Trouble with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean

CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 275, December 2020

The discovery of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean has rekindled unresolved issues between Turkey and two EU members, Cyprus and Greece. Steps taken by a more assertive Turkey that fears being cut out of the energy bonanza have precipitated a crisis. An escalation would not only have far-reaching implications for the region, but also for EU-Turkish relations and NATO’s cohesion.

By Fabien Merz

The Eastern Mediterranean is a region steeped in history and strategic competi- tion. Over the last few decades, it has seen a number of fissures between Turkey and two EU Member States, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, due to the unresolved conflict on the island of Cyprus and contested maritime boundaries. With recent discoveries of important gas fields under the seabed and the prospect of finding more, the Eastern Mediterranean has also gained strategic significance as an important source of energy. The discovery of natural gas occurs against the backdrop of a Turkey that is highly dependent on imports for its natural gas and is seeking to diversify its energy sources. However, the new brand of assertive foreign policy that A Turkish drilling vessel is escorted by a Turkish Navy frigate in the Eastern Mediterranean off Cyprus, 6 August 2019. Murad Sezer / Reuters Ankara has adopted over recent years has not only further estranged Turkey from its traditional NATO allies and the EU, but also further strained tense relations between Turkey and other major actors in the Since 2018, Turkey has thus begun taking maritime boundary treaty with the Gov- Eastern Mediterranean, particularly Egypt assertive steps to secure its claims to what ernment of National Accord (GNA) in and Israel. This, in turn, has led Greece, the Ankara considers its “fair share” of Eastern Libya. These actions have raised alarm Republic of Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel, Mediterranean energy resources. It has de- across the entire Eastern Mediterranean amongst others, to coalesce and cooperate ployed naval expeditions to explore gas region, especially in Athens and Nicosia, on the exploitation and commercialization fields in waters claimed by the Republic of both of which have been the most affected of natural gas, fueling Turkish fears of be- Cyprus and Greece, blocked exploration by recent Turkish actions. Greece and the ing cut out of the Eastern Mediterranean vessels operating under Republic of Cyprus Republic of Cyprus have since lobbied the energy bonanza. licenses, and signed a highly contentious EU to impose comprehensive sanctions

against Turkey. Yet, despite having ex- Mosaic of Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean pressed its unequivocal support for Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, disagreement between EU Member States about how to handle a more assertive Turkey have prevented the EU from devising far-reaching sanctions and confronting Turkey more energetically. However, this has not prevented some Member States from acting on their own. France has not only backed calls for more comprehensive EU sanctions against Turkey, but has even dispatched naval forces and organized military exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean together with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus to deter Turkey.

This highly volatile situation has led to sev- eral incidents between French, Greek, and Turkish naval vessels, highlighting the risk of a confrontation between NATO members and further straining already severely damaged relations between Turkey and the EU. The Eastern Mediterranean has thus once again become a geopolitical hotspot. An escalation could potentially spiral into a crisis with far-reaching implications for regional stability, as well as for NATO cohesion and the future of EU-Turkish relations. generates a plethora of complex issues with maritime law, its islands, such as the Island Unresolved Conflicts far-reaching implications. of Kastellorizo, lying two kilometers off The Eastern Mediterranean has long been Turkey’s southern coast, should be granted a theater of deep-seated and historically One issue that has recently regained in im- an extensive EEZ. This would effectively rooted antagonism between Greece and portance due to the discovery of gas fields cut Turkey out of the Mediterranean, dash- Turkey. Most notably in 1974, when Tur- around Cyprus’ coast relates to the island’s ing its hopes of finding and exploiting hy- key invaded Cyprus to prevent Greek Cy- so-called exclusive economic zone (EEZ). drocarbon resources off the Anatolian priots from uniting with Greece and to Normally, the 1982 United Nations Con- coast. Turkey, therefore, argues that the protect the Turkish Cypriot minority living vention on the Law of the Sea grants states Anatolian mainland generates a continen- on the island. The Turkish military inter- EEZs, zones that give exclusive rights to tal shelf, which limits the scope of the vention resulted in the de facto partition maritime resources 200 nautical miles or EEZs of Greek islands and the Republic of approximately 370 km from Cyprus. International lawyers generally A general trend towards a their baselines, typically the agree that the law of the sea leaves room for more assertive Turkish foreign low-water line of their coasts. interpretation on the issue. However, both Ankara argues that Turkish Cy- parties have taken what most experts would policy has emerged over the priots have “undeniable rights” qualify as maximalist approaches in their last decade or so. to the Cypriot EEZ, a claim re- respective claims (see map). Lack of resolu- jected by the Republic of Cy- tion of the demarcation of maritime prus, its Greek ally, and the EU boundaries between Greece and Turkey and ethnic division of the island into the as they do not recognize the TRNC as a has caused tensions in the past. In 1987, Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Re- sovereign entity. This has resulted in com- Greece and Turkey confronted each other public of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The peting claims to the island’s EEZs (see over the drilling of oil in the Aegean Sea Republic of Cyprus is culturally and politi- map). Despite these unresolved issues, the and again in 1996 in a dispute over the sta- cally close to Greece, internationally widely Republic of Cyprus has established the tus of the small Islets of Imia (or Kardak in recognized, a UN member, and a fully- practice of selling licenses to private com- Turkish). Since then, less acute incidents, fledged EU member since 2004. By con- panies to explore and exploit the natural such as violations of airspace, have formed trast, the TRNC is recognized and backed gas within the island’s EEZ. part of Greek-Turkish relations. only by Turkey. Numerous attempts to re- solve the conflict on the island of Cyprus, In addition, a long-standing dispute exists A Storm Is Brewing including by the UN, have proven unsuc- between Greece and Turkey about how the Alongside these unresolved issues in the cessful. A UN peacekeeping force, the maritime boundaries of Greek islands ad- Eastern Mediterranean and the discovery United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cy- jacent to Turkey ought to be drawn in the of gas, a general trend towards a more as- prus (UNFICYP), is stationed on the is- Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. sertive and, at times, confrontational, Turk- land to this day. This unresolved conflict Greece argues that under international ish foreign policy has emerged over the last

