The Dynamics of Social Network Structures and Contestation in the Collaborative Management of Lake Tempe in South Sulawesi

Muhammad Said, Bevaola Kusumasari, M. Baiquni, Subando Agus Margono,Policy The Dynamics & Governance of Social ReviewNetwork Structures and Contestation in the CollaborativeVolume Management 2, Issue 3,of SeptemberLake Tempe in 2018 South (217-231) Sulawesi ISSN 2580-3395 (Print), 2580-4820 (Online) doi: 10.30589/pgr.v2i3.106

Muhammad Said1, Bevaola Kusumasari2, M. Baiquni3, Subando Agus Margono4

Abstract In managing common pool resources; ideally, it was carried out using a co-management approach that facilitated the cooperation, sharing of power, and responsibility among actors. However, this is quite difficult to achieve since each actor competes against each other’s interests. Such cooperation and competition between actors will form a structure of social networks. This study aims to explain the dynamics of the formation of social network structures based on the cooperation and competition among actors in the management of Lake Tempe, a common pool resource crossing Wajo, Soppeng and Sidenreng Rappang Regencies in South Sulawesi Province. This is a qualitative study with explanatory case study approach, using two data collection techniques: participatory observation and in-depth interview with the government, fishermen, businessmen, and NGOs. This study found that the formation process of the social network structure in the management of Lake Tempe is a dynamic interaction among actors, i.e., cooperation in one side and competition on the other side, forming a social networking structure in two types: centrality and heterogeneity network. Network centrality occurs at the level of decision-making, the rules of play, and the allocation of resources, which is dominated by government actors, while heterogeneity network is dominated by communities that are still maintaining social capital such as kinship as well as knowledge and resources sharing. Brokerages, those who link the advantaged groups (local government and big-scale-fisherman/Pallawang) with the disadvantaged (small-scale-fisherman/ Pakkajalalla) do not exist in the management. Although the existence of brokerages is potential, they may also have a conflict of interest, since authorities and economic factors will be their target.

Keywords: collaborative management; social network structure; contestation; common pool resources; natural resources management

it is common that the contestation of interests Introduction will arise between actors. Contestation, as In managing common-owned natural argued by Margono, et al. (2013) is the process resources that comprise the decision-making of interaction between actors who claim each process and the allocation of natural resources, other for their interests in determining the

1 Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada. 2 Corresponding Author. Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada. Email: [email protected] 3 Department of Regional Development Faculty of Geography, Universitas Gadjah Mada. 4 Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

217 Policy & Governance Review, Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018 management orientation of an item (specifically and responsibility between state actors and common goods) between social interests users’ local communities (Carlsson & Berkes, versus business interests, and social interests 2005; Carlsson and Sandström, 2008). Dietz et versus interests of authority, there is the al. (2003) prove and find the fact that through struggle of each actor to represent his interests. self-governing institutions analysis in managing Contestation of interests between actors occurs natural resource, several community groups in based on differences in knowledge, ideology, the UK have successfully fought the threat of and expectations of each actor (Mitchell, natural resource degradation in their country. 2010, p. 7). The actor referred here refers Based on the theory of shared to parties that allow interest and influence, management and general characteristics of individuals, groups and organizations (such as natural resources that require cooperation, government, private sector, non-governmental the distribution of power and responsibility organizations, land users, and landowners) in among actors in management, Lake Tempe a natural resource area. When the contestation South Sulawesi, as one of the Mainland of interests between actors is not well managed, Common Water categories and common-owned it is feared that it will lead to a natural inability natural resources, is ideally managed with a to fulfill various actors’ requests over( carrying collaborative approach management based on capacity). Hardin (1968) discusses it as the social networks. However, the fact shows that tragedy of the common, namely the natural social networks have not worked effectively resources tragedy because of continuous to encourage collective action in integrating exploitation by various actors. social, economic, and environmental interests. In accommodating interest contestations In fact, it is still dominated by the pursuit of between actors, some experts promote economic interests of each actor to get the collaborative management approaches based on maximum economic benefits. social networks as a critique of the hierarchical This can be seen from the management and market structure approach that has existed policies of 3 Regional Governments (Wajo, in the natural resource management. Ostrom Sidrap, and Soppeng Regencies) which are (1990) was a pioneer who initially criticized still individually making Regional Regulations Hardin’s (1968) writing, which only suggested for the Management of Lake Tempe that is mechanisms for managing common-owned in their territory. Although several articles natural resources (centralized-governance) consider pro-environment management and through centralized-governance mechanisms maintain the social function of the lake, it and market mechanisms by private ownership still seems more dominant to be motivated (private-enterprise). to obtain locally generated revenue (PAD). According to Ostrom et al. (1994), Policy of The 3 Regencies Government to common pool resources are types of goods that auction ex-ornament land shows the practice the availability are limited, but many parties of commercialization and triggering social want to use them. Thus, management is no and economic polarization. At least, it can be longer handled and dominated by a single actor seen from the relationship dynamics and ties or institution, but with a joint management that arise between auction-winning fishermen approach (Ostrom, 1990; Berkes and Folke, 2000), (Pallawang) who use harvesters and fishermen co-management is used to facilitate collaboration who use mobile fishing gear (Pakkajalalla). between actors (Berkes, 2009; Sandström, and The auction winner fisherman (Pallawang) Rova, 2010; Carlsson and Sandström, 2008), and seeks to extract the natural resources that formulated in terms of the division of power are controlled as much as possible to gain

