An Integrated Perspective on Contemporary : Reviewing Cross-National Data on Attitudes, Incidents, and Exposure

Johannes Due Enstad∗

Preprint (April 2021)

Abstract

Research on contemporary antisemitism is fragmented. Existing empirical studies tend to focus on a single dimension of the phenomenon or a specific national or ideological context. This article advances an integrated perspective on contemporary antisemitism by pulling together and descriptively reviewing several sets of cross-national data shedding light on patterns and trends within three key dimensions: antisemitic attitudes, incidents targeting Jews, and Jews’ exposure to antisemitism. It is found that (1) attitudes vary considerably, being low in Western countries (yet high for some sub-groups), less low in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, and high in Middle Eastern, North African, and other Muslim-majority countries; (2) global incident rates have fluctuated on a relatively high level after 2000; and (3) Jews’ exposure to antisemitism appears relatively high and stable over the past decade, with some notable temporal and spatial variation. To account for trends and variations observed in the data, the article proposes several hypotheses that may guide future research and serve as building blocks for middle-range theorizing about contemporary antisemitism.

∗Norwegian Institute for Social Research / [email protected]. This research was supported by the Norwegian Research Council under Grant 302297. Thanks to my colleagues at the Norwegian Institute for Social Research and the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) for helpful comments.

1 Introduction

Seventy-five years after the liberation of Auschwitz, Nazi Germany’s attempt to destroy the European Jews stands as a dark reminder of the importance of protecting minority rights and curtailing prejudice. Nevertheless, antisemitism remains an ongoing societal challenge, with serious questions being raised about Western societies’ ability to provide a secure environment for their Jewish minorities (e.g., Goldberg 2015; Kotkin 2019; AFP 2020). Many Jews worry about their future on the European continent, as evidenced by a 2018 survey covering 16,500 respondents in 12 EU countries—among them, 38 percent said they had considered emigrating because of safety concerns (FRA 2018). Given these circumstances, understanding the development of contemporary anti- semitism is not just a meaningful academic pursuit, but also indispensable from a policy and counteraction perspective. For policy to be informed by research and evidence, we first need to know what characterizes the global development of anti- semitism in the 21st century: what are the key patterns and trends across countries and over time, and how can they be explained? Answering such questions requires a perspective that looks beyond particular national or ideological contexts and takes into account several dimensions of this complex phenomenon simultaneously. The problem with our current picture of 21st century antisemitism is fragmentation: scholars and monitoring agencies tend to focus on one dimension, one country, or one ideology. The key contribution of this article is to advance an integrated perspective by reviewing several publicly available cross-national datasets in order to extract patterns and trends for three key dimensions: antisemitic attitudes, incidents target- ing Jews, and Jews’ exposure to antisemitism. Specifically, I draw on survey data from Pew, the World/European Values Survey, the Anti-Defamation League, and the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency, as well as incident data from the /Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism. Based on observations from these data, I suggest several hypotheses worth pursuing in future empirical research and theory-building efforts. The article proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief definition and review previous research on contemporary antisemitism, suggesting the need for middle-range theories to build a more consolidated understanding of this phenomenon. Next, I describe the sources from which the data reviewed here were extracted—i.e., attitude surveys, incident counts, and surveys of Jewish populations—noting some methodological hurdles along the way. I then present main patterns and trends observed in the data. Finally, I propose explanatory contenders for some of the observed variations.

2 Definition, past research, and the need for middle- range theory

Before moving on, a brief conceptual clarification is in order. According to Helen Fein’s influential definition, antisemitism is “a persisting latent structure of hostile beliefs toward Jews as a collectivity” expressed through individual attitudes, hostile actions, and cultural imagery (Fein 1987, 67). Such beliefs typically portray Jews as greedy, powerful, maliciously manipulating on a global scale, and cunningly intelligent. The relationship between antisemitism and anti-Zionism remains a controversial issue. While there is no space to treat this ongoing debate extensively here, I believe the most helpful approach is to think of antisemitism and anti-Zionism as two distinct sets of beliefs that may, but do not necessarily, overlap. Recent decades have witnessed a growing body of research on contemporary anti- semitism, with sociologists, historians, political scientists and psychologists enhancing our knowledge about many aspects of the phenomenon. Within this literature, five main strands of inquiry can be identified. First, a number of studies analyze the histories and dynamics of antisemitism in particular countries (e.g., Bachner 2004; Kovács 2010; Kurthen, Bergmann, and Erb 1997; Kushner 2013; Wieviorka 2007; Yukhneva 2010). A second set of studies focuses on particular ideological or reli- gious contexts, including right-wing, left-wing, and Islamic variants of antisemitism (Herf 2007; Hirsh 2018; Jikeli 2015a; Wistrich 2012; Wodak 2018). A third strand of research has analyzed the prevalence and determinants of antisemitic attitudes (Beattie 2017; Bilewicz et al. 2013; F. Cohen et al. 2009; Kaplan and Small 2006; Staetsky 2017, 2019b), while a fourth line on inquiry has sought to explain variation in the occurrence of antisemitic incidents (Smith 2008; Jacobs et al. 2011; Feinberg 2020). Finally, a fifth strand investigates Jews’ perceptions and experiences of antisemitism (J. E. Cohen 2018b; DellaPergola 2020). Most of this research, however, is particularistic in scope, dealing with one country, one ideological context, or one dimension of antisemitism. While particularistic accounts are certainly valuable in their own right and necessary elements of knowledge-building, their high specificity tends to produce a field characterized by “a bewildering plethora” of theses and explanations (Nonn 2008, 16). There is a distinct lack, then, of integrative accounts and efforts to develop theory on a more general level. Against this background, I propose that research on contemporary antisemitism would benefit from development of middle-range theory. Conceived by Robert K. Merton, middle-range theory aims to develop explanatory frameworks that are neither too abstract and universalist (as in “grand theory”) nor too concrete and