decade or so. This new foreign policy stance The Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan) marks a stark departure from the policy of “zero problems with neighbors” that had The Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan in Turkish) is a naval doctrine that was first announced in 2006. It envisages a more assertive Turkish stance in order to assert Turkish control over the shaped Turkish regional foreign policy seas surrounding Turkey, including the Eastern Mediterranean. The stated end goal of the doctrine during roughly the first decade of the Jus- is to augment Turkey’s regional and international influence, as well as to enable access to energy tice and Development Party’s (AKP) rule resources to support the country’s economic and demographic growth without dependence that began in 2003. The reasons for this on others. Even though it was set out in the late 2000s, the doctrine only recently gained in impor- shift are manifold, often interlinked, and tance in Turkish foreign political discourse. The doctrine aligns well with the new brand of assertive Turkish foreign policy and the country’s apparent willingness to revive the past glory of the hotly debated. Yet, many observers attri- Ottoman Empire by expanding Turkey’s influence throughout the wider region. In September 2020, bute it to Turkey’s slow move away from the directorate of communication of the Turkish presidency published a video that alludes to the EU and from the West as a model to be the doctrine and draws parallels between Ottoman victories in the Eastern Mediterranean in the emulated and an apparent willingness to 16th Century against Christian nations and the steadfastness of the current Turkish navy in the revive the past glory of the Ottoman Em- Mediterranean. pire by expanding its influence throughout the wider region. The instrumentalization of foreign policy to rally domestic support for Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdo- gan, and his AKP is an additional factor that is often identified as having contrib- Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves by and the legal consequences of the accord uted to this shift. these countries, as well as others, culminat- are disputed by a number of Eastern Medi- ed in the creation of the Eastern Mediter- terranean states, including Greece, the Re- This new brand of Turkish foreign policy, ranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in January public of Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel, as well coined by some observers as “neo-ottoman” 2019. Turkey was deliberately not invited as by the EU. This recent Turkish move has or “nationalistic”, has at times not only led to join. In parallel, plans for the EastMed undeniably caused other actors in the re- to a brash willingness to act against the in- Gas pipeline, projected to connect Israel to gion to close ranks. In August 2020, Egypt terests of its traditional western allies, but Greece via the Republic of Cyprus, also left and Greece signed their own maritime also a confrontational stance towards other Turkey out of the equation (see map). agreement, claiming an EEZ that overlaps regional powers. This shift to- with the EEZs claimed in the Turkish and wards a more assertive foreign To counteract regional initiatives Libyan GNA maritime boundary treaty policy has further estranged that exclude Turkey, Ankara (see map). Moreover, the EMGF, which Turkey from its allies within has extended its remit to include regional NATO and the EU, as well as has chosen a path of escalation security cooperation and joint military complicated already difficult and confrontation. drills, has now evolved into an instrument relations between Turkey and geared towards countering Turkish influ- two other major actors in the ence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt and Israel. These developments raised concerns in Both of these countries have seen their re- Ankara, which increasingly feared being Since the beginning of 2019, Turkey has lations with Turkey dramatically deterio- excluded from access to Eastern Mediter- also begun to deploy naval expeditions to rate. In the case of Egypt, this is mainly ranean energy resources and saw these explore gas fields in waters claimed by the due to Turkey’s persistent support through- moves as a threat to Turkish ambitions to Republic of Cyprus, and has repeatedly out the region for the Muslim Brother- reduce dependency on energy imports. chased away exploration vessels operating hood - an Islamist movement - in the Driven by the same brand of assertive for- under Republic of Cyprus licenses. Ankara wake of the so-called Arab Spring. Since eign policy that has informed previous has also begun to conduct gas exploration the coup against democratically elected Turkish actions in the region and by its in waters contested by Greece and Turkey. Muslim Brotherhood president, Mo- Mavi Vatan or “blue home” doctrine (see Greece, in turn, has reacted by dispatching hamed Morsi, in 2013, the government in textbox), Ankara has recently reacted with naval forces into the contested areas. Cairo staunchly opposes this movement a series of steps that most independent ob- domestically and throughout the MENA servers consider the immediate cause of This has led to a number of dangerous inci- region. This has put Ankara and Cairo at the current crisis in the Eastern Mediter- dents. In August 2020, a ship of the Greek loggerheads. In Israel’s case, the deteriora- ranean. navy collided with a Turkish warship that tion of formerly relatively close relations in was escorting a Turkish geological survey the 2000s was mainly due to Turkey’s new- To counteract regional initiatives aimed at vessel during a standoff in these contested found international activism in support of energy exploitation and marketization waters, highlighting the potential for esca- the Palestinian cause and its harsh criti- that exclude Turkey, Ankara has chosen a lation. President Erdogan responded by cism of the Jewish state’s handling of this path of escalation and confrontation. Tur- declaring that any attack on a Turkish ship issue. key signed a highly contested and widely exploring for oil and gas in disputed Medi- criticized maritime boundary treaty with terranean waters would incur a “high It was thus not a surprise to see Turkey be- the Libyan GNA in November 2019 (see price”. After a short break in September, ing excluded from deepening regional co- map). The EEZs claimed by Turkey and Turkish survey ships escorted by the Turk- operation initiatives in the Eastern Medi- the GNA would block the EastMed pipe- ish navy resumed their exploration activi- terranean between Greece, the Republic of line’s path, disregard the presence of Greek ties in waters claimed by Greece and the Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. It is in this con- islands, and overlap with Greek and Republic of Cyprus, yet again raising the text that a collective interest in leveraging Egyptian maritime claims. The legitimacy specter of escalation.

