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Reframing of moral dilemmas reveals an unexpected “positivity bias” in updating and attributions
Minjae J. Kim1*, Jordan Theriault2*, Joshua Hirschfeld-Kroen1, Liane Young1
*Equal contributors
1 Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA
2 Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston MA
Corresponding author at: [email protected]
Abstract: People often encounter new information about others that may require them to dynamically update their moral judgments about them. While prior work on impression updating has examined the process of moral updating following the observation of additional moral behaviors that violate prior expectations, relatively little is known about how moral updating occurs when new contextual information directly reframes prior behaviors, casting them as more or less moral than they were on an initial interpretation. The present work sought to identify whether such moral reframing is differentially sensitive to the qualitative character of reframing information. Study 1 found that the negativity bias, well-documented by prior work on moral impression updating, can be reversed, such that immoral-to-moral reframing results in more updating than moral-to-immoral reframing. Study 2 replicated this pattern and found an additional asymmetry: moral reframing information was interpreted as providing more situational (vs dispositional) information, compared to immoral reframing information. Taken together, the present findings show that theories of moral impression updating should consider distinctions between the addition of new moral information and the reframing of prior information, as well as the impact of reframing on attributions.
Keywords: moral updating, negativity bias, situational/dispositional attributions
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1. Introduction
People form moral impressions about others based on their behaviors and dynamically update these impressions in light of new information. A large body of social psychological research has identified factors that influence moral updating in the face of counter-attitudinal information. One prominent line of work has identified a negativity bias in moral updating, such that initial and updated moral judgments depend more on negative than positive moral information (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Mende-Siedlecki, Baron, & Todorov, 2013; Cone &
Ferguson, 2015). This work has typically relied on presenting participants with sequences of decontextualized behaviors (e.g., “Laura heckled a woman speaking on human rights; Laura translated items for a foreigner in a restaurant; Laura gave money to charity”, Mende-Siedlecki
& Todorov, 2016). By contrast, relatively little work has examined how moral updating unfolds when new information comes to light that provides additional context, or a reframing, of prior behavior. Earlier work in this area has shown that reframing initially immoral behaviors can reverse both implicit and explicit negative first impressions (Mann & Ferguson, 2015). To our knowledge, however, there been no empirical test of whether there is more updating when moral behaviors are reframed as immoral, relative to the reverse—reframing immoral behaviors as moral. Research on negativity bias in moral updating leads to a clear prediction that moral to immoral reframing should be stronger, and, given this, the present research set out to test whether negativity bias actually does persist in the context of moral reframing.
1.1. Negativity bias in updating
Importantly, negativity bias is neither a homogeneous nor a universal phenomenon.
Several lines of research on impression updating have revealed both 1) properties of negative behaviors (beyond valence) that explain their dominance for updating, and 2) properties of 3 behaviors that explain differences in updating, in the absence of a negativity bias. One such property is perceived behavioral frequency. Mende-Siedlecki and colleagues (Mende-Siedlecki,
Baron, & Todorov, 2013) found that immoral behaviors and highly competent behaviors elicit greater impression updates (compared to moral behaviors and incompetent behaviors) because they are understood to be less frequent than their counterparts, in line with the idea that behaviors that are understood to be more rare are more diagnostic of true character. Relatedly, measures of diagnosticity can also explain differences in updating. In a study using implicit character evaluations, Cone and Ferguson (2015) found that an extremely negative behavior
(mutilating a small animal) moved initially positive evaluations more than an extremely positive behavior (donating a kidney) moved initially negative evaluations. Importantly, the more participants viewed the negative action as offensive, the more they viewed the action as reflective of true character, and these perceptions of diagnosticity, in turn, predicted the degree of implicit impression updating (although see Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014 for evidence that people see others’ true selves as fundamentally good).
Other work has shown that the relevance of a behavior for inferring interpersonal intent also matters for updating. Brambilla and colleagues (2019) found that morally relevant behaviors elicit greater impression updates compared to behaviors in the domains of competence or sociality, because they are seen as containing more information about interpersonal intentions. It should be noted that, in this paradigm, no valence asymmetry was observed when comparing impression updates following moral versus immoral behaviors, and mediational analyses did not support a behavioral frequency account of differences in updating.
1.2. Reversing impressions through reinterpretation 4
Much of the extant work on impression updating typically presents a sequence of disconnected facts about a person or a sequence of disparate behaviors they have performed, e.g., some number of moral behaviors followed by some number of immoral behaviors (Mende-
Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013; Brambilla, Carraro, Castelli & Sacchi, 2019; Gawronski,
Rydell, Vervliet & De Houwer, 2010; Petty, Tormala, Briñol & Jarvis, 2006). In reality, information is rarely decontextualized—for example, when we learn that someone has done something wrong, we often also learn the context for the behavior that may ultimately provide some justification or at least explanation. Indeed, we may be persuaded to question others’ motives, or to reconsider a behavior that at first appeared inexcusable. Mann and Ferguson
(2015) illustrate such a case, of a Nazi who employed Jewish workers as a cheap source of labor at the dawn of World War II. On its own, this information is enough to elicit powerful feelings of moral outrage. However, it is then revealed that this man—Oskar Schindler— went to great lengths to keep his Jewish workers from being killed, even risking his own life to protect them.
For most, this new information elicits a dramatic update in their moral judgments about
Schindler. Indeed, Mann and Ferguson’s studies (2015) show that negative implicit evaluations can be undone if observers are given additional details that reframe seemingly bad prior behavior in a positive light. Crucially, the negative implicit evaluation is reversed only when the new positive information can be used to reinterpret bad prior behavior, and not when the new positive information is seen as irrelevant to the prior behavior. This evidence suggests that a key component of (implicit) impression change is the relationship between new and old information: specifically, whether the new information affords a reinterpretation of past events.
In sum, prior work indicates that behavioral frequency, diagnosticity, intention information, and reinterpretation can all affect impression updating. The present work seeks to 5 extend and refine our understanding of the relationship between reinterpretation and updating, which may be particularly relevant to real-life moral judgment. Providing people with a moral reinterpretation of initially immoral behaviors has been shown to be a robust method for reversing both implicit and explicit negative first impressions (Mann & Ferguson, 2015). To our knowledge, however, there is no research exploring whether the degree of moral updating changes when people are given the exact same information in reverse order, such that moral behaviors get reframed in an immoral light, and immoral behaviors get reframed in a moral light.
Is there more updating when moral information is reframed as immoral, relative to the reverse, as research on negativity biases in moral updating would suggest? And, if a valence asymmetry is found, what is the informational feature underlying the asymmetry?
1.3. Reframing tragic and taboo dilemmas
We explored these questions across two experiments examining explicit moral judgments following both positive and negative reframing information. Specifically, we first presented scenarios framing someone’s behavior as either moral or immoral, and later presented additional information intended to reframe that behavior as the opposite. To design scenarios that could test the relative degree of updating in response to moral-to-immoral and immoral-to-moral reframing, we relied on the rich framework of tragic and taboo dilemmas (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock et al., 2000; Tetlock, 2002; 2003; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005; Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki,
2007; Gregory & Irwin, 2007; Bartels, 2008; Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008; Lichtenstein,
Mandel, & Vartanian, 2008; Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011). The examples used in this study are simple, but the framework of tragic and taboo dilemmas has been applied across a variety of contexts with practical relevance to important issues (including negotiations for peace in the Israel-Palestine conflict; Ginges et al., 2007). In tragic dilemmas, decision-makers are 6 faced with a choice between two competing moral values, such that they must choose the “lesser of two evils”, while sacred values (sometimes others’ lives and livelihoods) hang in the balance.
Imagine a scenario used in the present work: a fishing boat captain, Jeremy, must choose whether to buy expensive new fishing nets that would kill fewer dolphins, where, to compensate for the expense, he would also need to lay off many of his crew (who would not find new jobs easily). Critically, the ambiguity of these tragic dilemmas makes moral judgment difficult, as it is unclear which choice is “morally correct” (Tetlock et al., 2000). Given this, if Jeremy decides not to buy fishing nets, sacrificing the lives of dolphins, then people may still judge him as moral
(or at least not immoral) because his decision ultimately protected the livelihoods of his workers.
By comparison, taboo dilemmas present individuals with a choice between a moral concern and economic self-interest. Imagine another fisherman, Steve, who runs a side business selling dolphin fins on the black market. When Steve learns about the new fishing nets, he must choose between saving dolphins and keeping his side-business. Most people believe that prioritizing economic self-interest over the lives of others is wrong (Tetlock, 2003), and, as such, people may judge Steve as immoral if he chooses to maximize his profit at the expense of the dolphins.
Critically, tragic and taboo cases can be reframed (Atran & Axelrod, 2008). Now imagine that Jeremy and Steve from the previous scenarios are the same person: Gregory. Initially, when
Gregory favored his workers’ jobs over the lives of the dolphins, he appeared to be making a moral decision in the context of a tragic dilemma. However, his decision can be reframed as an immoral decision in a taboo dilemma by revealing his side business. The information can also be presented in reverse: first establishing an immoral decision in a taboo dilemma, then elaborating 7 on how Gregory’s workers are actually helped by his decision, suggesting he made a moral decision in a tragic dilemma.
1.4. Present Work
We used tragic and taboo dilemmas to explore possible asymmetries in moral updating.