3 particularistic, but rather deal with a limited range of phenomena appearing across multiple contexts within a given timeframe (Merton 1968, 39–72). A key purpose of middle-range theorizing, as Merton put it, is to pull together disparate avenues of inquiry, to “consolidate otherwise segregated hypotheses and empirical uniformities” (Merton 1968, 334). My call for middle-range theorizing about contemporary antisemitism is motivated by many of the same concerns that led sociologist Stephen Castles, in an influential article in this journal, to call for middle-range theories of migration—i.e., preventing fragmentation and integrating insights from various sub-fields and disciplines (Castles 2010). I suggest a roadmap for such theory development by proposing a number of hypotheses for further exploration based on notable patterns and trends in the data reviewed and informed by findings from extant research. In doing so I rely on Pawson(2000)’s model of middle-range hypothesis generation, according to which explanations should focus on outcomes (“interesting, puzzling, socially significant outcome patterns”), suggest underlying mechanisms generating these outcomes, and recognize the contextual contingency of such mechanisms (Pawson 2000, 293–98).

Data and measures

In the following I describe the sources from which the data reviewed in this study were extracted and note some methodological problems involved in the different ways of measuring antisemitism. I draw on several publicly available datasets, including three different attitude surveys, one incident database, and two surveys that asked European Jews about their perceptions and experiences of antisemitism.

Attitude surveys To provide a picture of the development of antisemitic attitudes over time and across countries, I draw on three sets of cross-national surveys, each with a different measure of antisemitic attitudes: the Pew Global Attitudes surveys, the World/European Values Survey, and the Anti-Defamation League’s (ADL) Global 100 Index. The Pew Global Attitudes surveys are a useful and hitherto largely untapped source for studying the development of antisemitic attitudes over time and across a global range of countries. In nationally representative samples covering the years 1991–2019 and 24 countries, the Pew surveys usually included an item measuring opinion towards Jews by way of a favorability rating (respondents were asked whether they had a favorable

4 or unfavorable opinion of Jews).1 The World/European Values Survey (W/EVS), conducted in several waves beginning in 1981, features nationally representative samples, global coverage, and a longitudinal dimension across several decades. The relevant item measures social distance towards Jews by asking respondents to consider a list of groups and select those they would not like to have as neighbors. The W/EVS surveys including this item cover 55 countries, with measurements spread across three decades from 1990 to 2020.2 The ADL Global 100 surveys, conducted in 2014, 2015, and 2019, also rely on nationally representative samples. For the purposes of this article I draw on the 2014 survey, with 101 countries participating (the 2015 and 2019 waves were limited to 19 and 18 countries). Instead of a general favorability rating or social distance measure, the ADL surveys present respondents with a set of 11 statements designed to reflect antisemitic beliefs and the choice to rate each statement as “probably true” or “probably false.” Respondents answering “probably true” to 6 or more of the statements are considered to harbor antisemitic attitudes, and the share of such respondents becomes the index score for each country.3 Attitude surveys can be vulnerable to distortions such as acquiescence bias (“yea- saying”) and social desirability bias (answering dishonestly to avoid social disap- proval). Acquiescence bias typically occurs when questionnaire items are given in the form of closed statements to which respondents are asked to agree or disagree, such as in the ADL surveys (e.g., “Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars”; “Jews have too much power in the business world”) (ADL 2019). It is less of a problem when general questions are used, such as in the case of the Pew surveys where respondents are not asked to agree or disagree about specific statements (J. E. Cohen 2018a). Social desirability bias often occurs in contexts where having the “wrong” opinion is perceived as socially undesirable and when questions are administered by an interviewer (as opposed to being self-administered) (Tourangeau and Yan 2007; Janus 2010). For all three sets of surveys under review here, telephone or face-to-face interviews were used. There is reason to believe that self-administered survey modes such as online questionnaires can reduce social desirability bias (Krumpal 2013). However, in a British 2017 survey of antisemitic attitudes using both face-to-face and online samples, the impact of survey mode was found to be negligible (Staetsky 2017, 17–18).