218 Muhammad Said, Bevaola Kusumasari, M. Baiquni, Subando Agus Margono, The Dynamics of Social Network Structures and Contestation in the Collaborative Management of Lake Tempe in South Sulawesi profits by reason of issuing capital. While unequal distribution of limited resources forms small fishermen Pakkajalalla( ) feel increasingly an imbalanced network structure that forces pressured because they have increasingly actors to cooperate and compete (structural narrow fishing areas, so they make complaints coercion) in fighting over a natural resource. by using prohibited fishing gear illegal( fishing) Some individuals and groups will join to and carrying out disturbances to the auction get limited resources by collaborating, while winner’s land for survival purposes. At the some individuals or groups will compete for same time, the local government should be resources (Ritzer and Goodman, 2010) present with its authority to enforce regulations, Recent research on social networks but in reality, it seems helpless to control illegal in managing natural resources has largely fishing, which is increasingly prevalent. explored the role of social networks, in terms This research focuses on the dynamics of collaboration between actors (Bodin and of the formation of social network structures Ernston, 2006; Bodin and Crona, 2009, Lauber, behind the contestation of interests between et al. 2008; Crona and Bodin, 2006; Prell, et these actors in the management of Lake Tempe. al. 2009; Yamaki; 2014). For example, Bodin This research focused on the pattern and and Ernston (2006) have concluded that content of the relationships between actors the existence of social networks is a general expressed through the patterns of relations of dominator, and it is important to facilitate interests, knowledge, and authority of each collaboration between different actors and actor in the management of Lake Tempe. The stakeholders in natural resource management. theory used in this study to explain the pattern Meanwhile, studies of social networks are of relations of interests, knowledge, and power rarely found in terms of competition or between actors is the theory of social networks. asymmetric relationships between actors. For In this context, this study follows Granovetter this reason, this paper focuses on elaborating (in Ritzer and Goodman, 2010) who examines the dynamics of the emergence of asymmetric social networks from actions of relations social network structures in the management between actors that occur at the level of macro of Lake Tempe. and micro social structures. According to him, Previous studies have established two through relationships between actors, form distinctive forms of network structures that structured and tended to be stratified bonds, affect the performance of natural resource where one particular component depends on management; namely, network closures and other components (interdependence), so that network heterogeneity (Yamaki, 2014, Bodin the relationship was based on the idea that each and Ernston, 2006, Bodin and Crona, 2009; actor (individual or collectivity) has different Sandström & Carlsson 2008; Sandström & Rova access to valuable resources (wealth, power, 2010a, 2010b). First, the closeness or network information). closure, which is evaluated by the level of One of the basic principles of social connectedness, associated with social ties or networking is to enable symmetrical and solidarity between actors in clicks or groups asymmetrical relationships to occur between (bonding). Network closure can be seen in actors in social action. Symmetrical relationships two forms based on the level and intensity occur when actors supply different resources of the actor’s relationship, namely (1) density based on their level and intensity. Asymmetric network, where actors are directly connected to relationships occur when there are elements in each other; and (2) centralized networks, where a wider network system with limited resources most actors are directly connected with central distributed unevenly or lame. Uneven and actors and other actors are indirectly connected

219 Policy & Governance Review, Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018 through central actors. at this location; there was a social network Second, network heterogeneity is related between actors in the management of Lake to structural holes; namely, connections between Tempe. Each actor interacts (cooperating various sub-groups that are structurally and competing) representing their respective separate, such as in an organization or a interests in the use of natural resources at Lake certain sector directed towards bridging actors Tempe (Figure 1 Map of Research Locations). (individuals or groups) that have separated This research is qualitative research with (Burt, 2001). This study explains the dynamics an explanatory case study approach following of the formation of 3 typologies of the structure the opinion of Yin (2006) to answer “how” or of social networks; namely, the network of “why” research questions directed to a series closeness, centralized networks and structural of contemporary events, where the researchers holes in the case of Lake Tempe, South Sulawesi. only have little chance or no opportunity to exercise control against the event. This Method study aims to answer the question “how” the This research was carried out in Lake dynamics of the formation of the social network Tempe, South Sulawesi Province, which structure behind the contestation of interests traversed three Regencies, namely Wajo between actors in the event of natural resource Regency, Soppeng and Sidenreng Rappang management at Lake Tempe, South Sulawesi. covering 7 Sub Regencies and 26 villages/ The data collection techniques in this region which bordered directly. Lake Tempe study were, first, in-depth interviews with was chosen as the location of the study because seven people from the Government, five big

Figure 1. Map of Research Locations

Source: adopted from KLH, 2014.