The stimuli take two forms: Moral-to-Immoral reframing, where agents’ decisions begin as moral (in the context of tragic dilemmas) and are reframed as immoral (in the context of taboo dilemmas), and Immoral-to-Moral reframing, where agents’ decisions begin as immoral (taboo) and are reframed as moral (tragic) (Figure 1). In either form, participants report a first-pass moral judgment, and then report a second-pass moral judgment made after reframing, with moral updating calculated as the difference between the two judgments. As prior work has identified asymmetries in moral judgments about agents’ actions (act-based judgments) and moral judgments about agents themselves (person-based judgments) (Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum,
2013), we measured moral updating for both types of judgments to test the robustness of any effects that were observed.
In Study 1, consistent with prior work in impression formation, we predicted that we would observe a negativity bias, (Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013; Baumeister et al.,
2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), such that Immoral-to-Moral reframing would elicit less updating than Moral-to-Immoral reframing. Contrary to this prediction, we observed the opposite pattern in Study 1: updating was greater for Immoral-to-Moral reframing than for Moral-to-
Immoral reframing. We hypothesized that this discrepancy may be due to an asymmetry in the interpretation of immoral and moral information—i.e., they may differently afford dispositional and situational attributions (Fein, 1996; Fein et al., 1990; Gilbert & Jones, 1986; Gilbert &
Malone, 1995; for review see Gawronski, 2004). Study 2 directly investigated this asymmetry in 8 dispositional and situational attributions, revealing that moral information (both when presented initially and when presented as reframing information) was interpreted as providing more information about the situation than about the agent’s disposition, whereas there was no such difference in attributions for immoral information. Furthermore, the more participants interpreted reframing information as providing situational information, the more likely they were to engage in positive moral updating.
2. Study 1
Study 1 examined asymmetries in moral updating between Moral-to-Immoral and
Immoral-to-Moral reframed scenarios. We predicted that Moral-to-Immoral updating would be greater than Immoral-to-Moral updating, consistent with prior work on negativity bias (Mende-
Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013; Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001).
2.1. Methods and Materials
2.1.1. Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for payment.
The final sample consisted of 122 adults (63 female; MAge = 33.25 years, SDAge = 11.17 years), after excluding 8 participants for failing a simple attention check, and 17 participants for quitting before completing the survey. The Boston College Institutional Review Board approved the study, and each participant provided informed consent before beginning the survey.
2.1.2. Stimuli
We created 24 detailed moral scenarios, either designing novel scenarios or adapting them from prior work (Critcher et al., 2012; Tetlock et al., 2000; Uhlmann, Zhu & Tannenbaum,
2013). Each scenario initially presented an agent’s moral or immoral decision given a dilemma
(Initial Condition), and was supplemented with either subsequent reframing or control 9 information (Updating Condition), designed to reverse the initial moral judgment (reframing), or to be morally irrelevant (control) (Figure 1). Participants read each scenario and made moral judgments at two time points (Time Point): a first-pass judgment, made when the agent’s moral or immoral decision was presented, and a second-pass judgment, made after the scenario was reframed (or after control information was presented). Moral updating was calculated as the difference between second-pass and first-pass moral judgments. The combination of Time Point,
Initial Condition, and Updating Condition created six conditions: (a) Initial Moral, (b) Initial
Immoral, (c) Moral-to-Immoral, (d) Immoral-to-Moral, (e) Moral–Control, (f) Immoral–Control.
Critically, each scenario was composed of segments, which could be rearranged to generate the conditions of interest. Rearranging these segments ensured that at the end of both Moral-to-
Immoral and Immoral-to-Moral scenarios, participants had received the exact same information, only presented in different orders (Figure 1). Each participant read 24 scenarios (6 Moral-to-
Immoral, 6 Immoral-to-Moral, 6 Moral–Control, and 6 Immoral–Control), presented in a semi- randomized order, balancing scenario-by-condition combinations across participants.
We also tested the possibility that patterns may differ for act-based and person-based moral judgments (Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013). Participants were assigned (randomly, between-subjects) to make either act-based (n = 59) or person-based (n = 63) moral judgments
(Judgment Type). For act-based judgments, participants were asked: “Are
Figure 1. Scenario design. Segments 1-4 created an initial dilemma, which was either Moral or Immoral. Segment 5 either reframed the initial dilemma, or presented morally irrelevant control information. Control information provides a baseline for changes in second-pass moral judgments. The text above is abbreviated, and 24 scenarios were used in total (see Supplemental Materials for the full text of all scenarios).
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants were instructed that they would read a series of 24 brief scenarios, that they would read each story as it unfolds, and at two points they would answer a question about it.
They were told that they would be asked the same question twice, and that at each point they should answer it in light of all of the information that they currently have (see Supplemental
Materials for experimental instructions). For each scenario, segments were presented cumulatively, i.e., after participants began the survey, they were presented first with segment 1, then segment 2, and so on, with each segment appearing beneath the previous segment after 11 participants clicked through to the next screen. After responding to all 24 scenarios, participants were asked to complete a brief demographics questionnaire.
2.1.4. Analysis
All data and analysis code are available on OSF (https://osf.io/3cyaj/?view_only= c748f6e262d947c7a5d05d709659d84a). Mixed effects analyses were performed using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014; R Core Team, 2013). A linear mixed effects regression was fit to predict moral judgments, including as predictors: Initial Condition
(moral, immoral), Updating Condition (reframing, control), Time Point (first-pass, second-pass), an interaction between Initial Condition and Time Point, an interaction between Updating
Condition and Time Point, and the 3-way interaction. Contrasts within the model were tested using the multcomp package (Hothorn et al., 2016). Random effects parameters were chosen by first fitting a maximal model, i.e., all necessary by-subject and by-scenario random slopes and intercepts (Barr et al., 2013), then removing random effects components that showed near-zero variance in an uncorrelated model until convergence could be achieved (see Supplemental Table
1). The maximal model included random effects for Initial Condition, and Updating Condition and Time Point.
2.2. Results and Discussion
2.2.1. Act-based vs. Person-based Judgments
There were no significant differences between act-based and person-based moral judgments (see Supplemental Materials). Given that there were no significant differences between judgment types, the following analyses collapse across act-based and person-based judgments.
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Figure 2. A (Study 1) & D (Study 2): Mean moral judgment for each condition, collapsed across act-based and person-based moral judgments. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. B (Study 1) & E (Study 2): Difference between second-pass and first-pass moral judgments, for each scenario type. C (Study 1) & F (Study 2): Magnitude of moral updating. There was greater updating for Immoral-to-Moral reframing relative to Moral-to-Immoral reframing.
2.2.2. Moral Updating
Reported p-values were corrected for multiple comparisons using the Tukey method.
Figure 2 plots mean moral ratings for each condition, and mean moral updating for each scenario type. Consistent with our intended design, Initial Moral scenarios were rated as more moral than
Initial Immoral scenarios, M = 1.30, SE = 0.13, z = 9.96, p < .001. Also consistent with our intended design, moral judgments changed in the intended direction in both Moral-to-Immoral 13 and Immoral-to-Moral conditions: Moral-to-Immoral scenarios were rated as less moral than
Initial Moral, M = -0.67, SE = 0.09, z = -7.43, p < .001, and Immoral-to-Moral scenarios were rated as more moral than Initial Immoral, M = 1.24, SE = 0.09, z = 14.06, p < .001. Moral judgments for Moral–Control scenarios were not significantly different from Initial Moral, M =
0.06, SE = 0.09, z = 0.70, p = .960. However, moral judgments for Immoral–Control were more moral than for Initial Immoral, M = 0.24, SE = 0.09, z = 2.73, p = .037. Critically, this positive change in moral judgment for Immoral–Control was significantly smaller than the positive change in moral judgment for Immoral-to-Moral, M = 1.00, SE = 0.14, z = 7.40, p < .001, meaning that moral judgments increased more from the Initial Immoral baseline when the reframing information was presented, compared to control information.
At their conclusion, Moral-to-Immoral and Immoral-to-Moral scenarios present the same exact information. Given this, do differences in the order of moral reframing lead to asymmetries in moral updating? When the absolute magnitudes of updating in Moral-to-Immoral and
Immoral-to-Moral scenarios were compared, Immoral-to-Moral scenarios were updated more than Moral-to-Immoral scenarios, M = 0.57, SE = 0.11, z = 5.34, p < .001. That is, contrary to our prediction—based on past work documenting “negativity bias”—participants updated their moral judgments less when positive information was reframed in a negative light, and more when negative information was reframed in a positive light.
2.2.3. Discussion
What accounts for this unexpected asymmetry (i.e., an apparent “positivity bias” in moral updating)? One possibility is that moral and immoral scenarios are interpreted as providing different amounts of information about the situation relative to the disposition of the agent. In prior work, negativity bias has been found to stem from interpretations of negative moral 14 information (relative to positive information) as providing more dispositional information, i.e., immoral behaviors are infrequent, and thus more informative about a person’s character (Mende-
Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013). However, under certain conditions, information that affords strong situational attributions could still outweigh immoral dispositional information. For instance, past behavioral research has shown that, given sufficient attentional resources, situational information can override a negative dispositional impression (Fein, 1996; Fein et al.,
1990; Trope & Gaunt, 2000). Study 2 directly investigated the possibility that the unexpected asymmetry in moral updating observed in Study 1 stems from differences in situational/dispositional attributions made about moral and immoral reframing information.
