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Briefings from the Research Advisory Group BRIEFINGS FROM THE RESEARCH ADVISORY GROUP BRIEFINGS TO THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE FOR THE FULL COMMISSION MEETING, BRATISLAVA 2018 Bratislava, May 2018 GCSC ISSUE BRIEF №2 PROMOTING STABILITY IN CYBERSPACE TO BUILD PEACE AND PROSPERITY The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) engages the full range of stakeholders to develop proposals for norms and policies that enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace. @theGCSC www.cyberstability.org info@cyberstability.org cyber@hcss.nl The GCSC does not specifically endorse the respective publications, nor does it necessarily ascribe to the findings or conclusions. All comments on the content of the publications should be directed to the respective authors. Copyright © 2018. Published by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. The opinions expressed in this publication are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC), its partners, or The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from GCSC partners: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, Microsoft, ISOC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the partners. The intellectual property rights remain with the authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non- commercial – No Derivatives License. To view this licence, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ncnd/3.0). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice. ABOUT THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ABOUT THE BRIEFINGS ON THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE The Global Commission on the Stability of The briefings and memos included in this issue were Cyberspace (GCSC) is helping to promote mutual developed by independent researchers working within awareness and understanding among the various the GCSC Research Advisory Group. The papers cyberspace communities working on issues related included here were submitted to the Global to international cybersecurity. By finding ways to link Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) in the dialogues on international security with the new order to support its deliberations. communities created by cyberspace, the GCSC has a genuine opportunity to contribute to an essential The opinions expressed in the publications are those global task: supporting policy and norms coherence solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect related to the security and stability in and of the views of the GCSC, its partners, or The Hague cyberspace. Centre for Strategic Studies. The Commission does not specifically endorse the respective publications, Chaired by Marina Kaljurand, and Co-Chairs Michael nor does it necessarily ascribe to the findings or Chertoff and Latha Reddy, the Commission conclusions. All comments on the content of the comprises 25 prominent Commissioners representing publications should be directed to the respective a wide range of geographic regions as well as authors. government, industry, technical and civil society stakeholders with legitimacy to speak on different As a result of the Commission Meeting in New Delhi aspects of cyberspace.The GCSC will be linked to in November 2017, the GCSC issued a set of existing initiatives, such as the Global Commission on Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for four research Internet Governance and the London Process, through projects. The Commissioners selected the winning Special Representatives. proposals at the Commission Meeting in Lille, France, in January 2018. The researchers received the funding associated with the RFPs and were invited to present their work to the Commissioners during the Commission Meeting in Bratislava in May 2018. TABLE OF CONTENTS BRIEFING 1 ADAPTATIONS TO ENHANCE THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE 6 Prof. Shen Yi, Dr. Jiang Tianjiao, Ms. Wang Lei MEMO 1 PROMOTING AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR CYBERSPACE 17 Ms. Elana Broitman, Ms. Mailyn Fidler, Mr. Robert Morgus MEMO 2 CONCEPTUALIZING AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY REGIME FOR CYBERSPACE 37 Ms. Elonnai Hickok, Mr. Arindrajit Basu MEMO 3 DEFINING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES 73 Mr. Thomas Uren, Mr. Bart Hogeveen, Mr. Fergus Hanson MEMO 4 DEFINING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES 91 Dr. Dragan Mladenović, Mr. Vladimir Radunović MEMO 5 RETHINKING THE ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM - A PLAUSIBLE PROOF OF NON- INVOLVEMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CREDIBLE ATTRIBUTION 134 Mr. Thomas Reinhold BRIEFING 1 ADAPTATIONS TO ENHANCE THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE Prof. Shen Yi, Director, Research Center for the Governance of Cyberspace, Fudan University Dr. Jiang Tianjiao, Researcher, Research Center for the Governance of Cyberspace, Fudan University Ms. Wang Lei, Research Assistant, Research Center for the Governance of Cyberspace, Fudan University BRIEFING №1 GCSC ISSUE BRIEF 2 6 BRIEFINGS FROM THE RESEARCH ADVISORY GROUP REDEFINING STABILITY / INSTABILITY OF CYBERSPACE Though scholars and policymakers have mentioned and analyzed “stability” or “instability” of cyberspace repeatedly, the concept has to be redefined. We argue that relevant existing discourses have failed to describe the essence of stability or instability of cyberspace, despite some enlightening arguments that are beneficial for further discussion. We believe a new theoretical framework is needed to define the stability of cyberspace from a structural perspective, through which coordinating core interests of sovereign states is both possible and an effective instrument for managing threats in global cyberspace. Cyberspace has been viewed over time as a space of instability as a result of the rising risks of asymmetric strikes that technology-dependent countries are facing. In this theory, the popularization of information technology and the low costs of launching cyber attacks prompt actors like revisionist countries and non-state actors to target advanced countries. Lucas Kello (2013) has summarized the mechanism, pointing out that instability derives from technical characteristics of cyber offense and defense, including offense dominance, attribution difficulties, technological volatility, poor strategic depth, escalatory ambiguity, as well as low barriers for actors to enter cyberspace. Some Chinese scholars (Ren, 2014) also stress this logic leading to strategic instability in cyberspace, which is widely expressed as “cyber Pearl Harbor” or “cyber 9/11”. This theory defines instability of cyberspace as a status that some states or non-state actors may take advantage of cyber technology to launch asymmetric attack against developed countries, which in turn has a huge impact on the existing order in the real world. Criticisms arise in recent years towards this perception of strategic instability in cyberspace, claiming that it exaggerates the effect that cyber attacks can exert. Erik Gartzke (2013) made an effort of “bringing war in cyberspace back down to earth” by demonstrating that cyberwar alone cannot meet the objectives that can be achieved through traditional military violence. Gartzke and Lindsay (2015) then refuted the proposition of offense dominance in cyberspace by advocating the function of deception strategy. Based on these arguments, cyber deterrence is thought of as a credible instrument for dealing with cyber attacks (Shen and Jiang, 2018). While accepting this view, we disagree with the idea that misperception of the dynamics of cyber offense and defense means an exaggeration of instability in cyberspace, and believe instability is rooted in the very structure of cyberspace1, which contains misperceptions and divergences among state actors. The international society is still far away from forming a consensus on principles of conducting cyber offense and defense, notwithstanding the rising assertion on limitations of cyber attacks, let alone contradictions on more issues including the role of state actors in cyberspace and the approach of defining interests of different actors. In this situation, the main reason for cyber attacks among state actors becomes misjudgments about actors of other states and the vision that attacks are superior to defense in cyberspace, rather than ideological divergence between advanced countries and revisionist states. As a result, with developing countries increasing their dependence on information technology, any country and actor can become the victim of cyber attacks. Events in Estonia, Iran, Russia, France, and the United States represent this situation: 1 The term “structure” used here is used in the framework of the theory of International relations in which it is mainly defined by the distribution of power among different actors, mainly represented by the nation-state. BRIEFING 1 7 ADAPTATIONS TO ENHANCE THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE none of these states could afford to tolerate those behaviors produced in cyberspace to affect their national security via either attacks on infrastructure or via organized manipulation of social media during a critical domestic political process. That is the main reason we should focus more on how to find a pragmatic path toward building strategic stability in cyberspace. To define from a structural perspective, instability of cyberspace could be understood as a certain digital version of the anarchy in the real world. Although states still seek self-preservation and maintenance of security and stability of property in cyberspace, they
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