students took machine guns, military knives, and helmets from inside the buses and displayed them on top of the buses.
The soldiers inside the buses were in plainclothes instead of military uniforms (Notes 2 June 1989).
The people, already angered over the military jeep accident, were further outraged by the fact that the soldiers were trying to enter the city unnoticed, and, more importantly, because the soldiers had guns in the buses. As one student was on top of a bus giving details of last night's accident, other people were talking to the soldiers. A student explained:
They stopped the soldiers around midnight. They were surrounded by the people and they can't go away. All of the people are very angry, and they want to ask the soldiers: What happened? What are their orders? Where do they come from? But they can't tell us. We want the soldiers to speak, speak to the people. . . . The people want to show their anger to the soldiers but they don't feel beating them is useful. (CBS tape 3 June 1989 [E])
At another bus, the following dialogue took place:
Laobaixing: Why are you here? What are your orders? 56Idler: We came to protect the people, we are the people's sons and soldiers. We stand together with the people forever. Laobaixing: You want to protect the people, then why did you bring machiné guns? What are you going to do with them? Why do you wear plainclothes? Soldier: I don't know what the orders are. (CBS tape 3 June 1989] ------254
Although the streets were filled with people, many of them tried to help keep order. As people crowded together and pushed, someone would yell, "Don't push or h ’ :he vehicle (che); otherwise in the official news they will say that we hit people and damaged vehicles"
(Notes 3 June 1989): Other people yelled, "We must turn in the guns"
(Notes 3 June 1989). A window was broken on one of the buses, but a
sign that read, "This window was not broken by students or citizens.
The soldiers inside broke i t with a bottle" (CBS tape 3 June 1989) was
posted to avoid blame.
During the afternoon, the buses with soldiers were prevented from leaving; however, some vehicles were permitted to leave. A mili tary jeep was allowed to leave after the driver explained that he was from a small unit and was only going to Wangfuging, an area near the
Beijing Hotel, to buy medicine. He produced a document to prove his case, and several students helped clear the way to let the vehicle go through. A police car was also allowed to go through after students
determined that the occupants were from outside Beijing and unaware of the situation (CBS tape 3 June 1989; notes 3 June 1989).
At about the same time that the military jeeps and buses entered the city from the west, a very large contingent of soldiers entered from
the east. The soldiers, most of them wearing white shirts and m ilitary
pants, jogged about eight miles to just east of the Square. At that
point they were stopped by thousands of citizens. There was some
hitting, pushing, and a lot of name calling, but apparently no serious
injuries. A participant described the situation thusly: 255 Some soldiers came last night, they wanted to occupy the Square. I was there just beside the Beijing Hotel. I saw lots of soldiers. They just wanted to come to the Square. The city is under martial law; they just want to show that they can occupy the Square, that they can just control the whole situation. I think they wanted to throw the students out. I helped stop.the soldiers, many people helped. [Q. What did you do?] Surrounded them and ju st shouted slogans. That was enough. You know we don't think that the soldiers are enemies of the people, you know, they are the defenders of the people. But they must come here, they are just under orders, you know, the soldiers must obey their orders. (A worker, CBS tape 3 June 1989 [E]) The unarmed soldiers, after jogging eight miles, could not reach the Square, nor could the vehicles with plainclothes soldiers and guns.
Just as on May 20, when the army tried to enter the city to enforce martial law, the people rushed to the streets and were able to stop them, but now the situation was more intense. Two students explained their feelings and thoughts, and what they thought might happen next:
F irst Student: The government must be very angry because the troops can’t come into the city. Maybe other leaders are mad at Li Peng. I feel angry about the soldiers. Soldiers are forced by their leaders. The student movement will now get new life, there will be a large demonstration this afternoon. [Q. Why did you stop the army?] I t's my duty. The army is a weapon of Li Peng. He uses i t to fight against democracy. . . . Second Student: Maybe it's the end of Li Peng's political life. I think It is very serious; maybe other leaders will kick him out. Bringing in the army was a great mistake. If they dialogue--it would be calm—but now everyone is angry. I t 's normal to talk. I don't know why they bring in soldiers, maybe actually they made a mistake. [Q. Will the troops use force?] Maybe they will use force, but they won't open fire . If they fire , th a t's even worse, bring China to disorder. If civil war happens, it would be disaster for China. I wish i t wouldn't happen. I think Deng [Xiaoping] and Li [Peng] should have conscience about themselves; they should be aware of people's feelings, not against people. . . . (CBS tape 3 June 1989 [E])
Many people may have thought Li Peng would lose power and the army would quietly leave town; however, they were s till willing to resist the soldiers until they pulled back. The people's willingness 256 to resist the arny's advance and to protect the students on the Square continued throughout the day as troops emerged at various points in the city. In the early afternoon, at Liubukou, people were s till surrounding the buses and displaying the weapons as a large number of soldiers came out of the Music Hall. As the troops came forward, they were surrounded by a mass of people. Tempers flared and people shouted slogans and cursed at the soldiers. Some yelled:
Down with Shameless Hooligans! Down with Autocracy! People that deal with People should Have a Conscience!
Others yelled:
Go Back! Get out of here, you sons of bitches! Get out, you bastards!
The situation, although i t appeared as if i t might escalate, quickly calmed down as the soldiers agreed to go back. People talked and laughed with the soldiers and applauded loudly as the soldiers le ft.
A worker explained why he helped stop the soldiers:
Look at those guns—knives [on top of the buses]; because of that we can't let them through. Look at those knives and machine guns; they are ready to use them on the people. [We're] afraid they will hit people. They're going to use those things to clear the Square; we can't let them go through to shoot our students. They put on makeup to pretend to be regular people, but really they are soldiers. . . . The soldiers broke the glass [window], but they said the citizens did i t . People don't want to see a bloody incident. (CBS tape 3 June 1989).
At around 2:00 P.M. several thousand troops emerged from the west doors of the Great Hall of the People, and at about the same time several thousand armed police and soldiers emerged from Zhongnanhai.
The troops at the Great Hall of the People were quickly surrounded by 257 thousands of people and the road leading to Zhongnanhai and Liubukou was blocked by buses pushed together to form a barricade. The situation behind the Great Hall was tense, but no major clashes occurred between the troops and the people. At one point there was some shoving and name calling. A l i t t l e while later, a young person came out from amongst the soldiers; his face and clothes were bloody but it was not clear what had happened to him. This was apparently the only incident of this type, and, for the most part, citizens sang patriotic songs and just kept the soldiers surrounded. Some people shouted:
Don't crowd—protect the soldiers Oppose violence Oppose martial law (CBS tape 3 June 1989)
There was also a large banner that read, "OPPOSE VIOLENCE" (CBS tape
3 June 1989). The army at one point sang a popular army song and the people applauded (CBS tape, notes, 3 June 1989).
At Liubukou, about one thousand police and soldiers came out the west gate of Zhongnanhai on Fuyou Avenue carrying electric clubs and some were wearing gas masks. There was an announcement for everyone to clear the streets and to go home at once. By this time there were several thousand people in the intersection; many people had been there for several hours blocking the buses with soldiers, while others had just arrived as they were going home or to work. As the troops moved forward, people chanted, "Fascists, Fascists, Fascists!" and "Down with
Li Peng !" as well as many curse words (Notes 3 June 1989). A student on top of one of the buses tried to talk to the police, but he was pulled down by several policemen. The troops fired tear gas and began hitting the people. As the people scattered, some threw rocks and 258 bottles at the soldiers. Some people ran down Changan Avenue toward
Xidan; others ran into the alleyways (hutongs) in a residential area along Fuyou Avenue. The soldiers fired tear gas into these areas and the people yelled, "Who is a hooligan? We are just going home—this is our home!" (Notes 3 June 1989). Witnesses claimed that many people were beaten by the armed police and soldiers. One witness described the situation thusly:
At Xinhuamen (near Liubukou) at about three o'clock, the riot [armed] police used tear gas. They hit a young g irl's leg and broke it. Some young kids were hiding behind a tree; they used sticks to beat them. One of the kid's heads were sp lit open, the stick was full of nails. The kids' mother went to help her son; she wore a white skirt—they pulled it up and kicked her like she was an animal. No humanity. Some people who lived close by went home and got vegetable knives and garden spades and wanted to fight them. People threw rocks at them and then the police charged and the people ran away. An old lady and a pregnant woman were too slow; they hit them with sticks. One probably died. I saw all this; it is a fact. (Interview, farmer, 6 June 1989)
The government video showed a truck with what they claimed were workers carrying large sticks with nails (CCTV News video 3 June 1989).
One witness claimed that the government had hired people to ride in the truck so that they could claim that citizens were rioting. The CCTV video did not show the people except while they were in the truck (Notes
3 June 1989).
The police collected the guns and knives from the tops of the buses; it is not clear whether or not there was any ammunition. After collecting the weapons, the police and soldiers returned to Zhongnanhai
(CCTV video 3 June 1989; notes 3 June 1989). Many people were very angry, and some did get knives and went to the Square. At the Square, the students were trying to calm the 259 situation. Hou Dejian, Liu Xiaobo, and their fellow hunger strikers urged the people to oppose violence. Liu stated, "If hit, don't hit back; i f cursed, don't curse back" (CBS tape 3 June 1989). Even after news of the clashes at Liubukou reached the Square, student leaders continued to urge tire people to remain peaceful (CBS tape 3 June 1989).
News soon reached the Square that a large column of military vehicles stopped at Jianguomenwai, an area about three kilometers east of the Square. People surrounded the vehicles and tried to talk the soldiers into leaving. One person, talking to a soldier, said:
We are not intentionally against you; after I say these things to you others will tell you the same thing, but we didn't make an agreement, but we all support the students. You look, even very old ladies who always stay home, even they come out to te ll you to go back and don't kill the students.
Another added, "The students are demonstrating for the citizens. We all want democracy; don't kill them." Another person tried a different approach:
In the countryside primary school students, while sittin g in class, were killed when their old building fell down on them. The government gave them money, but the officials used the money to build themselves a nice office building. Look at yourself. You are from the countryside, you have no power to change th is, and your children will have the same experience. (CBS tape 3 June 1989)
Near dusk, a military leader stood up on top of a military vehicle and received and drank a cup of hot tea from the residents.
This is a gesture that means you want to make friends with the person.
After drinking the tea, the soldier said:
Thank you. Thank you everyone. We soldiers stand together with the people. There is no way we will go to Tiananmen Square to suppress the students. To tell you the truth, today, our leader said that he did not want us to go to Tiananmen Square. I hope everyone can understand me. I have many d ifficu lties. If you want 260
us to leave, please give us a clear road, support us to leave. (CBS tape 3 June 1989)
The troops, however, did not leave.
Meanwhile, at the Great Hall of the People, the soldiers returned inside and several hundred people gathered outside the north eastern fence. Several people threw stones at a few soldiers who were standing outside. The soldiers were far enough away that they were not hit by the stones (CBS tape 3 June 1989).
A column of troop trucks carrying approximately one thousand soldiers had also been stopped at Qianmen, an area just to the south of the Square. People climbed into the trucks and talked to the soldiers. The soldiers were armed with machine guns; however, the discussions were friendly. After about forty-five minutes, the soldiers got out of the trucks and started walking in a column four abreast away from the Square. As they were walking, some pushing and shoving broke out. Soon afterwards, the pushing and shoving turned into hitting, some soldiers used their guns to h it people, and some people threw rocks at the soldiers. Many people yelled, "Don't hit! Don't hit!" and others yelled, "Punish the killers" and cursed at the soldiers (CBS tape
3 June 1989). Near the end of the column, one soldier was hit with a rock and fell to the ground. Many people gathered around him and then forced a CBS cameraman to put him into his jeep and take him to the hospital (Notes 8 June 1989).
For two hours, CCTV broadcast an announcement from the martial law troops not to go outside. Otherwise they should bear the responsi b ility for their own fate. However, by 7:00 P.M., hundreds of thousands 261 of people were already on the streets, and, as reports of troop movements continued to reach the people, they began to put up new barricades to stop the troops. During the evening, citizens and students went to various locations to reinforce barricades. For example, word that troops were stopped at Muxidi reached one university at around 9:00 P.M. Many students immediately rushed there to help stop the army.
Muxidi-Fuxingmen
A student who was already at Muxidi explained the situation:
I arrived at Muxidi at around 9:00 P.M. I saw students and civilians facing the soldiers but nothing happened. Soldiers were holding sticks, cudgels, and wearing steel helmets. The f ir s t conflict started after 9:30. Because students were sitting in front of the trucks, the soldiers began to throw stones at them. The students tried to keep order; they didn't want to give them an excuse [to use force]. They didn't want the citizens to throw stones back at the soldiers, but some people did. After a little while, suddenly several troop trucks started on fire. I don't know how this happened, but because the trucks were behind the army area where no civilians could go, so I guess they did this just for an excuse. I don't know. The army began to march on both sides of the street and the people were still in the middle of the street. At that time a student from Shi Da went forward to talk to the officers. I heard a shot and the student fell to the ground. People ran to him and took him to Fuxingmen Hospital—he died. Then after 11:30 a lot of shooting began. Soldiers put down their sticks and started shooting, f ir s t to the sides, then forward; dozens of people fe ll down. The soldiers were very angry, just walked forward and shot. Students yelled, "Down with Fascists, Down with Fascists, Down with Li Peng, Oppose violence." Soldiers were also shooting at buildings. A seventy- to eighty-year-old woman, a nine-year-old kid, and a thirty-year-old pregnant were killed by the side of the road. I saw lots of people just lie on the ground; i f they stood up, the soldiers shot at them. A boy was hiding in the bushes, he had been shot in the hand and in the leg. A g irl—maybe his girlfriend—went to help him but the soldiers saw them and the boy was killed and the girl was hurt very badly. I was very scared and ran too . . . (Interview 4 June 1989)
Another student said, "At Muxidi almost no soldiers were injured because 262 people didn't have weapons and they wore iron helmets" (Interview 4 June
1989). A third student added, "Many people were scared and ran into ti.j alleyways. The soldiers should have let them go, but they didn't— they shot them" (Interview 4 June 1989). CBS News cameraman John Liu was at Muxidi and shot what may have been the first tape after the beginning of the shooting. His tape shows many people being carried away on bicycles, three-wheeled carts, and in people's arms. There was heavy gunfire and the situation was very dangerous; therefore, he was unable to get footage of the soldiers (CBS tape library 3 June 1989). The troops continued to march forward toward the Square and reached Fuxingmen at around 11:30 P.M. There were thousands of people on the Fuxingmen overpass, where they had used six buses to put up a barricade to block the soldiers. As the soldiers reached the bridge, they were firing th eir weapons and shooting tear gas. People ran down
Changan Avenue and down the exit ramps to the number two ring road.
People attempted to overturn the buses, but were unsuccessful. A bus was later set on fire, but it is not clear how or by whom this was done.
When the troops were in the middle of the bridge, many of the soldiers turned th eir guns toward the people running down the exits and fired over their heads. The soldiers also shot several rounds of tear gas.
At this time there was also the sound of gunfire coming from the direction of Muxidi (Audiotape, notes, 3 June 19i89, 4 June 1989). Some people hid behind trees and others ran far enough away so as to be out of danger. Even as bullets echoed through the branches of the trees. 263 people yelled and cursed at the soldiers (Audiotape, notes, 3 June 1989,
4 June 1989). All along West Changan Avenue, as the troops advanced toward the Square they shot at many buildings, including shops, hotels, and apartment buildings.- A student described what he saw: "Soldiers robbed food shops at Fuxingmen; I saw them kill people in one shop.
Everywhere, every direction, they shot. . . . One soldier was beaten"
(Audiotape 4 June 1989). A professor who lives in the area described the situation this way:
As the troops came closer, there was a lot of noise. Many people went to the windows to see the real situation. My neighbor, an old man, was killed. His daughter told him to go to the window, but he said, "No, i t 's too dangerous" and he went into the kitchen. When he turned the light on, he was hit by a bullet here [in the neck]. My son, who is here [in Beijing] on business, was staying across the street with his wife's family. They walked out on the balcony and his wife was shot in the leg. (Notes 4 June 1989)
Other witnesses gave names and addresses of people who were shot, injured, or killed while they were in their apartments (CBS tape 4 June
1989). A professor who was on the street as the troops went past
Fuxingmen described his experience thusly:
On that night I was at Fuxingmen and I saw the soldiers shooting at the people. Not automatic fire , ju st, boom, boom, boom. Shots came toward me and I fell to the ground; I was really scared. I got up and ran away, but I was shot in the foot. Some people carried me to the army hospital, but they refused to treat me, but they gave me a car to go to People's Hospital. This was about midnight. I saw ten people in the hospital. I watched these people die. One was a young person, perhaps a student; he had been shot through the head. He was breathing when he came in. The doctor X-rayed him and said something was broken inside his head. He died as I watched him. Another person was a soldier, and s till another, an old man. Before I le ft, I saw at least ten more people carried in. Now I'm worried because I had to sign my name at the hospital. Now I know they will come and ask me why I was outside that night and what I 264 was doing. But, I think, everyone must go outside to see what is happening. I can't image that our government would do th is. Now I see their true colors. What they are really like. I know this government can't last very long. (Notes 10 June 1989)
At 2:00 in the morning, the army had already passed through
Fuxingmen. The road looked like a disaster area, cluttered with broken cement lane dividers that had been used as barricades, stones that people had thrown at the passing soldiers, and spent bullets and shells that people were busy picking up. The six buses that were used as a barricade had been smashed and pushed out of the way by the army as they passed over the bridge. The following conversation was recorded at
Fuxingmen around 2:00:
Chinese #1 : [ I t's ] already over. The army already le ft. Levitt: Where did they go? Chinese #1 : They went to Tiananmen Square. Levitt: Uid you see the army? Chinese #1: Yes, i t 's terrib le, i t 's unbelievable. Mad! They're mad! They just shoot everyone. Levitt: How many people were shot? Chinese #1 : I think maybe five hundred to one thousand. One person was shot right here. I saw all this with my own eyes. Chinese #2: Beijing is China's capital. This is the f ir s t time in forty years I saw real guns. Chinese #3: They're not Communists, they are Fascists! Chinese M : Li Peng is worse than Hitler! Chinese #?: They are worse than the Japanese Devils [a reference to the Japanese during World War II]. Chinese #6: Look at what is happening in China. Isn 't i t shamefui? Female voice/announcement: Soldiers, we admire your bravery at Old Mountain LLao Shan in Vietnam], but you should think very carefully about th is. You are the sons of the people, you shouldn't kill people. . . . Chinese #7: You can go through Fuxingmen. Look at the guns. Chinese #5: Look, there is blood everywhere. You should leave. After a little while if they catch you they will beat you to death. They have already begun to kill people. Hurry and leave. Chinese #9: Where are you from? L evitt: Rmerica. Chinese #9: America is good. You should send the United Nations forces here to put them down. It's not safe even if you stay at home. It's happened very often that bullets have flown into 265 the buildings and killed people. Look, they use real weapons and real bullets. Here, look at these bullets. There were two children killed over there In that building. Chinese #10: In the last two thousand years, China has never had this experience. This stupid government, they shoot the citizens. Which government shoots Its. citizens? American government should punish them. Chinese #11: Hooligan government. Chinese #12: This Is the f ir s t massacre In forty years In China. This is the f ir s t time Beijing citizens heard gunshots. (Audiotape 4 June 1989) Many people were Injured and killed In the area around Muxidi and Fuxingmen; however, attempts to ascertain exact numbers were
hindered by various circumstances. Many people who took the Injured to a hospital tried to get Information about the number of people who were admitted, but were prevented from doing so by doctors and nurses; however, some people succeeded In ascertaining partial Information.
The following are excerpts from Interviews concerning a few major hospitals around that area:
I went to the hospital, but things are very crazy there. Hundreds of people are outside. I saw ten bodies just In front, an old woman. People were screaming and crying . . . I didn't go In, I just left. . . . This [hand] Is not serious. . . . They're Fascists! . . . (A student who had been shot In the hand and had just returned from Children's [Ertong] Hospital, 1:50 A.M.)
I took my classmate to Fuxing Hospital. . . . I wrote down their names. By 5:00 A.M. I had fifty-nine dead, over a dozen were college students. There were students from Qinghua, Bel Da, Shi Da, Education College, and the Normal Institute. There were several hundred people wounded. (Male student, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
In Fuxing Hospital, there was no room In the hospital; they just put bodies In the parking lo t. They used very powerful bullets. One man said he was In Vietnam battles and he never saw things this bad. Soldiers said they were lied to--treated badly. (Female student, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
At Fuxing Hospital I saw dozens of bodies moved outside and put near a bicycle rack because there was no room Inside. (Male student, audiotape, 4 June 1989) 266 [At Fuxingmen] I saw soldiers put bodies on trucks. I thought the drivers must be killed. (Female student, audiotape, 4 June 1989) A worker told me he saw soldiers kill people and put their bodies on trucks. I don't know where they took them. (Male student, audiotape 4 June 1989)
There were eighty-five dead at the Railway Hospital. It wasn't regular, because usually they only treat railway personnel. By 5:00 A.M., there were several hundred wounded. Many doctors cried. Doctors, you know, everyday routine they can see people die, but now they cried. I know it's very serious. (Male student, audio tape, 4 June 1989) By 2:30 A.M., the army had already passed by the Minzu Hotel, which is just to the east of Fuxingmen. Many of the windows had been shot out, there were bullet holes on the outside walls, and the glass doors had been knocked down and broken by people rushing inside as the army shot its way past the hotel. Many people were standing outside; one middle- aged man said:
In that alley [pointing to an alley beside the hotel] there were twenty people killed. Now I know that one hundred people were killed. There is a person who lives on the sixth floor—he was killed. (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
Another person said:
It doesn't matter if you are.a foreigner, they will still beat you. They killed one Japanese. The Chinese government has no mercy, no humanity; they are too cruel. They used m ilitary knives [zhun cai] to kill people. Who has ever seen the real weapons? (Female about 30 years old, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
The next major point of resistance for the soldiers on their way to the Square was at Xidan. the following statement described the scene:
This was apparently a reference to a Japanese photographer who was shot in the leg at Fuxingmen. Apparently he was only wounded; however, this story was repeated many times during the night. 267
I am a Ph.D. student; now I will tell the facts. Last night from 11:00 P.M. until 5:00 A.M., I was at Xidan and at the Minzu Hotel. At the very beginning, the Armed Police opened the road; they used sticks and tear gas and beat the people. Because resistance was very strong, they weren't successful. Then [they] used tanks to open the road and to go through obstructions. They used machine guns [ji giang] to shoot people. At that time two students, maybe twenty years old, they were shot, lots of blood. Two citizens standing beside the road—they were so innocent, [they] never thought that they would shoot them, but they did. Soldiers used sticks to hit the onlookers, old people, even young children were beaten on the head—blood was flowing out. I saw four dead and seven to eight hundred injured within an area of fifty meters. I tried to follow the tanks to Tiananmen Square, but the troops used guns to stop the people of Xinhuamen. The people shouted at the soldiers, "People nurture you, but you kill and beat the people." Old men and women [they] were so angry and so sad. (Male student, audiotape, 4 June 1989). By 3:00 A.M. the troops had passed Xidan. Thousands of people were standing in the streets and occasional gunfire was coming from the area around Liubukou and Zhongnanhai. In the intersection, five buses were burning and had been pushed out of the way by the passing troops. The following is a tape recording taken at that time:
Woman: [Army] killed a lot of people [Da si hao duo ren], a lot of children. What kind of government is this? [A gas tank on a bus exploded.] Woman: The army used guns to shoot the buses, the people didn't do i t . [Ambulance goes by coming from the direction of Liubukou and the Square. Gunfire and a wave of people run toward Xidan away from Liubukou. After a few moments, they stop and walk back toward Liubukou.] Man: They killed lots of people. They are mad. Crazy. At Tiananmen Square they used machine guns and also killed hundreds of people. They killed a child right here. It's not rubber bullets; it's real, look. [A three-wheel cart passes, carrying a woman. There is blood everywhere on her clothes; her head is dangling from his arms.] I am sure she is dead. Tiananmen is too dangerous. Stop here. [Several more carts carrying injured or dead people are going past.] Woman: In Tiananmen students must be dead because soldiers also use bayonets. People are not afraid of them, but we have no weapons. Chinese should go out to tell the truth. [More shooting 268 and another wave of people] American government is n 't like th is-- use guns to kill citizens. They said they weren't here to suppress the students, but they use guns to kill them and the citizens. [Several more carts go past. More gunshots and carts taking people away] (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
At Liubukou approximately nine troop trucks with soldiers and citizens inside surrounded by thousands of people. There were many gunshots coming from the direction of Xinhaumen and Tiananmen Square.
