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Emergency Preparedness Protection civile Canada Canada
Proceedings of Workshop on National Emergency Arrangements for Public Information November 13-15, 1991 Canadian Emergency Preparedness College Arnprior, Ontario
Procès-verbal du colloque sur les Dispositions nationales pour l'information du public en cas d'urgence tenu du 13-15 novembre 1991 e canadien de la vrotection civile,
I M 1
I 1
Proceedings of Workshop on National Emergency 1 Arrangements for Public Information November 13-15, 1991 Canadian Emergency Preparedness College 1 Arnprior, Ontario
Procès-verbal du colloque sur les Dispositions I nationales pour l'information du public en cas d'urgence tenu du 13-15 novembre 1991 au Collège canadien de la protection civile, I Arnprior (Ontario) 1 I t 1 I t t I r CONTENTS/TABLE DES MATIERES
INTRODUCTION
• Opening Statement - Lesley Lynn, Director, Communications Directorate, Emergency Preparedness Canada • Accueil - Lesley Lynn, Directrice des communications, Protection civile Canada 1
• Keynote Address - Robert Parkins, Director of Strategic Planning, Communications and Consultations Secretariat, Privy Council Office Allocution-thème - Robert Parkins, Directeur de la planification stratégique, Secrétariat des communications et consultations, Bureau du Conseil privé 3
• Consolidating National Emergency Arrangements for Public Information - Gérard Garneau, Chief Planning, Communications Directorate, Emergency Preparedness Canada Intégration des dispositions nationales pour l'informatiOn du public en cas d'urgence - Gérard Garneau, Chef de la planification, Direction des communications, Protection civile Canada . 8
II PUBLIC WELFARE EMERGENCIES/S/N/STRES - (Catastrophic EarthquakelTremblement de terre catastrophique)
• Introduction - Gérard Garneau 15
• British Columbia Eniergency Public Information Plan - David Richardson, Executive Director, Public Affairs Bureau, Government of British Columbia Plan colombien pour l'information du public en cas d'urgence - David Richardson, Directeur exeecutif, Public Affairs Bureau, Gouvernement de 1 Colombie-Britannique 15 I
• Federal Emergency Public Information Plan - Jean-Claude I Paradis, Chief Information Services, Communications Directora.te, Emergency Preparedness Canada Plan fédéral pour l'information du public en cas t d'urgence - Jean-Claude Paradis, Chef des services - d'information, Direction des communications, Protection civile Canada 25 1 - • Questions and Answers/Discussion 31 1
III PUBLIC WELFARE EMERGENCIES/SINISTRES - I (Civil Nuclear Emergencies/Urgence nucléaires civilés)
• Introduction - Gérard Garneau 35 'I • Ontario Nuclear Response Plan - Kathy Bleyer, Senior I Planning Officer, Nuclear Major Emergency Preparedness Section, Emergency Planning Ontario Plan d'intervention nucléaire de l'Ontario - Kathy Bleyer, ^ Agent supérieur de planification, Emergency Planning Ontario 36 r • Ontario Emergency Public Information Plan - Stephanie Bolton, Communications Co-ordinator, Ministry of the Solicitor General of Ontario I Plan ontarien pour l'information du public en cas d'urgence - Stephanie Bolton, Coordonatrice des communications, Ministère du Solliciteur général de l'Ontario 40
• New Brunswick Nuclear Emergency Public Information 1 Plan - Gary Stairs, Planning Officer, New Brunswick Emergency Measures Organization Plan du Nouveau-Brunswick pour l'information du 1 public en cas d'urgence nucléaire - Gary Stairs, Agent de planification, Organisation des mesures d'urgence du Nouveau- Brunswick 46 I 1 1 1 I 1 • Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan - Robert Greenslade, Communications Executive, Health Protection 1 Branch, Health and Welfare Canada Plan fédéral d'intervention en cas d'urgence nucléaire Robert Greenslade, Communications Executive, Direction 1 générale de la Protection de la santé, Santé et Bien-être social Canada 51
1 • Syndicate Reports: Catàstrophic Earthquake Rapports de groupes: tremblement de terre catastrophique 57
• Analysis (Panel)/Analyse (panel) 69
• Syndicate Reports: Civil Nuclear Emergencies Rapports de groupes: urgences nucléaires civiles 76 1 • Analysis (Panel)/Analyse (panel) 85 I IV PUBLIC ORDER EMERGENCIES/ÉTATS D'URGENCE • Introduction - Mike Theilmann, Senior Communications Officer, Communications Directorate, Emergency Preparedness 11 Canada /Agent supérieur de communications, Direction des communications,Protection civile Canada 91
1 • National Counter-Terrorism Plan - Charles Belford, Director of Policy and Planning, National Security Co-ordination Centre, Solicitor General of Canada 1 Plan national de lutte contre le terrorisme - Charles Bel,ford, Directeur, Politiques et plani,fication, Centre national de coordination de la sécurité, Ministère du Solliciteur général du t Canada 93 I • National Counter-Terrorism Plan Communications - David Davidson, Director General of Communications, Solicitor General of Canada Plan national de lutte contre le terrorisme: 1 communications - David Davidson, Directeur général des communications, Ministère du Solliciteur général du Canada I 98 I 1 • Counter-Terrorism Policy and Research - Bruce Beanlands, Research Analyst, Solicitor General of Canada Politiques et recherches relatives à la lutte contre 1e terrorisme - Bruce Beanlands, Analyste de la recherche, Ministère du Solliciteur général du Canada 102
• Conclusion - Mike Theilmann 102 • Questions and 'AnswereDiscussion 104
• Syndicate Reports/Rapports de groupes 108 • Analysis (Panel)/Analyse (panel) 117
• Questions and AnswereDiscussion 123
V EMERGENCY WARNING AND BROADCASTING SY STEMSISYSTEMES D'ALERTE ET DE RADIODIFFUSION D'URGENCE
• Introduction - Cindy Stevens, Director of Communications Services, Government of Manitoba/Directrice des services de communication, Gouvernement du Manitoba 126
• Alberta Emergency Warning and Broadcast System - Herb Presley, Planning Officer, Alberta Public Safety Services Système d'alerte et de radiodiffusion d'urgence de l'Alberta - Herb Presley, Agent de planification, Alberta Public Safety Services 128
• New Perspectives on a National Emergency Warning and Broadcast System - Joe McPherson, Planning Advisor, Emergency Telecommunication Division, Communications Canada Nouvelles perspectives sur un système national dd'alerte et de radiodiffusion d'urgence - Joe McPherson, Conseiller en planification, Division des télécommunication d'urgence, Communications Canada 136 • U.S. Perspective on National Emergency Public Information Arrangements/Perspective américaine sur la mise en place de dispositions nationales pour l'information du public en cas d'urgence - Phillip Cogan, Deputy Director for Public Affairs, Federal Emergency t Management Agency 139 1 • Conclusion s - Lesley Lynn 144 I APPENDICES/ANNEXES • A -- Public Welfare Emergencies Syndicate Lists and Consolidated Reports/Sinistres: liste et rapports intégrés I des groupes de travail • B -- Public Order Emergencies Syndicate Lists and Consolidated Reports/États d'urgence: liste et rapports intégrés des groupes de travail 1 I 1 I I I t I r PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15. NOV. 1991
WEDNESDAY NOV. 13 MERCREDI 13 NOV. INTRODUCTION
LESLEY Opening Statement L YNN Mot d'ouverture Permettez-moi de souhaiter à chacun d'entre vous la plus cordiale bienvenue et j'aimerais vous remercier d'avoir si généreusement répondu à notre invitation. Plusieurs d'entre nous ont assisté à un atelier semblable il y a deux ans. À ce moment-là nos efforts étaient surtout concentrés sur notre mandat initial, c'est-à-dire, la préparation, conjointement avec les autorités fédérales, provinciales et territoriales, de plans d'information publique adaptés à des situations d'urgence nationales de deux types: les états de crise internationale et les états de guerre. Comme plusieurs d'entre vous sont sans doute au courant, la Loi sur les mesures d'urgence prévoit quatre types d'urgence nationale. Outre les deux que je viens de mentionner, deux autres types de situation pourrait justifier l'invocation de la loi, soit les sinistres et les états d'urgence. At the last workshop, we discussed our complementary roles and responsibilities as communicators and the Parts III and IV of the ; but everyone was unanimous in suggesting that we should expand the original mandate to include Parts I and H, i.e. Public Welfare and Public Order type national emergencies. It was further suggested that we should look at arrangements for serious, but less than national emergencies, as it is in those types of more frequent occurrences that the network of federal, provincial and territorial communicators can play a most useful role. I am talldng about such eyents as the Edmonton tornado, the Manitoba and New Brunswick forest fires, the PCB fire at St-Basile-le-Grand and the tire fire in Hagersville. Although events like these are normally handled by the - municipality in which they occur, with support from the provincial or territorial emergency organizations, the federal government is continually monitoring them. It does this through the Government Emergency Operations Co-ordination Center at Emergency Preparedness Canada Headquarters in Ottawa, where it keeps track of real or impending emergencies around the clock, every day of the year, trying to second guess what help a province or a territory might need to manage the emergency 'and to be in a position to respond quickly and effectively. Z PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
During the Hagersville fire, for instance, representatives of 1 about 10 federal departments held a daily teleconference to get first hand information and discuss what assistance had been or might be offered. The Privy Council Office, both the Operations and the Communications 1 Secretariats, like to be kept well ahead and informed of developments, and in really serious crises that could demand considerable federal involvement, the PCO Communications and Consultations Secretariat 1 headed by the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet for Communications and Consultations, would in such instances call together a crisis 1 communications group -- as it did in the Persian Gulf War -- to be able to provide information and advice to the Cabinet. I If I seem to be concentrating rather on the federal role in emergencies, it's because it's one I am familiar with; however as I am well aware, past emergencies have shown that the provinces and i territories are usually on the front line, and that the federal government would take the lead only when asked, or when the emergency clearly lies within federal jurisdiction. For example, floods or fires on federal 1 lands, air crashes on federal airports, or in national emergencies that fit the category of international or war. In essence, what our plans amount to is a system of networking.
When it comes to a crisis no one is an island. It is necessary for us to work as a team if we are to be responsible to the public and I ensure they receive consistent messages, as we all know a serious emergency often becomes a media event, and although that event might take place several thousand miles from where any one of us works, you i -can bet your life we will receive endless calls from the media and the public asking what THE GOVERNMENT is doing and what can be done to protect life and property. As government communicators we have to I be ready for such demands. The media and the public aren't much concerned with the niceties of constitutional arrangements as they pertain to jurisdictional responsibility. To many people we are all 1 lumped together as THE GOVERNMENT. So the more we get to know each other the more we keep our lists of contacts up to date, and the more we understand the system of governmental responsibilities -- who is I responsible for what -- the more we shall be able to respond smoothly when we need to and all sing to the same hymn book. Otherwise the public could become confused. What we hope to achieve at this 1 workshop is a common understanding of where responsibilities lie for responding to emergencies and how necessary it is to have flexible plans that can be adjusted easily to meet changing circumstances. ^ 1 HARRY (Administrative Information BLOOM Consignes administratives) I I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 - 3 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-IS NOV. 1991
Keynote Address 1 Allocution-thème LESLEY (Intro) LYNN Now we had hoped to have with us this morning Dan Gagnier, Deputy 1 Secretary to the Cabinet for Communications and Consultations, but the Prime Minister has pre-empted his presence. We are, however, very fortunate to have with us Dan Gagnier's right arm, Bob Parkins. Now 1 Bob is Director of Strategic Planning with the Privy Council Office Communications and Consultations Secretariat. He has had an extraordinarily wide and varied career in communications. For 1 example he has worked in the private sector as a consultant; he has had provincial experience as Communications Secretary for the Manitoba Cabinet; he has worked closely with the Deputy Prime Minister, the 1 Honourable Don Mazankowski, as Special Communications Adviser to the Cabinet Committee on Communications. He has also had a varied and extensive career as reporter, editor and administrator with The I Canadian Press, the Calgary Herald, the Globe and Mail and Southam News. And above all he sold us the GST when at Finance Canada! What more can I say -- he is obviously un homme formidable. I would like to introduce to you Bob Parkins. Vous avez la parole!
BOB . Thank you very much Lesley, except for the part where we have another PARKINS 100 people who now tie me to the GST. Ce sera tout en anglais malheureusement. Thanks very much I'm glad to be here today. Dan has been hung up in yet another steering committee but I know he would 1 want me to pass on his best wishes and his admiration for the work you people are doing in trying to meet I guess two tasks: to come up with a ^ coherent national strategy, built on strengths of what we have learned in particular from Oka and the Persian Gulf Crisis over the last year or two; and also and possibly more importantly, in the give and take of public policy-making I would suggest your other main goal is to 1 convince your respective policy organizations and political leaders that what you are doing is not only important but absolutely essential in this 1 country. Two years ago in that vein, a. group like this including a lot of 1 people who would be here today, gathered at this college to discuss a concept of operations for dealing with emergencies that lead to the production of a National Emergency Communications Plan for I international and war emergencies. No one, I would guess, thought we might use the results of that effort as quickly as we did. But we are living in a volatile world in which change is the only constant. The work a produced by you people beginning two years ago, helped Lesley here and Gérard Garneau at EPC, and a group of departmental communicators -- and it is important to bear this in mind to your I political assistants -- to produce very quickly a Crisis Communications I 4 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES .DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Manual specifically for the Persian Gulf Crisis last winter. That small, but in some respects ground breaking, first step resolved many of the problems of how we would operate and who would be responsible for what before the crisis broke out into a war. It also enabled departments to work smoothly and efficiently as a communications group. We even had a dry run just a few hours before the Coalition's offensive against Iraq began on January 16th! Let me talk about the Gulf just to frame it from a communications point of view for a minute before we talk about how we handled it
You'll all recall that Vietnam was the first TV war. Politicians and military commanders were undoubtedly aware of the impact of television and it's a commonplace of course, but given the hindsight - with hindsight when we look back over the Gulf and Vietnam we can understand that in Vietnam they were not prepared or able to use TV to get their messages to the public from over there. The Persian Gulf Crisis on the other hand was the first war in which TV was skillfully used as a tool -- or a weapon if you want -- by both sides to influence the same publics. Those who support it could bring pressure to bear on members of the Coalition. CNN and ABC and the other networks brought minute-by-minute live coverage of developments 24 hours a day into homes, offices and shopping centres and, unless they were asleep, most North Americans were seldom without fresh news of the war. That meant for the first time « in a war the use of communications becam' e at least tactical, and maybe arguably of strategic importance. Senior officials and policy-makers were actively involved in the day-to-day design and provision of messages to those audiences that I mentioned. Audiences around the world had up to the minute tactical information, TV images of smart weapons hitting their targets with pinpoint accuracy. I guess we all remember bombs falling into chimneys from 50,000 feet. Historians might note -- I have had a lot of "to-ing and fro-ing" on this -- that even with complaints about censorship, communications efforts helped keep the public supportive of the Coalition's efforts.
From the perspective of the Government of Canada, the importance of communications was recognized from the outset, partly because of what had been learned about centralized communications during the Oka crisis the summer before. That was the first time that the PCO Communications Secretariat, as it was then, had taken on an expanded role in co-ordinating communications that worked in the final weeks of Oka. It showed the importance of policy and communications staff, both political and bureaucratic again, working closely together. We worked on it in Oka and did it again in the Gulf -- I am going to come back to this again and again and again. Let me walk you through what we did. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 5 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
First, the summer before the Gulf War, we began providing communications advice and recommendations to the- government to I position Canada's involvement as a commitment to the multi-national force in support of the UN. By doing that we were able to keep the public more or less with us for what we would be getting into beginning January 16th. As I mentioned, we produced the Crisis Communications Management Manual when the rubber hit the road in January.
As a reflection of the way government is changing its approach to communications, this time a year ago Dan Gagnier, long 1 time communications and federal/provincial expert, came back to Ottawa to be the Deputy Secretary to Cabinet for communications and Consultations. This is a significant change in the infrastructure although I I will be the first to admit that to the boys in the bar in Moose Jaw didn't talk about it all that much. But it meant that whereas communications at PCO was formerly lead by an assistant Secretary to Cabinet; Dan was a I full deputy minister equivalent with access to all the key steering committees, Cabinet meetings, key committees of Cabinet and the rest of the infra-structure. That gave the Communications and Consultations Secretariat, and through it EPC, extraordinary influence in the development of the government's communications approach in the I management of the Gulf crisis. A steering committee met in Paul Tellier's boardroom twice daily. Dan or I attended these, as well as meetings of an ad hoc group of I ministers on the Gulf. Then again Dan or I had full access to those meetings and it helped a lot: it meant that there was a linkage between the most senior political and bureaucratic managers of the government and I the people at EPC who were providing secretariat support. During the whole piece we provided deputy ministers and ministers and the Cabinet ministers very early every morning with a six-minute video of highlights of the preceeding 24 hours' newscasts, a comprehensive strategic analysis of print media with inputs from all departments, a rolling 48-hour communications strategy, agreed to by communications I heads and chiefs of staff for appropriate departments. That strategy was only two pages long every day. It outlined a the main issues we were facing and it summarized the public environment we were working in, and throughout, the dominant theme of the day or week as it might be, and the messages that should be I developed and conveyed. It is important to be reminded once again to keep such material to two pages. It meant that it was read every morning by the Prime Minister and his colleagues and it shows you that you don't I have to produce 'an inch and a half of bunk in order to convince the boss that you are doing your job. 6 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
We also tied into that a speaker's bureau kind of function, 1 outlining what ministers were speaking, and where and when, and developed questions and answers for ministers. The results of it all were that the steering committee, Paul Tellier's group, and the Prime Minister I and his Cabinet colleagues, read the strategy every morning, everyone focussed on the same problem, the same direction. Messages were consistent, we didn't get freelancing of the kind of what minister X was 1 doing giving a speech in Moose Jaw when nobody knew it was coming, and we appeared to be publicly consistent in the approach.
Through all of that though, on another level, in another meaning, what we were really doing was activating the central 1 component of. the National Emergency Arrangements for -Public Information, developed by you people. at Emergency Preparedness Canada. There was no need to activate other components, provincial and t territorial, of course, but if we had to there would be no doubt we would have. Under that plan EPC would work as a secretariat to the PCO, Communications and Consultations Secretariat in providing staff management and working up videos, as I mentioned, and media environmental analysis. We did something very much along those lines in the Gulf. EPC's communications director worked with our colleagues I in the EPC Centre, operating 24 hours a day doing everything, writing those pieces I was talking about, photocopying, developing messages. Not the least important making sure there were muffins and coffee every I day at 7:30 in the morning because a lot of grumpy people showed up there every day. They co-ordinated the distribution of public information material, press fines, Q & As, to ensure that the briefing I book I talked about was kept up to date. They maintained the referral list for enquiries on given topics that was shared with other partners in the emergency preparedness field. Departments plugged into that through 1 the chiefs of staff and the directors of communications who attended the morning meetings at 7:30, providing their own perspective. Information on public and media reaction was also gathered by EPC directly from provincial government organizations, like Alberta Public Safety Services. It went on and on and on, it seemed as though it would be forever. It was finally stood down on March 8th, about a week after 1 the unofficial ceasefire.
What did we learn out of all that? Four key points I would ^ suggest. First of all, co-ordination and co-operation between departments and staff, political and bureaucratic equally, is of paramount importance in handling anything like this. Secondly, it re- I enforced an argument that some of us have made, including some scarred warriors in this room, for years about bringing communications I and policy decision-makers to the same table. It is important to work in close harmony from the outset of a crisis. There is no doubt that that's the way to do it. As a result of that kind of relationship we took the 1 1 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 7 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
appropriate decisions at the appropriate time and everybody was on net through the piece. Question of timeliness; we proved again that a crisis will not generally allow for a lengthy approval process or even following a normal chain of command; a lot of key people from time to time went around corners that at other times they would not get around so easily. The reason we were able to do that was because we also developed through that period a shared sense of purpose and good humour brought to this task that I think was crucial and we couldn't have succeeded without hundreds of people woiking long hours, uncomplainingly, seven days a week. A lot of them were doing jobs outside their own job descriptions, sometimes below their levels; they would get their DGs of Communication collating media analyses and that kind of thing.
The fact that everyone had a say in the management and arrangements of- crisis communication was part of it. Of course everyone acted from a common understanding of how the system should work and played to the saine tune. In sum, the way that that crisis was handled could be regarded as a blueprint for the government in handling any future crisis. And that's under way. EPC is amalgamating the National Emergency Public Information Plans into one volume instead of two, so there is a single crisis communications management system for all kinds of emergencies. The difference will be around who leads and speaks on which subjects. Your efforts in the next two days, while directed to our plans for handling primarily national emergencies, will also take into account the spectacular media-attracting emergencies that fall short of being national ones. The tire fire in Hagersville would be a good example. I am not, nor is Dan necessarily, rushing to try out instantly everything you people come up with, but much has been learned from the Gulf and I am sure you will use a good deal of it in your deliberations.
I shouldn't leave here without endorsing on behalf of Dan and the whole secretariat, the ldnd of planning you are undertaking here. I can't think of any time -- everybody reads the newspapers, what's happening on the Unity front -- when the co-ordination of government information is as important as it is now. 'Those .of us who work in public communications, by the nature of our work, have a tendency to be open and informal and co-operative. From what I have seen and, heard we also have the professionalism, cornmon sense and goodwill to pull together when it counts, as again we have learned in the Gulf. As you are aware, the Emergencies Act is quite specific in planning and placing lead responsibility for meeting national emergencies under the categories I and ll in the province or territory in which they occur. However, although the federal government would not play the lead role in such circumstances unless specifically requested, the Cabinet would almost certainly ask us to activate a crisis communications group in Ottawa for I 8 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, - 13-15 NOV. 1991 1 an emergency of national proportions and perhaps for one not necessarily of national importance, but something that was in the ball park. t For those of you in the provinces and territories where primary responsibility for handling public welfare, public-oriented 1 crises rests, I want to tell you that whatever the dimensions of the crisis, you can count on our support. The basic reason why we are doing this, of course, is to, ensure that we all undérstand the responsibilities of the different players: federal, provincial and municipal. In responding to crises, make sure that plans are interlocked and everybody is singing from the same hymn book -- to use an old cliché one last time. If you can I make people understand the importance of this kind- of planning within your own jurisdictions you will be â credit to your profession and a builder of a stronger and better prepared nation. I
LESLEY I am going to ask Gérard Garneau, my hardworking colleague who is I LYNN responsible for organizing this workshop, to speak to you on where we are now and to just tell you briefly what his intentions are for producing a comprehensive plan by the end of the fiscal year. Gerard will then be 1 moderating a session on public welfare emergencies during which we will be speaking of a catastrophic earthquake,. taking that as a classic example of a type of public welfare emergency that could quite easily I become a national one. Then we will have a series of questions and answers, followed by lunch and then we'll discuss civil nuclear I emergencies which, if of sufficiently grave scale, again might constitute grounds for invoking the Emergencies Act, but if not could very well be of so serious a nature that certainly the Communications and 1 Consultations Secretariat and a number of you people would quickly need to be on net. I think at this point rather than bore you by giving you a compte-rendu of what it is we are going to do (after all you have it in print), I think I'll just bring on Gérard and ask him to speak to you. Gérard is Chief of- Planning with the Communications Directorate at Emergency Preparedness Canada. r
GÉRARD Consolidating National Emergency Arrangements for Public I GARNEAU Information. Intégration des Dispositions nationales pour l'information du public en cas d'urgence I Well, dear friends and colleagues, the last time we met in this hall two years ago it was to decide how the two senior orders of government and I their key emergency response agencies, which we collectively represent, ought to go about co-ordinating the dissemination of vital information I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 9 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
and advice to the public in international and war emergencies, as defined I in parts III and IV of the Emergencies Act. The results of those discussions, as you know, were consolidated in a document entitled National Emergency Public Information Response Plan, Volume 2, of which all of your organizations received a copy when it was published in the spring of 1990. Why Volume 2? Because this document was intended as a I companion to the [federal] Government Emergency Book, which is also in two parts, the second dealing with war emergencies, and the first [never compiled] with ordinary civil emergencies. This goes back to before the Emergencies Act replaced the War Measures Act, creating the four categories of emergencies that constitute our key reference points 1 today. We all have, at one time or another, while working out communications co-ordination plans for war and international emergencies, acknowledged intellectual and psychological difficulties in dealing with the dire worst case scenarios envisaged under parts III and IV of the Emergencies Act, particularly in light of the major geo-' 1 political changes which were happening around us. But we did get the job done and succeeded in producing a public communications response plan which we proudly put on the shelf, intending to revise it once or I twice a year to keep the names and telephone numbers and other basic information up to date, but not thinking that we would ever required to use it. You just heard from Bob Parkins how wrong we were on that I point! 1 I will not dwell further on the Gulf crisis experience, other than to say that it caused a slight delay in our getting on, as you had requested us to do at the conclusion of the last workshop, with 1 communications co-ordination plans for the kinds of emergencies which are more likely to affect and involve us here in this room: primarily I public welfare emergencies, but also public order emergencies. We started the process by holding one-on-one discussions with some of you, reviewing recent experiences provincially, federally, in 1 responding to various natural and human-made disasters, and trying to sift out of all of this a number of lessons and to identify some common approaches and principles that could form the basis for a public I communications response system for these kinds of emergencies. Before we were interrupted, so to speak, by events in the Gulf, we thought that we were going to end up with a system that was considerably different I from the one we had produced for international and war emergencies. But as we became progressively more involved in supporting the efforts of the PCO Communications and Consultations Secretariat in managing government communications during the Gulf crisis, we became more I 1 0 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
acutely aware that what we were doing, the principles we were applying daily, were in fact the very ones, at least from the federal perspective, we would want to use in all kinds of -emergencies where both orders of government were significantly involved. This brought us to the conclusion that we should scrap the notion of having a volume for this and a volume for that, that what we are really striving for is for a common approach, a single crisis communications management system that will be flexible enough to apply to all situations.
As Lesley indicated, we are going to produce by the end of the fiscal year a new manual which will .integrate all of these policies and procedures. At this workshop, our aim is to obtain information and guidance from you so that we can strike the right note and come up with a manual that we will naturally be inclined to use as a common tool, a common reference point and guide, in the development of our respective crisis communications systems and plans. I would now like to go back over some basic concepts and definitions to confirm our coirunon understanding of what we are taLking about. All of the work that we have been doing, the plans that we have been making so far, have been lumped together under the generic title of National Emergency Arrangements for Public Information. The concept of national emergency arrangements does not only apply to public information. Other federal departments use it to describe the emergency preparedness activities which they are charged with co- ordinating with the provinces and territories and industry in key sectors of national interest such as transportation, energy, telecommunications, national security, and so forth. What are national emergency arrangements? They're not plans in the strictest sense of the word, we should understand this. They are really sets of mutually agreed upon policies and procedures governing how the various responders or partners (meaning the federal, provincial, and territorial governments and their agencies) are going to work together to co-ordinate their emergency response in situations of overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction. Especially with public welfare emergencies, it is hard to imagine any situation that will not sooner or later involve the three orders of government: municipal or regional, provincial and federal. There are more and more examples on record of serious emergencies involving several jurisdictions where the perceived or real success of the response has depended on whether the players were able to sing in the same key. What we mean by 'public information' in National Emergency Arrangements for Public Information -- you could also call it crisis communications management -- are really three things: PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 11 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
• the timely delivery of consistent, accurate information and advice to the public; it is the first duty of all emergency responders that you begin by taking care of, getting information out to, the people at risk;
• the provision of reliable- communications advice to emergency I managers, and • issues management.- Issues management is a very broad concept but I that is in fact what we doing all the time during an emergency: we want to stay on top of the agenda; we want to have always at hand all of the information available about the situation, so that we can help I the emergency responders do their job, and reflect accurately and immediately to the public and to the media what is going on.
I Concerning the application or scope of the National Emergency Arrangements, what we are suggesting is that their underlying principles and main policy and procedural features should be I applicable to all four types of emergencies defined in the Emergencies Act.; but not only to declared n ational emergencies. This is important. There is a process, a legislative process, involved in declaring a national 1 emergency of any type, which gives the federal government special powers of intervention, whether it be at the request of a provincial government in a natural or human-made disaster, or whether it be in and I international crisis or a war situation in which the initiative clearly belongs to the federal government. What we are saying here is that if we are going to develop co-operative arrangements to co-ordinate I communications in emergencies, these should be brought into play whenever it appears necessary or advantageous to do so in any serious emergency that significantly involves several of the governments and 1 organizations that we represent, and not be reserved exclusively for national emergencies in the legal or technical sense. So what we are striving for is a common crisis management system to be implemented 1 by each government or agency in accordance with its own legislation. Just federally, there are several pieces of legislation that could come into play in specific situations before invocation of the Emergencies Act itself 1 would even be considered, among them the National Security Offences Act, the Energy Supplies Emergencies Act, and the provisions of the I National Defence Act under which the Canadian Forces went to the aid of the civil power in Quebec last year during the Oka Crisis. I We have to keep that in mind that if these arrangements are going to work, they need to have the force of policy within each jurisdiction; they have to bind the crisis communications plans and i practices of the different agencies and departments that could be involved. For us federally, this means ensuring, among other things, that what we do here is appropriately reflected in the government I communications policy. I 12 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Other characteristics of the National Emergency 1 Arrangements for Public Information, as we want to develop them, are: I • reliability -- knowing that other key players work from the same common book of general rules and procedures; 'I • flexibility -- the arrangements take full account of the individual roles and responsibilities of the different orders of government and, within each, of the various agencies involved; and they can be 1 activated to meet the requirements of the situation; • control -- control is assured by the lead system, meaning that either a I pre-designated lead department or one designated at the time, will be in charge of co-ordinating the emergency response, including public communications. The lead system is the norm federally, as in most I provinces and territories where that function is exercised by the provincial or territorial emergency measures organization; I • simplicity -- this is another-aspect of control and reliability factors, whereby the National Emergency Arrangements provide for the number of communications players and decision-makers to be kept I small, with direct lines of communications between one another:
One of the aims of the National Emergency Arrangements for Public Information is to inform federal agencies and departments and the provinces and territories how the federal government intends to manage its own communications in emergencies. What we are I proposing here are four levels of response, not to be confused with the four types of emergencies defined in the Emergencies Act. These response levels, with the exception of the fourth, could apply within any 1 category of emergency.
At the lowest level - level 1, are situations in which the federal I aspects of communications can be handled quite adequately through individual action by the appropriate departments and agencies, either at HQ or field level. The EPC Communications Directorate and/or the 1 EPC regional director in the province affected would. take on the role of ensuring liaison and co-ordination with provincial response organizations. The PCO Communications and Consultations Secretariat I would be kept informed as required and alerted to any development that might signal a possible escalation of the situation and the need for increased federal response. I would put in this category the Edmonton I tornado of 1987 which was certainly a spectacular incident, but in which the province remained in full control throughout, with specific t assistance being provided by half a dozen or so federal agencies -- among them National Defence, Employment and Immigration and Health and Welfare Canada. All this was largely co-ordinated locally, including the I I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 13 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
communications aspects, by EPCs man on the scene, Jim Hoffman, who fed the information to EPC Ottawa, which ensured that it was shared with all those who needed to have it, including PCO Communications.
Moving up to level two, we're now dealing with more serious situations, with a lead department stepping in to co-ordinate the efforts of all federal players, both at headquarters and in the field. With a lead department in charge, EPC assumes its normal background and support role, keeping a w.atching brief on the situation and standing ready to provide advice and broker additional federal assistance as required. The lead department chairs a crisis communications group with representation from other federal players -- including, normally, the PCO Communications and Consultations Secretariat. The crisis communications group co-ordinates all federal crisis communications and ensures liaison with and, as necessary, representation on, the communications co-ordination bodies established by the province or territory to handle public information at or near the site of the disaster. One situation that approximated this, although in the operational sense, the federal government was never very heavily involved, was the Hagersville tire fire of 1989. This event impinged on a number of issues with potentially serious implications for the federal government, although it fell wholly within the jurisdiction of the Province of Ontario which took charge early and eventually brought the situation under control with a minimal amount of federal assistance. A crisis communications group was set up.with representation, among others, from PCO and EPC, and was chaired by the lead department, Environment Canada. The group never actually met face to face, but conference calls were held every morning to review the situation and analyse media reaction and public perceptions of what the federal government was doing or ought to do. This went on for about 10 days, until it was clear that the govenunent had reacted appropriately and that no further action was required or expected. Several departments in Ottawa have plans to activate such communications group in specific emergencies or crises where they would act as the lead federal agency -- I'm thinking here, among others, of Health and Welfare C anada's Federal Emergency Nuclear Response Plan, and of the Ministry of the Solicitor General's National Counter- terrorism Plan, both of which will be discussed later in this workshop.
At response level three, we would be looking at much more serious situations, or at emergencies that have escalated to a point where Cabinet, or an ad hoc comrnittee of Cabinet might find it necessary to assume a dominant role in managing the federal response. As a result PCO would assume overall responsibility from the lead department for crisis communications management with the lead department, and EPC continuing to provide key operational support and consultation links 14 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
with communications managers in the provinces and territories I involved. This was the case during the Oka and Gulf crises. It is certainly what woiild happen again in any serious international emergency. But it is also an option that would be considered in I catastrophic public welfare emergencies, such as a high-intensity earthquake in B.C., where the kind of massive intervention required from the federal government could only be effectively co-ordinated at 1 the highest echelons.
Whereas none of the first three response levels described I above would technically require that a national emergency be declared pursuant to the Emergencies Act, level four would provide for fully integrated communications management and program delivery systems I between the two orders of government, in a war or near-war situation -- and only following invocation of the Act. 1 And this brings me in closing to an all-important reminder about the division of responsibilities between orders of government, which lies at the foundation of all national emergency arrangements: Parts I and II emergencies are the primary responsibility of the provinces and territories, with the level of federal involvement dictated by whatever elements of federal jurisdiction may be present in a given I situation, and by the extent of federal assistance requested; in Parts III and IV emergencies, on the other hand, one is dealing with federally initiated, federally driven responses to situations of external origin which, depending on how far they develop, may end up involving the provinces in national civil mobilization efforts. I Those are the principles that will be embodied in the manual to be produced at the end of the fiscal year, and for which we will be asking I you shortly to provide information and data on your respective crisis communications systems and capabilities. I (Break/pause-café) I A. - PUBLIC WELFARE EMERGENCIES SINISTRES
GÉRARD (Intro) GARNEAU We are now going to turn our attention to the co-ordination of public communications in serious public welfare emergencies, but first, to put ourselves in the mood, I would like to show a short video - it's about 15 minutes long -- that was put together by the college staff to illustrate the impact of various natural and human made disasters. Please look at these I images and listen to the narration and try and picture yourselves in the same situation. I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 15 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
(video vidéo) Well how many emergency public information bulletins and how many communications issues could you count in that video?
Al. - Catastrophic Earthquake Tremblement de terre cataclysmique You've all heard references to plans that are being made for the 'big one' which may happen at any time in B.C., and this is what we will want to talk about between now and lunch time. The federal government, that is EPC and eight or nine other departments, and the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta, have been working hard over the past two years to put together a response plan in the event of a catastrophic earthquake on the west coast of Canada. The federal plan is appropriately called the "federal support plan", because ifs the responsibility of the Province of British Columbia to make plans to assume primary responsibility in responding to such an event But it certainly couldn't do it alone, and we can already foresee without difficulty the kind of federal assistance that would be required to help the province cope with the situation.
I will call first on David Richardson who is Executive Director of the Public Affairs Bureau for the Government of British Columbia. David is mainly responsible for strategic communications planning for the provincial government. He has been a communicator all his life. He has been in the provincial public service for the past 14 years and before that he worked as a journalist in British Columbia and Ontario. David and his colleagues in British Columbia have been directly responsible for developing the provincial communications and public information response plan in the event of a major earthquake on the West Coast. Please welcome David Richardson.
DAVID Before I start, I want to say I was quite impressed by this video. We RICHARDSON go through some rather horrendous flooding just about every year. Some of those pictures were from B.C. One crisis or emergency that was not depicted in that video and to which I would like to draw to your attention as an opening to my presentation, was one that happened a couple of months ago in B.C. It illustrated dramatically the value of having a public affairs officer — a good public affairs officer -- in the right place and at the right time. It also illustrated the value of cellular phones. One morning, on my way to work I noticed the police had cordoned off Humble Street in Victoria very near the Empress Hotel. I passed by and proceeded to my 8:00 o'clock meeting with deputies. One 16 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
of the deputies sent word that he would not bé able to attend the meeting I because he had a bomb scare in his office. I suddenly remembered having seen the police that morning on Humble Street near the office of Social Services and Housing, a Ministry that has more than its share of I disgruntled clients, as we call them. I immediatly phoned my office and asked one of the public I affairs people to go to the scene of the bomb scare and see if there was anything he could do (e.g. to assist the police) since it was a provincial government office that was being threatened. At the scene, he found the t police had cordoned off the street. He approached a police van, and got a status report from the officer in command to the effect that they had found a cardboard box in the first level up in the foyer of this office, upon which someone had written, "If you move this box you will get a nasty surprise." I They had evacuated the building, stopped all the staff on their way to work and kept them outside. While they were waiting for the military bomb disposal unit, the PIO I had sent up was standing up there I with his cellular phone just waiting when someone sidled up to him. The person went up to him because he had a cellular phone and that made him look as if he was in charge in some way. And he said "What's going on 1 here?" And the public information officer said "There's a bomb scare in this building." The fellow thought for a minute and said, "I. might have some information about that."
I think all the blood rushed to the head of this public information officer because he assumed the bomber had chosen him to I come and make a confession. The man said "Are you in charge?" The public information officer said "No, I'm not in charge, but I can take you to the people who are." And he took him over to the police van and told I the police that this individual might have some information regarding this, whereupon the individual proceeded to tell the police that the night before he had gone into work late. Upon arriving he found a deposit on I the second storey foyer of, let's say, human waste, and not wanting to clean it up because he didn't feel that was his job, he put a cardboard box over it that said "When you move this you'll have a nasty surprise." Our minds were full of images of the bomb squad blasting this thing apart!
