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Recommendation of the Road RECOMMENDATION OF THE ROAD IN TOKYO BAY AND OTHER BAYS AND STRAITS IN JAPANESE WATERS Feb, 2007 JAPAN COAST GUARD Maritime Traffic Department Navigation Safety Division The JAPAN COAST GUARD is promoting various measures with the aim of ensuring the safety of maritime traffic in Tokyo Bay (Tokyo Wan), Ise Bay (Ise Wan) and the Seto Inland Sea (Seto Naikai) in line with the provisions of the Maritime Traffic Safety Law. In addition, each of the Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters carries out detailed navigation safety guidance in accordance with the actual conditions in the sea areas that it covers, the aim being to yet further increase safety. This pamphlet contains the details of the navigation safety guidance that is being promoted in the Tokyo Bay, Ise Bay, Seto Inland Sea, Nagoya Port (Nagoya-Ko) and Kanmon Strait (Kanmon Kaikyo) sea areas by the 3rd 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters. ● For the sake of convenience, some alterations have been made to the original navigation safety guidance texts when gathering them together in this pamphlet. Notice concerning maneuvering a vessel during Fort No.3 Removal Project & Nakanose Traffic Route Dredging Project Fort No.3 Removal Project and Nakanose Traffic Route Dredging project (Tokyo Bay Entrance Route Construction) will be implemented for the duration of ７years from the year 2000 and the navigation area will be narrowed, temporarily, in waters in the project's vicinity, Particularly from February to August of each year, the Nakanose Traffic Route dredging project takes place and the passable width of the Nakanose Traffic Route may be less than half of the normal width. For the safe navigation during the work period, the 3rd Regional Coast Guard Headquarters ask the cooperation of all vessels by observing the maritime traffic safety laws and regulations and recommendations for safe navigation, as well as giving attention to items below. 1. General matters that require attention (1) Keep in mind of the project work area, work period, and Aids to Marine Navigation that indicate the work area, as specified by project notification posters (It is prohibited for vessels to pass through the work area.) (2) Be extra careful in maneuvering vessels in waters in the project’s vicinity. (3) Give special attention to the work related vessels going in and out of the work area. (4) Pay attention to information and safety notices provided by the information boats and guard boats stationed near the work area. Vessels, which arranged boats for guarding the courses, should operate boats sufficiently to request for cooperation to other vessels. 2. Matters that require attention by vessels going toward the north on the Nakanose Traffic Route (1) Sufficient caution should be given to weather, hydrographic condition, and the vessel's ability to maneuver, and also to drifting to the work area by wind and current. (2) Due to the narrowed passable width in waters in the project's vicinity, avoid parallel navigation near the work area. Vessels are to navigate in a row well short of the work area. Do not, under any circumstances, overtake other vessel near the work area. (3) Vessels that don't have obligation to navigate all areas of the Nakanose Traffic Route, for example vessels going to Kisarazu Port, should go out from the route early in case that the depth of water and passing of other vessels are safe. 3. Matters that require attention by vessels going toward west on the north side of Nakanose Traffic Route Leaving Kisarazu Port Observe the regulation that recommend to navigate on the north side of the Kisarazu Port Offing Offshore Fixed Light. Keep in mind that there are navigation restrictions for vessels leaving the Nakanose Traffic Route and give sufficient attention to such vessels 4. Matters that require attention by vessels going toward south on the Uraga Suido Traffic Route (1) Sufficient caution should be given to weather, hydrographic conditioned the vessel's ability to maneuver, and also to drifting to the work area by wind and current. (2) During the period where the passable width is narrowed in waters in the project's vicinity, vessels are to navigate in a row well short of the work area, and do not attempt to overtake other vessel by force, for the safe navigation of all vessels. 