Rural India, on the Eve of Indepe
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Ill CHAPTER IV BHOODM MOWMTT. 19‘^1 1 . INTRODUCTION 1 Condition of Rural India, 19^7; Rural India, on the eve of Independence, presented a dismal picture of her economy in which majority of the people were engaged in agriculture having a low yield in relation to the manpower engaged in it and the area occupied,.* . A wide gulf spanned between the rural and the urban sectors of the economy of the country. To put in the words of J.P., " In reality the conditions in the villages were full of utter poverty, misery, inequality, exploitation, backwardness, stagnation, frustration and loss of hope ''J Further he stated, I must confess that the socio-economic reality in the villages is, on a o close examination, ugly and distressing in the extreme" It was an economy with primitive agriculture, a huge dependent rural population and a low agricultural productivity^. The lov; agricultural productivity combined with the near absence of other sources of employment and exploitation by zamindars and money lenders had kept them at an alarmingly low level of existence. Hence after Independence, there arose an acute land problem existing in the country. India had to face shortages of food production even with large government subsidised exports. 112 Steps were taken to solve it. The Grow More Food Campaign and the Five Year Plans sought to counteract the food shortages. The problem of the rehabilitation of land less agricultural labourers also lay before the country.*^ 1. Percentage of Agricultural Workers to Total Population in 1 9 5 1 S r .No. States Percentage 1. Andhra Pradesh hi. 27 2. Assam 6h,21 3 . Bihar 60.37 Kerala 2 5 . 6 2 5 . Madhya Pradesh 51+. 0 1 6 . Madras 1+0 . 9 8 7 . Maharashtra & Gujarat ^1 . 0 3 8. Mysore 5 2 . 2 1 9 . Orissa 5 7 . 9 2 10. Punj ab 1 1 . Raj as than 61+. 56 1 2 . Uttar Pradesh 66.86 1 3 . West Bengal 3 6 . 3 2 Ih. Andaman & Nicobar Island 9.01+ 1 5 . Delhi 6.58 1 6 . Himachal Pradesh 87*22 1 7 . Manipur 7 8 .1+3 1 8 . Tripura 6 2 . 3 7 Ii Source : Census of India 1951• • 113 All over the world in different countries, the agrarian problem was the main economic problem in the 1 9 th and early 20th centuries, though in the West indus trialisation had set in and was engaging the attention of the governments there particularly for providing the infrastructure. The problem was solved in different countries in various ways. Jji Russia after 1917 and in China after 19^9 the revolutionaries adopted the path c: of force and violence."' The Soviet economic develop ment in the field of agriculture since 1917 passed through several stages beginning v/ith the collectivisa tion of land holdings culminating in complete state control over the agricultural sector including marketing, provision of machinery for cul tivation and collective farming^. But, India could not afford to copy China or Russia. The density in Russia was 21 persons per square mile with land-holding of 3 0 acres per head and unlimited natural resources. Nor could Iidia have emulated the U.S.A. way which had a density of only 5 7 persons per square mile and had 1 2 acres of land per head. The U.S.A. had also at its disposal one-half of the vjorld’s total industrial and raw materials production. On the other hand, India had on an average, only 9 7 cents acre of cultivable land per head and its population was increasing at the fastest rate in the world above 2 per cent per annum. •114 2. Land Reforms The pre-British land tenure rights rested on tra dition rather than on law. The Muslim rulers did not dispossess the local inhabitants, they simply, like the Hindu Kings, demanded a share of the produce, but a much bigger share, often to the limit of what the cul- tivators could bear. The revenue extraction by the governments in the Indian land tenure patterns was in tensified under the British, Just v;hen feudalism was being exterminated in Great Britain and Europe, it was reinforced in India. India's present land reform problems/originate inter-alia in the so-called ’perma nent settlement’ Imposed on the traditional peasant ownership system by the East India Company in 1793. The Permanent Settlement thus created a new class of landlords, the zamindars. Another system, ryotwari tenure, first introduced in Madras in 1792 and gradually extended to other provinces, recognised the ryot or peasant land-holder as holding the land directly from the government with no intermediaries. The land revenue was fixed for a 3 0 yeaj* period and collected by village headmen. All these types of tenures led to the dis integration of the village economy, permitted a parasi tic class of absentee-owners and reduced all cultivation- to subsistence farming and Impoverished the actual tiller of the soil. 115 In 1931j in British ]iidia, nearly 70 percent of the 1 0 0 nillion persons employed