220 Muhammad Said, Bevaola Kusumasari, M. Baiquni, Subando Agus Margono, The Dynamics of Social Network Structures and Contestation in the Collaborative Management of Lake Tempe in South Sulawesi fishermen, 30 small fishermen, two traders, and it will reach water elevations at around 0, 50 - 2 NGOs. Determination of the informant was 2, 0 m above the sea level or an average of 1.25 carried out using the snowball technique, which m above the sea level only reaches 10,000 ha is extracting data and information to informants (KLH, 2012; KLH, 2014; KLH, 2006). who know the context of the study through in- The management case of Lake Tempe depth interviews from one informant to other has become an arena of contestation of informants and so on until the researcher interests between actors when there is value does not find new data and information manipulation between Lake Tempe as a (Hamidi, 2005, p. 75). Second, the data collection common pool resource (or shared property) techniques used are observations involved in shifting into state or private property whose following Baiquni (2007) to see directly and management practices are controlled by an deeply the social processes and social network individual or group. One of the basic principles structures that take place in the research area, of common pool resource is that its resources so that it achieved a general description of the are limited, but many actors or stakeholders condition of the research area and actual issues are willing to claim and utilize these resources. in the community related to the theme of this If a fishery land is controlled by one research. Observations were carried out in an individual or a group, it will automatically engaging manner, specifically to observe who exclude other individuals or groups to utilize the the actors that involved in social networks fishery land. At this point, emerged actors who are and how the processes and mechanisms dominate dominated the management practices for the formation of social network structures of the Lake Tempe. Social networks work as a behind the interactions between actors in the mechanism of relations and ties between actors management of Lake Tempe. (individuals, groups or organizations) that take place in the middle of actors who pursue each Result and Discussion other’s desires. The dynamics of the relationships Dynamics of Actor Relations and Contestation and ties between these actors form the structure of Interest of the social networks. Lake Tempe is a lake of flood plain in As is known, the management of Lake the Walanae River and Cenranae Rivers in Tempe is very complex, full of uncertainty and South Sulawesi. The Lake Tempe Basin consists the potential for conflict of interest. It is complex of terraces and floodplains. The terrain is because it relates to one spatially integrated generally flat in shape, located a few meters area, but is limited by the administrative from the flood plain, but the boundary between and political boundaries of 3 Regencies the two plains is not firm. During the dry season (Wajo, Soppeng, and Sidrap) as freshwater there are three lakes; namely, Lake Tempe, fisheries cultivation areas in three Regencies Lake Sidenreng and Lake Buaya, which are (Maros, Enrekang and Bone) as upstream and separated and only connected with naturally downstream of the Watershed (DAS). Full of formed waterways. During the rainy season, all uncertainty is because natural resources are the three lakes are united into a single pool of greatly affected by climate change and the lake, and by the local community are called the socio-cultural conditions of the society that flood. The area ofLake Tempe during the rainy are constantly changing. Potential conflicts season of March - July is approximately 28,000 of interest occur because of the diversity of ha with water elevations from 6.0 to 7.0 m above actors and interests that play as many have the sea level and 43,000 ha at elevations from 7.0 previously described the existence of mutual to 9.0 m above the sea level. In the dry season, claims, differences in values, knowledge, and

221 Policy & Governance Review, Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018 degrees of power among the actors involved. known locally as Pallawang belonging to Although the management of Lake Tempe the Regional Government with the aim of is very complex, decision-making was found to increasing Regional Original Revenue. In be still done individually by each Regency. This Soppeng Regency, there are 12 ex-ornaments and can be seen from the official decision of each Tappareng Salae land points. In Wajo Regency, by issuing a Regional Regulation or Regents of there are 27 Pallawang locations spread in 4 the Regent, namely: Districts and Sidenreng Rappang Regency, 1. For Wajo Regency with Regional Regulation there are 2 locations in Panca Lautan District. No.4 of 2012 concerning Management of Interestingly, because there is also a land Fisheries Resources in Wajo Regency; owned by the Regional Government, there is 2. For Soppeng Regency with Regent also a private location, which, if traced, the Regulation No.13/Perbub/VI/2012 owner or master (Mangongko) of these lands concerning Procedures for Common Water is the descendant of Datu (King) who once Management and Tappareng Salae, and ruled the area or former District Head and 3. For Sidenreng Rappang Regency with Sub-district head who had ruled or ruled in Regional Regulation No.4 of 2010 concerning the region. There are also those who are still Management of General Fisheries Resources controlled by the sub-district head who rules in the Sidenreng Rappang Regency. in a region, so he has the right to manage for the benefit of the government. For example, the Based on the Regional Regulations Belle Barue location located in Woronge Village, document and 3 of the Regencies, it was Sabbangparu District, Wajo Regency which found that the similarities in the basis of borders Soppeng Regency, which is about 100 the government’s thinking in taking the Ha in size. In addition, there has also been a management decisions of Lake Tempe, include changed hand to ordinary citizens because (1) agreement on administrative boundaries of the process of purchasing or mastering the marked by concrete stakes; (2) fishing process based on family claims (Ongko) for procedures; (3) fishing gear requirements; and generations. The rest is free access (open access) (4) conservation area. by the captured fishermen (Pakkajalalla) whose At the very least, the rationale for decision- area is wider than the government property making in managing Lake Tempe can be found and private property. Free land access can be in the narrative that currently Lake Tempe is transformed into private or group control when over fishing; many fishing gears do not fit the individuals or groups install permanent fishing type and their size. In accordance with the gear, such as Bungka Toddo, which is claimed Regional Regulation 3 of the Regencies, the by one family from generation to generation. net is set to be above 5 cm, 7 cm and 9 cm and Based on the management mechanism, a maximum length of 500 meters, so as not it is found three ownership regimes; namely, to catch small fish. However, the fact is that the local government property, the private there are those who use under 5 cm and their property, and the common property free length exceeds 500 meters. In addition, there access. Actually, this ownership regime is more are also fishermen who use prohibited fishing appropriately referred to as Ongko as the gear, such as storage storm, tiger trawlers, and name and term known by the residents in Lake trawlers and Cantarng (Tongkang). Tempe; namely, land tenure claims by actors In addition, the Regional Regulation (individuals or groups) for a certain time and 3 of the Regencies underlies the auction certain water depth conditions. mechanism of ex-ornamental land, which is In Wajo Regency, the period of the tenure