The people yelled at the soldiers and took some of th eir helmets and threw them into the crowd. The soldiers looked very scared but, even though they had weapons, they didn't use them. The people never hit or beat any of these soldiers (Notes from audiotape 4 June 1989).
At 4:30 A.M., Changan Avenue was blocked at Xinhuamen by soldiers who were occasionally firing their weapons. Individual people were being carried away from Liubukou by bicycles and carts (Notes from audiotape 4 June 1989).
Tiananmen Square
As on every day following the commencement of the hunger strike, the students on the Square took a vote on all major issues. Likewise, on the afternoon of June 3, when i t was apparent that a crackdown was imminent, the students, fully aware of the dangers, voted to stay and defend the Square. Although some citizens and students formed "dare- to-die" squads to help protect the students on the Square, their methods, like those of the other students, were peaceful. Some students may have wanted to use violent tactics to defend the Square; however, the vote was to maintain a peaceful, nonviolent protest (Notes 3 June
1989). 269
The student leaders tried many tactics to prevent violence.
Using th eir broadcast system, the leaders urged the students to maintain order and not to provoke the troops when they entered the Square.
Students were repeatedly told not to wear any confiscated army equipment. According to a statement by student leader Chai Ling, the
students collected guns that had been given to them by citizens, and turned them over to the armed police. The students were given a receipt for the weapons.
The events that took place on Tiananmen Square and the adjacent
areas, because of the vast size of the area, the dangerous nature of
the situation, and other circumstances that developed, are extremely
difficult to reconstruct. However, the following is an attempt to do
just that: to reconstruct the events based on eyewitness accounts and videotape taken by CBS News, TEA News (Japanese), Taiwan News, and official Chinese government sources. To assist the reader, a map of the area is provided (Figure 1).
There were at least two different groups of about fifty soldiers walking in the area between Xiahuamen and the Great Hall of the People between 10:00 P.M. June 3 and 1:00 A.M. June 4. The troops encountered some people who threw rocks and bottles at them, but, although tracer bullets could occasionally be seen flying overhead and heavy gunfire could be heard in the distance from the area toward Liubukou and Xidan, none of these troops fired their weapons (CBS tape library 3 June 1989,
4 June 1989).
Even with the sounds of heavy gunfire in the distance, people on the Square remained calm. Students in the Command Headquarters 270
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271 prepared for the troops' arrival by wrapping their faces with white cloth to protect them against tear gas. A plainclothes policeman was found on the Square carrying a knife, and the students displayed i t for, reporters. One person said:
Don't be nervous; when they enter the Square they will need time to prepare, and then we will have time to decide what to do to handle the situation. We shouldn't make ourselves nervous. If the troops come in, the four of us will stay with you forever. They won't come tonight, because i t 's Saturday; the citizens will go to bed very late. Tomorrow is Sunday. (CBS tape 3 June 1989)
Students and citizens were also calmly sitting outside the headquarters on the road beside the Great Hall of the People (CBS tape 3 June 1989).
An old farmer who was on the Square described the situation:
I went to Tiananmen Square many times; people asked me, "Why?" I said I wanted to see the students because they were on the Square saying things that we wanted to say for a long time, but weren't allowed to. Freedom of the press and dialogue with the government. Only these two requests. They went on a hunger strike for seven days and knelt [in front of the Great Hall of the People] in the old traditional way—still the government didn't respond. Now, the present government has no humanity, but i f you are human you must care about this. When it rained, eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old students were freezing and shivering; [government] s till didn't respond. Citizens gave food, water, and warm clothing to the students just like before [when they] gave these things to the PLA— because their [students'] actions meet the people's expectations. I knew that the government was going to do something terrib le— suppress the students—and resort to violent treachery, and lay murderous hands on the students. If we don't go to protect them, who will? If you are Chinese, you have the right and the responsi bility to protect the students. So I went there every day or early evening. Before 9:00 P.M. at Tiananmen Square, the government announced that everyone must leave the Square and that citizens should stay home. If [they] go out, they will suffer the consequences—be responsible for your ownself. On the one hand the government was holding a carrot, on the other hand they were holding a stick to threaten the people. But the government underestimated the people's strength [or will]. People still go to stop the troops. Now the common people see the government's real face. Very often at Tiananmen I thought the government, at most, would use tear gas, sticks, water cannons, or, like ten [fourteen] years ago, big sticks. But the students thought, at most, the Armed Police would 272
carry them out of the Square. No one thought at 1:00 A.M. the government would use tanks to run over us. Around 1:00 A.M., at that time many students were from outside Beijing—maybe ten thousand students. Tiananmen can hold one million people. You could see people everywhere except where there were tents—maybe 300,000 people. Some of the people went to stop the army trucks, other people just left. At 1:30 A.M., maybe there were thirty to forty thousand [people] still on the Square—maybe more. At 1:30, two armored personnel carriers [APCs—they were often mistaken as tanks] came from the east and west. The APC ran over tents at a very high speed, then i t went from north to south, stopped, made a U-turn, and went back. . . . Some students and citizens were like dare-to-die group, but after the APCs passed by I'm not certain if there was still such a group, but I really admired them. Before I only heard on television or read in books about such heroes, but today I saw the real dare-to-die heroes with my own eyes; therefore, I admired them. Now I am here to te ll these facts for the benefit of these dead people. I want everyone to know their deeds, their brave actions. I saw some young men run forward and use iron poles to stop the APC! They pulled out the drivers and destroyed the guns [mounted on the APC] so they couldn't fire any more. What spirit it was! Finally they stopped the fast-driving APC and poured gas inside and burned i t . . . . (Videotape 4 June 1989) Another witness said that an APC was driving wildly near
Jianguomenwai, where a large column of army vehicles and soldiers had
been stopped earlier. The APC drove through the army vehicles, wrecking one truck, and ran over at least one person, possibly a soldier (Notes
10 June 1989). As the APC headed toward the Square, i t ran into resistance from people along Changan Avenue. People threw rocks and iron bars at the APC in an attempt to stop it (CBS tape 4 June 1989).
A Taiwan videotape depicts this or possibly another APC running over a truck with civilians in i t on the Square. This APC was then stopped
and set on fire. A student explained what he saw:
We were on the south side [of the Square]. A tank [or APC] came from the north, driving wildly. It ran over everything and went through the barricades. People threw things at i t and stopped it. A soldier got out; people started to beat him. Students yelled, "Don't hit him" [Bie da ta ]. Then he had a gun . . . [tape is unclear] The relationship between the citizen and the PLA was 273 ruined. Citizens cussed at them and said that the soldiers were animals, not humans. (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
While an APC was burning on the northwest section of the Square, student speakers broadcast the following announcements:
We should believe in the quality of the soldiers, give them good ideological education. . . . Wish the Beijing citizens success [in stopping the troops]. Ambulance, please go to the east side at the monument; a tank driver has been injured. Please return all helmets and m ilitary things. Do your best to avoid violence. Don't wear m ilitary helmets. The 39th Army has turned its guns to the government. We protest Chinese government; they are killing people and soldiers. An army truck ran over one soldier. People, rise up! I admire our people, now I am not afraid of anything. (CBS tape 4 June 1989)
At the same time, the government speakers announced: "... people are kidnapping soldiers ..." and the speaker war continued (CBS tape 4
June 1989).
The troops that began firing at Muxidi at around 11:30 P.M. reached the west side of the Square before 2:00 A.M. These troops, unlike the ones that were in the area of Xinhuamen earlier, were ready and willing to fire at the people. A student gave the following account:
Last night at 1:00 A.M., the soldiers used tanks and machine guns to open the Blood Road [Changan Avenue] from Xidan and Wangfujing [an area just to the east of the Square] toward Tiananmen. At Tiananmen, when anyone threw a rock, they would shoot at the mass of people. I saw lots of people fall down. There's a seven-year-old boy who was looking for his sister. He was shot and couldn't stand up any more. (Male student, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
Another student gave this account:
Last night, at first armed police opened the road, then a leader, a hooligan soldier, held a gun in his hand and a cigarette in his mouth. His shirt was open. He was like the Japanese soldiers before—he shot into the masses of people. I don't know which country's soldiers they are. Dirty words spewed from his 274 mouth. At the beginning, they shot into the air, then they shot at people's feet. At that time many people were wounded. I saw a student, he/she went forward to the soldiers—he was shot. I saw this with my own eyes. Next to me there was a little girl; she was shot and blood came through her clothes. Blood gushed out from above her knee. I saw four people like that. People took them to the hospital—the girl died; they all died. (Male student, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
An approximately thirty-year-old man who had been on the Square until about 2:30 A.M. gave the following account:
. . . a tank came this way; the man just beside me died. I was lucky. I think there are 200,000 people in the Square. Their policy is to kill them--unbelievable. I think one hour ago [between 2:30 and 3:00 A.M.] was the high point. [The army came] from all angles; the people [inside] can't withdraw. Everybody must be killed. I saw this with my own eyes—maybe alive, maybe dead. Three hundred wounded and th irty dead at that hospital [perhaps People's Hospital]. The operation room is full of blood. Look at my shoes [they were bloody]. I don't know if there is another government in the world like this. Communist Party, Socialist, they say they put the people's interest over their own. [How many people were killed in the Square?] Now i t is sealed off; they stopped the news, stopped everything. No one knows. The dead were both students and citizens—half and half. Many ambulances went to the Square but were stopped far away by the army; [now] they are just waiting for the dead bodies. What can you say to this government? We asked them to correct it [the April 26 editorial] and they answered with machine guns. This is the tragedy of human beings. (30-year-old man, audiotape, 4 June 1989 [E])
The above account, as well as the one that follows, concerns the area to the north of the Square near the Tianan Gate and to the east and west of that area. A worker described it this way:
Troops came out of Tianan Gate from the north and from in front of the History Museum to the south to block Changan Avenue. Many people were very brave. People stood face-to-face with the soldiers —i f someone shouted a slogan or threw something, the soldiers opened fire . The people would run away, but then return. Many people were killed. Even students—I think from outside Beijing—
^ h i s figure does not f it with other accounts. Perhaps, because the interview was in English, he may have meant to say 20,000 instead of 200,000. 275
who were in the underground walkway [that crosses Changan Avenue] were killed. (Notes 20 August 1989)
A student who was shot explained the circumstance as follows:
I was shot at Tiananmen Square. I was riding away. I went to see the fact. I stayed until midnight, then [tried to] go back to [my] university. I went to around the Minzu Hotel. I was stopped by the soldiers, so I had to go back, so ju st by the Square I was shot. I saw many people by me shot. A person who was standing at a shop was shot here in the neck. [How did the soldiers shoot?] They ju st shot as they liked, in the sky, at the ground, or just straight into the people. I was standing; the bullet hit me here [just above his heart] and it came out here [in his left arm] so I think just [they shot] straight into the body. I saw about twenty people shot just near myself. I was sent to the hospital by some people. . . . At that time I'm very angry. I don't think any other government in the world would do like th is. I t 's not as expected [T a i.b e ib i]. Without humanity, because we people [were] just trying to go away, running away, they shot at us. [Who gave the order?] The leader of the soldiers ordered it— the senior leader—Deng Xiaoping. In the short time people will remain calm; th is , we didn't expect i t . Government will try to change our mind, [they] think the people won't go against them. They can shoot us, they can kill us, but [they] can't stop our thinking. I was very lucky. . . . (CBS tape 4 June 89 [E])
As the troops began to encircle the Square, people in the northwest corner were separated from the students who were gathered around the monument. By 4:00 A.M., there were approximately three thousand students on the Square, mostly in the area around the monument. Many of the student tents, the emergency medical center, and the students' Command Headquarters were still standing. The following are accounts of the students who were gathered around the monument and their exit from the Square:
I went to the Square at 10:00 P.M., 3 June. At 1:00 I began to hear shooting. Soldiers came from Muxiding Beijing [Railway] Station and Jianguomen. At 4:00 A.M., the government announced that they would begin to clear the Square. In front of the Great Hall of the People a large group of soldiers had guns [chong feng giang] with bayonets. They surrounded students and citizens in one area. Others surrounded students who gathered around the monument. Four people—Hou Dejian—contacted some military leaders to get them 276 to allow students to leave peacefully. He got a promise to leave peacefully. We decided to vote. At that time soldiers were using real bullets to shoot at monument [and the students' loudspeakers]. Three leaders of the Autonomous Union, their leader, in order to reduce the [number of] wounded, decided to leave the Square. The students were angry because the soldiers shot at the monument. Around 5:00 A.M., when we were leaving, students yelled, "Down with Li Peng," "Struggle to the end," and %Blood debts must be repaid with blood." (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
On June 8, 1989, a Hong Kong radio station broadcast an audiotape from Chai Ling, the student commander of Tiananmen Square. She described the situation thusly:
At around 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning, we had no choice but to abandon our headquarters and retreat to the broadcast station at the foot of the Hero's Monument. As General Commander, I mobilized the students for one last time, directing them to encircle the Hero's Monument. The students sat there calmly. They said to me, "We'll just sit here quietly. We in the first row are the most determined." Other students said, "We in the back will also sit here quietly. Even if our classmates in the first row are beaten and killed, we will just sit here calmly. We will not move and we absolutely will not kill." . . . The students began singing the "Internationale." Over and over again they sang i t , hands clasped together. Finally our four compatriots who were hunger striking--Hou Dejian, Liu Xiaobu, Zhou Duo [and Gao Xin]—could not longer restrain themselves. They said, "Children, do not make any more sacrifices." (Translation from Han 1990, 263-64)
After Hou Dejian and the others received the guarantee of safe passage for the students to leave the Square and after the students voted to leave the Square, the students began their exit to abandon the
Square that they had held for one and a half months. As the students were preparing to leave, some soldiers attacked the people on the monument. Chai Ling stated:
For a more detailed account of this time period, see Robin Munro, "The Real Story of the Slaughter in Beijing," The Nation, 11 June 1990; and Hou Dijian. 277
But at that moment [as they were preparing to leave], that bunch of slaughterers violated th eir promise: as the students were leaving, soldiers wearing combat helmets and armed with machine guns charged to the third tier of steps at the platform of the monument. Before the Headquarters had a chance to announce the decision to withdraw, our loudspeakers had been strafed into shreds. This was the people's monument. . . . they were actually shooting at the monument. Most of the students retreated, crying as they retreated. Some say more than two hundred students died; there are also others who say nine thousand have already died in the Square. Up to now, I s till don't know the exact number. But every one of the people at the Workers' Autonomous Union near the [northern] edge of the Square perished. There were at least twenty or th irty of them. . . . (Translated in Han 1990, 364) Another report on the retreat of the students was given by Hou 35 Dejian. His report describes gunfire on the Square, but does not mention witnessing any students being shot. As the students le ft toward the southeast corner, Hou stated:
All around me plainclothes anti-riot police were waving thick wooden sticks and beating people on their heads and bodies. Students were bleeding. The crowd stumbled over iron railings that had been scattered on the ground. A whole row of people fell. Those behind fell over them, and the next wave over them. (Translated in South China Morning Post, August 1989)
Another student who was on the Square and witnessed Hou Dejian's discussion with the army leader stated:
I went to Tiananmen at 2:30 and I saw the four new hunger strikers and the troops circled the Square. They went to talk to the political commisar [m ilitary] about how to leave the Square. [He said], "We don't want to shoot but we have very strong orders— by 7:30 A.M. the Square must be cleared by any means." . . . Most students were gathered on the monument, some citizens gathered at Mao's mausoleum. Students voted to leave. . . . After 4:00 the lights came back on. [I] could see the special troops begin tearing down tents, soldiers came across the fence onto the monument and started shooting the speakers. Students began to leave. Some
35 I t should be noted that Hou Dejian was, at the time of this statement, holed up in the Canadian Embassy. His statement was released as part of a deal with the Chinese government for his safe release from the Embassy. 278 didn't leave; [they] just didn't want to leave. Others continued to sleep in the tents—unaware. (Audiotape 4 June 1989) Although several witnesses claimed that some students were s till in tents, i t is not clear what their reports were based on; that is, did they really see people still in tents? Some students explained that many of the students were completely exhausted and some were injured; therefore, they didn't leave the tents. Other witnesses were less clear; for example, a student stated:
The massacre lasted three hours. At 4:00 the lights went off; at 4:30 the lights came back on. [I] saw the special soldiers appear. [They] shot at the monument; dozens of people in tents were run over. (Male, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
Another student added:
When it started, soldiers used guns with bayonets to open the tents to check for people, but they didn't check very carefully and they didn't check all of them. There were students still in some tents. At that time we were discussing whether or not to leave. So I think maybe about one thousand were killed there. (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
Another person stated:
There were students in the tents. I'm not sure how many people were in the ten ts, but I know some were. The students thought that the soldiers would just take them away, so they didn't leave. (Videotape 5 June 1989)
Perhaps there were students s till in the tents; however, if there were, it is not certain how many were there.
As the students left the Square toward the southeast corner, they sang the "Internationale." The students were, as usual, organized by universities. The following are accounts of what happened to some students after they le ft the Square:
When we left the Square, some students didn't go back to the university; some students went with citizens to ...... Some students, when they le ft, didn't have shoes or enough clothes. 279
There was one soldier and one officer; one had a big gun, the other had a handgun, they walked with Hou Dejian. In the Square, at the center, the soldiers were afraid to shoot them obviously, but after students left [the Square], on the street things were very crazy [hen luan]. When they shot tear gas, some students spit up blood. I went with many students from Bei Shi Da [Beijing Normal Univer sity] around 11:00 P.M. last night [crying, very emotional]. Only two returned. (Male, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
. . . as we turned the corner, I saw a tank coming toward us; they shot tear gas [described the effects of the tear gas]. Soldiers should shoot into the air to scare people away, but they didn't. They shot at us. As we left, tanks followed us and tried to run us over. (Male, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
At Liubukou they shot tear gas. Students were still in a neat line, we shouted slogans. A tank shot tear gas. Students were blinded and coughing. Suddenly a tank turned and as the students came around the corner, [ it] ran over them. I saw one student—his brains were spilling out, [I] saw another with his/her intestines spilling out, another his/her leg was smashed and cut off. Altogether eleven were dead. [The tank] ran over three people, then started shouting at them. When the tank was a little ways away, citizens and Red Cross workers went to save the wounded, but they were all dead. So they just left the bodies there. I saw fifteen bodies behind me; they were all fla t. [At this time there was shooting outside of the university and then a report on television that stated that students and citizens burned tanks and military vehicles.] We didn't burn the tanks. When it first started, no one burned the tanks or other vehicles. Only after lots of people were killed, then students and citizens burned several tanks and vehicles. A driver of a tank opened the cover and looked out; when he saw the dead bodies, he laughed. There were three tanks and APCs [Interrupted by more shooting—end of interview.] (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
. . . the last group to leave the Square was Bei Shi Da. After we le ft the square, we walked to Changan Avenue just past Liubukou. A tank chased after us [at] 5:20 A.M. Shot tear gas. Students who s till had their bicycles pedaled away. Some crossed over a fence, but because of the tear gas, others just lay on the ground. A tank just drove over them. I saw eleven people, including four female students from Shi Da and Qinghun. The tank also shot—dozens of people fell down. An old man was pushing a cart. I saw him fall down, saw dozens of bullet holes in him. People took bodies away. [I] also saw two dead soldiers who were killed by angry citizens. At Qianmen, soldiers and students were also face-to-face, but the soldiers didn't shoot. [Citizens] said 37th [perhaps he meant the 27th] division is the one that shot the people. They just returned 280
from Vietnam. Now I just came back here [university] at 9:00 A.M. (Male, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
. . . soldiers around Tiananmen have bayonets. The citizens yelled and cursed at them. They said that they were not like soldiers, that they were the old rebel, bandits. (Male, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
. . . after we left the Square, [I] saw a tank burning. The driver was getting beat up by citizens. Some students helped the soldier and took him to a hospital. The citizens were very angry; they cursed at us. (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
An announcement was made over the student broadcast station:
Please come to building number to protect the broadcast station. . . . Now let us memorialize the four hundred citizens and thirty students who gave their lives at Tiananmen Square. The government said Tiananmen is the center of Beijing, center of the country. Can you imagine th is massacre happened there--four hundred citizens and th irty students will not come back any more. . . . Then a student read a poem:
We come to this world and we will die But before we die. . . . I want to tell this, I don't believe the sky is blue I don't believe that death is the end of life. . . . (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
Then the speaker announced, "Students who just returned from Tiananmen
Square, come to the broadcast station to tell the truth. ..."
(Audiotape 4 June 1989).
At around 9:30 A.M., two students approached several foreign teachers who were listening to the student broadcast. The students requested the assistance of the teachers to deliver two messages to the
International Red Cross. After translating the messages, the following two items were given to the Voice of America who said they would do their best to get them to the Red Cross: 281
#1
1070 89 - 05-21 23:08
TO: The President of the Int. Committee of the Red Cross
FM: The National Students Autonomous Association of the PRC at Tiananmen Square
Top Urgent There are more than 40,000 armed m ilitary personnel at the subway at downtown Beijing. And there are more than 10,000 armed soldiers at Nan Yuan airport outskirt of Beijing. And the Prime Minister [Premier] of the country has made up his mind to use violence to oppress the demonstrating students of more than 200,000 and the citizens at the Tiananmen Squaer [sic ]. We sincerely hope that the International Committee of the Red cross to do what it all can, and the other international organizations concerned to save the demonstrating students and impose further pressures of all kinds to stop the government from using any violence to the students and citizens and save China from the Fascist Rule.
Many Thanks, RGBS, The National Students Autonomous Association of the PRC [As indicated by the above date, this message was originally written (in English) on May 21, 1989.]
#2
About ten thousand fully equipped soldiers instructed by the false government headed by Deng, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, turned their guns to the citizens and students making petitions peacefully on the Tiananmen Square. There are about 100 people shot dead up to now, about 1000 injured, including people aged from 6 to 80s. We sincerely hope that International Red Cross and other inter national organizations try with all your effort to help [save] these Chinese people who are making petitions peacefully, stop the government to use violence on the people. Autonomous Students Union of China Workers - -...... And All the Beijing Citizens
1989.6.4 (Autonomous Students Union 1989) 282 From the above accounts from eyewitnesses on the Square, i t is clear that some students and citizens were beaten and killed on the northern part of the Square and in the areas just to the east and west of the Square, or Changan Avenue and the adjacent areas. Evidence suggests that as the students left the Square there was some shooting in the background, some students were beaten by soldiers, and an unde termined number of students may have been killed in their tents, but there apparently was no massacre of the students as they left the
Square. After the students le ft the Square on their way back to their respective campuses or other destinations, some students encountered some fighting with soldiers; witnessed the shooting, beating, and killing of students, citizens, and soldiers; and at least eleven students were run over by a tank at Liubukou.
Morning, June 4, 1989
The army took control of the Square before daylight. By
5:30 A.M. there were thousands of soldiers, hundreds of army vehicles including tanks, APCs, and troop trucks on the Square. Many of the vehicles had entered the Square from West Changan Avenue. The following is an excerpt from an audiotape recording at the Minzu Hotel as the army vehicles passed by:
American male: My God, what is going on? Why is everyone c1earing the street? [People scatter as the sound of approaching tanks gets louder.] Woman: Mother fuckers. . . . [four tanks pass] Those sons of bitches--let me go. I'm not afraid to die.
An almost endless column of tanks, APCs, troop trucks, jeeps, and vans 283 passed by the hotel. People were very angry and very frightened. Many people went into the hotel; others hid behind the large cement columns in front of the hotel. A man asked, "What kind of government is this?"
(Audiotape 4 June 1989). Other people cursed the soldiers and vehicles as they passed by, but no one threw anything at them. There was no shooting (Notes from audiotape 4 June 1989).
After the tanks and other vehicles reached the Square and after the army controlled the Square, there was still fighting between citizens and soldiers just to the northeast of the Square on Changan
Avenue. Citizens walked up to the soldiers and yelled slogans and occa sionally there was some rock throwing followed by shooting, and the crowd would run away, then return. At one point citizens put gasoline in an ambulance and aimed i t at the tanks and soldiers; however, it collided with the traffic patrol stand in front of the army and burned
(CBS tape 4 June 1989; TBS tape 4 June 1989).
Several people were injured or killed in this area (just west of the Beijing Hotel) in the early morning hours just after daybreak.
People carried the injured to hospitals in ambulances, three-wheeled carts, and on bicycles (CBS tape 4 June 1989).
After gaining control of the Square, soldiers in largecolumns of tanks, APCs, and troop trucks patrolled different parts of the city.
As these patrols passed certain areas, people hiding behind walls and buildings threw rocks and other debris at the passing vehicles. The soldiers occasionally fired at the people (CBS tape 4 June 1989).
