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TWENT YZEIVEME ZO1IA.1 LaLOOMU OP TWA NATEONAL LA301 RELATIONS DO FOR 'MD FT FINDBD JUNE 1.959 TWENTY- FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL L OR RELATIONS \BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1959 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. • 1960 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D.C. - Price 55 cents (paper) - - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Members of the Board BOYD LEEDOM, Chairman PHILIP RAY RODGERS STEPHEN S. BEAN JOSEPH ALTON JENKINS JOHN H. FANNING Chief Counsel to Board Members HARRY H. BUSKIN STANLEY R. STRAUSS THOMAS B. SWEENEY ELIHU PLATT WILLIAM C. BAISINGER OGDEN W. FIELDS, Executive Secretary JAMES V. CONSTANTINE, Solicitor WILLIAM R. RINGER, Chief Trial Examiner THOMAS W. MILLER, JR.,2 Director of Information Office of the General Counsel STUART ROTTIMAN,3 General Counsel JAMES R. BEAIRD DOMINICK L. MANou Acting Associate General Counsel Associate General Counsel Division of Operations Division, of Law CLARENCE S. WRIGHT, Acting Director, Division of Administration I Appointed Mar. 20, 1960, to succeed Frank M. Kleiler. 2 Appointed Jan. 25, 1960, to succeed Louis G. Silverberg. 3 Appointed June 29, 1959, to succeed Jerome D. Fenton. III . - , TABLE OF CONTENTSIlp CHAPTER Page I. Operations in Fiscal Year 1959 4) 1. Decisional Activities of the Board 3 2. Activities of the General Counsel 4 a. Representation Cases 4 b. Unfair Labor Practice Cases 4 c. Types of Unfair Labor Practices Charged 5 d. Division of Law 5 3. Division of Trial Examiners 6 4. Results of Representation Elections 6 5. Fiscal Statement 7 II. Representation Cases 13 1. Showing of Employee Interest To Justify Election 14 a. Sufficiency of Showing) of Interest 14 2. Existence of Question of Representation 15 a. Certification PetitionsA 15 b. Decertification Petitions\ 16 c. Disclaimer of Interest 16 3. Qualification of Representatives 17 a. Filing Requirements 18 (1) Compliance Required of Individual Petitioner 18 b. Craft Representatives 19 4. Contract as Bar to Election 19 a. Execution and Ratification of Contract 20 (1) Execution of Contract 20 (2) Ratification 20 b. Coverage of Contract 21 (1) Master Agreements 21 (2) Change of Circumstances During Contract Term 21 (a) Prehire contracts 21 (b) Changed operations 21 c. Duration of Contract 22 (1) Uniform 2-Year Rule—Industry Test Abandoned 23 (2) Contracts of No Fixed Duration No Bar 23 d. Terms of Contract 24 (1) Union-Security Clauses 24 (a) Qualification of contracting union 24 (b) Terms of union-security clause 25 (c) Model union-shop clause 25 (2) Checkoff Clauses 26 e. Change in Identity of Contracting Party—Schism—Defunct- ness 26 (1) Schism Rules 27 (2) Nature of Election—Effect on Contract 27 (3) Defunctness 28 VII VIII . Table of Contents , CHAPTER Page II. Representation Cases—Continued 4. Contract as Bar to Election—Continued f. Effect of Rival Claims and Petitions, and Conduct of Parties_ _ 28 (1) Substantial Representation Claims 28 (2) Unsupperted Claims-10-Day Rule Abandoned 28 (3) Timeliness of Petitions 29 ‘ (a) Petition filed on day contract executed 29 (b) Premature petitions , 30 (c) Sixty-day insulated period 30 (d) Forestalling automatic renewal 31 (i) Untimely notice 32 (ii) Notice under modification clause 32 (e) Effect of midterm modification 33 (f) Termination of contract 33 g. Premature Extension of Contract 34 h. List of Leading Cases and Cases Overruled 34 (1) Leading Cases on Revised Contract-Bar Rules •34 (2) Cases Specifically Overruled or Modified 35 5. Other Election Bars—Waiver 35 6. Impact of Prior Determinations 36 7. Unit of Employees Appropriate for Bargaining 37 a. Factors Considered 37 b. Craft and Quasi-Craft Units 38 c. Multiemployer Units 40 (1) Bargaining History 40 (2) Intent of Employer 40 (3) Withdrawal From Multiemployer Unit 41 d. Individuals Excluded From Bargaining Unit by the Act 42 (1) Agricultural Laborers . , - 42 (2) Independent Contractors 43 (3) Supervisors 44 e. Employees Excluded From Unit by Board Policy 45 8. Conduct of Representation Elections 45 a. Voting Eligibility 45 (1) Seasonal or Intermittent Employees 46 b. Timing of Elections 47 (1) Effect of Unfair Labor Practice Charges 47 c. Standards of Election Conduct , 48 (1) Mechanics of Election 48 (2) Interference With Election 49 (a) Preelection speeches—the 24-hour rule 50 (i) Twenty-four-hour rule in "mail-in" elections 50 (b) Use of sample ballots 51 (c) Election propaganda_ , 51 (d) Campaign tactics 52 (e) Threats, promises, and concessions 53 III. Unfair Labor Practices 55 A. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers 55 1. Interference With Section 7 Rights 55 a. Prohibitions Against Union Activities 57 b. Interference With Board Proceedings 58 Table of Contents IX oaerrEn Page 9 III. Unfair Labor Practices—Continued . _ A. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers—Continued - 2. Employer Domination or Support of Employee Organization.! 