in agriculture owned no land, about 3 5 percent were tenants and 3 3 percent landless labourers. About 2 percent vere non-cultivating land owners and the balance 2 8 percent were cultivating owners. Even amongst this last group, 5 O- 8 0 percent possessed under 2 hectares and were thus only nominal owners, spending much of their time working as labourers on others* land. Moreover, both the number and the percentage of landless were increasing; 7 million in 1 8 8 2 and 3^ million in 1931. Agriculture had to absorb, not only an increasing number of persons , but also an increasing proportion of the total population : 6 3 per cent in 1 9 OO and 7 0 percent in 1 9 ^0 . The provincial governments elected in the general elections in 1936-37 led by the Indian National Congress forumulated a land reform policy. Due to Gandhiji’s leadership the peasants participated in the national independence movement. The history of post-independence Indian land reforms broadly was marked by three phases: legislation to abolish intermediaries during 1 9 ^8-1 9 5 ^, tenanci'’ reform measurers implemented in many states, after 1 9 5 3 and finally legislation for imposing ceilings on land holdings since 1956. The first land reform in Sidia was the abolition of zamindari and (other Jagirdari and Inamdari) inter mediary tenures, which had covered hO percent of India's ‘ IIG farmed area and subjected 20 million tenants to iniquit ous rental relationships. The zamindari system being localised in northern, central and south-eastern India, the legislation had a greater icipact in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. Basically the legislation enables State governments to acquire all intermediaries rights, on payment of compensation and subject to certain exceptions-chiefly in respect of lands personally cultivated by the intermediaries. In all, 72 million hectares were acquired, while 2.6 million inter- ' -j mediaries had their interests abolished. Acquisition of rights over these lands brought the statutory tenants — but not necessarily the sub-tenants ^into direct relation ship with the State governments. Some tenants acquired full ownership rights over land without payment; others had to make some payments to the state for full occupancy rights, and remaining tenants of the state did not obtain these rights until these charges were paid. Having settled, at least on paper, the problem of the intermediaries, attention was focussed on the primarily 0 ryotwari 60 percent of India where land was cultivated mostly by tenants and share croppers, burdened by high rent and insecure tenure. Legislation aimed primarily ' * at (i) rent legislation, (2) security of tenure, (3) pur chase of land by tenants, and (^) preventing resumption of land, by landlords for direct cultivation. Generally, tenancy legislation was unsystematic, uncoordinated and 117 contradictory. Sometimes it did more social hai'ra than good. Ceiling legislation v/as the third prong of the triple land reform movement of the 1950's. Proponents employed two main rationales. ]ji one, social justice required redistribution of existing land holdings both to satisfj^ land hunger and to reduce inequalities in control and use of land'resources. The second rationale focussed more on the economic argument namely, that the need of increased incentive and of the statistically - proven relationship between smallness of holding and land productivity, ceiling should be implemented to increase agricultural production. Consolidation of fragmented holdings has long been a component part of the Indian agricultural development planning. Land consolidation is the particular pride of Punjab and Haryana, where it has been associated, officially at least, with rural development success stories. Most States now have legislation for conso lidation and also for preventing refragmentation, exception being Kerala and Orissa where the fragmenta tion problem is not severe. India's land reform efforts show a wide gap between goals and achievements. Zamindari abolition, tenancy regulation, consolidation of holdings and land ceilings fixation have offered little solace to the marginal 118 farmers, tenants, and labourers. The importance of land reform in Indian politics had raised peasants’ e:-^ecta- tions, hut piecemeal and half-hearted implementation caused disappointment and disrupted rural life. India illustrates the practice of democratic land reforms actually helping to polarise land property relations. The upgrading of superior tenures and guaranteed tenure security enabled the relatively few rich and middle peasants to improve their position at the expense of the large absentee landlords and the zamindars. The lowest classes on the land, servants, hired labour, share-croppers have not been significantly affected except adversely. The Indian agrarian problem remains serious, basic and deep rooted.