At any rate a good information officer, in the right place at the I right time with a cellular phone, proved to be valuable in that instance.
For my presentation, I don't intend to go through the provincial emergency public information plan in detail because that might be tedious, and I think that probably most of you in the room are I better planners than I. But I am going to touch on three things. I am going to talk about the status of the British Columbia Emergency Public PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 17 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Information Plan, about the structure and aim of the public information centre, which would be the manifestation of this plan, and I am going to I talk about how we see that integrating with the national support plan put together by Emergency Preparedness Canada. I First, I take some pleasure in the fact that we now have an Emergency Public Information Plan, because when I was here two years ago, we did not. In- fact it was Lesley Lynn in her subtle way who 1 embarrassed me into doing something about this at a seminar in Vancouver, which was along these same lines --examining how Canada would support British Columbia in the event of an emergency. We were sitting in a room discussing this and Lesley gently pointed out that while we were discussing how Canada would support B.C., B.C. had no plan to come in support of. I felt we should do something about that and I put I together this plan after a great deal of consultation with many individuals, including Lesley and Larry Pearce, who is the regional director for B.C.. I read the work of Gary Stairs, who is here today, and I certainly Grahame Blundell of Alberta Public Safety Services, and Phil Cogan who is with us today from the U.S. Federal Emergency Management who was very generous with his information... as well as I the Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) personnel, both past and present. I think we have put together a fairly useable and workable plan. What I'd like to do is run. through here is how we did it and what stage we are at now.
I will begin by depicting this overall structure of an I emergency response as it has been planned in British Columbia. As you will see, the Public Affairs Management function is a primary function I of the response. We have two basic responsibilities: one is to operate a media centre, and the other is to deal with public enquiries that would 1 inevitably result from an emergency. The execution of the Public Affairs Plan is the responsibility of the Public Affairs Bureau, of which I am Executive Director, and my colleague Ed Walters who is also in the I Public Affairs Bureau. Because we are not part of the Provincial Emergency Program, but a separate unit in a separate ministry, we have I had to develop some protocols with PEP. I think we have a very good working relationship with that organization and Ed Walters is in a sense a day-to-day assistant in I working with PEP. As I said, we brought this to the point where I have taken the word "draft" off the emergency plan. But we don't feel we have accomplished anything at this stage -- we are just ready to begin. I I think it was Phil who told me that plans on paper are really just the beginning until people are so familiar with those plans that they don't I need them, and they know what they're doing minute by minute. So we I 18 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
are at a point of having to begin to become well versed on what the plan oudines as responsibilities. Because the Public Affairs Bureau isn't part of PEP but a separate central public affairs organization under Government Services (it was under the Ministry of Provincial Secretaries until last Tuesday), we have no legislative. authority to do any of this. So the first thing I had to do was get this plan reviewed and signed off by the Deputy Ministers of govermnent With those 20 signatures on the plan, I now have the on the resources of govermnent to make the Public authority to draw Information Plan work. The resources are mainly human resources. We have learned from past experience that while ministries may have agreed to provide public information officers to an emergency centre, unless you have something more than a gentleman's agreement, you may fmd that when you call on staff to head up to the farm north of British Columbia, which is under 10 feet of water, they have other things they think they have to do. So Fve told the Deputy Ministers that this plan and their signature on the plan means that, without ques tion, when public information officers are required to staff an emergency information centre, they• do it and they take all of the responsibilities for that. This includes keeping their ministries informed of their • whereabouts and so on. The plan has been discussed with all of the public affairs directors of government and they have contributed to that plan. So all of the ministries that also have other emergency responsibilities that were broadly indicated in that structural chart also have contributed to the public information plan. Certain ministries have special responsibilities that show you later on. The plan has also been presented to some of the federal public affairs officers working in Vancouver. I had a very disappointing turnout (which we agreed to correct) but we'll be having another meeting in the very near future. In principle, the public affairs officers working for the federal government in Vancouver understand that this plan implicates them, and they have had an opportunity to look at it. Some of them took that opportunity and the rest will be forced to in a short time. The plan has also been presented to a cornmittee of B.C. emergency planners and broadcasters, a very useful group of people which includes emergency planners from Vancouver and other municipalities, as well as media who have an interest in emergencies and this committee. I don't lcnow if this committee is unique in Canada, but I think Lesley said at one time she thought that it might be, but if it isn't, it certainly is useful and I highly recommend it. It means that on a I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 , 19 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 frequent and regular basis you can discuss such things as provincial emergencies and public information plans with the people who I ultimately make it work, i.e. the news media. And that committee has resulted in some very practical advancements in emergency I preparedness in B.C. Media outlets on the committee have begun to share their emergency plans with each other. We have also been able to package I some information from certain B.C. utilities that have been distributed to the media and that can be used in the first few hours after a catastrophic earthquake if we are not able to contact them. This is I practical information that could be used -- some of it is to be used in the first couple of hours, some in the first 72 hours -- and we took the lead on this information (much of wich is distributed in California by their I utilities).
Discussions are now under way with the Provincial Emergency Program Academy, located in Vancouver at the Justice Institute, to develop a training curriculum for information officers in British Columbia who will make this plan work. Their curriculum, 1 although it is in the early stages, is meant to familiarize them with the emergency information plan, other emergency plans, the operation of the information centre, the psychological effects of emergencies on I organizations and on individuals and so on. I also speak from time to time to British Columbia Institute of Technology public affairs classes on emergency communications, and I have learned that there is a demand 1 among public affairs officers working in the private sector for just such training in emergency communications. And, although I haven't discussed it with anyone, I have in my own mind the idea that once we t have dealt with our own and have trained our own officers, we will open this up to the private sector, if PEP is willing and so on.
I To a very limited extent this plan has been tested. Not in anything like the application that I will go over here, but in the flooding we endure just about every year. We have implemented the principles I of this plan and-Ed has been a key player in that, working in the field as an emergency public information officer; and we have found (and the media has told us in fact) that they recognize there is a certain amount of I thought and training or planning going into this because we are responding much better than we used to. I think one of the things that precipitated the development of a plan that could be used in flooding and I severe weather and so on was a very bad cold snap that happened a couple of years ago. Those of us who live on the West Coast panic any I time the temperature dips below freezing. But what happened was that it was particularly severe weather and the government MLAs decided that they would like to help in some way and they threw their constituency I offices open to help anyone who was in dire straits. It really confused I 2 0 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 1 things more than it helped because the Provincial Emergency Program was responding as it normally did, burinstead of having one number to call, you had a bunch of numbers to call. And, a number of MLAs didn't I get around to opening their offices on time and others opened them and thought: well, supper time, and they closed them. They didn't respond like emergency responders, and furthermore, to aggravate the situation, I the opposition MLAs tended to be more conscientious than the government MLAs. So, at any rate, we thought we were going to have to be not only better prepared for routine emergencies - such as flooding 1 and severe weather - but we had to make the government more aware, so they didn't rush out and try to get involved themselves or at least get involved in inappropriate ways. .I Now let's look at the aim and the structure of the emergency public information centre. I won't go into the planning assumptions that I this is based on, nor the concept of operations, because I think they would all be fairly familiar to most of you in the room. But I just want to touch on the aim and the structure of the centre and on its ultimate aim, which is to establish an immediate and constant flow of accurate authoritative information to the public, primarily through the news media. 1 Basically, we were trying to achieve speed, consistency and a continuous flow of information. In other words,* we had to be in the ^ game and stay in the game until the demand for information ceased. In so doing we had to demonstrate the concern by the government, show the action being taken and also show that government had a responsibility. I This is not for political reasons but for the sake of general public well- being and rising to the concern that the public will feel in the event of an emergency of this nature. And we establish some control over the I rumour and the escalation of a crisis and the stress that government (and any other organization put in this position) would inevitably feel. I thought that if I could keep that in mind while putting the plan together, I I could come up with something reasonably sound in structure. Now to accomplish this, obviously we would have to have an I information centre open in a matter of hours, capable of running on a 24-hour basis, seven days a week. That in a nutshell is why we have to draw on all of the public information resources in the provincial I government. It has to be organized so that the information it does give out is authoritative and up to date and so that the information centre itself doesn't collapse under the strain of the demand for information by the public and the media. So the structure of the centre would look like this. I would ask you to keep in mind that this - according to the planning principle that you plan for the worst and assume you can respond to anything under that - would be a centre that would be established on a seven/24-hour basis to respond to a catastrophic event. When applied to I I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 21 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
lesser emergencies, virtually all of these functions are done by one person. The director of the emergency public information centre - at the moment it would probably be me - would also be a member of the provincial response group so that the information connection is there and the information given out by the centre is verified. It also underscores what Bob Parkins said earlier: the importance of having communications people linked closely with the policy and the decision makers, a principle that we try to establish in other aspects of government work in B.C., but to a limited level or degree of success. There would have to be a manager of this operation to ensure that it worked continuously and that procedures didn't change from shift to shift and so on. The senior co-ordinating group off to the left side would consist of senior public information officers or public information directors from those ministries of government principally involved in the response. They are there to ensure that the information going out from the centre is consistent with what their own ministries are going to be saying and doing. They are also there to prepare daily updates or briefing notes for their deputy rninisters and their ministers, so that we can be reasonably assured that the government as a whole has up-to-date information and is being consistent With its messages. The real work of this organization would be done by the people represented by the boxes at the bottom. The Information Production Section would gather the information, compile it and prepare the information for release. I see this group as also monitoring rumours and media stories that may be going off the rails and also preparing and researching responses to those rumours. The Information Dissemination Section would ensure that information got out to the press in a timely way. They would deal with the press on the telephone as well as in person. They would set up briefings for the news media. They would post the information that's being released. They would set up news conferences and so on. The next box of course is self explanatory - Administration and Logistics - even though the overall provincial response structure would have an administration group, we feel the information office or centre would have to have someone to liaise with that group to ensure that supplies are kept up and to arrange transportation where required for rninisters to visit the sight and so on. And then there would be the telephone enquiry desk, which would deal with public enquiries. I borrowed from Grahame Blundell a 2 2 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 I structure for the telephone enquiry desk to ensure that information is kept in the same spot from shift to shift and that whoever comes in would be well aware of what information has been approved for release and so I on. I should also reiterate that this structure is based largely on information I obtained from Phil Cogan and modified only very slightly, and it has not been tested in its entirety but we expect to do that this I winter and get a better idea if this is a workable structure. Now, if a full-fledged public emergency happened in British I Columbia and let's say to use as a working model - a catastrophic earthquake in Vancouver. The National Support Plan I would assume would be implemented and as I understand it, the objectives of the I National Support Plan are, in a sense, to divert national media and non- media public enquiries away from the site as much as possible in those early hours. In other words, to deal with the routine media as well as I public enquiries that are going to arise in other parts of Canada so that people aren't trying to get through to Vancouver or Victoria when that will not likely be possible anyway. They are also to provide the province I with human resources to run the emergency public information centre. As I mentioned to you I had reviewed this plan with the public affairs officers working for the federal government in Vancouver. I have also ^ told them, as I think they've heard before, that in the event of such a catastrophic emergency, they would become public information officers for the provincial centre and that's by agreement with 'the federal 1 government. Larry Pearce, the regional director for EPC in the west, has undertaken to discuss this delicate matter with each department involved to ensure that they are prepared to respond to provincial needs I and to staff an information centre if the need arises. This is particularly crucial I think for us because our capital is separated, as you know, from Vancouver by approximately 65 kilometres of water, plus some land, I and it is possible that in certain circumstances the first people to arrive at the centre would be the federal people, and possibly in some scenarios without even having telephone contact with myself or anyone in I Victoria. I think we need to test that notion and develop it further. Suffice it to say that we are counting on, if the need arises, having those information officers familiar with the B.C. plan, trained and ready to 1 help us operate an emergency information centre.
The third objective, as I see it, is to provide co-ordination I between levels of government and, I include in that, keeping the elected officials in Ottawa well informed on the status of the emergency in B.C. and the response that the province has undertaken. I
After being alerted to this crisis, my first phone call as I see it would be - if the telephones are working - to start my own provincial I fan-out system, which consists of me or my department calling a small number of people who then take care of the rest of the fan-out for the .1 t I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 23 . PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
B.C. government. That puts all of the information officers in the government.on alert. There are two levels of alert and they would be I immediately put on alert and would then have to be put in telephone range. Again, this is assuming that telephones are working. It would also alert all deputy ministers and all ministers of the provincial Crown. I My second phone call would be to the Premiers office to ensure that the Premier knew that this crisis was under way, and I would also call the Premier's press secretary or deputy minister. And my third phone call I would be to the media to establish, at least, a telephone number of an avenue of communications, if not the fact that an emergencies information centre was to be set up. Then my fourth call, as I see it, I would be to Ottawa to Lesley to give her a status report and to start to open the line of communications which I would then assume would I continue until the, crisis had ended. Again as I understand it, Lesley would in turn update senior federal communications officials, national news agencies, FEMA (if I required), thè general public outside British Columbia, and Canadians in other countries, (I suspect through foreign desks if that's required). I understand that Lesley would also assume some responsibility for dealing with rumours developing outside the province. Again, this is the kind of thing that has to be worked out in tests, but I would assume that one of our problems would be escalating rumours away from the site, which can be sometimes more wild and out of control than those close to the site. Once established, the communications link between the Director 1 of the Emergency Public Information Centre and Lesley Lynn would be maintained throughout the crisis with regular updates at least twice a day, and I would think that it would be more frequent in the early stages. t We're working now on having a predesignated site for the information centre. It's dependent on the PEP's selection of a site for its headquarters in Vancouver. In a catastrophic event in Vancouver, as I I said, the federal officers would report to that site, assuming they could get there without further instruction. We would then be in contact with I them from that point. This plan was presented to the federal information officers earlier and Larry Pearce (EPC's Regional Director for B.C. & Yukon) is going to assist me in dealing with the federal departments to I bring us all to a higher level of understanding. If telephones are not functioning, the initial media contact 1 would be made through the Provincial Emergency Program, probably through their internal radio networks or their ham-operated network. As I understand it, the military based in Victoria has agreed that in the I event of a total collapse of telecommunications they would automatically report to provincial emergency headquarters and, that being the case, then my contact with the media and with Lesley would have to be I through the military, I assume. I 24 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
I should also point out that at the moment Emergency Preparedness Canada and the Provincial Emergency Program in British Columbia are looking at a plan or a concept for an integrated crisis - management structure. The public information side of that is implicated in that plan. Tony Heemskerk, the Dire-ctor of PEP, is here today and he could probably bring me up to speed on how far those discussions have progressed, but I do know that in that report it is suggested that there be an automatic integration of the public information capability in the event of a catastrophe, and that I would assume would mean that one of your information officers working in Vancouver would be named as perhaps an assistant director, if titles are important, in that structure and would report automatiçally to the structure and would be there for the duration. I think that's a concept well worth pursuing and, if that's the case; that individual I would assume would become our communications link with Ottawa and that would be written in as a responsibility. I like the idea. I think it needs to be explored within the context of the overall integrated crisis management structure. So to sum up, I believe that British Columbia has come a long way in the last couple of years - it sounds as if I am patting myself on the back - I suppose I am. But there was a void that was brought to my attention by Lesley and other people. I suppose in some ways I was rushing in to fill a void, but nonetheless I did so, and I think we have. something that will serve as a good start to emergency information planning. I believe that the plans in place make it possible for British Columbia and Canada to practise as well as preach this integration, and I certainly welcome the opportunity to do so. I want to acknowledge again the people from when I have drawn upon the great amount of wisdom -- much of.it is represented in this room. This knowledge was invaluable in putting the plan together, and I think it's a credit to emergency planners that their dedication to the cause of emergency preparedness transcends pride of ownership and makes them all very generous with their information. And with that, I thank you, and I hope this helps to focus some thought for the corning discussion.
GÉRARD 'Thank you very much David. I think your presentation shows how far GARNEAU it is possible to go with the federal government sitting down with the provinces and working out national emergency arrangements to inform and advise the public in a variety of disasters. Now I would like to move to the federal side of the equation and call on my colleague Jean-Claude Paradis to present the communications component of the federal earthquake support plan. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 25 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Mon collègue Jean-Claude Paradis a été intimement lié à la préparation du plan de soutien que gouvernement fédéral mettrait en ouevre pour porter secours à la Colombie-Britannique advenant un tremblement de terre majeur dans cette province . C'est lui qui a mis au point le volet communication de ce plan. Jean-Claude est à la Protection I Civile Canada depuis trois ans. Il a commencésa carrière comme pédagogue mais il est communicateur au gouvernement fédéral depuis 1976. Après huit ans au Ministère de l'Agriculture, il est passé au I Secrétariat, puis chez nous en 1988, comme Chef des services de I communication. Jean-Claude. JEAN CLAUDE David vient de décrire en termes concrets, l'application d'un modèle PARADIS de gestion et de coordination intégrées des communications en cas de I sinistre, en l'occurrence, le plan provincial de communications en cas de tremblement de terre en Colombie-Britannique.
I En cas de "sinistre" tel que défini à la Partie 1 de la Loi sur les mesures d'urgence, ce sont les provinces, dans le cas qui nous intéresse, la Colombie-Britannique, qui assument l'entière responsabilité de la I gestion des opérations d'urgence, et ce indépendamment d'une déclaration en vertu de la Loi. Le rôle du gouvernementfédéral en sera I alors un de soutien à la province. David Richardson a exposé le plan provincial d'information I publique en cas de tremblement de terre, et a souligné le caractère de soutien du gouvernement fédéral, notamment par l'affectation des agents d'information fédéraux dans la provinces à des fonctions de 1 communications dirigées par la province. Voyons maintenant plus en détail, le plan de communications I qui fait partie du Plan national de soutien en cas de tremblement de terre, élaboré par PCC pour l'ensemble du gouvernement du Canada. 1 Je ne crois pas avoir besoin ici d'insister sur la nécessité d'élaborer des plans de communications spécifiques aux situations de crise, mais permettez-moi simplement d'énoncer l'objectif du plan I national de communications qui serait mis en oeuvre dans l'éventualité d'un tremblement de terre catastrophique en Colombie-Britannique, I histoire de bien s'entendre sur ce que nous faisons ici. Objectif du plan de communications:
I - Aider la province (Colombie-Britannique) à fournir, dans les plus brefs délais, de l'information à jour et factuelle .au public et aux I médias, dans le but de sauver des vies, réduire les souffrances 2 6 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
humaines et les pertes matérielles, et faciliter la mise en oeuvre du I plan d'intervention d'urgence.
- Informer les Canadiens, au pays comme à l'étranger, du rôle et des I activités du Gouvernement du Canada dans une telle situation d'urgence: .1 Je n'ai pas l'intention de vous réciter des "énoncées de principes" et d'exposer les "concepts" et les "politiques" qui ont régi l'élaboration du plan. J'aimerais plutôt vous expliquer, en pratique, ce I qui devrait se passer si le plan était mis en oeuvre. Au risque de faire du "nombrilisme", je vous présenterez les principaux intervenants en 1 décrivant leurs rôles, responsabilités et leurs activités. Pour ce faire, on peut imaginer le scénario suivant: I Un tremblement de terre de très forte intensité, disons 8.5 à 9 sur l'échelle de Richter, frappe la région de Vancouver, I à 02 h 15, un lundi matin. Qu'est ce qui va se passer, ici à Ottawa, au cours des heures qui 1 vont suivre, du point de vue des communications? (Noter qu'il est 05 h 15 à Ottawa.) - Dès qu'il en est informé, le Centre des coordination des opérations I d'urgence du gouvernement (CCOUG), à PCC, avise immédiatement le directeur des communications de PCC (Lesley Lynn) ou son remplaçant I - à son tour, Lesley, sort son plan d'urgence, qu'elle conserve sous son matelas, et appelle Michèle Pilon-Santilli ou Louise McWade et les I leur demande d'alerter tout le personnel des Communications et de leur demander de se rendre immédiatement au bureau - puis, Lesley se rend immédiatement au bureau. I Dès son arrivée au bureau, Lesley I - s'informer de l'état de la situation auprès du CCOUG - appelle Dan Gagnier ou son remplaçant au Secrétariat des I Communications et Consultations du Bureaù du Conseil privé. (On peut être certains de l'intérêt du Bureau du Conseil privé à l'égard de l'ensemble des opérations de soutien du gouvernement fédéral et des I communications en particulier. Cet intérêt sera sans doute plus ou moins manifeste selon la gravité de la situation.) - Elle émet un avis aux médias (préparé d'avance) après en avoir I complété les détails. Les versions anglaises et françaises de ce communiqué sont sur ordinateur et des copies sur disquettes sont I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 27 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-13 NOV. 1991
aussi conservées avec les plans. Ce communiqué qui sera émis par télécopieur à une liste de distribution pré-programmée portera sur les grand points suivants: Confirmation du tremblement, intensité, épicentre, région affectée Intervention fédérale concertée et coordonnée pour venir en aide à la province par l'entremise du CCOUG (mise en oeuvre du plan national de soutièn Évaluation des dommages en cours • On demande également aux gens de s'abstenir d'appeler pour éviter d'encombrer les lignes disponibles. Il en est de même pour ceux qui veulent se porter volontairé ou envoyer du matériel on leur demande d'attendre que 'la province (ou les intervenants officiels) en fasse la demande. On donne les numéros de téléphone pour Ottawa, le pays et l'étranger. On indique également que la Société canadienne de la Croix rouge s'occupera des appels locaux. Lesley avisera en outre la Presse canadienne, et les principaux médias dont le Bureau du Vancouver Sun à Ottawa elle communiquera avec les organisations non gouvernementales comme la Société canadienne de la Croix rouge et l'Armée du salut s'assurera que les directeurs des communications des principaux ministères fédéraux qui seront vraisemblablement impliqués (d'après la liste d'alerte) seront avisés communiquera avec Barbara Adams (Énergie, Mines et Ressources) avise le cabinet du Ministres et tient l'adjoint ministériel informé de l'évolution de la situation En tant que directeur des communications, Lesley sera membre du Groupe exécutif, à PCC, et à ce titre elle pourrait être appelée durant la phase initiale à être la porte-parole du gouvernement du Canada pour préciser le rôle du gouvernement fédéral dans une telle situation. Ce rôle reviendrait par la suite, au ministre désigné ou son représentant.
Selon l'ampleur de la catastrophe, il est fort probable que le Bureau du Conseil privé réunira les directeurs des communications des principaux ministères fédéraux impliqués dans le plan national de soutien, pour former un Groupe de communications de crise. La fréquence des rencontres de ce groupe pourra varier, encore une fois, selon la gravité de la situation. Evidemment, le directeur des communications de PCC aura un rôle de liaison important à assumer 2 8 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 ' PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
entre le Groupe de communications, et le centre de coordination des I opérations d'urgence du gouvernementfédéral.
Lesley sera, il va sans dire, en liaison constante avec le Bureau I des Affaires publiques de la Colombie-Britannique, qui sera sous la responsabilité du sous-ministre associé, David Richardson. I Elle entretient également un contact étroit avec l'Alberta Public Affairs Bureau qui sera responsable de la gestion de toutes les activités de relations publiques dans le cadre du Plan de soutien de I l'Alberta à la Colombie-Britannique.
Enfin, le directeur des communications de PCC demeurera I responsable des activités de communications du ministère qui, dès l'annonce d'un tremblement de terre catastrophique, établira un centre d'information pour les médias et mettra sur pied un service de I renseignements téléphoniques.
Parlons d'abord du Centre d'information pour les I médias. I L'annonce d'un tremblement de terre dévastateur en Colombie-Britannique, semant la mort et causant des pertes matérielles considérables (enfin, tous les scénarios imaginables sont possibles) ne I laissera certainement pas les médias indifférents. Le site de la catastrophe sera évidemment le centre d'attraction des médias, mais toutes les sources d'information possibles seront grandement sollicitées, 1 dont PCC, d'où émanera un avis officiel, et qui sera le Centre national des opérations de soutien à la Colombie-Britannique. I Les relations avec les médias seront ma principale responsabilité. Dès que je serai avisé, je me rendrai au bureau et mettrai sur pied le centre d'information pour les média qui sera aménagé dans la salle de conférence de PCC. Sous la direction du Directeur des communications, je serai I responsable de coordonner toute les activités de relations avec les médias: accréditation, organisation des sessions de breffage, préparation du matériel d'information, communiqués, modules de discours. I
Je comuniquerai aussitôt que possible avec les membre du Groupe d'information publique (PIG) leur demandant de rester en alerte pour fournir avis et conseil en matière de communications sur les questions qui relèvent de la compétence de leur ministère respectif.
Formé il y a environ deux ans, le groupe d'information publique (le PIG) est composé d'agent de communications seniors des I I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 29 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
principaux ministères impliqués dans le plan national de soutien.
Le groupe d'information publique assurera la liaison du point des vue . des communications et de l'information du public entre PCC, qui sera le siège du Centre des opérations d'urgence, et chacun des ministères: c'est à dire les directeurs des communications, les agents de planification, les cadres supérieurs et le secrétaire de presse au bureau du ministre.
Le PIG aura un rôle important à jouer quant à l'exécution -- conjointe ou coordonnée -- des décisions du Groupe de communications de crise, dirigé par le Bureau du Conseil privé.
Nous avons en effet demandé aux membres du Groupe d'information publique (PIG) d'identifier d'avance du matériel d'information et de nous en fournir copie dès que possible. Nous nous sommes réservés un coin où nous avons rassemblé ce matériel d'information qui sera rendu public dès l'annonce de la catastrophe. Nous avons jugé qu'il était important de rassembler ainsi le plus d'information possible pour fournir aux médias durant les premières heures qui suivront l'annonce d'une catastrophe.
Énergie Mines et Ressources, merci à Barbara Adams, nous a fourni une trousse bien documentée sur les tremblements de terre au Canada. (Copie disponible pour consultation.) Nous avons aussi réuni dans cette réserve d'urgence des choses comme des cartouches de rechange pour notre imprimante, et une vieille machine à écrire manuelle au cas ou manque d'électricité. Le CCOUG, situé sur le même étage a un groupe électrogène d'urgence, mais pas dans la section où nous travaillons habituellement.
. Les membres du PIG seront appelés à contribuer à la préparation de matériel d'information pour le public et les médias.
Enfin, je resterai en contact constant avec le directeur des communications de PCC, lui fournissant du feedback sur les réactions et les attentes des médias, ainsi qu'avec le responsable du service de renseignements téléphoniques.
On peut s'attendre à ce que la pression exercée par les médias décroisse quelque peu après les quelque 12 à 24 premières heures suivant l'annonce initiale. La grande majorité des médias auront alors des représentants sur le site même des opérations d'urgence. Nous devons être prêts à entrer aussi tôt que dans un mode opérationnel "proactif "dans nos relations avec les médias pour supporter le rôle et l'intervention du gouvernement fédéral à l'appui de la province, sujet le plus susceptible de continuer de retenir l'attention des médias. 3 0 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Le Bureau du Conseil privé serait normalement impliqué dans la planification stratégique des communications et dans le cas d'un tremblement de terre vraiment catastrophique, il se pourrait qu'il décide d'un mode de fonctionnement semblable à ce qui a été mis en oeuvre lors de la Crise du Golfe persique. Service de renseignements téléphoniques
Si on prévoit une baisse ou plutôt un changement de l'intérêt des médias, ici à Ottawa, il serait difficile d'en dire autant des demandes de renseignements du public. Nous avons en effet prévu mettre oeuvre ,un service de renseignements téléphoniques (service 1-800), accessible à l'échelle du pays. Le numéro de téléphone sera diffusé dans le communiqué initial émanant de PCC. Nous avons présentement la possibilité de mettre en service quasi-immédiatement jusqu'à 10 postes téléphoniques pour les renseignements, au public et aux médias. Ce service de renseignement permettra de fournir constamment de l'information à jour sur: - l'état de la situation en Colombie-Britannique - le rôle et les activités du gouvernement fédéral - diriger les demandes d'information vers les organismes appropriés (offre d'aide ou recherche de personnes, par exemple) La responsabilité de ce service à été confié à Michael Theilmann, de la direction des communications de PCC, qui devra: - superviser le travail du personnel affecté au service de renseignement (nous avons une liste de volontaire de divers ministères qui seront rendus disponibles pour venir travailler au service de renseignements téléphoniques) - maintenir le contact avec le centre des opérations d'urgence pour s'assurer que l'information à la disposition des préposés est constamment à jour - rapporter au directeur des communications, l'information ou les besoins d'information identifiés d'après les appels reçus - travailler avec le centre des médias pour corriger les rumeurs et la mesinformation qui circulent dans l'opinion publique s'assurer qu'il y a suffisamment de personnel pour répondre aux besoins du service. veiller à ce que le service soit adéquat pour répondre aux besoins, PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 3 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
voir à l'expansion du service au besoin assure le maintien d'un registre des appels. Le personnel du service de renseignements téléphoniques fera des rapports réguliers au Directeurs des communicaitons et contribuera à identifier les besoins en information et les dépister les rumeurs au fur et à mesure de leur émergence.
Voilà donc dans les grandes lignes, comment pourrait s'articuler le plan de communications d'urgence du gouvernement fédéral en cas de tremblement de terre catastrophique en Colombie- Britannique.
Évidemment un plan reste de par sa nature un plan. Je pourrais préciser que lorsque nous l'avons élaboré, et mis en place les méchanismes, et les outils, comme les lignes téléphoniques et les feuillets de documentation, nous pensions principalement à se donner les moyens d'intervenir IMMÉDIATEMENT. En moins d'une heure, le plan pourrait être mis en oeuvre. Et on pourra, selon les besoins, s'ajuster aux situations qui se présenteront dans la gestion d'un tel dossier.
Cela vous donne un aperçu général des principaux acteurs, des centres de responsabilités et de l'interaction de ces centres entre eux et avec les autres, acteurs importants de la gestion de crise, soit:
le Centre des opérations d'urgence du gouvernement avec le Centre d'information pour les médias et le Service de renseignements téléphoniques le Bureau du Conseil privé et les directeurs de communications les autres ministères (directeurs des communications et planificateurs d'urgence).
J'espère que cette présentation a apporté quelque lumière sur ce qui pourrait se passer au niveau des communications et vous aidera, selon le cas, à mieux comprendre votre rôle, et l'importance de votre contribution à l'information du public en situation de crise.
(Questions and AnswersIDiscussion)
LESLEY I WOUldiUSt like to ask David if he could remember the âme when I came LYNN out and we had a meeting in B.C. to discuss the public information aspects of the plan. I think there were three or four very lively, critical, typical reporters in the room, and I said to you beforehand "Let's discuss your ideas for a British Columbia Plan." And you said "Good Lord, with those people in the room!" And I said "Come on, be brave because 32 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
though you'll probably fmd, even starting off with only vague notions, that they'll be a help.. I think you'll prove the sheer value of worldng with the media." This is a message we have been working on right from the very beginning for about the last four or five years. But you were brave and it did pay off. And I would like to tell you that you're fantastic - what you've done since that time! Bravo!
QUESTION Fil ask the question in both languages for Jean Claude Paradis. Vous avez parlé d'un groupe d'information; je suppose que ce sont des agents d'affaires publique dans les différents départements. Je me demandais ce que vous avez comme plan au cas où ces gens soient absents ou pas disponibles?
I was wondering what kind of back-up arrangements there are in the plan for public information officers in the different departments if people should be away or not available for some reason?
JEAN-CLAUDE C'est la responsabilité de chacun des agents 'de communications et de PARADIS leurs ministères. On a déjà demandé à chacun de ces agents de communication de dresser une ,liste des ressources, d'identifier les besoins en communication chez eux, et d'élaborer leur propre plan interne, au niveau de chacun de leurs ministères. Évidemment, un back- up pour assumer leur rôle et leurs fonctions dans ce cas-là ferait partie de leur plan personnel.
QUESTION I illSt WaIlt to say I also remember a couple of years ago there was no plan to speak of in B.C., and I think you have done just wonderful work in a very short period of time. One of the questions that I have is: why you would not advise the Premier's office first before you went to the deputy level to advise him of the situation?
DAVID Well, that's -a good point. I think that my concerti would be to get the RICHARDSON apparatus moving in the province. I feel that being prepared to respond and getting those people to set up an information centre, and being prepared to deal with the crisis, the public crisis, is the number one priority. And number two, I would alert the Premier. I would assume I am going to be around long enough to make those two phone calls. But I can see your point of reversing it. I just think that the number one priority, as the person responsible for public information, is to get that apparatus moving, and so, that's how and why I.put it in that order. But I would assume that those two calls would be made very quickly one upon the other. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 33 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
QUESTION Maybe you are in a parallel time with the two individuals at the same time?
DAVID That could be. I tried to arrange it sequentially just to give a sense of I RICHARDSON what my responsibility would be in the fan out. But I have Ed, and I have other people working with me, who would more than likely be -- in fact we really act as advisers to the Cabinet, the Premier's office -- and I my immediate supervisor, in the office next door, I imagine in fact would be there, and he would take care of the actual informing of the Premier's office. But it depends on when it comes, and if it occurs in the I middle of the night, and whether I can get hold of him. Anyway that was I my thinking. QUESTION Is EPC working toward establishing a media advisory group that would work with you in mùch the same capacity to review plans, to get feedback from them in terms of public broadcasting use of the media, I working with the media in national plans development? JEAN-CLAUDE Just last week, we were asked to start working on the communications I PARADIS aspect of the next exercise, which will be centered on an earthquake scenario; and our first concern was to involve the media, and I wanted to take this opportunity to discuss the matter with David, how to work that I out - but, yes, it's our plan.
LESLEY Perhaps what you were thinking of, apart from that, was: would the Privy Council Office headed by Dan Gagnier, the Deputy Secretary for Communications and Consultations, be involved? I would say almost I categorically: yes. If this was an earthquake on a catastrophic scale, there would be no question. We do have plans -- the whole idea is to have plans that are sufficiently flexible to be able to handle any kind of I development. Our plans will take care of the immediate response, because there could be a vacuum in the immediate aftermath of a catastrophic earthquake -- inevitably, for a matter of hours, maybe four I minimum, I would think, while the intelligence gathering is taking place. And we are geared up to handle that immediate vacuum, to be supplying the media with facts as they come into the operations centre at EPC - that I is the Government Emergencies Operations Co-ordination Centre. That's why we have a number of fact sheets already in place -- "When is the last time there was a major earthquake in Canada? Historically when have they taken place?" -- because they'll be insatiable in their quest for information. So we do have all this material pre-stocked along with our flashlights and even our old fashioned typewriters in case the power goes I 34 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
off in Ottawa simultaneously.
But we are in constant contact through Len Dent, who is sitting right here, who is our analyst in PCO. Arrangements are such that Dan Gagnier can call a meeting at the drop of a hat and get all of the Directors General of Communications instantly, together with Ministers' Chiefs of Staff, whatever. I mean, we've got the facilities that would allow for almost instantaneous activation of such a committee if necessary. We have facilities which would accommodate meetings such as this and which would also provide for simultaneous briefings of media -- right at our headquarters.
But it may be also decided by the communications group headed by the Deputy Secretary that théy will, after the first few hours, decide that so and so will be nominated as the official spokesperson for the Government of Canada. Maybe the group would decide that they would have briefings at a set hour - just as National Defence did during the Gulf War, in the National Press Building. But the whole idea is to have arrangements .that are totally, but totally flexible.
DAVID « To get the provincial information centre functioning, I have key public RICHARDSON affairs directors who would report -- if it happened right now -- we would report to the PEP headquarters in Victoria without any other contact. If telephones are down and no one knows what's going on, at least that key core group would report communications out of Victoria to elsewhere in the province or indeed to Ottawa. As I indicated, it would have to go either through PEP's radio network or the ham amateur radio network or the military. Failing all of that, I could simply walk to the nearest radio station on the satellite network in British Columbia, and if they are functioning and if they can beam up, I would get the information to the media that way.
But to get staff reporting -- certain key people are asked to automatically report to the centre, and then we would move from there. Now, I think if all telecommunications were down those first few hours, getting enough staff gathered around to actually staff the centre would require a lot of leg work or driving, or something. But that's how I would at least have enough people to work to establish the core of the information centre.
QUESTION (Barely audible - on whether the federal government would at some
point assume the lead role in the overall responselpresqu'inaudible - à savoir si le gouvernement fédéral pourrait éventuellement assumer le contrôle de l'intervention) PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 35 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
DAVID I am responsible for the public information side of things, and I may not RICHARDSON be the most appropriate person to answer this. But I do have an opinion - 1 - and perhaps this opinion comes from years of working closely with provincial premiers and Cabinet members -- that I can hardly think of a scenario in which the Premier of a province would declare that he could I no longer function and that he wanted someone else to take over the government. In those instances and in such circumstances, no matter how much help he needed, he would probably still look upon it as I assistance from Ottawa in dealing with the crisis, as opposed to capitulating -- come and take over the reins of government. As long as the reins of government are being held by provincially elected people, I they would expect provincial elected staff to direct the response. I can certainly see a scenario in which our resources are virtually flummoxed in the sense that we would need all of the human and other resources we I could get our hands on. But I really cannot envision a circumstance in which the government would capitulate responsibility for responding. And I think that it is general knowledge that even the most catastrophic I earthquakes or other such disasters tend to be visited upon the incumbent government. Down the road people tend to hold them responsible, and I think they would see that as well. They would see that no matter - I'll give a short example of a minor incident in which a provincial minister tried to say. this is a federal matter and never recovered his credibility. It involved a British Columbia beach that was being inundated with oil off the west coast of the island, and the first response of the minister was - although he was advised to go to the site - "Well, that's an awfully I expensive helicopter ride. Besides this is really -- you know, the Coast Guard is there -- this is really a federal matter." And he never recovered his credibility, and Jennifer Smyth was in British Columbia shortly after I that and knows that you can't hand it over and say you've had the biscuit.
I (Lunch/déjeuner) GÉRARD This morning we started looking at public welfare emergencies I GARNEAU and heard about earthquake planning as a first example of the kind of serious public welfare emergency which could simultaneously heavily involve the response capabilities of the federal and provincial I governments. The list of major disasters which would bring about a joint response on such a large scale is not very long. But the reason we focus on these in our discussions is that they tend capture our I imagination and enable us to capture all aspects of emergency response -- it's always wise to plan for the worst-case scenario.
