POLITICS IN 1947-1979 By the same author ELECTORAL POLITICS IN AN EMERGENT STATE: THE CEYLON GENERAL ELECTION OF MAY 1970 Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979

A. JEYARATNAM WILSON Professor and Chairman. Department of Political Science University of New Brunswick formerly Professor of Political Science and Head. Department of Economics and Political Science University of Sri Lanka © A. Jeyaratnam Wilson 1974, 1979 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission

First edition 1974 Second edition 1979

Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Associated companies in Delhi Dublin Hong Kong Johannesburg Lagos Melbourne New York Singapore Tokyo

Typeset in Great Britain by Vantage Photosetting Company Ltd Southampton and printed in Great Britain by Billing & Sons Limited Guildjord. London and Worcester

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Wilson, Alfred Jeyaratnam Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1979.-2nd ed. l. Sri Lanka-Politics and governrnent I. Title 320.9' 549' 303 DS489.57 ISBN 978-0-333-26208-5 ISBN 978-1-349-17718-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-17718-9

The paperback edition of this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent, in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser

This book is sold subject to the standard condition 0/ the Net Book Agreement For Susili and Malliha, Maithili and Kumanan Contents

List of Maps and Tables viii Prime Ministers and the Executive President of Sri Lanka x Acknowledgements xi List of Abbreviations xiii Introduction to the Second Edition xv Introduction to the First Edition xxviii The Land and its History 2 Problems in a Plural Society 10 3 Economic and Social Progress 52 4 Political Behaviour and Political Forces 112 5 Constitution and Government 171 6 Foreign Policy and Defence Arrangements 243 7 Conclusion 277 Notes 283 Bibliographical Note 307 Index 309

vii List of Maps and Tables page Modern Sri Lanka: Provincial Divisions and Principal Towns xxx Sri Lanka: Main Agricultural Exports and Climatic Zones 51 Population Growth 1871-1971 53 Unemployment by Educational Status, 1953, 1963 and 1966 56 Acreage of Lands alienated and Number of Allottees settled under State Schemes 66 Paddy Yields 1956-74 74 Export Volumes and Earnings of Tea, Rubber and Major Coconut Products 1948-77 76 Taxes, Dividends and Reserves as a Percentage of Gross Surplus of Companies 78 Value of Assets, Plantations and Private Sector, 1964 78 Sri Lanka's Exports and Imports 1956-76 93 Government Expenditure on Social Services and Economic Development, 1948, 1955, 1961 94 Government of Sri Lanka, Financial Position 1956-76 95 G.N.P. (1960-65) at 1959 Factor Cost Prices 96 Per Capita Income (1960-65) at 1959 Factor Cost Prices 96 G.N.P. and Per Capita Income at 1959 Factor Cost Prices (1965-77) 98 Party Positions (House of Representatives) at General Elections, 1947-77 156 Distribution of Seats (House of Representatives) by Provinces, 1947-56 197

Vlll Lists of Maps and Tables ix Distribution of Seats (House of Representatives) by Provinces, 1960-70 199 Distribution of Seats (National State Assembly) by Provinces, July 1977 231 Foreign Trade, 1951-76 267 Prime Ministers and the Executive President of Sri Lanka

Under the Constitution of the Second Republic, 1978- Executive President Junius Richard Jayewardene (February 1978- ) Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa (February 1978- )

Under the Constitution of the First Republic, May 1972-February 1978 Sirima Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike (May 1972-July 1977) Junius Richard Jayewardene (July 1977-February 1978)

Under the Constitution of 1947-1972 Don Stephen Senanayake (September 1947-March 1952) Dudley Shelton Senanayake (March 1952-0ctober 1953) John Lionel Kotelawala (October 1953-April 1956) Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike (April 1956- September 1959) Wijayananda Dahanayake (September 1959-March 1960) Dudley Shelton Senanayake (March to July 1960) Sirima Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike (July 1960-March 1965) Dudley Shelton Senanayake (March 1965-May 1970) Sirima Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike (May 1970-May 1972)