5. Matters that require attention by vessels engaging in fishing including leisure Keep in mind that vessels navigation in the Nakanose Traffic Route are under greater navigation restrictions near the work area than that of the usual circumstances. Therefore, do not block the way of other vessels while fishing near the work area. ・ Navigate on the north side the Kisarazu-Ko-Oki Offshore Fixed Light the Nakanose Traffic Route ・ Att e mti on t o vessel s Honmoku ◎ ●★ kiarazu-ko-oki Offshore Fixed Light Ｄ ● Vessels going to Kisarazu area ◎ Ｃ No.8 shoudgooutfromtherouteearly ● ★ No.6 ◎ Ｂ Nakanose ● Fishing should be done without blocking the way of other vessels ・ Navigation in a well short No.3 ・ Avoid atte mpting to overtake by force No.4 Ａ ● Nakanose Traffic Route No.1 No.2 Avoid parallel navigation No.5 (No.6) No.6 ○ and overtaking Fort No.2 (Daini Kaiho) Fort No.1 Futtsu Yokosuka ○★ (Daiichi Kaiho) (No.5) Dredging Project ○★ (No.4) (attention to project work area and period) Re moval Project ○★ (No.3) Uraga Suido Traffic Route Tokyo Wan Traffic Advisory Service Center No.3 ○★ No.4 (No.2) No.1 ○★ No.2 (No.1) Uraga Suido Traffic Route and Nakanose Traffic Route and Adjacent waters 3rd Regional Coast Guard Headquarters recommends vessels to take the following safety measures. 1. Taking a pilot on board The following vessels should take a pilot on board (1) A vessel of entitled to fly the flag of a foreign country (2) A vessel of entitled to fly the Japanese flag, commanded by a master who does not have sufficient sea-going service and experience of navigating in Tokyo Bay (Tokyo Wan) 2. Continuous placement of an escort boat A vessel under the legal obligation to place an escort boat for the guarding her course should continue to place the escort boat, until she confirms her safe navigation even out off the traffic routes. 3. Navigation in the vicinity of the gate way of each traffic route. (Refer to Fig.1) (1) Vessels which are proceeding in the vicinity of the northern gateway of the Nakanose Traffic Route after having left Kisarazu Port should pass the Kisarazu Port Offing Offshore Fixed Light with it on their port side. (2) Vessels which are proceeding southward from Tokyo and passing through the sea area off Kawasaki should pass to the east side of Kawasaki Traffic Route Light Buoy No.2, maintaining a distance of at least 1,000 m from this buoy. (3) Vessels which are proceeding southward along the Nakanose Western Side Sea Area in Tokyo Bay should pass the Tokyo Wan Nakanose Western Side Light Buoys No. 3, No.2 and No.1 (hereafter referred to as the: 'Traffic flow management light buoys') with each of these buoys on their port side. (4) Vessels which are proceeding northward along the Nakanose Western Side Sea Area in Tokyo Bay (except vessels that are heading for Negishi Keihin-ko Yokohama-ku Area 5) they reach the designated course for the destination in which they are heading for. (5) Vessels having a draft of 17m or more which are proceeding northward along the Nakanose Western Side Sea Area in Tokyo Bay must maintain a distance of at least 400m from the line joining Tokyo Wan Nakanose Light Buoys A, B, C and D. (6) Vessels wishing to drop anchor in the Nakanose Western Side Sea Area must do this at least 1,000m from the line joining the 3 traffic flow management light buoys. (7) Vessels which are leaving the Uraga Suido Traffic Route and proceeding southward must not do anything (such as changing course through a large angle) in the vicinity of the gateway of the traffic route that obstructs the way of vessels that are about to enter the traffic route. (8) Vessels passing off Tsurugisaki and entering the Uraga Suido Traffic Route must proceed down the middle of the entrance to Tokyo Bay so as not to cross the path of vessels proceeding southward in the vicinity of the gateway of the traffic route. 4. Restriction on crossing Uraga Suido Traffic Route During the evening rush-hours in Uraga Suido Traffic Route (4 p.m～ 8 p.m.JST), a vessel of some 10,000 G/T or more should normally avoid crossing the traffic route from or to the westward, but if obliged to do so should pursue safety in crossing by: a. understanding the prevailing circumstances and conditions in and around the traffic route by keeping in close contact with the Tokyo Wan Traffic Advisory Service Center; b. faithfully obeying maritime traffic rules (particularly the rules on conduct of vessels and indication of their own routes under the Maritime Traffic Safety Law); c. at all times maintaining a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as all available means; d. at all times proceeding at a safe speed; e. effectively using escort boats, tugs, and the like; f. as far as practicable maintaining a listening watch by a VHP on ch16. 5. Restriction on overtaking Huge vessels and other particular vessels as prescribed by the Maritime Traffic Safety Law, and vessels of 10,000 G/T or more should, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid overtaking a vessel of 500 G/T or more in the traffic routes.
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