1 Survey results were collected from Pew’s public repository at https://pewresearch.org/global/datasets/. 2 W/EVS data were retrieved from EVS(2015); EVS(2020); WVS(2015); and WVS(2021). 3 Index scores for each country for 2014 were retrieved from the ADL Global 100 website at https://global100.adl.org/map.

5 Incident counts For a global view of the development of antisemitic incidents over time, I draw on the annual reporting by the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry. On the basis of data collected from about 40 countries worldwide in the period 1989–2020, the Kantor Center’s annual reports provide a measure of the overall level of recorded antisemitic manifestations, including violence, threats, and vandalism. While the Kantor Center does not capture each and every incident in all countries, it is unique in having monitored and collected data on antisemitic incidents worldwide according to the same criteria continuously since 1989.4 The varying provenance of the data, however, does not allow for cross-national comparison, which leaves us only with a single global count.5 When quantifying antisemitic incidents, two main methodological problems arise: dif- ferences in reporting propensity and varying registration and categorization regimes. The first problem is that many victims of antisemitic crimes (like other hate crime victims) do not file a report about what they experienced. This problem can be somewhat mitigated by surveying the victim group about reporting practices. European surveys of Jews carried out in 2012 and 2018 (more on these surveys below) suggest that among Jews subjected to antisemitic violence or threats, only 35 to 50 percent chose to report the most serious incident. For those subjected to harassment, as few as 19 percent filed a report (FRA 2013, 48–51; 2018, 55–57). In other words, we should expect the number of unrecorded incidents to be at least as many the recorded ones, even several times higher in the case of harassment. The second problem with incident counts is that they are shaped by registration and categorization regimes, which differ across countries and organizations. Police force X may routinely use procedures specifically tuned to detecting a possible antisemitic motivation, while police force Y may have no such routine, relying on the individual officer’s evaluation in each case. In police force Z, the standard for what counts as antisemitism may differ from X and Y. As a result, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to conduct meaningful cross-national comparison of such data. Categorization regimes also influence perpetrator statistics. In Germany, for instance, police authorities have tended to group antisemitic crimes as “right-wing” by default,

4 These criteria are listed as follows: proven antisemitic motivation; counting a multi-event as one case; no exaggeration or diminishing the severity of the situation; and distinguishing between violent cases and verbal and visual manifestations (Kantor Center 2020, 36). 5 Annual incident counts (including the total number of incidents and the number of “major attacks,” defined as attacks involving weapons, explosives, and arson) were retrieved from the reports published at https://en-humanities.tau.ac.il/kantor/rerearch/annual_reports.

6 often in the absence of evidence of motivation, producing a possibly false impression that “90 percent of the threats to Jews in Germany come from far-right extremists.”6 While antisemitism is undoubtedly widespread on the German extreme right, the relative salience of this threat (compared to other milieus) cannot be determined on the basis of police data only. Because of the problems involved in counting incidents, surveying Jews about their experiences (i.e., victimization surveys) is an important additional measurement device.

Surveys on Jews’ perceptions and experiences I draw on two major surveys of Jews’ perceptions and experiences of antisemitism carried out by the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). The surveys were carried out in 2012 (8 countries, n = 5,847) and 2018 (12 countries, n = 16,395), using non-probability samples and online questionnaires.7 From these data I derive several measures of objective and subjective exposure to antisemitism (i.e., the extent to which Jews report having experienced antisemitic incidents and the extent to which Jews report worrying about antisemitism and fearing for their safety). A limitation of the FRA surveys is that, because a random sample was impossible to achieve, opt-in online surveys (i.e., convenience samples) were used. This method can be vulnerable to volunteer bias, by which people with strong opinions about antisemitism would be more likely to participate than people who do not care much about the question. Another issue is sampling bias: the survey samples were found to underrepresent the younger segments of the Jewish population as well as the communally unaffiliated segment. However, a study using benchmark data to weight the 2012 survey results in order to adjust for these discrepancies found that the weighting produced no significant change, suggesting that the survey results do provide a reliable picture of Jews’ perceptions and experiences of antisemitism despite these sampling biases.8

6 See Connolly(2019) and Reisin(2018). In one noted case, Hezbollah supporters performing the Hitler salute at an anti-Israel demonstration were sorted as “right-wing” (Graw 2017). 7 As the 2012 dataset had not been published, data were collected from the published report (FRA 2013). For the 2018 survey, the dataset has been published (FRA 2019). 8 See Staetsky(2019a). The 2018 survey results, according to the study’s author, appear to be similarly reliable. E-mail correspondence with Daniel Staetsky, 20 December 2019, author’s archive.