I This afternoon we are going to consider another type of disaster which could, if it happened, have different but equally I catastrophic consequences as a major earthquake. We all remember I 36 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. In spite of the public scare, Canadians came to no harm from those two disasters. But stories are still coming out of the Soviet Union confirming earlier suspicions or much more widespread, catastophic and long-lasting effects than ever reported before. Now in Canada, we have three provinces that operate major nuclear power installations: Quebec, New Brunswick and Ontario. There also are research nuclear installations of one type or another in other places across the country. We are certainly. not anticipating a Chernobyl or a Three Mile Island, but if those disasters have taught us anything, it is that we must be prepared for the worst regardless of our well-placed confidence in the safety of our nuclear installations and in the professional competence of those who operate them.
We have asked colleagues from two provinces, New Brunswick and Ontario, to tell us about the plans they have made to keep the information flowing to the public in the improbable case of a major accident at one of their nuclear facilities. We have also asked Health and Welfare Canada, which is the lead federal department in this area, to do the same. Federal responsibilities here include the licencsing of nuclear facilities by the AECB, and of course Health and Welfare's overall responsibility to protect the health of Canadians.
I think we will get from the speakers this afternoon another very good illustration of how the two senior orders of government would be working together in a major civil disaster. First we will hear about Ontario's plans. Owing to the way responsibility for informing and advising the public has been divided up in Ontario's nuclear response plan, the presentation will be in two parts, by two different officials. First we will hear from Kathy Bleyer, who is Senior Planning Officer with the Nuclear Major Emergency Preparedness Section of Emergency Planning Ontario. She has acted in that capacity for seven years, before which she worked as a consultant in land-use planning. Kathy will be followed by a colleague from the Communications Branch of the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Ontario, Stephanie Bolton, who is Communications Co-ordinator in that Branch, which has overall responsibility for emergency communications planning and management in the province of Ontario. Stephanie is responsible for development of an overall provincial emergency information plan and the ministry's crisis management plan. Stephanie has had extensive experience in public relations, advertising and marketing. She is also a volunteer accreditation examiner with the Canadian Public Relations Society in Ontario. I will now invite Kathy Bleyer to come to the podium.
KATHY For any type of emergency which affects the public's safety or even BLEYER just their perception of their own safety, communications is the most PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 37 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
critical element. Without proper communications the operational element can't succeed. In Ontario detailed planning is done both for an operational plan as well as for an emergency plan. I am going to try and be as brief as I can about talking about the operational elements of a nuclear emergency. But I feel it is important to just give you a context in which to view the whole emergency public information function.
The legislation in Ontario which deals with all types of emergencies is the Emergency Plans Act. It was passed in 1983. Now under this act the province, and specifically the Ministry of the Solicitor General, is required to formulate a provincial nuclear emergency plan. This is the only type of emergency for which the province is required to prepare a plan- and it's the only type of emergency for which the province automatically assumes control. Then, in 1986, Cabinet approved the Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan Part 1. This is the master plan and it prescribes the basic principles and concepts, organization and policy for dealing with a nuclear emergency. Subsequent to that, the site-specific nuclear emergency plans were developed and adopted. These are parts 2 through 7. They deal with site specific plans for nuclear facilities at different nuclear facilities in Ontario. These are at Pickering, Bruce, Chalk River and Darlington, and there is also a plan which deals with the Fermi 2 Plant in Michigan, directly across from the Windsor area. It is s. o close that we plan for that as well. So while the site-specific plans all deal with utility emergencies, there is also another part of the provincial plan which deals with other types of nuclear emergencies, and this is the trans-border plan or part 8. An example of a trans-border emergency would be a nuclear emergency outside of Ontario's borders or even outside of Canada, but one which might have an impact on the Ontario public. It could be a utility emergency, such as Chernobyl, or one which involves the release or the potential release of radioactivity from another source such as the Cosmos satellite.
The basic difference between the way an Ontario site-specific utility emergency would be handled, as opposed to trans-border emergency, is the way the organization would be set up to manage it. This overhead shows what we call the Phase 1 Emergency Management Organization. It would be set up to handle one of the site specific nucleàr emergencies. To just briefly go over it. The first line shows the provincial centres that would be set up. The operations centre assesses the situation and directs the implementation of measures to remedy it. The information centre would deal with the media. The second line shows the centres set up in the local area. Again an operations centre would implement the directives of the province, and an information centre would be set up to deal with the local media. The third line shows the nuclear facility which gets involved through the provision of technical data and advice. 38 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
The next overhead shows the make-up of the Provincial Operations Centre in a bit more detail. What I want to do is just point out the numerous representatives that are present there getting first hand information so they can then transmit it back to their organizations for any necessary acticin. There is the operations group which is made up of representatives from different provincial ministries. There is also the liaison group. This is one of the informational links that exists between the province and the federal government during a nuclear emergency. The liaison group includes among others representatives from the federal government and it I:vs.:mid likely be a team that would include a technical person and a communications person. In the Provincial Operations Centre there is also an information group providing emergency public information input into the decision-making. So all aspects of the emergency are dealt with at the Provincial Operations Centre, all the information is assessed at the Executive Group meetings where decisions are taken, and hourly briefing sessions are held to keep all the members of the operations centre up to date.
The information link between the province and the federal government is shown more clearly on this overhead and this illustrates all the lines of communication between the federal and provincial governments. First there is the federal team again at the Ops Centre and the liaison group, and they are in contact with their counterparts at the Federal Nuclear Emergency Control Centre. The Info Centre liaison at the Provincial Information Centre keeps all information centres informed and this would include the federal. public information group. Just briefly, here is the organization of the provincial information centre and you can see where the info centre liaison lies in that organization. The ftmctions of the other groups will be discussed in a little more detail in Stephanie's presentation. • Also included in your set of hand-outs is the organization of the local information centre. And it basically parallels the provincial information centre organization, and again Stephanie will discuss that a little later on. So that's basically the organization that handles the site- specific utility emergency.
This overhead shows what we call the phase 2 organization. It would either be activated in the later stages of a utility emergency. 'That's once radioactive emissions cease and the task at hand would be to restore things back to normal. Or it could be activated to handle a trans- border emergency. So in either case it's a reduced organization when it's compared to the phase I. Its main purpose is to mônitor the extent of contamination and to take measures to restore things back to normal. You will notice that there is an operations centre set up but its staffing is limited to the expertise that's required for the situation. The phase 2 advisory committee is the advisory group to the executive authority, and PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 39 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
it considers all the information fed into it by these other groups and makes recommendations for action. The IMO or the Ingestion Monitoring Organization' oversees field monitoring operations which are carried out to determine the extent of contamination. The GPM or General Province-wide Monitoring is a program developed to monitor any effects on the whole province through selective site and field surveys. In the case of this phase 2 organization, the liaison with the federal govenunent would be through this reduced operations centre. It is expected.that normal communications organizations could handle the emergency information aspect of a phase 2 emergency. But the plan does provide for the possibility of a provincial information being set up if it is seen as necessary. So that is a brief overview of the organizations that would handle the operational aspects of a nuclear emergency. What I want to talk a bit about now is information and how it would be handled. The way we see it is that there are two types of emergency public information and the determining factor is the audience that we are attempting to mach. We call the first type of information, emergency information, and the second is public direction. Emergency information is dealing with the regular media that converge upon us when there is an accident. The audience for this news type information is the general public and the extent of the accident will determine the extent of the interest aroused, and also how broadly the general public is defmed geographically. The audience for public direction is the public most immediately affected by the emergency. Geographically, this audience is defined by a much narrower limit probably within 10 to 20 kilometres of the nuclear facility where the accident would occur. Public direction involves the issuing of public action and directives. We define these as directives from the authorities who are managing the emergency, to the public on measures they should take for their protection. So the audience for this public direction are those people who may have to take measures to protect themselves from exposure to radiation. As examples of protective measures they may need to take are sheltering indoors, evacuating from certain areas, or restricting consumption of certain food items or exposed water. We have prior agreements made with certain media that cover the affected areas to broadcast these public action directives when they are directed to do so. These media are referred to as a designated media and they are generally radio stations but do include some television stations as well. The public direction system is designed to function something like this. As soon as there is a problem, the province notifies the designated media. These media then initiate their own internal procedures to broadcast bulletins which are issued by the province through the operations group of the provincial operations centre. The 40 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
public would be alerted to the occurrence of an emergency by way of some sort of sound signal which would be activated by the municipality. For example in the Bruce area, Ontario Hydro vehicles equipped with loud hailers would traverse all of the routes surrounding the nuclear facilities making the announcement. At Chalk River there will soon be a siren system in place. Now the public would already know to tune into one of the designated stations because public education brochures are issued to the entire population surrounding the nuclear facility telling them what to do when they hear this sound signal. So the sound signal triggers the response of tuning into the designated stations. Directives are issued from the provincial operations centre via fax or computer linkages to the designatecl media, who then broadcast them. They are also immediately passed on by the operations centre to all the other emergency centres at all the levels for their information and action. And this would include the information centres who could then pass on these directives to the general media as emergency information or news. That's about it.
Stephanie Bolton from our Communications Branch will take over and give us some insight on how the emergency information, or news aspect, is handled during a nuclear emergency.
STEPHANIE Much of what I am going to mention we have already touched on, I B OLT ON think, this morning. It goes without saying, however, that these messages should be reinforced time and time again. This morning we will establish that the effectiveness of providing information during any emergency depends upon planning that takes place long before the emergency ever occurs. And regardless of what level of government is responding. The public basically lumps us all together; Lesley Lynn said it very well this morning.
In Ontario the importance of the information plan is not just to ensure that there are sufficient personnel available to handle and inform the media. The plan itself has to be sufficiently comprehensive to handle not only the realities of the emergency but also the public's perception of the event; and that really is the basis on which we wrote our Emergency Public Information Plan to complement our Provincial Emergency Plan. The success of providing information during an emergency depends on the comtnitment and co-operation of governments at all levels. That's municipal, federal and provincial. Our urgency here is to provide prompt and understandable information on events that may affect or simply worry residents in the areas surrounding nuclear facilities, in this instance. As Lesley Lynn said this morning, we all have to sing precisely the same hymn. And even in an emergency there are opportunities to improve the collaborative relationships that we have established. As PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 41 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES • DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Kathy said, the geographical location, the scale and the nature of the emergency will determine the information that is going to be required. But it should not alter the basic communications principles, concepts and procedures that are followed. So even though it is a nuclear emergency, we would follow the same information procedures and policies as in any I type of emergency in the province of Ontario.
The general communications functions that we tend to follow t during an emergency are implemented by information officials at either a provincial emergency information centre or the site-specific 1 information centre: number one on that list is, of course, advising the emergency planning authorities on public information I number two, quite simply, is providing the public and elected and appointed officials promptly with any information that comes available I number three is arranging the news announcements and news conferences so that this information can be properly distributed number four is answering public and media enquiries very promptly number five is monitoring the media so that we can correct any inaccuracies and squelch any rumours that could cause unnecessary concern among the public.
The principles of communications we have already touched on I this morning, but to reinforce the communications approach that we in Ontario try to follow in emergencies, I'll cite four basic concepts that are not actually dissimilar from the federal ones discussed earlier. The first I on our list is the single focus. And by this we mean the steady, continuous flow of authoritative, accurate and reliable information, both internally and externally: internally within the local and provincial information 1 centres, and externally from both of those sources out to the media and the public. The facts have to be presented in a very straightforward or what we like to call plain language in context of the total significance of I the event; in other words, let's not blow it way out of proportion here. If it is a low key event you may be responding with all your resources and the infôrmation is going to go out promptly and factually, but in a low I key manner. The provincial information centre it provides a single information forum in which all the technical and communications resources are represented. So we have at the very top the director of 1 information who is responsible for providing and receiving information to and from the provincial operations centre. He is the key information link, so that the Control Group, which is the authority in an emergency, t is receiving all of the information possible, not only from technical advisors but also from the local information centre, including any concerns regarding rumors or issues that should be addressed and I responded to. He filters all information in there, both as adviser to the 1 42 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
senior emergency management team, and as the individual from whom 1 all authoritative response comes down the pipeline to be distributed through the provincial and local information centres. There are representatives that I will deal with in a moment. Municipal I representatives at the local information centre. Both the provincial and the local information centres have representation from federal officials, as Kathy mentioned, provincial and municipal officials, as well as utilities officials, such as Ontario Hydro in this instance. r The second principle we are really trying to enforce here is that of the timeliness, accuracy and reliability of information, making sure it is shared among the representatives within the information 1 centres prior to public distribution. Everyone should know what everyone else knows. The centres are an extremely good forum to find out whether, for example, Transport Canada might have to reroute I commercial flights. We want to make sure that everybody knows what Transport Canada is doing, by relying on the federal liaison official who is at the provincial information centre to provide that kind of t information. Likewise at the municipal centre, if we hear from municipal officials -- they know their streets, their roads -- there is a problem with a bridge not being able to take the loads, truckers will have 1 to be advised of an alternate route; we want that information shared so that it is known not only at the local information centre but also at the provincial information centre. In Ontario our direction is that we will ensure the provincial responses are operational within the first two hours of a federal emergency call. Similarly our target is to have the initial information statements made within the first hour, so that the 1 issues can be managed properly and operations established to control the development of any inaccuracies in the reporting of an emergency.
Naturally we also want openness and honesty in anything we happen to communicate. We want to make sure that the media are able to receive verified information as quickly as possible, and that inaccuracies 1 will be prevented or squelched as soon as possible.
And flexibility: we will respond with everything we have if I necessary, but on the other hand, if it is something that is quite manageable by the communications branches in the various ministries with co-ordination from the director of information at the Ministry of the Solicitor General, then that is the route that will be taken. So we remain flexible about this in terms of our assessment and we can gear down or gear up accordingly depending on the information resources I that are needed. . Now to the specific functions of the provincial information 1 centre. I will briefly go through the functions of the individuals we bring into play here. I've mentioned the director of information already, so I 1 I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 43 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
won't repeat myself on that particular role. Within the provincial information centre, we have five sections: management or control, media and assessment, media services, liaison and administration: The management section comprises a provincial spokperson through whom the information is provided at hourly media conferences, as well as a nuclear facilities spokesperson, who primarily provides teçhnical information as directed by the provincial spokesperson and as required by the media. The centre manager co-ordinates the operations of the centre to ensure the prompt and accurate delivery and release of information on a timely basis, and also looks after things such as co-ordinating news conferences and ensuring that the monitoring of the feedback processes are efficiently carried out, that staffmg is adequate, and other matters of an administrative nature. The media and assessment section has a news desk that handles all of the telephone enquiries fxom any form of media, and an assessment unit which monitors media coverage, particularly with regard to any serious inaccuracies or misperceptions that require corrective action by the provincial spokesperson. The media services section prepares and produces all releases, backgrounders, bulletins for distribution to the media through the provincial spokespersons. The technical briefers help the writers in the preparation of accurate and easily understood information. Information kits, glossaries, media clippings, any other information materials that can be thought of, are available at the media services desk. The unit also arranges for media tours if required. The liaison section provides updates and answers queries from provincial ministries, the legislature, municipal officials. It is basically a government information source. The administration section handles media identification and registration, building security, office and technical equipment requirements and other administrative functions. The local information centre operates in precisely the same manner as the provincial information centre does; it has . identical five sections. However, it also has included in its management section a municipal spokesperson, for fairly obvious reasons. Under the direction of a centre manager, the management section of the local information centre is staffed by provincial and municipal personnel, with technical advisers from the nuclear utility. Another addition to the local centre is the public enquiry desk of the liaison section. This desk handles all public enquiries and provides activity reports to the assessment section for monitoring and analysis. 44 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
I will now describe the flow of information during an emergency. Kathy briefly touched on this. We have a call that there is a provincial emergency from the provincial control group through the provincial director of information who is a member of that control group. News releases are filtered down through the provincial information cent= manager who makes sure that each of the sections, liaison, media assessment, media services and administration, receive exactly the same notification of what actions are about to be taken, so that when media and public enquiries start coming in, they are given precisely the same response. The provincial centre manager ensures that the information also goes to the manager of the local information centre, for distribution to the media that happen to be on the site there, through the municipal spokesperson.
Likewise, as the emergency progresses, you are going to start to get a sense of what type of information is needed by the public in order to continue to respond appropriately. Enquiries have to be analyzed by the assessment section, the media section and the liaison section. That is done at the local information centre, whose manager will pass it back to the manager over at the provincial information centre. The information will then go to the director of information for discussion and analysis by the provincial control group who will determine what type of action should be taken. And the process starts again in terms of recommendations on a course of action, and back down through the pyramid. It is important here that we have a single clearing house among all of the partners, that we have a single voice to minimize the confusion.
The priorities schedule that we follow in Ontario in these types of incidents is not uncommon to any other type of scenario. The first day, of course, the bottom line is to get information of a practical nature out on how the incident affects the public and what they have to do. So we want to organize to reflect a very Well managed response, namely get our first statement out in the first hour, get ourselves organized in our centres within two hours. We want to start to deliver accurate, timely, practical information as quickly as possible through a clearly defined line of authority. This, as an emergency progresses, can be very difficult to maintain, which is why the interrelations between aLl three levels of government becomes exceptionally important. It will be very difficult to maintain those lines when you have first of all two centres to which the media can go to -- and they are more than likely to go to the nuclear site, or get as close to the facility as possible. You will have experts in nuclear planning who will be approached by the media for their opinion on a particular event. These are the kinds of things you can't control, so a continuous flow of information on a very regular, hourly, basis is our objective here, and to maintain agreement as to what will be said and when. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 45 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
• In day two we still have to maintain a continuous flow of information of a very practical nature regarding the cause of the event, the anticipated length of the emergency and how it is going to affect public, i.e. physical inconveniences in the event of an evacuation: "Do my children go to school?" "What about my mother who is in her nursing home?" "Hospitals - do they evacuate their patients?" And so on. That kind of information we have to get out as quickly as possible.
Thereafter it is a matter of handling information on future • risks, inconveniences. As the emergency beg-ins to gear down, one has to assess how long the provincial and the municipal information centres will continue to operate at full capacity. You rnight gear down on the number of personnel as the incident goes into the recovery phase. Alternatively, you might maintain the local information centre with full resources, but close the provincial information centre and just have information filtered through the director of information at the Ministry of the Solicitor General, who will then filter it to the other directors of information throughout government ministries. We have that capability. So we have to remain very flexible, recognizing that there can be a continuing need for information on additional measures that need to be taken: "Is it still safe to return?" "How will they prevent this from happening in the future?" All these issues can have a ripple effect for many weeks after an incident. One of the key elements when we start to gear down is the knowledge that there has to be promotion of alternate sources of information. Because you close your Centre, people become very panicky that suddenly they do not have access to the government anymore. And consequently it is important that information continues to be relayed, whether through a 1-800 number, or through different ministries. In other words, if it's an agricultural or food matter, where is the number of a communications branch of Agriculture and Food? What is the number of Ministry of Health? and so on. And we would continue to liaise with the federal and municipal officials through the director of information, to ensure that any communications and any misperceptions are accurately dealt with.
I hope this gives you some ldnd of understanding as to Ontario's arrangements with regard to emergency planning and the flow of information among all the government partners, as we feel confident that it would function if it had to.
GÉRARD Thank you, Stephanie. Now, for a variation on the same theme, I GARNEAU would like to call on an old friend and colleague, Gary Stairs, who is a planning officer with the New Brunswick Emergency Measures Organization, where he is responsible for emergency communications planning, and for the development of information systems. Gary has been a member of the Steering Committee which has been guiding the 4 6 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 i PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
federal government in the development of the National Emergency 1 Arrangements for Public Information, since it was established four years ago.. He has lectured often at the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College on the subject of emergency public information. I Before joining EMO, he worked for several years in the nuclear industry where he participated in the early stages of development of the 1 nuclear response plan he will outline for you today. I GARY I am going to talk in pictures rather than words as much as possible. STAIRS I would like to thank Jim MacCarthy from Communications New Brunswick for helping prepare my speech. This morning he passed me a note - he said "Gary when you do your thing point out your extensive 1 experience in dealing with floods, fires, state visits, papal visits and so on. Point out that we have a co-ordinated approach in New Brunswick; I that our emergency management agency works very closely with Communications New Brunswick. Note that we don't wait for information, we seek it. And note that we always get a very positive media response." So that's the written part of the presentation.
This is our big bad nuclear generating station in New Brunswick. It is located on the southwest coast of New Brunswick between the port city of St. John and the state of Maine. That is relevant for reasons we will pass along to you later. When we started to do our 1 planning in New Brunswick, we had no book of rules to follow. So we borrowed extensively from international experience. We stole material from the International Atomic Energy Agency; we borrowed from the Nuclear Regulations in the United States of America; plagiarized heavily from the Ontario Plan; stole a few ideas from Phil Cogan in the back row, and came up with the arrangements that you will find today in New 1 Brunswick.
Our structure on a day-to-day basis is a permanent organization of 14 people with 10 field offices. All of the planning in New Brunswick happens under the banner of the Provincial Emergency Action Plan. It is really a paper framework that provides for a number I of peacetime emergencies and can be adapted easily for nuclear instances or in the case of nuclear war. e Now, in our particular province, I am not going to suggest that we are victims of regional disparity, but I am going to suggest that we long ago discovered very good reasons for working together. I think that when you look at any planning initiative, or even an emergency response initiative in our province, you will see that it is characterized very much by voluntary approaches and co-operative outlooks and I planning. In fact we see ourselves as very integral to something that we call the "canadian emergency preparedness community". And we see b I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 47 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
ourselves as being not the central player but a player which would draw heavily on our neighbours in other jurisdictions.
We began planning for the generating station back in 1976. I don't think we really planned with conviction and with dedication until 1979, at the time of the accident at Three Mile Island. And then, by 1982, in the intervening three years between 1979 and 1982, I think we got our act pretty well together. This is an. old slide, but since that particular slide we have had three more nuclear exercises, so you can see that we have been involved for a long time in an extensive set of arrangements for off-site emergency preparedness. This is our nuclear I plan for Point Lepreau. So, as I told you earlier we have taken the provincial emergency action plan and we have customized it for the express purpose of a Point Lepreau emergency. We have taken the group of people we call the Provincial Emergencies Action Committee, and we have added some nuclear specialists and some weather specialists to come up with what we call the Point Lepreau Emergency Control I Group. I don't think we need to read all of the names off in particular, but you will see a smattering of federal officials mixed in there with provincial departments represented. Also, in the second slide, you will .1 note the military; on an earlier slide you will have seen the Atmospheric Environment Service, and other officials. So the purpose of this control group is really to act as a decision-making organization which gathers in 1 the provincial capital, Fredericton. It takes a look at the data which it gets from the plant and from around the plant itself. The control group decides on protective actions which should be taken in the event of a 1 nuclear emergency, commands and controls operations throughout the entire province, particularly in the Point Lepreau area, and controls public information activities, through the Communications New 1 Brunswick organization, which we will refer to in more detail later.
This is part of our emergency operations centre. And this is I another part of the operations room itself. So what you can see from these photographs is that we have some fairly vast and well equipped facilities. You are not seeing the entire picture here. We think we have I been fortunate to have a government in our province which supports our I off-site emergency planning efforts. In addition to the provincial operations centre, we have specific operations centres near Point Lepreau, one in our EMO district at St. Stephen, which is right on the border of the state of Maine, and another one on the other side of St. I John, away from the potential plume of the plant. And an off-site emergency centre which is about 14 kilometres north of the Point Lepreau Generating Station, that is, away from the ocean itself. And then, operations linkages to the city of St. John and to Washington County in the state of Maine. The off-site emergency centre which I referred to earlier is really the field operations post, the command post 1 in a nuclear emergency, and -among all of these facilities we have very 48 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
extensive communications networks. That's useful in the public information reaLm, because if you lose a mass media linkage or a phone line, you have the extra communications capabilities which enable you to sta.y connected in a crisis.
What's essential, I think, in the case of Point Lepreau, is that we have probably one of the most extensive community preparedness programs in our entire province's -history. We have, since 1979, been into every home within 20 kilometres of the plant. And we have every family on our online data base. So we know what's happening in each household. The second thing is that we went door to door with packages of potassium iodide pills. We did this against federal advice and we did this against recommendations from other jurisdictions, and we're still convinced that it was a timely and appropriate decision for us to make. Thirdly we actually stockpiled this potassium iodide in other locations in the southern New Brunswick area. And we regularly test our reception centres in southwestern New Brunswick for Lepreau. We have a unique cormnunity-based warden service, because of the isolation of the plant. In the case of Point Lepreati, there are no local municipal police forces to rely upon. So we went to the community and asked 25 local volunteers to fit their cars out with radio systems and loud hailers and communications devices. Mid these people proudly wear a warden's uniform and they are active on a 24-a-day basis, seven days a week.
And fmally we have what we call an emergency broadcasting system. It isn't a real emergency broadcasting system per se, but these are arrangements we can draw upon with the news media in southwestern New Brunswick. Through the Communications New Brunswick Group, we have a wire service into every newsroom in New Brunswick, a direct wire linkage and computer communications with all news media in the province.
These are our notorious pills. We have had people ask us if they are cyanide tablets used to wipe the people out in the event of a very severe nuclear emergency. In fact they are simply a salt like substance used to protect the thyroid gland from airborne nuclear material. The card on the left is used when people need to evacuate. It is placed in the window to say "Look, I'm gone; my house is locked-up; we're okay." The guide in the middle is an information product and the action card itself is on the right. In the area surrounding the plant, within let's say 60 kilometre radius of the plant, we initiated something called ingestion pathway planning; so we are planning to protect food chains back through the environment, particularly the marine food chains.
So the nuclear plan in New Brunswick has exactly the same structure and philosophy as the general plan for the province, except that we frequently test the nuclear plan through the notification test. We PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 49 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 •
have specific criteria as to who gets notified first and in what sequence. You v■rill see the fan-out sequence in this particular slide, beginning with the generating station through to our organization. We in turn notify our control group and they invoke their specific agency plans. Our districts invoke the district plans. The emergency operations group brings together the administrative support and the entire public warning and broadcasting network.
1 We've had since the late 1960s in New Brunswick a provincial Emergencies Measures Act which has helped us a great deal in our planning initiatives. So when we actually put our nuclear plan to work in New Brunswick, this plan connects very closely with the on-site plan operated by New Brunswick Power. It centralizes control of the nuclear operations and co-ordinates field response. It provides diverse communications, as I stated earlier: steady flow of data, predetermined protective action guidelines and public alerting in the EB S. The information plan and team have clear ties to other provinces and the federal government. The Emergency Information Services Manual is one which we created initially for nuclear incidents back in 1979. We had so much success with it that we decided to use it for other applications, notably forest fires, flooding along the St. John River etc. So it has been a very productive piece of planning for our province.
Now I am not going to go through the actual function of public information planning. I think Dave Richardson really did a superb job of it this morning talldng about the communications arrangements in British Columbia, which philosophically are identical to ours. And I also dtink the folks from Ontario did a superb job in covering the details of their plan. But I do have my own provincial agenda that I would like to read to you. And some of the specific areas of concern in which we are concemed about in New Brunswick: one of them is that nuclear power plant operators have not been given specific guidelines for on-site crisis communications plans, beyond some broad and outdated pointers from the Atomic Energy Control Board secondly, there is not assurance or tested practice which will help facilitate the communication between AECB, the plant owners, and the public in an oriLsiie nuclear emergency.which may transpire over several days causing wide spread public concern thirdly, the ongoing conundrum remains of how to cope with media convergence near a potentially contaminated nuclear plant site, yet still provide an acceptable level of access to information, visuals and officials 5 0 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Éourthly, we anticipate difficulty in maintaining clear lines of authority, communication flow, and co-rdination among the near site media centre, the provincial media centre and the federal operations fifthly, New Brunswick would welcome increased consultation with other nuclear provinces and the federal govenunent, regarding the public information guidelines for the federal nuclear emergency response plan. This would reduce the possibility of problems of interpretation, potential of jurisdictional conflict. Now, in other words, we think we are going in the right direction, and we think the feds are going in the right direction, but we feel there is a need to really sharpen the relationship sixthly, New Brunswick has some honest concerns about our collective ability to maintain communications control in a large-scale crisis, and to find adequate resources quicldy without some more fully considered arrangements in place, such as the host broadcaster arrangement used for major state occasions fmally, despite our very best intentions and numerous exercises, I have doubts that we will be able to adequately meet the information demands of adjoining jurisdictions in an expedient co-ordinating way. And I say this liased on our experience in dealing with Chernobyl and. other incidents. I feel that particularly in a nuclear incident the information demands are different. I feel that not all of the provinces have the same nuclear expertise and the body of expert spokespeople to draw upon. I think that this is a matter for further discussion and exploration.
So, in conclusion, in New Brunswick we feel very strongly about off-site emergency planning. We feel that it is important on a number of levels. It is important for economic reasons. It is important for social and political reasons. And we feel that the nuclear industry itself has to be really awake when it comes to emergency planning, and realize that the public is insistent on proper public protection for nuclear plants. And this is the rainbow, hopefully we will all live happily ever after.
GÉRARD Thank you'dary. Of course, we chose to talk about civil nuclear GARNEAU emergencies and civil nuclear planning today to enlighten us all as a group as to ways and means of achieving emergency communications co- ordination generally among the different orders of government. But it could also be, Gary, that given the people present here today, this will prove a good starting point for the resolution of the concerns that you raised. And with that I would like to invite to the podium a representative from the other major partner in the nuclear equation, PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 51 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991.
Health and Welfare Canada. Robert Greenslade is a Communications Executive with the department's Health -Protection Branch, or was, I should say, until a few hours ago when he took up a new assignment as Chief of Aviation Liaison in Transport Canada's Public Affairs Branch. Robert has been a communications officer with the federal government 1 for eight years, the last three in Health and Welfare Canada, where he has been working on such things as family violence and seniors issues. Latterly, as a communications executive in the Health Protection Branch, 1 he was responsible for pursuing the development of the communications component of the Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan. I will now invite Robert to give us an outline of that plan to complete the 1 national picture of nuclear emergency planning.
I ROBERT Thank you Gérard. I will be ably assisted this afternoon by Carole GREENSLADE Peacock who is going to help me with the overheads. Carole is the Director of Media and Public Relations at Health and Welfare Canada I and would be the person who would oversee the operational functions of the communications working group. I also appreciate Gary's comments and would hope that this workshop will give us an opportunity to take up I the gauntlet a little bit. With respect to these communications challenges, I might also say that the Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan, or at least the public information aspects of it, are now under review, so .1 that I would think there will be ample opportunity to work with New Brunswick, Ontario and others to ensure that there is compatibility I among the various plans. The Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan covers the federal response to nuclear emergencies requiring federal action and to provincial and federal requests for assistance. The plan is designed to ensure that it is compatible with provincial plans and to provide a I communications mechanism between federal and provincial governments. A number of factors play a key role in the development of 1 the plan. They include: immediate and accurate information on the incident and the possible health affects, so that the affected area can be quickly identified
I the need to move populations in and out of an area.
procedures required to restore normality and resources to assess the I situation until normal conditions are achieved.
the distribution of timely and accurate information to the appropriate I government agencies and international organizations, the media and, I of course, the general public. . I 52 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAP' WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
A nuclear emergency requiring the implementation of this plan may arise from any one of the following causes: - an accident in a nuclear energy cycle in Canada with off-site implications an accident in the nuclear energy cycle in another country. which may affect Canada, and someone already mentioned Chernobyl which occurred in 1986 - an ideal example nuclear weapons testing with off-site implications, which may affect Canada. nuclear powered devices landing on Canadian territory, such as Cosmos in 1988, and - non military vessels, which use nuclear reactors as a primary source of power.
Under the Health and Welfare Act, a major responsibility of the department of National Health and Welfare is to preserve the health of all Canadians. The Minister of National Health and Welfare is the designated minister responsible and the department is the lead federal agency for responding to nuclear emergencies. The department is responsible for the preparation and implementation of the off-site plan, for c&ordinating the federal respinse to nuclear emergencies requiring federal action, and for co-ordinating the response to provincial requests for assistance. Other federal departments maybe involved as required.
The following chart will give you an idea of the structure of the plan. It is headed by a co-ordinating group. The purpose of this group is to ensure the flow of timely information and to co-ordinate overall activity. It is made up of the co-ordinator, the heads of the operations group, the technical advisory group, the public information group, the deputy co-ordinator, the director of the Government Emergency Operations Control Centre, or a senior representative of Emergency Preparedness Canada, and representatives from the departrnents of Natiénal Defence and External Affairs and International Trade.
The operations group's responsibility is to control the deployment and application of federal resources. It will have access to specialists and resources from all federal government departments and agencies.
The technical advisory group provides assessment and information that will help the Department of National Health and PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 53 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Welfare to determine health risks and recommend protective measures, and to idèntify the appropriate technical resources to monitor the situation.
The public information group's responsibility is to 1 prepare and co-ordinate the flow of information from the -Federal Nuclear Emergency Control Centre to the media and to the public. The head of the public information group is also a member of the co- ordinating group. As I mentioned previously, a number of federal departments and agencies will send representatives to the public information group: Atomic Energy Control Board, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Emergency Preparedness Canada, Environment I Canada, National Defence and National Health and Welfare. The basic communications strategy is to plan and operate a communications service that will present a single, consistent and 1 authoritative source of federal government information throughout the crisis. The primary emphasis will be on informing the media, as the most effective mechanism to reach the public quickly in a crisis. Media I relations, therefore, will be a primary focus. The Minister of National Health and Welfare is the single spokesperson at the political level. The key source of public information at the non-political level is the designated official spokesperson who will provide the single authoritative voice of public information on the crisis I on behalf of the minister. In some cases an on-site, i.e. outside the National Capital Region, operations maybe required, necessitating the designation of an on-site spokesperson.
Not all crises under the Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan have the same public communications implications. Generally I speaking, crises can fall under one of three broad categories: - level 1, a situation where public health and safety are not an acute or I immediate risk. But public perceptions of the crisis demand a government response. Again for example the Cosmos incident t - level 2, a situation where threats to public health and safety, would typically be contained geographically or be well defined as to health risk. But nevertheless, generate considerable public concern and I interest, and level 3, a worst-case situation having direct national impact that could 1 span international, provincial or territorial boundaries, and pose an immediate acute threat to health and safety, for example, a major 1 incident in a metropolitan or densely populated area. I 54 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAP! WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
As I mentioned previously, the communications working group is an arm of the public information group that will be assemble to provide basic working level services. The nucleus of this group exists within the Communications Branch at Health and Welfare Canada. During a crisis the group's resources can be supplemented by te,chnical communications specialists, public affairs officers and support staff from other federal departments and agencies, if required. The communications working group functions as the primary contact and servïcing point for news media and public enquiries. The Director of the public and media relations would be responsible for planning and co- ordinating and managing the operational communications activities, including liaison with Health and Welfare Canada Regional Communications offices and with the Minister's office -- that is the Minister of Health and Welfare.
The Chief of media relations would be responsible for planning and managing media relations services -- that is the two major areas of media relations and media operations, which would include research and writing, language adaptations, piint production and distribution, news releases and backgrounders and so on. The media operations area would also provide the first point of contact for all media inquiries. The other group under this person's responsibility would be the media monitoring group, who would provide ongoing media monitoring and analysis and would also be used to identify rumors and control them.
The Chief of public communications plans and manages a a public enquiries service and provides logistical support to the communications working group as required.
Now, as I have mentioned, there maybe a need in certain types of incidents for an on-site communications person. This would be the Chief on-site communications, who would direct the on-site public and media relations, provide staff support to the on-site operations manager and the designated on-site spokesperson, and be responsible for liaison with the headquarters communications working group. And, of course, there would be an administrative group or officer responsible for providing administrative support to the communications working group throughout the crisis.
The final group would be the Chief of writing services, who would work with the technical advisory group and the operations group, and prepare written material in lay language for use by media operations and the public communications groups.
Should an incident occur, the federal co-ordinator assesses the severity of the incident, determines the actions to be taken and allocates PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 55 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
resources. This person would ensure that the Minister of National Health and Welfare as well as federal, provincial and international authorities, are kept informed. The federal co-ordinator will activate the plan by calling the members of the co-ordinating group. The heads of the operations, technical advisory and public information groups will in turn alert their respective core members.
The head of the public information group would.notify the director of public and media relations at Héalth and Welfare Canada, who would in turn convene the communications worldng group, and call together the three chiefs just mentioned. And those chiefs would set their respective areas in motion.
The final overhead will give just a brief overview of what the links are between the federal government and the provincial governments; and that, of course, would be through the provincial public information centres, although the name and the structure may vary a little from one province to another. But I think you can see the from presentations we have had today, that there needs to be link from that centre back to the federal government.
I hope I haven't been too repetitive coming as the final presenter, as everybody has done such an excellent job of conveying the communications objectives and the important messages that we need to get out there. Thank you
GÉRARD Thank you very much Robert. Now the time has come to break up GARNEAU into groups and to use the information you have received today to resolve some communications issues and challenges that are posed in a couple of scenarios that have been handed out to you. We have divided people into seven groups, and four of those groups - the lists are being passed along now - four of the groups will work on the earthquake scenario, which was included in your binders; and three groups will work on the nuclear scenario which was passed around at noon.
We will ask each group to appoint a rapporteur and an assistant rapporteur. The rapporteurs will present the conclusions of the group in a plenary session tomorrow morning. We will ask you to sumrnarize your answers or findings in point-form as legibly as possible and hand them back to us. My colleague Joan Borsu will collect your handwritten notes and have them typed and transferred onto acetates for the assistant rapporteurs to show on the overhead projector as the rapporteurs are spealdng.
During your syndicate discussions, we have asked members of 1 5 6 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 I our EPC team and the speakers who have. been on today, to circulate among the groups, just to make themselves available for information and advice. I
(afternoon and evening: syndicate discussions) 1 (après-midi et soirée: travail en groupes) A THURSDAY NOV. 14 JEUDI G 14 NOV. I GÉRARD Good morning. We will begin immediately with the reports from GARNEAU yesterday's group discussions. Each group is allotted eight minutes I for its presentation. After we've heard from the four groups who worked on the earthquake scenario, the members of the panel on my left and right will be invited to comment and analyze and challenge the I findings of the groups; and, of course, participants on the floor will enjoy the same right of intervention. We will let the discussion roll at that point for maybe 10 minutes or so, and then move on to the three r reports on the nuclear accident scenario; and call the panel back to deal with those three reports.