x Acknowledgements

This work is the result of many many years of research on and first-hand observation of political developments in Sri Lanka since 1947. The many hundreds of students I taught at the University of Sri Lanka during 1952-72 helped me tremendously in the formulation of my views, theories and interpretations by their immediate and critical responses in classroom discussions, and to them lowe special thanks. There are close friends in Peradeniya from whose criticisms and observations I benefited greatly. I should like to make particular mention of Professor K. M. de Silva for his unfailing generosity and helpful advice. Professors W. J. F. Labrooy, H. A. de S. Gunasekere, Mr H. A. I. Goonetilleke, Professor Stanley Kalpage, Drs B. Hewavitharana and W. A. Wiswa Warnapala also had long conversa- tions with me on various aspects of this work. Outside Sri Lanka, Professor Dennis Austin of the Victoria University of Manchester, Professor George Lerski of the University of San Francisco, Professor Ferdinand Hermens, formerly of the University of Cologne and presently Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, and Dr Calvin Woodward of the University of New Brunswick were helpful. I am grateful to the latter and to Brown University Press for permission to base my two maps on the map in Woodward's The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon. Needless to say the responsibility for any errors are mine. I am specially grateful to Mrs N. M. Hettiaratchi of Peradeniya for patiently typing several drafts of this book. Many thanks are also due to Mrs Rheta MacElwain of the University of New Brunswick for making an accurate typescript of the final draft. My wife Susili and my children Malliha, Maithili and Kumanan showed forbearance and patience while I was on this project through the years. To my younger brother, Mr R. K. Wilson, lowe a debt for supplying me with essential documents almost at a moment's notice. lowe much to Mr Tim Farmiloe of Macmillan for his patience whilst awaiting the completed manuscript and for the encouragement he gave me in this endeavour. Mr H. W. Bawden of the same firm did xi xii Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979 everything possible to bring out this publication in good time, and I am grateful to him for all his efforts. A.J.W. Fredericton April 1973

Acknowledgements to the Second Edition I wish to acknowledge the useful information and materials pro- vided by my former students Laksiri Fernando, Tressie Leitan, V. Nallainayagam, Vma Nallainayagam, Kuruganty Sastry, and Wiswa Warnapala. My friends Kingsley de Silva, Ian GoonetHeke, Neville Karunatilake, Donald Snodgrass and Bishop Lakshman Wickremasinghe were of invaluable assistance in giving me their views and analyses of the developing situation during 1973-1978. They also sent me relevant literature. My friend and colleague Calvin Woodward helped me with his advice on my 'Introduction to the Second Edition'. My wife SusHi, who is also trained in my discipline, gave me the benefit of her comments and criticisms on the various drafts of the changes and additions to this revised edition. To all of them lowe a debt. The responsibility of course is mine. Peggy Fenety and Dixie Wilson typed the final draft and were souls of patience in deciphering my handwriting and the numerous changes I had made on what turned out in the end to be an untidy manuscript. I am particularly appreciative of Mr Tim Farmiloe for all the encouragement he gave me and for his patience in awaiting the com- pleted version. Mr. Allan Aslett expedited the printing of this revised edition and to him lowe many thanks. A.J.W. Fredericton June 1978 List of Abbreviations

Note.' Ceylon and Sri Lanka, as used in this book, are interchangeable

A.D.B. Asian Development Bank B.B.P. Bosath Bandaranaike Peramuna (The Bodhisattva S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike Front). Note a bodhisattva is a being destined to be a Buddha B.J.B. Bauddha Jathika Balavegaya (National Front for the Protection of Buddhism) B.L.P.I. Bolshevik Leninist Party of India B.R.P. Buddhist Republican Party B.S.P. Bolshevik Samasamaja Party (the Bolshevik Equal Society Party) c.P. Communist Party (Moscow) C.I.c. Ceylon Indian Congress C.W.c. (Indian) Ceylon Workers' Congress D.M.K. (Ceylon) Dravida Munnethra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progressive Front) D.P. Dharma Samaja Party (Social Justice Party) D.W.C. (Indian) Democratic Workers' Congress E.B.P. Eksath Bhikku Peramuna ( of Buddhist Monks) F.P. (Tamil) Federal Party I.B.R.D. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development I.M.F. International Monetary Fund I.S.F. Islamic Socialist Front J.V.P. Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna (Sinhalese) National Liberation Front L.P. Labour Party xiii XIV Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979 L.P.P. Lanka Prajathanthrawadi Party (Ceylon Democratic Party) L.S.S.P. Lanka Sarna Samaja Party (Ceylon Equal Society Party) M.E.P. Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People's United Front) P.D.P. People's Democratic Party P.L.F. People's Liberation Front R.M.P. Revolutionary Marxist Party R.P. Republican Party S.L.F.P. S.L.F.S.P. Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party S.L.J.P. Sri Lanka Jathika Peramuna (the Sri Lanka National Front) S.M.P. (R. G. Sinhala Mahajana Peramuna Senanayake) (Sinhalese People's Front) S.M.P. (I.M.R.A. Samajawadi Mahajana Peramuna Iriyagolle) (Socialist People's Front) S.M.S. Sinhala Maha Sabha (the Great Council of the Sinhalese) S.P. Swaraj Party T.e. Tamil Congress T.R.P. Tamil Resistance Party T.S.R.P. Tamil Self Rule Party T.U.F. Tamil United Front T.U.L.F. Tamil United Liberation Front U.F. United Front (Samagi Peramuna) U.L.e. United Lanka Congress U.L.F. United Left Front U.N.P. V.L.S.S.P. Viplavakari (Revolutionary) Lanka Sarna Samaja Party Introduction to the Second Edition