7 While the data on attitudes, incidents, and Jews’ exposure each have their limitations, triangulating them enables the formation of an integrated perspective, providing a useful window onto the realities of antisemitism.

Results: main patterns and trends

Patterns of antisemitic attitudes Figure 1 presents the development of attitudes towards Jews as reflected in three decades of Pew Global Attitudes surveys across 24 countries. The scores were calculated by subtracting the share of negative answers (very/mostly/somewhat unfavorable opinion of Jews) from the share of positive ones (very/mostly/somewhat favorable opinion) to indicate the net level of favorability in each case.9

Figure 1: Favorability ratings of Jews, 1991–2019. Percent “favorable” minus percent “unfavorable.” Data source: Pew Global Attitudes

Most people say they view Jews favorably in most of the 24 countries on display, with a stable or slightly positive trend visible in many cases. However, there are also some clear divergences, and countries can be grouped into three clusters.

9 Note that the share of “don’t know/refused” varied from zero to 34 percent (average 12 percent, median 13 percent).

8 First, attitudes towards Jews in Western Europe and the US are the most positive as of 2019, with net levels of favorability ranging from 80 to 90. The trend of increasingly favorable attitudes towards Jews in Western countries have been confirmed in several national surveys (J. E. Cohen 2018a; Jikeli 2017b, 264–67; Unabhängiger Expertenkreis Antisemitismus 2018, 59–60; HL-senteret 2017; Staetsky 2017). The second cluster includes countries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe as well as the two post-Soviet states of and Ukraine, with favorability ratings ranging from 30 to 70 as of 2019 (with the exception of Greece, which displayed low scores of –18 in 2016 and 13 in 2019). In the period 2009–2019, notably, attitudes became more positive in 8 of 11 countries in this cluster. It is notable that in Ukraine, a country often thought of as a traditional hot spot of antisemitism, Jews in 2019 appeared to be more favorably looked upon than in most of East-Central and Southern Europe. The third cluster consists of seven Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia that diverge markedly from the other countries in the sample. These are the only countries with consistently and highly negative favorability levels, ranging from about –95 to –70 in the most recent surveys.

Figure 2: Rejection of Jews as neighbors, 1990-2020. Data source: World/European Values Survey

Data from the W/EVS, as visualized in Figure 2, reveal a similar pattern. In Western Europe and North America between 1 and 10 percent say the would reject Jews as neighbors; in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe rejection rates range from 5 to 40 percent, while in the rest of the world they range from 20 percent (Bangladesh, 2002) to 96 percent (Iraq, 2006). Even though certain countries display

9 large fluctuations (in some cases by as much as 30 percentage points from one survey wave to another), on the whole the rates appear stable, fluctuating within the same range over time. The ADL Global 100 surveys, fielded in 2014, 2015, and 2019, do not permit the same longitudinal view as provided by the Pew and W/EVS data. However, if we look at the results of the 2014 survey (Figure 3), carried out across 101 countries, the data provide further confirmation of the overall picture in which levels of antisemitism are lowest in the U.S. and Western Europe, higher in Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe, and higher still in Muslim-majority countries.

Figure 3: Antisemitic attitudes in seven world regions, 2014. Percentage endorsing at least 6 of 11 antisemitic stereotypes. Data source: ADL

Besides national-level differences, there is significant variation in antisemitic attitudes within populations. Surveys carried out in recent decades have repeatedly confirmed that three subgroups tend to stand out. First, those who identify with the far right of the political spectrum typically display elevated levels of antisemitism (Bergmann and Erb 1996, 416; Mayer 2007, 57; Reynié 2014, 17; Hoffmann and Moe 2017, 96; Staetsky 2017, 45; 2020). Second, such attitudes are more prevalent among Muslims than among non-Muslims, and especially among religious fundamentalists (Koopmans 2015; Jikeli 2015b; Hoffmann and Moe 2017; Staetsky 2020).10 Third, anti-Jewish attitudes tend to be more prevalent among those reporting a high degree of hostility toward Israel (Kaplan and Small 2006; F. Cohen et al. 2009; Hoffmann and Moe 2017, 11; Staetsky 2017, 49–50; 2020).