222 Muhammad Said, Bevaola Kusumasari, M. Baiquni, Subando Agus Margono, The Dynamics of Social Network Structures and Contestation in the Collaborative Management of Lake Tempe in South Sulawesi of the auction is two years but is controlled government, which was applied, to residents only from 1st of May – 31st of December every in Lake Tempe. The sanction mechanism was year. In Soppeng Regency, the tenure in the stipulated in writing and officially carried auction is one year but is controlled from 1st out or enforced by the government officials, of July – 31st of December, outside that period, such as the Joint Lake Tempe Control Team the land changes to open access, meaning that (Police, Community Police Officer, Common it can be accessed by the captured fishermen Administration Officer, and Fisheries Main (Pakkajalalla). In Sidenreng Rappang Regency, Station) to everyone who violates these rules. the tenure auction was two years and was Meanwhile, informal rules are rules that held for two years without any lags, such as in are regulated and agreed upon by citizens Soppeng Regency and Wajo Regency. from generation to generation, relying on Land tenure by the auction winner oral traditions, local customs, and horizontal (Pallawang) is regulated depending on the characteristics. The sanctions mechanism is a conditions of certain water depths. Although, social sanction that was regulated and agreed in the auction tenure period and within the upon which is carried out by traditional elders stipulated time to be mastered; however, called Macoa Tappareng (lake elders from men) when the water depth in the lake is above and Pabbijagae (spokespersons and executors 1.45 meters, then the land may be accessed of ritual events from women). or become a fishing area that is free for the From the two types of rules of the game captured fishermen (Pakkajalalla). Exceptions that apply at Lake Tempe, there are differences occur in Sidenreng Rappang Regency, where in claims (contestation) of interests between land acquisition by auction winners is held for actors in interpreting these rules, the level of two years permanently without any time with compliance and submission of citizens and certain water depth conditions. the implementation of existing sanctions With the complex management dynamics, mechanisms. For the Regional Government on the one hand, the local government gives the formal rules of the game are fair enough to access rights to the auction winner (Pallawang) regulate the fishermen who use Lake Tempe; to be controlled for a certain period of time, moreover, the process of determining it at but on the other hand also gives concessions the beginning of the preparation of Regional to the capture fisherman Pakkajalalla( ) to access Regulations was carried out in a participatory through the time and condition of the water’s manner involving NGOs, Universities and depth. So, at the community level, there are local Fishermen. However, for the captured mutual claims that have implications for the fishermen (Pakkajalalla), the rules for playing reality of relations between actors versus the with this open auction system only benefited legal rights and control of each actor. a few people who had money to pay rent Based on the observations involved, the and actually violated the customary rules of author found at least two types of rules that permanently installing fishing gear (Mattang apply at the Lake Tempe; namely, the formal Poli ‘). rules and the informal rules. Both formal Rules that can be accessed when the rules and informal rules are constructed to water is above 1.45 meters or “assala” “assala’ regulate, control, and manage the actors in weddingngi mopi nola lopi yase’na belle’e makkajai the management of Lake Tempe. The formal campongnge” (as long as the boat can still pass rules are arranged formally and in writing above the attached splint catching gear can be from the government which is vertical. It is accessed. This was based on the small fisherman; called vertical because the rule came from the it is almost impossible to enforce because