The five odd years from April 1973, when this book was first com- pleted (published in May 1974), to the present (June 1978) have witnessed a great many political, economic and social changes, dramatic and far-reaching but also in some ways pathetically ineffective in the consequences they sought to bring into being. There are three urgent questions that arise from the rapid progression of events. Firstly, does the Sinhalese Buddhist ethos of tolerance and accommodation, on which we expatiated at times in the first edition, cease to be an emollient or inhibitor of violence in situations of chronic economic stagnancy? The period 1947 to 1973, despite the occasional turbulence, was one of comparative tranquillity, with Parliament still in a position to function as the great redistributor as well as the pacifier of growing social discontent. Our view therefore is that, in the context of post-1973 developments, the Sinhalese Buddhist ethic has a certain tolerance level beyond which it cannot cope and which therefore, in times of extreme stress, ceases to be operative. In moderately stressful situations, it still can be a mollifying agency. The second is a more critical one which emanates from the virtual collapse of Sinhalese-Tamil relations, brought about by the mishandling of the problem by Mrs Bandaranaike's U .F. government during 1970-7. A point of no return appears to have been reached, despite the efforts of the U.N.P. government returned at the general election of July 1977 to act the role of a government of national reconciliation. The third is the problem of accelerating economic progress so as to keep pace with a rising population, and a youthful one at that, which implies a greater degree of dependence of the latter on the state. Can the state undertake the task itself by bringing the major means of production under its control? The U.F. government attempted this exercise during 1970-7 and failed. The alternative is the mixed economy with the private sector permitted adequate opportunity for manouevre. The U.N.P. government of 1977 is involved in the effort. But the open xv xvi Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979 economy has its enemies in the left-wing. They represent the third alternative, which is a complete regimentation of the economy in the interests of progress in the long term. The first edition sought to weave the developments in Sri Lanka's post-independence history around these three central themes. Events up to 1973, despite challenges on occasion to the constitu- tional order, seemed to portend the continuation of the parliamentary system in its role of universal conciliator. But Sri Lanka is victim to the vagaries of the international market, as are most primary producing countries. And being a small country, she counts for little in the calculations of the Trilateral Commission, and is a risk for communist powers because of the whirligig of electoral politics. Herein lies the island's dilemma of the mid-seventies. This new edition seeks at various points to assess anew the post-independence developments-examined and analysed in the first edition-in the context of the tum of events since 1973. There is still another related question to the three we have raised. Do the forty-seven years of universal suffrage (1931-78), ten general elections since 1931, six changes of government in a constitutional manner since 1956, and numerous elections to local bodies, indicate a wisdom, maturity and sense of discrimination arising from the totality of experience of the electors? Our conclusion is contrariwise. The forty years of radicalisation and political education undertaken by left-wing parties were reduced to nought when they failed to secure a single seat in the National State Assembly at the general election of 1977, when even the votes they polled recorded a nadir. The electors have been distracted by slogans and propaganda against readily identifiable religious and ethnic minorities, a phenomenon which reached cruel proportions in the anti-Tamil riots of August-September 1977. Political parties and their leaders have throughout the period tried to be paternalistic, made extravagant promises, raised the bidding at each succeeding election only to disillusion the electors. The most cynical of such reversals of promises was the step-by-step measures taken to dismantle the welfare state in the post-1970 years, especially during 1973-7. The effective response was the rout of the United Front at the general election of 1977 and the return of the United National Party. But the latter had suffered a similar fate for almost the same reasons at the general election of 1965. The evidence points to the electorate's increasingly frustrating dependence on the state for welfare and employment, not a utilisation of the parliamentary process for the purposes expected of a matured democracy. Introduction to the Second Edition xvii The next general election is scheduled, at the outer limit, unless Parliament is earlier dissolved, for 1983, and what happens between 1978 and 1983 will indicate whether Parliament will continue, or collapse, or be transformed into a completely different instrument. The major parties, from left to right, are elitist in their approach to the electors. For example, J. R. Jayewardene in a public address stated quite pertinently that '98 per cent of the people are not interested in what is going on at the top' and he added 'they want to live; they want employment'.! The other political leaders think no differently. The experience is that a slow and gradual deterioration in welfare services seems acceptable to the electorate in karmic fatalism. And frustrations in the search for employment appear to have the same effect, provided the state does not use its repressive apparatus with telling and immediate harshness. But there are the periodic explosions. These could well become endemic and place the foundations of the state in jeopardy. The first serious challenge to the established order came with the April 1971 insurrection. The irreconcilable contradictions in the system were brought out sharply by Rohana Wijeweera, the P.L.F. leader, in his evidence at his trial before the criminal justice commission. He stated, on 2 November 1973: 'We should not forget that the living reality which transpires here is a struggle for the fulfilment and class interests of two opposed social classes'.2 It is likely that similar out- breaks will occur not merely from unemployed youth but from two other just as potent quarters. Organised labour and its political expression-the traditional left-have indicated that 'to the extent that opposition to the government shifts out of Parliament, Parliament itself stands devalued and can in certain situations become almo~ or altogether irrelevant'. 