10 For US figures showing the same pattern, see JTA(2017).

10 Antisemitic incidents What do we know about the global development of antisemitic incidents? As shown in Figure 4, the turn of the millennium appears to mark a divide: While the average number of recorded incidents per year was 186 in the period 1989–1999, this number rose to 507 in the period 2000–2010, declining slightly to 490 in the period 2011–2019.

Figure 4: Recorded antisemitic incidents worldwide (violence, serious threats, van- dalism and desecration), 1989–2019. Data source: Kantor Center

To what extent do the Kantor Center data reflect the actual level of antisemitic incidents “out there?” The figures are certainly too low, given reporting rates of 20 to 50 percent. Moreover, even when they are reported to the police or a community organization, not all incidents end up being registered by monitoring agencies. But can we trust these data to reliably indicate trends over time? Other factors in addition to the true occurrence of incidents may influence reporting levels, such as media attention or campaigns designed to increase reporting. These questions remain open and should be addressed in future research. One way to do so would be to check if there is an observable increase in recorded incidents following the launch of awareness campaigns to increase reporting, or following rising media attention. Who targets Jews in these incidents? As noted above, police statistics can be misleading and are typically not comparable across countries. We therefore turn to the antisemitism surveys carried out by FRA in a selection of European countries in 2012 and 2018. Both surveys included items asking those who said they had experienced antisemitic violence or harassment to characterize the perpetrator(s) of the most serious incident. The response patterns indicate that no particular group

11 has a monopoly on antisemitic misdeeds (see Figure 5). However, some groups stand out. For experiences of violence, “someone with a Muslim extremist view” was the most frequently selected category of perpetrator, followed by “someone else” who did not fit any of the available categories. “Left-wing” perpetrators were mentioned somewhat more frequently than “right-wing” ones, yet this difference appears negligible given that a margin of error of 2 to 4 percent applies to the survey estimates, depending on country and year (Staetsky 2019a). For the most serious incident of harassment, the category “someone else” was most frequently mentioned in 2018 (making a jump to 44 percent from 20 percent in 2012), indicating a diffusion of perpetrators, followed by “someone with a Muslim extremist view,” “someone with a left-wing political view,” and “someone with a right-wing political view.”11

Figure 5: Perceptions of perpetrator(s) in the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment/violence in the past 5 years, 2012 and 2018. Data source: FRA

Jews’ experiences and perceptions as indicators of exposure What do Jews’ experiences and perceptions of antisemitism as recorded in the FRA surveys reveal about levels of exposure? Exposure to antisemitism may be conceptualized in two different ways, objective and subjective. Objective exposure can be quantified in terms of Jews’ chances of being targeted in an antisemitic incident in a given time period. The 2012 and 2018 FRA surveys provide a measure

11 Similar patterns were found in a German survey fielded in 2016 (Zick et al. 2017, 21).

12 of this by asking respondents whether they have experienced antisemitic incidents (violence or harassment). Subjective exposure is the extent to which Jews worry about antisemitism and fear for their safety. The surveys measure this as well, through several questions dealing with safety and security.

Objective exposure Looking first at antisemitic violence, the FRA surveys of 2012 and 2018 indicate the level of Jews’ exposure to incidents of this kind. In 2012, respondents in eight EU countries were asked whether they had experienced “physical violence or threats that frightened you” because of being Jewish. An average 4 percent said they had experienced this in the past year. In 2018, respondents in 12 countries were asked about physical violence only, without mentioning threats. Here, an average 2 percent said they had suffered an antisemitic physical attack in the past year. Experiences of harassment were far more common. As the FRA data suggest (Figure 6a), about one in four Jews became victims of antisemitic harassment in the year preceding the two surveys. With regard to trends, such incidents appear to have decreased in Hungary from 2012 to 2018, while increasing in Sweden and Germany. A final measure of objective exposure is the share of respondents who have personally witnessed other Jews being verbally harassed or physically attacked because of being Jews in the year preceding the survey. As Figure 6b indicates, levels hover around 20 to 30 percent, with no clear overall trend discernible.

(a) Experienced antisemitic harassment in (b) Witnessed other Jews being verbally the past 12 months insulted/harassed and/or physically at- tacked in the past 12 months