Now it is my pleasure to introduce this morning's panel. Two members you already know from yesterday's presentations. They are Gary Stairs from New Brunswick, on my far right, and David Richardson from British Columbia, on my far left. The other two members are close federal colleagues:to my immediate right, Len Dent, who is a lieutenant colonel in the forces, and is currently serving as I senior policy analyst in the PCO Communications and Consultations Secretariat. Prior to this he spent over 25 years with the Public Affairs Branch of the Canadian Forces. His experience includes heading the r Canadian Media delegation to Cyprus during the 1974 invasion of the island by Turkey, and serving as Director of Information at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. And to my immediate left is Bill 1 Pascal who is Director General of Communications at Health and Welfare Canada. After eight years at Transport Canada in Regional Operations, where he was involved in building airports and managing I ferry services on the east and west coasts, and handling finances and evaluation services, he managed the federal participation at Expo '86 in I 1 I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 57 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Vancouver and then was in charge of developing a national marketing communications strategy and plan for the Olympics in Calgary in 1988. After that he became Director of Operations in the Communications Consultations Secretariat at PCO, where he and Len had a major role in directing us and other federal colleagues in putting together the communications co-ordination plans for the Gulf crisis.
I would now like to invite the rapporteur - le rapporteur du groupe numéro un, s'il vous plait.
Groupl groupe 1 First of all I would prefer to tell the message of our group in English but SYLVAIN I think it is going to be easier for me and for you if I do it in French. So I AYOTTE invite you to pick up your ear phones. Sécurité civile du Québec Immédiatement après le tremblement de terre, Gon fait état du besoin d'un porte-parole pour présenter un message, un porte-parole gouvernemental, évidemment. On parle possiblement d'une période de temps qui peut s'échelonner entre une et deux heures suivant l'impact. On s'est posé la question, à savoir, qui fera le message? quel est le public- cible qu'on désire atteindre? Le public-cible, à notre point de vue, ce sont les sinistrés et les personnes résidant dans la zone affectée.
Au niveau du message, qu'est ce qu'on peut dire à ces gens-là qui ont été affectés ou qui sont dans la zone touchée par l'impact? À notre point de vue, il y a deux grands thèmes qu'il faut aborder. C'est premièrement un état de situation, dans lequel on fait valoir l'importance de l'évènement qui a eu cours, son impact. Il y a lieu de faire valoir la mise en place du plan des mesures d'urgence, de faire état du fait que les principaux niveaux de gouvernement sont présentement en train de structurer le plan; et, compte tenu de l'importance de la tragédie, faire appel au calme, faire appel à la collaboration de l'ensemble des personnes ayant été touchées de même que les organismes appellés à collaborer. Le deuxième point sur lequel doit toucher le message sont des directives très pratiques: par exemple, on souligne qu'il est important pour les gens qui sont à l'intérieur de demeurer à l'abri, de ne pas se servir du téléphone, et bien qu'il ne soit possiblement pas fonctionnel, au moment ou les lignes vont être rétablies, demandez aux gens de l'utiliser le moins possible, sauf en urgence, pour conserver la liberté des lignes aux intervenants d'urgence. Bref, il s'agit d'attendre les secours, de faire son petit 'kit' de survie dans l'hypothèse où il pourrait y avoir une évacuation, et l'apporter avec soi. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, la source du message à notre point de vue doit être à un niveau assez élevé pour avoir une certaine crédibilité. Cà ne doit pas être quelqu'un à un niveau politique. On pense, par exemple, que Monsieur Richardson ferait très bien l'affaire, c'est-à-dire un sous-ministre 5 8 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
responsable des mesures d'urgence. I Au niveau des môyens de communication, on pense I évidemment qu'il y a lieu de prendre les moyens traditionnels, c'est-à- dire surtout la radio-amateur, les réseaux de radio-amateur, qui sont implantés possiblement dans toutes les provinces et qui sont abilitées à 1 rejoindre un certain nombre de personnes. On a pensé également au système de communication mobile des patrouilleurs policiers qui dans un rayon de trois à cinq kilomètres sont fonctionnels indépendamment du fait qu'ils aient des tours de transmission ou non; et, en alternative, on a pensé qu'il y aurait peut-être lieu de passer si possible par des chaînes radio de la Colombie-Britannique, par exemple, à l'Alberta et, I possiblement de façon plus fonctionnelle, au nord-ouest Américain. On se pose la question si les centres d'opération que ce-soit le PEC ou au niveau local seront capables de transmettre des informations 1 adéquatement.
Bon, on pense qu'il faut être réaliste, le porte-parole se doit absolument de faire valoir que les informations en sa possession sont fragmentaires, qu'il ne peut aucunement faire état d'un diagnostique en termes absolus. Au même titre, il ne peut pas commenter les rumeurs; il I doit se baser, uniquement commenter, des informations vérifiées. Les carences de l'information -- c'est évidemment que les informations sont fragmentaires, mais Insiter sur le fait que, présentement, les mesures t d'urgence sont en voie de structuration. Les intérêts des médias, dans ce genre de climat-là sont de plusieurs ordres: on veut savoir quel est la zone touchée, l'envergure du sinistre, le nombre de blessés, les décès et, souvent, ils vont aller plus loin et demander s'il va y avoir des mesurer d'aide financière pour indemniser les sinistrés? On pense toujours que le porte parole_se doit uniquement d'aborder le volet opérationel pour t l'instant; le reste est prématuré. Il y a des mesures d'urgence qui sont en structuration et, ce qui est important, c'est de sauver des vies humaines. 1 On arrive à l'exercise 2 où on parle d'une réunion préparatoire du Secrétaire du Cabinet, laquelle précède la réunion du Cabinet. En terme d'ordre du jour, on pense qu'il y a lieu de faire un rapport de situation exhaustif sur l'ensemble du déroulement des opérations, y incluant possiblement les intentions du gouvernment provincial au niveau d'une demande éventuelle d'intervention fédérale. C'est une chose qui est excessivement importante de savoir. Il y a lieu d'analyser la revue de presse, d'établir le plan de communication, donc, entre autres, bien camper le rôle du gouvernement fédéral au niveau de t ses responsabilités, et possiblement émettre des suggestions au regard des plans d'urgence sectoriels des différents ministères susceptibles 1 éventuellement d'être appelés à intervenir, si la province en fait la demande. Les grands paramètres du plan de communication dont parle le porte-parole, il ne faut pas qu'il soit trop positif, à notre point de vue, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 59 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
mais pas trop négatif non plus. Il faut savoir doser: il ne peut pas dire que ça va bien alors qu'on est en catastrophe, ni que c'est l'enfer et qu'il n'y a aucun contrôle. Il doit reconnaître le caractère tragique de l'évènement, dire que la situation est évaluée d'heure en heure, qu'il est en appui au gouvernement provincial, qu'il agit à sa demande et en concertation avec lui. Il doit mettre l'emphase, évidemment, sur les démarches qui sont entreprises et se sont avérées positives. Il doit reconnaître que ça ne finit pas là, qu'il y a encore beaucoup de mesures d'urgence à déployer, et faire état des prochaines démarches dans la mesure où c'est possible pour lui de le faire.
Au niveau du centre de co-ordination des opérations d'urgence du gouvernement fédéral, cà nous a posé des problèmes et on calcule que, dans une certaine mesure, il est excessivement difficile pour le gouvernement fédéral d'intervenir lors d'un sinistre comme ça, surtout lorsqu'il est localisé à l'intérieur d'une province. Par exemple, dans le cas du centre de co-ordination fédéral, s'il est difficile pour lui d'intervenir auprès du citoyen, il est cependant de son devoir de rassurer le reste des Canadiens qui eux veulent savoir qu'est-ce-qui se passe en Colombie-Britannique, qui veulent savoir si leur province est prête à intervenir, s'il est possible que ce genre de choses-là arrive chez eux. Çà c'est vraiment le rôle du gouvernement canadien en l'absence d'une demande du gouvernement provincial d'intervenir directement.
Au niveau du plan de communication de chacun des ministères, on s'est posé beaucoup la question et un point qui est ressorti était; il faut absolument éviter, comme çà s'est passé au Québec dans le cas de St-Basile, l'incohérence entre des différents intervenants gouvernementaux. Un petit exemple, très très rapide: Environment Canada disait que c'était non-contaminé, Environment Québec disait que c'était contaminé, ou l'inverse. Le problème était que un parlait de l'eau, l'autre de l'air. Et en temps de crise, bien souvent, on a pas le temps d'expliquer aux journalistes de A à Z. Eux, ils veulent du noir sur blanc et ils sont ravis lorsqu'ils surprennent deux intervenants gouvernementaux, deux sources gouvernementales, en apparente contradiction. A partir de ce moment-là, on se dit qu'il faut un certain contrôle de l'information, une ligne de presse pré-établie, et faire valider l'information à un niveau hiérarchique relativement élevé, soit sous-ministre ou sous-secrétaire du Cabinet. Bref, c'est le principe de la co-ordination pour éviter l'incohérence. Pour l'essentiel, pour un briefing de cabinet, ce n'est pas compliqué comme question: il faut donner l'heure juste. Souvent, comme fonctionnaire, on a tendance à vouloir donner les côtés positifs et cacher le reste. Ce n'est pas la façon de faire. C'est vraiment le niveau politique qui prend les décisions; s'ils n'ont pas le score, s'il n'ont pas l'heure juste, les décisions vont être à côté de la piste et ceux qui vont faire les frais de ces décisions-là, outre les sinistrés, ce sont évidemment les fonctionnaires qui sont chargés de 6 0 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
les appliquer.
Au niveau de l'exercise 3, après trois jours, on fait un bilan médiatique qui est pas toujours très rose. On reproche au gouvernement fédéral trois principaux points, dont sa position distante par rapport aux opérations, par rapport à son implication. On fait également état de certaines erreurs opérationnelles. On soulève que le fait de démolir certaines immeubles a engendré certaines pertes de vies humaines, Et d'une certaine façon, on remet en cause la capacité d'intervention des autorités en place. Quant à la stratégie de communication au niveau de la recherche et du sauvetage, je pense qu'il y a lieu de réitérer que le gouvernement fédéral a une responsabilité relativement bien définie, laquelle se cristallise en appui à la demande de la province. Évidemment un tel sinistre, ça pose des problèmes au niveau opérationnel que tout le monde se doit de le reconnaître. On ne fait pas d'omelette sans casser des oeufs. Il y a des décisions qui ont été prises, il y en a d'autres qui vont être prises, il y en a qui peuvent être moins heureuses; il faut absolument que le porte-parole évite de tomber dans la recherche du coupable et dans la vérification et l'enquête. Ce serait prématuré. L'objectif principal, peu importe le niveau, c'est de sauver des vies.
Au niveau de l'efficacité du plan de communication ; celui de la première journée, bien que ce n'était pas facile, on a quand même réussi à noter un point positif de notre côté, comme on avait misé beaucoup sur l'importance de ne pas être pris en flagrant déli ou d'incohérence; ça, il . n'y a pas un journaliste qui nous a reproché que ce que disait la main droite le dédisait la main gauche. C'est un point qui est intéressant car c'est très facile pour un journaliste de coincer le gouvernement, surtout au début d'une crise.. Lorsqu'on manque nos premières relations publiques, ça fait mal et puis pour longtemps. Évidemment, le plan de communication était loin d'être palfait, parce qu'on n'a pas anticipé les accidents, pas anticipé non plus qu'éventuellement on pourrait se faire taxer d'être distant. La préoccupation des autorités par rapport aux médias, on a eu une longue discussion mais je ne suis pas certain d'avoir une réponse la dessus. Il est très difficile d'être pro-actif en urgence et c'est encore plus difficile pour le gouvernement fédéral qui n'a pas le levier des opérations, à moins que ça soit une crise de nature nationale qui implique plusieurs gouvernements provinciaux, et qu'il ait un alibi pour entrer dans le dossier. Si il n'y a pas de demande, qu'il n'intervient pas directement, c'est délicat pour lui. La critique selon laquelle le gouvernement fédéral est distant, je pense qu'il est presque pris pour vivre avec, en tous cas, pour un bout de temps.
A plus long terme, on retient l'idée de la Colombie- Britannique, qui est excessivement intéressante, d'impliquer les médias, non pas en urgence, mais dans la planification des mesures d'urgence. C'est une bonne chose de les inviter à participer; c'est pas sûr que la PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 6.1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
réponse soit toujours très très bonne, mais dans la mesure où ça peut fonctionner un peu, ça les sensibilise à la complexité des mesures d'urgence, à la complexité des problèmes. Les journalistes, il faut les comprendre. Ils ne sont pas toujours faciles; c'est pas facile poour un intervenant d'urgence d'avoir à 'dealer' avec ces gens-là. Ils ont un travail à faire, ils ont un mandat à réaliser, c'est une 'bigbusiness'. Je vais juste conclure avec une petit anecdote sur les feux de forêts de l'été dernier. Louis Lemieux de Radio-Canada m'a dit "J'ai deux techniciens, j'ai deux recherchistes, il y a deux 'trucks' puis il y a mon caméraman et moi. Là, ça fait trois jours que je montre la porte du centre de co- ordination, je veux voir le feu!" Dans une certaine mesure, il faut leur donner ce qu'ils veulent, il faut les organiser pour ne pas se faire organiser. Merci.
Groupl groupe 2 In our group we have two planners and about five communicators, none PETER of whom wish to do the presentation. Phil Cogan declined saying he was RUSSELL a foreign alien. That left Claude and myself. Alberta Public Safety Services From a communications perspective, what emergency information should we be the cotnmunicating to the public? As you see up there, information packages have been pre-distibuted to all the municipalities. Where they have the means of disseminating this information they should do it. The public affairs division of the Provincial Emergency Program, PEP, will conununicate emergency information where they can, both to the media and to the public. Outside B.C., we would see EPC communicating into the impacted area by whatever means they had, and deal with national and international media re quests. What are the important messages they should be sending? Again these have been pre-packaged for possible future use: public safety and public advice both from inside and outside the affected areas. As group 1 mentioned, much use should be made of the ham operators in the dissemination of information. Use the municipalities for general earthquake information, and use the federal resources to reach the B.C. population in the impacted area by utilizing national communications outside of the area, as you will have people inside the area with battery radios which should be able to receive communications from the outside. Alternative means of getting information in and about the municipalities, as we have seen in many situations, are: helicopters equipped with loudspeakers, search and rescue teams and foot patrols, and word of mouth. Would operational information supplied by the municipal, provincial and emergency response centres in BC be sufficient for the government communicators? No. Our group felt that operational information does not always make adequate communications 6 2 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
information. And how could we get-more complete information? By using our own resources, information officers, and putting them into the field to collect information if there is a lack of communications, or pre- assigning within the municipalities people who would be capable of I collecting and reporting information. What areas of information would be of most interest to the media? It was felt that some of the key areas would be statistics (how many, how much); what was being done for 1 clean-up, accommodation and financial assistance; and references to .after shocks (what to expect, how many and what people should do). I Turning to exercise 2; with the Privy Council Office having its second meeting of the day in preparation of the Cabinet Meeting, the J agenda should discuss the overall situation in B.C., with an assessment of media coverage to date and of needs that Ottawa can fill to assist B.C. in its communications role. The government spokesperson will reaffirm I the position of the federal government and its willingness and readiness to step in and help, if requested. In the Government Emergency Operations Co-ordination Centre in Ottawa, they should review the I NEAPI Plan and see what parts can be implemented to assist B.C., inasmuch as BC has not requested a formal state of emergency. Each department of the federal government should examine its emergency I support function to see how it can assist in the province. Essential points that should be highlighted in the Cabinet briefing would be a complete media analysis and a situation analysis of what the federal government 1 has done so far in the crisis, what is being done now, and what resources have been committed and what ones are in reserve. 1 Going to exercise 3- concerning the development of a communications strategy on search and rescue in co-ordination with the province, there are concerns over the rescue techniques being used in the I municipalities with the heavy lift and the demolition of the buildings. We have to use the best training skills available for search and rescue, following proven procedures, to prevent further loss of life. I
On the last point in exercise 3: 'based on the scenario, would you say the government has responded effectively?' we feel that the 1 government responded to communications issues as best they could under the circumstances. On whether the government communicators showed a defensive attitude toward the media, we feel that government r communicators are not generally defensive, * though government as a whole is sometimes perceived to act defensively toward the media. As to the use of media or public environment analysis as a yardstick to assess 1 the effectiveness of government decision-making and operations, governments tend to conduct only superficial media analyses - they don't go into it in great depth and tend to just go on doing what they are doing. ^ I I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 63 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Group/groupe 3 Good morning everyone. First of all I would say we had a lively spirited CINDY group, and once again, nobody seemed willing to talk - but me. STEVENS Government of Okay. So the question is, who should be communicating Manitoba. after this incident? We felt that this would be an emergency where the provincial govenunent would take the lead; we thought it would be well beyond the scope of the City of Vancouver to deal with this on its own. Officials obviously would be getting support from the municipal governments in Vancouver and surrounding areas, and also from the federal govermnent. We didn't really get into too much discussion on who the spokesperson would be, not knowing exactly how it would work in B.C. But obviously, it would be someone who would be in charge of communicating public information during emergencies.
The messages to convey to the population? We thought the first thing would be: what happened and what is the government doing to respond, so that the population feels a little bit more confident from what is going on; evacuation and survival info, where the reception centres are, and what people should do in case there are more after shocks and if one's home, or wherever you are, has been damaged. We also said, realizing that the phone lines were down, we thought at this point that we should also be setting up registration and enquiry numbers so that they would be ready to go once the phone lines were operational. And we also thought we should confirm to the population that there had been casualties, but it was too soon at this time to give numbers as to how many had been killed or injured.
Means to reach the population? We, as the other group, said by radio ham radio, provided that there were towers standing. Some of the technical people in the room said that may not even be possible. We discussed the possibility of a military portable radio system. And we also here got into a discussion about considering delivering messages in alternate languages, which may not fit this question but that's where we discussed it. There may be people . who need survival and evacuation information who do not speak english and we should be considering alternate language provisions as well. Alternate means of getting the message out? If we didn't have a radio system, we said we could use loud hailers. We discussed leaflet drops toe central locations; again that would be using nmners as we've got below, people doing it on foot as much as possible. Hopefully this would be information that would be pre- packaged about health concerns and how to keep yourself safe after something like this has occurred. We did realize that this wouldn't be the easiest thing to do, given the scenario, but if it were possible, that it might be another way to get the information to people.
We did not think the operational info was enough for us to mount an effective emergency public information response. We did not 64 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
obviously have enough information as we would like. As conununicators, we like to know everything that is going on so that we can get that out as quickly as possible. With no roads and no power, it is very hard to get information and we felt that anyone doing titis job in that situation would have a tough time.
Deficiencies in the information? We thought that we didn't know the number of dead, we didn't know the extent of the damage and we didn't know the full ability to care for injured and receive evacuees in the early stages. We didn't know how many hospitals had been damaged, how many reception centres had been effectively set up at that point. We though that this deficiency in information would be corrected as the response operation continued and more information became available, and the search and rescue people were able to do their jobs a bit better. We also thought we could help to correct some of the deficiencies in information by using prepared fact sheets on earthquakes and previous scenarios of this type, to give to the media in particular.
What do media want to know? Site and location of the earthquake; number of dead and injured; amount of damage and the area of the damage --obviously, eventually, they are going to want to know dollar figures, but not on the first day; who is in charge of the response; what are we doing to respond; and further seismic activity if that's possible, and what could that mean for people.
The meeting agenda: we said it should include an assessment of the situation; the communications problems -- since this is a communications group that is meeting — the gap between perception and reality. We were seeing that the media were perceiving a hands-off mode from the federal government, whereas it was responding as required at that point. We also were recommending that perhaps the Prime Minister might want to tour the site with the B.C. Premier to show concern for the people that have been affected. And we would also at this meeting put together advice to rninisters on a communications strategy for the next couple of days.
The communications plan content for the spokesperson? We thought this should include a situation analysis, a response to the criticisms of the federal government. If this were a federal spokesperson, he/she should be able to respond to criticisms that the goovernment is taking a hands-off attitude; say what is being done by the federal government and the government in B.C., and why; clarify the federal government's role of supporting provincial response efforts; explain how the response efforts work, how the Emergency Measures Act works, etc. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 65 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
The government EOCC: liaison with the province and other responding agenciès and government departments should be its main role. It should do a daily media analysis, a briefing and daily mini- strategies for ministers on the federal role i.e.: what the government spokesperson is saying, and be consistent. This is to be sure that the people in the media centre are saying the same things as the official government spokesperson, and to be sure that they are, monitoring exactly what they are saying. Other responsibilities are preparing I backgrounders material, questions and answers, press fines and media releases, and also setting up a public enquiry line across the country. Other departments. communicate through the government centre -- we I thought everything should be coming through one area; we didn't think departments should be setting up their own phone lines and doing their own communicating, but that they should come through the central I government office. And they should also be providing communications resources to the central EOCC.
I The essential points for the Cabinet briefing, we thought, were: the state.of the emergency at the moment; response operations at all three levels of government so that Cabinet had an overview of what 1 everyone was doing to respond; how the media are reporting the story and recommendations on a communications strategy.
I For the search and rescue strategy, we thought we should be . focussing on the positive results, although there had been some criticism of efforts so far. We should be saying we have rescued this many people; I these are some of the positive things we're. are doing; talk about our successes; explain why search and rescue are being carried as they are. Obviously, the people involved had good reasons for doing what they I were doing, and we thought we should be getting that across. We should also provide information on what we are going to be doing today and over the next few days. If possible, provide media tours of select search I and rescue areas and locate rescued survivors and rescue team members for interviews with the media. We also thought we could be providing I agency spokespersons, volunteers, reception centre people, Red Cross people and this was all in an effort to provide some human interest I backgrounders for the medias, to give them a little bit more to focus on. The efficiencies - the actual question here is: "Which elements of the information plan you developed were efficient, and which yielded I poor or nil results?" We thought some positive results had come from establishing public and media info lines. We had established and communicated the location of reception centres to evacuees. Some of the I negatives appeared to be the explanation of the federal government's role, and insufficient information for evacuees who had actually left the I area, wanting to know when they could go home, etc. I 66 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Based on the scenario to this point would we say that the government had responded effectively? We thought not necessarily, but if they had followed our recommendations they would havé been fine.
Last question, "Do government communicators take a defensive attitude?" We all agreed that no, we hope we don't, but Fm sure that happens to all of us at one time or other, depending on the issue. We also agreed that is not the way we like to work, and we felt the media should not be the only yardstick to measure how a goverrunent responds. They should be part of the equation on issues management, but we should also be considering research, opinion polling, effectiveness of the program that you are operating on at the time, and also the dollars in your budget. Of course we all know that usually political masters are only looking at what is on the front page of the newspaper but if it ain't a perfect world - that is what we would like to see.
Grouplgroupe 4 Well, good morning all. At the risk of repetition for the fourth time - BARRY here we go. And hopefully we'll have a couple of additional items to FREWER throw up. Department of National Defence Certainly, the magnitude of the mass confusion that would erupt that first day is going to cause the media to focus on every area. We saw the communications responsibilities lying first with the city of Vancouver. They will be flooded with calls looking for response; they have the responsibility to get it together and respond accordingly. The province would assume the lead in the communications co-ordination, we would hope, in very short order, working very closely with the municipality as well as the federal government, through EPC. The province would establish the principal information centre that would have ties federally there, and with the municipality.
Well how about the messages. They must convey information about what is being done to respond to the emergency, and also have that tone of instilling confidence in the population. We saw factual explanation of the situation as paramount, with assurances that the emergency plans are being activated and that guidance is being given for personal safety and also medical assistance -- both for the present situation and what to do if future shocks should occur. Also to advise the public on sources of information, particularly hotlines that may be set up that they can call to find about evacuation plans and other procedures to follow as the days unfold.
. Naturally the media -- we also saw the community press in the area -- may be a good means of getting the message out in their communities within the Vancouver area. The use of ham radio, also the use of military radio -- by now we would be calling upon the military to PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 . 67 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNULP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
set up emergency communications. Conununity wardens could also expedite the information flow in their respective hamlets. Also we saw the use of helicopters with loudspeakers and the dropping of leaflets. There may be problems of air space management in this regard, but I think that is probably a very viable option if the devastation were so catastrophic that other means of transportation were too difficult.
The effectiveness of municipal, provincial and federal operational information exchange -- we can definitely expect some confusion initially. The need for verification and the co-ordination process are going to be paramount for us right at the outset, to ensure we • have consistency and accuracy in the flow of information. Also the recognition that confidence would only be built up over time: with that mass confusion initially, it is going to take lime to work up confidence. The deficiencies we saw in the plan in the initial stages would be in information gathering -- ensuring that it was done expeditiously and accurately -- and also in marshalling sufficient resources to cover all areas. At this point we would be really considering calling on federal information agencies and others to provide additional resources if they weren't forthcoming immediately in the execution of the plan. Also a need for more up -o-date information, possibly using surveillance flights and also satellite photography. What are the areas of media interest? As mentioned before the casualties, the extent of the numbers, noting the human tragedy of it all. The focus would be on the human suffering; property damage; the dangers hiherent in the situation; the responsiveness of government -- how quickly the government is responding to the emergency at all levels; rescue operations and how these will unfold. Also, after probably the first twenty-four hours, we would see some questions on the political leadership and the expectations there: looldng for commentary from local and municipal politicians and at higher levels.
Now we took otr focus from managing the situation in the B.C. area back to Ottawa, inevitably, and the Cabinet committee emergency agenda that first day. Naturally enough, they would want an overall situation report on the magnitude of the B.C. crisis. They would also probably discuss the command control and communications aspects of it all. Also how to position the federal government in a leadership role, but in juxtaposition and in balance with the support role they must play, recognizing that it is for the B.C. government to manage this one. Also asldng various departmental representatives to have a look at their contingency plans and discussing of the allocation of r- esources in the days ahead, as well as the role that individual ministers will play. 6 8 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 ^ PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
The communications plan for the government spokesperson: I the spokesperson, we believe, must be at the ADM level or above. That individual must be prepared to give those regular daily briefings to the media, and there should be in place a very good process to update that r spokesperson -- the requirement for regular media analysis, the development of press lines, questions and answers, interdepartmental liaison. I
On the media relations side, we saw the tremendous impact this event would have on international media and the need for media I pools and accreditation, and co-ordination of access to the site. That's a question that needs much further exploration. t As for the public enquiries aspect, we see the requirement for multilingual resources to be set up, and for establishing and publicizing the various telephone lines that would be available; briefing enquiries I officers and establishing liaison with non-governmental organizations involved to ensure that information is shared regularly. I With regard to the departments - definitely they must have well established media guidelines that would be worked out in consultation with PCO and EPC to ensure that they stay within their I mandate. They will be in a response mode and there will be media seeking information from them. But the only way we can ensure consistency and co-ordination is to ensure that they remain within the I mandate. For example the military would only discuss what their support role is in assistance to the operation. Policy announcements, I ministerial announcements that individual departments might be making must be filtered through PCO to ensure consistency. Also, it is of paramount importance, that government departments co-ordinate I properly with their regional offices on the lines and role that they should be playing. I The communications group's briefing to Cabinet: we would expect that Cabinet would want to know what the process is for managing the flow of information; also media issues and the issues I management approach, when you consider the perceptions versus the realities of what is happening on the west coast. There should also be a plan for drawing attention to the government's efforts since we saw, at I this stage, that the federal government is taking a lot of hits from the media. Somehow if we can get provincial B.C. authorities to publicly recognize that we are playing a very good honest broker role, and that 1 we are of tremendous support to them, to come on camera to discuss the role that the federal government is playing in assistance to them, would be ideal. 1 Getting back to the west coast again, we looked at the I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 - 69 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
communications strategy for the search and rescue effort within the municipality. In developin&the strategy, we wanted to home in on what the identification of the problem is, the way the media have been playing it. And we saw a misunderstanding, or really a misperception, of the rescue efforts. Our objectives in establishing a communications strategy must be able to demonstrate why and how effectively we are doing what we are doing. We would have a pro-active media campaign that would use front-line experts as credible sources of information, to explain just what is going on, as well as teclutical briefings and updates for the media on a regular basis. We would also work into this strategy local politicians and community leaders: they are needed to provide a leadership role image. The effecdveness of the information plan: we tended to be very critical of ourselves when we looked at it. We only wanted to discuss, here, the downside. We felt we did fail, in those early days, to provide the full assurances that the response efforts were effective. Definitely, that's the way some of the media were playing it. We had difficulties in correcting inisinformation. We_ just didn't have the resources to get back quickly to the media, to correct all the errors. We did not win the media's confidence. We recognized very quickly that, although we wanted to control the media, the best we could hope for was good management of the- information flow. We thought it was reasonably so, given the circumstances. But it does take time to win confidence and we hoped that would build up over time. Finally, we examined the importance of media an alysis. We saw and accepted the media's adversarial role in something like this, turning over every rock to examine the shortcomings, as they believe is their duty to the public. That adversarial role does breed a certain defensive attitude in government communicators. We hope we can strive to overcome that. The soundness, really, of government decisions and policies, is seen in their execution and how they impact on the public, how the public and the media react to them. Public and environmental analysis is required as a yardstick to measure that effectiveness of the execution of the government policy decisions. It assures the soundness of government decision-making and the development of effective communications strategies to meet changing situations.
(Analysis by Panel Members/ analyse des membres du panel)
LEN DENT First of all, I would like to say these were just excellent presentations. From my experience, there is really no right or wrong answer to these questions. And even if you thought you had the perfect answer on any 7 0 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
given day, that answer probably might not be used just because of circumstances. I think we have all run into those situations. I just want to make a few gèneral overall comments.
In my mind there is no doubt that the federal government, because of the enormity of this situation, would be involved in this kind of disaster; I think that would be a given. And from the centre, the first thing we would be doing is ensuring that the government and Cabinet were involved and aware of the situation, the public environment, and sort of analysis of what the media were saying. There give them some would be a meeting, undoubtedly, because of the implications for so many different departments, whether it would be Transport, Defence, Health and Welfare, CMHC etc. They would ail be around that table. And the first thing we would want to do is to identify the issues with which the govermnent would have to deal, and then, to indicate that the govenunent has to address those particular situations.
And one point I would like to make -- and sometirnes it is forgotten — is that even though a department feels it is going to deal with something, while the media may very well call that department or that ministers office, there is no doubt thàt if not the first call, certainly the second call goes to the Prime Minister's Office. And they always want a .comment from the Prime Minister of his press people as to how they feel about a situation. So we can never rule out the Prime Minister's Office and that's on any situation.
I am not so sure, although Mary Collins was in the scenario as the lead minister, in a situation like this, I'm not so sure she would be the lead minister. Kim Campbell, maybe - but more likely the Prime Minister may very well want to take the lead on this himself.
With respect to government spokespersons, that's a difficult, difficult situation. We discussed this at great lengths for I guess a couple of months between Bill and Lesley and Gérard and I, when we were all involved, and a few others in this room, looking at the possibility of a government spokesperson, the way the Americans operated in the Persian Gulf war. And I think we came to the agreement, that we couldn't have an agreement on that between different departments. So whether or not we could have a government spokesperson on that matter, I sincerely doubt it. The government spokesperson probably would be the Prime Minister at the lead, and everybody would have to follow from what he was saying.
One of the things I am sure we would be saying is that the Prime Minister would have to come out and make a statement. I am not so sure I would recommend that he go to the west coast on the first or second day because this could depend on the government and how the PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 71 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
government is perceived. It would probably interfere with the operations and be seen as that, if he were to go out there. But certainly he ought to have some sort of - he could certainly go on national television and state the government's position, identify the problem as he sees it and to tell the people what has been done, what is being done, what I is being planned and some of the problems that have yet to be dealt with.
One thing that concerns me -- I don't have an answer for it -- I but having all of these different officials who are responding to the media, ideally there would be one responder, probably in the Province of British Columbia. Now, I am not naive enough to think that is going I to happen. But I think we have to look carefully at how many people would be responding. And I think that one of the successes we had in the Persian Gulf War was the fact that we had that meeting everyday. We I were able to sort out the themes, the messages and the lines, and we got that to everybody. And that really formed the basis of what everybody I said throughout the day. Something that I think was missed in your considerations, there would be some fairly significant international implications of this I disaster. You would have to start getting messages out to our various embassies around the world and what they should be saying to foreign I governments, and what they should be saying in response to the hundreds of calls that would be coming in to those various embassies around the world about the situation. And certainly, there would be some I implications for the Port of Vancouver, and what that meant to trade, because that's the second largest port in North America, and there are a I lot of foreign holdings in British Columbia. I would like to conclude by just saying that from the point of view of looking at what the media do and analyzing how we react, we I found through the Persian Gulf War that on a daily basis we were getting a media analysis done by, co-ordinated by EPC; we were also getting some polling on how the public felt on a very regular, very frequent I basis. And although that didn't direct what we did, it certainly helped to decide when and how we were going to announce particular decisions. And that was done, as I say, on a very regular basis, and I think in the I future that is the way we would operate. In conclusion, I thought that if we took those four presentations and put them together and did away I with some of the repetition we would have an excellent plan. Thank you. DAVID I, too, thought that the presenters covered the ground very well. There I RICHARDSON were obviously some good discussions last night. There were, I think -- I think most of the presenters danced around something that is a pretty significant problem. And that is the alternatives to telephones. I know I that some of the groups I sat in on looked at it in some detail. But there I 72 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
aren't any easy answers as to how you establish and maintain contact with the news media if the telephones are down. And L think that in this scenario, as it was mapped out, you could assume that telephones ■,vere down in those early hours. And it is something that I am going to take back with me to work on and get Ed to work on. We do need to have some established networks of alternatives to the telephone that we -- that are quite specific, and we are going to have to get some agreements -- I think, perhaps, on paper -- to ensure that when the- time comes, we don't fmd ourselves competing, perhaps, with the operational people for information. We have to have our own networks that we can rely on, and Phil Cogan has some good ideas in that regard; we'll tap his brain.
The other thing, I think that the last paragraph in Exercise 3 was put 'there for a good purpose. They asked us to discuss the matter of defensiveness and the sort of relationship that government has with the news media, and I think it is important because, usually, that defensiveness knocks you off your game plan. I have been in government for a long time and I am of the opinion that we do tend to lapse into defensiveness in dealing with the press. Especially when they get us on the run. And I think that we can't dismiss that natural tendency. Part of what emergency planning is about, as I understand it, is anticipating problems that you can virtually count on happening. I think you can count on having problems such as outlined- in the search- and rescue scenario where the media begin to accuse you of killing people, instead of saving them. You know that those things are going to arise in an emergency of these dimensions, and the governments should be planning their response to that.
What are we going to say and do when these things inevitably arise? I think the hardest thing for the federal government to do in this sort of scenario would be to resist the temptation to intervene when the pressure begins to mount. And part of the reason that the media will mount pressure, I think, is because they won't be familiar with the agreements, as familiar as we are in this room with the agreements between the federal and the provincial governments. They simply see a problem developing, they, those media who are used to plaguing your ministers, will come to you and say "Why aren't you doing more?" I think familiarizhig the media with these agreements is important, as is briefing Cabinet -- I didn't notice the emphasis that should be placed on familiarizing rninisters with what the agreement is, and what their lines are going to have to be when the press inevitably begin to mount that pressure. I think the natural tendency to lapse into defensiveness is the only thing that - if we do a proper job of planning -- the only thing that can throw us off that is the tendency to doubt that once the media begin to question you.
I think that briefing the spokesperson adequately is part of the solution as PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. '13-15, 1991 73 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
well: you can't have those moments of doubt appear there on camera or things will begin to slide. But, generally, I think that the ground was 1 covered very well and the exercise has given me some things to take back and work on. I think it identified a lot of the shortcomings we have been aware of but we still have to nail down.
BILL PASCAL I am not going to comment on the presentations because I think by in large you have most of the key points there. What I would like to do is make a couple of observations about situations like this.
I The first point is, the story is going to evolve. What we have seen from the centre, looking at a number of crisis situations, obviously not of this magnitude but of similar nature, is that the story line will I evolve. It will move to a human interest dimension, and then- it is going to move to who's to blame and, at the speed at which that happens, you've probably got about three days before you get to "Why didn't you do I that?" and "Why are you to blame for this?" So there is a time, a very compressed time, to get your act together, to be in a position to respond.
I The second thing that I would make an observation on is that however you structure yourself, make sure that you present yourself as I being extremely open on how you respond to these things. I mean the Gulf War, Oka and.a number of other situations in which I was involved, clearly demonstrated that the times we ran into problems were when we I seemed to clam up and did not provide information. If you don't have information, or you can't talk about information, then tell people you can't and tell them why, but don't hold back stuff simply because you I don't want to talk about it. The third observation is that the public doesn't care what are I the jurisdictional differences between the province, the municipality, the federal government. They want the problem solved. And anytime you go out as a group to say well our role is X and then we leave role Y to I somebody else, quite frankly, no one wants to hear. What they want to find out. is how you are going to prevent any more people from dying, how are you going to resolve the issue. The example I give is in the Oka I situation, where the argument from the federal side was it was the provincial government and, more particularly, it was the Sureté du Québec's problem to resolve the Oka thing. All it did was to fuel the fire I and caused us about three weeks of grief, trying to finally sort that out. So all I am suggesting is that if you are going to talk, stay away,from our role specifically as X. You should really talk about how we're in this I together, and this is the problem we are trying to solve and how we are going at it. Later on, if people want to get specifically into the roles, I fine. But not in the first instance. I 74 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Another point is one which,David, I think you raised, which is: don't over react There is a tendency on the part of all governments, because they're being driven by political imperatives, to want to rush in and seem to be doing something, but in reality there is really no need. And it is difficult for us as public servants to resist ministers' temptations to do stuff; but I would caution you, if you have to provide advice to the minister on these matters, to take a long sober look. That long sober look maybe no more than an hour, but at least it is an hour to examine and say what should we be doing before we rush in and try to look like we are solving the problem.