In the morning hours there were reports of civilian and military casualties in many areas of the city; for example: 284 Around 11:00 A.M., two tanks came by from Tiananmen, just around Xinhuamen. One tank came from the direction of Tiananmen—we burned that tank. Lots of citizens and a few students put gas on i t —to burn i t —and two drivers came out. We beat them. One driver fell down. [He] couldn't move; the others hit him and blood came out. A little while later, the one soldier got up to run away. They caught him. I think he was killed. (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
. . . People were killed in Tuanjiehu Park [near the People's Daily office] while they were doing th eir morning exercises. A woman whose husband was killed—she was very angry. An old couple- old man—killed. (Male student, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
In the morning between Xinhuamen and Liubukou, twenty people were killed. I saw some people burn a m ilitary truck. [Students] took a briefcase from an officer. [They] brought it here for evidence. (Male student, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
When we walked back to school, [I] saw people throw Molotov cocktails at soldiers. Soldiers shot at them. (Male student, audiotape, 4 June 1989)
A woman just brought a six- or seven-year-old child to the front gate [of the university]. He had been shot and killed. The couple had just returned from Shandong [Province], he was shot as he stood on the side of the street. There was lots of blood. Wherever the soldiers are—i f people shout at them, they shoot them. Even if you say, "The people love the army, the army loves the people," they s till shoot you. (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
At Xidan a plainclothes policeman was chased by people and beat up. . . . (Audiotape 4 June 1989)
Two students were killed outside of our university this morning as the troops passed by [a university on the far east side of Beijing]. (Notes 4 June 1989)
At Muxidi a large column of tanks heading toward the Square
suddenly stopped in front of the Military Museum and the CCTV offices.
The soldiers got out of the vehicles and the vehicles were set on fire.
This event was filmed by CCTV crews. After pictures of the burning vehicles were widely shown on television, a professor who lives in the
area said:
They pretend that this happened f ir s t. You know, we Beijing residents just went crazy and attacked the tanks. Just think. 285
unarmed citizens attacking hundreds of tanks. Ridiculous. The trucks came by on the morning of the fourth. They stopped and the drivers got out. Some set the vehicles on fire themselves, others just went into the Military Museum. After awhile, some citizens went over and burned the rest of the tanks. I know the government did th is. They had to-bave an excuse for all the killing, but they can't fool the people. (Interview 15 June 1989)
Killings of students, citizens, and soldiers continued throughout June 4; however, the pro-democracy movement that began on
April 15 with the death of Hu Yaobang had ended. A student who returned from the Square to her campus around 9:30 A.M. on June 4 said sadly:
I t 's over. This movement is over. The government has won. Deng has the support of the army and we—what can we do? We have nothing. I t 's over. Now our hope is to wait for th eir sons [many of the leaders' sons and daughters are studying abroad] and the other students to return home. Ten years, twenty year, maybe then we can have change—now i t 's already over. (Female student, notes, 4 June 1989)
Aftermath: June 4r9, 1989
Beijing citizens were shocked to learn that the army—the
People's Army—had opened fire on the people. Rumors and stories were passed around which, for the most part, were attempts not only to te ll what happened, but also to offset the massive propaganda campaign that
0 7 was instituted by the government.
Facts were difficult to sort out, but one thing was clear: the citizens of Beijing were angry and most of their anger was directed at
Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Yang Shangkun. the following interviews reflected the mood of many people:
36 This is a rough translation of a telephone conversation. For more information on this event, see Munro (1990, 815). 37 Government propaganda will be dealt with in the next chapter. 286 In that night I went to Tiananmen before 12:00. Tiananmen was quiet"When I returned I heard guns. About 1:00 [A.M.] I saw tank and truck on Changan jie [Avenue] and soldiers shoot the people [crying] and people crowd—run. Some young men throw stones to trucks and ju st here one truck was blocked—burned the truck. Maybe a soldier was killed. And that morning 7:00 I go through Changan--! saw this blood—and also I see a body laying on the street. [Official reports claim there were no civilians killed.] I think they are lying. They are very bad, yes, they murdered lots of people and people only have stones. They have guns, they have tank, even woman, child was killed. I know every people hate the government, hate the troops. [Who do you think was responsible?] Perhaps Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun. I don't know. These people, I want to kill them. (Female, CBS tape 4 June 1989 [E])
I saw the troops come. I saw them just shoot the people. It's a terrib le tragedy, i t 's unhuman. They say if people oppose them they can shoot the people, now it's martial law. I don't think this is communism. Only Yang Shangkun—a few did th is. Everyone was quite surprised that the troops did this. We are from the people; they are from the people; how can they shoot the people? Some of my students in the university here were killed. I am quite afraid now. It's the first time such as this in the history of China, in the history of the world. How can th is happen in China today I can't imagine. The people can't support them, will overthrow them, must overthrow them. (Male professor, CBS tape, 5 June 1989 [E])
Woman : We are firmly against tyranny. We are so angry that we can't eat or sleep. I saw them with my own eyes. The 27th division used machine gun to shoot the people and used tanks to clear the road. We can't eat, we can't sleep. They suppress the patriotic students and the citizens. No one made a rebellion. Give us proof. Burned the vehicle just because they killed so many people. People are very angry; they couldn't do anything else but burn the military vehicles. Man #1 : All of [their] words are nonsense, lying words [jia huaj. They killed so many people, but still they lie. News is all nonsense, no one listens to or reads that. Man #2: Just like 1976, they said that they must use force because they were counterrevolutionaries, just to make an excuse so that they k ill. Woman: Government f ir s t used force. We used force to protect ourselves. The government said that we started turmoil, but look, our students don't have anything with iron, but they have armed forces. [They] asked for democracy, freedom, and reform: What is the crime? What they are asking for represents the progress of society. Before we didn't know about these things; now people know about i t and ask for it. 287 Young man: The government said that there were only a few [or a small handful] of hooligans, then they only needed to send in the police to catch them. Why do they need an army? Older man: They used machine guns and tanks. Tanks ran over and kilied people, but what can we do? We will do our best. If our work unit doesn't allow us to strike we will have a work slowdown— students will have an unlimited boycott. Young man: But so far all we can use to face the government and the troops are our chests. We don't have any weapons. We can't le t people be like sheep, where anyone can wantonly stick a knife into them and k ill them. We can use our conscience to do what we can do now. We can walk to the streets to support the students; citizens are counted on. Woman: That evening, the people who died were not just students; there were also citizens, old people, and 5-, 9-, and 11-year-old children. A nine-year-old child had dozens of bullet wounds—around Fuxingmen. A doctor from Xiehe Hospital went tg help wounded people, but his eyes were shot blind. Boy: At the History Museum there was an ambulance and a doctor. They TrTed to enter the Square but were stopped . . . Soldiers are mad [fengle]; they are so angry they can't control themselves. When [a personj first kills someone he/she is sad, then after [the person] k ills a few more, he/she becomes crazy, kills even more. They become like wild animals . . . (CBS tape 5 June 1989)
And the stories and the rumors and the propaganda and the killings continued. However, on June 9, Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, Yang
Shankun, and the other leaders were seen on national television congrat ulating the martial law troops for quelling the counterrevolutionary rebellion. The stories and the rumors stopped, but the government progaganda and killings continued, and they were now accompanied by arrests and executions.
The campuses were deserted as most students went home or were in hiding. The dazibao were also gone. Only a few reminders of the
Pro-Democracy Movement remained on the campuses:
A single blood-stained tennis shoe beside a "democracy wall"
Blood stains on the cement where classmates were put before their funerals 288 A few flowers left over from the funerals
Government posters—"Hot line" numbers to turn in counterrevo
lutionaries (Notes 5 June 1989 through 9 June 1989)
At one university there was a dazibao that read: "The Spirit of the
Martyrs Will Last Forever" (Photo 5 June 1989). Like all other dazibao, this, too, was removed. Martial law troops patrolled the city and were permanently stationed at many intersections. They randomly checked
people's identifications, and at night there were roadblocks and secu rity checks at all key intersections. By the end of the week, this the seventh week after the death of Hu Yaobang, in the words of State
Council spokesman Yuan Mu, "Beijing [was] basically back to normal." CHAPTER V
TEACHING ABOUT THE BEIJING SPRING
Introduction
Following the events on June 4, 1989, schools and universities in Beijing were not able to function as usual for several days.
Students and teachers who tried to go to their schools were prevented by real or perceived threats of violence and by the presence of martial law troops In the city. Schools and universities, although never o ffi cially closed, reopened for Instruction In some cases within a week, and In other cases not for over one month. The time of the reopening depended on several factors: (1) The level of the school—elementary and middle schools generally opened first, while universities opened last; (2) the school administration and faculty—for whatever reasons, some administrators and faculty members were more eager to begin classes than others; and (3) the amount of Involvement of the school, i.e., administrators, faculty, and students,-In the Pro-Democracy
Movement—at some schools, for example, Shi Da and Bel Da, many of the students and sta ff were heavily involved In the movement and, conse quently, they were the last schools to reopen. This chapter discusses
(1) the process of reopening the schools, (2) the materials and methods used to teach about the Beijing Spring, and (3) changes in the educa tional system after June 4, 1989. For (1) and (2), the chapter will
289 290
be separated into separate sections for primary, lower middle school,
and upper middle school.
The Process of Reopening-the Schools
The first step at the school level in reopening the schools was
to hold meetings for faculty, staff, and CCP members. At these meetings
party members listened to speeches by Deng Xiaoping and Beijing Major
Chen Xitong about the nature and quelling of the "counterrevolutionary
re b e llio n .A ll party members were required to voice support for these
views and were instructed to follow party discipline. For example,
party members were required to voice agreement that the April 26
editorial was correct and that the "turmoil" was caused by a small group
of people whose "real aim was to overthrow the Communist Party and
topple the so cialist system" (Speech, Diang Xiaping, 9 June 1989;
reprinted in Xinhua News 27 June 1989).^
During some of these meetings, at some schools videotapes taken
during the "turmoil" were shown and people were asked to identify people
from their schools; for example, teachers were asked to identify their co-workers and students. Lists were made of people involved from each
school and given to that school's party leader. People placed on these
As Deng Xiaoping's speech took place on June 9, some schools may have been in partial session at this time. In an effort to protect their faculty, students, or themselves, an unknown number of adminis trators reported that their schools were not interrupted and were otherwise unaffected by the "turmoil." Factory managers, neighborhood committee members, and work unit leaders in official interviews with the foreign press also stated that their employees were not involved in the turmoil. 2 For a full text of th is speech, see Appendix E. 291 lists were further Investigated and the information was recorded on their permanent file s and used for handling their cases.
A person's permanent file is extremely important. Negative information contained in one's file can prevent a person from going on to a higher level of schooling or from getting employment following graduation. For teachers and administrators, it can prevent them from getting promotions, transfers, or funding for research or further edu cation. For example, several students from Bei Da who had been accepted by a work unit prior to June 4 were later rejected (Interviews 15 August 3 1989). An administrator at one university, who had received a grant for further study in the United States, was told in July that his/her grant had been canceled. This administrator's involvement in the movement was limited to delivering food and clothing to the students from his/her university during the hunger strike (Notes 16 July 1989).
People were not only required to report on others, they were also required to report on their own activities during the "turmoil."
If a person had been involved in the "turmoil," he or she had the choice of reporting the truth or lying and hoping that no one else reported him or her and that the security bureau was unaware of his or her activities. The decision to report on oneself and/or others must have been d ifficu lt for many people.
The length of these meetings was determined, in part, by the
Party leader and the Party members. If the Party leader took the
3 Because of the heavy involvement of Bei Da's faculty and students in the Pro-Democracy Movement, i t is believed that many employees were afraid to hire Bei Da graduates. 292 meetings very seriously, then the meetings lasted longer. Likewise, if the Party members quickly gave their reports and voiced support for the Party and the views expressed by Deng Xiaoping's and Chen Xitong's reports, then the meetings ended more quickly.
Once everyone in the meetings was in agreement, the meetings were expanded to the entire faculty and staff. These meetings followed the same basic procedures. Once everyone at this level was in agreement, the meetings were expanded to the entire student body. At this level the meetings primarily consisted of typed speeches by Deng
Xiaoping and lectures by faculty members about the international envi ronment and the nature of the turmoil. Once these meetings were completed, schools began regular classes (Notes 1 August 1989 through
25 August 1989).
Many intellectuals had had a lot of experience in these types of rectification campaigns and movements against bourgeois liberalism during the Cultural Revolution and afterwards. The Chinese word for movement (yuandong) is the same word that describes an athletic event. A person who has had a lot of experience in movements is, therefore, called a yuandongyuan, which means athlete or seasoned athlete. A seasoned athlete was well aware of how to proceed through this movement and to protect himself/herself and others by quickly agreeing with the
Party positions, admitting one's errors, and saying as little as possible about oneself or others' activities. The purpose of these meetings was to change one's way of thinking or, to put it another way, to get a person to go down the correct road. That is to say that people who supported the movement were misled and had gone down the wrong road 293
(zuo c u o -le lu ). To correct this mistake, a person had to change
"roads" by going a different direction. Although the situation was very serious, a common joke on one campus was to greet a fellow professor by asking, "Have you changed roads yet?" The person would answer, "No problem; I have already changed 360 degrees." That is , the person had changed all the way around so as to continue down the same road (Notes
16 August 1989). Not all administrators, teachers, or students were quick to voice their support for the Party line. Bei Da was, however, the last school in Beijing to reopen.
When schools did reopen, th eir f ir s t priority was to complete coursework and final exams for the 1988-89 school year (Interview 20
August 1989). This was especially important for college students because many students had missed a lot of school because of the demon strations and class boycotts. Once the previous year's coursework and exams were completed, schools were ready to begin the 1989-90 school year. The following sections utilize information and materials collected from a variety of sources including textbooks and supplemental teaching materials, audiotapes of classrooms, and interviews with students and teachers.
Primary Schools
Primary students were only minimally involved in the pro-democracy movement. Some teachers and parents allowed or encouraged their students and children to show support for the students during several demonstrations. For example, some children gave food and water to protest marchers, held signs and banners supporting the students. 294 and dapped and cheered during several of the demonstrations (Levitt, videotape 1989; CBS tape, 1989). Perhaps because of the age and minimal involvement of the students in the movement, the changes in the primary schools were less drastic that those in the other levels.
Teaching about the "Beijing Spring" in primary schools took place in the ideological and moral education classes. These classes meet one class hour per week (Interview 15 August 1989). In recent years, these classes usually dealt with moral education and good behavior.
The materials used for teaching about the Beijing Spring consisted of a new textbook titled Study.Materials for Situation Edu cation in Primary School (SMSEPS) (Interview 15 August 1989). This textbook contains four chapters: (1) The Republic Bodyguard, (2) People
Love Their Own Army, (3) Without the Communist Party, There Would Be
No New China, and (4) Love the Socialist Motherland.
Chapter One describes the heroic efforts of the army in suppressing the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Beijing. It describes how the army was attacked by ruffians who used bricks, stones, bottles, and iron rods to beat them. The chapter focuses on the heroic efforts of a platoon leader named Liu Guogong, who risked his own life to save the lives of other soldiers in his platoon. It describes how he was viciously attacked and, although he had a gun and could have fought back in self-defense, he chose not to. As the book explains:
. . . At the very moment of his life, what he first thought of was the people. In order to safeguard the People's Republic, safeguard Beijing—the capital of the Republic—he went to his death unflinch ingly, like a hero. (SMSEPS 1989, 2) 295
The chapter concludes by stating that Chairman Deng Xiaoping gave Liu
Guogong and nine other martyrs the t i t l e "The Republic Bodyguard," and that the nation and the Beijing residents will never forget their contributions (SMSEPS 1989).
Chapter Two-gives examples of regular people risking their own lives to feed and protect soldiers. It describes how "Mother Chen" rushed outside to protect one soldier who was being beaten by ruffians and took him and nine other soldiers into her own house. When the ruffians threatened to set her house on fire and burn everyone in the yard i f she didn't turn over the soldiers, she simply refused the ruffians. The chapter concludes by stating:
Numerous facts verified that the PLA is the people's army and that the people love their own army. We children should also study and inherit their good tradition, support the PLA, love the PLA, learn from the PLA . . . (SMSEPS 1989, 4)
Chapter Three describes the history of the party and how, under the leadership of the party, they defeated the Japanese invaders, the
Guomindong reactionaries, and liberated all of China. It describes how the CCP led people to change "backward old China into a socialist country with the beginnings of prosperity" (SMSEPS 1989, 5). It states that in the counterrevolutionary rebellion a small group of evildoers attempted to overthrow the leadership of the party, but the Chinese people will never agree with them to do that. The chapter concludes by stating, "People all over the country love the Party . . . The children in our country love the Party and should do as the Party says from childhood and be a good child of the Party" (SMSEPS 1989, 6). 296
Chapter Four describes some of the accomplishments in the areas of science, technology, production, and industry. It states that before liberation (1949), the Chinese people were exploited, oppressed, and enslaved for thousands of years; however, under the leadership of the
CCP China has developed quickly:
. . . in the short forty years [since 1949], we have achieved greatly in the socialist construction and turned the poor, backward old China into a socialist country with the beginnings of prosperity. Therefore, that we love the Motherland means that we love the so cialist New China. (SMSEPS 1989, 7)
The chapter also states that because of its large population and poor foundation, China is still a poor country. It states that for moderni zation to succeed, i t will require a stable social environment for several generations and for people to strive together and work hard.
The chapter concludes, "We shall love our own mother, love our so cialist New China, foster a lofty ideal of working arduously and developing our China vigorously from childhood and devote ourselves to the Motherland when we grow up" (SMSEPS 1989, 8).
This textbook also includes four exercises for the students.
The exercises include "fill in the blanks," such as:
(1) At present, the conspiracy, whereby ruffians attempted to overturn the leadership of ------andsubvert ...... has now been crushed. TrTTuppressing the counterrevolutionary rebellion [we] won a decisive victory.
Other exercises request the students to sing the song, "Without the
Communist Party There Would Be No New China," and request the students to "say something about real people and real events whereby people saved and consoled the PLA soldiers in suppressing the counterrevolutionary rebellion" (SMSEPS 1939, 1-10). 297
In some schools, these lessons were supplemented by field trip s
to the Square where soldiers explained the history of the Chinese flag
and information about the artny. Some students even went to the Square
at daybreak to watch the raising of the flag ceremony in front of Tianan
Gate (Notes 10 September 1989).
Some schools arranged for a group of soldiers to spend the day
playing games and giving marching and kong-fu demonstrations for the
students. Soldiers played such games as "Pin the Tail on the Donkey"
and traditional Chinese games. The foreign media were invited to some
of these events.
In primary schools, the teaching about the Pro-Democracy
Movement focused on the following points: (1) a small group of evil doers viciously attacked the PLA soldiers, who were suppressing a counterrevolutionary rebellion; (2) the people of the city risked their own lives and made great sacrifices to help feed and protect the soldiers; (3) the PLA soldiers are brave heroes and were willing to die rather than shoot their weapons to defend themselves and thereby endanger the lives of the citizens; (4) the children should follow the leadership of the party because without the CCP, China would s till be an old, backward country; and (5) under the leadership of the Party,
China has developed rapidly and therefore the children should love the
Party and the socialist Motherland.
The textbook does not discuss the nearly eight weeks of student demonstrations nor does i t use the word "student." The text does not mention casualty figures; the only deaths mentioned are the ten soldiers who were made "The Republic Bodyguard." 298
Lower Middle School
The teaching about the "Beijing Spring" in lower middle schools took place in t!=e Political Thought or Politics courses. These classes usually meet two class hours per week. In recent years these courses dealt with citizenship, social development, and Chinese socialist construction.
The materials used for teaching about the "Beijing Spring" consisted of a new textbook titled Study Material for Situation Edu cation in Lower Middle Schools (SMSELMS) (Interview 20 August 1989).
The following is a general outline of this textbook:
I. The Turmoil and Counterrevolutionary Rebellion Took Place in Beijing
A. A tiny minority of people made use of the student movement to stir up turmoil. 1. The party and government affirmed many times the patriotic enthusiasm and wishes of the students. 2. The tiny minority of people conspired for a long time to stir up the turmoil. 3. This tiny minority of people had carefully planned to s tir up the turmoil. 4. During the turmoil, various political powers overseas intervened and offered ideas. 5. The tiny minority of people used extremely cruel methods to make the situation worse. 6. The mistakes made by comrade Zhou Ziyang prevented the party and government from stopping the turmoil and made the situation worse.
B. A counterrevolutionary rebellion took place in Beijing. 1. How did a tiny minority of people stir up the counter revolutionary rebellion? 2. How did the counterrevolutionary ruffians beat, smash, rob, burn, and kill?
C. The character and source of this severe political struggle 1. The character of the struggle is the antagonism between bourgeois liberalism and the Four Cardinal Principles. 2. This serious political struggle was inevitable. 299
II. The Important Success of the Suppression of the Counterrevolution ary Rebellion and the Historical Merits of the People's Army
A. The methods applied by our Party and government to put an end to the turmoil 1. The April 26 editorial correctly determined the nature of the turmoil. 2. The Party and the government took the attitude of extreme forbearance. 3. Under the conditions, there was no alternative except to enforce martial law in some areas of Beijing.
B. The Party and government took firm action to calm down the counterrevolutionary rebel lion. 1. The tiny minority of people started the appalling counter revolutionary rebellion. 2. The suppression of the counterrevolutionary rebellion was a just action in keeping with the aspirations and the basic benefits of all the people in the Capital and all over the country.
C. Teenagers should learn from the PLA and love the PLA. 1. The PLA made an historical contribution by suppressing the counterrevolutionary rebellion. 2. Learn from the martyr, Liu Guogeng. 3. Who will not support or love such an army? 4. People love their own army.
III. Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and Oppose Bourgeois Liberalism. A. The significance of the suppression of the counterrevolu tionary rebellion 1. The major significance of the victory of suppressing the counterrevolutionary rebellion
B. The Four Cardinal Principles are the essence to establish our country. 1. The contents of the Four Cardinal Principles 2. The Four Cardinal Principles are the essence to establish the country. 3. The most important of the Four Cardinal Principles is to adhere to the leadership of the Party. 4. Adhering to the leadership of the Party is determined by the position of the Party in the revolution and construction. 5. Adhering to the leadership of the Party is determined by the nature and tasks of the Party. 300
C. Love the so cialist Motherland. 1. China is a socialist country. We should not separate patriotism from loving socialism. 2. What youth should do to "love the country"
D. Adhere to the policy of "one center, two points." 1. "One center, two points" is the main constant of the Party's basic route in the primary stage of socialism. 2. In the near future, we must concentrate on four causes: (1) completely stop the turmoil; (2) continue the reform and open policies; (3) seriously strengthen the political work in ideology, develop widely education in patriotism, socialism, independence, and hard work, and opposing bourgeois liberalism; and (4) straighten Party construction and firmly punish corruption.
E. Oppose bourgeois liberalism. 1. To build the four modernizations, we must oppose bourgeois liberalism. 2. Distinguish between good and evil, and re sist the influence of bourgeois liberalism.
IV. Observe the Laws and Principles and Safeguard Stability and Unity.
A. The harm created by the turmoil and counterrevolutionary rebellion that took place in Beijing 1. The economic loss in Beijing is over 1.3 billion yuan. 2. Great losses were suffered in every major city. 3. More than 1000 military trucks were burnt and destroyed. 4. Important activities and relations between countries were disrupted. 5. The students were the direct victims.
B. Without stability and unity, there would be nothing. 1. Stability and unity are the social conditions for devel oping production, improving people's livelihoods, and realizing people's basic interests. 2. Stability and unity are the insurance of the reform and open policy. 3. Only by maintaining socialist law can we realize stability and unity. 4. Turmoil destroys socialist law. 5. Stopping the turmoil and suppressing the counterrevolu tionary rebellion maintained the dignity of the socialist legal system. C. Teenagers should strengthen their sense of legality and improve th eir consciousness in observing the laws. 1. One—Student patriotism should manifest its e lf in observing and protecting laws. 301
2. Two—Patriotism and patriotic behavior must be based on the constitution and law as a criterion. 3. Three—Improve legal ideology, have a correct under standing of the relations between democracy and law, discipline and liberty, and use the rights of democracy within the boundaries of the. constitution and the law. (SMSELMS 1989)
As indicated by the textbook outline and in the textbook, the main themes of the lessons are as follows:
1. A tiny minority of people, with the help of foreign polit
ical powers and people within the leadership of the Party,
planned for a long time and then successfully created
turmoil in Beijing.
2. A tiny minority of people, by spreading rumors, conspired
to negate the Four Cardinal Principles and institute a new government with new leaders.