3. Study 2 Study 2 probed the unexpected asymmetry in moral updating by examining whether it was driven by a qualitative difference in situational/dispositional attributions about information reframing moral and immoral judgments. We hypothesized that moral reframing information may be interpreted as affording more situational, as opposed to dispositional, inferences. To this end, Study 2 replicated the design of Study 1, with an additional measure of the extent to which the scenarios allowed for situational or dispositional inferences.
3.1. Methods and Materials
3.1.1. Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for payment.
The final sample consisted of 121 adults (56 female; MAge = 33.69 years, SDAge = 10.07 years), after excluding 5 participants for failing a simple attention check, and 20 participants for quitting before completing the survey. The Boston College Institutional Review Board approved the study, and each participant provided informed consent before beginning the survey.
3.1.2. Stimuli 15
The same 24 scenarios were used as in Study 1. For consistency with Study 1, we collected both act-based (n = 62) and person-based (n = 59) judgments (despite finding no differences between judgment types).
In addition to providing a moral judgment, participants were asked to make an informational judgment, addressing whether the scenario provided relatively more information about the person or about the situation. Specifically, before being prompted for a first-pass moral judgment, participants were asked: “Based on the story so far, have you learned more about
Likewise, before being prompted for a second-pass moral judgment, participants were asked:
“Based on the new information, have you learned more about
(1 – Only about
3.1.3. Procedure
The procedure followed that of Study 1, with the following exception which was implemented to facilitate reading and decrease unnecessary loading delays: segments 1–4 were presented simultaneously on one page, and participants were prompted to make first-pass informational and moral judgments on this page. On the next page, segment 5 was added in bold below the previous segments, and participants were asked to make second-pass informational and moral judgments.
3.1.4. Analysis
As in Study 1, analysis was performed by fitting a linear mixed effects regression to the sample and testing contrasts within it. Random effects parameters were chosen by fitting a maximal model (Barr et al., 2013), then removing random effects components that showed near- zero variance in an uncorrelated model until convergence could be achieved (see Supplemental 16
Table 1). Ratings for moral and informational judgments were modeled separately. The maximal models included random effects for Initial Condition, Updating Condition, and Time Point.
Correlations between moral updating and informational judgments were also examined.
To test the correlation across scenario types, a linear mixed effects model was fit to predict moral updating (difference between second-pass and first-pass moral judgments) with second-pass informational judgments as a predictor. To test the correlation within each scenario type, a linear mixed effects model was fit to predict moral updating, including as predictors: second-pass informational judgments, Initial Condition (moral, immoral), Updating Condition (reframing, control), and all interactions. The maximal model included random effects for informational judgments, Initial Condition, and Updating Condition. Lastly, a mediation analysis was conducted (brms package, Bürkner, 2017): a Bayesian mediation model was fit to predict moral updating among reframed scenarios, with Initial Condition (moral, immoral) as the treatment variable and second-pass informational judgments as the mediator. Default, uninformative priors were used; all Rhat values were <= 1.01, suggesting the model had converged (see Supplemental
Materials for detailed model summary). The maximal model included random effects for Initial
Condition and informational judgments.
3.2. Results and Discussion
3.2.1. Act-based vs. Person-based Judgments
Replicating Study 1, there were no differences between act-based and person-based moral judgments (see Supplemental Materials). Given this, the following analyses collapse across act- based and person-based judgments.
3.2.2. Moral Updating 17
All manipulation checks, and critically, the core Study 1 finding—that Immoral-to-Moral scenarios were updated more than Moral-to-Immoral scenarios—were replicated in the Study 2 sample (Figure 2). Reported p-values were corrected using the Tukey method. As in Study 1, all manipulation checks were passed: Initial Moral scenarios were rated as more moral than Initial
Immoral, M = 1.33, SE = 0.12, z = 11.07, p < .001; updating occurred, such that Moral-to-
Immoral scenarios were rated as less moral than Initial Moral, M = -0.85, SE = 0.09, z = -9.51, p
< .001 and Immoral-to-Moral scenarios were rated as more moral than Initial Immoral, M = 1.20,
SE = 0.10, z = 12.46, p < .001; control conditions showed the same pattern as in Study 1, where
Moral–Control scenarios were not rated as more moral than Initial Moral, M = 0.04, SE = 0.09, z
= 0.47, p = .992, and although Immoral–Control scenarios were rated as more moral than Initial
Immoral, M = 0.33, SE = 0.10, z = 3.38, p = .004, this increase was significantly smaller than the corresponding increase in moral ratings for Immoral-to-Moral, M = 0.88, SE = 0.16, z = 5.50, p <
.001. Critically, Study 2 replicated the core asymmetry observed in Study 1: the magnitude of updating was greater for Immoral-to-Moral than Moral-to-Immoral, M = 0.35, SE = 0.12, z =
3.05, p = .014.
3.2.3. Informational judgments
The core question for Study 2 was whether qualitative asymmetries in dispositional/situational information could be observed between directions of reframing (Figure
3). Contrasts compared all conditions against the scale midpoint (of four), and an additional contrast was run comparing Immoral-to-Moral and Moral-to-Immoral scenarios; p-values were corrected using the Tukey method. Initial Moral and Immoral-to-Moral scenarios were rated as providing relatively more information about the situation: Initial Moral, M = 4.45, SE = 0.08, z =
5.92, p < .001; Immoral-to-Moral, M = 4.79, SE = 0.12, z = 6.58, p < .001. Comparing these two 18 conditions, Immoral-to-Moral scenarios provided more situational information than Initial Moral scenarios, M = 0.34, SE = 0.12, z = 2.90 p = 0.025. None of the remaining scenarios—Initial
Immoral, Moral-to-Immoral, Moral–Control, Immoral–Control—significantly differed from the scale midpoint (see Supplemental Table 2 for means). Surprisingly then, the same vignette describing a moral dilemma, whether presented initially (Initial Moral) or as reframing an immoral dilemma (Immoral-to-Moral), was judged as providing situational information.
However, the vignette was seen as providing more situational information when it reframed an immoral dilemma (Figure 3). Finally, comparing Immoral-to-Moral and Moral-to-Immoral scenarios, Immoral-to-Moral scenarios were rated as providing more situational information than
Moral-to-Immoral scenarios, M = 0.93, SE = 0.14, z = 6.52, p < 0.001.
Figure 3. Study 2 condition means for informational judgments. Moral information was rated as providing more information about the situation (relative to the scale midpoint), both when it was presented in the initial segment and in the reframing segment. Moral reframing information was rated as providing more information about the situation, compared to immoral reframing information. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
3.2.4. Correlations between moral updating and informational judgments 19
Immoral-to-Moral scenarios elicited greater moral updating and were rated as providing more situational information compared to Moral-to-Immoral scenarios. We hypothesized that these two measures may be related, and explored the correlation between moral updating and situational (vs. dispositional) information. Moral updating was positively related to situational
2 information, b = 0.13, SE = 0.03, t = 4.54, p < 0.001, Rβ = 0.387, such that, collapsing across scenario type, reframing information that was rated as providing more situational information was associated with more positive moral updating.
Similar results were found when examining within-condition correlations. Contrasts tested the relationship between moral updating and informational judgments in each condition
(Figure 4); p-values were corrected using the Tukey method. Within Immoral-to-Moral scenarios, reframing information rated as providing more situational information was associated
2 with more positive moral updating, b = 0.11, SE = 0.03, z = 3.18, p = 0.006, Rβ = 0.297.
Likewise, within Moral-to-Immoral scenarios, reframing information rated as providing more situational information was associated with less negative moral updating, b = 0.15, SE = 0.03, z
2 = 4.90, p < 0.001, Rβ = 0.416. No relationship was observed between moral updating and informational judgments among Immoral-Control scenarios, b = 0.004, SE = 0.03, z = 0.18, p =
2 2 1.00, Rβ = 0.011, or Moral-Control scenarios, b = -0.007, SE = 0.03, z = -0.26, p = 1.00, Rβ =
0.002. In sum, although moral judgment became more positive for Immoral-to-Moral scenarios and more negative for Moral-to-Immoral scenarios after reframing, the interpretation of reframing information as providing situational information biased moral updating to be more positive in both cases (Figure 4). 20
Figure 4. Relationship between second-pass informational judgments and moral updating for each scenario type in Study 2. For Immoral-to-Moral scenarios and Moral-to-Immoral scenarios, rating reframing information as providing more information about the situation was associated with more positive (less negative) moral updating. There was no significant relationship between informational judgments and moral updating for Immoral–Control scenarios, or for Moral– Control scenarios.
Given that (a) Immoral-to-Moral scenarios were more strongly reframed than Moral-to-
Immoral scenarios, and (b) interpreting reframing information as situational was associated with more positive moral updating, we hypothesized that (b) may contribute to the "positivity bias" asymmetry observed in (a). To test this, a Bayesian mediation model was fit to predict moral updating among reframed scenarios, with Initial Condition (moral, immoral) as the treatment variable, and second-pass informational judgments as the mediator (see Supplemental Materials for detailed model summary). The mean estimated total effect of moral reframing direction on moral updating was b = 2.08, 95% Bayesian credible interval = [1.68, 2.50], and the mean estimated direct effect was b = 1.97 [1.55, 2.36]. The mean estimated indirect effect of moral reframing direction on moral updating through informational judgments was b = 0.11 [0.05,
0.17], representing a 5.09% [2.11%, 8.07%] mediation. These results indicate that a small 21 portion of the effect of moral reframing direction on moral updating is explained by informational judgments. Thus, the “positivity bias” toward stronger moral updating in the
Immoral-to-Moral direction is partially explained by the interpretation of reframing information as situational.