The fifth thing I would suggest you have to be very careful about in your communications, is that your actions and words have to mesh. There is a great tendency to want to go out and talk a lot, but then there is no action that follows. So be very careful that, if you are going to tnlk, then the action immediately follows, or the action is going on as you are talking about it. The sixth thing rd say is the media do have a bias; you've got to accept that up front. The media do not like governments. Any analysis that you have seen over the past number of years will clearly demonstrate that if there is blame to apportion, they're going to go to a level of government and blame that level of government, or some other large institution, before they are gbing to place the blame anywhere else. So accept that going in, and recognize that that's something you are going to have to deal with. I can't tell you how you are going to deal with it -- we have been through many situations and have tried to use different tactics and, quite frankly, I haven't found one that works in all cases.
The last point I would like to make is that our communications are driven partly by the need to get information out to individuals to help them, partly by political imperatives, in that there is a tendency for the political side to want to get out and say something. Recognize that as a difficulty you are going to have to deal with. Everybody wants to be out there to be seen to be doing something, whether they have to be there or not. It's just something you'll have to balance and, once again, I have no easy answer for you. A lot of it depends on who the minister of the day is and how well he or she has been briefed, and how receptive he or she is to advice etc. But that's one of those unknowns that will complicate your life as you move through these things.
GARY STAIRS It is going to be quite a challenge to say something original after these folks - have stolen what's left of my thunder. I think what I'll do perhaps,after Bill Pascal, is maybe to focus on the general and the philosophical first, and deal with the specific after. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 75 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
I think there is a very strong relationship between decisive action, responsible action by the local and the most appropriate level of govenunent, and openness by the same response organization, and public morale and media support. And we have found, in cases in New Brunswick where we have had to appeal for public assistance and media support, that where we have gone openly, immediately, and honestly to senior executive people in the media, we have usually had the support that we were looking for. By support I am talking about the CBC in particular, reconfiguring their broadcasting patterns and pre-empting progranuning and doing a lot of other things; and I might add that we didn't use a big stick. We used a carrot. We used moral persuasion and we convinced them from the outset that we needed their assistance. So I think that the support can be accessed. I don't think we can yet coma on their 100% carte-blanche endorsement, but I think there is hope.
The second thing is that, in a situation like this, there is an important relationship between the flow of operational information and public information. I agree with most of the speakers that the operational information won't give you all you need to carry out the public information program. But, presumably, between an ongoing in- depth public environment analysis and a very good information gathering mechanism, I think you will certainly improve your chances of success.
In an earthquake situation as with most modern day disasters, I think you have to pay special attention to the media's requirement for visualization of the event. And I am not proposing that I know who to solve the problem of earthquakes, eicept to say that the more information of a graphic and visual nature the better, and the more information of a pictorial and video nature the better. And one of the areas that you will probably be frustrated in is your inability to gather information in pictorial and visual form and to move it to your media centres, and then to share it with the media. But I think that in British Columbia that is certainly something that you will have to wrestle with.
In terms of specifics -- specific techniques -- I urge you in British Columbia, to think about something called integrated radio communications system, which will help you shore up your communications, both on an operational basis and on a public information basis. Peter Russell alluded to the use of ham radios, and I think that is a very good suggestion, because you can do an analysis of where the ham operators are set up and you can come up with contingency arrangements for hams, more easily, perhaps, than for other communications systems, such as the telephone, particularly the public telephone networks. When you are thinking about ham radio systems, give some serious thought to what we call packet radio. It is espe,cially useful for communicating with the media, because packet will 76 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
enable you to send textual information, such as press releases, over ham radio networks. And it is an extremely effective technique. We use it in New Brunswick for nuclear communications for Point Lepreau. And I urge you to explore it. Phil Cogan and I, we sitting in the back row, pooh -poohed the notion of rushing the media out to interview the survivors of the earthquake; we felt there were some inherent risks in that. And we felt t.hat the pressure, the responsibility that puts on the individual may not be appropriate for their mental health and stability. Barry I kept wondering were these. hamlets were located; whether you were referring to the play or to suburbs of Vancouver. But I must compliment .you on your very thorough analysis. I thought it was comprehensive perhaps to a fault, but I think this probably betrays your own insiders perspective in working in the capital. But overall I was very impressed and the francophone group did exceptionally well leading off the discussion. They set a tough pace for the other groups to follow. That was good.
GÉRARD Thank you. We will hold any general discussion until, after the next GARNEAU round of presentations. We've - there has been quite a bit time slippage here. We will try not lose anymore. I'll ask the members of the panel to go back into the room and invite without any further ado. the first nuclear emergency .group. Group 5 to make ifs presentation.
Group/groupe 5 As Gerard introduced me, my name is Linda Leek and I am with Ontario LINDA LIIK Hydro, but my group elected me to outline what our proposals were on Ontario Hydro how the province and the federal government should be communicating in the event of a nuclear emergency. Before we start with our responses to the exercises or situation. I thought I would give you a little overview of where we stand and what happened. Basically what's happened is that government and industry have made efforts to market the CANDU Technology and they have been successful in selling or setting up a sale of two CANDUs to South Africa, now that economic sanctions have been lifted. And so CBC National News ran the story one evening, indicating that a press conference was scheduled the next day at 11:00 a.m. to give details of the CANDU sale to South Africa. Well, coincident with , as luck would have , in the morning most of the morning news shows started off in eastern and central Canada announcing this CANDU sale. And as luck would have it, one of our Darlington Nuclear Generating Stations, Unit 2, had a malfunction. So coincident with the sales announcement, we had a bulletin going out issued by the Province of Ontario indicating that Darlington Nuclear Generating Station, located in the town of Newcastle, has experienced a malfunction. "There has been a small release to the atmosphere and that the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Plan has been activated, the province has declared a nuclear emergency". PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 77 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
What that means is that Ontario Hydro is mitigating the consequences of the emergency, the Province is in control of making the decisions that affect public safety, and the municipality will implement those decisions, so you've got the responding bodies activated. Well, early morning reaction is swift. A number of media are out there going I to our provincial information centres, local information centres, and they're looking for answers. At around 8:00 o'clock, a second press release is issued. The Province has decided to evacuate people living within the four kilometers of the nuclear station.
Not surprisingly, MPPs at Queen's Park, as well as their federal counterparts, now, are sort of swamped with calls. People want to find out what's going on. So Health and Welfare Canada have activated their Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan in support of the Province's declaration of an emergency. And they are issuing a statement echoing their support for the province.
The Privy Council Office is monitoring the media in an effort to review what reports are going out and trying to assess their position I and the impact of this accident on their planned announcement of the Candu sale. 1 Along with that the evacuation is ongoing, weather is bad, and we've had two road deaths. So two people who had been evacuated have been killed on the road. And basically businesses are having problems t getting staff in and out. People are staying home, hundreds more and thousands more are evacuating, so we have mass evacuation or exodus in I the incident area. It is eleven o'clock and the Department of Health and Welfare as well as International Trade are deciding on what their bèst strategy is I with the announcement of the sale of the two Candus to South Africa. That's the problem we now have. I So what are we going to do about this first? Barely six hours into the incident, what issues are being faced by the provincial and fedéral authorities? Basically we have summarized them as two things. 1 Number one the Province is in control and the Province has to demonstrate and.make sure everybody knows they are in control of emergency response. And their primary objective is public safety. They I are concerned with the affected public and making decisions to ensure that the public in the surrounding area is protected. The federal government is also involved with public safety and is monitoring the situation and offering support where it can. It is expressing confidence that the provincial government is carrying out its public safety objective. The federal government is also concerned with the sale of the Candu and I the international implications of the incident; whether it should go on I 78 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
with the announcement or not, and give confidence in the safety of the I Candu design -- that it is not selling something that it shouldn't. And in terms of international relations, again it is the moral question of the Candu sale at the time of an accident involving a Candu reactor within our own country. International relations in terms of safety of the public that may be visiting, and friends and family of people who live abroad. I So those are the issues. The next question was on communication roles and priorities. I Now, looking at it from a generic- public information perspective, the provincial communication role is to issue protective action decisions. The public at large is interested in two kinds of information: protective I action directives, that is what they should be doing to protect themselves; and also the news. Protective action directives are operational in nature. You automatically bring in the people who live in the affected area.into I the operations or the response efforts. So we have to get the protective action directives out quickly and immediately. Although this is a public information responsibility with that lies with the provincial operations t centre, not the. information people. Once the executive authority at the provincial operations centre has made the decision to evacuate the public, then the provincial operations centre operations group will make I direct contact with the designated media and get that message out. These will be preformatted bulletins because we want the public to move and it doesn't need-any approval once the decision has been made; the objective I is to get an uneditorialized news bulletin or crisis communication out there and get the people sheltering and evacuating or what have you. I From a public information point of view and from a communicator's point of view, we are interested in getting the news out. What's happening, who's doing what, what are your plans? We will deal I with the evacuation situation, sheltering situation, from a news perspective, but not an operations perspective. So the provincial information centre and the local information centre are jointly I responsible for getting the news out and managing rumor control -- that includes media monitoring and feedback to the operators on the effects of what they are saying and what they are doing on the public. It also I involves public enquiries. From the federal side, the communications would reaffirm support for the Province; that the province is in charge and is capable of responding and controlling the activities; and that the federal government is ready to assist the province if called upon, and secondly, to maintain confidence in .the whole Candu System, so that the sales can go on. You're kind of stuck in the situation where the sale has already been announced and there is no backing down now. I What information if any would be shared between the province and the federal government? We have just said all of the information, everybody needs to know everything that is going up. The I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 79 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Province will feed up to the federal organization and all of the federal departments information on everything that they are doing, all of the actions that are being taken, all of the decisions they have made, how many people they'd be affecting and they would feed up information. Likewise, the federal government would just feed down information that doesn't necessarily affect the response but makes us aware that they're going on with the sale or they are not going on with the sale or what position they'd be taking. So everything, what type of information would be exchanged, everything, what happened and whose responding, where it is happening, when it happened, why it happened, what you are doing about it, everything would be shared.
How would it be shared? Well, we have drawn it as it was referred to as a sort of two-headed pitchfork, that you would try to keep the concept of a single voice and a single source of information exchange, so you don't get mixed messages and you don't get into a timing problem, into what order certain actions were taken. So where the Ministry of the Solicitor General takes the lead in the provincial operations centre, the liaison section in the provincial operations centre will provide information to the Health and Welfare Canada group because they have activated their own emergency centre, and from there it would be disseminated to the various federal departments. The Privy Council Office will also be integrally involved, and they will work alongside Health and Welfare Canada to make sure there are not any interdepartmental problems or misunderstandings of any kind. So information will converge to a single source, be exchanged and be dissetninated at either end as required. And this is done through the liaison groups at each end.
Once everything is said and done, and an all clear signal has been announced, what are the medium and long term issues facing the province and the federal authorities as a result of the incident? As our panel had indicated, the public will just look at the government as the government, they are not going to understand jurisdictional rights. It is important during response, though, for the responders and the people involved to maintain a clear perspective of who's in control and who's managing the emergency and who's there to support. With the medium- and long-term effects, however, we are into the recovery phase. And this is an all-inclusive recovery phase. It will involve monitoring the health effects on the public, which will jointly be done by the federal and provincial govenunents; clean-up and environmental monitoring, which would call upon all of our environmental people at both levels of government; looking at food and ingestion monitoring. It will be also lessons learned, it will be re-looking at what actually happened and how we can prevent it from happening in the future, which would draw in the AECB and various provincial groups. We would look at compensation, if there is any compensation required, nuclear liabilities that would kick 8 0 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
in; we would also be looking at and questioning energy sources. We would be going .back into the cycle of is nuclear the way to go, what should be done, what are our viable options? So in the medium- and long-term we would be looking at a recovery process that would be pretty all-encompassing. What advice would we have for each side managing and resolving these issues? I think the important advice is to maintain open communication between themselves, even after the fact. Not even look for blame between them, and consider any lessons learned and implement them into the arrangements that have been made -- both from an operational perspective, making sure we can manage evacuations well, and from an information exchange aspect, by going back looking at what has happened in the press and seeing if there is a better way we can conununicate or streamline operations and support one another. That's it.
Group/groupe 6 I would like to ask Linda what kind of surveillance she had connected to JOE room J over there, because she actually stole everything that we had to ARSENAULT titis morning. And it makes my job very easy. Although we do have EMO - P.E.I. some things to bring to light that are somewhat a little different.
We played devil's advocate with the papers we received and the events that came out pro.ved to be very interesting for the discussion purposes.
I am not going to read everything you see on there, but I will highlight some of the issues. The issue that is facing authorities as .you see on the top. We felt these are some of the issues. We felt that there was some confusion with having two press conferences so early in the morning. And some of the facts that were on the paper added to the confusion. Consequently we felt we should clarify the events and the facts.
The timing of the CANDU reactor announcement was not as important as the incident that was happening at the reactor site itself. We felt that could have been left to secondary news announcements. And it added to the confusion. It added to the credibility gap between what was happening on the safety side of it, as Linda mentioned, and the reassurance between the perception and the reality. It added to panic responses in releasing inadequate information which created confusion and causes backtracking. It also created logistical problems in handling the evacuation and that came from two of us were in that group who were in the operations side of it. Which led then to a lack of co- ordination in the emergency plan.
The next question we were asked was to comment on communications roles and priorities. We were fortunate in that out of PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 8 1 PROCÈS-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
the six people in that room four people were public information officers and we let them run with it. And this is what we collectively came up with. It is very important for federal and provincial governments to have a co-ordinated, dovetailed emergency plan. We didn't fmd that in the paper, it was mentioned and assumptions were made that we should institute an emergency plan; however if the federal government institutes an emergency plan for a nuclear incident and the provincial has one too, the question begs to be asked: Is it a co-ordinated dovetailed plan? We didn't fmd that in the information supply. One of the two most important things in responding to an emergency from an operational side is communications. It is hard to place communications in a secondary role under the response agencies. However we feel that it is one of the most important resources and operational modes that you have to conduct, and this conducting of ongoing media monitoring analysis and revising them as the incident moves on into the mitigation phase and beyond; we felt highly important. We had no doubt in our minds that the Province was the lead agency for communications. The next question we asked ourselves, and were asked to comment on, was information sharing. And we were asked to break it down into types, how this was done and what agencies to give this information to. As you can see on the chart, we broke it down into the technical types. We felt that the condition of the reactor was important, the safety present and future, news release, questions and answers, fact sheets as it was eluded to in previous presentations. On the logistical side we felt that Transport Canada, and the provincial Ministry of Transportation worked closely together in aspects of that. The communications are provincial and local. The activities which included the media briefings, the situation technical updates, and the backgrounder represented an emergency response. We did talk a little about letting everybody and his dog know what was going on. But that would evolve from news bulletins, media reports in newspapers and on television, radio and so on. So we didn't mention that in our report. The last question that we were asked to comment on were the medium and long term issues; of which a lot were eluded to, but we thought we would do it this way. The safety and reliability of the CANDU reactor was an international issue as well as a Canadian one, but mainly we thought it was an international issue. Based on the information we received on the paper. Consequently, we felt that it was a medium - as well as a long-term issue as far as selling them to other countries. We decided that we should be provinding advice and situation reports to our External Affairs offices abroad an other agency offices, to malce sure it would help out with the safety and reliability, when people start tallcing about the CANDU reactors abroad. We also accepted or • 82 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
provided advice and sought advice on the monitoring of the media coverage of that incident. We thought that was very important, immediately after the incident and as far as the long-range coverage position. We felt it was important to meet with the international clients in the export market both abroad and in Canada. And the safety and reliability of the nuclear reactor, nuclear power, should be reiterated and encouraged -- that nothing had changed and public information campaign, long-term I think„ rather than the short term. People might be asking questions to be addressed. Environmental health concerns are also an important thing that we have to seek advice and advise people on. Ways that we could do this is to have community meetings with Hydro and public health officials. Have open houses with facilitators in the inunediate area of the incident. I have to make sure that the credibility of the government officials is maintained. And the cost-effectriveness of nuclear technology still should be talked about, discussed and maintained. These could all be done by debriefings and including the media. We felt very strongly that if you gave the media honest information, you would get an honest response and an honest set of work. We have to maintain the post-incident information flow for the long term, it is something that will not go away in two or three months. And that information has to be honest and it has to be updated. Maintain a visible presence from a communications side of ministers who were responsible. Don't let them hide, and issue proper statements etc. The consistency of the messages is very important and we should maintain a strong community presence by Hydro. That is our presentation. We thank-you very much for the opportunity.
Group/groupe 7 Now the reason I am up here , of course, is that all the remaining DOUG members of my syndicate suffer from radiation exposure. And they all HARRISON felt they would be in the hospital this morning. So I was the only one left Emergency to do this presentation. Okay, we'll run through it. Planning Ontario First of all , the first question -- and the key point here is within the first six hours -- we felt that there were many issues which you could consider, but there are some core ones. And the three core ones for the Province are first of all that the public's perception of the situation was worse than stated. And that I think will inevitably happen in any nuclear emergency. So that has to be dealt with openly and, I stress, honestly, because if you don't deal with it honestly in the first instance, it will come back to haunt you later on.
The second issue is, of course, ensuring public safety in the vicinity of the accident. There are some sub-points there. There are probably many more, but we are concerned with the evacuation and the weather and in particular the wind. If there is any venting that takes place in the facility, it depends on the direction of the wind as to what the PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 83 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES - DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
impact will be. And while we are talking about facilities, there are in fact two facilities: the Darlington Generating Station, in Newcastle, Ontario, I and the Pickering Station in Pickering. And we chose to deal with the Pickering one as it is kind of confusing in the problem stated. But the first group dealt with Darlington. So we are at Pickering, ensuring I transportation problems were solved with the air and road matter; health problems, security of the site and, of course schools, hospitals, and old I age homes. . The third major role that we though the Province would be concerned with is whether Ontario Hydro is in fact responding I effectively to the emergency. Are they managing the site effectively? Now what are the feds concerned about? Well they are concerned about the public safety issues as well, for different reasons. The Province is I concerned about them because they have to take actions to sort out the problem. But the federal people are concerned about them because they have to comment on them. What assistance does the Province of Ontario I need if any? It's a second major issue. What is the cause of the accident? Is the CANDU safe, related to the CANDU sale? Whether in fact they should proceed with the CANDU announcement? -- We didn't think they I should. What is the environmental impact, because they have a primary responsibility for the environment when it comes to nuclear problems and, of course, liaison with international authorities, specifically with I the United States.
What are the respective communications roles and priorities? Well, we have them in priority there, first of all from the Province. The first priority is information gathering and analysis. What happened, what is the situation? The second priority is the dissemination of the information to the public through the use of public action directives for both protective measures to be taken and evacuation arrangements. We I saw the third role as media management. Getting a grip on the media. Keeping them informed and ensuring that they are part of the process. The fourth role of the province - monitoring public reaction. What I happens out there? what is the public reaction? what issues have to be corrected? what rumors are there? and basically to reassure the public that as a result of the monitoring all is in order. Public enquiry services I is another provincial communications role. And finally, information sharing with all levels of government and agencies, in other words co- I ordination of the information. The federal communications role is a priority: information gathering, analysis and dissemination, as much as for the Province. I Information and co-ordination, reassurance to the public -- the general public across Canada, not the public at the site -- and the departments, that the situation is under control. Reassuring the public that the I Canadian technology is safe. And reassurance to the international I 84 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
community that the situation is under control and, again, that CANDU I technology is safe.
Question C deals with information sharing between the I provincial and. federal levels. Of course, it must be shared. The type of information shared? Operational or emergency response information. A lot of technical information not only has to be shared but validated, to I make sure it is correct. There is additional public information which has to be shared, which may not necessarily be operational information, but it is none the less public information -- reaction to the situation -- that I should be shared amongst all the communications people. And, of course, specific communications information has to be effective. How I shared? Well, the provincial operations/information centre is the focal point for all this activity and everything disseminates from that location. Federally, it would go up from the provincial operations centre to the I federal nuclear emergency co-ordination group and federal co- ordination would be done by them to federal departments, and of course international agencies etc. There will be a lot of informal information I sharing. For example, provincial ministries will share information with federal departments -- an example is the Ministry of Environment which will share information with the Department of the Environment. And I these are less formal, but you can bet your bottom dollar that kind of information sharing is going to take place. So the challenge from the communications point of view is the make sure that whatever I information is being shared is correct information.
These are the agencies that we felt would be involved in this 1 information sharing. First of all the provincial ones, there is a list of them, I am not going to read through them. You can read through them quickly. Those are the ministries in the province and the agencies that I would be concerned with this situation. We took a stab at the federal departments and agencies, again all of these organizations have some kind of interest in what is going on down at Pickering. I
Okay, the next question -- we had quite a discussion on this. The statement of the problem minimizes the 24 hours or when I everybody is back home. I tell you it ain't going to work that way. A lot of people are not going to go back home, particularly if there was some kind of emission or some kind of venting took place, until their concern, I until they're sure their homes are safe for occupancy. And we don't have any details of that in the problem. It will take a long time before the people of Pickering or Darlington re back in their homes; it will take I several days.
Okay, provincial medium-term issues: effects of the radiation I -- that's health and of course; following that is long-term monitoring. The effects of the radiation if a venting took place and it fell inland on I I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 85 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
agriculture and the environment. Compensation to victims and business. The Province will be very concerned about the affects on the economy. Getting things back, restoration of the economy. Security of the site. And, of course, I add that there should be a co-ordinated communications policy, and that last group made the point, and we make the point again that the communications policy must be co-ordinated for a long tiine after this event. After everybody is even back home it has to be co-ordinated.
Okay, federal medium-term issues. Same sort of thing: effects of radiation, health effects -- there will be a board of inquiry, so we will be concerned about that. Federal supervision of the clean up of the operation on site throughout the emergency area: the regulatory agency is the Atomic Energy Control Board, and they are responsible for ensuring the clean up is effective. Reputation of CANDU, compensation on the disaster or financial assistance arrangements, liability. And again I stress a co-ordinated communications policy.
Okay let's go to long-term issues. Provincial? Same sort of thing: effects of radiation -- it will be an ongoing thing -- board of inquiry, cause of the accident. The Province will be concerned with the continued operation of the nuclear plants, compensation of victims and business, liability issues, long-term effect on the economy, and again, keep your communications policy co-ordinator.
And the final one, federal long-term issues: nuclear programs on safety in Canada overall. Whatever falls out of the board of inquiry, the compensation issue will go on in the long term, it will be a while before it is solved; liability issues will continue to play a role -- and again keep our communications policy co-ordinator. The advice to both governments at this phase is to co-ordinate their responses, maybe set up some joint conunittees. Take steps to restore public confidence, co- ordinate communications policy -- and we wish them good luck.
GÉRARD We have just about reach our time limit but I will ask the panel to come GARNEAU back to the front. A lot of their earlier observations of course would apply to this situation as well, but they may have additional ones to make. Gary, would you pplease go first?
GARY STAIRS Fascinating, particularly from a nuclear province's point of view, I think some of the key issues in a nuclear incident, an off-site nuclear incident relate to openness. What constitutes openness? "think people have different definitions of what's being open, what's being honest, and also different definitions of what information is being shared and whether 86 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
information is being adequately shared. I think that has to be tackled because I think in a nuclear emergency one of the worst and most troubling aspects of the emergency is what I call the phobic response to a nuclear incident. It is a very strong, visceral reaction to something that you can't see, taste, feel, touch.
When we were dÉting a research in New Brunswick on nuclear power we discovered four things about nuclear incidents that relate to federal planning. One of them is that in a nuclear incident there is a perception of loss of control, diis things has gone nuts, it's going through the ground, it is a China syndrome kind of incident, and I think that's important and has to be part of communication strategy. The second thing is familiarity with the risk -- earthquakei share this same element of concern. We are familiar with flooding and forest fires, and you can move away from that kind of a risk, but I think it is relevant in nuclear incidents that you... how can I see it? how will I recognize it? The third is, is diis risk one which we feel to be necessary or not necessary, and that's important. We smoke we fly, we do all kinds of things that are risky. Fourthly, the perception of magnitude or scale, and I think that's an important one particularly if you look at what I call charter incidents like Chernobyl which had, in real terms, an enormous geographical impact. When you are thinking and talking about a puff at Pickering or Darlington, you have to think in terms of putting this puff in geographical context and talking about what kind of stuff radioactively speaking is in the puff, and how far it can go. I think the whole contextualizing, accurate, quick perceptive contextualizing from the start, is very important. I was glad to see emphasis on media monitoring for these reasons. I think media monitoring and then translating the results of your public environment analysis into program assessment on an ongoing basis. Don't do the analysis and let it stand but use that analysis to track your performance in the communication side.
Linda, I have to congratulate you, someone from Ontario Hydro. You carried off a very convincing performance this morning as a public safety official. We vvill send the tape to your employer.
I did not hear anyone talk about special populations today and I wanted to hear more about those. How you communicate with the elderly because they need more than simply communication, they need assistance. How you deal with pregnant mothers in particular -- they are particularly concerned about the genetic consequences and biological effects of radiation. How you address specifically pet owners -- people will not leave until they are sure that their pets are returned or are going to be safe. Dealing with the disabled. I draw special attention to the use of wardens and conununity-based alerting as much as possible. This not only takes pressure away from public safety and police officials, but it also helps to return to the community a sense of control and a sense of PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 87 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
ownership over their own public safety and protection. Those are my points.
BILL PASCAL I basically found the presentations very interesting and I wouldn't say that I sàw any holes or things that you didn't cover. One observation I would like to make is there is a tendency in an issue like this for people to try to start to deal with a couple of the problems. For instance, the primary concern is the public safety and working with the public. However, there is the other issue which is sitting there, which is the • safety of the CANDU reactor, and should we solve this thing abroad? We have to be careful in situations like this that we don't get balled up in trying to solve a another policy issue, while we are trying to really deal with the public safety issue. From the province's point of view, it is pretty clear it's public safety, and if I were a province, I would stick away from "is the thing safe right now?" to saying our primary concern is making sure the public has all the information it needs, and get them sorted out, and then we worry about the other issues. From the feds' point of view, yes. Their primary concern is the public and that's what they are going to talk about, and that's the words that will come out of the political side. Quite franldy, their primary concern is the safety and the adequacy and the confidence that is maintained in CANDU sales for a whole variety of reasons, and it really comes down to one decision they have to make that day is: do they go ahead with their announcement? and that will be based on a number of things such as, if we don't do it is there a loss of confidence? Do we want to show that we are concerned and therefore we are going to have an extra study into the safety? whatever. Those are things that the issue itself did not address, but things that have to be dealt with between the Minister of Health and Welfare and what he is going to get up and say in the House that day, and what Michael Wilson is going to be saying to the international side. And that is something that issues would dictate at the time.
The second point I would make is that given the fact that the press is out saying that there is a bunch of problems with the reactor, if those do exist my advice to the province would be to get up and be very frank and say yes, there have been problems, but here is what we have done in the past to address these. If you get up and start to defend why you did things or things that you didn't do or that you are trying to defend what you thought you should have been doing, all you are going to do is to get people to be very distrustful of you. As I said before, coming from the government, you already have a stroke against you. They are not going to trust you in the first instance so be as frank and open. You may get beaten up in the initial going but it is going to work to your advantage in the long term maintaining the confidence that they are putting in you to protect your safety as individuals. NOV. 13-15, 1991 I 88 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 I The other point I would like to make is what we are really into is an area that we call risk. communication and it deals with such things, Gary spoke about issues that the people feel they have no control over, I issues that challenge people's sense of risk. There is a whole variety and there is a whole Group of literature on this thing. Why it's interesting to me is that in our department we deal with this on the food side, on the I drug side, on chemicals, we deal with it on medical devices, my life has been captioned in the last three months with breast implants and teeth. Many of you may not see that as a big problem but it is an issue that gets I very visceral, it's very emotional, it's not based on reason or fact, it is based on you have done something to me and I want a villain and I am going to shoot at somebody. For those of you in the business, if you I haven't done much reading on the risk communication side you may want to, there is a lot of good material out there. It really helps to understand the public psyche when you get into a situation like this and it will help you think about the type of communication and how you may want to get out and try to communicate. The key thing that I was up there which is very important is long term. In situations where you have I a risk component like this you will never be able to deal with this issue in the short term. If you take a look at most industries now that are in this type of business where there is a risk attached to it, be it chemical or I nuclear or whatever, the ones that have been successful have got a long- standing, open approach to the community, getting them involved in the decisions, bringing them into the plant, showing them what they -are I doing and that, quite frankly, is one of the few ways to mitigate some of the emotional reaction you are going to have when an incident does happen. You will never cap it but at least you will be in a position to I better manage it when something does happen. 1 DAVID I just have two quick points to make, both of which have been covered to RICHARDSON some extent by Gary and Bill. They relate to the role of the media and a word we saw in one of the presentations, media management and the I purpose of media analysis which has features prominently in the presentations, these presentations and the ones in the morning. The second point is on community based communications. I
First, the media. It concerns me whenever I see the term media management because most of the people I have talked to who I are in the media cringe at the very thought of it So do I in fact, because I have never been able to do it successfully. I think what we are trying to suggest here, and I don't think it is a small point, is that if you are the best source of accurate information then the media will come to that source You are not managing them or manipulating them into coming to the source, you are providing the information and they are automatically attracted to it as bees are to pollen; but if you try to manipulate or manage them, I don't think many of the communicators in this room for I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 89 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-I5 NOV. 1991
that matter, would try to do it, but many of our superiors do. They specifically set out to manipulate the media and I have never seen it work I and usually the consequences are disastrous. The second thing has to do with the purpose of analysis. I I think that sometimes we ask for analysis simply a collection of clippings We say here is what the media are saying; but in my experience in managing issues in British Columbia, very often if you analyze what is coming out of the media, you find that you can identify the gap that is occurring. It is either a gap between the public perception of what you are doing and what you are actually doing, or it's a gap I between what the public expects you as government to do and what you are actually doing. I don't know whether that's confusing or not. In other words it's often a performance gap, not a communications gap. I More often than not senior officials in government will ask communicators to fill a performance gap by talking a lot, by putting out more press releases, by reiterating what the press already knows. They I feel they say in simple terms we are not getting our message out but the fact is they are putting out an inappropriate message they are trying to get the newspapers to write again what is already news, i.e. the I performance of the government, when the problem is the performance is falling short of what the public expects. I think as communicators advising, especially politicians, we have to have the courage when it is a I communications gap that can be addressed with communications and when it is a performance gap that cannot be covered up by more verbiage.
The second point I want to make relates a lot to risk communications, and that is the validity of the effectiveness of I community based communications, in other words, going to the community that is at risk and dealing with them in their own main streets. More often than not government, being a sort of bureaucentric I organization, will tend to communicate from Ottawa or from Victoria or from Toronto. And the people in the community who are at risk are already in a heightened state of concern to have communications I emanating by way of the media out of some other town. I think this has a tendency to aggravate the situation: I believe that communications, I especially on issues of risk, work best if they are delivered from some sort of a store front operation where you move in either with wardens or other types of agents to deal with people in their own communities. Just I to underscore something Bill said, again people who are not close to communications tend to think, they seem to be 10 or 15 years behind the times in my estimation, and they endanger communications, have a I tendency to want to come up with cute comparisons which were the vogue a few years ago, in trying to estimate miles or parts per million. I hear some bureaucrats suggest that it was like a roll of toilet paper I stretching from here to the moon. The public just doesn't compute and it I 9 0 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAP! WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
sounds like an insult I think risk communications, some familiarity with how to deal with risks so that you don't exacerbate the situation, is good training not only for conununicators but for the decision makers who call the shots.
LEN DENT I guess from my point of view what I would call this is a no win story. There is absolutely no way from my point of view that we are going win on this kind of a situation. It brings into question the very credibility of the govennnents. I am not so sure today that we have a great deal of credibility. This is an aside, I am not so sure that putting out a bulletin to tell people that there is a problem or to put out a-bulletin to tell them that really there is no problem, but we are going to evacuate you, is going to add to that credibility. I think we would have to thinlç of a different way to transmit that message. I think back to an experience I had when I was looking after communications for Canada in Europe and thus was responsible for getting information to some 20 odd thousand people stretched out throughout Europe during the time of the Chernobyl crisis. The thing that is stuck in my memory is the fact of the absolute terror and the absolute panic that ran through all those different communities, and the fact that regardless of what we did as a government or as an institution in trying to get them honest information, even when we went out and told them what the good points were and what the bad points were they chose not to believe us and we were inundated, and if you think of the map of Europe, there were literally hundreds of experts who were out there telling all the dire impacts of Chernobyl and what was going to happen, and it did not matter what we did, it was kind of, pardon my vulgarity, spitting into the wind -- we got no reaction from people. They chose not to believe us. We flew in experts from Canada, we told them the test that we had taken and if we had 15 people on a platform to tell people, and they all had all the expertise in the world, and if there was one person in the local community who stood up and said they were a witch doctor and we were all going to die then the witch doctor would be believed. That's one of the real problems we are going to have to face in this kind of a situation, the credibility for the government is not going to be there.
I am not so sure how you deal with it but I think some of the suggestions like getting down and getting people who are in the community to try and transmit these messages with some credibility may help. Even there I recall being in Pickering in 1980 and talldng to a doctor who had been at the Pickering plant for 20 years or whatever in that business, he said he went to a town hall meeting and he was on the platform with an English professor from York University and he went on for about 30 minutes. The scientist talked about all the precautions that have been taken and the record and everything else and why would he need to worry. The English professor said that was a lot of bunk and PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 91
PROCES - VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13 - 15 NOV. 1991
he got the applause. It is a tremendously difficult situation, it is no-win and I think the only thing we can do is to go out and try to be as honest and-as open as we can, and to make sure we have co-ordinated messages. There is a lot of emotions involved in this even amongst the people who are giving the information. I found out in Chernobyl that even the people who were supposed to be on our team were getting emotionally involved and they were not giving out the information in a way that was really in the government's best interest. And in this particular situation bbviously you are going to get inundated with information and concerns from Quebec and from south of the border. You are going to get the American media feeding into this so it is going to be a tremendously difficult problem and I guess honesty and a long time co-ordinated campaign is the only hope we have to combat what I call a no-win situation.
B. - PUBLIC ORDER EMERGENCIES • ÉTATS D'URGENCE
MICHAEL For the last year I have been working with Gérard Garneau on THEILMANN developing the public order component of the national emergency (moderator/ arrangements for public information. Many of you here are already modérateur) familiar with the work that Gérard has been doing over the last few years on arrangements for handling public information in international and war emergencies, and I know that as of yesterday and as of this morning we all have a better idea of the arrangements that we would need to have in place for public welfare emergencies.
We now come to what might be termed the joker in the pack: public order emergencies. I say .joker, because public order emergencies have some unique features all of their own which set them apart from public welfare, international and war emergencies. Perhaps the first and most important difference is that there is no clear-cut division of responsibility for managing a public order emergency. In a war emergency we know that the federal government would have paramount jurisdiction, and we know that in a public welfare emergency--unless a province were totally devastated—that it would have paramount jurisdiction. However, in public order emergencies the question of leadership will, I think, in all likelihood hinge equally on the circumstances of the emergency and on political decisions.
Another unique feature of public order emergencies is that at first glance they appear to be purely police emergencies. As defined by the Emergencies Act, a public order emergency is an emergency that 92 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 E arises from threats to the security of Canada and that is so serious as to be a national emergency. The definition of threats to the security of Canada is taken from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. The I definition covers espionage or sabotage, foreign influenced activities, acts of serious violence or covert unlawful acts detrimental to the interests of Canada. It is obvious from this description that such matters I fall within the purview of the municipal, provincial, territorial and federal agencies responsible for policing- and law enforcement. On the surface this would seem then to preclude a role for emergency planners I and emergency measures organizations. However, you don't have to look far to find scenarios that will I involve both policing agencies and emergency preparedness organizations. For example, at one point during the Persian Gulf war there was widespread public fear of Iraqi-sponsored terrorism in I Canada. Fortunately these attacks never materialized, but if they had, and say their target had been something like the Point Lepreau nuclear generating station in New Brunswick, we could have been faced 1 simultaneously with a public order and a public welfare emergency, as well as the external international emergency. This scenario actually was summed up quite nicely by this editorial cartoon which appeared in a I small New Brunswick newspaper. (See attached.)
The public communications challenges of such a scenario are I obvious and indicative of the type of issues we will be grappling with in the syndicate work that we have planned for later this morning. What we will be trying to do is to adapt the basic NEAPI crisis communications model which was developed for international and war emergencies to the special demands of public order emergencies. To establish a context for this work, we need first to look at the role of I federal policing agencies in public order type emergencies, and in particular, the arrangements that are in place for dealing with public communications during such emergencies. I
To help us in this endeavour we are indeed fortunate today to have as speakers representatives from the Solicitor General of Canada to I give us the police point of view from the federal perspective.
The chief federal instrument for dealing with public order I emergencies is the National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP) and to start us off today we have Mr. Chuck Belford who is Director of Policy and Planning with the National Security Co-ordination Centre, the body I at Solicitor General which provides ongoing program management for the National Counter-Terrorism Program. I Mr. Belford began his public service career as the Executive Secretary of the Commission of Enquiry into RCMP Public Complaints, I I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13 - 15, 1991 93 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Discipline and Grievance Procedures. He then joined the Police and Security Planning and Analysis Group in the Secretariat of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and served as Director, RCMP Policy and Programs, and Director of Security Operations before assuming his present position. Mr. Belford has also served with Treasury Board as director of a task force looking into the security and criminal enforcement implications of the immigration program.
Aside from his public service accomplishments, Mr. Belford also served with the 82nd Airborne Division of the U.S. Army, and he holds a PhD in Philosophy from Queen's University. Chuck is going to give us a brief overview of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan.
CHARLES I am here today to talk about the general shape of our national cotmter- BELFORD terrorism arrangements, the centrepiece of which is the National Counter-Terrorism Plan. What I will do in the overview is discuss the legislative framework supporting our current arrangements; the seminal policies that collectively fonn the core of the public policies governing counter-terrorism; and the principal parts of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan.
The key to understanding the government's counter-terrorism policy is to understand that such national events require a national response. The public and political character of terrorist events necessarily engages the government's attention. The public expects not only an effective police response: it also expects a political response, a response that reflects very clearly the government's commitment not to let tenrorist violence succeed in setting the political agenda.