3. When the turmoil quieted down, the tiny minority of people
created a counterrevolutionary rebellion by maliciously
attacking the army.
4. The Party and government, while agreeing with the patriotic
enthusiasm of the students, disagreed with their methods.
They had no alternative but to impose martial law and
suppress the counterrevolutionary rebellion.
5. During the turmoil, many students and others were misled
by the tiny minority of people. Now they should learn from,
love, and support the PLA, follow the leadership of the
Party, follow the Four Cardinal Principles, the consti
tution, and the laws. 302
6. Patriotism means observing the constitution and the laws
of China.
7. Stability—i.e., no demonstrations, hunger strikes,
boycotts, etc.—and unity under the leadership of the party
is the only way China will be able to be a strong nation
and realize the four modernizations.
This textbook does not give an overall account of the events from April 15 through June 4; i t simply mentions a few events on certain days. The account of June 3 and 4 is , however, more specific. The following are excerpts from the textbook which describe the events starting on April 15, 1989:
On 15 April of this year (1989), Comrade Hu Yaobang died. The college students in Beijing put out elegant couplets and wall posters to express their sorrow and memorialize Hu Yaobang. However, a tiny minority of people with ulterior motives made use of the youths' sorrow for Comrade Hu Yaobang to make up rumors to mislead the masses, to slander party and government leaders. They incited people to oppose party leaders and socialism and agitated students to boycott classes. They distributed reactionary leaflets, set up illegal organizations, charged Xinhuamen . . . and occupied Tiananmen Square. More than one thousand people went on a hunger strike for seven days . . . [which] caused big demonstrations involving millions of people for several days. The public order in Beijing was in chaos. The Sino-Soviet Summit . . . was severely disturbed . . . (SMSELMS 1989, 2-3) During the more than one month of turmoil every phase, every action, the slogans and petitions were all carefully planned and arranged. At the beginning of the turmoil, under the intrigue of the tiny minority of people, the Four Cardinal Principles were attacked and Party and government leaders were blamed by name. After the April 26 editorial disclosed the truth that a tiny minority of people had created turmoil, they turned to a totally opposite tactic. Under the guidance of Fang Lizhi, they changed their slogans from "Overthrow the bureaucratic government!" and "Overthrow the dictatorship" to "Oppose bureaucracy, corruption and privilege," which gained the agreement of all the people. (SMSELMS 1989, 3-4) 303 The text then describes how Zhao Ziyang's published speech at the Asian Bank Conference on May 4 encouraged the conspirators and then the "ringleaders" of the Student Autonomous Union to declare a second class boycott, which stirred up another wave of demonstrations.
The text goes on to state that the tiny minority of people learned that the State Council was going to impose martial law on the night of May 19, before martial law was declared, in order to create a false impression that martial law was unnecessary, changed their tactics from a hunger strike to a sit-in demonstration. When the
"conspirators'" plot was severely attacked, the text states, "... they changed their method and directed the spearhead at the People's Army.
They spread rumors and incited people to hinder and seige the army enforcing martial law" (SMSELMS 1989, 4).
The text then describes how the turmoil turned into a counter revolutionary rebellion:
The organizers of the turmoil used the Capital and materials aided by overseas and various domestic political powers, and prepared to occupy Tiananmen Square for a long period of time. They proposed, "Use the struggle on the Squareto support the struggle in the country." They set up a statue of the so-called "Goddess of Democracy" on the Square and opened a "Democracy University." They gathered molesters to organize a "Dare-to-die Corps," a "Flying Tiger Team," and an "Army of Volunteers," which were te rro rist organizations. They rumored that they would imprison and kidnap Party and government leaders and seize the power with the method of "attacking the Bastille." All of these things proved that the turmoil developed into a counterrevolutionary rebellion that was made by the tiny minority of anti-Party and anti-socialist people with a plan and conspiracy and did not depend on the will of the people. (SMSELMS 1989, 4)
The details of suppressing the counterrevolutionary rebellion are stated thusly: 304
The small group of the turmoil organizers knew deeply that if the army enforcing martial law came to their places according to the plan, they couldn't go on their various illegal and counterrevo lutionary activities and their plots would all fail. So they intended to stir up cases and deteriorate the situation. On the night of the 2nd, June, a jeep of the armed-police which was borrowed by the CCTV for ten months was on its way back to the unit. As the speed was too high and it slipped on the road because of water, there happened the accident that the jeep turned over and ran over the people. But there wasn't any student. This was a traffic accident, but the tiny minority of people intended to connect it with the action of the army enforcing martial law going into the city according to the plan. They created rumors that the leading truck of the arniy enforcing martial law deliberately ran over the students and agitated the people who didn't know the truth to take over the body by force and demonstrate with the coffins. At once people fe lt insecurity and the atmosphere became inten sified. Through such agitation, they agitated the turmoil. On the morning of the 3rd, June, when parts of the army enforcing martial law entered their guard position according to the plan, someone organizedly incited some people to stop the vehicles at the intersections of Jianguomen, Nan Heyan, Xi Dan and Mu Xidi, set up street barricades, stop the army trucks, beat the soldiers and rob military materials. There were 12 army trucks at Cao Gezhuang that got stopped. Soldier who went through in front of the gate of Yanjing Hotel were forced to be searched. The tires of the army trucks in front of the Telegram Building were slashed and surrounded by street barricades. Around dawn, the army trucks on the bridge of Yong Diaomen were turned over. The tires of the trucks at Muxidi were stabbed. More than 400 soldier going into the city at Chaoyangmen were stoned by the ruffians. In the area of Liubukou and Heng Erqiao army trucks were stopped and soldiers were sieged. At 7:00 a.m., at Liubukou, some ruffians entered the besieged trucks to rob the machine-gun with bullets. From Jianguomen to Dongdan and around Tianqiao, the army entering the city were seperated, sieged and attacked. On the double-bridge of Jianguomen, some soldiers were benuded and some were beaten black and blue. In the morning, the army entering the city near Hufangqiao was disbanded, soldier were beaten viciously and some were harmed blind. Some wounded soldiers were blocked on their way to hospitals. The tyres of ambulances were punctured and the wounded were kidnapped. 21 army trucks from Hu Fangqiao to Tao Ranting were surrounded and when the soldiers removed the ammunition, the policemen on guard were wounded. At noon, the PLA soldiers were stopped at the south intersection of Fu Youjie, the north crossing of Zhengyi Road, Xuan Wumen, Hufangqiao, Muxudi and Dongsi. Some were wounded. Their helmets, caps, mackintoshes, kettles and bags were robbed. A group of people at Liu Bukou stopped an army truck with guns and ammunition, the armed-police and security police didn't succeed in rescuing it. 305
It can't be imagined i f the guns and anmunition on the truck were robbed or exploded. In order to protect the security of the life and property of the people of the capital, the armed-force used tear-gas as a last resort to dissect the mass and get back the truck. ^ Meanwhile, a group of ruffians siezed and attacked the country organs and important units. They attacked the Great Hall of the People's Congress, the Propoganda Bureau of the Party Central and the Ministry of Broadcasting and TV. Also they charged the west and south gate of Zhong Nanhai. Tens of the armed-police soldiers and security police that safeguarded these units were wounded. At about 5:00 p.m., the ringleaders of the illegal organizations of AUUS and AUW distributed kitchen knives, staggers, iron rods, iron chains and sharp-speared bamboo poles and declared "If they catch the armed-police they will beat them to death." AUW raised a terrific hue and cry through broadcasting that people should took up arms to overturn the government. Another group of ruffians gathered thousands of people to push over a wall of a construction site near Xidan and take away lots of tools and bricks, preparing to fight in street. Just at this very moment of emergency, the Party Central, the State Council and the Miltary Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had to make up their mind to give order to the army enforcing martial law nearby the capital to enter by force and suppress the counterrevolutionary rebellion.
How Did the Counterrevolutionary Ruffians Beat, Smash,.Rob,.Burnand-Klli? Since the martial law, according to the order of the Party Central, the army enforcing martial law that continuously entered the city kept the attitude of high forbearence and divided conflicting as much as possible from beginning to end. Around 10:00 pm. on 3rd, June, the army enforcing martial law received orders to enter and went into the city continuously. But they were all severely blocked at the main crossings. In spite of this situ ation, the army still didn't retaliate and took the attitude of extreme forbearence. But the counterrevolutionary ruffians used this forbearence to sta rt the horrible case of beating, smashing, robbing, burning and killing. From 22:00 p.m. to 23:00 p.m., there were 12 m ilitary trucks burned from Cuiwei Road, Gongzhuten and Muxudi to Xidan. Some people delivered bricks with trucks to stone the soldiers. Some ruffians pushed trolley-buses on the crossings, burnt i t and blocked the roads. Some fire engines hurried to put out the fire, but were also smashed and destroyed. Around 23:00 p.m., there were 3 military trucks destroyed at Hu Fangqiao and one jeep was turned over. Military trucks on the double-bridges of Youngdingmen and Jianguomen were blocked. A regiment of soldier in Chongwenmen Street were sieged. In order to guarantee the advance of the trucks, some soldiers and officers 306 got off the truck and dredged, they were sieged and beaten. Some were kidnapped and disappeared. In order to avoid conflicting the trucks blocked at the San Yingmen of Nan Van went around to the east and were against blocked at the south gate of Tian Tan Park, many trucks were destroyed and burnt. After the morning of the 4th, June, the violence of burning army trucks became stronger. Hundreds of army trucks in tens of places as the east road of Tiantan, the north gate of Tiantan, the west of the Qianmen underground, the east road of Qianmen, the Fuyon Street, Liu Bukou Xidan, Fu Xingmen, the South Lishi Road, Muxudi, Lianhuachi, Che Gongzhuang, Dong Huanmen, Xizhimen, DabeiYao, Hujialou, the North Don Ge zhuang and the old Gongxiang of Dan Xing County were ignited with gas, Molotov grenadiers and self-made flamethrowers by ruffians. Some soldiers were burnt dead in trucks, some jumped out of the trucks and were beaten dead. In some places, several, more than ten, or even twenty or thirty army trucks were burnt at the same time and it formed a sea of fire. At the crossing of Shuangjing, more than 70 armoured-trucks were sieged and the machine-guns of more than 20 of them were removed by the ruffians. From the intersection of Jingyan to the west of Laoshan Guhuitang, more than 30 army trucks were burnt by ruffians and the flame was strong at the place. Some ruffians pushed gas barrel to the crossings to block and took from rods. Several ruffians drove the robbed armoured-trucks and dashed around madly in the area of the double-bridge of Fuxingmen, shooting. The illegal AUW declared through broadcasting that they captured a military transcriber and a cipher book. There were also many trucks delivering food and seking trucks that robbed by the ruffians. Some ruffians also seized the chance to beat, smash and loot. The windows of some shops such as Yanshan in Xicheng D istrict were smashed. Some buses, fire-engines, ambulances and taxes were smashed and burnt. What was most vacious is that a group of people drove a bus full of gas to the Castle of Tiananmen, attempting to burn it, but they were arrested on time by the army enforcing martial law in the south of Jinshui Bridge. While the ruffians violently attacked the army trucks, beat, smashed and looted, the violence of murdering the PLA officers and soldiers continuously happened, and their way of murdering was extremely cruel. On the morning of the 4th, June, a group of ruffians at the intersection of Dongdan stoned soldiers with bottles, bricks and bicycles. Many soldier's blood flew on their faces. At Fuxingmen a military truck was blocked, the twelve soldiers on it were dragged out, forced to be searched and later were beaten heavily, many were badly injured. In Liu Bukou 4 soldiers were sieged, beating, some were dead on the spot. Three soldier's were cruelly beaten near Guang Qumen. More than 20 armed-police soldiers were blocked by a group of ruffians in Xingsheng lane of Xicheng D istrict and many were severely wounded. At Hu Guosi a army truck was blocked, the soldiers were dragged out to be beaten and held as a hostage, lots of submachine guns were robbed away. A truck full of bricks drove from Dongjiao Minxiang 307
to the Tian Anmen Square, the ruffians on i t cried along the way, "Those who are Chinese get on and stone the PLA." After the dawn, the atrocity of murdering the PLA officers and soldiers had already made the hair stand on end. An ambulence which sent 8 wounded soldiers to the hospital was block by the ruffians. They killed one on the spot and cried to murder together the other seven soldiers. In front of the gate of a bicycle shop in Qianmen, three PLA soldiers were severely injured. Ruffians sieged them and shouted, "Who dare to rescue them will be beaten dead." In Changan street an army truck suddenly died out the fire, one or two hundred ruffians crowded on, smashed the door of the driver's cab and stoned the driver to death. In the place 30 metres from the crossing of Xidan, Liu Guogong, the platoon leader, was beaten dead, put the gas on the body and burnt. At Fu Chenmen, after the armed-police soldier Liu Guorui was murdered by the ruffians, the body was hung on the double-bridge. In Chong Wenmen, the soldier Cui Guozheng was thrown from the overstreet bridge by the ruffians, put on gas and was burnt. Ruffians shouled that this was "to light a fire for heaven." In the several days' turmoil, army trucks, police-cars and buses that were smashed, burnt and destroyed by the ruffians were alto gether more than 1280; among them, there were more than 2000 army trucks, more than 60 armoured-trucks, more than 30 police-cars, more than 120 trolley buses and buses and more than 70 other vehicles. Lots of guns and ammunition were robbed. There were more than 6000 soldiers of army enforcing martial law, the armed-police and the security-police wounded and tens of them died. They devoted their blood and even lives to safeguard the motherland, the constitution and people. People will ever remember their contribution. Such heavy losses powerfully proved the extreme forbearence and generosity taken by the army enforcing martial law. Why did the army suffer such heavy casualties in suppressing the counterrevolu tionary rebellion? Why were the PLA beaten or even murdered when they had arms in th eir hands? This was just what comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out, "Because the good and bad were mixed together, we couldn't take some measures that we should have." This just proved that the People's army love people and don't want to injure the mass accidentally. They "stood the forbearence and went to their death unflinchingly. This is the full reflection of the character of the people's army. The appalling counterrevolutionary rebellion that took place in the capital has never occured since the founding of the country. It is pernicious development of the turmoil made up by the tiny minority of people in more than a month and the concentrated explosure of their conspiracy that they protest against the Party, against socialism and against the people. (SMSELMS 1989, 8-12)
The textbook does not identify any of the tiny minority of people other than Liu Xiaobo, Fang Lizhi, and the "ringleaders" of the 308
Autonomous Student Union. It is not clear if there are others in this tiny minority of people or if this group of people is the entire tiny
minority of people.
This textbook, like the primary school textbook, does not
discuss casualty figures. The only injuries or deaths mentioned are
those received by the soldiers and the police.
In some schools these textbook lessons were supplemented by
field trip s to Tiananmen Square and the Military Museum (Interview 20
August 1989). Outside the Military Museum there was a large display
of military vehicles that had been burned. Inside the museum there was
a large display of artifacts collected during April, May, and June of
1989 (Notes 10 December 1989). Besides field trip s, these lessons were also supplemented by
guest lectures by military personnel and soldiers. At one school these
lectures dealt with the history of the PLA and their accomplishments.
Soldiers were also invited to give marching and martial arts demon
strations at some schools (Notes 10 December 1989). Lower middle school students were required to write about th e ir
views on the "Beijing Spring." Once a student completed his/her essay,
the teacher graded it. If there was any deviation from the content of the textbook or the official line,* the student was required to rewrite
the essay. Students who continued to have difficulty writing an accept
able essay received a talk by the teacher. At one school, one student
^ h e official line is based on the April 26 editorial, the June 9 speech of Deng Xiaoping, and the report by the Beijing mayor to the NPC on June 29, 1989. See Appendices I and J. 309 who had written three unacceptable essays was told by the teacher to
"just copy these sections from the textbook" (Notes 10 December 1989).
The teaching method used in teaching about the Beijing Spring
was lecture-discussion, with more lecture than discussion. Student
questions were answered according to the textbook and the official line
(Interview 10 December 1989).
Upper-Middle School
Teaching about the Beijing Spring in upper middle schools took
place in the Political Thought classes. These classes usually meet
between two and three class hours per week. In recent years these
courses have dealt with the scientific (correct) view of life (first
year), basic economics (second year), and basic political science (third year).
The materials used for teaching about the Beijing Spring
consisted of a new textbook titled Study Material for Situation Edu
cation in Upper Middle Schools (high school) (SMSEUMS). Some teachers
in some schools also used daily newspapers and the government videotape
title d The Quelling of the Counterrevolutionary Rebellion to supplement
the textbook (Interviews 20 August 1989 and 10 December 1989).
The content of the upper middle school textbook is broader and
more specific that that of the lower middle school textbook. Below is
an outline of the textbook:
I. Introduction
A. Deng Xiaoping's speech of June 9, 1989 310 B. The Bulletin of the 4th Plenary Session of 13th Central Committee of the CCP, June 24, 1989
II. Turmoil and Counterrevolutionary Rebellion Took Place in Beijing.
A. A small handful of people made use of the student movement in order to stir up the turmoil. 1. The student movement was utilized by the organizers from the very beginning. 2. The Party and government affirmed the students' patriotic enthusiasm and wishes many times. 3. The turmoil had been brewing for a long time. 4. The turmoil was a conspiracy by a few people and was assisted by various domestic and foreign political powers. 5. During the turmoil, all kinds of domestic and foreign political powers put their finger into it by offering and giving advice. 6. A few people made the situation worse by using evil methods, such as continuously creating rumors. 7. Because of comrade Zhao Ziyang's mistakes, the Party and government missed the chance to stop the turmoil. The situation became even worse.
B. The counterrevolutionary rebellion took place in Beijing. 1. How was the counterrevolutionary rebellion stirred up by a few people? 2. How did the counterrevolutionaries abuse, smash, rob, burn, and kill?
C. The character and source of this severe political struggle 1. The character of this severe political struggle is the confrontation of the bourgeois liberalism and the Four Cardinal Principles. 2. This severe political struggle was inevitable.
III. The Decisive Success of the Suppression of the Counterrevolu tionary Rebellion and the Opening of the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th CCP
A. The methods applied by our Party and government to prevent the turmoil 1. The April 26 editorial revealed the truth that a few people were producing turmoil. 2. Party and government leaders dialogued with the students. They affirmed the patriotic enthusiasm of the many young students and wished that the students would separate themselves from the organizers of the turmoil who were behind them. 3. Declaring martial law was a correct method and displayed ultimate forbearance. 311
B. The Party and government took firm actions to calm down the counterrevolutionary rebellion. 1. The Party Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission resolutely made the decision to calm down the counterrevolutionary rebellion. 2. The Arny Enforcing Martial Law (AEML) troops evacuated Tiananmen Square and arrived at their assigned posts. 3. The AEML has taken a series of measures to solidify and improve their successes. 4. The PLA performed an historical deed of merit in the process of suppressing the counterrevolutionary rebellion. 5. The PLA protects the people, the people love the PLA. 6. The significance of the success of suppressing the counterrevolutionary rebellion
C. The holding of the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th CCCP 1. The major contents and the holding of the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th CCCP 2. The significance of the holding of the 4th session of the CCCP
IV. Distinguish the Good from the Bad, Enforce the Four Cardinal Principles
A. The Four Cardinal Principles are the standpoints of our nation.
B. Adhere to the leadership of the CCP. 1. There would not be a New China if there were not the Communist Party. 2. The characteristics of the CCP decided her leadership of our country. 3. Only if the Party's leadership is followed can the 1.1 billion people be united in the socialist construction. 4. The CCP has led the Chinese people and gained great victories; however, it is true that it has also made some mistakes. 5. Our Party is capable of avoiding mistakes and eradicating corruption. 6. Bourgeois liberalism must be opposed in order to adhere to the leadership of the CCP.
C. Love the socialist motherland. 1. China is a socialist country. Patriotism is inseparable from loving socialism. 2. Total Westernization and capitalism are suitable for China. 3. Self-respect and self-confidence shall remain in the course of opening to the West. 4. How can young students be really patriotic? 312
D. Adhere to the "one center, two points" policy. 1. The policies and principles following the 3rd session of the 11th CCCP are correct. 2. Adhere to the center of the economic construction. 3. Adhere to the "two basic points," which are to adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and the reform and open policy. 4. Four major things for us to do at the present time
V. Improve the Sense of Legality, Guarantee Security and Solidarity.
A. The severe results brought about by the turmoil and the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Beijing 1. 1.3 billion yuan of damage in Beijing 2. Severe events in other large cities 3. More than one thousand army trucks were burnt and destroyed. 4. Enterprises, the reforms, and construction were directly threatened. 5. Important governmental affairs were interrupted. 6. The young students were the direct victims.
B. Without security and solidarity [political] there would be nothing. 1. Social stability is an essential condition for the nation to prosper and enrich the people. 2. In today's China, to guarantee stability and solidarity reflects the basic benefits of the masses. 3. Above all other problems, keeping stab ility is the most important problem in China. 4. The sanctity of the socialist legislation shall be protected in order to guarantee stability and solidarity. 5. The turmoil was a destruction of the socialist legal system. 6. The sanctity of the socialist legal system was preserved by calming down the turmoil and suppressing the rebellion. 7. Four lessons for the many young students • a. Take the constitution and law as the criteria of patriotism. b. Non-democratic methods should not be used to urge the construction of democracy. c. Methods that deviate from the law shall not be taken to urge the construction of democracy. d. Adolescents should improve their concept of legislation.
Appendix
1. The April 26 editorial—text 2. What is martial law? 313
3. What kind of organization is the VOA? 4. Let's see how the U.S. government suppressed the people involved in demonstrations.
This textbook is similar to the lower middle school textbook except the upper middle school textbook has more details and covers a
few more topics. For example, this textbook included strong criticism of the VOA for doing what i t referred to as "blowing wind on the fire ,
spreading rumors, and helping the turmoil" (SMSEUMS 1989, 17).
Perhaps because many Chinese expressed the view that no other
government in the world would use force to suppress demonstrators, this textbook addressed the handling of demonstrations in the United States.
The following is an excerpt from the text:
Let's See How the U.S. Government Suppressed the People Involved in Demonstration Excerpt from The Angry Love In the 60s, the American black people met the appex of discrimi nation, segregation and oppression. Therefore, since February the 1st in 1960, the North Carolina Affair ignited the torch of the Human Right movement of the blacks. Demonstrations and sit-in s were held in the black schools of the Southern cities, the students began to take actions.
20 thousand people were arrested From 1960 to 1963, more than 20 thousand people were arrested in the south because of demonstrations and sit-ins. The non violence protestings of the students in the beginning of the 60s could not avoid the threat of force. For example, in a bloodletting night in Denver, 65 demonstrators were severely abused by the Police. 47 of them were sent to the emergency treatment. In the summer of 1963, the protesing went to the peak. The government legalized the violence of the police. A lot of temples of congre gation of the blacks were burnt, a lot of black families were shot; on May tenth, the headquarter of the protesting in Birmingham— Austun Hotel and the leader of the protest—King's home were bombed. On June 12th of 1963, the Secratery of "Coloured People Improvement Society" of Mississippi—Medgar Evers was assasinated. 314
The- army stati oned at the schools for one.Year' In Cambridge of Maryland, because of continuous demostrations, hundreds of people were arrested by the National Guard Army stationed their enforcing Martial Law for One year. In May, 1000 people in Greenburg, North Carolina wefe arrested. 1400 people were arrested in [name of a place]. In September, 1400 people were arrested in Bridgeburg, South Carolina. In November of 1963, 1300 people were arrested in the demon stration for Human Rights Movement in Gulf area in California. In the Summer of 1967, demonstrations against the Vietnam war were held. In at least 57 northern black communities in Michigan, and Detroit protests were held. The treatment of the Police and the National Guard Army was also appalling. At least 24 blacks died in [name of place], 43 in Detroit, at least 10 in other places. Immediately after th is, on June the 23rd, A group of demon strators against the war were firmly suppressed by the Los Angelas Police. 51 were arrested. 40 were sent to the hospital. On June the 26th, the chairman of the Students Nonviolence Supporting Committee—Brown was arrested, the crime was "rebellion." In July, President Johnson informed all the officials to "end the social disorders, not to analyze." Additionally, Johnson and other high level officials also informed the Continental American Intelligence Bureu of the Arniy to focus on the monitoring of the disstatisfied political organizations and send the informations efficiently to FBI and the Local police.