3 The other is the threat to the unity of the state that is gathering momentum around the forces of Tamil separatism. That threat will not come from the respectable middle-class Ceylon Tamil representation in the legislature. Already militant Tamil youth have tossed Parliament to the winds and have launched a campaign of selective political assassinations. An Irish- or Cyprus-style imbroglio is likely to mushroom. We have examined this situation in our revisions in chapters 2 and 4. The V.N.P. government of 1977 is heir to these problems. It is already in the process of converting itself into an I.M.F.-run democracy more sophisticated than the cruder version of its V.F. predecessor. The debatable question is whether solutions can be found and implemented. The guiding hand of the ship of state, the executive president of the 'Second Republic' (as we have called the gaullist-type presidential xviii Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979 system that the U.N.P. government has introduced) is already in his seventies. That seems to exhaust the possibilities of experienced states- manship within his party. He is the last of a generation of old-style parliamentary democrats. A partial answer to these questions might be attempted in the effort to identify where power lies in the system. An observable fact is that caste and family ties, of whatever political hue, act as political solvents because of close links among the island's well-knit elitist middle class. The elite is therefore all-pervasive and capable of influencing policy decisions.4 This is largely true of the Sinhalese political elites. G. Uswatte-Aratchi provides added evidence of the westernised nature of this elite in his findings on higher education in Sri Lanka. Four low country Sinhalese districts on the western and southwestern seaboard, exposed successively for four centuries to the influences of Portuguese, Dutch and British rule, he has observed, 'have been the source and strength of the major political leaders and the permanent home of the senior bureaucracy'.s In effect these assessments make it evident that the present Sri Lankan system hinges on the designs ofa self-perpetuating elite to keep it within the limits of certain boundaries of its choosing. In its efforts to stay where it is, this elite has drawn to itself what Leonard Binder, in another context calls 'the second stratum'.6 This Sri Lankan 'second stratum' comprises the rural intermediaries-Buddhist monks, native physicians, Sinhalese school teachers, and a new class of aggressive indigenous entrepreneurs referred to in local parlance as mudalalis. They owe a great deal to the S.L.F.P., but at times tend to veer towards the U.N.P., depending on the extent to which the former moves in its leftward policies. These indigenous entrepreneurs became increasingly relevant in the years after 1973. The Trotskyist minister of finance, N. M. Perera, in his resignation speech in September 1975, alleged that 'the decision of the prime minister [to expel his party from the United Front] is a premeditated and well-calculated plot by the mudalalis and the imperialist supporters she has recently gathered around her'.1 Sections of the westernised elite in the S.L.F.P. and leading Buddhist monks were as well in the forefront of the move to end the attempts of the traditional left parties to widen the base of mass politics-a move which would have reaped for them a plentiful harvest. The point is that the members of the 'second stratum' have aspirations of upward mobility. They are conservative and have no serious com- plaints against the prevailing Sri Lankan system. But at the lower base levels of this pyramidal structure is the vast majority, the poverty belt, Introduction to the Second Edition xix as well as the politically conscious proletariat. Its members are separated in every possible way from the ruling elite, despite the inter- vention of the 'second stratum'. Parliament to them is nothing more than the great disburser. They are the barbarians at the gates, kept at bay by welfare policies and state subsidies. To speak of Parliament in such a context is nothing but specious. And the world has forgotten that since 1956, and especially from 1970 to 1977, Sri Lanka was ruled for more than half the time by severely repressive laws under a state of emergency. The government made regulations which were published in the Government Gazette. Parlia- ment was merely informed and not given the opportunity to discuss these. The Lake House press (publishing around 60 per cent of the country's newspapers), which came under government control in 1973, became the mouthpiece of the V.F., while publications overly critical, such as the five newspapers of the Davasa group, were permanently banned from April 1973. Our point is that major sections of the inter-linked ruling elite, propped up by the 'second stratum', have provided tacit and at times active consent to the attempts of various post-1956 governments, in particular the V.F. regime of 1970-7, to make erosions into the prevailing democratic system. Dissatisfaction no doubt there is, coupled with frequent accusations of the possibilities of a seizure of power by the right or left. These help to prevent the system phasing itself out into total dictatorship. Consequently the facade of democracy is maintained. But effective power remains concentrated in the oligarchical inter-linked elite. There is little to choose between the Republican Constitution of May 1972 with its armoury of executive power and the concentration ofall powers in a National State Assembly 8 subservient to the bidding of a forceful prime minister, and the latest change to a strong presidential system.9 The socialising process has resulted in the major parties differing more on vital details than on essential fundamentals. Or it might be argued that the conservative tradition in the V.N.P. and S.L.F.P. gives its assent to socialistic legislation only to the extent that such legislation does not seriously undermine the system. It can therefore be reasonably argued that insofar as the traditional left has lent support to 'the party ofthe national bourgeoisie', the S.L.F.P., it has helped to postpone the demise of the existing framework of restricted capitalism and con- trolled democracy. It is difficult to conjecture what the traditional left expected from its policy of collaboration-from trying to introduce socialism through two ministries when the Marxist faction, led by the xx Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979 late Philip Gunawardene, secured two important portfolios in