To ensure a full and complete response to terrorism, that is to say to effectively counter terrorism, the nature of the response, including the police response, must be worked out in a way that permits the government to ensure that the several public policies it has put in place to deal with terrorism are successfully implemented. Without the evidence of government guidance in shaping the response to terrorism through the implementation of policies like the "no concessions" policy, the public would be permitted to infer that the state was not capable of co-ordinating its resources in the face of the terrorist threat. Public fear and anxiety would naturally increase and the terrorists would have succeeded in their short-term objective which is, of course, to intimidate and erode confidence.
Let me now draw you a picture of the legislative framework that underlies our present counter-terrorism arrangements. The Criminal Code of Canada is the legal centrepiece of the Government of Canada's response to terrorism. Acts of violence committed by 94 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
terrorists are treated as criminal acts and prosecutions proceed under this Act. We make no concessions to the political character of a terrorist act
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act) defines specific sorts of threats against Canada which, taken collectively, serve as the operational mandate of the service. The threat of particular importance to us because it is generally most applicable to terrorist operations reads as follows: "...activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious- violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political objective within Canada or a foreign state;"
The "or a foreign state" clause, refers to homeland conflicts which spill over into Canada, such as Armenians, Sikhs, Indians, and so on.
The Security Offences Act builds on the existing legal code and offences arising out of threats found in the CSIS Act or circumstances where the victim of an offence is an internationally protected person to define a share of responsibility in which Parliament : • authorizes the. Attorney General of Canada to take over the prosecution of such cases • identifies the RCMP as having primary responsibility for such offenses • authorizes the Solicitor General to make arrangements with the province on policing arrangements that would stand as the infrastructure in support of a well-integrated national response to a terrorist incident.
The Emergencies Act contains provisions that the government can undertake should terrorist threats or activities be so grave as to cause public disorder. Mike has very appropriately laid out the legal framework there. You will note that the precipitating conditions had two characteristics: the first is that they must emanate from the CSIS Act definition of threats to the security of Canada. I have read you the one that deals with terrorism, but as Mike pointed out, there is espionage, sabotage, insurrection, subversion, and so on. We don't pretend to expect that in every case public order emergencies arising out of threats of security to Canada will necessarily arise out of those that relate to political objectives. However, if you are talking about a national conflict that would underwrite the enactment of that portion of the Emergencies Act, you are talldng about matters that have a political PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 95 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 focus. That is a personal opinion but I don't think it's far off the mark.
I Finally, again still on the legislative structure, we have the Immigration Act. This provides for measures to deny entry or remove from Canada those, who on reasonable grounds, are taken to be I security or criminal risks. If they are citizens or have gained citizenship that's a far more difficult thing to do. You will notice last week that Cabinet removed the citizenship of a person who was found to be a war I criminal. I have been in government 15 years and I guess the guy has . been in play that long so it's not something that happens precipitously. 1 What complements the legislative picture are the domestic arrangements between the federal and provincial governments under subsection 6.2 of the Security Offences Act. Allied to this are the I formal international arrangements and conventions that Canada, as a state, has entered into with other international bodies. For example, the prosecution or extradition of persons involved in aircraft hijacking, or a I mutual legal assistance program where we have entered into co- operative arrangements with a variety of European and other states for I the exchange of information on criminal matters, including terrorism. Let me turn now to,the National Counter-Terrorism Plan which ties together Canada's counter-terrorism arrangements. The I plan provides a framework for co-ordinated response by all levels of government to a terrorist incident. In Canada the Solicitor General is responsible for co-ordinating response of involved governments, police forces and other agencies across the country. I stress the word co- ordinate, not manage. Generally speaking, there is a clear appreciation in the plan that the police command structure is responsible for dealing with the incident on site. On the other hand, there is an appreciation that in terms of co-ordinating the response there are matters that necessarily I engage the political executive. For example, responding to a request by the terrorists for access to the media, or a terrorist demand to have prisoners that are being held in another state released. We do recognize I that in terms of site management, in terms of operations, the police do that. There are arrangements in the plan that allow police access to I information about relevant policies. The aim of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan is to define and co-ordinate the characters and roles, responsibilities, I procedures of government and law enforcement agencies in Canada. The plan is issued under the authority of the Solicitor General of Canada by virtue of his lead responsibility for counter-terrorism in Canada. I That's a lead responsibility that you will see nowhere, in legislation but which has been granted under Cabinet order and by direction of the I Prime Minister. The principal ingredients of the plan are: I 96 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13 - 15, 1991 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
• The policies the government has adopted to combat terrorism.
• The responsibilities of the various federal departments and agencies, and the Special Emergency Response Team of the RCMP, and the specific responsibilities of the National Security Co-ordination Centre.
• Operational details to guide departments in intervening in a terrorist attack.
• Guidance in the area of public communications and media relations.
• Material to assist in an exercise and training program.
As I noted before, the core policy of the government is the fact that terrorist incidents, terrorist acts and the violence that they incorporate, will be treated as criminal acts. There is therefore a clear intention to deny terrorists any recognition of a special role that is 1 somehow above the law and to deny them any recognition or confessions in law.
A second principal policy is the government's decision to name the Solicitor General as the country's lead minister for the planning and co-ordination of counter-terrorism responsibilities. A third policy is that of "no concessions" which was 1 established by the government and commits it to refusing all terrorist demands except for those of a minor nature which are essentially at the discretion of the police commander on site. To give an example, you may in some situations find terrorists opening up negotiations in exchange for food or the release of women, children and the sick and elderly. Those sorts of "concessions" we consider to be a legitimate and proper part of police negotiations. If, on the other hand, the request is not for food but as I said earlier to leave the country, that is not something that would be resolved at a local police operation command level.
A final policy concerns the RCMP Special Emergency 1 Response Team formed in 1986. As the name implies, the team has a special role. It is a highly-trained team of RCMP officers available to the police commander to engage in an assault on a hostage/barricade situation should that be required. The policy covers the command and control principles which govern the use of the team. Intelligence specialists from CSIS and the RCMP are also available to assist the police commander. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 97 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
A couple of international policies are also particularly important to us. In the area of civil aviation for example, Canada has endorsed a policy that states a hijacked aircraft should not be allowed to take off once it has landed, except in very special circumstances. The policy also provides for termination of air services with any state that harbours and refuses to extradite terrorists.
We also have policies dealing with marine navigation and fixed platforms and, of course, there is a long-standing policy of Canada extending, as other countries do, protection to diplomatic personnel (internationally protected persons). Under the Security Offences Act, serious violence against an internationally protected person engages the Act and then puts the government and the RCMP in a position of prirnary, but not exclusive, responsibility for their protection.
There is also protection of nuclear materials and other Acts relating to hostage taking. And fmally, as I mentioned earlier, we have mutual legal assistance treaties that we have engaged in with a variety of foreign countries and which support our counter-terrorist arrangements.
To conclude, I would like to give you a quick overview of the National Security Co-ordination Centre, focussing on our current activity and how we operate during an extended terrorist incident. We are lodged within the Ministry of the Solicitor General and work with other federal departments that have an interest or stake in counter- terrorism. Within the last year, we have consulted with a variety of Deputy Solicitors General and Deputy Attorneys General with a view to improving the National Counter-Terrorism Plan. As a result, we are now in the process of rendering a second edition.
When a serious terrorist incident occurs the National Security Co-ordination Centre metamorphoses into the National Policy Centre. It is the same organization but it takes on expertise from the various federal departments that are engaged in dealing with the incident. For example, if you have a hijacked aircraft, the Minister of Transport is the lead minister for the aircraft as long as it is in the air. Once it has landed and the aircraft door is open,- my Minister then takes lead responsibility. In such a situation, when we become the National Policy Centre, we will naturally invite External Affairs, Transport Canada, and any other department that may play a role in resolving the incident. I want you to appreciate that the structure does change as the focus becomes intense. You have deputy ministers sitting around a table in our building from those engaged departments, advising their ministers and the Solicitor General of Canada as lead minister, on the management aspects of the incident. . I 98 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 1 MICHAEL Our next speaker is Mr. Dave Davidson who is Director General of THEILMANN Communications with the Solicitor General of Canada. Prior to taking up his present duties, Mr. Davidson held many senior public affairs I position in the federal public service, including those- of Special Adviser, Communications, Prime Minister's Office, and Executive Director of the Canadian Unity Information Office. Mr. Davidson is also a former I parliamentary and senior Ottawa Editor for The Canadian Press. Aside from these accomplishments, Dave is also the author of the communications component of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan. In 1 the original concept paper whiçh was sent to all of you, we identified the communications component of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan as the logical place at which to start our discussions on how to handle public I information during public order emergencies. To refresh our memories and to provide a little more detail, Dave is going to give us a short presentation on the communications component and the principles on r which it is based.
DAVID I have been asked to speak about the ties between public communications DAVIDSON in Canada and Canadian counter-terrorism and such communications in general public order emergencies. Actually a terrorist incident is itself a public order emergency but of a special kind. Public communications is central to terrorism because terrorists depend on the media to give dramatic and speedy publicity to their grim messages to vast audiences. I But the media fulfil other functions in terrorist incidents as they do in all public order emergencies. They are the main conduits for government and police information to the public. i
Communications from the police and government may be straight news but more often than not it is information to assist the public I in dealing with the emergency. Such information is usually aimed at public safety and the protection of lives. I Public communications -- especially public and media relations -- is central to the effective resolution of any public order crisis, including a terrorist incident. The recent Persian Gulf War and ^ Oka standoff illustrated vividly the influence of television reporting and images on public perceptions. They also demonstrated the power of information through technical and general briefings in moulding public s opinion and shaping events.
The Gulf War and Oka also underscored the vital need not just 7 for communications planning but also for speedy analysis of news coverage and swift response to reporting error or exaggeration, 1 especially by the electronic media. Public communications in Canadian domestic security, 1, I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 99 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
including counter-terrorism, reflects the lead security role of the federal Solicitor General as the Minister responsible for the RCMP and CSIS. The Emergencies Act is a further spur to public information in domestic security. That legislation calls for national arrangements for public information in international and war emergencies as well as in public welfare and public order emergencies.
The National Cotmter-Terrorism Plan, which seeks links and co-operation between Ottawa and the provinces in the common fight against terrorism, recognizes that public communications is essential to preparedness for terrorism. Such ties and co-operation are essential in preparing for all public circler emergencies. The public communications chapter of the plan reflects work and communications planning in counter-terrorism that began in earnest six and a half years ago following the killing of a security guard at the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa. The threat to bomb the Toronto subway system a month after the March 25 embassy incident and June 23 Air India disaster off Ireland in which 329 persons died, prompted further federal planning and analysis in public communications. The three incidents raised questions about media practices in covering such stories and called for a look at possible guidelines for government-police-media relations in such incidents. Solicitor General Canada developed guidelines for informal discussion with journalists and also said what it would do to assist reporters in covering tenorism. Emergency Preparedness Canada was also working with reporters and editors in encouraging co-operation in the coverage of emergencies such as national disasters and industrial accidents. No guidelines on the coverage of terrorism were ever formally agreed to but the discussions and debate in the media led ,to a finer appreciation by government, the police and the media of each other's needs in terrorist incidents. Several news organizations, notably The Canadian Press, developed internal guides for terrorism coverage. And the federal government, in the National Counter-Terrorism Plan, affirmed its support for press freedom and distaste for any censorship or other attempts to control the news. Internal news organization and police guides covered many of the do's and dont's for governments as well as police in the successful resolution - and news coverage - of an incident. Here are some examples that might apply to police and government that were included in the 100 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 1 PROCES-VB`RBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
National Counter-Terrorism Plan, in effect a commitment to: 1
• Provide all the timely information that can be given without endangering lives or the safety of the public, because as you 1 know lack of hard information prompts speculative news stories that can cause real harm. 1 • Ensure a single spokesperson and regular briefings as close to the site of an incident as possible. I • Correct misinformation and erroneous stories as quickly as possible. 1 • Do not play coy with reporters or distort facts.
• Do appeal to the professionalism and sense of public 1 responsibility of reporters in briefings and other contacts.
Exercises and other analysis have underscored additional basic 1 issues in counter-terrorism public communications that also may apply in other public order emergencies. Here are a few: 1 The use of disinformation. Should the police, for example, use fake news releases or other phoney mechanisms to deceive terrorists? I • How or whether a government should request a news agency to agree to terrorist demands for the full coverage of 1 statements or other declarations.
• The participation of reporters as go-betweens in incidents and 1 the possible conflict between their social and political responsibilities. I • The reporting of police movements in an incident's management and whether the government or the police should request modified or delayed news coverage, especially where 1 live immediate coverage could endanger lives or public safety. • Government/police/media co-operation and news coverage r and the development of guidelines for reporting.
• And lastly, whether politicians or others ought to make statements during incidents.
The National Counter-Terrorism Plan also envisages, as do the national emergency arrangements for public information, the highest co-operation among the federal, provincial and municipal governments I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 101 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
in the management of incidents.
Co-ordination among the three governments in public cômmunications at the political and operational levels would be a goal. While federal authorities would speak to an incident from a national perspective, this would not preclude municipal and provincial authorities speaking as they see fit in their areas of responsibility.
The National Counter-Terrorism Plan recognizes that during an incident the fullest informatibn must flow rapidly to a central point for co-ordination, analysis and assessment to ensure that politicians who must make strategic decisions have a reliable idea of what is going on. This includes an incident's wider implications as well as minute-to- minute developments.
Success in national counter-terrorism is tied to co-operation among the federal, provincial and municipal governments and their police forces. Such co-operation is basic to the success of any public order emergency. Such co-operation requires that provincial and federal authorities, including the police, political leaders and government officials, consult and keep one another fully informed in an incident.
In winding up I would like to say that the main points I wanted to make in these remarks are that: • public communications is crucial to the effect of management of public order emergencies • communications planning, analysis and speedy responses are essential to the effective management of public order emergencies • informed government-police-media relations are basic to the safe resolution of terrorist incidents • effective co-ordination among all the players - governments, politicians, officials, the police and the media - is the key to success in counter terrorism public communications.
MICHAEL We are going to have a few last points from Bruce Beanlands who is a THEILMANN Research Analyst with the Department of the Solicitor General. 102 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 . PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
BRUCE As Mr. Belford has already mentioned, the National Security Co- BEANLANDS ordination Centre (NSCC) is involved in co-ordinating Canada's counter-terrorism response. An important part of that 'work falls in the • area of research and how research can affect and aid in developing new policy. The Centre and the other agencies within the ministry collaborate in identifying research areas that will help promote better understanding of terrorism and create better policies. The NSCC is itself engaged in sevèral benchmark research projects. For example, we have created a resource document and bibliography and are now in the process of completing the terrorism chronology, Terrorism in Canada since 1960. Both documents are non-classified and will be published. Finally with respect to the media and communications, in consultation with Mr. Davidson, we are worldng on immediate depiction and public perception of terrorism in Canada. This project focusses on many facets of terrorism and the media in Canada. We intend to do a content analysis of newspaper articles selected from the Canadian news index, language used to describe tenorism and terrorists, and the issues involved in government response. We also intend to use polis to identify public confidence and interest in the government's response to terrorism in Canada. We intend.to do these polls annually and also after major events to try to gauge public response to how well the government handled different incidents.
MICHAEL I should like to thank our speakers for their presentations today. I think THEILMANN they have done an admirable job of setting the framework for what we have to do this afternoon which is examine the information demands of a major public order emergency: I think both Chuck and Dave's presentations underline the fact that the key to successful management of public information in public order emergencies is co-ordination, and co- ordination in turn hinges on information sharing. Or to put it more simply, "Talk to your buddies." In fact, those four words, "Talk to your buddies," sum up, in my opinion, what the National Emergency Arrangements for Public Information are all about. No matter whether you have a public welfare, international or public order emergency, the one rule to ensure everyone speaks with the same voice is, "Talk to your buddies." And by buddies I mean everyone in this hall: federal, provincial and territorial. We all realize the constraints of our trade, the political considerations that govern relations between the various orders of government in Canada. However, information sharing is something that helps us all do our jobs better and, hopefully, being professionals we can share information, serve our political masters and serve the public at the same time. It's a tall order PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 199.1 103 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
but one I believe we are all used to performing.
In the case of public order emergencies, we have already heard from our presenters what 'type of information-sharing arrangements are in place at the federal level for dealing with terrorist type incidents. However, the generic term "public order emergency" encompasses a lot more than just terrorist incidents. In the past year alone, we have seen Oka, street violence sparked by racial tension in Halifax, and picket-line confrontations during the PSAC strike. All to a greater or lesser degree could be termed public order emergencies. And all to a greater or lesser degree require co-ordination of information and information sharing in order to develop effective communication strategies.
The task before us today is to determine what additional arrangements are necessary when a public order emergency assumes a public welfare dimension or when it is of such a magnitude that it I involves more than one government or agency. il We are not looking for a rigid structure here. On the contrary. We are looking for something that is flexible and adaptable. Arrangements that will function no matter which way the political winds r are blowing... arrangements flexible enough to accommodate new players and which can adapt to the changing circumstances of a public order emergency. There will be some fixed reference points. Solicitor I General of Canada will, in nearly all cases, be the lead federal agency for incidents affecting the security of Canada for example, and the provinces I will always have paramount jurisdiction over local police forces. But by t and large, there are no right or wrong answers. As we say in the introduction to the scenarios in your manual, we are looking for creative 1 but practical solutions rooted in existing arrangements and procedures. We also hope that the work we do today will help foster a better understanding between policing agencies and emergency I preparedness organizations. A better understanding of our respective roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis public communications and we hope I this will also encourage future dialogue on the subject. I should also like to emphasize that the exercise we are conducting today is very much rooted in the real world and not in the r world of theory. Through luck and chance of geographic location Canada has been. spared the civil unrest that has plagued many other countries in the world during the last century. But we are by no means r immune. For example, looking back over the last 90 years of Canadian history, we have had conscription riots in Quebec-in 1918; a series of riots during the 1930s sparked by the social dislocation and unrest caused I by the Great Depression; a wave of arson and bomb attacks in the early I 104 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
'60s by the radical Doukhobor sect, the Sons of Freedom; and the Octob.er crisis of 1970. And the future, I think, doesn't promise to be any easier.
We live, as the Chinese proverb says, in interesting times. In the last three years we have seen incredible changes in the face of the world geopolitical map. And, as we are seeing in Yugoslavia, these changes are not always being effected in a peaceful manner. We are also increasingly subject to economic and environmental pressures. In Europe they now talk of environmental and economic refugees and the threat they pose to civil stability. It's not inconceivable that such pressures could eventually affect Canada. It all makes for a potent brew that could result in any number of unforeseeable events. History, as I have learned, and my academic background is in history, is the study of what everyone thinks impossible, actually happening. I recall an incident three years ago. I was at an OECD conference in Stockholm and I was sharing a lunch table with the eight West German delegates who were attending the workshop, and our conversation focussed on the exciting events that were happening in Europe at that time, specifically the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. I posed the question, "Will we see the unification of the two Germanys in the near future." The answer from the assembled delegates was an emphatic, "No. Not in our lifetimes." Within six months of that conversation the unification of East and West Germany was a reality.
All of this is to say that in the syndicate work we are looldng for solutions to problems that we could very well be facing in some form or other in the next few decades or even sooner. I think this is worth bearing in mind as we start work.
Are there any questions for our panelists?
QUESTION What arrangements are there to communicate the federal government policy on terrorism, and is there any evidence in research that this policy has had an effect on the profile of terrorism? In other words, is terrorism in Canada and around the world showing any increase or decrease.
CHUCK There seem to be two questions. The first is what are the arrangements BELFORD for communicating policy information during terrorist incidents. I will invite my colleague David Davidson to answer that in a moment and to relate how you would prepare the Minister to respond appropriately to an incident as it develops.
Some incidents, like the attack on the Turkish embassy, are PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 105 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
over relatively quickly. Others, such as the October Crisis or Britain and the IRA, go on for long periods. In either type of incident, my job is to be part of what is called a Special Advisory Team; which is available to the police commander either in the command post or right on site. My expertise would fall in the area of national plans and policies. I would be accompanied by a DND communicator, a CSIS officer, and anyone else we fell could provide useful and pertinent advice. This could easily include an Emergency Preparedness Canada officer if there were a public welfare dimension to the emergency.
DAVID Internationally, we have done a lot of work with the Americans in public DAVIDSON communications, focussing on many of the questions that we have been dealing with in these workshops. We have also had a major Canada/U.S. exercise to test our communications arrangements. Though we have certain agreed-to procedures, the work is ongoing. We have discussed public communications with the British but not in any great detail. So the answer is yes, on the matter of terrorism, we are aware of what's going on -in one anôther's countries, particularly in public communications. As far as advice to the minister is concerned on making a statement out of the blue,- our advice is no. If the situation warrants, we might offer that kind of advice, particularly where it would be natural to make a statement in the House or in a scrum with reporters. However, we don't just come out of nowhere to do this. If I may use the bus hostage situation which took place on Parliament Hill a few years ago as an example, there was a case where the minister was receiving continuous advice as the incident unfolded. For example, as the incident happened on a Friday, we had to prepare all kinds of advice for handling the thing in the House on the following Monday. There isn't a continuing public education program on counter- terrorism. We do it in a generic sense.
CHUCK I mentioned earlier that when an incident occurs the National Security BELFORD Co-ordination Centre (NSCC) changes into the National Policy Centre. Part of the structure of the National Policy Centre envisages Dave Davidson at the head of a communications group of advisers that supports the ministry and the minister during the incident. It was that group or its NSCC version that took care of the problem on the hill.
DAVID This committee, on which incidentally Emergency Preparedness Canada DAVIDSON (EPC) is a key player, comes together in an incident to handle the management of public communications, and to develop advice and so on 106 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
for the government. If we had a terrorist incident, such as we are 1 discussing now, where the public welfare dimensions of the emergency were overshadowed by the public order dimensions, then I would hand over the committee to Lesley. i QUESTION It would seem to me in the case of Oka, where violence was used to attain political objectives, that this would qualify as a terrorist incident. Did the government view Oka as terrorism? Was the counter-terrorism plan implemented in any respect? Was there concern at the national level that the provincial police were unable to handle the situation within the parameters the federal government sets for handling terrorist incidents?
CHUCK The first question asked was, "Was it perceived as a terrorist incident?" BELFORD In a certain sense the honest answer is it didn't matter. It was a serious ti incident whatever we called it. However, the government did not take the position that it was a security offence, principally because if you invoke the Security Offences Act then you are essentially labelling the A person or group which is the subject of the act as terrorists. And if what you are looking for down the roàd is a remedial resolution of the grievances that are being expressed, you don't want to scuttle chances for 1 a solution by labelling one side as terrorists.
You must also remember that the matter was already comfortably within the jurisdiction of the province which had availed itself of the civil power provisions of the National Defence Act. So it was clear that while there was some difficulty with developing a police 1 and law enforcement response using Quebec resources, the Quebec government was able to avail itself of the civil power provisions just as any other province is entitled to do. 1
The third question had to do with the extent to which it was perceived as a terrorist incident. Certainly the short answer is no, we 1 did not dust off our counter-terrorism plan. However, we did act as advisers to the minister and to government. For example, we developed alternative scenarios and suggested how we might respond if certain r things happened. However, none of the scenarios came to fruition, the federal government was not directly involved, and the province was left to manage the incident. t
DAVID First of all, Oka was never officially declared a terrorist incident. But to DAVIDSON those of us who work in terrorism, if it walks like a duck, quacks like a I duck, looks like a duck, swims like a duck, it's a duck, but this was never said officially. Secondly, on the public communications side, although no communications plan was officially invoked, the plan we used was the I one developed by Emergency Preparedness Canada and used during the 1 I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 107 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 Gulf war. It was all the work that Lesley had done with the people throughout, provincial and the feds. That's what was used and it was invaluable.
MIKE You saw the military in Quebec under what's called, 'Aid to the Civil I CHARRIER Power.' This means the military are working for the province. You (Policy Analyst, also saw the RCMP backing up the provincial police. They were not Solicitor General federal police, they were backing the provincial police and those are two t of Canada) very important points. It was a provincial show all the way.
QUESTION: In Canada a lot of the news that people get, taking the Gulf crisis as an example, comes from CNN or from other news services. Even if the news appears in our own newspapers or our own. TV shows, it is often coming out of other expertise or news services around the world. Generally speaking, what do you do to cater to that in your communications plans? It doesn't necessarily have to be terrorism. It can be an earthquake or any other type of natural or human-made disaster. Almost any incident. in today's global village gets taken up by media outside the country and is then fed back into Canada thereby 1 affecting your capability to deal with the situation.
DAVID Certainly one of the major problems which confronted us du ring the DAVIDSON Gulf war, particularly when we met every morning to work out strategic advice for the government and examine the analysis that had been done overnight. One of the most difficult problems was to counter, not neutralize, but to get balance from the coverage that was coming from outside Canada. If you watched outside of Canada you would have thought that we were doing nothing. We devised our own strategies for 1 trying to deal with that. The problem you have raised is very important 1 and one that we will have to continue to look at. QUESTION Who handles it? It is very difficult for a province and yet they are the 1 ones that are often in front of the cameras. DAVID Absolutely. When you diffuse AP stuff coming up through Seattle into t DAVIDSON B.C., if it hasn't been covered by CP or something like that or another domestic news agency then you will get a different slant and I could give I you numerous examples. QUESTION I understand what you're saying but it's more the idea of how do you get co-operation from these people. There are identifiable, international 1 news services. However, it's no good talking to their local rep because he is not necessarily going to help you. Is it possible to establish relationships with the head offices of some of these services and have a I relationship as you do with the Canadian media. A more accurate story 1 I 108 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 1 from a Canadian point of view would be better for you. It seems to me that when Canadians get a distorted picture it's because that's the picture that's coming across the media.
DAVID That's also a good point, and quite frankly, I haven't examined it DAVIDSON carefully. But my instinct says it would be very difficult to do in any 1 kind of comprehensive, effective way. We have made some enquiries of foreign news agencies, CBS, AP and so on, and the response we get is always very polite, but it is, here is a copy of our practices and this is 1 what we follow. I can walk into Canadian Press and talk to Kincaid as an old colleague, but I can't very well walk into AP and do the same. It gets very formal and I don't know how effective it really is.
FRIDAY NOV. 15 VENDREDI 15 NOV.
MICHAEL We will start this morning with the syndicate reports. Could we hear THEILMANN from Group 1 please.
Grouplgroupe 1 The first question we were asked to answer is: what would be the BEVERLEY. respective communications roles of the municipal, provincial and SMITH federal governments? I Industry, Science & Technology It was felt that at the municipal level there would be a need for the mayor Canada to make some kind of statement of reassurance. The mayor would not be alone but would have the backup of the police or operations people. From a communications perspective, it would also be valuable for the mayor to have a Commonwealth Gaines Committee spokesperson on 1 hand to reaffirm support for the mayor and to reinforce the impression, that the authorities have the situation under control. 1 On the provincial level the Attorney General would be the lead department given his/her concern with public safety and the RCMP. The federal government's primary role would be one of reassurance, particularly to the international community. All levels of government would brief their respective colleagues in Cabinet. 1 Overall, it was felt that a show of solidarity between all concerned parties would be needed in this kind of situation. 1 How are public communications being co-ordinated between the city police, municipal authorities and the provincial government? A I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP,. NOV. 13-15, 1991 109 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
joint information centre would be set up with municipal and provincial involvement. This centre would have to have multilingual capabilities.
Would there be any information sharing between the provincial and federal orders of government, if so, what type of information, how would it be shared and what provincial and federal agencies/departments would be involved?
An emphatic yes to the first question. There would definitely be information sharing between the federal and provincial orders of government. The type of information shared would be both of an operational and a communications nature. What was happening at the site and what would have to be done to deal with the situation. The mechanism for information sharing would be a pre-established EOC with representation from the provincial Attorney General's office, the Premier's office, and appropriate provincial departments. Federal agencies and departments that would be involvèd would include the Solicitor General and CSIS, the PMO and PCO, External Affairs, International Trade, Employment and Immigration Canada, RCMP, Multiculturalism, and Fitness and Amateur Sport in view of the fact that I the Commonwealth Games are involved.
Is there a communications role for the B.C. Provincial Emergency Program in this scenario? If so, what would it be and how would it be co-ordinated with what is being said about the public order aspects of the emergency? What is the role of the federal government at I this stage? Does it have a lead communications role? If not, what preparatory work should it be doing in case it should have to assume such a role if the crisis were to assume larger proportions? Who would 1 be doing the work on behalf of the federal government?
We felt that there was a role for the Provincial Emergency 1 Program. The federal role was to provide support to the province. The federal government would also be heavily involved in international communications with embassies abroad and representatives of other 1 countries in Canada. There would also be a federal co-ordinator of information. The federal government would prepare for a larger role 1 by dusting off the National Counter-Terrorism Plan. This- would involve close co-operation between the Solicitor General, the Privy I Council Office and External Affairs. Exercise 2, Questions A and B: Describe how public communications would be handled at the site of the hostage taking and 1 consider who would issue the media statements and releases pertaining to both the operational and policy aspects of the hostage taking. I What federal and provincial departments and agencies would 110 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
be involved in establishing communications policy? We made a couple of assumptions here. We said that the hostages were Internationally Protected Persons under the CSIS Act and therefore we felt it appropriate to invoke the Security Offences Act. There would be an RCMP spokesperson at the operations site. This person would be acting in co-operation with the provincial police. The lead would be taken by the federal Solicitor General and External Affairs and their actions would be co-ordinated by PMO/PCO in consultation with the provincial Attorney General and Premier's office. Exercise 3: the crisis has now assumed a large public welfare dimension and has grown to include Alberta and New Brunswick. The United States and the provinces adjacent to New Brunswick are also involved due to the danger of radioactive fallout should the nuclear power plant be destroyed. What are communications roles of the federal and provincial govennnents? For the federal government we felt that the Privy Council Office would have to expand representation on its communications committee to include such other bodies as the Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada and Atomic Energy Canada Limited. The Prime Minister would be making a statement, to instill public confidence and this would indicate a co-ordinated response amongst the various levels of government. The NEAPI plan would be activated and there would .be constant communication with the international community. At the provincial level, the province would establish a provincial information centre which would communicate both directives and emergency information to the public. They would also be liaising very closely with the federal government and other jurisdictions. How does the federal government react to this crisis in public confidence and how does it communicate and co-ordinate what it is going to do with the provinces/ territories and United States? We felt that to reassure the public it was vital for the Prime Minister and federal- and provincial ministers to make themselves visible with publicized visits to the various crisis locations. Privy Council Office (PCO) would co- ordinate the communications activities with the provincial counterparts. PCO would also establish public enquiry lines where people could call in and be given information. PCO would establish a media services desk similar to what was done during the Persian Gulf crisis. We also felt that it was necessary to seek allies among various interest groups. True North has been saying all along that they weren't affiliated with the Rightists so we would try to get them on side. In the same vein, we would try to get the ethnic community and perhaps some key academics to use as allies in communicating a co-ordinated message. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 111 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Grouplgroupe 2 The main difficulty we had when reading the scenario was trying to CLAUDE gauge the impact of the initial events on the staging of the DALLEY Commonwealth Games. We resolved the difficulty by dividing the Provincial communications problem into two parts. The first part centred on the Emergency Pgm communications role of the municipal government. This focussed on the B.C. operational role to quell the riot and to communicate the meaning of law and order to the public in the city of Victoria.
We felt this was separate from communications regarding the summer games. One of the provincial roles, of course, would be to support and reaffirm the law and order stance of the municipal govenunent and to make sure provincial resources are available to the municipality. We also felt there was a role for the federal government given its involvement with the Commonwealth Games. It would obviously have a role to inform and reassure .the Commonwealth members present at the games that Canada is still a safe place.
Co-ordination of the public communications is crucial and, in this instance, would be co-ordinated through the communication cell of CLEU. CLEU is the Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit and has been in existence for a number of years in B.C. The Director is part of the Police Services Branch and the unit comprises members from federal, provincial and municipal police forces. We assumed CLEU was actively involved in preparation for the Commonwealth Games and that they therefore would have a communications component.
There would definitely be information sharing between the various orders of government and the mechanism for the information sharing would be the communications cell of CLEU.
The federal departments involved would include Employment and Immigration, Customs and Excise, External Affairs, PCO and Health and Welfare. On the provincial side there would be the Premier's office and the Attorney General.
We felt there was a communications role for the B.C. Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) but that it would be in the standby mode. Basically this would mean monitoring events and standing by ready to move if necessary. We would also notify the provincial public affairs bureau of our concerns and have them on standby. 112 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 1 The federal government's communications role would focus on international concerns, such as protection for the games and information on potential terrorist activities. This latter subject would naturally involve the Solicitor General of Canada and the RCMP, CSIS and so on. We also envisage EPC working on behalf of the federal government, to communicate to the public the message that everything is 0 safe and that the games will proceed. As we are talking about a riot, on-site communications would I still be an RCIVIP responsibility with the senior police official acting as spokesperson. The Solicitor General of Ottawa is still the lead agency because it's a police function. Communications activity would be co- i ordinated between the Solicitor General in Ottawa and the senior police official RCMP on site. The departments involved would be the federal Solicitor General, and on the provincial side, the Attorney General and I the Premier's office. The latter would be kept informed through the provincial public affairs bureau and PEP. 1 We decided to address the questions in Exercise 3 in reverse order. To start we decided to declare a public order emergency. We felt that given the situation -- riots, hostage-takings and potentially huge 1, public welfare emergencies -- and given that the U.S. and several provinces were involved, this was a good opportunity to justify the existence of the NEAs and give them a practical workout. Once we f decided that we then, of course, had to start looking at communications strategies. 1 Basically this centred on developing a communications strategy to inform the public of the declaration of the public order and public welfare emergencies and emphasizing that such declarations have 1 been made only after consultation with the provinces. Another message would be to inform the public of the powers that would be used under the t declaration and that such powers were necessary to bring the situation under control. 1 Group/groupe 3 Group 3 concurred with many of the solutions proposed by the MABLE previous two groups: MACNAUGHTON 1 Public Works • municipal lead role in dealing with the riot Canada • reassurance to the public that all levels of government were co- operating to restore order and control
federal role at stage one was mainly one of support and dealing withinternational concerns and keeping the foreign press informed 1 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 113 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
• information sharing would occur between all levels and be comprehensive in nature
• advisory communications role for PEP
National Security Co-ordination Centre in Ottawa readying itself for f possible escalation of the crisis. The group felt that the best way to achieve the above aims would be to form an emergency public information team with I representatives from the three levels of government and a Commonwealth Games representative. The team would be responsible for co-ordinating all communications efforts.
Exercise 2: Communications on-site would be the responsibility of the senior police commander. Jurisdiction would 1 govern who would answer questions on policy. The federal government would be speaking on policy matters relating to the terrorist acts per se in the province, and any other matters related to federal jurisdiction. 1 Communications policy at the provincial level would be established by the Attorney General, the Premier's office, PEP and the Solicitor General of Canada acting through the National Security Co-ordination I Centre.
Exercise 3: We felt the communications roles of the federal and provincial governments at this stage would be identical: to restore public confidence in government and to maintain that confidence. 1 However, we did not get into the practical details of how this would be accomplished. But we felt public morale and evident and visible restoration of control were the key issues given the effect the situation ^ was having on both a national and international level. In the latter case there was also the question of shoring up confidence in Canada so as to 1 restore the falling Canadian dollar. In this respect, we felt it imperative for the Prime Minister to make a statement to the nation to reinforce the message that the I Government of Canada was in control of the situation. There was also a need at the federal level for consultation with U.S. counterparts in all areas of concern. We also felt the Prime Minister should call an I emergency meeting of the premiers and territorial government leaders to discuss the various options. Given the serious nature of the emergency, we felt the highest levels of authority should be brought together for consultation. I I 114 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Grouplgroupe 4 In Exercise 1, Group 4 arrived at many of the key solutions identified by the previous groups. One minor variation was that they identified the existing municipal emergency operations centre as the mechanism for co-ordinating communications between the municipal and provincial governments. Information sharing between the provincial and federal governments on the other hand, would, they felt, be handled through the RCMP Divisional Emergency. Operation Centre in B.C. The Centre would pass on information to the National Emergency Operations Centre in Ottawa which in turn would pass it on to the Solicitor General of Canada from where it would be distributed to all other concerned federn1 departments (i.e. External Affairs, National Defence, Multiculturalism, Fitness and Amateur Sports, Privy Council Office). Coming back down the pipeline the information would go to the provincial Attorney General, the Premier's Office, and other provincial departments directly involved in managing the emergency. Conununications strategy and media reaction monitoring would be done in-province. The federal government would be involved in monitoring and replying to international reaction. At this stage PEP, beyond monitoring, would not have a communications role. The federal government would be supporting and would not have a lead communication role but would be preparing a communications strategy. Exercise 2: Identical solutions to previous groups. Exercise 3: The federal government would now take the lead communications role. This would largely involve taldng actions to restore public confidence and to demonstrate that national action is being taken to resolve the crisis. Within this overall strategy, the provinces would be co-ordinating the release of information pertaining to aspects of the crisis falling within their jurisdiction.To facilitate the federal communications strategy Group 4 developed solutions similar to those developed by previous groups: • Activation of the NEAPI • National Address by the Prime Minister • 1j.S./state-Canada/provincial consultation. In a key variation, Group 4 decided not to declare a public order emergency. They felt the emergency still had a police focus and that a declaration would send the wrong signal to the public, increase tension and unease, and probably resurrect the ghost of the War Measures Act and October 1970. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 115 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Groupl groupe 5 Exercise 1: for this exercise Group 5 developed solutions similar to the DOUG previous groups with two minor variations. First, they felt there was a HARRISON role for EPC's regional director, probably in the form of federal liaison Emergency within the provincial operations centre. Second, the group felt that Planning Ontario there would already have been a media plan in place for the Commonwealth Games. As a result, they felt that designated media spokespersons working under that plan would be present in the municipal operations centre acting as liaison for the Games Committee and providing communications advice. Exercise 2: We made two assumptions regarding the hostage taking. First, the hostages were not Internationally Protected Persons. Second, the hostage taking was a political act and therefore automatically involved the Solicitor General of Canada is automatically involved as the lead agency. However, we felt that given the size and professionalism of the Victoria police force, they would probably still handle on-site operations, including public communications. There would also be an RCMP presence, either in the form of a specialist team or a liaison officer. The RCMP would co-ordinate, assist and give advice on federal issues. The on-site commander's public communications activities would focus on the.tactical situation. The Solicitor General of Canada would provide advice on policy and speak to policy issues. Group 5 listed the same federal and provincial departments which would be involved in resolving the crisis, as previous groups. Their one addition was the Commonwealth Games Organizing Committee. Exercise 3: We would not declare a national emergency. We did not even see a need to declare a provincial emergency. Although we now have public order and public welfare emergencies, the provincial authorities are still capable of managing the situation. However, having said that, we do feel there is a need for all levels of government to share. information and co-ordinate communications strategy between the various jurisdictions. At the federal level, we saw Privy Council Office/Federal Provincial Relations Office leadership with National Policy Centre input, in the creation, in consultation and co-operation with the affected provinces, of a comprehensive crisis communications plan. External Affairs would be responsible for U.S. liaison. Provincial and federal dissemination of information would be done through normal governmént channels. Each ministry or department involved would have its own method of disseminating information in 116 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
conjunction with the overall crisis communications policy.