Figure 6: Two measures of objective exposure. Data source: FRA

13 Judging by the data reviewed so far, we cannot conclude that European Jews’ overall objective exposure to antisemitic incidents of violence and harassment has been trending in any particular direction from 2012 to 2018 (although there may be hidden variation in the intervening years). How should we interpret the observed overall levels of Jews’ objective exposure to antisemitism? Are these levels high, low, or somewhere in the middle? In order to answer this question, we need a benchmark against which Jews’ levels of exposure to antisemitism can be compared. Such a benchmark can be found in the European Minorities and Survey (EU-MIDIS), a major FRA survey on migrants and minorities in the European Union.12 The latest wave of EU-MIDIS (2017) surveyed 25,515 respondents from a variety of backgrounds across all 28 EU member states about their experiences of hate crimes and related issues. On average, 24 percent of respondents said they had experienced hate-motivated harassment in the preceding year (FRA 2017a, 58). Among Muslims, this figure was 27 percent, the same as for Jews (FRA 2017b, 42). Three percent of all respondents said they had experienced a hate-motivated physical attack in the past year (FRA 2017a, 64), while for Muslims this figure was two percent, again the same as for Jews (FRA 2017b, 46). Judging by these data, European Jews’ overall objective exposure to antisemitic harassment and violence appears roughly similar to the level of comparable incidents experienced by Muslims and other minority groups.

Subjective exposure To what extent do Jews in Europe worry about antisemitism, and how much do they fear for their safety? In the 2012 and 2018 FRA surveys, an average 47 percent said they worried about being verbally insulted or harassed because of being Jewish in the coming year, while an average 33 percent (2012) and 40 percent (2018) said they worried about becoming a victim of antisemitic violence. Looking at the country breakdowns (Figures 7a and 7b), France, Germany, and Belgium displayed particularly high levels of worry both in 2012 and 2018. Hungary, notably, stands out: the share of Hungarian Jews worrying about becoming a victim of antisemitic harassment dropped from 57 percent in 2012 to 24 percent in 2018, while the share worrying about violence dropped from 33 percent to 13 percent.

12 When comparing results from the EU-MIDIS survey with those of the antisemitism survey, keep in mind the different methodologies. While the EU-MIDIS survey used randomly selected population samples and face-to-face interviews, the antisemitism surveys relied on convenience samples.

14 (a) Worries about becoming a victim of (b) Worries about becoming a victim of antisemitic verbal insults/harassment in antisemitic physical attack in the next the next 12 months (“very worried” or 12 months (“very worried” or “fairly wor- “fairly worried”) ried”)

(c) Never wearing, carrying, or displaying (d) Considered emigrating in the past 5 things that might help people recognise years because of not feeling safe as a Jew them as a Jew in public because of safety concerns (2018)

Figure 7: Four measures of subjective exposure. Data source: FRA

15 A precise measure of subjective exposure is provided in Figure 7c, which indicates that as many as 25 to 30 percent of Jews in Denmark, France, Sweden, Germany, and Belgium say safety concerns prompt them to never display signs of their Jewish identity in public. In Hungary, Italy, and the UK, however, just 7 to 10 percent say this. Finally, Figure 7d provides yet another measure, indicating the extent to which European Jews have considered emigrating because of not feeling safe as a Jew in their country. Notably, the share saying they had considered emigrating increased significantly in Germany and Sweden from 2012 to 2018. For subjective exposure, comparable data have not been found for other European minority populations.

Why does antisemitism vary? Some hypotheses

The data reviewed above reveal several notable patterns of variation, both across countries or regions and over time. How can these variations be explained? In what follows I propose some hypotheses and avenues of inquiry that may guide future research and serve as building blocks for constructing middle-range theories about contemporary antisemitism. Following Pawson(2000)‘s model for hypothesis generation, I focus on mechanisms and contexts pertaining to the three relevant outcomes: attitudes, incidents, and Jews’ exposure.

Diverging attitudes What explains cross-national variation in antisemitic attitudes? I would suggest at least three key mechanisms for further exploration: general intolerance of outgroups, religion, and opinion on the Israel-Palestine conflict. In their classical study of authoritarianism, Adorno and colleagues found that antisemitism tended to go hand in hand with general outgroup intolerance (Adorno et al. 1950). This finding has been strengthened repeatedly by evidence from survey research in multiple countries (E.g., Bergmann and Erb 2003; Zick et al. 2008; Nannestad 2009; Moe 2012; Hoffmann and Moe 2017). Thus, we should expect antisemitic attitudes to be more prevalent in societies that display higher levels of general outgroup intolerance. Religion also appears to matter. The survey data reviewed here demonstrate a wide attitude gap between Muslim-majority countries and the rest, and a less pronounced but still clear difference between mainly Protestant nations and mainly Catholic or Orthodox ones. However, it is not clear to what extent Islamic/Catholic/Orthodox beliefs in and of themselves predict antisemitism. Previous research has found a