3.2.5. Discussion
Study 2 extended and clarified the asymmetry in moral updating observed in Study 1.
Despite predictions of a negativity bias, in both studies Immoral-to-Moral scenarios elicited greater updating than Moral-to-Immoral scenarios. Study 2 identified an additional asymmetry, where moral (but not immoral) reframing information was rated as providing relatively more situational (vs. dispositional) information about the agent. These asymmetries were related: for both moral and immoral reframing, situational interpretations were associated with more positive moral updating. Finally, mediation analyses indicated that the “positivity bias” toward stronger
Immoral-to-Moral updating can be partially explained by moral reframing information being interpreted as providing more situational information. Together, these findings may explain why a negativity bias was overcome in both studies, and illustrate the interplay between moral judgments and qualitative interpretations of information that has the potential to reframe them. 4. General Discussion
Prior work has provided evidence for a negativity bias, where “bad is stronger than good”
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). That is, for moral judgment and impression formation, negative information is thought to be more influential than positive information. This asymmetry has been explained in terms of the relative infrequency (Mende-Siedlecki, Baron, &
Todorov, 2013) and diagnosticity (Cone & Ferguson, 2015) of immoral (as opposed to moral) behaviors making immoral behaviors more important for character judgment. The present work 22 complicates this picture in several ways. First, Study 1 showed that the negativity bias can be reversed: moral judgments became more positive in Immoral-to-Moral scenarios than they became negative in Moral-to-Immoral scenarios, even though, after reframing, participants had access to the same information in both cases, only presented in different orders (Figure 2). Study
2 replicated this unanticipated “positivity bias” in updating and showed that it could be partly explained by an asymmetry in the qualitative interpretation of the reframing information—moral information was rated as providing more situational information, and this effect was exaggerated when moral information was presented in the context of Immoral-to-Moral (as opposed to
Moral-Initial) scenarios (Figure 3). Across scenario types, rating new information as situational was associated with more positive moral updating (Figure 4), and the “positivity bias” was partially mediated by situational attributions. These findings paint a more nuanced picture of the moral judgment unfolds in the face of conflicting information.
In prior work, impression updating has been simulated by adding novel—but unrelated— anecdotes about an individual (Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013; Brambilla et al., 2019; Gawronski et al., 2010; Petty et al., 2006). The present work used a technique that more closely resembles reality: we form impressions, then reevaluate them as we learn more (see Mann & Ferguson,
2015 for a discussion of this distinction). For example, beliefs about bad agents have been observed to actually be more volatile than beliefs about good agents (Siegel, Mathys, Rutledge &
Crockett, 2018), which is consistent with our own finding that immoral first impressions can be reframed by expanding on the situational context. Critically, Siegel and colleagues collected continuous measures of character judgment over time, as one person delivered painful shocks to another in exchange for varying amounts of money. In this case, participants were given the opportunity to judge behaviors as immoral, but also to see the behavior change in the future. That 23 is, negative judgments can be updated if relevant counter evidence is provided. Contrast this with traditional designs, however, where counterevidence comes from completely unrelated behaviors
(e.g., Laura cheated on a final exam, then later, Laura volunteered at a homeless shelter). This unrelated counterevidence may fail for a number of reasons: the original immoral action may be more threatening, it may be more diagnostic, or it may be that people don’t form generalizable impressions of someone as good or bad “on the whole”, and assessments may be more context- dependent. Future work is necessary to disentangle these hypotheses.
The present work identified an asymmetry in the qualitative interpretation of morally reframing information, where information interpreted as situational (as opposed to dispositional) facilitated more a more positive reframing of negative first impressions. This is in line with work showing that, when situational information is made salient, accessible, or specific, observers are less likely to make dispositional inferences (Fein, 1996; Fein et al., 1990; Trope & Gaunt, 2000; see Chakroff & Young, 2015 for evidence that this applies to harmful but not impure acts). In addition, in the present work moral information was operationalized as decisions in tragic dilemmas, and tragic dilemmas (c.f. taboo dilemmas), by design, involve a difficult decision
(Tetlock, 2000; Mandel & Vartanian, 2008; Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008), from which an agent can still emerge having made the ‘right choice’ (Driver, 2006; Van Zyl, 2007). Interpreting tragic dilemmas as difficult situations may explain why moral reframing information elicited such high situational attributions. We speculate that moral information, used in a reframing context, can be interpreted as “pulling back the curtain”: providing necessary context that reveals a more complicated and ambiguous situation in which the initial taboo dilemma only appeared immoral because of participants’ limited access to information. That is, people may have been more amenable to positively updating their initial judgments because they had previously misjudged 24 the complexity of the situation. By contrast, immoral reframing information, on average, was not interpreted as providing more information about the situation, and instead only provided a conflicting signal about the character’s disposition. Note, however, that even among Moral-to-
Immoral scenarios, situational ratings of immoral reframing information were associated with more positive second-pass judgments. This suggests that, even when reframing information is negative, interpreting it as revealing the broader context may contribute to a reluctance to downgrade initially positive moral judgments, at least in the context of moral dilemmas.
Interestingly, even the addition of irrelevant information (in Immoral–Control scenarios) increased moral judgments relative to the Initial Immoral condition. Speculatively, in the context of moral dilemmas, even neutral information may complicate the initial impression of an agent as a purely bad actor; however, this hypothesis would require additional exploration in future work.
Our findings may have implications for how criminal defendants are perceived by juries when new information comes to light. While information about a criminal defendant’s moral behavior (e.g., volunteering at homeless shelter) may be considered immaterial to a criminal charge (Davies, 1991), jurors are expected to be sensitive to new evidence that provides additional context for the criminal act itself. Our work confirms that this recontextualizing information may correct a bad first impression, but it also suggests that jurors may be sensitive to the order in which exculpatory or incriminating evidence is presented (Shirkey, 2010).
Specifically, positive information that reframes an immoral act may weigh more heavily in the final evaluations of jurors. The apparent “positivity bias” we observed may serve as an implicit acknowledgment by people that they do not have access to the complete picture. In line with this, the presumption of innocence—i.e. the acknowledgement that we cannot prematurely fill in the 25 gaps of our understanding—is formally enshrined in most legal systems (Tadros & Tierney,
2004), and may have an intuitive basis (Levine, Mikhail, & Leslie, 2018).
4.1. Conclusion
The present research makes a number of contributions to our understanding of how moral updating unfolds over time. First, we find that the negativity bias, well-documented by prior work in moral impression updating, does not hold in all cases, and indeed, can be reversed in some cases of ongoing moral judgment. Second, we show that this “positivity bias” appears to depend on the degree to which moral reframing information is interpreted as providing more situational context, suggesting a more complicated model of moral updating that moves beyond the simple power of valence, and instead incorporates a more holistic understanding of context and the qualitative features of informational interpretation. Critically, we identified these asymmetries by testing moral impression formation and updating in a form that more closely aligns with reality—reevaluating what we already know, rather than keeping a moral score card across independent instances. By constructing scenarios that involve moral reframing of prior behaviors, we identified important gaps in our understanding of moral impression updating, demonstrating that future research may benefit from a sensitivity to the subtle difference between the addition of new information and the reframing of what is already known.
26
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Emma Alai, Kevin Jiang, Gordon Kraft-Todd, Justin
Martin, Mookie Manalili, Ryan McManus, and BoKyung Park for their thoughtful feedback.
This work was supported by the John Templeton Foundation (61061 to L.Y.) and the National
Science Foundation (1627157 to L.Y.).
Conflicts of interest: None declared.