Grouplgroupe 6 As the other groups, Group 6 felt that the municipality had primary DUGALD responsibility for public communications, particulary those relating to STEWART fire and police operations. But on a broader note, they felt the Industry, Science responsibility for maintaining information flow between the federal and & "Tecnology provincial orders of government lay with the provincial government. Canada However, given that the scenario has the potential to be a public order emergency, and possibly a public information disaster, the group felt that information sharing with the federal government should begùi immediately. In other words, do not wait until you are under the gun to act. Aside from the obvious role of providing support, the federal govenrunent would be dusting off plans (Le. National Counter- Terrorism Plan) and alerting Lesley's team. This would be essential given the international implications of the crisis (i.e. Commonwealth Games) and the potential threat to foreign nationals.
The rest of Group 6's solutions were virtually along the same lines as the solutions of the previous groups. In Exercise 2, Group 6 arrived at similar solutions to the previous groups.
In Exercise 3, our group was divided over the question of whether We had a huge national crisis or just the threat of one. This brought up the supplementary question of whether we would have to declare a public order emergency or continue to handle the emergency under the auspices of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Half the group felt the federal government would be reluctant to declare a public order emergency as it would send the wrong signal to the Canadian public and possibly escalate the crisis. Our reasoning here was based on the fact that you only invoke the Emergencies Act if the powers you need to manage the situation are unavailable under any other piece of federal legislation. In this case we felt, on balance, that existing powers were adequate for dealing with the situation. We also felt the Solicitor General of Canada would be the lead agency and that all communications activity would be co-ordinated through this department.
How does the federal government react to this crisis in public confidence? We felt that you demonstrate you are competent. However, one problem in this regard might be a possible public perception of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan as being covert in nature (i.e. lots of behind the scenes activity). Lack of behind the scenes knowledge might fuel public panic and contribute to the impression that the situation were running away with itself. To redress this, we felt you should develop a strategy which demonstrates that action is being taken to resolve the situation. To help orchestrate and sustain this message, we felt it PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 117 I PROCEPS-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 important to activate the NEAPI. This would also serve to relieve pressure on the counter-terrorism people. To conclude, the overall I communications objective would be to reassure the Canadian public that I the situation is under control and will not get out of hand. MICHAEL Are there any questions for our last group? I would like to thank all the- THEILMANN groups for their presentations. The scenario contained a lot of issues and I there were some difficult management decisions and you came up. with some imaginative answers. I would now ask our panel of experts to I come up to the front and take their places. The panelists we have today are the same as yesterday, with one exception. We have Inspector Yves. Juteau of the RCMP. Inspector I Juteau has been a member for the force for the last 23 years. He has had 14 years experience as an RCMP officer in a contract province, specifically New Brunswick, and he also has had two years experience in I protective duties and security for dignitaries and VIPs. He is presently head of the Public Information Branch of the RCMP headquarters in Ottawa. He is also Assistant Commander at the National Emergency Operations Centre, RCMP HQ in Ottawa.
I think as the scenario started out in the fair city of Victoria I with a riot it would be only appropriate to let our colleague Dave I Richardson take the floor first. DAVID I have three or four general comments. One is that I had a little trouble I RICHARDSON with the scenario. I think it very unlikely that 10,000 people could descend on Victoria without the police having advance warning. I work on a lot of foreign and royal visits, and a person with a cold can't get into I Victoria without the police knowing about it. Therefore I believe there would have been advance warning and that there would already have been an emergency communications plan in place that would have I encompassed police operations and the Commonwealth Games Committee communications people. This plan would also have taken 1 into account the role of the Mayor of Victoria. We should bear in mind that the games, while they are centred in Victoria, involve a number of municipalities. In the provincial I government we know from experience that if the municipalities are in trouble the provincial government hears about it within about 30 seconds. I suspect that if an event of this magnitude occurred, though I some municipal facilities would be used, the municipalities themselves would only have a minor communications role. In other words, I don't I think the Mayor would sit around very long having press conferences. I 1 118 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
I feel that the emphasis would be immediately on police operations. The Commonwealth Gamés issue would be handled by the 1 province at this stage. I also felt that the question of who would cancel the games would have a significant impact on communications strategy. The person who actually appears in front of the cameras to announce the I cancellation, be it a provincial or federal official, would, from that point on, assume a dominant role as spokesperson. I I saw in the presentations a difficulty in determining when exactly the scenario becomes.- a terrorist event. This would have implications for communications. At first it would be a fairly local story t with a heavy focus on the riot and the police response. However, several of the groups noted that as events iinfolded and the crisis grew, the communications role shifted to the federal government. I would like to I know how that shift takes place and how it is communicated to the province and the public.
I think the Commonwealth Games communications people would be concerned largely with handling, as one presentation mentioned, the large volume of calls from overseas seeking information 1 about the situation, the safety and security of their athletes, and whether or not to bring them home. I also think the province would carry the can for the failure of the games. I
In many of the, presentations, the role of the federal government seemed to be played down. Many of the presenters did not see this as a public order emergency or a public welfare emergency. However, I suspect the national media would play it as a national story. When you have three, apparently related incidents going on, all backed 1 by a violent group with demands, then it is highly probable that the media would be playing it as a national story. But if there is no national focus to the communications strategy, or no national spokesperson, I 1 think this might work against effective communications.
I didn't see much differentiation made in the presentations 1 between the communication roles of the various levels of government. I think, for instance, that as soon as the train is hijacked in Edmonton or the nuclear facility in New Brunswick is siezed, one of the predominant I concerns is going to be the health of the people in the immediate vicinity. I think, without question, that this would be a priority communications concern to the province. I also think that in the planning of 1 communications, we would want to keep our messages straight. If we have three levels of government involved, we have to be specific about r what the role and responsibilities of each level of government. I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 119 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
DAVID Perhaps I can open by making a few comments. to clarify some of the DAVIDSON confusion that seems to exist regarding relations and responsibilites between the various orders of government during terrorist-type incidents. First, the international role. External Affairs has the international role in any relations outside Canada and this includes I terrorism. The mechanism for discussion is a bilateral consultative group led by External Affairs and which includes the Solicitor General of Canada. Representatives from our two countries discuss matters I involving terrorism, including public communications. But let me emphasize again, the Solicitor General would not take the lead role in any international realtions pertaining to terrorism. However, we would be involved and in an incident External Affairs would be a player in the National Policy Centre.
I Another important item to consider is the multiculturalism angle. To use a recent example, there was a lot of media coverage concerning the reaction of the Canadian-Arab community during the Gulf war. To come up with a strategy for dealing with these types of issues, we have found it often helps to know what is going on politically in the home countries of the various ethnic groups involved. This often has a bearing on what's happening here in Canada and can be useful in resolving communications problems. The Turkish embassy siege is an example of an incident where it.was very useful to know some of the I background information on Turkish-Armenian problems and issues.
It didn't always come out clearly in the presentations, but once f you understand the difference between strategic and operational communications you'll be able to understand a lot of other things. Strategic communications is the broad political policy (short and long I term) aspects of what we are planning to do. Operational or tactical communications concerns: what we are doing right now to deal with the I situation. I find when advising ministers, or when drawing up communications plans, that if I just keep those simple ideas clear in my mind then I can keep the whole thing in perspective and my I communications strategies become very clear. Many of you were unclear on the role of the National Security I Co-ordination Centre vis-à-vis the Commonwealth Games. I just want to tell you that it would be geared up for such an event regardless of whatever the plans say. The last time the Commonwealth Games were i held in Canada, we operated 24 hours a day monitoring and making threat assessments, and generally ensuring that we were ready should I anything happen. Another useful point to bear in mind is that in provinces where the RCMP is contracted to act as the provincial police they wear I two hats. Though their primary function is to act as the provincial police t 120 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
force, they also have federal policing responsibilities. If an incident is declared a security offence under the Security Offences Act, the RCMP then acts in its federal role and accepts direction from Ottawa. An offence under the Criminal Code on the other hand would fall within the jurisdiction of the Attorney General or the Solicitor General of the province. If there is any federal involvement you can be sure the Solicitor General will be involved, if not for the policing aspect then for the security and intelligence aspect. This latter area of course, is the concern of CSIS which hàs an ongoing responsibility to be on the lookout for potential terrorist threats, or an incident which may evolve into a terrorist event.
Many of the presenters mentioned a lead role for the Privy Council Office. If the Privy Council Office assumes the lead role in a terrorist incident it means, in effect, that the Prime Minister has taken over the lead role from the Solicitor General. This is because the PCO is the Prime Minister's department. However, until the Prime Minister makes that decision, responsibility for handling terrorism rests with the Solicitor Genreal of Canada and the National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Don't assume that Pd0 is necessarily going to take the lead. When it does we will all know about it.
One presenter made the good point that the national Counter- Terrorism Plan has, in the public mind, a covert air about it. We have done all our communications contingency planning in this area and public education is an important component of that planning, that is telling people what we are doing. And while there is nothing secret in our counter-terrorism plan, people do tend to get hyped up when they hear it mentioned. By and large this excitement is unnecessary. But there is a fine balance required in explaining these things. There are no state secrets when we talk of our anti-terrorism program in a general sense. For example, we did a feature about the RCMP Special Emergency Response Team in our departmental magazine that had wide public distribution. It's when you get down to specifics that you run into difficulty. Those are the points I wanted to make. Thank you for your presentations. I've learned a lot.
LEN DENT During the excellent presentations we have heard today two words kept coming to mind: co-operation and consultation. With hundreds, perhaps thousands, of jnournalists covering the Commonwealth Games, there is no doubt that the world's attention will be focussed on Victoria. And when that happens you will quicldy capture the interest of the federal government, thereby involving several levels of government and cutting across the interests of a number of departments. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 121 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
A couple of my colleagues, especially David Davidson, mentioned there are two different types of communications: strategic I and operational. In terms of the scenario that means you are going to have two different sets of problems. First, there are the local issues in Victoria, Edmonton and Point Lepreau where local residents are going I to be very concerned about operational information, i.e. how you are going to solve the crisis on their doorstep? To resolve this particular crisis you are going_ to need a plan and a particular set of messages. I Second, there is the national, perhaps even international, picture. This is where the federal government would probably come in with a different set of messages for the national audience and, possibly, another set of I messages and plans for the international audience. This is called strategic communications. And as you are going to have to address both types of communications problems simultaneously, you are really going r to need a lot of the consultation and co-operation that many of you mentioned in your presentations.
The public, as mentioned by Bill Pascal yesterday, is not interested in what level of government is responsible for responding to the crisis. They are only interested in solutions. The public and media are going to approach whoever they can get hold of, including local MPs, and demand answers on how.the situation is being handled. There is no doubt in my mind that this type of pressure would be present right I from the start of the crisis. And as the crisis grows and spreads across the'country, we in the centre from all those departments you mentioned, would be gathering to address the communications dimensions of the I crisis. I would also add, based on our experience during Oka and the Persian Gulf war, that it would not be long before PCO would want to 1 take the lead role. In my opinion it would also be important for top-level officials to set the tone. For example, the Solicitor General and the Minister of External Affairs could hold a press conference to denounce I what is happening. This would set the tone for both the national and international audiences. I am not sure we would use the Prime Minister at this point. My recommendation would be that we hold on to the Prime I Minister as an ace up our sleeve until we see how the crisis develops. It's important to remember that once you play the prime ministerial card, it's difficult to play it again. So most of the communications work would I fall on the shoulders of the Departments of External Affairs and Solicitor General. We would set the messages at that level, send them out and allow them to filter down. The tone to set would be that we were I going to enforce the rule of law, that we abhor what is happening and so on. Messages then would then obviously have to go out to other federal ministers as every minister would be expected to be able to respond. I Eventually -the messages could filter all the way. down and serve as a guideline for the different provinces and for the municipalities. I To wind up I would like to bring you back to those words, t 122 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
"co-operation and consultation." There is no doubt that those are the two most important words. We would have to be seen to be working together.
YVES JUTEAU First let me set the stage. My experience is related to operations not communications, and I like the point David Davidson made about distinguishing between operational and policy information. My remarks, therefore, will focus a lot more on the operational side.
I think Group 2 did a good job of setting the stage when they tnliced of a security organization in place for the Commonwealth Games. With all due respect to the Victoria police department, they are not going to run this thing on their own. Look at the Winter Olympics in Calgary in 1988; look at all the summit meetings that have been held over the past. in each case, our task force was in place, whether you call it a few years; CLEU or some other name. So in this riot scenario in Victoria you're going to have a lot of reinforcements in plade, including the RCMP and probably representatives from other policing agencies in Alberta and Sasktachewan. As I mentioned before, this was the case with the Calgary Winter Olympics. And there will most definitely be a communications component within this group. To reiterate what Bill Pascal was saying yesterday, the public just wants to know how you are going to solve the problem. In my opinion, the first part of this scenario--a riot in Victoria--is strictly a law and order problem. Therefore the police will have the lead role in operations and probably in communications. I say communications because the media will not want to see PR men. They will want to talk to one of our commanders and ask him what the hell is going on and what is being to done to protect and reassure the public. I would also suggest that if you elect to have a mayor or a provincial representative as a spokesperson, then you must have them accompanied by a commander of operations who can provide detailed operational information. I see my own role as a facilitator, ensuring that the police remain in charge of what is essentially a law and order situation, including the communications aspects. As far as reassurrance of the public is concerned, again, the ideal person for this role is the uniformed officer. In the case of a major fire it could be a fireman; at Oka it was the military. In the latter case it was not people in civilian clothes addressing the media, it was the uniformed officer. Uniforms are equated with credibility. Another aspect of this type of scenario is that in reality, elected officials will want to make statements and will have to be allowed to do so. But from my point of view, I think they can be used to best effect to deflect criticism, such as why did the police not receive vital PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 123 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
intelligence; how come CSIS didn't do their job, and so on. By deflecting this criticism they will 'remove pressure from. the police operational team and allow them to do their job.
The question of whether or not to invoke the Emergencies Act also interested me. Frankly, I don't know the answer. I am glad however, that the scenario involves provinces where the RCMP act as the provincial police force. This makes things a lot easier in terms of communication and co-operation. If we were to repeat the same scenario in Quebec and Ontario, we might have a totally different situation as all aspects of the Security Offences Act are not recognized. As a result, there will be an awful lot of discussion over who is responsible for what. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to be here today to comment on your presentations.
MICHAEL Thanks very much Yves. Are there any questions from the floor for our THEILMANN panelists?
QUESTION There seems to be a big difference in what our panelists are saying. David Davidson said he felt that PCO would likely take over the handling of the situation and that the police role would therefore become, to a certain extent, subordinate. On the other end of the table we heard Yves Juteau say that it would end up being a Police operation. Linda Liik of our group said we may not go with a public order emergency declaration but we would still have to address the communications problems and this would mean activating the National Emergency Arrangements for Public Information. Of the 11 National Emergency Agencies, we felt that the NEAPI is the one NEA that can be used in support of a particular emergency. But without a declaration of a public order emergency what public information plan is there to support the Solicitor General? And if we declare an emergency and activate the NEAPI does this not, in effect, change the nature of the response? You have to be clear about this.
DAVID With all due respect, I think you are talking about apples and oranges and DAVIDSON I'll explain why. The National Emergency Arrangements for Public Information would not come into existence unless the Emergencies Act were invoked. That's my understanding. If the act is invoked, PCO would automatically take the lead because that is what is required. The Prime Minister himself is responsible for the NEAPI. What I was talking about was an extended terrorist incident where, as the fallout from the incident became wider, the Prime Minister or Cabinet decided that the situation was much more serious than originally anticipated and that the Solicitor General needed strong support from the government. Therefore the PM0 or the PCO in the 124 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
guise of the NEAPI would take over. That's what I meant. Certainly the I NEAPI comes into being:
QUESTION My question is for Len Dent. Is it true that once the NEAPI is activated, t largely in response to political imperatives originating in the Prime Minister's office, the management of the communications aspects of the emergency falls on the shoulders of the Privy Council Office and the political level?
LEN DENT My understanding is that if the Emergencies.Act is invoked it gives the I government additional powers that they need to handle the situation. However, even during the Persian Gulf crisis we did not need to invoke any of these emergency powers. On the other hand, I think what David I and I are talking about is that when a crisis reaches a point where many different jurisdictions are involved you need a co-ordinating mechanism. The federal government has found during a couple of recent emergencies (i.e. Oka, Persian Gulf war) that a good way of doing business is to have an ad hoc committee of ministers come together I at PMO/PCO; have an ad hoc mirror committee of deputy ministers; and both supported by an ad hoc committee of communications people. This system has allowed the government to operate more smoothly and to 1 make fast decisions. Instead of having to go through a lot, of different departments we have the major ministers, including the Prime Minister, right there. As Dave said, I think there are two different issues, and in I this case we would strongly consider taking over to make sure that everything was co-ordinated from the centre. However, at this point, there would be no need to invoke the Emergencies Act and to bring into I being the NEAPI.
QUESTION I am Linda Liik and I'd like to clarify what I said. I understand the need 1 for co-operation and communication among the organizations involved in a large-scale emergency. I also understand the need for a clear idea of who is saying what to whom, and who leads the response to the crisis. 1 But in reading this exercise, we have, within 48 hours, a terrorist organization wreaking havoc in three provinces and threatening others, not to mention the U.S. I don't understand how, from any point of view, I you would not declare some kind of national emergency. If not, please give me a scenario where you would invoke the Emergencies Act and declare a national emergency. I MICHEAL Perhaps, Linda, I can clarify a few points. The Emergencies Act is THEILMANN legislation of last resort. It is only invoked when the federal government I needs powers that are not available under existing pieces of federal legislation. Therefore, unless the situation were critical, it is highly unlikely it would be invoked. And before you made a decision to invoke I the Act, you would have to consider what kind of signal it would send to the Canadian public. Declaration of a national emergency could very I I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 125 PROCES-VERBA'L DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
well alarm the public and escalate the crisis, thereby working against your communications strategy of reassuring the public and emphasizing control and containment of the situation.
I would also like to point out that in all the NEAPI planning that Gérard has done, and in the public order section that I have been helping him with, we have based it on a worse-case scenario. But because it is -so unlikely that the Emergencies Act would be invoked except in extreme circumstances, we are also looking at arrangements that can be partly utilized or activated in lesser emergencies, and to that extent you might say the NEAPI is activated. However, you don't need to invoke the Emergencies Act to activate the NEAPI. The NEAPI arrangements, or any part of them, are available for use in any emergency where co-operation and co-ordination of communications is t required. Just what part of the arrangements or how extensive their activation, will depend on the nature of the crisis and the needs of the I various parties involved. LESLEY LYNN Thank you for bringing. this out. That is what I was going to say too. If you are confused, I don't blame you. But ultimately, the decision to I invoke a public welfare or public order emergency will be taken at the very highest level. And it will not just be the federal government taking the decision. It will be made by the federal government in consultation 1 with the provinces. The only instance in which the federal government would unilaterally decide to invoke the Emergencies Act would be in an international or a war emergency. But these are the only two examples f in which the federal government would have the authority and legal right to act in such a fashion. That, as -Mike just clearly said, is why we are looking at a set of arrangements for national emergency public 1 information that could be activated in national emergencies or lesser 1 emergencies.
1 B. EMERGENCY WARNING AND BROADCASTING SYSTEMS SYSTEMES D'ALERTE ET DE RADIODIFFUSION I D'URGENCE LESLEY (Intro) I LYNN The next part of our program concerns emergency warning and broadcasting systems. As any of you who have been involved in emergencies at the local level will attest, the ability to be able to warn I people and to be able to communicate with them, particularly once you have evacuated them, is of paramount importance. The introduction of I the topic and the moderator for this part of the program is Cindy I 12 6 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
Stevens. Cindy is well qualified to lead this session because she is ^ Director of Communications Services for the Manitoba government. She oversees media contact and preparation of communications material for all government departments and a number of related agencies, I including the Manitoba Emergency Measures Organization. She has co- ordinated media liaison during many emergencies, the most challenging perhaps being Manitobà s 1989 forest fires in which something like 1 28,000 people were evacuated. Previously Cindy worked in both radio and television and held communications positions with a large community college and two government departments. Cindy would you I mind taking over.
CINDY Thank you Lesley and good morning everyone. I think it is STEVENS appropriate to be discussing emergency warning and broadcasting (moderator/ systems after two and a half days of discussions surrounding modératrice) emergency public information. As emergency responders, most certainly our first concern is for the safety of the public. Providing quick and accurate warning information to people in danger is our main responsibility as emergency communicators. In this age of electronic media proliferation in our homes, in the workplace, it seems to make eminent sense to work with the media in getting this information across to concerned citizens. I In my experience as a media liaison and public information resource during emergencies, I found the media to be more than helpful in providing critical information to the public'. However, this is always i done through an informal relationship and not through an established program such as an emergency warning and broadcasting system. The media do not always understand the difference between various I emergency warnings -- for example, the difference between a weather watch and a weather warning -- and different media outlets will play these stories in different ways. An effective emergency warning and 1 broadcast system would standardize all emergency warnings and would ensure your message is coming across clearly. 1 A recent incident in Manitoba pointed out to me how important a proper warning system could be. In July we had a hazardous goods train derailment in St. Lazare, Manitoba, and it caused the 1 evacuation of all 400 residents of the small community which is quite close to the Saskatchewan border. In St. Lazare the evacuation occurred almost instantaneously after the accident. Residents heard a loud bang, they ran outside, saw the chemicals and smelled the very strong odour which was coming from anhydrous ammonia -- it has a very strong vinegar smell. Everyone in the town just left, they thought, Oh boy! we I are in trouble here, and they just took off. No emergency warning system was required in that instance to get everybody out of the town. t PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 127 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
However, if this had occurred in Winnipeg on one of our many rail lines, we would have had a much different scenario. We would have had thousands of people to inform immediately of the necessity to evacuate.
Although the media would be more than willing to assist in conveying titis information through their conventional means, there is no guarantee the message would get out exactly as you wished. I noticed the tremendous difference in media messages a week ago or so as I was reviewing the media video and audio clips from the St. Lazare derailment. In the first few hours, the media were all reporting different facts about the accident. Although our public information unit had been set up and was issuing media updates, some said there 600 people were evacuated, some said 300, some were using our correct number, some said 25 rail cars were derailed, some said 15, some said there were three chemical spills, some said four or five, some said there was a chlorine leak -- which is very dangerous, and there wasn't -- so all ldnds of inaccurate information were going out. This was the result of many reporters arriving at the site talking to evacuated residents and then going live on the air without ever reading our media updates or ever talking to our public information person at the site.
I think titis points out the fact that even the best relationship with the media and the best public information plan cannot guarantee how your story will play. This is where the emergency warning and broadcast system comes in. It can provide you with immediate unimpeded access to broadcast airwaves and I can think of several instances in Manitoba when we certainly could have used this, certainly the 1989 forest fires would have been one of them. Hopefully you have involved the media in the preparation of your emergency plans so they have begun to buy in to the idea of emergency planning and response. This will go a long way in developing emergency warning systems in conjunction with them.
This morning we are going to hear about a pilot project in Edmonton where an emergency warning and broadcast system has been developed with the local media. I think this ambitious project of Alberta Public Safety Services could provide a good starting point for all of us. We are also going to hear about a new initiative from Communications Canada that could go a long way in assisting with the development of an emergency warning and broadcast system across the country. I think we all need to be aware that a system such as this should be used prudently and only when absolutely necessary. In any emergency scenario general media contact and update will suffice to get your message across. If an emergency warning system were used too often the public could begin to ignore the message. Another key point would be initial and ongoing public information campaigns to inform the public of how the warning system works, how they access it and what action they should be taking to 128 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU • COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
personally protect themselves and their property. I would now like to call on Herb Presley of Alberta Public Safety Services to tell us about Edmonton's pilot project and Emergency Warning and Broadcast Systems. Herb joined Alberta Public Safety Services as a Planning Officer in June 1987 and his bio said six weeks before the tornado struck Edmonton, so I guess you got a good indoctrination into emergencies! In 1989 he began working on an emergency public warning system. He had four years of previous experience in public communications and fund raising with the Alberta Cancer Treatment and Research Organization, and also spent 15 years in the social work addictive treatments field. He is very keen on this topic, I think he has a lot of good information to impart, and more importantly he became a grandfather for the first time last week. Herb.
HERB I want to start off with a bit of a dramatic presentation this morning PRESLEY because in order for you to understand the human aspects behind why we developed a warning system, I want to show you what, if you had been in Edmonton on July 31, 1987 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and had been either listening to radio or television and there had been a warning system in place, this is likely what you would have seen in a hurry. •
(High pitched sounds)."Your attention please" (high-pitched sounds). "Your attention please, listen carefully to the following emergency warning message broadcast from the Edmonton Region Emergency Public Warning System. This may affect your community. -- 'This is a tornado warning issued by Environment Canada. The Alberta weather centre has issued a tornado warning for the City of Edmonton and the counties of Leduc and Strathcona. A tornado was seen to briefly touch down near the City of Leduc and then retract, the system is moving north and northeast so a significant risk of tornado or other damaging winds exist for Edmonton city and the counties of Leduc and Strathcona Until 5:00 p.m. Persons in these areas should be on the lookout for these severe conditions and listen for updated warnings. This warning is in effect from 3:15 p.m. mountain daylight time until 5:00 p.m. '-- This. emergency warning message has been broadcast over the Edmonton region emergency public warning system. If this emergency warning message affects your community, take all necessary precautions and stay tuned to your local radio, television or cable outlet for further details. Do not use your telephone for the duration of this emergency."
Just as a point of information, that was the actual Environment Canada warning issued as a result of the conditions that were developing toward the imminent tornado. I wanted you to hear that because the PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 129 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
tornado was probably the starting point of the latest rounds of discussion in Alberta on whether to develop an emergency public warning system or not. It has always been an issue and it started with our pilot project which is currently right on the verge of coming on line and it seems we have been saying that for a long time. The hardware and software has now arrived and CKUA access network is in the process of bench testing and setting it up and making sure the software's bugs are all worked out. I want to say a couple of things about that later on because it is really important that you realize that in this public warning system and in the development of public warning systems you don't have to reinvent the wheel. The hardware, particularly that we are using, is off-the-shelf technology. By and large it means that you could walk into any electronics store and construct your own little warning system if you wanted from the component parts that are there if you were so inclined. So the Edmonton region pilot project started as a direct result of the tornado.
There is some background information I would like to give you because it is really important to understand that this was not the only reason. A lot of times people construct stop lights at corners where there I have been a dozen accidents and it is very easy to say after 27 people lose their lives and 350 people are injured, we should have had a warning system in place. Subsequent studies after the tornado have shown that a I number of very strange things happened in terms of how people understood what was happening. You will see it in the front of your brief and I won't elaborate, I just want to touch on it very briefly because I it really emphasizes some of the things that in fact are real problems in communicating anything to the public:
I The first one was that the people would think that no warning was given, and thàt's not true. People would think that there was no warning that actually ended up on a radio or TV and that's not true. In I fact four radio stations and one television station carried the actual warning. In fact, two of the radio stations, one FM and one AM, cut off the regular programming, pre-empted it, put two announcers, including I in one case the news director, at the desk and started trying to find out information so they could tell the public what was actually. going on. I This was before the tornado hit its major areas. The interesting thing was first and foremost people didn't react as you would expect they would. They did a number of very strange things as we can determine I by later studies. They were doing things like running out of their offices into the path of the tornado to see this strange and wonderful phenomenon. People were driving down the freeway, stopping their I cars to have a look at this strange cloud that was moving across right in front of them or coming at them. People were actually converging on the area that was being dictated as being the target area for the tornado so I they could see this wonderful event. From what we can understand and 13 0 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
we don't -- some studies were done later, but it is very hard to talk to 27 dead people, obviously -- those who did try to take protective action in many cases did the wrong thing: they ran into wide-sp an buildings for example. A number of warehouses went down in the Strathcona industrial area, large shipping warehouses like Byers Transport and people were running into the middle, getting into trucks. They were sitting in the middle of this wide7span building and they found their bodies in the subsequent search and rescue. So we began to be aware of the fact that not only is there a question of whether or not people hear the warning but also a question of whether people en masse are going to do the right or the wrong thing. If they are going to believe what they are hearing and if they are going to understand the seriousness of it, how much danger they are really in.
Getting the warning out is a communications issue, but what they do with it after that becomes a warning issue, an operational issue if you like. So we took a look at the last five years since 1987 and those are the number of incidents that have happened in Alberta that were reported to the co-ordination information centre that includes all the incidents whether they were minor, major, whatever. You can see we had a high in 1990, I have no idea why that is of close to 600 incidents in 1990. Certainly the Province of Alberta appears to be ripe for some similar kind of system like this. Here is how the incidents broke down: there were per Srear on the average of up to 200 minor incidents. There were up to 250 - 300 requiring basic response; again in 1990 the number seems to be highest. APSS attended 81 of them in one year; 22 were listed as major incidents. Now let me just give you the definition of major incident as seen by the Compliance Information Centre Management (Cc). "An incident where the major impact on life, property or the environment usually involving an evacuation of the immediate area, usually accompanied by a higher level of response from the local authority and may draw significant public attention." You can see again in 1989 we had 22 of them. Level 5 is where the GOC actually gets activated and it reads "This is a major catastrophe with multi-level response, significant evacuation and or threat to the public or the environment usually resulting in activation of the provincial government emergency operations centre at APSS. A comparable event outside Alberta would be the Mississauga derailment. To get an idea of the levels they are looking at, and these two are the ones that we are most concerned about. Most concerned about in a couple of ways. First of all determining whether there in fact was a need for a warning. You can know in your own heart that there is a need for something but you have to really prove it to people who are going to provide the funding, and you have to prove it to people who are going to look at developing assistance. The percentage of total incidents each year, as you can see, major incidents and particularly the activation of the GOC, comprise a very, very small amount. PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 131 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
One of the things that you have to be very careful about when you go to broadcasters is to indicate very carefully for them what you are going to use that system for. Particularly if you are going to ask to use their air waves. They are not going to want 600 times a year somebody picking up the phone and activating the system and cutting into their broadcast. No, I don't think so. We had to explain very carefully that we are only talking about the kinds of incidents where in fact there is imminent danger to life and safety. If you read our operational plan, and I have a couple of copies here, later on, you will find that within it we have actually defined imminent danger and it really deals with life and safety. There is very little you can do for property when there is a tornado bearing down at you, or anything like that. Particularly we have got very short lead time. But you really have to deal with whether people are going to die or whether people are going to be injured, and that's really the two things you want to deal with here and you have to demark that very carefully.
The pilot projects objectives when we started were to first of all provide a means whereby local emergency responders and other agencies could issue warnings to the public during life-threatening disaster situations in the Edmonton region. We wanted to find a way to interface local warning systems with the project and ensure local autonomy in the first level response. Two of the municipalities involved in this had already moved into developing their own warning systems in the wake of the tornado. Particularly those which had a high industrial concentration right in the path of it. Many of you may or may not know that the tornado went through the east Edmonton industrial area, the refinery row as it is very affectionately known in Alberta. And in many instances narrowly missed refmeries - we are talking feet. And so there was really a lot of concern about what ifs, the what ifs that come out of a disaster like that as you know are very, very many. What if the Esso refinery instead of having just being clipped in the corner of one small portion of it, had received a direct hit? Or what if the Celanese plant where they make vinyl pyrite had received a direct hit? Not only do you have the damage that's being done by the tornado, but you have the generator that will pump the stuff into the air in a way that you have never imagined possible. We wanted to provide coverage to all citizens of the Edmonton region, we wanted to look at how to deliver warning messages in the shortest possible time. We wanted to talk about public education and emergency public warnings and how to train. Let's ta& about it, train and orient people to take proper self-protective action over a period of time. To develop a single point message entry system and to tiy to get full support from all the electronic broadcasting media outlets..., and its s on that last point that I think I would really like to talk 132 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
about. I was absolutely bowled over and it could have been the tornado 1 (I tend not to think it was); I think it was really the public mindedness of the our broadcasters, at the tremendous response we got from them. We have structured the pilot project as you see it there. The administration I of the warning system is going to be Public Safety Services, probably in view of the future province-wide expansion of it. The systems operator is going to be our access network which basically holds 15 to 17 (I am I not quite sure of the exact number) FM towers across Alberta -- you will- see them in the back of the brief that you got. I We set up a working group and that was the group that actually keyed the whole thing consisting of all the key municipalities in the region, particularly those that had been directly affected by the tornado. It also involved a number of federal and provincial departments; Environment Canada was one, Communications Canada I was another. Public Safety Services was obviously involved in it, Emergency Preparedness Canada was also involved in it and subsequently added a group called the Standing Committee of I Broadcasters in which we ask the stations to elect one representative as required to a committee of people who would take a look at the overall use and operation of the warning system and provide input to both the 1 system operator on the technical matters, and the system administrator on the matters of operation and philosophy. And we again had a tremendous response. Every station and, every broadcast company (and I we have 15 of them in the Edmonton region) appointed somebody to that committee, and in many instances it has been like the Chief Engineer or the Manager of the station or the President of the company - it really t bowled us over. We thought that in the usual fashion it would continue to be sort of salted off down below, but in discussions in that committee they see this as being one of the most important things they have done in I quite some time in terms of public service, public communications. What I would like to do now is to outline for you what the I project consists of. That's not a very good slide it was done on my home computer - you will have to forgive my little dot matrix printer, it tries its best. The pilot project, and a warning system consists of two things. I We often think about warning systems as being a hardware-software issue or a hardware issue. You have some receivers and you have a transmitter and somebody picks up a mike and they put something into it I and in a magical way it is heard all over the place and that's fine and probably how the system operates. I As I mentioned earlier it's an off-the-shelf-system; simple is the key word, cost effective is the key word in terms of the hardware- software. What we did is we contracted with CKUA to do that for us. I We are not even really involved except to tell them what it is we need on the system and they are doing the development of the hardware and PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 133 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
software as part of their overall transmission system. But the development of a plan, and I can tell you something right now, the one thing I really believe that sold it to the broadcasters for us was going to them with an organized plan, saying to them this_ is what we want to do and here are the parameters and here are the boundaries, give us some I feedback on this. We have the hardware and software. I brought a technical manual with me, if you can understand it you are welcome to take a look at it and read it, I can't, so I don't bother. The plan is the key I document for us. This basically denotes for a person who is going to use the system what the guidelines and what_ the boundaries are. What is the philosophy behind it when you pick up the telephone to, or when you I contact the computer at CKUA to sound a warning, what exactly is it you are doing it for, what are the parameters, what are the boundaries in your community? We circulated this. This was, by the way, developed- I by a group of broadcasters who were the forerunner of our standing committee of broadcasters. They sat down with me and they wrote this plan. We just wrote, well this is point one, we will write this in and see I what happens. 'Men we circulated it around to all the broadcasters. We circulated it around to several of the government departments and municipalities that had been on the original working group, we got their I input and it was signed and ifs gone back out to the broadcasters with a notation that this is their plan, it's our plan, it's a joint plan, it's something we have all put together. I guess it goes without saying that if 1 you want their co-operation you co-opt them. And that's really what you have to do, and there were a lot of things we didn't get but we wanted, I like the on-air testing which we really haven't clarified yet with them. I'd love to see the ability like the fireman. The fire chief can walk into a building and see what people do; but you can't do that with I broadcasters. They have backed us off, they backed me off on that one. They said no, we have to talk about a better way to do that because we don't mind interrupting our transmission with warnings, actual I warnings, but when it comes to testing we have to talk about a different way to do it to create the public awareness and to test the system and so f on. This is what the transmission system for the pilot project I would have looked like if we had gone satellite, and we will go satellite when we go province wide. Basically an authorized agency which mainly is a municipality will actually pick up the telephone and call I CKUA and get, it will contact directly IBM PC; the PC has got custom- written software which is prototyped now throughout Canada, since we are the ones who have a copy. I suppose it's throughout Canada, and the I user gets a menu-driven response on the telephone saying this is the time to enter your security access code. They are given a password, they are not allowed to use the system unless they actùally know the password. I The password is given to them under their personal name so they are I 134 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
personally responsible for whai goes on in the system. It transmits through satellite and will. Right now it's going by direct line because we simply found that we ran out of money on the pilot project so we were unable to establish a satellite link initially. But when it goes province- wide it will go by satellite out to the CKUA towers in the various locations and there will be an SCM0 radio station signal go out, SCMO just means a subsidiary signal to the FM signal that is going out, its not a piggy-back signal or anything else: it's a totally different frequency. It's a totally addressable communication. It will trigger all or portions of those as required, depending on who is addressing it and depending on how they have addressed the communication at the other end.
I should mention to you that the whole system is operated by the person continuing to hold the phone, so if you want to address something, is this province wide? or is this a local emergency? you dial your code in and the software recognizes the dial tones off the telephone once you have accessed the password. It goes into radio, television, and cable stations and in 12 of the 15 we have received permission from the broadcasters to have full broadcast override. One is going to give us partial broadcast override in the off-hours and two are going to put the messages on manually,. However, under the understanding of the plan in which is says they will immediately pre-empt current programming to go on the air with the messages verbatim as received. So they are still agreeing to that even though there may be a few seconds delays while somebody pushes a button.