223 Policy & Governance Review, Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018 the auction winner (Pallawang) is “tricky” by as the winner. installing a connecting device over the splint, The dynamics of other actor relations so that no boat can pass. Likewise, with rules are how actors interpret formal rules, informal that allow access by anyone when the water rules, and the mechanism of sanctions from recedes to become Palawija farming area, which each type of rule. As an example in the formal it is almost impossible to implement, because rules, it is prohibited to use fish stunner, tiger the auction winner (Pallawang) always argues trawlers (Jabba ‘Trawls), trawls of (Jabba’ Bessi), that they are experiencing a loss. net Tongkang and Bungka Toddo ‘ which size For big fishermen (winner of the auction/ should only be 125 meters’ x 125 meters and Pallawang), the rules that stipulate regular Lanra’ (nets) that must be above 5 cm and a management time; namely, July - December maximum length of 500 meters. However, in for Soppeng Regency and May - December the field, there are many violations of fishing for Wajo Regency cause Pallawang fishermen (illegal fishing), especially the use of prohibited to often suffer losses due to climate factors fishing gear, a distance ofBungka Toddo’ and the that often change. According to Pallawang size of the net that should be used. fishermen, the rules should follow climate From the results of the observations change because the capture fisheries system in and interviews, it was found that there was a Lake Tempe is actually based on tides. tendency for the fishermen to violate the formal Based on the results of several interviews, rules due to economic urgency or the desire of it was found that even when the auction rules the fishermen to get more catches. In addition, were open, there were several factors. Thus, Lake Tempe fish stocks are increasingly limited not all fishermen wanted and could take part in along with the many fishermen who depend the auction, including the flow of information on this lake. The emergence of modern fishing spread from the committee to all fishermen, gear such as Tongkang and Jabba Bessi ‘in the fishermen’s proximity to the committee or early 2000s replaced traditional tools such as local government, actor knowledge about the Bubu’, spear, Konde,’ Julu’ and Salekko ‘and auction mechanism, experience participating increased illegal fishing is known to contribute in the auction. Therefore, generally, those who to increasing fisherman competition in getting win an auction are village elites who have results fish at the Lake Tempe. economic capital, have strong information on Responding to the rampant illegal fishing, correlations with local government officials. the regional governments in the 3 Regencies While the captured fishermen (Pakkajalalla), initiated the establishment of a Community even when they knew that the auction was Monitoring Group (Pokmaswas) in their area. open, anyone could follow it, but they did This Pokmaswas serves to supervise and direct not know or did not want to know how to control of illegal fishing activities. The core participate in the auction process; besides, management (Chairperson, Secretary, and lack of capital was the main reason. The only Treasurer) is taken from the fishermen elements thing they can do is just to watch the auction plus a joint team of fishermen elements, Head at the Sub-district head’s Office and to wait for of Fisheries Main Station, Fisheries Extension, who wins one particular location. Captured commander of the army administrative, head fishermen (Pakkajalalla) are important to know of district police, police officer, Prosecutors, who the auction winner is because it will later and village chief/village. In its journey, the affect the workforce on the land. It can be seen Pokmaswas was not functioning properly. who won the auction from year to year; it will Fishermen can “play cat and mouse” with appear that the name often appears and recurs patrol officers, if Wajo officers hunt fishermen

224 Muhammad Said, Bevaola Kusumasari, M. Baiquni, Subando Agus Margono, The Dynamics of Social Network Structures and Contestation in the Collaborative Management of Lake Tempe in South Sulawesi in Wajo, fishermen can run to Soppeng, which a ritual event, in which full of meaning and is no longer their territory. Even when found, symbols began the work of fishermen and read the Chairperson of the Pokmaswas himself natural signs, whether the work or income of claims to use Jabba Bessi trawl, while showing fishermen in this season would be abundant the tool to the author at his home. According to or bad. – It is therefore always carried out at him, this has to be used, if you don’t use it, what the beginning of the tide as the meaning of do you want to eat? As it’s hard to find fish. picking up water (Maddupa Uwwai). – Now, it In addition, he also highlighted the Pallawang is turned into a “local government protocol” system, which was dominated by rich people event with the name “Tempe Lake Festival” and close to the local government officials. followed by a boat race, not just the changing In contrast to the formal rules, it seems times, which usually adjust 17 August event, that the informal rules are still abstinence to but also its orientation is more towards the break by citizens. It is known that there are tourism destination, and the executor of the still many residents who abstain from fishing program has also changed. Formerly, the in sacred places, bring two fishing gear at dominants were traditional leaders and figures once, catch fish on Friday nights and bring of fishing communities led byMacoa Tappareng, their wives to join in catching fish. After being but now, more from the Department of Tourism asked further, commonly, they stated that and Culture in collaboration with the Fisheries they were afraid of getting social sanctions in Service. the form of fines (Idosa). In addition, they also Based on the results of these studies, believe this action gives the opportunity to fish it can be concluded that in determining the to rest and breed, so that later on the day, the formal and informal regulatory framework, income will be abundant. They also believe that there are actors who have the most role and when someone violates this custom, it will be dominance. In the formal rules, it was found discovered during the Maccera Tappareng event, that the most important and dominating actors where customary violators will be caught when were state actors who were supported by the Macoa Tappareng and Pabbijagae are possessed. local business actors who obtained economic At the time of the confusion, the fishermen’s benefits from the regulation. The state actors violations will be revealed, the time is too late, have a high level of influence, and a high level there is a flag there, wrong intention, why of importance in determining the rules of the should the goat, it should be buffalo, because game and sanctions, but do not get strong this year’s results only get this much but why legitimacy at the level of the community. While only cattle, all kinds of things, but that is the informal rules that have the most role surprising. However, these past years have and dominant are traditional leaders (Macoa always been buffaloes; I have heard that fewer Tappareng) with a high level of importance people are possessed. and influence and gain the legitimacy and Although, the informal rules persist until compliance of the local fishermen compared now; however, according to some fishermen to their compliance with formal rules. In and community leaders that the informal rules terms of urgency, both formal and informal have begun to erode, for example, the Maccera rules are equally important to balance the Tappareng event has been challenged by the social, economic, and environmental aspects of Islamic groups, especially Muhammadiyah natural resource management at Lake Tempe. in Wajo because it was considered Mappadua Although, there was no manifest conflict (Godly or Shirk). In addition, there have been between Pallawang and Pakkajalalla because of several changes in orientation. It used to be the kinship ties between them and the existence