27
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1
Table S1. Mixed effects model specifications
Model Formula
lmer(moral ~ (Ini_Pos_Neg_c*Pre_Post + Pre_Post:Con_Re_c + Study 1 Moral judgments Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post:Con_Re_c)*ActPers_c + (Ini_Pos_Neg_c + Pre_Post:Con_Re_c + Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post:Con_Re_c|ID) + (Ini_Pos_Neg_c + Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post:Con_Re_c|Question)
lmer(moral ~ (Ini_Pos_Neg_c*Pre_Post + Pre_Post:Con_Re_c + Study 2 Moral judgments Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post:Con_Re_c)*Act_Pers_c + (Ini_Pos_Neg_c + Pre_Post:Con_Re_c + Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post:Con_Re_c|ID) + (Ini_Pos_Neg_c + Pre_Post:Con_Re_c + Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post:Con_Re_c|Item)
lmer(persit ~ Ini_Pos_Neg_c *Pre_Post + Pre_Post:Con_Re_c + Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post:Con_Re_c + Study 2 Informational (Pre_Post + Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post + Pre_Post:Con_Re_c + judgments Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post:Con_Re_c|ID) +
(0+Pre_Post + Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post + Pre_Post:Con_Re_c + Ini_Pos_Neg_c:Pre_Post:Con_Re_c|Item)
Study 2 Moral updating lmer(moral.diff ~ persit.final + (persit.final|ID) + (persit.final|Item) predicted by second-pass informational judgments lmer(moral.diff ~ persit.final*Con_Re_c*Ini_Pos_Neg_c + (0+ Con_Re_c:Ini_Pos_Neg_c|ID) + (0+Con_Re_c:Ini_Pos_Neg_c|Item)
med.mod <- bf(persit.final ~ Ini_Pos_Neg_d + (Ini_Pos_Neg_d+ID) + (Ini_Pos_Neg_d|Item)) Study 2 Bayesian dv.mod <- bf(moral.diff ~ Ini_Pos_Neg_d + persit.final + (0 + Ini_Pos_Neg_d+ID) + mediation model (Ini_Pos_Neg_d|Item))
mediation <- brm(med.mod + dv.mod + set_rescor(FALSE), data = reframed)
2
Table S2. Comparisons of mean informational judgments against the midpoint of 4
Condition Estimate Std. Error z p Initial Immoral 4.07566 0.07573 0.999 0.860 Initial Moral 4.44835 0.07571 5.922 <0.001 *** Immoral–Control 3.56690 0.23009 -1.882 0.296 Moral–Control 3.55078 0.20644 -2.176 0.163 Immoral-to-Moral 4.78954 0.11991 6.584 <0.001 *** Moral-to-Immoral 3.86007 0.11103 -1.260 0.706
3
Study 1 Experimental instructions “This study consists of a series of brief scenarios. You will read each story as it unfolds, and at two points answer a question about the story. As you will be asked the same question twice for each story, please answer it in light of all the information you currently have at each time that you are asked. There are 24 scenarios in total. Unfortunately we are unable to display a progress bar with this survey. We apologize for the inconvenience.”
Study 2 Experimental instructions “This study consists of a series of brief scenarios. You will read each story as it unfolds, and at two points in the story you will answer two questions. There are 24 scenarios in total. Unfortunately we are unable to display a progress bar with this survey. We apologize for the inconvenience.”
Study 1 person-based vs. act-based moral judgments We compared act-based and person-based judgments in all six conditions: a) Initial Moral, b) Initial Immoral, c) Moral-to-Immoral, d) Immoral-to-Moral, e) Moral–Control, and f) Immoral– Control. We used a series of contrasts within our model to test the difference between act-based and person-based judgments in each condition; p-values were using the Tukey method.
There were no significant differences between judgment types: a) Initial Moral, M = -0.20, SE = 0.15, z = -1.31, p = 0.598; b) Initial Immoral, M = 0.04, SE = 0.16, z = 0.22, p = 1.00; c) Moral- to-Immoral, M = -0.01, SE = 0.20, z = -0.04, p = 1.00; d) Immoral-to-Moral, M = -0.04, SE = 0.18, z = -0.25, p = 1.00; e) Moral–Control, M = -1.00, SE = 0.18, z = -0.57, p = 0.983; f) Immoral–Control, M = 0.42, SE = 0.20, z = 2.13, p = 0.145. The only trend of note was that, within the Immoral–Control condition, act-based judgments became slightly more positive than person-based judgments, i.e. act-based Immoral–Control judgments drifted up from the negative first-pass judgments—however, this trend was not significant. Given that there were no significant differences between judgment types, the following analyses collapsed across act- based and person-based judgments.
Study 2 person-based vs. act-based moral judgments We replicated our finding from Study 1, that there were no differences between act-based and person-based moral judgments. P-values were corrected using the Tukey method. As before, there were no significant differences between judgment types in: a) Initial Moral, M = 0.08, SE = 0.13, z = 0.59, p = .984; b) Initial Immoral, M = -0.14, SE = 0.14, z = -1.00, p = .841; c) Moral- to-Immoral, M = 0.06, SE = 0.15, z = 0.40, p = 0.998; d) Immoral-to-Moral, M = 0.08, SE = 0.15, z = 0.55, p = 0.989; e) Moral–Control, M = 0.42, SE = .18, z = 2.31, p = .103; f) Immoral– Control, M = 0.52, SE = 0.20, z = 2.53, p = 0.058. Both control conditions showed a trend where act-based judgments became slightly more positive when control information was added, consistent with our observation for Immoral–Control scenarios in Study 1.
4
Bayesian mediation model summary
Family: MV(gaussian, gaussian)
Links: mu = identity; sigma = identity mu = identity; sigma = identity
Formula: persit.final ~ Ini_Pos_Neg_d + (Ini_Pos_Neg_d | ID) + (Ini_Pos_Neg_d | Item) moral.diff ~ Ini_Pos_Neg_d + persit.final + (0 + Ini_Pos_Neg_d | ID) + (Ini_Pos_Neg_d | Item)
Data: reframed (Number of observations: 1442)
Samples: 4 chains, each with iter = 2000; warmup = 1000; thin = 1; total post-warmup samples = 4000
Group-Level Effects: l-95% u-95% Estimate Est.Error Rhat Bulk_ESS Tail_ESS ~ID (Number of levels: 121) CI CI sd(persitfinal_Intercept) 0.92 0.08 0.76 1.08 1.00 1691 2342 sd(persitfinal_Ini_Pos_Neg_d) 0.85 0.11 0.65 1.06 1.00 1398 2531 sd(moraldiff_Ini_Pos_Neg_d) 0.68 0.08 0.52 0.84 1.00 2132 3172 cor(persitfinal_Intercept, -0.59 0.09 -0.75 -0.38 1.00 2386 2990 persitfinal_Ini_Pos_Neg_d)
Group-Level Effects: l-95% u-95% Estimate Est.Error Rhat Bulk_ESS Tail_ESS ~Item (Number of levels: 24) CI CI sd(persitfinal_Intercept) 0.23 0.09 0.03 0.41 1.00 969 768 sd(persitfinal_Ini_Pos_Neg_d) 0.46 0.12 0.24 0.73 1.01 1009 2261 sd(moraldiff_Intercept) 0.44 0.09 0.29 0.64 1.00 2116 2792 sd(moraldiff_Ini_Pos_Neg_d) 0.86 0.16 0.61 1.22 1.00 1658 2247 cor(persitfinal_Intercept, -0.27 0.39 -0.81 0.71 1.01 559 716 persitfinal_Ini_Pos_Neg_d) cor(moraldiff_Intercept, -0.87 0.09 -0.98 -0.65 1.00 1419 1785 moraldiff_Ini_Pos_Neg_d)
Population-Level l-95% u-95% Estimate Est.Error Rhat Bulk_ESS Tail_ESS Effects CI CI persitfinal_Intercept 3.86 0.11 3.64 4.08 1.00 2250 3209 moraldiff_Intercept -1.31 0.15 -1.60 -1.01 1.00 3009 2572 persitfinal_Ini_Pos_Neg_d 0.93 0.14 0.65 1.21 1.00 2461 2762 moraldiff_Ini_Pos_Neg_d 1.97 0.21 1.56 2.38 1.00 2032 2383 moraldiff_persit.final 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.17 1.00 6898 3071
Family Specific Estimate Est.Error l-95% CI u-95% CI Rhat Bulk_ESS Tail_ESS Parameters sigma_persitfinal 1.34 0.03 1.29 1.39 1.00 4938 3230 sigma_moraldiff 1.43 0.03 1.37 1.48 1.00 5276 3197
Samples were drawn using sampling(NUTS). For each parameter, Bulk_ESS and Tail_ESS are effective sample size measures, and Rhat is the potential scale reduction factor on split chains (at convergence, Rhat = 1).
5
Scenario Text
Scenario 1 - Adapted from Lichtenstein et al., 2007
1. Rebecca is in charge of running a yearlong drug trial at McAdam Hospital. The drug was given to the experimental group of patients, and a placebo was given to the control group. At two months, early results suggest that the drug is effective.
2. Rebecca has the option to give the control group the medicine early. This could potentially save the lives of patients who would die without immediate access to the treatment.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Holding the trial at the original length would produce more conclusive data. This would help develop better treatments in the long run, and save the lives of patients in the future.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Giving treatment to the control group before a study is complete is frowned on in the medical community. If Rebecca ends the study early, she will have trouble progressing her career.
4. Rebecca thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to continue the study at its original length. The drug trial continues for the remainder of the year, but some patients in the control group die during this time.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Giving treatment to the control group before a study is complete is frowned on in the medical community. If Rebecca ends the study early, she will have trouble progressing her career.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Holding the trial at the original length would produce more conclusive data. This would help develop better treatments in the long run, and save the lives of patients in the future.
5c. [Control]: After Rebecca arrives home from work, she makes herself spaghetti for dinner and watches television. After dinner she washes the dishes and takes a shower before going to bed.
6
Scenario 2 - Adapted from Lichtenstein et al., 2007
1. Jessica is in charge of a subcommittee of the Environmental Protection Agency and must break a tie in a vote. The vote is on whether to approve a project proposed by a drug company.
2. If Jessica rejects the project then the drug company will be prevented from harvesting old growth forests to develop their drug. This would prevent severe environmental damage which would wipe out many endangered species.
3a. [Moral Initial]: By approving the project, Jessica will be allowing highly effective treatments for multiple sclerosis to be developed. No other treatment is nearly as effective as this drug, and the new drug would help thousands of people across America.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Jessica’s boss, the head of the EPA, would personally benefit if this new drug were to be produced. By approving the project Jessica would win his gratitude and he would be more likely to grant the promotion she planned to ask for.