I just want to basically talk a bit about the status of the project. Before I do that I want to show you what we actually brought to the broadcaster: one was the question of why you really need to put emergency public warnings on the air and why you really need to say the right thing and why you have to have somebody in authority saying the. Because we basically said we were aiming for five things in issuing a emergency public warning. We are aiming for authoritative messages, we want them to. be issued and the voice to be a recognized authority or statement that I am a recognized authority, one that held public trust like the mayor, like the director of disaster services. Each municipality has three users they are allowed to nominate to access the system, and we will be attending to our user training. We are setting one the 26th of November. It has to be clear, that means factual, that's the user's responsibility; and unedited, that's the broadcaster's responsibility. It has to be brief and I want to just say something on the brief part because there is obviously a limit to what you can say in an emergency public warning message to people in terms of what happened.
It is not a news service and that's something that we try to really clarify with the broadcasters' , so of course the immediate come- back of the broadcasters was what are you going to do for news? We are PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 135 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991 all going to hear this thing go off simultaneously and we are going to be left wondering what the heck is going on; we want to put this on the I news. We don't want anybody to scoop anybody else, that was a big" concern, but we want to be able to follow this up; we want to put this on our newscast. We have basically developed a system whereby the first I call of the authorized user will be told to make is to the public warning system to get the message on the air: a brief to-the-point message like you heard, similar to that. Then the second call will be to our I compliance information centre which is a 24-hour centre to give them the details of the message. The compliance information centre will page Grahame Blundell and, within half an hour, we will have a news feed set I up and operating and it will be going directly out to the radio and TV station so they are getting the details of what's actually going on. What's actually the problem? I am giving you timeliness mind you, those are I target timelines. The message has to be consistent and that meant that the same message had to be carried by all broadcasters and we said that, that was critical, if that wasn't the case then there is no point in having a I public warning system and it has to be immediate. We wanted less than one minute from the time the message was entered into the system until it actually got on the air. If you were present, probably you weren't, but I being present during the time that the public warning system was activated, or,the tornado came through, you would have found out that despite the fact that 23 minutes of warning had been issued there really 1 wasn't an awful lot of time to tell people what to do. Twenty-three minutes is a very short time at the front end of a disaster ad probably a very long time during and an even longer time after. At the front of a I disaster 23 minutes is not an awful lot of time. I Here is the current status of the project as it stands now. I want to tell you that this is a cost-effective system, the entire Edmonton region project is costing us $171,000. We have written a software for I province-wide expansion which probably means that we will be able to increase to province-wide basis for less than another $100,000. We received cost-sharing from Emergency Preparedness Canada on this and I it is very important to state that. I think that there is a real general consensus that at the federal level there is (Joe will talk about this in a few moments) an interest in what's going on in terms of public warning I in Canada. April 1993 is our target to commence province-wide installation. To start actually looking at a province-wide expansion and getting the broadcasters on line throughout the province. I am open to I any question, I left an awful lot out of this but I try to keep it short.
I CINDY Thanks Herb. I would now like to introduce Joe McPherson. Joe is a S T E V EN S planning adviser with the Emergency Telecommunication Division of the Department of Communications; he is the department's I representative in the national earthquake working group and Canadian I 136 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
representative to the Civil Communications Planning Committee in NATO. Joe has worked as a volunteer communications officer with the Ottawa Carleton Emergency Measures Organization for 15 years. Prior to joining the Emergency Telecommunications Division he held other appointments in the department and served at the Department of Extemal Affairs in India and Washington, D.C. Joe is going to discuss a new initiative designed to solicit feedback from the provinces and territories on their requirements for an emergency public warning system. Joe.
JOE It's fun to be last, especially following a very positive presentation by MacPHERSON Herti. A few things I would like to start off with, first of all the notes are • out the window -- we don't have time to go through this dog and pony show in its entirety, but I learned something at an emergency preparedness conference in British Columbia recently and I just have to congratulate Lesley Lynn on the initiative she has taken to form a relationship with broadcasters and other media and I will tell you why.
Mr..., I have forgotten his name, a gentleman from Barbary Coast Broadcasting, made a statement to the effect that during the recent Oakland fires, the emergency broadcasting network did not come into play at all. In fact, the only information given to those poor devils racing around the hills and the trees that were burning was that they should run for cover. It came over television set with the assumption that people were going to be sitting with their feet on a coffee table waiting for instructions on a television. Needless to say it didn't work and a few people died. But the message there I think is that if there were some kind of a relationship, I think that would not have happened.
Another point that was made was that some place at about 5:00 o'clock on the second day one or more of the radio stations came on the air and said anybody please out there with information, please tell us what the heck is happening so we can inform these people, it was a real disaster. Of course, I am very pro-emergency broadcasting and as you will see I am just not entirely sure if the approach we are taking at this stage of the game, given the international political situation, is the correct one.
Unfortunately we are probably not going to have time to have Roy Marsh come up and give a small presentation on some of the technical innovations the department is working on. Roy is a professional engineer. He is Director of our Informatics Applications Branch at the Research Centre. If Roy would just maybe for a moment stand up so you can have a look at him, so if you want some information you can corner him over dinner and keep him talking until 3:00 o'clock. In any case I had some background information that I wanted to present PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 137 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
but it sort of almost, for those of you who have been here before, it is alinost like another episode of 'as the stomach turns'. • We have been trying to get something in place for 20 years. We have been trying to get it into place in an environment in which there was some fear of a nuclear attack. Now that fear of course continues, as people like Khadafi, and other fine citizens of the world would like very much to nuke us, but the reality is that if we couldn't sell the product with nuclear submarines sitting off our course and tried for 20 years to get somebody's attention on it, and having failed in 1989 for the last time, ies unlikely that unless there is a very, very definite scenario that would get our political masters' attention we might not get far even now, but lees not be too negative. First of all let me just clue you in or refresh your memory on why the Department of Communications is involved in the first place. We have been involved all along, the military looked after the attack warning signs, the DOC was responsible for, in conjunction with the CBC, for the emergency broadcasting system. Unfortunately both are in disarray at the moment. They are working sporadically in some places under protest, in others nobody likes sirens in their aesthetically correct communities anymore and they like them even less at 2:00 clock in the morning when they sound. By the same token the emergency broadcasting network I have the, I guess you could call it the privilege, of visiting what I would like to call a very, very fine looking broadcasting museum up at Nanaimo a few weeks ago. I am sure that any museum would be proud to have that CBC equipment and this is not a criticism of CBC: it's what happens when these things are sort of not paid attention to. Equipment there that technicians today don't know how to operate, they are in a format that probably couldn't be used even if they did know how to operatè it, and the lines connected to the outside world don't exist anymore. So what we are trying to do under Section 18? and I won't bore you with a lot of details. The department is responsible for the design, development and d operation, and we have added and they might not like it, incorporation with the provincial authorities. A national public warning capability based upon the technical adaptation and procedural co-ordination of existing telecommunications networks in Canada. That's what the good book says and that's what we will continue to do until we can find some way of either doing it or getting out of it. Again I don't want to sound negative because Lesley will recommend that I get fired and I have to look for a job. Anyway, current status, very quickly, we are proceeding in two directions, what I like to call two parallel paths. First of all, and many of you will shake your heads and say God don't you know by now 138 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 I PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
that you need one of these systems as a needs analysis? Why would we I want to do that after studying this thing for 20 years? It's very simple. Everybody has this perception that we need one of these national broadcasting systems, emergency broadcasting systems but almost I nobody has ever been able to tell me why, given the current. scenario. The second is, we are doing extensive research, I call it extensive because it is taking up a heck of a lot of time. I don't know if it getting very far I into appropriate technology, we are looking at technology that didn't exist when the famous "WEBS" which is the Warning Emergency Broadcasting System that died at Treasury Board in 1989, did not exist. I There are some interesting technological developments out there now we can follow Herb and see what he is doing and copy what he is doing and I maybe pass it out to the rest of you and there are systems being built into radio that were previously used in Europe that are horrendously expensive, we thought we would put them in now, it may become very a applicable in Canada as they become fitted in our vehicles and our homes. Anyway that gets into little bit too much the nitty gritty of the technical side of it. I The questionnaire, and I have spoken to some people here, taken the opportunity to speak to people who will be hopefully I responding to this. We would like you to be very frank with us. Tell us like it is, we don't want you being nice if you think we shouldn't be in it or if we have no place in it, or if our role has changed, a national I emergency broadcasting system is no longer the way to go, tell us, tell us. But if you do feel that it's relevant, just before you tell us why, we will push the train up the hill a little longer. We will keep on doing it I until somebody gets the message. We have also learned through past experience, and I think again with the Canadian political climate that the made-in-Ottawa solution that is imposed upon people just doesn't work. I Even if it's a good system there is reluctance out there. We know it, we feel it, we hear it every day on the radio and TV. The feds ain't gonna shove nothing down our throats. We want input from you people, we I want to know what you people in the front lines need and we will try to help you as best we can. Even if it means just co-ordinating the information that we have talked about before. I would like to leave with I one, I think fairly positive note of, it's hard to believe after what I have just said, but you are all I think familiar with the three big lies - the cheque is in the mail, I will still respect you in the morning and I am I from the federal government, I am here to help you. We can't correct the cheque problem because we don't issue them -- DSS is responsible for that, I try not to get in any trouble at my age on the second one, but I we are really trying to do something federally, we may not be getting very far at this stage but we have to keep a positive outlook. And Lesley I did finish before twenty to, it's all yours! I PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 139 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
LESLEY Thank you very much the two last presenters. We have a little bonus LYNN for you. We are going to ask Phillip Cogan, who is â very good friend of Canada, so much so that we are proposing him for honourary Canadian citizenship, and I will tell you why. Phil has been a broadcast journalist for 12 years at CBS radio and other all-news radio stations in the western I United States; and he has also been a TV assignment editor for NBC in Seattle. For the past 16 years he has served as the senior U.S. public affairs official on approximately 55 major disasters declared by U.S. I presidents, and he has been involved in a similar number of emergency exercises. Assignments have ranged from floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, nuclear power plant incidents and earthquakes, to space shuttle launches I carrying radioactive plutonium. Phil is currently the Deputy Director for Public Affairs at the headquarters of the Federal Emergency Management Agency...the rough equivalent of Emergency Preparedness 1 Canada -- and he is based in Washington, D.C. For the past five years he has worked. frequently with British Columbia and other western Canadian provinces and with us at EPC in connection with catastrophic I earthquake planning. He has been exceptionally generous with his time and his talents, and I would just like him to wrap up this part of our three-day workshop with a few comments that he may have and also just I to tell you briefly of the public relations challenge of the twentieth I century. Phil you have, vous-avez la parole Monsieur. PHILLIP Thank you very much Lesley. I wondered does that mean if I am an COGAN honourary citizen I have to pay the GST? This has been a fine 1 conference and it's very good to see some familiar faces and to make new friends and meet new colleagues.
I It is always good to see David Richardson for whom I have an enormous amount of respect as I do others that I have met during this I conference. I also want to thank Lesley for the honour of being seated at the head table.last evening. It's one of the reasons I like coming to I Canada because I get all this respect and I am going back to the office to tell them the way I am treated here, I am telling my wife and children also that I have a new level of respect that I expect to be granted on the I basis of my trips to Canada. I I was a little bit embarrassed that my name came up several times during some of the presentations as being the source of some of the information, if it works I was the source, if it doesn't it was David's I fault. But you should know just to put me in perspective and lower me down to the level where I should be that I am not familiar with the simultaneous translation capability, we don't require it in the United I States; so I was very impressed and pleased to note that there was I 140 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 1 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
simultaneous translation available at this conference and i found the I English and i found the French but I couldn't find the American. I did find the Newfoundland translation but no American. I One of the things I should point out is I also like to talk about experts, but that was a good one and I am going to take that back if you I don't mind, but people come up who have experience in dealing with certain types of events and then they are held up as experts, especially in disasters, they run the risk of having people copy them. And also we all I know, from experience, no emergencies are the same so I always attach the caveat that when experts stand up and talk about what they are doing and what they have done in past emergencies that you sort of take away I as something to put into your bag of tricks to consider trying if the circumstances appear right, but by no means are they ever guaranteed to work. I In my case I would think the basis of my success is that I have had more opportunities to screw up 55 disasters gives you lots of I opportunities to make mistakes, and if you are any. kind of an intelligent person at all eventually you start learning from them. It's like running headlong into a wall: eventually you learn to walk around it and that's I often where my experience comes from. When you have 55 disasters that the President has declared and you work on enough of them then you learn what works and what doesn't work, and you try not to keep doing I the things that don't work.
One of the things that Lesley alluded to is the unusual I experience that I am working with now is that United States Congress in it's wisdom has decided that the United States will destroy all of the chemical agents currently stored in the United States. Most Americans I don't realize that we have a lot of chemical weapons stored at eight different sites in the country in conjunction with a treaty with the Soviet Union where we are launching into a program to destroy them. This has I created a severe public affairs, or you would call public communications, challenge for us because we are now launching a vigourous and expensive public information and public education I campaign and actually with the destruction of chemical weapons in the United States when these weapons have been sitting there for 25 or 50 years and we have done nothing up until now. So the obvious first I question is why are you doing this now? Is something wrong? Or are we on the verge of an imminent disaster? And of course we are still trying to figure out exactly how we are going to answer that question and that's I just the first of a number of questions we are trying to deal with.
One of then is related to the presentations you have just heard: I public alert and notification of the event in the release of chemical agents. If you think you have problems in a weather emergency, the PROCEEDINGS OF NEAP! WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 141 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
experts are telling us that we have five to 13 minutes to warn people in a chemical agent emergency before we might as well ldss them off. We are dealing with nerve agents, a single drop of which can be lethal. We are dealing with mustard agents, we are dealing with some pretty nasty stuff; and when you have 13 minutes to get people not only notified but get them to hear and understand the warning message and take the appropriate action, it is a major task. And so having said that we have special alert and notification systems going. Our emergency broadcast system is inadequate to be a part of the primary link for those living nearest to the installations and we are putting sirens up around installations that have had not had sirens for 45 years, and we are installing tone alert radios in each of the residences and each of the buildings within what we call the immediate response zone, trying to convince the public that they should now allow us to put a radio that would be activated by the government on our command, will be powered by a battery and cannot be removed from the wall into which it is plugged except with a special tool which we will have! That is a public affairs challenge. I have just listed several of the challenges, not the least of which is that it is the government doing it and we all know how the public feels. about government doing almost anything. Yet we are required to do it. The weapons will be destroyed and the positive side is that we are going to totally eliminate a hazard even if it takes us now five years longer than we anticipated. The project was supposed to end in the late 1990s and it is now projected to go into about 2002 or 2003 and the cost has gone from 2 billion dollars to now about 8 billion dollars and of course we know what happens over time to budgets... and so God knows where the budget will end up. Those are some of the unusual challenges that we are attempting to deal with. It is one of the few public affairs project that I have been associated with that suffers from an embarrassment of money. If you can imagine in this day and age any kind of government project that has, I wouldn't say too much money, but I would certainly say that I would have a hard case for saying that we are being underfunded. My current budget for the current fiscal year, minus salaries, is somewhere around three quarters of a million U.S., and that is just for those activities at headquarters, and we are also funding information officers and information programs in each of the 10 states involved in this program. On top of that, we are providing funding for their brochures and their video products in addition to ours, so there is quite a lot of money being spent. Something that we don't always have the ability to do.
I think I can honour Lesley and Gérard's request just to make some general observations about what I have heard, keeping in mind that I am the guest here. But I do truly commend you on where you are today 142 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
and meeting together to solve these problems as you are provinces and the federal level. Lesley has brought you and this group to roughly the same place that we were about a year or a year and a half ago and I think that Lesley's counterpart, our former Director of Public Affairs, Peg Malloy, obviously spent a lot of time talking because I see the same solutions occurring on both sides of the border. We have, under the direction of the White House Press Secretary, Marion Fitzwater, what we call an inter-agency committee on public affairs and emergencies which is made up of the departments and agencies at the federal level in Washington. Their public affairs people, with our agency as the Executive Secretariat. They started meeting and one of the things they started talking about... and I say this is probably the second level of organizational development of emergency public information.., they just started talking about what would happen and who would, do what to whom and very quickly realized that before you can make any of this work in the United States, and I suspect elsewhere, you have to deal with this issue of turf.
So there is this jockeying for position and power and authority and responsibility until people realize that somewhere along at the end of that first level of discussions and negotiations that the system you are talking about implementing is for the good of all. And once you get beyond the turf as we did in the United States, and you get to the level where I see you now, is that you are now trying to figure out okay now that we have worked out the turf issues and we realize we really have an important task to do how is it that we organizationally accomplish that?
We just, I think, moved out of that phase a short time ago into what I would say is the third level for this organizational solution to the emergency public information or public communications problems, and that is a realization that once we have organized ourselves as personnel as people resources, we now need some tools to allow us to implement that which we have decided to organize ourselves io do. That's one of the points that I wanted to make about the tools necessary once you organize yourselves, as I think we have now done successfullY.
And then a fourth level which is sort of the highest level of being for this organizational approach is that you get to the point where you have the tools, you have the people organized and then you begin exercising and testing and refining and learning from experience and application of that system.
That leads me to the tools comment that I wanted to leave you with, two comments really, and Joe McPherson had absolutely- nothing to do with this first observation I have. People that I had the privilege of being with in our syndicate group have heard me stress this but it a cause célèbre for me and I think an important one for all of us as emergency PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 143 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
communicators and that is, forget telephones exist! Totally forget that telephones exist! The experience that I have had and that others in the field have had is that the major gap in your emergency communications planning has always been, certainly was for me, a naive assumption that the problem was that we had to organize ourselves and had to get I facilities and we had to figure out what to say and that once we did that things would be alright. But the fact of the matter is that our day-to-day reliance on telephonic communications is so great and, add to it now facsimile and cellular, that any emergency plan that's based on using those familiar day-to-day tools is doomed to fail in a worse-case scenario. And so we always say in all of our planning: Replace the phone system with something else! We have a way of, and there is no time to go into details, but we replace it with the various types, actually three different systems. We totally replace our communications among I our agencies, replace our communications to the media and replace our communications intraorganization, that is to the information officers working in the field between our information centre and. the information I offïcers: So I would say that's one general observation.
The second one is a comment that I heard from the floor 1 yesterday about the global village. I think it's important to stress, and it's one you all understand, but the implications that I see in it for the kind of discussions that we are engaged in here is simply this: that, and I I will relate very quickly my experience on the time that I spent at the Defence Department Public Affairs office in the Pentagon during the first three weeks of Desert Storm, the London Times, most of the J London papers, would call during scud attacks in the Middle East, they would call the Pentagon news desk asking for us to tell them how many scuds went in, were they carrying chemical agents, how many people I were injured and how many were killed. Mind you they were watching the same television broadcast that we were watching and they were I expecting us to know more than they knew. And what that tells me is that we need to deal with non-events and we need to mobilize our resources before they are needed. If it is an event like Commonwealth Games then I we need to anticipate that something could go wrong and stand up the information centre maybe on a limited basis so that it can function like that. If it's a flood that is minor but has the potential for becoming I major, it means standing it up well before it might be needed and being prepared to stand it down in case you don't need it. But it's better and it's almost imperative, given the global village today, to be I there and do nothing than to not be there when required. And so that concludes my general observations. I very much appreciate the opportunity to learn from you and to allow us to continue the contact I between our government, FEMA, EPC and all of your agencies, departments, and the provinces. I have enormous respect for what you are doing and I pledge that our agency will continue to support your I efforts in any way that you see fit. Thank you very much. I I 144 PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
LESLEY Phil, thank you very much. We have 10 minutes left and this brings us I LYNN to he close of these three-day proceedings. All I want to say is I don't know about you but I have thoroughly enjoyed this series of workshops and exercises and I think there is no question that we have all learnt I something we will take away, something we didn't know before. And I couldn't help thinking as I saw many of the planners leading discussions and coming up here and some representing communications, suggestions I on how to proceed, what a long way we have come in the last few years. Because I can remember times when public information aspects, communications aspects of responding to emergencies were barely I considered. The operationâl people thought they would do their thing and that would be it. But I think we have all come to the realization that we have to work hand in hand and that an emergency public information I plan is an integral part of the overall operations plan. I am also amazed and utterly delighted at the spirit of co-operation and good will that has been demonstrated here. I think if I were to sum up the basic lessons I learned from this pretty impressive collection of talent and expertise,_ I would say that we are in general agreement on the following points: I 1. We know that we are all regarded as representing the government and which one or part, it really doesn't matter to us. It certainly matters to our policical masters, but it really doesn't matter to us as I communicators which order of government we work for. We know that we should be prepared to sing to the same tune so that the public is not confused. I
2. It's therefore imperative that provincial, territorial and federal, and I might add U.S. and Canadian emergency plans, be co-ordinated and I dovetailed so that this co-operation extends beyond the first phases of an emergency but, not only that, into the recovery period and what follows. I
3. We are in entire agreement that constitutional arrangements are to be respected: that is in public welfare or public order type emergencies, I the province or territory in which they occur remain in charge, with the federal government providing support. 1 4. We should take it as a given that in general the media are somewhat biased against government, that they delight in playing an adversarial I role, and it's okay. And that ideally we should involve them in our emergency planning to make sure that they have an understanding of what we are trying to do, that they be part of the emergency response I team, although you needn't tell them that quite. They can criticize what we did well and what we did badly as much as they like after the event, but we do need their co-operation in the height of an PROCEEDINGS OF NEAPI WORKSHOP, NOV. 13-15, 1991 145 PROCES-VERBAL DU COLLOQUE SUR LES DNUIP, 13-15 NOV. 1991
emergency. 5. We all know we should be open with the media and the public. If we don't know something we say so, we volunteer to find out, but we don't try and hide things because it just absolutely ruins relations forever if you deliberately trj to mislead them. 6. We shouldn't as a basic principle rush in too hastily in a crisis with insufficient information, but on the other hand, we should be pro- active. 7. We understand that in an emergency the basic need is providing life- saving information to those affected and that there is also another dimension: satisfying the political needs of our ministers. 8. We understand the importance of having a finger on the pulse of public and media opinion by gathering information and analyzing it. 9. We realize that the media are insatiable for information in and after an emergency and that they have high expectations of having that information being rendered often in graphic form, so we need to be prepared for that in advance. I think a great deal of the momentum that was engendered here will be carried home and that you will put into practice what we have preached and what we have discussed together here. I thank and congratulate the members of my four-star team, especially Gérard, who must take entire credit for the formulation and the ideas that have come forth on paper and put into practice here and for his colleagues who have supported him, people like Mike Theilmann, Jean-Claude Paradis and Joan Borsu. Others in the wings, such as the interpreters who provided an excellent service here, also deserve credit. And for you dear colleagues, the invited participants, we thank you all very much for highly intelligent and veiry energetic participation. So what remains is for you, in Mike Theilmann's words, "to talk to your buddies," to-keep the network open and active. •
End of proceedings Fin des travaux APPENDIX A. PUBLIC WELFARE EMERGENCIES SYNDICATE LISTS AND CONSOLIDATED REPORTS
ANNEXE A. SINISTRES TRAVAUX DE GROUPES: LISTES ET RAPPORTS INTÉGRÉS APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.1
NEAPI Workshop Colloque sur les DNUIP Syndicate Groups Groupes de travail November 13, 1991 13 novembre 1991
A. Earthquake Scénario de Scenario tremblement de terre
#1 Classroom/salle de cours 1 #2 Rm/pièce E
M. Sylvain Ayotte Mr. Peter Russell M. André Boulanger Mr. W.C. Dalley Mad. Lucie de Blois Ms. Sharon Lopatka Ms. Monique Sabourin Mr. Ron Billingham Mr. Daniel Brien Ms. Sandra Laverty Ms. Louise Gravelle Ms. Pat Cardill ' Insp. Yves Juteau Mr. Ed Scallen Mr. D.Y. Stewart Mr. Phil Cogan
#3 Rm/pièce F #4 Rm/pièce G
Ms. Cindy Stevens Mr. J. Marvin Brooks Ms. Elizabeth Fitzgerald Mr. Lome Gibson Mr. Bob Kerr Mr. Ed Walters Mr. Eric Bussey Ms. Diane Boyce Mr. Kelly Hart Mr. Roger MacPherson Mr: Dennis Orchard Cpl Ken Lane Ms. M. (Mike) MacNaughton Ms. Barbara Morris Mr. Roger MacPherson Commander Barry Frewer
B. Nuclear Emergency Scénario d'urgence Scenario nucléaire
#5 Rm/pièce H #6' Rm/pièce J
Ms. Sandra Phillips Mr Joe Arseneault Mr. Wayne MacKinnon Mr. Paul Chislett Ms. Linda Liik Mr. Herb Presley Mr. Sam Baird Ms. Jennifer Smyth Mr. David Davidson Ms. Connie Copeland Mr. Paul Hunter Ms. Amanda Maltby Ms. Betty Whittington Ms. Beverley Smith
#7 EOC/COU
Mr. James McCarthy Mr. Michael R. Lester Mr. Doug Harrison Ms. Carole Peacock Mr. Norm Pascau Mr. J.R. Clarke Mr. Wally Kornyck UM MR IIIIII MO MU 1111111 111111 NM I» MI; MR Ile MP Mil MI OM Mai
APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.2.
Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencieslrapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Earthquake/tremblement de terre) Exercise 1 (immediate aftermath) 1. Who should communicate? • Province (Public Affairs Division of Provincial Emergency Program) should take lead in communicationg emergency information to media and public -- with municipal and federal support • Federal government (initially EPC Communications) will deal with national and international media requests. 2 . What information/messages? • What happened and what are we doing to respond (factual - too soon to give no. of casualties - plus reassurance that someone's in charge) • Survival/evacuation/public safety information and advice -- special attention to aftershocks • Publish registration and enquiry numbers. APPENDIXIANNEXE A.2. Consolidated syndicale reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Earthquake/ tremblement de terre)
Exercise 1 (cont'd)
3. What means of communication with population? &4 • Radio/HAM radio -- provided towers standing • Military radio system • Helicopters equiped with loudspeakers • Community wardens • Others: leaflet drops, loudhailers, word of mouth, runners, radio stations in adjacent provs/states.
5. Ability to access and exchange information • limited: information hard to get and verify because of time of day and problems with roads and power • operational information insufficient basis for emergency public communications activities.
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rappants de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Earthquakeltremblement de terre) Exercise 1 (cont'd)
6. Information deficiencies and remedies • lack of information on casualties damage, ability to care for injured and evacuees, and consequent inability to provide adequate advice to population, keep media informed and deal with rumours • need strong resource base to overcome problem: assign information offers and others in municipalities to collect and report information; overflights; satellite photos; good prepackaged information (fact sheets, etc.). APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres ' (Earthquake/tremblement de ferre)
Exercise 1 (cont'd)
7. What do media want to know? • Area and intensity of earthquake • Casualties and damage • Who's in charge? What's being done? (rescue activities) How will things unfold? (response plans, anticipating future seismic activity, etc.) • Human tragedy/human interest angle • Responsiveness of government/political leadership
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Earthquake/tremblement de terre)
Exercise 2 (end of day 1)
1. Meeting Agenda • Assessment of overall emergency - action to be taken - federal leadership/support role • Media/public environment analysis • Advice re communications strategy: - dealing with gap between perception and reality,. - building confidence in government's ability to manage the crisis - federal communications support to B.C. - role of responding federal departments/ministers - allocation of resources. APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.2.
Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Earthquakeltremblement de terre) Exercise 2 (cont'd) 2. Communications Plan • Designate, brief and deploy government spokesperson to respond to criticism, clarify and explain government role and actions, and reaffirm government's willingness and readiness to help • Federal crisis communication co-ordination group (with support of gov't EOCC) to - ensure liaison with departments and provinces - - provide media and public environmental analysis - co-ordinate federal media lines and Qs & As - operate national public enquiry service • Federal departments handle communications within own mandates (emergency support functions) - in consultation with Crisis Communications Co-ordination Group (PCO/EPC) am ma, au on all OM MI BIM UM IMF MI UM 111. an MI an *1111 MIR OM WM 11111 1111.1 UM UM 11111111 IINII Ilia OM MI an MI MS INN WI111
APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Earthquakeltremblement de terre) Exercise 2 (cont'd) 3. Cabinet Briefing
• Situation analysis: status of emergency and federal response/support so far; what resources committed and on reserve • complete media analysis: how story reported; issues; perceptions vs reality • recommendations on communications strategy; how to address major issues; messages (drawing attention to federal support role); how to get information out. APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Earthquake/ tremblement de terre)
Exercise 3 (day 3)
1. Search and Rescue Communications Strategy:
• identification of problem; misunderstanding or misperception of rescue efforts
• communications objective; to show and tell what we are doing and why; focus on positive results; "using best skills and equipment available and following proven procedures to prevent further loss of life"
pro-active media campaign: escorted media tours; interviews with SAR experts; involvement of politicians and media leaders; provide human interest stories.
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APPENDIXIANNEXE A.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencieslrapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Earthquakeltremblement de terre) Exercise 3 (cont'd) 2. Effectiveness of Public Information Plan: • Positive elements: - public and media lines established promptly - established and communicated location of reception centres • Negative elements: - failed to provide assurance that response was effective - difficulties in correcting misinformation and misperceptions (of federal role) - did not win media confidence - insufficient information for evacuees APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres ( Earthquake/tremblement de terre)
Exercise 3 (cont'd)
3. Overall Assessment:
• response was reasonably successful under the circumstances
• it takes time to win public confidence
• adversarial role of media breeds defensive attitude in government communicators, even though latter try and avoid defensive attitudes
• environmental analysis needed to ensure soundness of government decision-making, but often conducted only in superficial manner.
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.3. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Civil Nuclear Emergency/urgence nucléaire civile)
A. Provincial issues: • Crisis in public confidence/public safety • Effectiveness of emergency response : operation
Federal issues: • Crisis in public confidence/public safety • Timing of CANDU announcement • International ramifications - CANDU sales/ trade image
Key variations: • Management of public and media enquiries • Communications co-ordination between fed. govt. and prov. • Environmental impact APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.3.
Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Civil Nuclear Emergencylurgence nucléaire civile)
B. Provincial communications roles: • Provision of timely info, to the publicimedia/MPPs/MPs/ and other target audiences • Monitoring media and public environment - rumour control • Info-sharing at all levels of government • Reaffirm lead provincial role.
Federal communications roles: • Provision of timely info, to the publichnedia/MPPs/MPs/ and other target audiences
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.3. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapporfs de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Civil Nuclear Emergency/urgence nucléaire civile)
B . Federal communications roles (cont'd) • Maintain confidence (national and intern'l) in CANDU and Cdn. technology • Reaffirm support to the province.
Key variations: • Implement both federal and provincial emergency communications plans. APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.3.
Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencieslrapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Civil Nuclear Emergencylurgence nucléaire civile)
C. Information Sharing Type: • All information should be shared Mechanisms: • Provincial Operations/Information Centre • Federal Nuclear Emergency Co-ordination Group Key variation: Informal mechanism, i.e. inter- ministry/departmental (e.g. Environment Ontario to Environment Canada
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.3.
Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Civil Nuclear Emergencylurgence nucléaire civile)
Provincial departments/agencies: • Solicitor General of Ontario • Ontario Hydro • Health • Transportation • Premier's office • Emergency Planning Ontario • Environment • Agriculture • Municipal Affairs • Labour • Volunteer agencies (e.g. Red Cross, St. John Ambulance) • Community and Social Services APPENDIXIANNEXE A.3. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emerge nc ieslrapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Civil Nuclear Emergency/urgence nucléaire civile)
C . Federal departments/agencies:
• Health & Welfare Canada • AECB/AECL • Environment Canada • Agriculture • Emergency Prep. Canada • External Affairs • Transport Canada • National Defence • Industry, Science and Technology • Energy, Mines and Resources • National volunteer agencies • Fisheries and Oceans • Solicitor General of Canada
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.3. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencieslrapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Civil Nuclear Emergencylurgence nucléaire civile)
D. Medium-term issues: Provincial: • Environmental/health concerns • Compensation to victims/businesses • Economic effects (i.e. real estate values) Federal: • Supervision of clean-up operation (AECB) • Reputation of CANDU • Compensation/liability APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.3. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Civil Nuclear Emergency/urgence nucléaire civile)
D. Long-term issues:
Provincial • Environmental/health concerns • Compensation/liability • Safety/reliability of nuclear plants • Board of enquiry to determine cause of accident
Federal • Safety/reliability of CANDU reactors • Compensation/liability • Board of inquiry
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE A.3. Consolidated syndicale reports - Public Welfare Emergencies/rapports de groupes intégrés - sinistres (Civil Nuclear Emergency/u-rgence nucléaire civile)
To deal with both medium and long-term issues, all groups recommended:
• Co-ordinated communications response
• Restore public confidence (consistent messages, on-going honest, factual information flow) APPENDIX . B. PUBLIC ORDER EMERGENCIES SYNDICATE LISTS AND
. CONSOLIDATED REPORTS
ANNEXE B. ÉTATS D'URGENCE TRAVAUX DE GROUPES: LISTES ET RAPPORTS INTÉGRÉS APPENDIX/ANNEXE B.1
NEAPI Workshop Colloque sur les DNUIP Syndicate Groups Groupes de -travail November 14, 1991 14 novembre 1991
Public Order Emergency Scénario d'état d'urgence Scenario
#1 EOC/COU #2 Rm/pièce E.
Ms. Elizabeth Fitzgerald Mr. Peter Russell M. André Boulanger Mr. W.C. Dalley Ms. Kathy Bleyer Ms. Sharon Lopatka Ms. Monique Sabourin Mr. Ron Billingham Ms. Amanda Maltby Ms. Sandra Laverty I Ms. Louise Gravelle Ms. Pat Cardill Insp. Yves Juteau Mr. Ed Scallen Ms. Beverley Smith Mr. Phil Cogan I Mr. Joe MacPherson
I #3 Rm/pièce F #4 Rm/pièce G
Ms. Cindy Stevens Mr. J. Marvin Brooks I Mr. Paul Hunter Mr. Lorne Gibson Mr. Bob Kerr Mr. Ed Walters Mr. Eric Bussey Ms. Diane Boyce I Mr. Kelly Hart Mr. Roger MacPherson Mr. Dennis Orchard Cpl Ken Lane Ms. M. MacNaughton Ms. Barbara Morris I Mr. Wayne MacKinnon Commander Barry Frewer I Ms. Sandra Phillips I #5 Rm/pièce H #6 Rm/pièce J Mr. James McCarthy Mr Joe Arseneault Mr. Michael Lester Mr. Paul Chislett I Ms. Carole Peacock Mr. Herb Presley Mr. Sam Baird Ms. Jennifer Smyth Mr. Doug Harrison Ms. Connie Copeland I Mr. J.R. Clarke Mad. Lucie de Blois Mr. Wally Kornyk Mr. D.Y. Stewart M. Sylvain Ayotte Ms. Betty Whittington I Ms. Linda Liik I I MI OM MI UM OM MI MI Ili MN Mal MN all MI MI MO
APPENDIX/ANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Orderlrapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence Exercise 1
A. Municipal Role - lead communications role operational information • public safety and law and order message Provincial Role - support role to municipality - reaffirm messages
• ensure info flow between prov. & feds. • responsible for RCMP operations Federal Role - support to province and municipality
• reassure international community • media monitoring and info sharing APPENDIX/ANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Orderlrapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence Exercise 1 B. Co-ordination and consultation crucial. Mechanisms:* • Joint Information Centre • CLEU (Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit) • Municipal EOC C. Information sharing between all levels crucial. Mechanism • EOC/ Pub info team/RCMP REOC or NEOC * All of the above would have provincial, federal and Commonwealth Games liaison officers.
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Order/rapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence Exercise 1
C. (cont'd)
Type of information shared
• Operational and policy information relating to communications strategy (i.e. riot, international, national and local media reaction)
Departments Involvéd
Provincial: • Premier's Officer •. Attorney General (prov. counterparts of fed. departments) APPENDIXIANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Orde7lrapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence
Exercise 1
C. (cont'd)
Departments Involved
Federal: • Sol Gen • DND • EPC ^ PCO • External Affairs • EIC • Fitness and Amateur Sport • HWC • Multiculturalism • C&E
Commonwealth Games Organizing Committee
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Ordér/rapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence
Exercise 1
D. Provincial Emergency Program
• Support role • Information gathering and monitoring • Information conduit to other provincial depts.
E. Federal Role
• Support to province • International communications strategy • Answers media/public enquir ies relating , to federal jurisdiction (i.e. immigration, terrorism, etc.) • APPENDIX/ANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Orderlrapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence Exercise 1 F. Preparatory Work • Sol Gen lead on behalf of federal government at this point NSCC up and running • Public communications group mobilized
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Orderlrapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence Exercise 2 A. Operational Information • Operational communications handled by on-site police commander Policy Information • Fed. govt., via the National Policy Centre, handles public communications relating to policy*
* Actual release of policy information may be by designated fediprovipolice spokesperson on site. APPENDIXIANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Orderlrapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence Exercise 2
B. Communications policy/strategy set, in consultation and co-operation, by:
Prov: • Attorney General • Premier's Office • Public Affairs Bur. • PEP
Fed: • Sol Gen • External Affairs • PMO/PCO • EPC • H&WC • EIC • Customs and Excise
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APPENDIX/ANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicate reports - Public Order/rapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence Exercise 3
A. Federal government and provinces work toward same goal within respective jurisdictions.
GOAL: Restore and maintain public confidence and morale on both a national and international basis.
Key Variations:
• Feds have lead given national dimensions of emergency
• Prov. EMOs responsible for public welfare aspects
• Provinces establish information centres APPENDIX/ANNEXE B.2. Consolidated syndicale reports - Public Order/rapports de groupes intégrés - états d'urgence
Exercise 3
B. • Activation NEAPI - PCO/Sol Gen leadership
• PM statement to the nation
• Ongoing consultation with the U.S.
• PM/premiers meeting to discuss options
• Declaration of public order/public welfare emergency
• Establish media services desk
• Establish public enquiry lines
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