225 Policy & Governance Review, Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018 of customary rules and mutual dependence on least, it was found three typologies of social the relations of workers and capital owners, as network structures were formed, namely [1] it gave rise to a subtle elite capture. Quoting network closeness or cohesiveness; [2] network Das Gupta, et al., 2004: 28 in Setiadi, et al. (2016) centrality; and [3] network heterogeneity or that elite capture is “serious power imbalances Burt (2001) called as structural holes. ... the poor are heavily dependent on vertical links First, the density network, which is a with local elites. [therefore] it is difficult to form the network formed because the actors are directly horizontal associations necessary for organizing connected. In the case of the management of collective action for the common good.” When Lake Tempe, there were clicks or groups of collective action is co-opted by the interests of users of freshwater fisheries. In the open access some of the elites, the elite will take advantage area, there was a close relationship between of it (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000 in Setiadi, small fishermen. Small fishermen are fishermen et al. 2016). Elite capture is increasingly who use fishing gear that was installed to move unstoppable when socio-cultural models of in no more than one day or 1 night. Because social relations prioritize harmony; avoid the fishing gear moved around and was not conflict, as well as there is no check and balance installed permanently, they were referred to as (Setiadi et al., 2016). Pakkajalalla (migratory fishermen) to find fish where according to knowledge, experience, The Reality of the Structure of the Formed and information from fellow fishermen it Social Network was possible to catch more fish. At the level The dynamics of relations between of Pakkajalalla, it was found to click according actors and the contestation of interests that to the fishing gear used and the time chosen take place between state actors, big fishermen to start searching for the fish. For example, (local entrepreneurs) and small fishermen Pakkajalalla uses a net fishing gear (Lanra) as described earlier reflect a relationship of and both depart in the morning and returns interests and asymmetrical power relations. home in the afternoon, they call it Pallanra This is in accordance with the basic principle Esso (fisherman nets during the day); a kind of of social networks that when an asymmetrical fishing club that uses nets Lanra( ) on daytime. relationship occurs, where the resources among The same thing happens to fishermen who use actors were distributed unevenly, it equitably nets that leave in the afternoon and go home forms an unequal social network structure. in the morning; they call themselves Pallanra Bodin and Ernston (2006) emphasize that the Wenni (fishermen nets at night). Generally, they typology of the structure of social networks was have a very strong network of closeness, both influenced by the dynamics of relationships of those who meet on the lake from 3 regencies and ties between actors that can be seen from and (moreover) from the same village. They the characteristics of the pattern and content build a high level of kinship and cooperation of the relationship. The pattern and content of in solving the problems faced. They also shared relationships is a process of social interaction knowledge and access to resources at Lake that works, which can be detected through the Tempe, sharing of knowledge about places to process of transferring knowledge, sharing catch more fish. information, and building consensus among Pada Lao Te Pada Upe’ (the same goes actors from relationships of interests and not the same fortune) is a phrase often spoken power. from a capture fisherman in the waters of From the dynamics of relations between Lake Tempe when they saw other fishermen actors in the management of Lake Tempe; at catching more fish. Although departing at the

226 Muhammad Said, Bevaola Kusumasari, M. Baiquni, Subando Agus Margono, The Dynamics of Social Network Structures and Contestation in the Collaborative Management of Lake Tempe in South Sulawesi same time, the same type of boat and fishing a location, so they told their competitor, H. gear are the same, but sometimes the results Ruse ‘that had to put lower bids below him, (which are interpreted as fortune) are not even when the difference was only 100,000 IDR the same. Different fortune does not make vice versa. After being explored further, the fishermen jealous, protest and fight. But on the common auction winner usually has a kinship other hand, fishermen can protest with various and family network. expressions: damaging fishing gear, taking fish A network of closeness can also be seen and terrorizing other fishermen when there are between local government actors as auction fishermen or other parties who violate norms, implementers and local entrepreneurs. In some control (Mangongko) a land and government cases, the auction winner is the Bupati (officer policies that hinder and/or reduce their fortune, in charge of regency) candidate’s success team which according to them has become a right and legislative members; so that later, the that has been mutually agreed upon. auction mechanism will become a medium of When catches using nets start to decline, exchange. they usually give information to each other This density is actually a bonding social about what fishing gear can catch more fish. capital between fishermen which can contribute From this mutual information, this was the to the strengthening trust between individuals beginning of the emergence of banned modern and groups, thus increasing the possibility of fishing gear, such as iron wire nets (Jabba social control over resource use (Granovetter, ’Bessi’), tiger trawlers, Tongkang (bamboo- 1985; Coleman et al., 2008; Pretty and Ward shaped parabola made of bamboo or iron) and 2001 in Bodin and Ernston (2006)). However, storage storms. the closeness of the network has the potential The closeness network can also be to further erode the preservation of Lake seen from the employer-labor relationship Tempe’s natural resources when there is a (patron-client) between small fishermen and homogenization of experience and knowledge. local entrepreneurs (big fishermen) who win In order to obtain abundant fish locations and the auction of the local government-owned innovation in fishing equipment that is not land with a profit-sharing system. Small environmentally friendly. fishers usually work in a double profession, Second, network centrality occurs at the one day, they become laborers during the level of determining regulations, implementing harvest season in Pallawang and on the other rules for playing management, and allocating day, they keep looking for fish in free areas as land dominated by state actors, in this case, usual. Between the employer and the workers, the local governments in 3 Regencies. The there is intertwined with mutual trust. As an position of the state occupies the center of employer, it must be ensured that the profit the structure that was supported and utilized sharing is according to the agreement, as a by the local entrepreneurs to influence the worker must ensure not to cheat and steal management decisions of Lake Tempe so fish Maceko-Ceko( ). In addition, close networks that the decisions remain stable and provide can also be seen from the relations between benefits for themselves and their groups. State fellow local entrepreneurs (big fishermen). actors and local entrepreneurs are at the top of They usually give information to each other the centrality structure, while small fishermen about auction times and requirements with are on the periphery network structure. This the lowest number of bids. When the auction is because of this centrality network, the state was held, they usually managed each other’s benefits as a source of authority and profit strategies, for example, H. Sau wanted to win for large fishermen (comprador) as a source