59 a. Domination of Labor OrganizatiOn 59 b. Assistance and Support 59 (1) Assistance Through Contract 60 c. Remedies in Section 8(a) (2) Cases 61 3. Discrimination Against Employees 62 a. Discrimination for Protected Activities 62 (1) Loss of Statutory Protection 63 (a) Effect of grievance procedure onstrike against un- fair practices - 63 b. Forms of Discrimination • . I ■ I 64 (1) Lockout - 65 (a) Partial lockout , 66 (2) Discontinuance or Change of Opeiations 67 (3) Union Security 68 (a) Validity of union-security agreements 68 (i) Agreement, with individual representative 68 (ii) Agreement covering one employee 69 (b) Terms of agreement 69 (c) Illegal enforcement of union-security agreement 70 (4) Discriminatory Employment Practices 71 c. Remedial Provisions 74 4. Refusal To Bargain in Good Faith 74 a. Representatives Majority Status 75 b. Appropriateness of the Bargaining Unit 77 c. The Request To Bargain 77 d. Subjects for Bargaining 78 (1) Waiver of Right To Bargain , 79 e. Violation of Duty To Bargain in Good Faith 82 (1) Unilateral Action 82 (2) Lockout During Bargaining Negotiations 83 (3) Refusal To Furnish Bargaining Information 83 B. Union Unfair Labor Practices 84 1. Restraint and Coercion of Employees 84 a. Forms of Restraint and Coercion 85 (1) Threats and Violence—Other Coercive Conduct 85 (2) Minority Union Activities 86 (3) Illegal Union-Security and Hiring Practices 87 2. Restraint and Coercion of Employers 88 3. Causing or Attempting To Cause Discrimination 88 a. Forms of Violations 88 (1) Illegal Hiring Agreements and Practices 89 (a) Exclusive hiring halls 92 (2) Illegal Seniority Practices 93 (3) Illegal Union Security 94 b. Remedial Provisions 96 4. Refusal To Bargain in Good Faith 97 a. Bargaining Demands 97 b. Section 8(d) Requirements 98 X Table of Contents CHAPTER Page III. Unfair Labor PracticesContinued B. Union Unfair Labor Practices—Continued 5. Secondary Strikes and Boycotts 99 a. Inducement or Encouragement of Employees To Strike_ _ _ 99 (1) Employee Status 99 (2) Inducement and Encouragement To Strike 101 (a) Refusal to refer employees as inducement to strike_ 102 b. Neutrality of Secondary Employer 103 c. Ambulatory and Common Situs Picketing 104 d. "Hot Cargo" Agreements 106 6. Strikes for Recognition Against Certification 106 7. Jurisdictional Disputes 107 a. Proceedings Under Section 10(k) . 108 (1) Disputes Subject to Determination 108 (2) Determination of Disputes 110 (a) Nature of determination i/ 111 b. Violation of Section 8(b)(4)(D) 112 8. Excessive or Discriminatory Fees for Union Membership 113 IV. Supreme Court Rulings 114 1. Jurisdictional Policies 114 2. Relation of Unfair Labor Practice Charge to Complaint 114 3. "Employee Committees" as Labor Organizations 116 4. District Court Review of Representation Proceeding,: 117 5 Board Jurisdiction in Secondary Boycott Involving Government Subdivision 118 V. Enforcement Litigation 120 1. Employer Unfair Labor Practices 120 a. Employee Protests and Signs on Employees Personal Effects_ 120 b. Lockout and Reduction of Seniority for Strikers 122 c. Employer Refusals To Bargain 123 2. Union-Security Agreements 124 a. "Subcontractor Clauses" 125 3. Union Unfair Labor Practices 126 a. Applicability of Section 8(b)(1)(A) to Picketing and Other Attempts by a Minority Union To Force Employer Recog- nition 127 b. Notice Obligations Under Section 8(b)(3) and 8(d)_ 127 c. Strikes and Boycotts Prohibited by Section 8(b)(4) 128 (1) Inducement or Encouragement of Employees , , 129 (2) Secondary Boycotts 130 (a) The "all" defense 130 (b) Picketing at a "common situs" 132 (3) Picketing To Force Recognition Where Another Union Is Certified—Section 8(b) (4) (C) 133 4. Remedial Orders for Reimburseinent of Union Dues 134 5. Representation Matters 135 a. Elections 135 b. Unit Determinations 137 / Table of Contents XI CHAPTER Page VI. Injunction Litigation 139 A. Injunctions Under Section 10(j) 140 B. Injunctions Under Section 100) 143 1. Secondary Boycott Situations 143 a. Withholding Work Permits and Union Label 144 b. Ambulatory Picketing 145 c. Alleged Consumer Picketing 147 d. Construction Gate Cases 147 e. Waterfront Cases 148 f. Hotels 150 g. Common Situs Situations 150 2. Injunction Against Picketing To Force an Employer To Join an Employer Association 151 3. Injunction Against Picketing After Certification of Another Union 151 4. Jurisdictional Dispute Situations 152 VII. Contempt Litigation 154 VIII. Miscellaneous Litigation 156 1. Subpena Enforcement 156 2. Petitions for Judicial Intervention in Representation Proceedings_ 157 3. Petitions for District Court Relief in Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings 159 Appendix A. Statistical Tables for Fiscal Year 1959 161 CHARTS IN CHAPTER I CHART Page I Comparison of Filings of Unfair Labor Practice Cases and Repre- sentation Cases, Fiscal Years 1936-59 8 II. Unfair Labor Practice Cases Filed, Against Employers and Unions, Fiscal Years 1955-59 9 III. Unfair Labor Practice Cases, by Charging Party, Fiscal Years 1955 59 10 IV.
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