16 strong link between religious fundamentalism (among both Christians and Muslims) and outgroup intolerance on the individual level (Koopmans 2015), which suggests that fundamentalism is a key mechanism in play here. Future studies should explore this hypothesis further. Popular opinion towards the Israel-Palestine conflict is another potential mediator of the relationship between the prevalence of Islamic belief and antisemitism. Popu- lations in Muslim countries are known to sympathize with the Palestinian side in the conflict (Pew 2007, 55), and previous research leads us to expect antisemitic sentiment and beliefs to circulate more widely and easily in places where more people strongly sympathize with the Palestinian cause, or, perhaps more importantly, display strong hostility towards Israel (Kaplan and Small 2006). Thus, it appears worthwhile to analyze in more detail the phenomenon Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi have termed “Israel-derived antisemitism” on a cross-national level (Dencik and Marosi 2016). Moving down from the cross-national level to the level of population groups, we also need to ask why some sub-groups (as measured in Western countries) display higher levels of antisemitic attitudes compared to the overall population. As mentioned, this pertains to those identifying with the far right of the political spectrum, those identifying as Muslims, and those expressing high levels of hostility towards Israel. Mechanisms at work here may overlap partly with those discussed for the cross- national level. In particular, we already know that general outgroup hostility tends to co-exist with antisemitism, so a pertinent question would be whether all of these groups tend to be high in general outgroup hostility. Another underlying mechanism that appears to be important is the notion of threat, which is a key concern in research on prejudice in general (E.g., Stephan and Stephan 2000; Zárate et al. 2004). When studying the impact of threat on antisemitic attitudes, researchers should distinguish personal from collective forms of threat, as these appear to have different functions depending on contextual factors. For instance, a study of antisemitic beliefs in a sample of Christians and Muslims in North America found that among Christians, antisemitism was higher among those with a sense of personal mistreatment and vulnerability, while for the Muslim sample the key predictor was a sense of threat to their social and religious world (Baum 2009). While mechanisms such as outgroup hostility and threat may help explain sub-group antisemitism using quantitative methods, more fine-grained qualitative approaches are also needed. The different sub-groups are entangled in ideological, religious, social, and cultural webs that need to be understood, and this requires contextually

17 sensitive research. For some fine examples of how this can be done, see Baer and López(2012); Brustein and Roberts(2015); Jikeli(2015a); and Wodak(2015), 97-124.

Ebb and flow of antisemitic incidents The data on antisemitic incidents generally do not enable meaningful cross-national comparison because of differences in reporting propensity and varying registration and categorization regimes. Overall changes over time, however, can be identified. The Kantor data indicate a global rise in recorded incidents after 2000, particularly for assaults and other violent incidents. What explains this change? The Kantor Center analysts traced the origins of this development to the outbreak of the Second Intifada, with perpetrators of the most serious incidents being described as young males belonging to (typically Arab) Muslim minority communities identifying with the Palestinian cause (Stephen Roth Institute 2006, 13–14). Historical research retracing the development from preceding decades could check this assumption. Was the Second Intifada really the key trigger? Maybe, but another possibility is that events in the Middle East served to catalyze a development that was already underway and had different underlying causes. Following the turn of the millennium, incident levels have remained high compared to the preceding decade, with fluctuations from year to year. These fluctuations have commonly been explained with reference to flare-ups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Events in the Middle East have sometimes functioned as “trigger events” influencing the levels of antisemitic incidents in Europe (CST 2018, 4). Yet the connection between events in the Middle East and has not always been clear (Jacobs et al. 2011). In other cases, major antisemitic attacks in Europe appear to have had a similar trigger effect, suggesting a possible social contagion mechanism (Leduc 2012). Few attempts have been made at closer analysis of the ebb and flow of incidents within particular countries. It is worth mentioning the approach advanced by Ayal Feinberg, which explains variation in antisemitic incidents in the United States as a result of four mechanisms (target group concentration, target group visibility, trigger events, and hate group quantity) (Feinberg 2020). This approach appears particularly well suited for further study in other national contexts. With sufficiently fine-grained data, analysis of possible network effects (social contagion) would also be possible (See Fagan, Wilkinson, and Davies 2007).