S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's M.E.P. government during 1956-9, to the attempts of the L.S.S.P. and C.P. to infiltrate the S.L.F.P. and the bureaucracy with the four portfolios they obtained in Mrs Ban- daranaike's 1970 U.F. government: the L.S.S.P. from 1970 to 1975 and the c.P. from 1970 to 1977. These efforts at introducing socialism were possibly motivated by four factors. The traditional left leadership was tiring of sitting in the opposition benches since the 'thirties. The leadership had to reward the faithful, and this could only be achieved by obtaining office. There was a genuine hope that a major segment of the S.L.F.P. will be agree- able to moving in a leftward direction. Economic conditions will deteriorate to a point where a Marxist solution might be the only one available to the problems of poverty and unemployment. Some of these objectives were achieved, but the parties concerned lost credibility as genuine Marxists. The outcome was the emergence of ultra-Marxist groupings such as the P.L.F., and splintering of sections from the parent Marxist parties.lO The traditional left has re-assembled under the umbrella label of a United Left Front, but it seems evident that its middle-class elitist leadership will continue to adhere to parliamentary strategies, launching trade union action from time to time in order to emphasise its existence as a force to be taken into account. There is yet another factor that threatens the system. The Tamil question has reached insoluble proportions, as already indicated. Its middle-class leadership, which still has links with the Sinhalese political elites, hopes for a peaceful resolution of the outstanding issues. But it is unlikely, given the economic contraction and the minority psychology of the Sinhalese Buddhist majority, that a settlement acceptable to the Ceylon Tamils can be effected. Prime ministers have, with the exception of Mrs Sirima Bandaranaike during 1970-7, tried to accommodate the Ceylon Tamil leadership, and have failed because of strong opposition from Sinhalese Buddhist pressure groups. This has been so even in 1977-8. Consequently, there are many Ceylon Tamils who are convinced that the only solution lies in Eelam, a separate sovereign state comprising the Tamil-speaking northern and eastern provinces. In the present political climate in Sri Lanka, it seems obvious that the Sinhalese Buddhists constitute mainly the politically relevant community. Consequently the Ceylon Tamils have been the victims of relative deprivation in the spheres of education, employment, national development, constitution-building and land alienation. E. L. H. Lee, Introduction to the Second Edition xxi in his 'Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka, 1963-73',n in comparing the changes in income as between the years in question, has observed that 'the mean incomes of the Sinhalese, the majority of the population, increased significantly, while those of other racial groups, with the minor exception of the Malays, either stagnated or declined'P But more pertinent was his conclusion that 'the per capita incomes of Kandyan and low country Sinhalese increased by 24 and 18 per cent respectively while that of Ceylon Tamils and Indian Tamils fell by 28 and 1 per cent respectively'.u There cannot be a better catalyst for the movement towards sovereign statehood than economic discrimina- tion and relegation to second-class status of a minority which has the attributes of a nation in its own right. Nor is the economic situation any too rosy for there to be enough to go round so as to satisfy deprived groups. Chapter 3, which deals with economic and social progress, explains the deeper trough into which the country has fallen since this book was completed in 1973. The national debt, local and foreign, has increased considerably,14 as has unemploy- ment,15 and the local money supply.16 The new V.N.P. government has virtually inherited a bankrupt treasury and an administration demoralised and ridden with corruption, family nepotism and political jobbery. To some extent the compulsions of democracy, in a country where more than ninety per cent of the population live below the poverty line, leave the politicians with no alternative than to utilise the instruments of political bribery and corruption to remain in office. But this has been, assuming that the restricted democratic framework must persist, at the expense of economic development. Two conflicting studies have been published, one by L. Jayawardena in 1974 and the other by Lee (already referred to) in 1977, with a view to assessing the impact of the state's redistributive policies. Jayawardena, a higher civil servant, argues that 'income distribution over the last two decades in Sri Lanka has moved markedly towards greater equality, both by reductions in the shares received by the top decile of households and by significant if small increases among the poorer deciles'.17 Further, he emphasises that 'the redistributive impact of production policy on earned income was reinforced by a commitment to social policy in Sri Lanka to a degree exceptional for developing countries with low per capita income' .18 The more independent Malaysian scholar Lee, in joining issue with Jayawardena, insists that 'the principal conclusion to emerge from (t)his study is that considerable doubt must be attached to the claims, based on the Central Bank survey data, that there has been a xxii Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979 dramatic reduction in income inequality in Sri Lanka and that the situation of the rural poor has improved substantially' .19 He adds: 'The data on consumption and real wages point strongly to the fact that there has been an increase in inequality and even a reduction in levels of real consumption of the poor'.1fl The truth, however, lies somewhere in between these two opposing views. The fact is that despite 'redistribution with growth', as Jayawardena asserts, there has been a massive increase in unemploy- ment, two if not three changes in government during the period involved (1965, 1970, 1977) because of voter dissatisfaction with governmental performances, a major insurrection by disillusioned youth which almost overwhelmed the legitimate government (April 1971), and civil unrest of an unprecedented nature in the Ceylon Tamil provinces. On the other hand the democratic system has as yet not come to a grinding halt, presumably because the poverty belt still views it, with some degree of approval, as the great disburser, if not the supreme alms giver. Assistance from the international funding agencies and the rival power blocs has also helped avert the descent to a broken-backed state. Way back in the latter part of 1943, while languishing in the detention prison that the British raj had put him into, the Trotskyist leader, N. M. Perera, in his booklet The Case for Free Education, wrote: 'A revolution is very much in the offing, and we seem nearer the realisation of our life-work than we ever suspected'. 