If Rush to the gate, beat.with the butt In the fall of 1967, 106 colleges and univesintes held demon strations against War and conscription. In the capital, the demon stration in front of the Pentagon on October the 21st of 1967 was the biggest one. In midday, more than 100 thousand people, mainly students (including old people and women), held the demonstrations under the monitor of the well armed police, the bayonets of the police were all fixed, the troops were in formation, people would be arrested immediately after they passed the cordon. But some radical young people broke out beyond the cordon and reached the gate. Soliders inside rushed out and beat them with the butt of their gun and then arrested them. In this big demonstration, 700 were arrested, 1400 were wounded. After the protest in front of the Pentagon, the U.S government became alert and strengthened the suppression. President Johnson require his followers to "pay full attention to any chaotic events." A high level President—commanded special Commission was also set up. The U.S Defence Ministry enlarged the network of intellegence. The Chief Procurator did not know that the military training staff were also monitoring the radical elements in schools until the network had collected materials of 18 thousand radical elements and had established two big file s . The conscription Bureau informed 315
all the drafting centers to list all the anti-conscription elements involved and call them up immediatly and send them to Vietnam.
Troops entered in more-than-100-universities On April the 4th of 1968, Dr. King was murdered in a hotel in Memphis, Tenessee. The affair stirred up a big tide. Black people held rebellions in more than 100 cities. The chief of FBI—Hoover said, "There are over 60 casualties in the rebellion in April, thousands of people were wounded, millions of dollars of damages were caused." The Federal Army entered metroplises such as Chicago. 88700 soldiers were sent. In the fall of 1968, at least 21 universities called the police to come on the campus. 1265 people were arrested. In the Spring Semester of 1969, the National Defence Army and the Police were invited to 127 universities to calm down riots. 4000 people were arrested from January to April, 1000 were expelled. A lot of students were acused by the college administration. In the night of October the 8th of 1969, people had assemblies in the Lincoln Park in Chicago. The police had prepared for i t already. They beat people on the head, chest in the face on the foot with the cattle prods. A lot of Blood tur out from people's mouthes and heads. The police rushed to the demonstrators for twice. People were bumped to the sky. One police man shot at the people for 3 times. One of the people was shot on the head. The result of the first conflict was that at least 6 people were shot, 68 arrested, countless wounded. After about one day's calmness, two hundred Meteorology Party members took to the street again. 2500 well armed National Defence Soldiers were sent by the government, in the conflicts followed, 130 were arrested, a lot were wounded.
1,4000 Students were arrested within-2 years On April the 30th of 1970, President Nixon sent troops to Kampuchea. Protests were held on the Campuses for several days 60 universities declared to demonstrate. On May the 4th, 28 National Guard soliders, carrying guns with them, entered the State University of Kent without warning in advance. They shot at 200 demonstrators. 4 students were immedi ately shot dead, 9 wounded, 1 mained. From May 5th to 8th, half of the 1350 universities in the U.S were involved in demonstrations. From May the 1st to 15th, 1800 students were arrested. A lot of schools were occupied by soldiers. A state of emer gency was declared in all universities of several states. In 21 colleges of 16 states, the National Guard Toops patrolled for 24 hours a day.—The FBI was immediately computerized in order to improve monitering equipment, 1200 more agents were hired, 14565 people were arrested according to these materials in 1970 and 1971. (SMSEUMS 1989, 71-74) 316
The lesson was clear. In using force to suppress the demon
strations, China was no different from the United States, and the widely
held belief by the students that America is the land of freedom and
democracy is incorrect.
According t a the textbook, the turmoil was planned for a long time by a small group of people working in conjunction with domestic
and foreign political powers. This small group of people used the death of Hu Yaobang and the students' sympathy, sorrow, and patriotic enthu
siasm to get the people to oppose the Four Cardinal Principles, attempt to overthrow the government, and establish a bourgeois republic that would be to tally dependent on the West. With the help of foreign and domestic political forces, this small handful of people continuously spread rumors to mislead the people. Party and government leaders showed deep concern for the health and safety of the students and
extreme forbearance in dealing with the situation. The Party and government had no alternative but to declare martial law in parts of
Beijing. When the tactics of hunger strike, sit-ins, and demonstrations failed to achieve the desired result of overthrowing the government, th is small group of people sharpened the turmoil by stirring up conflicts between the people and the martial law troops that produced
an incredible counterrevolutionary rebellion. This small group of people encouraged people to take up arms and overthrow the government.
They organized te rro rist groups and attempted to take over major Party, government, and other vital offices. Ruffians, hooligans, and counter revolutionary thugs viciously attacked the PLA troops and the Armed police. They confiscated guns, ammunition, and knives and used them. 317
along with bottles, bricks, iron rods, sticks with nails in them, and
other things, to beat and kill police and soldiers. They also used
Molotov cocktails and other means to burn and destroy m ilitary and
public vehicles and steal, loot, and vandalize stores. The ruffians threatened to kill anyone who helped the wounded soldiers, including medical personnel.
This textbook describes the justification and use of force
thusly:
In order to quickly calm down the counterrevolutionary rebellion, to avoid greater damages, and after sustaining severe caualties and suffering and demonstrating extreme forbearance during extremely difficult conditions, the AEML troops were forced to shoot warning shots into the a ir to clear a way for them to proceed. They were forced to retaliate and kill some extremely savage ruffians. At the same time, because there were so many students and citizens on the road, some of them were unintentionally hit by vehicles and hit by ricocheting bullets. Altogether, 3,000 nonmilitary people were wounded, 200 were killed including 36 college students. Besides those who deserved it, there were some civilians who were unintentionally wounded. The Party and government are not willing to see this kind of situation. However, if this was not done, the rebellion could not have been calmed down; more blood would have been shed; the People's Republic which was won by the blood and lives of more than 20 million martyrs would be subverted; socialist construction and the accomplishments of the 10-year-old reform would be destroyed; and the whole nation would be under the cover of white terrorism. Therefore, it was a righteous action to suppress this rebellion resolutely. It conforms to the desires and the wishes of the people in the Capital and all over the country. (SMSEUMS 1989, 36)
This was the basic outline of the official explanation of the
Beijing Spring. In classrooms, teachers did not allow any opposing
viewpoints or information to be expressed by the students. If a student
expressed an opposing viewpoint, the teacher or fellow students would
help that student gain a correct understanding of the situation. 318
This official version contained the "correct" explanation, interpretation, and information. Any information or viewpoints that contradicted the official version were classified as rumor, and spreading rumors was a violation of the law which carried severe penalties. Telephone numbers to turn in "rumor mongers" were widely broadcast on television and radio and posted in many locations, including schools. A widely publicized case of a man from Dalian who, i t was claimed, said he heard on VOA that twenty thousand people in
Beijing were killed, received a twenty-year prison term for "rumor mongering" (China.Daily 1989, 1). To assist the students in their "understanding" of the events, study or practice guides were given to students (Interview 20 December
1989). The following are excerpts from one guide:
Fill in the blanks 1. The character of the severe political struggle is the confontation of — and the ------. 2. The aim of the organizers and designers of the turmoiI and the rebel 1 i on was to overthrow ______-...... and to overturn _
3. That the PLA used their own blood and royal hearts proves that they are ______firm foundation, are the People's Republic of China's - . . 77". , are .. ----- firm defenders, and are the loveliest people of the new generation. 4. In today's China, loving our country and loving ------are inseparable.
Short-Answer 1. Who were the organizers and designers of the turmoil and the rebellion? 2. Why do we say without stab ility and unity we would have nothing? 3. Why do we say that having patriotic enthusiasm and desire does not mean that one's actions are patriotic and that violating the law will not be called a patriotic action? Please analyze and explain this idea in relation to the students' strike. (China teaching guide 10 December 1989) 319
The answers to these questions were to be taken from the
textbook. The correct answers were to conform to the content of the
textbook. Students who had difficulty correctly answering the questions were given assistance until they could answer all of the questions
correctly (Interview 20 December 1989).
Most students, however, did not need assistance in answering
the questions correctly. The textbook, the government video, tele
vision coverage of the government position, daily newspaper articles,
and broadcasts over government speakers in the schools and in
neighborhoods were all the information anyone needed to learn the
official position. And the severe penalties for expressing a different
viewpoint made the official position imperative to learn (Interviews
10 December 1989 and 10 February 1990).
The threat of severe penalties for "rumor mongering" and the
daily spectacle on television of "hooligans and ruffians" being arrested
and punished had a chilling effect on the students and teachers. In
an interview in early September, one student explained his feelings thusly:
Q. How does i t feel to be in school now? T 7 It's a lot different than before. 1)7 Are you nervous? ÏÏ7 I'm very afraid now. 1J7 Why are you afraid? T 7 Now everyone is afraid. The country is in a very extreme situation and the consequences are very severe. The government is very s tric t; for instance, i f any regulations are broken, the government treats i t very harshly. After seeing how the government is treating the situation, we are all very scared. The reaction [among the students] is reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution; now everyone is mutually watching each other. We are all very scared . . . Q. Some students have said they regret participating in the demonstrations. How about you? 320
A. I understand your question. You want to ask how the students feel now about the demonstrations. I think that their words and deeds are different. We must go through the motions. For instance, drastic punishments for th is action, i t is terrifying. We have not experienced before ourselves, but we have read, and have seen movies, and heard of i t . Now we see i t , i t is real; therefore, we are terrified. If they tell us to write or say that the demon strations were turmoil and give i t to the government or our school, we will. We must protect ourselves. Q.So you must say what you are told to say? T 7 Yes, if they tell us tosay that the demonstrations were a development from chaos to a counterrevolutionary rebellion and against the Party, well . . . I can only say yes. If I say no, then there's a different future for me and I would become a part of a tragedy. Q. Can they make you think the way they want? J 7 It is impossible. They can never make us changeour minds. This IS not a problem of one generation. Q, What do you really think about what is going on in China nowr^ A. I think that following the demonstrations and the crackdown that“ïhe government has tried to brainwash the people by getting their propaganda tools into operation to completely change people's thinking. They want the people to believe that the pro-democracy demonstrations were a counterrevolutionary rebellion. . . . I want the world to really understand this movement. From one point of view this movement was confused, but from another point of view it wasn't. It was basically a student movement and will be more influ ential in Chinese history than the original May Fourth Movement. (Tape, early September 1989)
This student may or may not have really believed that this movement was
"basically a student movement"; however, in class, and even to classmates, this student knew the correct things to say.
Like the lower middle school classes, upper middle school classes were supplemented with other materials and activities to teach about the Beijing Spring. Students in some schools were required to read articles in newspapers and to watch excerpts from the government- produced video about the Beijing Spring. PLA representatives and some local Party and government officials also visited some schools (Notes
10 December 1989). 321
In all schools, the lessons and the materials were designed to
"unify people's thinking," a policy that was established by Deng
Xiaoping in mid-June. In a speech published in the People's Daily on
June 16, 1989 title d "Programmatic Document for Unifying the Thinking of the Whole Party,'- and in an earlier speech on June 9 (see
Appendix J), Deng set the stage for a new educational policy in China.
In these twospeeches, Deng characterized the turmoil and the rebellion as a confrontation between bourgeois liberalism and the Four Cardinal
Principles. Deng stated it thusly:
There's nothing wrong with the Four Cardinal Principles. If there is an^hing amiss, it's that these principles haven't been thoroughly implemented. They haven't been used as the basic concept to educate the people, educate the students, and educate all the cadres and Party members. . . . The fault does not lie in the Four Cardinal Principles themselves, but in wavering in upholding these principles, and in the very poor work done to persist in political work and education. . . . I once told foreigners that our worst omission of the past 10 years was in education. What I meant was political education, and this doesn't only apply to schools and students alone, but to the masses as a whole. (China Daily 28 July 1989, 3) ------
Soon other leaders echoed Deng's words on increasing ideological education and opposing bourgeois liberalism. On July 16, 1989, newly appointed General Secretary Jiang Zemin urged academicians to take a clear-cut stand by strengthening ideological and political education among the students. Jiang stated that many students were influenced by Western culture and ideology because they had reduced ideological education in schools, which created ideological problems for students.
Jiang suggested that a group of political workers be formed to help students understand that the leadership of the CCP and socialism are indispensible for China's prosperity. Premier Li Peng and standing 322 committee member Li Ruihuan also supported the position expressed by
Jiang Zemin (China Daily 17 July 1989, 1).
Overall these speeches indicated a reversal of ten years of edu cational policies that focused on training a labor force to help realize the four modernizations. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in
1976, educational policies and practices downplayed ideological training. Now these policies and practices were to be reversed. In
December 1989, following the completion of research in China for this study, schools in Beijing began a massive campaign to "Learn from Lei
Feng." Lei Feng was the PLA soldier who supposedly devoted his life to following the leadership of the Party. He was quoted as saying that he would go anywhere, do anything, make any sacrifice to serve the Party and serve the people (Notes 15 January 1989).
This "Learn from Lei Feng" movement, like the 1987 movement, appeared to be a further attempt by the leaders to stifle dissent.
Students were not to think for themselves; they were to follow the leadership of the CCP. One problem inherent in this type of movement was stated by Liu Binyan in A Secpnd Kind of Loyalty (1985). Liu wrote:
Everyone is studying Lei Feng. I admit that Lei Feng has many fine qualities, and of course I ought to learn from him. But I think Lei Feng is far from being a perfect model. He has serious, even fa ta l, defects . . . [namely] that he only knows how to follow orders from above; he does not know how to make decisions on his own that would enable him to resist the mistakes of authorities . . . I feel that this attitude is incorrect, unscientific, and replete with grave damages that even you [Mao Zedong] cannot foresee, because it presupposes that you will always be correct; that not only what you have already said or saying is absolutely correct, and that Lei Feng should follow it to the letter, but even those things that you have not yet said will be correct, and that Lei Feng must also follow those to the letter too. If this isn't blind obedience, what is it? 323 Consider this: If every member of the Party, and even every citizen of the entire nation, were actually to become Lei Fengs, what kind of predicament would we find outselves in? The social atmosphere of its mores would no doubt change entirely. But if you yourself made one mistake, if you as a representative of the Party Central Committee made a bad decision, who would there be to help you correct it? If everyone were like Lei Feng, there wouldn't be anyone around who would even dare consider making a criticism . How could there be any suggestion of uncovering mistakes and correcting them? But there you are, appealing to everyone to act like Lei Feng! Obviously, all your earlier promises that channels of commu nication would remain open and free of blame to all thsoe who would address you are just empty talk! (Schell 1988, 157) The government leaders were apparently more interested in uni fying people's thinking and getting students to follow the leadership of the Party than worrying about possible mistakes by the leaders.
It remains to be seen if this movement will be more successful in stiflin g dissent than the "Learn from Lei Feng" movement in 1987.
It is still too early to analyze or to even identify all of the changes that have taken place in schools in Beijing or the changes in educational policies since June 4, 1989; however, one thing is clear: ideological education is and will continue to be a much larger part of the educational system than i t has been during the last ten years of reforms.
Summary
This chapter identified and discussed some of the materials and methods that were used in schools in Beijing from August through
December 1989. New textbooks for primary and lower and upper middle schools were identified and discussed, as well as the teaching mate r ia ls , resources, and methods. 324 The content of the textbooks conforms to the content and position of the April 26 editorial, the June 9 speech by Deng Xiaoping, and the report to the National People's Congress by Beijing Mayor Chen
Xitong on June 29, 1989. The Beijing Spring was characterized as turmoil that was planned by a small group of people who were attempting to overthrow the leadership of the CCP and overturn the socialist system. By spreading rumors and working with conrnon thugs and ruffians, this small group of people created a counterrevolutionary rebellion.
In quelling the rebellion, the PLA suffered great losses. After suffering great losses, and with no other alternative, some "extremely savage ruffians" who deserved to die were killed, and some other civilians were unintentionally wounded by ricocheting bullets.
Suppressing the rebellion was a righteous action by the PLA and supported by people all over the country.
According to the textbook, students should now love their motherland, love the CCP, love the army, and love socialism. Patriotism means loving socialism and the leadership of the Party. Actions that violate the law are not patriotic.
The focus of teaching about the events at all three levels focused on the actions and words of a small group of people, and the injuries suffered by the PLA and the armed police. The small group of people who plotted to negate the leadership of the Party and overthrow the government included such people as Fang Lizhi and Liu Xiabo; the exact number and identities of all the members of this important group were not specified. 325 The original courses and subject matter in the Thought and Moral
Education classes in primary schools and the P olitical Thought Education classes in secondary schools were replaced by the new textbooks and the teaching about the Beijing Spring. This change in subject matter was part of a general policy, initiated by Deng Xiaoping on June 9, 1989, to increase ideological studies in schools and in society. Following the completion of studying new textbooks, students began a "Study [or learn from] Lei Feng" movement. CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has examined the events of the Beijing Spring and the manner in which they were portrayed in primary and middle schools in Beijing within the context of the Chinese educational system and previous reform and pro-democracy movements. This chapter presents conclusions, summarizes the study, and offers recommendations for future research on this topic.
Conclusions
During the process of inquiry, many questions regarding the events surrounding the Beijing Spring emerged. Many questions still remain; some have been answered; others may never be answered or understood. Some of the findings presented below emerged during the inquiry process, while others emerged after I returned to the United
States and began the process of translating the data. This section discusses the findings of the study and lists the unanswered questions.
Background
In 1989 the communist-controlled system in eastern Europe collapsed, and around the world socialist-communist governments were
326 327 in trouble. Among the revolutions that shook the communist-controlled countries in 1989, China's was the biggest failure. Chinese leaders, with the support of the m ilitary, on June 3-4 demonstrated to the world that they were willing to pay a very high price to remain in power.
Viewed in isolation, the Beijing Spring may appear to have been just a temporary or sudden eruption of student activism that was even tually crushed by a to talitarian government. However, upon closer inspection and viewed in a broader perspective, the students' activism can be seen as a part of a movement with strong po litical, social, and economic roots. The poet Wen Yiduo, in a poem written about the
March 18, 1926 masacre of students in front of Tianan Gate, wrote:
Good Heavens, I was really scared today! Even now I can s till feel my legs trembling . . . There's nothing you can do nowadays. Who could give you an answer? There's nothing men can do about i t , le t along the ghosts. Ah, they are s till holding meetings, s till not behaving properly! See there, whose children are those, they're hardly Adolescents, are they? What's going on? Aren't those bayonet wounds on their heads? Sir, they say that people were killed yesterday. And those who died were foolish students. How strange things are nowadays. Those students have all they need to eat and drink— My second uncle died at Yangliuqing, Pushed by starvation to become a soldier— How can these ones sacrifice their lives like this? (excerpt from Spence 1981, 233)
Sixty-three years later, people are still asking the same questions that had puzzled Wen Yiduo in 1926. How could these people sacrifice their lives like this? And why, even after the massacre, are people still holding meetings, still not behaving properly? Certainly, after ten years of reforms, students and others have all they need to 328 eat and drink, so why were they "still not behaving properly"? To answer these questions, we must not only look at the students, although they were the most important participants; we must also look at other social groups and the historical, political, social, and economic factors that brought them together for the 1989 Beijing Spring. First, let us turn to an examination of the state of education in China.
In 1988, education in China was reaching a crisis point. The problems in education centered around two areas: (1) the growing feeling among students and intellectuals that "education is useless" and (2) problems within the educational system.
The feeling that "education is useless" can be better understood by looking at several factors, including (1) low pay and status for teachers and intellectuals, (2) teacher shortages, (3) increasing drop-out rates among primary and middle school students, and
(4) declining numbers of high school students applying for college admission. Low pay for teachers is not a problem unique to China; however, after ten years of reform, which brought wage increases to many sectors of society, the continual low pay for teachers has caused many problems. For example, some areas are already experiencing teacher shortages as increasing numbers of teachers resign to find jobs in business or other private enterprises. The resignation of teachers has forced some schools to close and forced other schools to suspend classes. For example, in 1988, in one district in Fujian Province, 148 schools were forced to suspend classes because 835 teachers quit, which, according to the newspaper article, deprived 2,874 students of an edu cation (China Daily 12 October 1988, 3). The article also stated that 329 the situation was even worse in more developed d istric ts such as those in Guangdong Province where the availability of higher-paying jobs encourage poorly paid teachers to change professions. Teachers' pay in urban areas averages between 110 and 140 RMB ($25-$35 U.S.) per month, whereas people in other professions earn twice that amount. For example, a college professor with 30 years' experience may receive a monthly pay of about 180 RMB ($45 U.S.), while a high school graduate in his/her first year of work in a joint venture hotel can make 300-500
RMB per month. This situation led one teacher to remark:
The lowness of Chinese teachers' status and the meagerness of their salaries may have set a world record. China has over 200 million illiterates and semi-illiterates and the number of new illiterates is on the rise. Does this have anything to do with teachers' low salaries? (China-Daily 18 March 1989, 3)
Another teacher remarked:
The problem is not lack of money. It is the attitude that "knowledge is useless." Few students want to become teachers and if the situation continues will be forced to close by the year 2000. (China Daily 27 March 1989, 3) Increasing numbers of students not only do not want to become teachers, they also do not want to attend school. Drop-out rates for primary and middle schools in urban and rural areas have been increasing in recent years. In the countryside, under the government's responsi b ility system, many farmers have preferred to keep their children out of school to enable them to work on the farm. In urban areas, students have dropped out of school to seek employment in the private sector.
And for the last two years, the number of students applying for college admissions was below the number of available positions. 330
For those students who do go on to college, the system its e lf presents them with many problems. College graduates are placed by the job allocation system administered by the national government. In recent years, increasing numbers of students have been unwillingly placed in jobs in remote areas. Although there has been some experimen tation with allowing students to find their own jobs, this, too, has presented students with problems. As students apply for new jobs, they discover that they are at the mercy of the employers. Under the contract responsibility system, enterprise managers are responsible for profits and losses for their businesses and therefore are more selective in th eir hiring practices. According to a China-Daily article, "some persons in charge of hiring have used their job opportunities to ask for money and color TV sets from job applicants; students can't afford this and are therefore denied jobs" (China.Daily 23 March 1989. 3).
Students also faced the fact that Party members and others often use their connections (quanxi) or family influence to get their positions.
Therefore, students without good connections or money to pay for a bribe and without a government-allocated job are faced with unemployment.
Many of these "abandoned children" and others see their only hope as going abroad to get an advanced degree. Presently there are over seventy thousand Chinese students studying abroad, and many more attempting to join them. For example, in Shanghai in 1985 there were approximately four applicants for student visas per day; however, in
April 1989, there were one thousand applicants per day (China Daily 10
April 1989). 331
In late March, the government announced an eleven-year plan for education. The plan was to include the following goals:
(1) Repair all dangerous school structures (2) Ban child labor (3) Encourage drop-outs to return to school (4) Eliminate extra fees charged by schools (5) Strengthen moral education (6) Grant more autonomy [decentralization] to local school d istric ts (China Daily 18 March 1989, 1)
These goals, however, did not address or offer plans to satisfy the growing numbers of students and intellectuals who were disillusioned with the educational system. Workers, farmers, private business people, and consumers also expressed concerns and complaints about the government educational policies.
In early 1989, China's economy was facing serious problems.
The mixture of planned and market economies contributed to irrational pricing, an increasing inflation rate, and high unemployment. To deal with the overheated economy, Li Peng announced an austerity program to cut back on government spending. This program, however, also contributed to unemployment and the increasing rate of bankruptcy by small businesses. A China Daily article stated, "In about three months after the central government began tightening the money supply, stiffen market competition and stric te r money supply conditions drove 81,000 rural firms into bankruptcy and another 30,000 had fatal losses" (China
Daily 4 April 1989, 4). This situation contributed to the growing number of people from the countryside going to large c itie s to seek employment. In Guangzhou, for example, the number of "blind floating labor" had reached approximately one million by early 1989 (China Daily
1 March 1989, 3). As a part of the government's austerity program, many 332 construction projects in major urban centers were halted. It was reported that one-quarter of the 24 million construction workers were facing layoffs due to the austerity program. This situation contributed to the increasing number of unemployed workers, which, by the end of
1988, included 3 million jobless people in China's major cities (China
Daily 3 March 1989). This 3 million figure, however, did not include the estimated 20-30 million "redundant workers"; that is , people who are still hired but who have no real job and are paid a very low wage.