227 Policy & Governance Review, Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018 of economic income. Although, according to level actually occurs between large groups Bodin and Ernston (2006), centrality networks of fishermen and small groups of fishermen have advantages and disadvantages. On the in terms of inequality of resources (interests, one hand, it can create effective coordination power, and economy) in accessing and of the actors and users of resources at the controlling the Lake Tempe. Small fishers are beginning of the decision-making process. a group that is cut off from access, which is However, on the other hand, the disadvantages always losing in competition for the benefits are greater because it can lead to increasingly and benefits of natural resources at Lake centralized decision making and reduce access Tempe, even when this structural hole is social to marginalized individual actors for various capital that can be activated to bridge separate sources of information according to their actors (individuals or groups) in facilitating aspirations and interests. collective management action. Third, the structural hole referred to in For this reason, Bodin and Ernston (2006) this study is the connection between various proposed a broker as an actor who embodies sub-groups that were structurally separated, “social bridging” from the community to such as in an organization or a particular sector. bridge broken and losing groups. According In the case of Lake Tempe management, it was to him, the advantage of being a broker is that found that at least four groups of actors that it can access a lot of information from specific had the potential to become separate clicks; groups and then replicate it in different groups namely, state actors (3 regional governments), that allow brokers to synthesize knowledge local entrepreneurs (big fishermen), small of natural resources extensively. In addition, fishermen, and NGOs. The four categories through structural positions, brokers learn of actors were ideally placed as key players about the inner life of many different groups who are expected to build cooperation, share and therefore, through their position, benefit power, responsibility, and collective action from knowing which groups or individuals to solve social, economic, and environmental were connected or not connected, and how to degradation problems in the core region of connect them, (Burt 2001 in Bodin and Ernston Lake Tempe Region as an integrated spatial 2006). unit. The potential fact has already formed with However, the broker who is expected to the fact that big fishermen (local entrepreneurs) connect between groups that get a lot of profits have close relations between large fishermen (Pallawang) and the losing group (Pakkajalalla) across the Regency. Small fishermen have does not appear on Lake Tempe. Although, relationships and ties between small fishermen the potential exists as in H. Sau (Soppeng), H. across Regencies. NGOs have been informed Karding (Wajo), Usman Pangade (Wajo) and La about the establishment of the Tempe Lake Bure (Sidrap), “they are people who are close Rescue Forum across the Regency. Therefore, to the local government, and they are very groups of fishermen fit their categories and close to the citizens and respected in their area. NGOs have the potential to become one large They also have an extensive network in the group and have no problems in collaborating Lake Tempe Region and at traditional markets across Regions. It’s just that in the Regional and places of sale for fish.” However, they are Government actors found a structural hole also trapped to pursue economic interests as between the 3 Regencies with no legal and law much as possible as auction winners (local protection together to regulate the management entrepreneurs) and often become a successful of Lake Tempe. team of candidates and regional heads in the The structural hole at the fishermen election and regional elections which make