21 Three and a half decades have passed and a host of events have intervened to inter- fere with the fulfilment of these hopes. The welfare policies of successive governments have in limited ways controlled social discontent and postponed the anticpated revolutionary upheaval. The emergence and stabilisation of the Bandaranaikes and the S.L.F.P. as a third force in Sri Lankan politics railroaded the poverty belt into accepting their method of combining socialist change with Sinhalese Buddhist regeneration within the framework of Parliament, a mix of modernity and tradition, thereby distracting mass attention from the real issues at stake. The traditional left assisted the Bandaranaikes in good faith in the belief that they would achieve their goals but ended, unwittingly, as the grave-diggers of Marxism. Their ranks, re-formed as the United Left Front, are still, however, a potent source of a prospective Marxist transformation of society. In like manner in the Ceylon Tamil areas, the traditional left was frustrated by the success of the Tamil Federal Party and later the Tamil United Liberation Front in focusing the attention of the people on the more pressing and ever-present dis- Introduction to the Second Edition xxiii crimination practised on them by pro-Sinhala governments. Other left-wing groupings have emerged with programmes that pose a counter- model to Parliament, but even the insurrectionary P.L.F. now appears attracted to the operating system. The traditional left, which has always warned of the possibilities of a 'rightist takeover', now alleges that the new presidential system is a cover for executive dictatorship. The right-of-centre U.N.P. for its part has learned from its past mistakes and, taking a cue from Balfour's famous dictum 'reform or we perish', tried as best as it could to combine welfarism with limited free enterprise. The changes that it has effected in the constitution, which are explained and analysed in detail in Chapter 5 (,Constitution and Government') , will in all likelihood postpone revolution for some further time. It is possible that a com- bination of constitutional change which will, under a scheme of proportional representation, accommodate left-wing groups that count, a minimum.of welfarism and slight improvements in the unemployment situation could have the effect of permitting the system to continue a little while longer. Much will, however, also depend on the terms of trade, prices for the traditional export products and aid from global agencies and foreign powers. Under the proposed change in the method of representation, no party could possibly gain an overall or sweeping majority, making more possible than ever a 'national front government' of the Malaysian type. There remains, finally, the unanswerable problem of the Ceylon Tamils. The U.N.P. leadership hopes that a bill of rights, remedial action in the educational and employment sectors and entrenched provisions for the use of the Tamil language will undo the damage perpetrated by Mrs Bandaranaike's U.F. government of 1970--7. But this is the all too familiar 'too little too late' syndrome. The Ceylon Tamils, as already mentioned, are looking for other solutions, which they seek to attain, after the death of their charismatic Gandhian-type leader, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam in April 1977, by organised violence rather than by the use of the conventional methods of satyagraha and non-violence, a situation analysed in detail in Chapter 2 ('Problems in a Plural Society'). The political and economic situation in the island since the first edition of this book was completed in April 1973 has taken an all too perilous course, creating the most intense dissatisfaction among large sections of the working and middle classes, as well as within the more important religious and ethnic groups. The rate of inflation, the chaos in the educational sector, the slowing down of activity in the public and xxiv Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979 private sectors owing to acute shortages in foreign exchange, the fall in production in traditional cultivation and the destabilisation of the politicalsituation with the exit from the V.F. government of the L.S.S.P. in 1975, the C.P. in 1977 and the formation of breakaway splinter groups from the S.L.F .P. in 1977-for further information see revisions and updating of material in Chapter 4 (,Political Behaviour and Political Forces')-tended to give rise to a highly charged atmosphere of political turbulence. Economic development could not keep pace with rising unemployment, nor was the economy able to recover completely from the setbacks of the April 1971 insurrection. The Five- Year Plan (1971) was, as a consequence, able to make only halting progress. What was politically worse, governmental action began to be directed towards pruning welfare measures.22 The U.F. government hoped that it could quiet social discontent by the radical measures it adopted in the post-insurrection phase. The imposition of ceilings on landholdings under the Land Reform Law of 1972, the nationalisation of all public company estates, especially tea, rubber and coconut, local and foreign~owned, with the enactment of the Land Reform (Amendment) Law of 1975 and the efforts to redis- tribute some of these lands to unemployed youth, failed to make any desired impact. The attempts at enlisting popular participation in the public and economic sectors proved futile. The institutions utilised, such as the district political authority, employees' councils, people's committees, janawasas (co-operative farms), district development councils and cultivation committees were, as one informed writer noted,23 'far from being "truly socialist", they created a machinery whereby the politicians in power can effectively control the masses',24 However, as the same writer observed, 'the new institutions have helped the rapid politicisation of the masses, marked by a growing resentment of the new kind of "political servitude" imposed upon them'.2s By the beginning of 1976, with the exit of the L.S.S.P. in September 1975, the V.F. government had virtually gone into reverse gear in regard to its earlier policies of moving towards the establishment of a socialist democracy. The two budgets (November 1975 and November 1976) presented by Felix Dias Bandaranaike, an anti-Marxist who succeeded N. M. Perera as minister offinance, indicated a policy mainly 'to ensure adequate incentives to work, investment and risk-taking in that part of the economy which is not directly state-controlled'. 