In early 1989, some economists predicted that unemployment in China—not including the "hidden unemployed"—would reach 3 percent by the end of
1989. Government efforts to reduce this number by encouraging rural workers to return to the countryside met with resistance. For example, an article in China Daily explained:
. . . rural workers having benefited from industrial jobs and city life are unwilling to go back to farming after their opportunities have vanished. Moreover, farming is not profitable and farm laborers are too numerous—by more than 100 million hands, as eco nomic sta tistic s show. (China Daily 4 March 1989, 3)
The large pool of "blind floating labor" and the large number of unemployed, coupled with a high rate of inflation, contributed to an increasing crime rate in China. Not only were economic crimes such as tax evasion and official corruption increasing, but also violent crimes such as robbery, th eft, kidnapping, and murder were also increasing. Investigations of cases of official corruption reached
8,500 in 1988, an increase of 3,300 cases over 1987 (China Daily 10
March 1989). To deal with the rising crime rate, the government established anti-corruption hotlines, corruption report centers, and crime control centers throughout China (China Daily 12 October 1988). 333 However, efforts by authorities to punish criminals sometimes caused
further problems. For example, several cases of workers attacking and
sometimes killing their bosses were publicized on television in late
1988 and early 1989. Another case of a worker stabbing his boss was
reported on April 25, 1989 in the China Daily. The article stated that
it was an example of the "increasing number of cases of dissatisfied workers seeking revenge on employers or bosses after they are punished
for wrongdoing" (China Daily 25 April 1989, 3).
Problems in the educational system, the economic system, and the
increasing crime rate were reflected in calls for political and economic reforms as the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement
approached. In late 1988, democratic forums sprang up on some college campuses, a democracy salon was established at Bei Da, prominent in te l
lectuals wrote letters to government officials asking for the release of political prisoners, and calls for Mr. "D" (democracy) and Mr. "S"
(science), as they were referred to in 1919, were carried almost daily in major newspapers throughout China. For example, on March 24, 1989, an editorial stated that "without Science and Democracy and an uncul tured population China can never fully develop" (China Daily 24 March
1989, 4). On April 7, members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences called for "rule by law" and to make the National People's Congress the highest organ of state power (instead of the current "rule by men")
(China Daily 7 April 1989). An article on April 13 explained that
Mr. "D" and Mr. "S" have not taken root in China because autocracy, feudal ideas, and people within the Party have been opposed to them. 334
There were also calls for freedom of the press. An article on
March 30 suggested that freedom of the press would help the stability of the nation by strengthening people's supervision of the government and creating an atmosphere "conducive to mutual feelings of under standing between the people and government that would help avoid the abrupt explosion of extreme feelings" (China Daily 30 March 1989, 4).
However, the person viewed by many students and intellectuals as being most supportive of education and the need for political reforms—Hu Yaobang—had been previously dismissed from office after student demonstrations in late 1986. And as students and intellectuals prepared for a massive May 4 demonstration, Hu Yaobang suddenly died on April 15, 1989. Although the outpouring of grief and sympathy for
Hu touched off the 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement, even if he had not died the conditions in China were certainly ripe for another series of student-led demonstrations.
The near-crisis situation in education, the seemingly bleak future for intellectuals, and the failure of the reforms to signifi cantly improve the situation for intellectuals set the stage for the demonstrations. The economic situation and the rising crime rate may help explain why the 1989 demonstrations were the largest in modern
Chinese history. Given the students'/intellectuals' historical role of petitioning the government for a redress of grievances and their role as the leaders of demonstrations opposing government policies, i t is not surprising that they were once again the leaders of yet another mass movement. We now turn to an analysis of the events surrounding the
Beijing Spring. 335
The Events
The actions by the students in Beijing were inspired by a
Pro-Democracy Movement that had characteristics similar to previous reform movements. The overall pattern of the demonstrations, the under lying theme, the characteristics of the leaders and the demonstrators, the tactics, and the major demands of this movement mirrored similar movements in the past. More specifically, the flow of events character izing previous reform movements—outrage followed by petitions; demon strations and other forms of protests; protests expanding to other major c itie s followed by a government crackdown—was consistent with the events in the 1989 Beijing Spring. The death of Hu Yaobang on April 15,
1989 angered students, who had begun to see him as the last hope for democratic reforms in China. The students' anger led to th eir peti tioning the government in the traditional manner of bowing before the emperor (this time it was the Premier), followed by demonstrations in
Beijing that soon spread to all other major c itie s in China. Likewise, the underlying theme of a weak China caused by internal corruption and a backward culture was similar to themes of previous movements.
This movement, as with previous ones, was e litis t in nature.
The leaders and the participants were, for the most part, intellectuals and university students from the major c itie s in China. As with previous movements, workers, farmers, shopkeepers, and other groups supported the movement but did not represent the mainstream of the effo rt. In addition to being the largest grassroots movement in Chinese history, it was the first time since the founding of the People's 336
Republic that many groups, including journalists, democratic parties, and government and Party work units had joined a reform movement.
The tactics of petitioning the government, mass demonstrations, boycotts of university classes, strikes, and the hunger strike had all been used in previous reform efforts. The major demands of the movement, such as democracy, science, bringing an end to official corruption, and the guarantees of freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly were the same demands expressed by Kang Youwei, Sun Yat-sen,
Hu Shi, Fang Lizhi, Wei Jingsheng, and Xu Wenli.
The government crackdown during the Beijing Spring was similar to the reactions of previous governments when faced with strong oppo sition. The Empress Dowager, for example, arrested and had executed the leaders of the 1898 reform movement; the Guomindang, warlord, and
Communist Party leaders also used violence to end reform movements in
1919, 1925, 1927, 1935, 1957, 1976, and 1986. While the army was not used and people killed in all of these previous cases, arrests, severe punishments, and sometimes, executions were imposed (see Chapter III).
Although the scope and the brutality of the 1989 crackdown was far larger than in any other crackdown since 1949, i t was not, as many
Chinese stated on June 3 and 4, the f ir s t time the PLA soldiers had fired on Chinese. The PLA, for example, was used to help execute landlords and counterrevolutionaries after the communist victory in
1949, and the military restored order during the Cultural Revolution and in doing so killed many Red Guards. In 1988 the PLA killed Tibetan monks when they suppressed the demonstrations in Lhasa. After June 4. 337 many Chinese learned that the PLA soldiers were just like soldiers in every other country. They follow orders.
A rebellion did not occur in Beijing on June 2 or 3, 1989.
Rather, data presented in Chapter IV suggests that although soldiers were surrounded and prevented from entering the city on those dates, they were not suddenly and viciously attacked by ruffians. There is no evidence to suggest that people, knowledgeable of the fact that upwards of 400,000 armed troops with tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) were surrounding the city and that martial law troops were stationed inside the major government. Party, and telecommuni cations offices, suddenly attacked the soldiers and important offices in an attempt to overthrow the government. It is possible, but not certain, that unarmed, plainclothes soldiers and soldiers riding in to u rist vans carrying boxes of unloaded weapons and knives were ordered into the city to make it appear as if a rebellion was taking place.
A long m ilitary convoy of tanks that stopped in front of the CCTV offices, where many tanks were subsequently set on fire, was portrayed on television as evidence of the counterrevolutionary rebellion.
However, th is event happened on the morning of June 4, long after the textbooks claimed the counterrevolutionary rebellion had already begun.
Violence was used by both the PLA and civilians; however, the research reported in Chapter IV suggests that some of the PLA soldiers initiated the violence and some of the civilians reacted with violence.
The use of force (not necessarily violence) to suppress the movement was set on April 26, i t was set in motion on May 19, and i t was carried out beginning June 3, 1989. The classification of the 338 demonstration as turmoil in the April 26 editorial reflected a decision
by the government to suppress the movement. Since the editorial
expressed the position of China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, i t
could not be reversed. After the harsh language in the editorial failed
to end the movement,- and after a long period needed to achieve a
consensus among Party leaders and to win the support of military
leaders, the declaration of martial law set the government's plan into
motion. Soldiers interviewed by students on May 20 said that they were
told that they were sent to Beijing to put down a rebellion. Therefore,
if the statement by the soldiers was true, the demonstration had already
been classified as a rebellion prior to May 19. After agreement by all
the major military regions was reached, the actual use of force to
suppress the movement began on June 3. The soldiers were given the
order to use whatever means necessary to reclaim the Square by early morning, June 4. The fact that the three thousand students s till on
the Square were allowed to retreat was due to the efforts of Hou Dejian
and the other negotiators and not the government's policy.
The exact nature of events that took place on June 3 and 4 and the exact number of casualties may never be known. The government, with the dozens of cameras posted in various locations throughout Beijing
and with the records of all of the area hospitals available to it, is
in a position to give a much broader picture of the events than it has to date. It is probable that the government has videotape of all the
events on Changan Avenue and Tiananmen Square June 3 and 4. Perhaps
if a new set of government leaders comes into power, they will reverse 339 the verdict on this movement and release all of the information they have on the Beijing Spring.
Teaching about the Events
The emphasis on ideological training that was announced after June 4, 1989 represents a return to earlier educational policies of the CCP. During the Yennan era and during the Cultural Revolution, ideological education was paramount—that is, political reliability was emphasized over academic training. During the last ten years of reforms, however, the policy has been skewed to emphasizing "Expertise" over "Redness." While i t is too early to ascertain the depth and scope of th is return to an emphasis on ideology in education, it is clear that it represents a return to earlier policies.
Some of the materials used to teach about the Beijing Spring represent indoctrination. Many of the statements in textbooks describing the events and government policies are of a disuptatious nature. Statements such as the following are examples:
(a) A tiny minority of people made use of the student movement
to stir up turmoil.
(b) The April 26 editorial correctly determined the nature of
the turmoil.
(c) The Party and government took the attitude of extreme
forbearance.
(d) Enforcing martial law was the correct method under the
circumstances; there was no other alternative. 340
(e) When th e ir (the small minority of people) conspiracy was discovered by more and more people and cadres, their ideas were
bankrupt, they staked everything on a single throw and started the
appalling counterrevolutionary rebellion.
(f) The suppression of the counterrevolutionary rebellion is
the just action in keeping with the aspirations and the basic
benefits of the people in the Capital and all over the country.
(g) If the turmoil and therebellion had not been suppressed,
the Party, country, and people would have no safe days.
(h) Only by maintaining socialist law can we realize stability
and unity.
(i) Without the Communist Party, there would be no New China.
(j) The PLA protects the people, the people love the PLA.
These statements, as well as the description of the events on
June 3 and 4, are of a questionable nature. Teachers charged with confirming these statements with teaching and about the events of June 3 and 4 from the government point of view, clearly were expected to nurture in the students a closed mind on the issues. It is not clear from this research if the teachers were successful or unsuccessful in this attempt at indoctrination.
From April 26, 1989, with the publication of the April 26 editorial, the position of the government leaders, as represented by
Li Peng, Deng Xiaoping, and Yang Shangkun, remained consistent. This observation is based on an analysis of the April 26 editorial, the views expressed by Yuan Mu (which were representing the view of Li Peng during the April 29 meeting with the students), the views expressed by Li Peng 341 during the May 18 meeting with the students, the June 9 and June 26 speeches by Deng Xiaoping, and the three textbooks used for teaching about the Beijing Spring. Of course, if the researcher could have interviewed these leaders, their views could have been presented more explicitly.
It is possible that when future leaders control China, the official position on the events and the textbooks that describe the events will be changed. The official position on previous events has been occasionally reversed by the government. For example, the government's stated position regarding the thousands of counterrevolu tionaries whom Hu Yaobang rehabilitated, the policies of Mao Zedong during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (which are now o fficially blamed on "le ftist errors committed by the Gang of
Four"), and the Tiananmen Incident in 1976 have all been reversed. A well-known joke about change in communist systems explains th is situ ation. The joke states that under communism only the future is known; the past keeps changing. And, like the joke, recent Chinese history keeps changing. Perhaps this is the reason that Chinese history textbooks stop their lessons in 1949 and do not deal with issues or events after liberation (1949).
In China, the top leader makes all major policy decisions.
These decisions or positions are carried out through the bureaucracy to the lower levels by cadres. This system is called "the mass line."
People in the lower levels must "toe the Party line." In the case of the Beijing Spring, it was Deng Xiaoping who determined the official position of the Party line, and as long as he remains the paramount 342
leader of China, the official position predictably will remain the same.
However, if another leader such as Zhao Ziyang comes to power, the
Party line may change and, along with i t , the materials presently being
used to teach about the Beijing Spring.
The o fficia l propaganda, including the curriculum materials
about the Beijing Spring, express one point of view about the events.
The position of various students, intellectuals, and laobaixing
presented in Chapter IV represent other points of view. The events that
have occurred in China since June 4, 1989 have grown out of an attempt
by the government and Party leaders to convince students, intellectuals,
laobaixing, etc. that the government's point of view is the correct way of looking at and interpreting the events. It is not clear from this research whether the government has been successful in convincing the dissident groups that the government's position is correct.
In summary, the major events of the Beijing Spring were as fo l1ows:
(1) Hu-Yaobang's funeral at the Great Hall of-the People on
April 22. Many students ignored a ban on meeting in Tiananmen Square and camped out all night on April 21 in order to avoid being stopped by police barricades. During the funeral ceremony, three students presented a petition to the government in the traditional manner of subject to emperor. Because no government leader came out to accept the petition or to address the students, they announced a boycott of classes.
(2) The publication of the edito rial. "Resolutely.OPPOSE
Turmoil" on April 26. The editorial used inflammatory language which 343
was reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution and called the student
movement "turmoil" (dongluan). The harsh language and strong message
to the Party and to the whole country in an attempt to unite the
population in a firm stand against demonstrations was followed the next
day by the largest demonstration in the history of the People's Republic
of China. Students, with the assistance of the laobaixing, were able
to defy government orders and outmaneuver the police and the army in
successfully completing this demonstration. In this major confrontation
on April 27, there was sufficient evidence that the students had won
the support of many laobaixing.
(3) The April-29 meeting between.government-representatives Yuan
Mu, He Dongchang, Yuan Libeng, and.Lu_Yucheng and_students from the
official student organization. The government representatives refused
to allow students from the Student Autonomous Union to participate, and with comments such as "There is freedom of the press; there is no news censorship in China," failed to win the support of the students. The meeting resulted in further resentment of the government by many students, increased support for the Student Autonomous Union, and
resulted in stronger calls for dialogue with government leaders by the
students, intellectuals, and laobaixing.
(4) The May 4 demonstration. Although somewhat smaller than the April 27 demonstration, the May 4 demonstration included, for the first time in fifty years, journalists and editors of the major newspapers and magazines in China. This also marked the beginning of some favorable reporting on the demonstrations by Chinese, which proved very important to the movement. Also, for the first time since 1949, 344 people from outside of the mainland (Hong Kong) joined in demon strations. This was a major morale booster for the students.
(5) The government's failure to resolve the impasse before
Gorbachev's v is it and the.students' decision to begin a hunger strike on May.13. By failing to end the demonstrations before the Gorbachev v isit, the government allowed the students to gain popular support in
China and throughout the world by the extensive coverage of the hunger strike in the foreign and domestic press. The hunger strike enlarged the movement from one basically involving students to a mass movement, as people from all walks of life demonstrated their support for the students.
(6) The-declaration-of martial - law-by Li-Peng.on May-19. Li
Peng announced the imposition of martial law in an attempt to put an end to the turmoil just one day after meeting the students and telling them, "I never said this was turmoil." The imposition of martial law outraged the students and laobaixing, who greeted the troops with barricades and prevented them from entering the city. This event set the government in opposition to the people of Beijing. The troops had been told that they were sent to Beijing to put down a rebellion; the people in Beijing tried to convince them and the government leaders that the troops were not wanted and were not needed to maintain order in
Beijing. Many Beijing residents were angered by the government leaders' refusal to hold a dialogue with the students during the hunger strike and for imposing martial law. They were also worried about the safety and health of the students, and many were determined to protect the students by not allowing the army to enter the city. 345 Ç7 ) Marti al law troops.enterlng Beijing to_enforce- tnarti al 1aw beginning on June 2 and ending on June 4. Beginning in the late evening of June 2 and the early morning hours of June 3, martial law troops began to enter the city. Plainclothes soldiers, riding in regular tourist-type buses and carrying cases of guns and knives, were stopped at various locations on West Changan Avenue. One m ilitary jeep had an accident and three civilians were killed. A large contingent of young, unarmed soldiers jogged from the outskirts of Beijing and, heading for the Square, were stopped just east of the Square by thousands of civilians.
The situation in Beijing that had almost returned to "normal" was disrupted as the students and laobaixing reacted angrily to the movements of the martial law troops.
On the evening of June 3, martial law troops began to use force to enter the city proper and to clear the Square. During this process many civilians were killed and injured. There were also reports of military personnel injured and killed. According to eyewitness accounts, the attacks on military personnel and equipment came as a result of and in retaliation for the killing and injuring of civilians by the military.
The seven major events referred to above were portrayed in primary and secondary classrooms in Beijing in the following manner:
(l).Hu. Yaobang's.funeral.at the Great Hall of-the People.on
April 22. The middle school textbooks described the situation thusly:
On April 22. after the funeral of Hu Yaobang, a person on Tiananmen Square spread a rumor that, "Premier Li Peng promised to come out and meet with the students at 12:45," there was no such 346
promise. Then another rumor stated, "The government ignored the crying petitioners." This caused 60,000 students to boycott classes and increased the turmoil. (SMSEUMS 1989, 22; SMSELMS 1989, 5)
The texts did not address the question of why Li Peng did not "come out" to accept the petition or address the students, nor did the texts address the question of why 60,000 students would boycott classes based on two "rumors." (2) The publication of the editorial "Resolutely Opposethe
Turmoil" on April 26. The middle school textbooks described the edi torial as a "profound" analysis of the true nature of the turmoil and as necessary "to stabilize the situation and calm down the turmoil as soon as possible" (SMSELMS 1989, 34). The upper middle school textbook described the effects of the editorial thusly:
As soon as the People's Daily editorial on April 26 disclosed the true nature of the turmoil, the organizers of the turmoil were forced to take totally opposite tactics. The illegal organization "The Autonomous Union of University Students" (AUUS) distributed the "1st Order of the AUUS" in order to alter their tactics. It required the students to march to Tiananmen Square under the banner of supporting the CCP on April 27. The given slogans included, "Support the CCP," "Support Socialism," and "Support the Consti tution." Under the guidance of Fang Lizhi, the subersive slogans of "Down with the bureaucratic government, down with the corrupt government, and down with the dictatorial government" were changed to the popularly received slogans of "Combat bureaucracy, combat corruption, and combat privilege." (SMSEUMS 1989, 16-17)
The text also stated that the editorial "indeed functioned to reveal the character of the turmoil and to stabilize the situation in the whole country" (SMSEUMS 1989, 35).
The text did not mention the public reaction to the editorial nor the size of the demonstration the day after its publication.
(3) The Apri1 29 meeting between government representatives Yuan
Mu, He Dongchang, Yuan Libeng, and-Lu.Yucheng and students from the 347 official student organization. The upper middle school textbook described the meeting as a "dialogue" between Party and government leaders and the students. The textbook stated that Yuan Mu affirmed the patriotic enthusiasm of the students and said that the students' suggestions for improving democracy, intensifying reforms, punishing official businessmen, and removing corruption were consistent with the aims of the Party and the government. The textbook further stated that the harsh language of the April 26 editorial was directed at the illegal activity of a few people and not the students. The Party and government were portrayed as being sympathetic, understanding, and in agreement with the students. The textbook stated that the '-waders asked the students to separate themselves from the handful of people who were using them to s tir up turmoil.
The leaders, however, did not mention who the small handful of people were. The textbook only stated that following the meeting, the few people continued to s tir up turmoil. This small group of people was blamed for preventing future "dialogues" and attempts by the government to settle the conflict through legal means. The text stated:
[The Party and government] hoped to settle the problems through the regular channels such as democracy and legislation, but these good wishes did not win active support. The few planners and organ izers of the turmoil applied different methods to prevent further dialogues from being held. (SMSEUMS 1989, 35)
In other words, the Party and government leaders were not responsible for the failure of a real dialogue meeting taking place; it was the fault of the small handful of people.
(4) The May 4 demonstration. None of the textbooks discussed this event. 348
(5)-The government leaders ' fai lure.to end the impasse before
Gorbachev's-visit and, the students! deci si on _ to _ begin a hunger strike
on May 13. The middle school textbooks described the Party and
government leaders as having an "extremely forbearing attitude" and making every attempt to hold a dialogue with students in order to
prevent the hunger strike and settle the situation. But, according to
the textbook, the small group of people took this opportunity and
conducted violent activities to worsen the situation. The government's
offer for dialogue was accepted and then rejected; four hours later the
students began th eir hunger strike.
The textbook states that the small handful of people took the
hunger strikers as hostages and put their lives at stake. The government, on the other hand, used all available means to protect the health and safety of the students. Including such things as sending medical help and supplies, warm bedding, buses, food and drink, portable to ile ts for the students, and workers to clean the Square and keep i t sanitary. But, regardless of these efforts by the government, the small
handful of people managed to increase the turmoil throughout China.
The social order in Beijing fell into chaos. All the efforts of the government went for naught; the textbook describes it thusly, "All the one-sided good wishes only made the enemy attack us more violently.
The longer the situation lasted, the greater the loss we would of had to pay" (SMSEUMS 1989, 35).
(6) The declaration of martial.law on-May 19. The middle school textbooks stated that a severe turmoil had taken place in Beijing and
in order to stabilize the situation and return the city to normal. 349
Premier Li Peng, out of "ultimate forbearance," took the "correct" method of declaring martial law in parts of Beijing (SMSEUMS 1989, 27).
The textbook described the situation after the announcement of martial law thusly, "Thanks to the entering martial law troops, the efforts of the Armed and the Security Police, and the help of the workers, peasants, businessmen, teachers, doctors, cadres, and the staff workers of Party and government units, the transportation system, manu facturing, and life turned better and the people felt relieved" (SMSEUMS
1989, 37). The textbooks did not mention that the troops were unable to enter the city nor the general reaction of the people to martial law.
(7) Martial law troops entering Beijing-to-enforce martial law beginning June 2 and.ending June 4. According to the middle school textbooks, the small handful of people realized that once the martial law troops reached their assigned posts, their conspiracy to overthrow the Party and the government would fa il; therefore, on June 3 they took actions that produced "an incredible counterrevolutionary rebellion"
(SMSEUMS 1989, 40). Soldiers were attacked, beaten, and their weapons
(with ammunition) were stolen. A few people organized others to stop the troops and distributed weapons and tools to people for beating the armed police to death. The ruffians attacked important Party and government offices as well as the major radio and television broadcasting stations. Under th is grave emergency, according to the textbook, the government gave the order to the martial law troops "to enter by force and suppress the counterrevolutionary rebellion" (SMSEUMS 1989, 37). 350
The textbooks, in describing the events of June 3 and 4, focus on the injuries and deaths of the soldiers and the destruction of property. Ruffians violently attacked the soldiers and ariry trucks, smashed and looted stores, and used extremely cruel methods to murder soldiers. According to the textbooks the soldiers, after sustaining heavy casualties including the deaths of many soldiers, had no alter native but to use force to enter the city.
The upper middle school text does say that the troops were forced to kill some extremely savage ruffians who deserved to die, and because there were so many people blocking the road, the troops had to fire warning shots in the air. As a result of this action, some people were accidentally hit by ricocheting bullets. The upper middle school text states that there were two hundred casualties, including thirty-six college students, and three thousand soldiers and policemen were wounded
(SMSEUMS 1989, 43). The lower middle school text, like the primary text, does not mention civilian casualties. It does, however, state that six thousand soldiers and policemen were wounded and several dozen were killed (SMSELMS 1989, 10).
That the army and the police suffered such heavy losses, according to the texts, "proves that the People's Army loves the people and didn't want to injure anyone accidentally" (SMELMS 1989, 10). In the face of extreme danger and even death, the soldiers thought f ir s t of the people and "stood the forbearance and went to their death unflinchingly" (SMSELMS 1989, 10). According to the textbooks, the soldiers demonstrated extreme forbearance and behaved like heroes. 351
The textbooks are not explicit about the times, specific circum stances, or the exact number of the soldiers who were killed.
The widely publicized (in the West) statement that "no one was killed" referred to a specific time, a specific place, and to specific people. The upper middle school textbook described the clearing of
Tiananmen Square thusly:
At 4:30 A.M., the martial law headquarters announced over the loudspeakers on the Square that i t is time to evacuate the Square, the students' request to retreat from the Square is accepted. . . . At about five A.M., the students on the Square began to retreat and the army began to march into the Square. The whole process ended at about 5:30 A.M. During the half hour of the process of evacu ation, the army did not shoot at the civilians on the Square. Not one student who had been sitting-in [demonstrating] on the Square was killed. (SMSEUMS 1989, 43)
That is , between 5:00 A.M. and 5:30 A.M., on the southern part of the Square, no students were killed. The above statement does not claim that no one was ever killed on the Square, just not during the one-half hour during which the students evacuated the Square.
Conclusions regarding the textbook: The portrayal of the events in Beijing classrooms is not consistent with the description of events as described in this research.
The differences between the portrayal of events in Beijing classroom materials and the description of events presented in this research are both in the focus and in the content of the information.