4. Jessica thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to approve the project. The drug is developed, and the old growth forest is destroyed.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Jessica’s boss, the head of the EPA, would personally benefit if this new drug were to be produced. By approving the project Jessica would win his gratitude and he would be more likely to grant the promotion she planned to ask for.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: By approving the project, Jessica will be allowing highly effective treatments for multiple sclerosis to be developed. No other treatment is nearly as effective as this drug, and the new drug would help thousands of people across America.
5c. [Control]: Jessica calls several of her close friends and makes plans to see a movie the following weekend. The movie had received good reviews in the local newspaper and Jessica has seen all of the leading actor’s previous movies.
7
Scenario 3
1. Emil owns a small farm in Argentina. Emil is considering expanding his farm, which would allow him to grow more varieties of fruits and vegetables.
2. Emil sells his crops to a nearby village. He knows that what he grows does not contain enough nutrients for a healthy diet. By expanding his farm he could save the villagers from malnourishment.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Emil knows that the area of the rainforest that borders on his farm contains an exceptional number of endangered species, and that expanding into it will cause many of them to die out.
3a. [Immoral Initial]: Emil regularly brings in tourists who pay for tours of the rainforest near his house, and continuing to give these tours will be more profitable then planting more crops and feeding the village.
4. Emil thinks very carefully and ultimately decides not to expand his farm into the rainforest. His farm is not developed any further, and the villagers continue to suffer from malnourishment.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Emil regularly brings in tourists who pay for tours of the rainforest near his house, and continuing to give these tours will be more profitable then planting more crops and feeding the village.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Emil knows that the area of the rainforest that borders on his farm contains an exceptional number of endangered species, and that expanding into it will cause many of them to die out.
5c. [Control]: Emil received a call the next day from an acquaintance he had lost contact with. They agreed to meet the next week at a café in the city in order to catch up on their lives since high school.
8
Scenario 4
1. Sanjeev is a government official in India who is in charge of a local wildlife preservation. A family of endangered tigers has been attacking people on the border of the preserve, and she must decide what to do about it.
2. The World Wildlife Foundation has asked that they be allowed to capture the tigers alive and relocate them. This will leave the villagers in danger for longer, but will save the tigers.
3a. [Moral Initial]: The nearby villagers are terrified and afraid to let their children out of their houses. By sending the army to kill the tigers Sanjeev could eliminate the danger almost immediately.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Sanjeev knows that the teeth of these tigers are very valuable and can be sold as an aphrodisiac. By sending the army to kill the tigers Sanjeev could take a share of the profit.
4. Sanjeev thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to send in the army. The army kills the entire family of endangered tigers.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Sanjeev knows that the teeth of these tigers are very valuable and can be sold as an aphrodisiac. By sending the army to kill the tigers Sanjeev could take a share of the profit.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: The nearby villagers are terrified and afraid to let their children out of their houses. By sending the army to kill the tigers Sanjeev could eliminate the danger almost immediately.
5c. [Control]: The next afternoon, Sanjeev goes for a walk to get exercise. She forgot to eat breakfast that morning and becomes hungry after 30 minutes. She decides to take the shorter route home.
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Scenario 5
1. Sarah and her five year old son Jeffery were recently evicted from their house and are living in a homeless shelter. A very rich couple has approached Sarah explaining that they are unable to conceive and that they would be willing to adopt Jeffery.
2. The couple has told Sarah that they will be moving to California. They do not plan to return and it is unlikely that Sarah will ever see her son again if they adopt him.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Sarah can barely feed Jeffery, let alone provide a comfortable life for him. She is absolutely certain that Jeffery would be very well off with his new family.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Sarah has been told by the couple that they will buy her an expensive new car to replace her old one. They will purchase the car when she signs over custody of Jeffery.
4. Sarah thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to allow the family to adopt Jeffery. Jeffery moves to California with the family, and Sarah never sees him again.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Sarah has been told by the couple that they will buy her an expensive new car to replace her old one. They will purchase the car when she signs over custody of Jeffery.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Sarah can barely feed Jeffery, let alone provide a comfortable life for him. She is absolutely certain that Jeffery would be very well off with his new family.
5c. [Control]: Sarah goes to her former high school’s basketball game that weekend. Her high school used to rank poorly, but recently has improved its standing in the league.
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Scenario 6
1. Candace is the Mayor of a small mid-western American city. The city needs to make cuts to the education budget. The council has brought two proposals to her about programs that could potentially be cut.
2. Candace could cut after school programs for at-risk youth. This would leave many adolescents without alternatives to getting involved with drugs and crime. It would almost certainly negatively affect their future prospects.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Cutting day-care programs would put a financial strain on single parents. Parents with jobs would need to work more hours and see their children less. Parents without jobs would have to balance childcare and their time to job hunt.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Cutting day-care programs would make parents unhappy, and Candace is up for reelection next year. The votes of these parents were essential to her victory in the last election. Losing the support of parents could lose her the next election.
4. Candace thinks carefully and ultimately decides to cut the after school programs for at- risk youth. As a result, many of these children get involved with drugs and crime.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Cutting day-care programs would make parents unhappy, and Candace is up for reelection next year. The votes of these parents were essential to her victory in the last election. Losing the support of parents could lose her the next election.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Cutting day-care programs would put a financial strain on single parents. Parents with jobs would need to work more hours and see their children less. Parents without jobs would have to balance childcare and their time to job hunt.
5c. [Control]: Candace takes her dog, Spot, on a walk through the downtown city park. The park allows dogs to go off of their leashes, but only in certain areas. When Candace reaches the area, she lets Spot off of his leash and throws the ball with him.
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Scenario 7
1. Michael is 36 years old and is visiting his mother in the hospital. She is completely paralyzed and unable to speak. She had told Michael that in such situations she wants to be euthanized and the decision is legally Michael’s to make.
2. Michael could ask the doctors to euthanize his mother. The procedure would be painless and if it was not performed she would live for years, completely unable to move or speak.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Michael’s wife is adamantly opposed to euthanasia. She understands Michael’s mother’s circumstances, but has told Michael that she will divorce him if he has his mother euthanized.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Michael’s mother is very wealthy and has set up automatic deposits to Michael’s bank account. When she dies, her fortune will be donated to her favorite charity, and Michael will stop receiving money.
4. Michael thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to leave his mother to die naturally. His mother remains conscious but unable to move or speak.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Michael’s mother is very wealthy and has set up automatic deposits to Michael’s bank account. When she dies, her fortune will be donated to her favorite charity, and Michael will stop receiving money.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Michael’s wife is adamantly opposed to euthanasia. She understands Michael’s mother’s circumstances, but has told Michael that she will divorce him if he has his mother euthanized.
5c. [Control]: On his way home, Michael listens to the radio. He hears that winter is expected to come early this year. As soon as he arrives home he writes himself a note to put the winter tires on the car on Friday.
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Scenario 8
1. Erica is a 25-year-old woman who is seven months pregnant and single after her husband’s death in a car accident. After a recent visit to the doctor, she learns that her baby has a rare chronic medical condition.
2. Erica could choose to have her baby. Although the medical condition will be debilitating, the baby’s life expectancy is expected to be completely normal.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Erica knows that her baby would be in extreme pain for his entire life. The condition causes skin to be hypersensitive and painful to any sort of touch.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Erica knows that her baby’s medical condition would require her specialized equipment. She would need to move to a cheap apartment in order to afford this.
4. Erica thinks carefully and ultimately decides to have an abortion. Her unborn baby is aborted, and Erica suffers no negative consequences from the abortion.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Erica knows that her baby’s medical condition would require her specialized equipment. She would need to move to a cheap apartment in order to afford this.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Erica knows that her baby would be in extreme pain for his entire life. The condition causes skin to be hypersensitive and painful to any sort of touch.
5c. [Control]: When Erica cooks dinner that night she accidentally burns the potatoes. She notices that the smoke detector does not go off and replaces the batteries.
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Scenario 9 - Adapted from Lichtenstein et al., 2007
1. Abby is the CEO of Morrison Motors, a large car manufacturing company. Abby must make a decision about whether to issue a recall due to a defect in the Ellipsis line of cars.
2. Abby could issue a recall to fix this defect, which would return the thousands of Ellipsis cars to the factory. This would protect customers from the fatal accidents that can occur when the brakes fail.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Abby knows that the finances of the company are poor, and the negative press and expense of a recall would bankrupt them. Thousands of long-time employees would lose their jobs and pensions.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: The cost of settlements with the families of the victims would be much cheaper than the cost of a recall. Not issuing a recall could save the company money and even set Abby up for a promotion.
4. Abby thinks carefully, and ultimately decides not to issue the recall. The company saves a great deal of money, but fatal accidents occur as a result.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: The cost of settlements with the families of the victims would be much cheaper than the cost of a recall. Not issuing a recall could save the company money and even set Abby up for a promotion.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Abby knows that the finances of the company are poor, and the negative press and expense of a recall would bankrupt them. Thousands of long-time employees would lose their jobs and pensions.
5c. [Control]: Abby went to the gym next to the office to exercise after work. She had originally planned to run on the treadmill, but they were all occupied so she used the bicycle machine instead.
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Scenario 10 - Adapted from Lichtenstein et al., 2007
1. Brock is a clerk working for the Canadian military and can decide to approve or reject draftees that have been referred to him. He is currently considering the case of Aaron, a young man who is eligible to be drafted.