26 Foreign investors were provided encouragement and incentives. All this was a far cry from the pronouncement in the V.F.'s 1970 manifesto 'to re-structure the economy through state control of the entire Introduction to the Second Edition xxv economy in such a way that the public sector would be considerably extended'. None of these eleventh-hour efforts, however, had the desired impact. Even the discontented middle classes were hardly impressed, because they now perceived a suitable alternative in a reformed V.N.P. The unprecedented and sweeping victory scored by the U.N.P. at the general election of July 1977 was the electorate's expression of dis- satisfaction and protest against the V.F. government of Sirima Bandaranaike. The left, traditional and neo-revolutionary, fared even more disastrously than the S.L.F .P. (for further details and analyses, see chapter 4 on 'Political Behaviour and Political Forces'). The V.N.P.'s victory seemed indicative of a number of dominant tendencies in Sri Lanka's countryside (the U.N.P. has always had sizable urban support). Society, despite the radicalisation processes set in motion by the left and the S.L.F.P., continues to remain uncertain of itself in major sectors- probably deferential, with a willingness to accept the hierarchical ordering of the social structure, tradition-bound and generally con- servative. More relevant is the fact that there is no clear evidence as to whether the electorate's acceptance of the socialism of the S.L.F.P. is proof of radicalisation or a manifestation of the rural voter's readiness to welcome the more liberal benevolence of the S.L.F.P. conservative establishment, which in other respects is little different from the V.N.P. The new V.N.P. government's solutions to the unemployment and Tamil problems, which are examined in greater detail in chapter 3 ('Social and Economic Progress') and chapter 4 (,Political Behaviour and Political Forces'), mayor may not be successful, as these are dependent on a series of unpredictable variables. There is, firstly, the question of mobilising mass enthusiasm in the national development effort. This does not appear to be readily forthcoming. On the contrary, the battle lines between organised labour and employers are being clearly drawn, despite the V.N.P.'s plans to persuade labour to participate in management and profit sharing and to de-link the trade unions from political control. Furthermore, the U.N.P.'s policies, though satisfactory to the middle classes and entrepreneurs, do not necessarily appeal to the poverty belt. These policies could thus very well end up with the rich getting richer and the poor being obliged to remain content with peripheral benefits. In such a situation, the social gaps can widen to a point where they might never be bridged. That could seriously destabilise the system. Secondly, there is the problem of aid from foreign countries and international agencies. A right-of-centre government may prove a xxvi Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979 working proposition where the west is concerned, but there is no guarantee that investments will be protected for any length of time. Further, aid will not be provided for welfare purposes. As a precondition there will have to be considerable pruning of the welfare services. And the political consequences can be incalculable. Thirdly, Sri Lanka is pathetically dependent on the vagaries of the international market for prices for her export produce. No government in office can have complete control over the terms of trade. And export income determines the availability of not only consumer goods but com- ponent materials for local industries. Finally, the weather provides the greatest of imponderables-droughts and floods can ruin an otherwise good harvest. In such a situation, the Ceylon Tamil problem will receive low priority. Such an attitude, however, does not help to mollify growing Tamil nationalism. The U.N.P. government has invited the Ceylon Tamil bourgeoisie to join with it in the exploitation of the open economy. This will not provide the solution to the problem of the educated unemployed among the Ceylon Tamils. The question of a Sri Lankan economic miracle, therefore, is a matter for conjecture and justifiable doubt. There are important sections of opinion in Sri Lanka that raise warnings of a possible abandonment of Parliament if the U.N.P. government fails to solve the island's manifold problems. Whether Parliament will be eroded by the right-of-centre and centrist dements, or be transformed into an instrument to speedily implement a Marxist programme by a government ofthe left, is another question. Presumably the former will precede the latter. But in either case Parliament will cease to be the replica of the Westminster model that it has been to date. The defeat of the left, and its failure to secure a single seat in the legislature at the 1977 general election, should not be taken for its complete and permanent eradication from the political scene. It will remain a powerful political force, though for the time being outside Parliament. The solutions it will offer, should the U.N.P. or a 'national front' government comprising the U.N.P. and right-wing elements in the S.L.F.P. fail to regenerate the economy, may find acceptance with an electorate disillusioned with the kind of political merry-go-round that has been going on since 1956. The left's co-operation with the S.L.F.P. in the past should, in this context, not be discounted as sterile and devoid of benefits to itself. The fact that that co-operation resulted in the removal of formidable obstacles (the nationalisation of omnibus transport, the ports, the schools, the petroleum companies, banks, houses, the national press, Introduction to the Second Edition xxvii land and the company-owned estates) which could have stood in the way of its coming to power is evidence enough that the path is clearer than ever before for the resurgence of a new left that could well be an amalgam of traditional and neo-revolutionary groupings. Whether such a Marxist takeover will be by extra-parliamentary action or through the electoral process is a matter that will depend on the prevailing objective social, economic and political conditions in the country. The open economy and the free enterprise system, however, could, because of its own contradictions, promote such a resurgence, should it fail to solve the pressing problems of low living standards and educated unemployment. Introduction to the First Edition