In discussing the events, the focus of the classroom materials was on the beliefs and actions of a "small group of people with ulterior motives" and the killing and wounding of soldiers and policemen. The focus of this research was on the beliefs and actions of the students, intellectuals, and laobaixing. 352 According to Marxism, alienation cannot occur in socialist systems. The government represents the interests of the people. The goals and interests of all the people, including the students, intellectuals, workers, etc., are the same as the government's goals and interests. There is no place for workers' unions, student unions, or separate political parties that represent goals and interests different from those expressed by the government. If a worker or student union represents goals and interests different from those expressed by the government, then, according to Marxist theory, they cannot represent the goals and interests of the people. Therefore, these groups represent only a "small group of people with u lterior motives." This group can in turn only trick or mislead people into thinking that they represent the goals and interests of the populace.
The textbooks, in focusing on "a small group with ulterior motives," was simply following Marxist theory~the theory that the government, not the students' or workers' union, represents the goals and interests of the people. The millions of people who demonstrated were, therefore, simply misled by a small number of malcontents. The textbooks devote a considerable amount of time to proving this "fact."
In focusing on the small group of people, the textbooks avoided discussing the beliefs and actions of the students, intellectuals, and laobaixing other than to show how they were misled and tricked. The
April 26 editorial stated that the situation was tumultuous and that i t was created by a small group of people. Everything that happened after that—the failure of the dialogue meetings, the failure to conduct additional dialogue, the boycott of classes, the mass demonstrations. 353 the disruption of the Sino-Soviet summit, the endangering of students' lives during the hunger strike, the need to declare martial law, and the counterrevolutionary rebellion —was caused by this small group of people. Then who were the members of this small group and how were they able to mislead so many people just by "spreading rumors"? The textbooks do not divulge this information.
By focusing on the soldiers and policemen who were injured and killed, the textbooks avoided discussing the details of the actions of the soldiers and policemen. For example, all three textbooks describe the death of PLA soldier Liu Guogeng. But none of the textbooks mentions that beside his dead body someone wrote, "He killed four people" (CBS tape 4 June 1989). The middle school textbooks describe the death of Cui Guozheng, but they don't mention that eyewitnesses claim that he killed an old woman and a child before he was attacked by the people.^ The textbooks state that Deng Xiaoping awarded the highest honor, "The Republic Bodyguard," to ten martyrs. The textbooks do not mention that six of these soldiers were trapped in the back of a truck that overturned and burned, although it was described in the
People's Daily. The circumstances of the deaths of the other two
"martyrs" was also not discussed. Because ten soldiers were awarded
"The Republic Bodyguard," i t seems likely, to this researcher, that these ten soldiers represent all the non-civilian deaths. Of these ten soldiers, six died in a traffic accident, two were killed by civilians
Vor details of the death of Cui Guozheng, including an eyewitness account by two foreign tourists, see Amnesty International (1989, 25). 354
—according to eyewitness reports—after they had killed civilians, and the circumstances of the deaths of two soldiers remain unclear. The textbooks focus on the actions of the civilians against the soldiers, without describing the overall circumstances or the events that preceded the actions by the civilians. Any information that was contrary to the portrayal of events in the textbook was classified as rumor. For example, if a student stated that he or she saw or heard that Liu
Guogeng had killed four people before he was attacked by civilians, he or she would be guilty of spreading rumors.
The research reported in Chapter V presented information contrary to the textbook's account of the events surrounding the deaths and injuries of the soldiers. The major difference in these two accounts is that the textbooks portray a small group of people attempting to violently overthrow the government and viciously attacking the soldiers, while the research in Chapter V gives no evidence to support this claim.
The textbooks portray the Beijing Spring as turmoil stirred up by a small group of people that developed into a counterrevolutionary rebellion that was heroically suppressed by the PLA. The research findings in Chapter V portray the events in the Beijing Spring as a
Pro-Democracy Movement led by students and intellectuals that gained the support of people from all walks of life and that was violently suppressed by the PLA.
The major changes in the educational system following the
Beijing Spring included a sh ift of emphasis from knowledge and skill-based education to ideological training, as well as changes in 355 the curriculum. On June 9, Deng Xiaoping declared that the biggest mistake during the last ten years of reform had been a neglect of ideological education. To correct this mistake, schools instituted curriculum changes that reflected an emphasis on ideological education.
The textbooks and content of the Thought and Moral Education classes in primary schools and the Political Thought Education classes
in middle schools were changed to emphasize ideological training. The emphasis in the textbook was reflected by the following directives
issued to students:
The students should:
(1) Love the CCP
(2) Love and learn from the PLA
(3) Love the socialist motherland
(4) Follow the leadership of the CCP
(5) Only the CCP can lead China to a bright future
(6) Only socialism can save China
(7) Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and oppose bourgeois
liberalism
(8) Patriotism and loving socialism cannot be separated
(9) Abide by the policy of "one center and two points"
(10) Observe the laws and safeguard stab ility and unity
(11) Patriotic behavior must be based on the constitution and
the legal system (SMSEUMS, SMSEPS, SMELMS 1989)
Of all the above guidelines that the students should follow, the most important was to follow the leadership of the CCP. To further assure that students understood this point, a "Study Lei Feng" movement 356 was launched. Lei Feng was the PLA soldier who dedicated his life to serve the Party and the people.
It is not clear from the research how long this emphasis on ideological training will last or what other changes have been or will be instituted to further implement ideological training in the schools.
Unanswered Questions
Even after the completion of the study, many questions about the Beijing Spring remain. Some of these questions are listed below and others are dealt with in the "Recommendations for Future Research" section.
(1) Why did the government allow the protests to continue until
June 3? (2) Were there people behind the scenes attempting to create turmoi1 ?
(3) Where did the students get the idea for a hunger strike?
(4) Why did unarmed soldiers attempt to jog to the Square on
June 3? (5) Why did troops begin to forcibly enter Beijing on June 3?
(6) How many people were killed June 3-4, 1989?
Summary
For many students and intellectuals, the high-spirited days of
April and May 1989 were fille d with hope, joy, and optimism for reform in China. In their courageous call for democracy, science, and a system without corruption, many students saw themselves as the disciples of 357 the students in the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Some students even considered themselves to be following the path of the reformers as far back as 1898. These students and intellectuals saw themselves in the same role as generation after generation of previous students and
scholars who also had called for democracy, science, and reforms in an
attempt to make China modern and to put it on par with other nations in the world. The protestors looked at the economic success of their
neighbors such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan
and wondered why China was s till so poor. The protestors looked at political reforms in the Soviet Union and wondered why China was so slow in instituting political reforms. The protestors also looked at their own constitution and wondered why they still did not, in fact, have the freedoms guaranteed to them in the constitution. The protestors sought to address these issues through their demands to the government.
At times during April and May it seemed that the protestors would achieve some of their demands. Government leaders stated that the aims of the students and the aims of government were the same, and they promised to hold dialogues with the students. It also seemed that
Li Peng, the much-criticized Premier, would, as many people demanded, step down. But these demands were not met. The students and other
protestors, as with earlier generations of protestors, were violently stopped by a government that has yet to change its authoritarian traditions. The present government, like its predecessors, the various warlords and the Empress Dowager, violently suppressed a reform movement. And the hope, joy, and optimism for democratic reforms in
China of yet another generation of students were crushed. 358
After weeks of encampment on the outskirts of Beijing and after reinforcements were positioned in all the major Party, government, and communications offices, the PLA was ordered to enter the city and clear
Tiananmen Square. Some troops who entered the city did not receive or did not follow orders to shoot, while other troops did shoot their way
into the Square.
By the early morning of June 3, when the f ir s t troops jogged toward the Square, i t appeared that the Pro-Democracy Movement would come to an antic!imactic end. Most of the Beijing students had already cleared the Square and had gone back to th eir campuses. There were long lines at the railway station as thousands of students from outside of
Beijing were also going home. After weeks of demonstrations and blocking the army's entrance into the city, people were growing tired .
And as the government's hard line position was being accepted by more and more danweis and m ilitary regions, the laobaixing and workers were less willing (or able) to leave work or to demonstrate support for the students. The government that just a few days earlier seemed weak and incapable of dealing with the situation suddenly looked strong, united, and capable of calming the situation.
Once the government leaders were united and had gained the support of all the military regions, the PLA was ordered to enter the city. In some ways, the strategy of the army appeared to be following
Mao's bandit tactics of warfare, which Mao had learned by studying the writings of Sun Tzu (500 B.C.). On the night of June 3, when the troops shot their way down Changan Avenue, and even the next morning, people often yelled at them, saying that they (the PLA) were not like real 359 soldiers—they were really like the bandit soldiers of the 1920s and
1930s. By early morning on June 4, the army controlled the Square and the Pro-Democracy Movement was ended. As schools reopened, teachers and students were welcomed by a new emphasis on ideological training. Once the teachers passed their
"brainwashing" (xinaozi) (as many teachers and students referred to it), the students went through their ideological reeducation. When this part of the reeducation was completed, regular classes began.
The primary and middle school curriculum, in early August, was changed to replace the previous Thought and Moral Education classes with a study of the Beijing Spring. New textbooks were used at each level to teach about the Beijing Spring. Some classrooms supplemented the textbook with field trips to the Square, the Military Museum, and the
Art Museum (where there was a large display of government photographs from April-June 1989); speakers from the military, the Party, and the government; and other teaching materials such as the government video, daily newspaper articles, and study guides. Once the students passed the test covering the events of the Beijing Spring, they went on to begin the "Study (or Learn from) Lei Feng" movement.
So far the lessons in primary and middle schools have included a reemphasis of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. This new emphasis on ideology represents a return to earlier (Cultural Revolution) educa tional policies. From the research it is not clear how far the new policies will go in returning to the earlier policies.
Overall, the 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement will take its place in the long history of reform efforts led by students and scholars. 360
While the mass numbers of demonstrators represented various social groups and voiced a variety of complaints about the government, the various groups were united in their dissatisfaction with the government
leaders and their policies. It may well be that the government leaders will be successful in suppressing this movement and meeting some of the demands of the demonstrators; however, because of the brutal nature of the suppression, the leaders should be fearful of the next pro-democracy movement. Given the nature of modern Chinese history, which has witnessed more than ten major reform and revolutionary movements, it seems inevitable that another movement will occur within the next ten years. And i t may be the case that a growing number of people will agree with Sun Yat-sen who, after several failed attempts to pressure the Qing officials to reform, decided that reform efforts were useless and that armed revolution was the only way to change the government.
And as Lu Xun stated in 1926, . . petitions do not serve any purpose, especially peaceful ones" (Lu 1985, 271).
Perhaps during April and May of 1989, the Chinese leaders lost their last opportunity to take China on a peaceful path toward greater democracy and political reforms. However, when the current "gang of old" retires or dies off, new leaders may emerge who are capable and willing to adopt democratic reforms that could restore public faith in the Party. The push for democratic reforms, which began in China in
1895, will continue. The current leadershp, which has at least tempo ra rily suppressed the latest pro-democracy movement, must now prepare for the next movement to erupt. And if the current leaders are still 361 in power at that time, the students and intellectuals may not be able to keep that movement peaceful.
Recommendations for Future Research
This research was based upon observations, eyewitness accounts,
interviews, and materials collected from the demonstrators, government
and Party organs, various media sources, and educational institutions during April through December 1989 in Beijing. Based upon the findings of this research, there are areas of need for further study.
First, future study is recommended to include the role of such groups as farmers, private entrepreneurs, and workers in or outside of
Beijing during the Beijing Spring. It was reported that demonstrations took place in all major cities and in many small towns; however, l i t t l e research has been done in these other areas. Similarly, little research has been done to include groups other than students and intellectuals and their role in the movement.
Second, the current research did not address the relations in the top level of the Party, government, or the military. Future research is recommended to analyze the decision-making process of the top level and the role of individuals such as Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng,
Zhao Ziyang, and Yang Shangkun in that process.
Third, this research did not attempt to estimate the total number of people killed during the crackdown. While many Chinese laobaixing say that it doesn't matter how many were killed~it only matters that the PLA opened fire and killed unarmed Chinese—it is 362 recommended that future research attempts to ascertain accurate figures
on civilian and military casualties.
Fourth, the current research indicated that the government
stated that a small group of people were behind the turmoil and started
a counterrevolutionary rebellion. Further research is recommended to
study the leadership of the student movement to ascertain their
decision-making process and the people who influenced their decisions.
Fifth, future study is recommended to give a greater emphasis
on the content of the social studies curriculum in China, especially the changes that have taken place since June 4, 1989.
Sixth, future study is recommended to study educational policies
as they relate to social studies to ascertain the scope, depth, and
implications of the policy changes instituted after June 4, 1989.
Seventh, future research is recommended to study the recruitment, training, role, and viewpoint of Thought and Moral Edu cation teachers after June 4, 1989.
Eighth, i t is recommended that future study about the Chinese educational system be conducted in China. The researcher of any future
study is recommended to spend more time systematically observing and/or participating in the complex process of social studies teaching and
learning in China.
Ninth, future research is recommended to determine the success
(achievement sense) of the ideological-reeducation-indoctrination
lessons on the students. APPENDIX A
LISTING OF REFORM EDICTS
363 I. Education
A. Replacement of the eight-legged essay in the civil service examinations by essays on current affairs (June 23, 1898)
B. Establishment of an Imperial University at Peking (June 22, August 9)
C. Establishment of modern schools in the provinces devoted to the pursuit of both Chinese and Western studies. Transfor mation of large private academies (shu-ylian) in the provincial capitals into colleges, of those in the préfectoral capitals into high schools, and of those in the districts into elementary schools (July 10) D. Establishment of a school for the overseas subjects (August 6)
E. Creation of a medical school under the Imperial University (September 8)
F. Publication of an official newspaper (July 26)
G. Opening of a special examination in political economy (July 13)
II. Political Administration
A. Abolition of sinecure and unnecessary offices, including: 1. The Supervisorate of Imperial Instruction, the Office of Transmission, the Banqueting Court, the Court of State Ceremonial, the Imperial Stud, the Court of Scarificial Worship, and the Court of Judicature and Revision 2. The governorships of Hupeh, Kwantung, and Yunnan 3. The director-general ship of the Yellow River, the circuit intendants for grain transport, and the salt intendants (August 30)
B. Appointment of the progressives in government (September 5)
C. Improvement in administrative efficiency by eliminating delays and by developing a new, simplified administrative procedure (June 26)
D. Encouragement of suggestions from private citizens, to be forwarded by government offices on the day they are received (September 11) 364 365 E. Permission for the Manchus to engage in trade (September 14)
III. Industry
A. Promotion of railway construction (June 25)
B. Promotion of agricultural, industrial, and commercial devel opments (June 20)
C. Encouragement of invention (July 5) D. Beautification of the Capital (September 5)
IV. Others
A. Tour of foreign countries by high officials (June 12)
B. Protection of missionaries (June 12)
C. Improvement and simplification of legal codes (July 29)
D. Preparation of a budget (September 16) APPENDIX B
EMPRESS DOWAGER'S 1901 LIST OF REFORMS
366 I. Abolition of Old Offices
A. Dismissal of useless clerks and attendants in government offices (May 1901) B. Termination of the sale of office (August 1901)
C. Incorporation of the Supervisorate of Imperial Instruction (Chan-shih fu ) into the Hanlin Academy (August 1901)
D. Abolition of the governorships of Yunnan and Hupeh (December 1904) and Kwantung (July 1905), as well as the director- general i ship of the Conservancy of the Yellow River and the Grand Canal (February 1902)
II. Creation of New Offices
A. The Superindency of Political Affairs (April 1901)
B. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to replace the Tsungli Yamen (July 1901) C. The Ministry of Commerce, which absorbed the old Bureaus of Railways and Mining (August 1903)
D. The Bureau of M ilitary Training (December 1903)
E. The Ministry of Police (October 1905)
F. The Ministry of Education (December 1905)
III. Mi 1i tary Reform A. Termination of m ilitary examinations (August 1901)
B. Reduction of the Green Standard Army and Braves by 20 to 30 percent within a year (August 1901) C. Creation of provincial military academies (August 1901)
D. Training of the bannermen in Peking by T'ieh-liang and Yuan Shih-k'ai E. Establishment of the Bureau of Military Training (December 1903)
367 368 IV. Educational Reform
A. Opening of the state examinations in political economy for the Hanlin members above the compilers (May 1901)
B. Recruitment of Chinese students abroad for service at home by the envoys (June 1901)
C. Replacement of the "eight-legged essay" by current topics in provincial and metropolitan examinations, to begin in 1902 (August 1901)
D. An order to transform provincial academies into colleges, prefectural schools into middle schools, and district schools into elementary schools, with a mixed curriculum, including the Confucian Four Books, Five Classics, Chinese history, as well as the study of foreign governments (September 1901)
E. Orders to provincial authorities to select students to study abroad (September 1901, October 1902)
F. An order to the Imperial Clan Court to selectbannermen's children to study abroad (January 1902) G. An order to Hanlin compilers and other holders of the chin-shih degree to study in the various departments of the imperial University (December 1902)
H. Annual examinations for returned students from abroad (July 1905) I. Abolition of the government examinations (August 1905)
V. Social Reforms
A. Permission for marriages between the Manchus and the Chinese (February 1902)
B. Liberation of women from foot-binding (February 1902)
C. Prohibition of opium (September 1906)
VI. Other Reforms
A. Revision of regulations on the tribute rice, and promotion of railway construction (June 1901)
B. Provincial taxes on tobacco and liquor (December 1903)
C. An order for drafting a commercial law (December 1901) 369
D. Establishment of refugee camps to absorb vagrants and the unemployed (June 1905)
E. Reduction of expenses in the palaces (June 1904) APPENDIX C
MORDS OF COMMUNIST "INTERNATIONALE"
AND CHINESE NATIONAL ANTHEM
370 The Internationale
Arise, slaves of starvation and cold Arise, wretched of the earth The blood in our hearts is hot and boiling To fight for the truth and to get rid of the old world
Slaves, rise up, rise up Don't say, "We have nothing" We shall be the owners of the earth There have never been gods We should neither depend on a supernatural being nor an emperor It depends on us to create happiness for the people
We want to reap the harvest from our labors Let this idea break through the prison walls Make the fire strong quickly, and forge the iron when it is red hot
Who created th is world of human beings? It was through the labor of the masses Everything belongs to the worker
There's no place for the parasite to live We hate most the poison snakes and wild animals Who eat all of our blood and flesh When we get rid of all of them the red sun will shine throughout the world
This is the last fight Unite until tomorrow The Internationale will certainly come true.
The Chinese National Anthem
Rise up, people who do not want to be slaves any more. Use our blood and our bodies to build a new Great Wall. The Chinese people stood up at the moment of greatest danger. Everyone was forced to yell out their last shouts Rise up, rise up, we millions of people have one heart Under the enemies' fire, keep going, keep going.
371 APPENDIX D
THE APRIL 26 EDITORIAL
372 "An Urgent Call for a Firm Stand against Turmoil"
During the days of mourning for Comrade Hu Yaobang, great numbers of Communists, workers, peasants, intellectuals, office workers, PLA soldiers, and young students used various forms to express their sadness. They resolved to transform their sorrow into strength and strive to realize the four modernizations to make a stronger China.
During that period, however, a handful of people in Beijing fabricated rumors against the leaders of the Party and the government. They incited people to storm into Zhongnanhai from Xinhuamen where the headquarters of the Central Party Committee and the State Council are located. A few even shouted for the overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party. In Xian and Changsha, rioters looted shops, smashed public properties, beat people, and burned vehicles.
Considering that the majority of the people were in mourning, and that youngsters may overreact when they are excited, the Party and the government exercised the utmost restraint and tolerance. On April 22, the memorial for Hu Yaobang was held as scheduled; however, the government did not in sist on the students' clearance from the Square as it customarily would. Instead, the students were asked to keep order and join in the memorial service. Because both sides made an effort, the service was carried out in the required atmosphere of solemnity.
Nevertheless, right after the meeting a handful of individuals with ulterior motives went on making use of the young students' emo tional feelings about Hu Yaobang to create rumors, confuse people's thinking, and write pamphlets and large character posters slandering the Party and government leaders. They openly went against the consti tution of the country by opposing the leadership of the Communist Party and socialist system. In some of the universities and colleges, illegal organizations were set up, announcing that they were going to "seize the power" from the legal student unions. Some forced their way into the university broadcasting rooms. They incited faculty and students to boycott class; they even blocked the way to classrooms for their fellow students. They also printed, in the worker's name, counter revolutionary handbills and traveled to get more supporters in an attempt to stir up an even bigger disturbance.
These facts make it clear that this handful of individuals were not mourning Hu Yaobang, nor were they working to push the process of the socialist democratic politics in China. They were not just letting off steam. They were waving the flag of democracy to violate democratic principles; their purpose was to instigate dissension between the party and the people, create national disorder, and sabotage the stable unity 373 374 in politics that China has been enjoying for years. This is a plotted conspiracy, an upheaval to negate from a fundamental basis the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system. The whole nation and the whole party are facing a serious political challenge.
If the unrest is not handled quickly, we will soon face a very grave time of confusion and disorder. In that case, the things that the people hope to achieve—such as the open policy, order and construction, price control, improvement of life, eliminating corruption, and developing a better system of democracy and law—will all become impossible. We may lose all the great achievements that we gained during the ten years of reform, let alone the realization of the plan of a stronger China. It is possible that a hopeful, promising country will become a hopeless, agitated country.
All the members of the Party and all nationalities in China must fully understand the graveness of the struggle. We must unite and stand firmly in opposing the turmoil. We must protect the constitution and socialist democracy and law and resolutely defend the hard-earned polit ical stability and unity. No illegal organizations are allowed in China. Any excuses to violate the rights of the legal student unions will be denied. Rumor mongers should be punished in accordance with criminal law. No illegal demonstrations. No visiting of students to the factories, countrysides, or schools. Those who commit violence will be prosecuted. Students have the right to go to school, and that right should be protected. Many students wish to wipe out corruption and promote democracy, which are also the Party's and the government's intentions. However, these can only be fu lfilled under the leadership of the Party through reforms and better socialist democratic laws.
Comrades of the whole party and people of the whole nation must see clearly that China will be in agony if this turmoil is not ended. This struggle means the life or death of the open policy and of the four modernizations. And for China's future. Party organizations at all levels, all the members of the Party, of the Youth League, of all the Chinese democratic parties, all patriots must differentiate right from wrong, must stand firm and eliminate the turmoil resolutely and immediately. APPENDIX E
SPEECHES BY DENG XIAOPING
375 DENG XIAOPING'S JUNE 4 SPEECH
Following is the full text of the speech delivered by Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, on June 9 in Beijing to commanders above the corps level of the martial law enforcement troops: -
You comrades have been working hard.
First of all. I'd like to express my heartfelt condolences to the comrades in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the armed police and police who died in the struggle; and my sincere sympathy and solicitude to the comrades in the arn\y, the armed police and police who were wounded in the struggle, and I want to extend my sincere regards to all the army, armed police and police personnel who participated in the struggle.
I suggest that all of us stand and pay a silent tribute to the martyrs.
I'd like to take this opportunity to say a few words. This storm was bound to happen sooner or later. As determined by the inter national and domestic climate, i t was bound to happen and was inde pendent of man's w ill. It was just a matter of time and scale. It has turned out in our favour, for we still have a large group of veterans who have experienced many storms and have a thorough understanding of things. They were on the side of taking resolute action to counter the turmoil. Although some comrades may not understand this now, they will understand eventually and will support the decision of the Central Corrani ttee.
Editorial The April 26 editorial of the "People's Daily" classified the problem as turmoil. The word was appropriate, but some people objected to the word and tried to amend i t . But what has happened shows that this verdict was right. It was also inevitable that the turmoil would develop into a counterrevolutionary rebellion. We s till have a group of senior conrades who are alive, we still have the army, and we also have a group of core cadres who took part in the revolution at various times. That is why it was relatively easy for us to handle the present matter. The main difficulty in handling this matter lay in that we had never experienced such a situation before, in which a small minority of bad people mxied with so many young students and onlookers. We did not have a clear picture of the situation, and this prevented us from taking some actions that we should have taken earlier. It would have 376 377
been difficult for us to understand the nature of the matter had we not had the support of so many senior comrades. Some comrades didn't understand this point. They thought it was simply a matter of how to treat the masses. Actually, what we faced was not just some ordinary people who were misguided, but also a rebellious clique and a large number of the dregs of society. The key point is that they wanted to overthrow our State and the Party. Failing to understand this means failing to understand the nature of the matter. I believe that after serious work we can win the support of the great majority of comrades within the Party.