2. Brock knows that Aaron has experience with engineering and could be put on a bomb defusal squad. This expertise could potentially save the lives of civilians and fellow soldiers.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Brock read that Aaron works with Engineers without Borders. If rejected from the draft, Aaron would continue to build wells in South Africa, giving the poor access to fresh water.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Brock was contacted by Aaron’s family, who are very influential. They will contact Brock’s superiors and get him promoted if he rejects Aaron’s file and spares him the draft.
4. Brock thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to reject Aaron’s file. Aaron is not drafted into the army.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Brock was contacted by Aaron’s family, who are very influential. They will contact Brock’s superiors and get him promoted if he rejects Aaron’s file and spares him the draft.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Brock read that Aaron works with Engineers without Borders. If rejected from the draft, Aaron would continue to build wells in South Africa, giving the poor access to fresh water.
5c. [Control]: The following afternoon, Brock attends a meeting along with the other clerks. They discuss a new database program that will help to reduce the amount of paper used in their jobs.
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Scenario 11 - Adapted from Lichtenstein et al., 2007
1. Elizabeth owns and operates an animal shelter that cares for stray dogs. The shelter had signed a contract under a previous owner to supply dogs to a nearby university for research purposes. The contract is up for renewal.
2. Elizabeth could refuse to re-sign the contract, in which case the sale of animals to the university would end. The university studies the causes of blindness and tests hazardous chemicals on the animals.
3a. [Moral Initial]: The animal shelter is in poor financial shape. If Elizabeth refuses to re- sign the contract the shelter will likely close. As a result, all of the animals in their care would be turned out into the street.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: The animal shelter is in poor financial shape. If Elizabeth refuses to re-sign the contract the shelter will likely close. As a result, all of the animals in their care would be turned out into the street.
4. Elizabeth thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to re-sign the contract with the university. Several cats and dogs are taken each month for experimentation.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: If Elizabeth re-signs the contract, then the university will increase their payment for the animals to adjust for inflation. The university has also promised to pay Elizabeth a signing bonus of $5000.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: The animal shelter is in poor financial shape. If Elizabeth refuses to re-sign the contract the shelter will likely close. As a result, all of the animals in their care would be turned out into the street.
5c. [Control]: After work, Elizabeth stops at a friend’s house to borrow a movie that her friend had recommended. Elizabeth planned to watch it that night, but got distracted by another program that was on TV.
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Scenario 12
1. Angela is a 40-year-old mother of two children, aged 12 and 14. She is has been approached by two women (Sandra and Megan) to act as a surrogate mother, and is considering whether to accept either offer.
2. By being a surrogate mother for Sandra, Angela would be helping a close friend who has always wanted a child but cannot conceive on her own. Sandra is willing to pay for Angela’s healthcare costs, so that the pregnancy will not cost Angela anything.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Angela wants to send her children to college, but she does not have the money for a college savings fund. Megan has promised to pay Angela generously for carrying her child. Without this money, Angela may not be able to send her children to college.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: By being a surrogate mother for Megan, Angela will be generously compensated. Megan is a wealthy acquaintance and in addition to the large payment, has offered to buy Angela box seats at the Metropolitan Opera, of which Angela is an enormous fan.
4. Angela thinks carefully and ultimately decides to act as a surrogate mother for Megan. She is generously compensated for her trouble.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: By being a surrogate mother for Megan, Angela will be generously compensated. Megan is a wealthy acquaintance and in addition to the large payment, has offered to buy Angela box seats at the Metropolitan Opera, of which Angela is an enormous fan.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Angela wants to send her children to college, but she does not have the money for a college savings fund. Megan has promised to pay Angela generously for carrying her child. Without this money, Angela may not be able to send her children to college.
5c. [Control]: While Angela’s children are at school she reads her favorite book. She notices that she is nearly finished and drives to a local bookstore to pick out something new. The store was having a sale, and so she picks out two books instead of just the one she planned to buy.
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Scenario 13 - Adapted from Lichtenstein et al., 2007
1. Gregory is the captain of a fishing vessel that operates off the coast of Cape Cod. He is considering implementing a new fishing method for himself and his crew.
2. The new method involves specialized nets that release larger creatures caught in them. If used, it would decrease the number of dolphins that are accidentally caught and strangled in the netting.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Gregory knows that by implementing the new method he would be forced to lay off a third of his crew due to the related expenses. These people would have a very difficult time finding other jobs.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Gregory has run a profitable business on the side where he sells dolphin fins to natural medicine distributors. If he implemented the new fishing method, he would need to shut down this business.
4. Gregory thinks carefully and ultimately decides not to implement the new fishing method. The vessel continues to kill several dolphins per month.
5a. [Immoral Initial]: Gregory has run a profitable business on the side where he sells dolphin fins to natural medicine distributors. If he implemented the new fishing method, he would need to shut down this business.
5b. [Moral Initial]: Gregory knows that by implementing the new method he would be forced to lay off a third of his crew due to the related expenses. These people would have a very difficult time finding other jobs.
5c. [Control]: On Saturday, Gregory drives to Connecticut to spend the weekend with his parents. The traffic is very light and Gregory arrives at his parent’s house two hours earlier than he had expected to.
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Scenario 14
1. Sergei is the governor of a small state in an Eastern European country. Sergei is considering whether to pass or veto an amendment banning the death penalty and public executions.
2. If Sergei passes the amendment, then the death penalty and public executions will be banned immediately. Based on the estimates of Sergei’s staff, this would prevent at least ten executions of innocents per year.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Sergei knows that the state uses the income from tickets sold to public executions. Banning the death penalty would eliminate funding for several ongoing investigations into gang violence, leaving citizens in danger.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: The public executions are very popular among Sergei’s supporters. Sergei will have a much better chance of reelection if he vetoes the proposal and allows both public executions and the death penalty to continue.
4. Sergei thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to veto the proposal. The death penalty is maintained.
5a. [Immoral Initial]: The public executions are very popular among Sergei’s supporters. Sergei will have a much better chance of reelection if he vetoes the proposal and allows both public executions and the death penalty to continue.
5b. [Moral Initial]: Sergei knows that the state uses the income from tickets sold to public executions. Banning the death penalty would eliminate funding for several ongoing investigations into gang violence, leaving citizens in danger.
5c. [Control]: Sergei attends a briefing on the accounting department of the local government. The head accountant arrives late, but the meeting still ends early as most of the plans had been discussed previously at a related meeting.
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Scenario 15
1. Brian is a contestant in a game show in which pairs of participants answer questions for money but are humiliated if they fail. Brian’s partner has just failed the final question, and Brian has the option to “save” him.
2. If Brian decides to save his partner, his partner will not be dropped into a tank of human excrement, and Brian will end the game with half of the $10,000 he has earned.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Earlier, both Brian and his partner stated their reasons for being on the show. Brian’s cousin was diagnosed with lung cancer, and Brian wants help pay for his treatment.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: By abandoning his partner to be dropped into the tank of human excrement, Brian will keep all of his money and be given a new Mercedes Benz car as a bonus prize.
4. Brian thinks carefully and ultimately decides to abandon his partner. Brian’s partner is dropped into the human excrement, and Brian collects his earnings.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: By abandoning his partner to be dropped into the tank of human excrement, Brian will keep all of his money and be given a new Mercedes Benz car as a bonus prize.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Earlier, both Brian and his partner stated their reasons for being on the show. Brian’s cousin was diagnosed with lung cancer, and Brian wants help pay for his treatment.
5c. [Control]: Brian is browsing Facebook later that night and notices that a former coworker has recently gotten married. Brian tells his wife who is surprised to hear the news.
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Scenario 16 - Adapted from Lichtenstein et al., 2007
1. Cassandra is a member of the transportation board in a large American city. The board is considering the addition of a lane to a dangerous section of the freeway at the edge of the city.
2. Cassandra knows that this stretch of highway is notorious for causing vehicles to lose control, and that there have been fatal accidents year round at it. Adding an additional lane would prevent approximately 50 deaths due to accidents per year.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Cassandra recently spoke to the mayor, who told her that the money for the lane would need to come from the education budget. By rejecting the repairs to the highway, Cassandra could prevent the city from having to lay off 100 teachers.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Cassandra’s husband is a personal injury lawyer who makes most of his income from settling accidents. Approving the additional lane would create less business for Cassandra’s husband, decreasing their combined income by a great deal.
4. Cassandra thinks carefully and ultimately decides not to approve the construction of the new highway lane.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Cassandra’s husband is a personal injury lawyer who makes most of his income from settling accidents. Approving the additional lane would create less business for Cassandra’s husband, decreasing their combined income by a great deal.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Cassandra recently spoke to the mayor, who told her that the money for the lane would need to come from the education budget. By rejecting the repairs to the highway, Cassandra could prevent the city from having to lay off 100 teachers.
5b. [Control]: When Cassandra arrives home she notices that the sports magazine “NFL Monthly” is in her mailbox. She does not subscribe to this magazine, and has received magazines that were intended for a former tenant of her apartment since she moved in.
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Scenario 17
1. Dr. Robertson is the medical administrator at St. Luke’s hospital. The hospital has received a $10,000 donation and she must decide how it will be spent.