Consequences of Escalation lateral relations with Turkey, has been espe- rallying domestic support, a crash of the al- The EU has seen its own relations with cially active in trying to reduce tensions in ready declining Turkish economy would Turkey deteriorate over the past decade or the Eastern Mediterranean. France, how- likely set them up for failure in the 2023 so due to a plethora of often-interrelated ever, which has seen its interests abroad re- Turkish general election. Key European in- reasons. Amongst them, an authoritarian peatedly clash with the more assertive terests would also be adversely affected by turn in Turkey, stalled EU accession talks, brand of Turkish foreign policy in recent an escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean the handling of the migration crisis, and a times, chiefly in Libya, has been leading the since it depends on Ankara’s cooperation in number of unilateral Turkish military in- bloc of countries lobbying for comprehen- areas such as control of irregular migration terventions in Syria. EU-Turkish relations and counter-terrorism, both of have become increasingly uneasy, transac- The EU remains divided on which are also of fundamental tional, and distrustful. However, Turkey confronting Turkey more importance to Greece. In the and the EU’s mutual dependencies have case of an escalation, Ankara thus far prevented their relationship from energetically in the Eastern would very likely use these is- becoming an adversarial one. Against this Mediterranean. sues as leverage against the EU, backdrop of uneasy, yet necessary relations, as it has repeatedly threatened the EU has repeatedly declared its full soli- to do in the past. An escalating darity with Greece and the Republic of sive EU sanctions against Ankara. Paris has crisis would also further dilute cohesion Cyprus on the issue of Turkish forays in the also dispatched naval forces to the Eastern within NATO, erode its credibility, and Eastern Mediterranean. The EU has re- Mediterranean to lend support to Athens perhaps even paralyze the Alliance. This peatedly condemned Turkey’s actions as il- and Nicosia, raising the possibility of mili- would benefit none of the actors currently legal and in violation of the sovereign tary escalation between NATO members jostling with each other in the Eastern rights of Greece and the Republic of Cy- France, Greece, and Turkey. Such an escala- Mediterranean given that NATO remains prus. Having to-date imposed only limited tion in the Eastern Mediterranean, either of fundamental importance as a guarantor sanctions against Turkey, the EU’s current deliberate or inadvertent, would have far- of security and stability. The stakes are thus approach seems to be based on “soft con- reaching consequences for regional stability, very high. It remains to be seen whether tainment”. Yet, this seems to have had little as well as deleterious effects on the cohe- the prospect of such dire repercussions of impact on Ankara’s behavior, as the re- sion and credibility of NATO, not to men- an escalation will be enough for all the ac- sumption of exploration by Turkish vessels tion the future of EU-Turkish relations. tors to compromise in order to find a after a brief pause in September 2020 peaceful solution to the crisis in the East- seems to demonstrate. Further escalation would force the EU to ern Mediterranean. act more assertively. This would deal a Currently, the EU remains divided on con- heavy blow to Turkey’s already faltering fronting Turkey more forcefully in the economy as a result of probably far-reach- For more on Perspectives on Euro-Atlantic Eastern Mediterranean. Due to a number ing EU-sanctions, cuts in EU funds, as well Security, see CSS core theme page. of considerations, EU Member States, such as the drying up of European investments as Italy, Spain, and Germany, are advocat- in Turkey. While stoking the flames of na- ing for dialog with Turkey. Germany, which tionalism on the issue of Eastern Mediter- Fabien Merz is Senior Researcher in the Swiss is currently presiding the EU Council and ranean gas might seem to make sense for and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for has traditionally tried to maintain good bi- Erdogan and the AKP for the purpose of Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich.

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