18 Varying degrees of exposure to antisemitism In terms of objective and subjective exposure to antisemitism among European Jews, overall levels were more or less the same in 2012 and 2018. The data pertaining to this dimension also revealed some notable patterns that merit closer study. First, significantly fewer Hungarian respondents said they had experienced antisemitic harassment in 2018 compared to 2012. An even larger reduction occurred in the share of Hungarian respondents worrying about being attacked verbally or physically because of being Jews. This appears somewhat puzzling given the widespread concern over authoritarian developments and accusations of state-sponsored antisemitism in Hungary (Dunai 2014; BBC 2017b; Krekó and Enyedi 2018; Kalmar 2020). Nevertheless, the share of respondents who said they had considered emigrating because of safety concerns remained substantial (at 40 percent in 2018). Qualitative work is required to move beyond these numbers and study the development closer in the context of Jews’ experiences and changes in Hungarian society over the past decade. A second interesting pattern is the sharp increase from 2012 to 2018 in the share of German and Swedish respondents who said they had considered emigrating because of not feeling safe as a Jew (by 17 and 19 percentage points). The share indicating they had experienced antisemitic harassment in the past year also increased in both countries (by 12 and 9 percentage points). What explains these changes? One possible factor is the impact of the so-called migration crisis in 2015. Germany and Sweden both received a large number of asylum seekers, largely from Middle Eastern countries where antisemitic attitudes are widespread, leading to concerns in the German public over “imported antisemitism” (Berek 2017; Schnadwinkel 2018). While no representative survey has been published as of yet, non-representative and qualitative studies suggest that antisemitism was indeed widespread among immigrants arriving in Germany in 2015.13 Moreover, the 2017 firebombing of a Gothenburg synagogue carried out by recent immigrants from Syria and Palestine may have increased perceptions among Swedish Jews of a new antisemitic threat (Abrahamsson 2018). Another likely source of increased exposure in both countries is the rise in extreme-right activism following the surge of asylum seekers. Such activism has directly targeted Jews on several occasions, even leading to the shutting

13 Haug et al.(2017), 68; Jikeli(2017a). For an Austrian report with similar results, see Aslan (2017). However, see Feldman(2018), which notes the lack of a clear connection between the 2015 spike in immigration and levels of recorded antisemitic incidents in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK.

19 down of a Jewish community center in northern Sweden (BBC 2017a; Deutsche Welle 2018). The developments in Germany and Sweden call for further study. A third pattern worth highlighting is the significant cross-national differences in the share of 2018 respondents who indicated that safety concerns prompted them to never display signs of their Jewish identity in public, ranging from 7–10 percent in Hungary, Italy, and the UK to 25–30 percent in Denmark, France, Sweden, Germany, and Belgium. This distribution makes sense in light of most of the data on objective and subjective exposure: Hungary, Italy, and the UK typically display lower levels, while the other group of countries display higher levels. However, the causes of these discrepancies should be investigated in more depth, taking into account generative mechanisms such as outgroup hostility and threat as well as contextual conditions in each country.

Implications and challenges for future research

The data reviewed above enable a nuanced view of the development of contemporary antisemitism. On the attitude dimension, the vast majority of people in Western countries, and most people in Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe, appear to be favorably disposed towards Jews, with some of the data suggesting a positive trend in the period 2010–2020. Yet while favorability levels have been increasing, antisemitic attitudes remain highly prevalent in certain sub-groups: among the far right, among Muslim communities, and among those most hostile to Israel. Turning to antisemitic incidents, global monitoring suggests a clear rise in attacks involving violence, harassment, and vandalism targeting Jews following the turn of the millennium, with fluctuations on a relatively high level in subsequent years. As for Jews’ exposure to antisemitism, documented in two major European surveys fielded in 2012 and 2018, the overall share of respondents saying they had personally experienced or witnessed antisemitic harassment or violence was about the same in 2018 as in 2012. Notably, the levels of objective exposure thus defined were similar to those found in comparable surveys of Muslims and other minorities in Europe, highlighting a commonality in Jewish and Muslim experiences of prejudice. Levels of subjective exposure (i.e., the degree to which Jews worry about antisemitism, hide their identity in public, and consider emigration because of safety concerns) were quite high overall, with some notable variations between countries and over time. An integrated perspective on antisemitism makes it clear that the extent of antisemitic sentiment in a country’s population is not tied to levels of exposure and concern among Jews in the way one might expect. For instance, France and Germany display

20 some of the highest levels of favorability towards Jews, but also high levels of exposure to antisemitic violence and harassment and the largest share of Jews considering emigration because of safety concerns. Other countries, like Italy, display lower favorability ratings but also relatively low levels of objective and subjective exposure to antisemitism. This implies that relatively small groups of people with strong anti- Jewish antipathies can cause much harm even in a society with a broad consensus against antisemitism.14 Given this circumstance, an important task for future research will be to understand how antisemitism operates among these particular groups. A broader challenge for future research on contemporary antisemitism is to move from particularistic accounts towards middle-range theory development. Successful middle- range theories of contemporary antisemitism should be able to answer questions such as the following: Why are antisemitic attitudes more prevalent in some countries than others, and why are some population sub-groups more prone to antisemitism? Why do incident rates fluctuate? What lay behind the many observed divergences in Jews’ objective and subjective exposure to antisemitism across societies? There is a need, in other words, for more general explanatory frameworks that can account for temporal and spatial variation in antisemitism across its key dimensions and with attention to varying contexts. In this article I have suggested several building blocks for such theory development, proposing hypotheses and unresolved questions in need of further research.

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