2. Dr. Robertson could use the $10,000 to save the life of Caleb, an 8 year-old boy who has a rare, but curable, degenerative disease. Caleb’s family cannot afford the treatment on their own, and if it were given then Caleb would be cured immediately.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Dr. Robertson knows that many patients who come to St. Luke’s hospital cannot afford basic immunizations. Setting up a free immunization clinic with the $10,000 could provide an essential service and save hundreds of lives in the long term.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Dr. Robertson knows that the hospital board has promoted past administrators who implemented new programs. Creating a free immunization clinic with the money would set Dr. Robertson up for promotion.
4. Dr. Robertson thinks very carefully and ultimately uses the $10,000 to set up the free immunization clinic.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Dr. Robertson knows that the hospital board has promoted past administrators who implemented new programs. Creating a free immunization clinic with the money would set Dr. Robertson up for promotion.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Dr. Robertson knows that many patients who come to St. Luke’s hospital cannot afford basic immunizations. Setting up a free immunization clinic with the $10,000 could provide an essential service and save hundreds of lives in the long term.
5c. [Control]: Dr. Robertson later attends a seminar on a database the hospital is implementing. The database will help to coordinate organ transplants with other area hospitals. The meeting runs late and Dr. Robertson arrives home after dark.
22
Scenario 18
1. Peter is a lieutenant in the United States Army during World War I, returning from a reconnaissance mission. He is behind enemy lines with Arthur, a private from his unit who was injured by a landmine.
2. By taking Arthur back with him Peter would be saving his life. Due to his injury, Arthur cannot walk and would be killed by the Germans if Peter were to leave him.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Peter knows that a German sneak attack is about to launch. Unless Peter leaves Arthur behind he will not reach the trenches in time to warn and save his unit.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: By leaving Arthur behind, Peter will avoid having to pay the money he owes Arthur. The soldiers have been playing cards in the trenches and Peter owes Arthur $1,000.
4. Peter thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to leave Arthur behind.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: By leaving Arthur behind, Peter will avoid having to pay the money he owes Arthur. The soldiers have been playing cards in the trenches and Peter owes Arthur $1,000.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Peter knows that a German sneak attack is about to launch. Unless Peter leaves Arthur behind he will not reach the trenches in time to warn and save his unit.
5c. [Control]: Peter comes across an abandoned German truck on his way back to the trenches. He checks if it can be hot-wired, but quickly realizes that the truck is inoperable.
23
Scenario 19
1. Angelo is a treasure hunter in the Amazon, who is returning to camp with his partner Galeno after finding a powerful magical artifact: the mystic ankh. On the path to their camp, a trap knocks Galeno and the ankh into quicksand.
2. Angelo could save Galeno by pulling him from the quicksand. The mystic ankh is sinking, and if Angelo saves Galeno it will be lost forever.
3a. [Moral Initial]: The villagers that hired Angelo and Galeno to find the ankh need its magical power to grow their crops. Unless it is returned to them they will all starve.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: By saving the ankh and letting Galeno sink, Angelo could avoid having to split the pay that was promised by the villagers that hired them.
4. Angelo thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to let Galeno sink .He pulls the mystic ankh from the quicksand.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: By saving the ankh and letting Galeno sink, Angelo could avoid having to split the pay that was promised by the villagers that hired them.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: The villagers that hired Angelo and Galeno to find the ankh need its magical power to grow their crops. Unless it is returned to them they will all starve.
5c. [Control]: On his way back to camp, Angelo sees movement in the jungle. He remains still in case it is a predator, and then continues to the camp.
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Scenario 20
1. Justice Adams is a judge in London, England in the year 1878. He is considering his verdict on the case of Vincent. Vincent is the son of a rich merchant and killed a man while he was drunk.
2. Justice Adams could convict Vincent. The sentence for murder in cold blood is death. Vincent would be kept in a cell overnight and hanged at dawn the next morning.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Justice Adams knows that Vincent owns a business, employing 100 men. These men and their families would almost certainly starve if Vincent were convicted, as the business would need to close.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: A wealthy colleague of Vincent’s offered to pull strings to promote Justice Adams to a superior court. This offer is on the condition that Justice Adams pardons Vincent.
4. Justice Adams thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to pardon Vincent.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: A wealthy colleague of Vincent’s offered to pull strings to promote Justice Adams to a superior court. This offer is on the condition that Justice Adams pardons Vincent.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Justice Adams knows that Vincent owns a business, employing 100 men. These men and their families would almost certainly starve if Vincent were convicted, as the business would need to close.
5c. [Control]: Justice Adams is scheduled to hear another murder trial after this case. The court cannot find the key witness in time, and the trial is postponed until tomorrow.
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Scenario 21
1. Dr. Ingris is a professor at McAdams University. Dr. Ingris employs Eric, a graduate student, and is part of an international project investigating the causes of cancer. A fire has broken out in her lab and when she arrived the lab was filled with smoke.
2. Eric is lying unconscious on the floor. Dr. Ingris could drag her graduate student to safety, saving his life. This would leave the lab server, which stores all of the lab’s data, to be destroyed in the fire.
3a. [Moral Initial]: The lab server contains five years of research into the causes of cancer. Losing this data would set back progress in treatment by several years and lead to hundreds of patients’ needless deaths.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Dr. Ingris has stored her own research on the server, which is unrelated to the cancer work. If she left the lab server behind then it could take several more years for her to obtain tenure.
4. Dr. Ingris thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to save the lab server.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Dr. Ingris has stored her own research on the server, which is unrelated to the cancer work. If she left the lab server behind then it could take several more years for her to obtain tenure.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: The lab server contains five years of research into the causes of cancer. Losing this data would set back progress in treatment by several years and lead to hundreds of patients’ needless deaths.
5c. [Control]: Outside the building, Dr. Ingris learns that the fire began in the lab beside hers after unstable chemicals were left too close to a hotplate. The fire had then spread through the walls into Dr. Ingris’ lab.
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Scenario 22
1. Matthew is 32 years old and lives in Argentina, next door to his brother. He is woken in the night by a tornado warning. There is a storm shelter in the basement of Matthew’s apartment building.
2. Matthew’s brother is disabled and cannot move without help. Unless Matthew helps him, he will be killed when the tornados hit.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Matthew’s neighbors left their two children home alone for the night. If Matthew saves his brother he will not have time to get them to shelter.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Matthew is listed as the beneficiary in his brother’s life insurance. If his brother dies then Matthew will receive a large compensation package.
4. Matthew thinks very carefully and ultimately decides not to save his brother.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Matthew is listed as the beneficiary in his brother’s life insurance. If his brother dies then Matthew will receive a large compensation package.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Matthew’s neighbors left their two children home alone for the night. If Matthew saves his brother he will not have time to get them to shelter.
5c. [Control]: Days later, Matthew learns that there were five other tornados that night. He hears that international aid might help with the rebuilding effort.
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Scenario 23
1. Carver is a contractor for a private company hired by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Carver is in charge of containing a nuclear meltdown in a major American city.
2. Fixing the nuclear reactor will expose Carver’s crew to dangerous radiation. By waiting on special equipment for defusal, Carver could guarantee the safety of his crew when they are sent inside to contain the reaction.
3a. [Moral Initial]: By sending in his crew immediately, Carver could be sure that the radiation is stopped before it could contaminate the city’s water supply. If the water supply is contaminated the city will be uninhabitable for years.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: Carver’s contract makes it clear that future work is only guaranteed if the situation can be resolved quickly. By sending his crew in immediately Carver would bring more business to the company and possibly be promoted.
4. Carver thinks very carefully and ultimately decides not to wait for special equipment, sending his crew in immediately.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: Carver’s contract makes it clear that future work is only guaranteed if the situation can be resolved quickly. By sending his crew in immediately Carver would bring more business to the company and possibly be promoted.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: By sending in his crew immediately, Carver could be sure that the radiation is stopped before it could contaminate the city’s water supply. If the water supply is contaminated the city will be uninhabitable for years.
5c. [Control]: Carver sends a team to collect radiation readings throughout the city. Hundreds of samples must be collected and sent back to the laboratory. This information will determine how the clean-up proceeds next.
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Scenario 24 – Inspired by Peter Singer/Peter Unger scenario
1. Andrei is 40 years old and lives in Latvia. He is driving home from the market when he comes across the scene of a terrible accident and sees an injured man lying in the street.
2. Andrei could drive the man to a hospital. The hospital is a 30-minute drive away. The man would almost certainly survive if he was able to quickly get medical attention.
3a. [Moral Initial]: Andrei lives with and cares for his father, who suffers from Alzheimer’s. Andrei left him sleeping at home and unless he returns immediately his father may wake and wander into the street.
3b. [Immoral Initial]: The injured man is covered in blood and it will get on the seats if Andrei helps him. Andrei had planned to sell his car soon and this would lower the car’s value.
4. Andrei thinks very carefully and ultimately decides to leave the injured man.
5a. [Immoral Reframing]: The injured man is covered in blood and it will get on the seats if Andrei helps him. Andrei had planned to sell his car soon and this would lower the car’s value.
5b. [Moral Reframing]: Andrei lives with and cares for his father, who suffers from Alzheimer’s. Andrei left him sleeping at home and unless he returns immediately his father may wake and wander into the street.
5c. [Control]: On the drive home Andrei sees that he is running low on gas. He stops at the next gas station to fill his tank, as he will not pass another until he reaches home.