228 Muhammad Said, Bevaola Kusumasari, M. Baiquni, Subando Agus Margono, The Dynamics of Social Network Structures and Contestation in the Collaborative Management of Lake Tempe in South Sulawesi them suffer from personal conflicts of interest. community level. There is the sharing of The NGOs Lake Tempe Rescue Forum knowledge and access to resources at Lake also has the potential to become a broker but Tempe. There is the sharing of knowledge has limited strategies for organizing small about fishing gear that can produce more fishermen and limited data based on the fish. Closeness also occurs between groups livelihood conditions of small fishermen. It of large fishermen and small fishermen, so seems that NGOs were trapped using technical a patron-client relationship is formed. The data from the local government to support network of closeness also occurs between big the decision to pass the management and fishermen and state actors (local government) permissive auction mechanism for several lake in maintaining the commercialization of ex revitalization projects. ornament lands. Second, network centrality occurs at the Conclusion level of determining the management and Based on the results of this study, it can be distribution rules of land control, which are concluded that: First, the relationship between dominated by state actors or local governments actors and contestation of interests that arise in in each region. The position of the state, which the management of Lake Tempe (determination occupies the center of the structure, is supported of rules, enforcement of rules and complaints and utilized by local entrepreneurs to influence of actors) show an asymmetrical relationship the management decisions of Lake Tempe so of interests and power. An asymmetrical that the decision remains stable and provides relationship took place because the resources benefits for themselves and/or their groups that of each actor were distributed unevenly. State trigger elite capture on one side and the removal actors and local entrepreneurs (big fishermen) of small fishermen subtly on the other side. State have a strong network and a high degree actors and local entrepreneurs are at the top of the of influence in determining the rules and centrality structure, while small fishermen are on allocation of Lake Tempe resources. While the periphery network structure. small fishing actors have a high level of Third, a structural hole appears in the importance but a weak level of influence, the form of clicks or groups, namely clicking the implication is that small fishermen complain local government of each Regency, clicking about formal rules with the widespread use of on local entrepreneurs (big fishermen) and illegal fishing and disturbances to the area of clicking on small fishermen. These clicks cannot land that is auctioned by the local government. be bridged for integrated management and are In this context, the legitimacy of the state is unable to realize joint management because considered weak because it is unable to control each click fights for its interests. The function of illegal fishing. As a result, natural resource the broker, which is expected to link structural management at Lake Tempe continues to gaps between strong groups and weak groups, perpetuate “the tragedy of the common.” does not appear on Lake Tempe. Although its Second, the structure of social networks potential is owned by the NGOs Tempe Rescue that were formed from the asymmetrical Forum, it has limited strategies for organizing relations of interests and power are networks of small fishermen and limited data based on closeness, centralized networks, and structural the livelihood conditions of small fishermen. hole: First, the network of closeness occurs It seems that NGO is trapped using technical between small fishermen at the community data from the local government to support or community level with high kinship and the decision to pass the management and cooperation in solving problems at the permissive auction mechanism for several lake

229 Policy & Governance Review, Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018 revitalization projects. (2003). Navigating social-ecological systems: Unfortunately, this study has limitations Building resilience for complexity and change. because it does not detect the role of villages that Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. include the Lake Tempe area, which is located Berkes, F., Folke, C., & Colding, J. (2000). Linking on the edge of Lake Tempe as a buffer zone. Social and Ecological Systems: Management The extent to which buffer villages organize the Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building empowerment of marginalized small fishermen Resilience: Cambridge University Press. from the access and control of Lake Tempe. It is Bodin, Ö, & Crona, B. I. (2008). Management considering that the village now has sufficient of Natural Resources at the Community village authority and allocation funds in the Level: Exploring the Role of Social community empowerment program and the Capital and Leadership in a Rural Fishing administration of BUMDes (Village Private Community. World Development, 36(12), 2763- Business Agency) according to the mandate 2779. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.12.002 of Law Number 6 the Year 2014 concerning Bodin, Ö, & Crona, B. I. (2008). Management Villages. of Natural Resources at the Community Thus, the implications of the results Level: Exploring the Role of Social of this study are in accordance with the Capital and Leadership in a Rural Fishing context of common natural pool resource Community. World Development, 36(12), 2763- management, which finds the fact that 2779. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.12.002 there is domination of state actors and local Bodin, Ö, & Crona, B. I. (2009). The role entrepreneurs in management. State actors and of social networks in natural resource local entrepreneurs have high power and high governance: What relational patterns interests, while small fishermen and NGOs make a difference? Global Environmental have a high level of interest, but have a level of Change, 19(3), 366-374. doi:10.1016/j. powerless influence. Thus, the recommended gloenvcha.2009.05.002 approach is the empowerment of small Bodin, Ö, Crona, B., & Ernstson, H. (2006). fishermen and NGOs to balance the role and Social Networks in Natural Resource position of the state and local entrepreneurs. Management: What Is There to Learn from When balance and equality occurs, then state a Structural Perspective? Ecology and Society, actors, local entrepreneurs, small fishermen and 11(2). doi:10.5751/es-01808-1102r02 NGOs can make partnerships as key players in Burt, R. S. (2001). Structural Holes versus the joint management of common natural pool Network Closure as Social Capital. Social resources belonging to Lake Tempe. Capital, 31-56. doi:10.4324/9781315129457-2 Carlsson, L. G., & Sandström, A. C. References (2008). Network Governance of the Baiquni, M. (2007). Strategi penghidupan di masa Commons. International Journal of the krisis: Belajar dari desa. Yogyakarta: IdeAs Commons, 2(1), 33. doi:10.18352/bmgn- Media. lchr.20 Berkes, F. (2009). Evolution of co-management: Carlsson, L., & Berkes, F. (2005). Co- Role of knowledge generation, bridging management: Concepts and methodological organizations and social learning. Journal of implications. Journal of Environmental Environmental Management, 90(5), 1692-1702. Management, 75(1), 65-76. doi:10.1016/j. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2008.12.001 jenvman.2004.11.008 Berkes, F., Colding, J., & Folke, C. (Eds.). Coleman, J. S., Muttaqien, I., Widowatie, D. S., & Purwandari, S. (2008). Dasar-dasar teori

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