Nature The nature of the matter became clear soon after it erupted. They had two main slogans: to overthrow the Communist Party and topple the socialist system. Their goal was to establish a bourgeois republic entirely dependent on the West. Of course we accept people's demands for combatting corruption. We are even ready to listen to some people with ulterior motives when they raise the slogan about fighting corruption. However, such slogans were just a front. Their real aim was to overthrow the Communist Party and topple the socialist system.
During the course of quelling the rebellion, many comrades of ours were injured or even sacrificed their lives. Some of their weapons were also taken from them by the rioters. Why? Because bad people mingled with the good, which made it difficult for us to take the firm measures that were necessary.
Handling this matter amounted to a severe political te st for our army, and what happened shows that our People's Liberation Army passed muster. If tanks were used to roll over people, this would have created a confusion between right and wrong among the people nationwide. That is why I have to thank the PLA officers and men for using this approach to handle the rebellion.
The PLA losses were great, but this enabled us to win the support of the people and made those who can't tell right from wrong change their viewpoint. They can see what kind of people the PLA are, whether there was bloodshed at Tian'anmen, and who were those that shed blood.
Losses Once this question is made clear, we can take the initiative. Although i t is very sad that so many comrades were sacrificed, i f the event is an1yzed objectively, people cannot but recognize that the PLA are the sons and brothers of the people. This will also help people to understand the measures we used in the course of the struggle. In the future, whenever the PLA faces problems and takes measures, it will gain the support of the people. By the way, I would say that in the future, we must make sure that our weapons are not taken away from us. 378 In a word, th is was a te s t, and we passed. Even though there are not so many veteran comrades in the arny and the soldiers are mostly little more than 18, 19 or 20 years of age, they are still true soldiers of the people. Facing danger, they did not forget the people, the teachings of the Party, and the interests of the country. They kept a resolute stand in the face of death. They fully deserve the saying that they met death and sacrificed themselves with generosity and without fear.
When I talked about passing muster, I was referring to the fact that the arrny is still the people's army. This army retains the traditions of the old Red Army. What they crossed this time was genuinely a political barrier, a threshold of life and death. This is by no means easy. This shows that the people's army is truly a Great Wall of iron and steel of the Party and country. This shows that no matter how heavy the losses we suffer and no matter how generations change, this army of ours is forever an army under the leadership of the Party, forever the defender of socialism, forever the defender of the public interest, and they are the most beloved of the people.
At the same time, we should never forget how cruel our enemies are. For them we should not have an iota of forgiveness.
Rebellion The outbreak of the rebellion is worth thinking about. It prompts us to calmly think about the past and consider the future. Perhaps this bad thing will enables us to go ahead with reform and the open-door policy at a more steady, better, even a faster pace. Also it will enable us to more speedily correct our mistakes and better develop our strong points. I cannot elaborate on this today. I just want to raise the subject here.
The first question is: Are the line, goals and policies laid down by the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, including our "three-step" development strategy, correct? Is i t the case that because this riot took place there is some question about the correctness of the line, goals and policies we laid down? Are our goals "leftist"? Should we continue to use them for our struggle in the future? These significant questions should be given clear and definite answers.
We have already accomplished our f ir s t goal of doubling the gross national product. We plan to use 12 years to attain our second goal of doubling the GNP. In the 50 years after that, we hope to reach the level of a moderately developed country. A two-per cent annual growth rate is sufficient. This is our strategic goal.
I don't believe that what we have arrived at is a "leftist" judgment. Nor have we set up an overly ambitious goal. So, in answering the f ir s t question, I should say that our strategic goal cannot be regarded as a failure so far. It will be an unbeatable 379
achievement for a country with 1.5 billion people like ours to reach the level of a moderately developed nation after 61 years.
China is capable of realizing this goal. It cannot be said that our strategic goal is wrong because of the occurrence of this event.
The second question is this: Is the general conclusion of the 13th Party Congress of "One Centre, Two Basic Points" correct? Are the two basic points—upholding the four cardinal principles and persisting in the open policy and reforms—wrong?
In recent days I have pondered these two points. No, we haven't been wrong. There's nothing wrong with the four cardinal principles. If there is anything amiss, it's that these principles haven't been thoroughly implemented. They haven't been used as the basic concept to educate the people, educate the students and educate all the cadres and Party members. Liberalization The crux of the current incident was basically the confrontation between the four cardinal principles and bourgeois liberalization. It is n 't that we have not talked about such things as the four cardinal principles, worked on political concepts, and opposed bourgeois liberal ization and spiritual pollution. What we haven't done is maintain continuity in these talks. There has been no action and sometimes even hardly any talk.
The fault does not lie in the four cardinal principles themselves, but in wavering in upholding these principles and in the very poor work done to persist in political work and education.
In my Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference talk on New Year's day 1980, I talked about "four guarantees," one of which was the "enterprising spirit in hard struggle and plain living." Promoting plain living must be a major objective of education and this should be the keynote for the next 60 to 70 years. The more prosperous our country becomes, the more important i t is to keep hold of the enter prising spirit. The promotion of this spirit and plain living will also be helpful for overcoming decay.
After the People's Republic was founded we promoted plain living. Later on, when life became a l i t t l e better, we promoted spending more, leading to wastage everywhere. This, in addition to lapses in theoretical work and an incomplete legal system, resulted in backsliding.
I once told foreigners that our worst omission of the past 10 years was in education. What I meant was political education, and this doesn't apply to schools and students alone, but to the masses as a whole. And we have not said much about plain living and the 380 enterprising spirit, about what kind of a country China is and how it is going to turn out. This is our biggest omission.
Approach Is there anything wrong to the basic concept of reforms and openness? No. Without reforms and openness how could we have what we have today? There has been a fa irly satisfactory rise in the standard of living, and it may be said that we have moved one stage further. The positive results of 10 years of reforms must be properly assessed even though there have emerged such problems as inflation. Naturally, in reform and adopting the open policy, we run the risk of importing evil influences from the West and we have never underestimated such influences.
In the early 1980s, when we established special economic zones, I told our Guangdong comrades that on the one hand they should persevere with reforms and openness, and on the other hand they should deal severely with economic crimes.
Looking back, it appears that there were obvious inadequacies; there hasn't been proper co-ordination. Being reminded of these inade quacies will help us formulate future policies. Further, we must persist in the co-ordination between a planned economy and a market economy. There cannot be any change in th is policy.
In the course of implementing th is policy we can place more emphasis on planning in the adjustment period. At other times there can be a l i t t l e more market adjustment so as to allow more flex ib ility . The future policy should still be a marriage between the planned and market economies.
Policy What is important is that we should never change China back into a closed country. Such a policy would be most deterimental. We don't even have a good flow of information. Nowadays, are we not talking about the importance of information? Certainly, it is important. If one who is involved in management doesn't possess information, he is no better than a man whose nose is blocked and whose ears and eyes are shut. Again, we should never go back to the old days of trampling the economy to death. I put forward this proposal for the consideration of the Standing Committee. This is also an urgent problem, a problem we'll have to deal with sooner or later.
In brief, this is what we have achieved in the past decade: Generally, our basic proposals, ranging from a developing strategy to policies, including reforms and openness, are correct.If there is any inadequacy, then I should say our reforms and openness have not proceeded adequately enough. The problems we face in implementing reforms are far greater than those we encounter in opening our country. In political reforms we can affirm one point: We have to insist on 381
implementing the system of the National People's Congress and not the American system of the separation of three powers. The US berates us for suppressing students. But when they handled domestic student unrest and turmoil, didn't they send out police and troops, arrest people and shed blood? They were suppressing students and the people, but we are putting down counterrevolutionary rebellion. What qualifi cations do they have to c ritic iz e us? From now on, however, we should pay attention to such problems. We should never allow them to spread.
Education What do we do from now on? I would say that we should continue, persist in implementing our planned basic line, direction and policy. Except where there is a need to a lte r a word or phrase here and there, there should be no change in the basic line or basic policy. Now that I have raised this question, I would like you all to consider it thoroughly. As to how to implement these policies, such as in the areas of investment, the manipulation of capital etc., I am in favour of putting the emphasis on capital industry and agriculture. In capital industry, this calls for attention to the supply of raw materials, transportation and energy; there should be more investment in this area for the next 10 to 20 years, even if it involves heavy debts. In a way, this is also openness. Here, we need to be bold and have made hardly any serious errors. We should work for more electricity, work for more railway lines, public roads, shipping. There's a lot we can do. As for steel, foreigners judge we'll need some 120 million tons a year in future. We are now using some 60 million tons, half of what we need. If we were to improve our existing facilities and increase production by 20 million tons we could reduce the amount of steel we need to import. Obtaining foreign loans to improve this area is also an aspect of reform and openness. This question now confronting us is not whether the policies of opening and reforming are correct or not or whether we should continue with these policies. The question is how to carry out these policies, where do we go and which area should we concentrate on?
We have to firmly implement the series of policies formulated since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee. We must conscientiously sum up our experiences, persevere in what is right, correct what is wrong, and do a b it more where we lag behind. In short, we should sum up the experiences of the present and look forward to the future.
That's all I have to say on this occasion. 382
DENG XIAOPING'S SPEECH OF MAY 31
(This speech has been heard in high-level — e.g. Provincial—work units.)
After pacifying the counter-revolutionary uprising, the economic open reform policies will not change. This policy of open reforms originates from the 11th plenum, was established as a basic policy. This policy is the "road to a strong China." It can't change; even the language cannot change, not one word of it.
(1) Really, there are some issues about which we must answer to the people. First, we must change the structure of the leadership. The Chinese Communist National Congress must be adjusted. The people need to see tangible results. If the group is stiff and conservative and incapable, then it will indeed be hard to maintain stability. Whether it's workers, peasants, students or intellectuals, they all want reform. The slogan "Down with Oeng Xiaoping!" has been brought up; in contrast, no one has called for the reversal of the open reforms. Therefore, a new "group" is very important.
(2) We have to do some concrete measures that say to the people that we really want to combat corruption. The corruption problem is the main source of the people's lack of confidence in the government. And this is n 't the f ir s t time we've brought up th is problem. Before, however, we were never able to resolve i t . Hereafter, we should do whatever necessary to resolve the corruption problem. We definitely need to gain the confidence of the people. In the past, I said I wanted to create a few "Hong Kongs." What I meant was to advance the reforms another stage. We haven't opened up enough. We don't have much in the way of capital resources, but we can use land to attract foreign investment. The foreign investors can also profit, but in the end China will be the ultimate benefactor. Hong Kong is very important to us. Were i t not for Hong Kong, we would not have access to basic infor mation. Needless to say, without it the reforms would be impossible. We have to do two things very well:
First, to organize a pro-reform "group."
Second, achieve some tangible results to prove to the people that we support the reforms, otherwise we can't depend on even one or two months of stab ility .
The Central Committee Politburo must consider the overall and long-term situation; departments under the CCP must follow after. Chairman Mao, Liu Shao Qi, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai—i t was only under the guidance of these leaders that the Communist Party became a mature leadership. These were the f ir s t generation of leaders. Their followers encountered the Cultural Revolution, Hua Guo Feng was only a temporary intermediary. All he did was bring up two points. Hua Guo Feng didn't contribute anything original, his leadership didn't 383 have a center, a root. Therefore he doesn't count as a "generation" of leadership in and of himself. The current generation of leadership is the second generation. Now we must hand it over to the third gener ation. I am the group leader of the second generation. Although there are people calling for tny overthrow, still we have made our contri butions. The ten years of reforms have had their fruits. We can't go back to the closed period of the past. The closed period of the past created disasters, for example the Cultural Revolution. The third generation must gain the confidence of the people, causing the people to unite them into a reliable entity. This entity is the Central Party. The new group of leaders must widen their world view. Those who enter the new group must be chosen according to their commitment to reform; these people who choose the leaders must put aside personal prejudices. Chairman Mao always dared to put people into power who opposed him. A person must consider public opinion; one cannot conduct affairs according to one's personal feelings. We must choose people with a commitment to reforms and a good political record. If the new group works well, within three months or half a year the form of the government can take shape. The students only requested in slogan form what we must in fact effect. Primarily, we must take count of the mistakes of the past. The way we deal with the uprising cannot be too extreme—the scope not too wide.
The new group must unite, and at no point should i t be allowed to deteriorate into factions. Factions are the source of error. When the new group will have established the confidence of the people, I will re tire .
I will retire, and not interfere in your work. Don't get into conflicts, you should unite completely. This is my political legacy.
DENG XIAOPING'S SPEECH OF JUNE 16
(Addressed to the new standing committee members of the Politburo)
Beginning now, the beginning of the third generation of leaders has been established. The Chinese Communist Party, from Chen Du Xiu, Qu Qiu Bai, Li Li San, all the way to Wang Ming, all these leaders didn't have the ability to create a capable central leadership. After the meeting of Zhen Yi, Mao, Liu, Zhu and Zhou, and, later, Ren Bi Shi, after his death came Chen Yun, and later s till Deng Xiaoping and Lin Biao before the Cultural Revolution the above mentioned created a strong and able central leadership. This was the first generation. The second generation was established after the 11th plenum,third meeting. I became key player during the second generation's leadership. I was choosing these new people all along. Unfortunately, two of these people turned out to be bad choices. Any leading entity must have a root. The first generation nucleus was Mao Zedong, and the second generation nucleus is me. The third generation must also have a nucleus. 384
Everybody must take the responsibility to preserve the nucleus. After comparing and considering, i t was decided that Jiang Ze Ming is the most suited. Everybody chose him, so now keep to the decision. Provided we have a good Politburo, we shouldn't be afraid of chaos or unrest. If the central leadership gets out of step, then the situation is harder to resolve. When the new group has commenced work I won't get into affairs any more. It looks for the moment as if ny influence is too strong, this is not beneficial to the country and the party. America and Western countries are banking on my poor health. Should I die, etc., etc. It's not good for the age of a country to be put on one person's shoulders. Now I'm 85 years old, at this age I should be resolute. In regards to the big problem, I can consult from the side, but I'll not take the lead.
We must carry forth Socialism, otherwise there will be no "big triangle." That we have such a triangle is only because China has remained unaligned. This counter-revolutionary uprising has exposed absolutely all our mistakes. Many aspects of our construction has been laid to waste. We can't get hold of everything; we can't get caught up on pristine theory. We have to do some tangible things in which the people will have some confidence; we can't discuss semantics like book worms. The economy mustn't be allowed to slip further, we must make efforts. Because we lack electricity and raw resources, so small and medium enterprises have taken over the large enterprises. This isn't good. We must solve this problem, we must part with some money to save the large industries. The small and medium size enterprises must be reorganized, and fast. Don't get caught up in arguing over how to do it, just do it when it looks right. In the eleven years following today we need to double production. An increase in production of 6 percent each year would be enough. We need to set a new economic plan for the year 2000 to 2050. Transportation, steel materials, plastic, wood, all these things must be produced well and efficiently. If we lack capital now, we can buy second-rate equipment from other countries. We also need to study the agriculture problem, ultimately using scientific methods to solve the ag. problem.
We must do some things to gain the support of the people. The state council will take responsibility for do economic reforms with guts. The most important thing for the political reforms is to maintain stability. Authoritarianism we can talk about little. We must clamp down on profiteering and corruption. We have to crack down on ten or twenty big cases of crime. Punishing corruption, the public factor, this must be high. We haven't been too successful in cracking down on corruption in the last ten years. The problem lies within the party and in high-level government. We must come up with a policy for dealing with corruption as soon as possible. For example a set time limit before which high ranking leaders must turn themselves in, admit their economic crimes. We can deal with those generously who report quickly, rigorously with those who do not report. Going to court can be avoided. Those who do not report themselves we'll let the people turn in reports instead. Although the slogan of "oppose corruption" during the uprising 385
was peripheral to the overall goal of the counter-revolutionaries, but we must listen to it. Please discuss in particular the corruption phenomenon. With one hand we'll grab the economic reforms, with the other hand we'll grab corruption.
(3) We must suppress to the very end the uprising. This bad thing can become a good thing, in one fell swoop wiping out all the illegal organizations in the country.
Executions should be limited, methods of punishment should include alternatives to death.
At this point let's not deal with theory and debate, at least not for the next two years, but rather concentrate on reality.
FROM BIG MEETING OF JUNE 24
(Was not given out to the general public)
(1) After the 13th plenum 4th meeting, the counter-revolutionary uprising, the pacification of this, is in the decisive stage.
(2) From the 19th until the 21st, the Politburo held meeting for four half-days, in the course of which 11 old comrades gave speeches. Zhao Ziyang was there for all the meetings. The meeting of the 23rd and 24th, Zhao Ziyang participated in the "Beijing group" discussion. All those in attendance at the last meeting on the afternoon of the 24th agreed on how to deal with Zhao Ziyang. There were no opposition tick ets, and no blank ballots. Zhao Ziyang was not present on the afternoon of the 24th. The transcription of the four half-days of meeting exceeds 100,000 words. The report was handed to the lower governmental layers.
(3) April 22, after having burned the body of Hu Yaobang, that evening the students rushed the gates of the Party Headquarters. Zhao Ziyang was summoned to resolve the problem, but allegedly was playing golf and wouldn't be bothered with it.
(4) After May 5th, Zhao continued to act indecisively with regards to the students, and was the driving force behind fueling the fire . Zhao Ziyang also allowed the press to become free for a few days, which had the effect of advancing the uprising even more.
(5) Zhao Ziyang, representing only himself, on May 21 sent a telegram to Wan Li, asking him to return to China.
(6) Jiang Ze Ming said during one of the meetings: Political methods will not change in the least. Whether or not China will be strong depends on the success of the economy. Recently in last few 386 years the press has not been listening to the party, so we must adopt strident measures to correct th is.
(7) Li Peng, representing four standing committee members, brought up the report regarding Zhao Ziyang. At the meeting of the 19th, twenty-eight people gave speeches, and fourteen had their opinion read at the meeting, supporting Li Peng. Zhao Ziyang attended the meeting from June 19 to 21, and also spoke, mostly to defend himself. Three in the meeting didn't agree with Zhao's self-defense.
(8) Hu Qi Li and Rui Xing Wen made speeches about their past mistakes with regards to the uprising. Their mistakes had to do mostly with letting the press have too much freedom. Yan Ming Fu mostly made mistakes in regards to dealing with the students. APPENDIX F
BANNERS AND SLOGANS, MAY 17, 1989
387 Leaders
People all over China denounce Li Peng Mourning the Death of Deng and Li Rise and Fall three times, step down again No more lif e long officer Li Peng do you think Zhou Enlai would act like you if he were still alive? Expel Li Peng from the Party Step down Last Emperor Missing person notices Deng Xiaoping . . . Li Peng Come Out! If the Premier does not care he should not be Premier The rule of the Gang of Old must stop Turtle draws in his head Silence is a crime 1984—How are you Xiaoping? 1989—What a fool you are Xiaoping Xiaoping, Xiaoping, his brain is not very good He had better step down and go sit at the bridge table This is not a rebellion, hope the government will correct this mistake Down with official profiteering, get rid of corruption Patriotism is not a crime Deng my son is starving what about your son? China doesn't need an emperor China doesn't need a helmsman The Premier never talks to the people, therefore there is no reason for him to s till be Premier Xiaoping Xiaoping is 85 years old Even if his health is very good his brain doesn't work very well If you are in a high position, butyou don't do things to help the people, it is not as good as going home and selling potatoes Deng Xiaoping's Collected Works page 141, "Lenin said: If no leaders take responsibility then it is the most dangerous situation for a country." Government, What on earth are you waiting for? Make the dialogue public. Let the People decide Premier never talks to the People, Chairman always goes to official banquets. Get rid of Fascists, Freedom belongs to the people Where is Premier Zhou Enlai? Your son is not like you. Mother Deng [Zhou Enlai's wife] come here quickly, take [your son] Li Peng home.
388 389
If you do something good—everyone will support you If you do something bad—no one will support you. China doesn't need an Empress Dowager Policies that fool the people must fail Deng Xiaoping re tire honorably Deng Xiaoping Collected Works page 137, "If you make a mistake we must correct you, those that made mistakes in the past should be correctly completely" [He should correct his mistakes, which was primar ily labeling the pro-democracy movement a turmoil in the April 26 editorial.] It's not too late to cure the patient Zhongnanhai doesn't believe in tears [the leaders have no feelings] Water [the people] can float the boat [government] or i t can turn i t over Against Autocracy Listen to Deng Xiaoping, Listen to the People Leader rules behind the curtain All over 80 years old Sell your crown to pay for the people's food and clothing Little potoatoes can't survive one day without a penny Big potatoes can't survive one day without power If you don't come out we will come here every day Li Peng you should apologize to me, call back Zhou Enlaisoul. Let Li Peng die so that he can be born again and turn into a good person [these words surrounded a portrait of Zhou Enlai] Down with Deng Xiaoping Down with Li Peng Talk with the Students Now If Li Peng doesn't step down we will come here every day If you work at night come to Tiananmen during the day If you work during the day come here at night Deng said don't do this—we still do this [demonstrate] we're not afraid You Delay in solving this situation It is really the same as killing people. Government, Government you should have humanity If you don't have humanity, we don't want you. Deng Xiaoping: i t 's time to retire Yang Shangkun: go home and enjoy the rest of your days Li Peng: Being Premier is too d ifficu lt for you—go back to a small ministry We feel shame for all the retired people White cat catches power. Black cat catches money [a play on Deng's pragmatic approach to economies when he said, "I don't care if the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice."] 390
The China Daily, 18 May 1989, on page one, in a rather long article under the t i t l e "Premier YÜ offers to step down" reported: "Premier" Yu Kuo-hwa said yesterday he submitted his resignation to "president" Lee Teng-hui to preserve party unity and allow a younger person to succeed him. "I am resigning for the unity of the party," Yu told reporters. "This is the right time for me to resign. We should le t younger people take this position. Yu 75, a former "finance minister" and governor of Taiwan's central bank, has been "premier" since 1984. [The implications are self-evident.]
Students, Support for
Taiwan classmates support the students Save our older brothers and sisters [elementary schoolchildren] Older big brother [the workers] are very angry! Young students are risking their lives; we Mothers cannot just look on/Nat'1 woman's Federation The working class is a powerful backup force for the students Patriotic Democracy Movement Long Live the students! Long Live Democracy! Corruption + Decadence = Cancer/Medical Workers Persist t i l l the end, that is victory Support the Students, Students Love our Country, Long live the Students Support the Hunger Strike The students are doing a meritorious deed I love the students, the students love the country The students' demands are our desires Students are the most intelligent Workers are here now no one will bully you! . . . Institute is willing to give blood and sweat If I die for the people and become a ghost I will still be meritorious United we are not afraid of fire Save the People, Save our Lovely Students Wake up the People's Hearts—save the Students The students are on a hunger strike for The People—The People should NOT Be Silent For China—Support the Students—improve Political Reforms We are SAD Every Chinese person that has a conscience rise up! All Chinese are together with you Stomachs will not starve for nothing Workers and students were born from the same Mother Our younger brothers and sisters are starving and we older ones—our hearts ache 391
Protect the students health Take action support the students If you have money—give money If you have energy—give energy Rescue the fasting students Students are near death—S till the government doesn't respond
Corruption
If the cancer is not removed, the country will not have a day of peace. A certain tree in China blooms every 40 years. Party journalists want to speak Oppose corruption: Eradicate Profiteering by officials. The right choice is to make dialogue with the students: if fact for dialogue we need intelligence, calm, and the right attitude. Don't do something you don't want to do just for an official t i t l e Sell the Mercedes Benzes to pay the National Debt [many leaders own Mercedes] Down with corrupt officials and bureaucratism
Reforms
The Flower of freedom will never fade. The tide of democracy will never recede. If the government lives or dies it is the concern of even the little potatoes [coimon people] Improve Political Reforms Carry out common elections Ask the whole world: what will make the world go up and down? Answer : Democracy. I want to shout but I have no voice. Good-bye slavery No matter what accent—s till want Democracy [People all over China want Democracy] Make decisions scientifically We want freedom we want Democracy we want equality The People's Festival Autocracy Ends We can 't lay down—if we do the bad people will look very big and then they can stop the winds of freedom Convene the People's Congress Improve Democracy If I don't have freedom I would rather die 392
General
The workers have arrived, forget our bonus. We aren't afraid to be fired The People's Police Love the People. The People are really God [the most powerful] Come here--Have some water [People all along the roads offered food and drink to the demonstrators] Let education help the country Dialogue with the workers Capital Iron & Steel workers have arrived! People's hearts can't be dishonored My heart belongs to my fellow citizen. My soul belongs to the country Lau Ge Don't leave [Lau Ge, affectionate way of addressing Gorbachev] All people desire the sam,e thing Go Ahead, don't look back [from a popular song] Don't only care just about yourself SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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