Sri Lanka was the model British crown colony that made the transition from dependence to sovereign status without rancour or violence. Transfer of power was in stages and the island's political elites were, unlike in the case of other volatile societies in Asia and Africa, voluntarily put through a gradual process of political education and experience which taught them to exercise power with moderation and democratic fervour. It was the same with the electors, the island being the first among colonial territories to have universal franchise, years before independence, as early as in 1931. The Buddhist ethos and a continuing process of modernisation even up to present times have, through the years, contributed in no small measure to generate that tolerance and accommodation which are so necessary for the satis- factory functioning of parliamentary government. Our chapter dealing with the problems of Ceylonese society spells out in detail this process of give and take, of compromise and middle-path solutions which have in fact been the guidelines of Sri Lanka's political development since the beginning of the twentieth century. Whereas in other societies, communal and religious strife have become endemic and more the rule, in Sri Lanka these have, with one or two exceptions (the Sinhalese Buddhist-Muslim disturbances of 1915 and the Sinhalese-Tamil riots of 1958), been kept within the bounds of constitutional agitation, and on occasion extra-parliamentary but non-violent protests. The principle of buying off social discontent in order to stabilise political authority started by the British but taken over with more eagerness and less hesitation by Sri Lanka's political elites anxious to maintain themselves in the seats of power is today the insoluble problem of governments in office. The state as the supreme alms- giver is not very different from the Buddhistic view of gaining merit through the performance of good deeds. The system worked well as long as population remained at optimum levels and primary products brought good prices despite the vagaries of a fluctuating international xxviii Introduction to the First Edition xxix market. But it has reached the utmost limits with the expansion of population and the instability of export prices. Achieving a balance between economic development and the maintenance of welfare services is today the unanswerable political question. That is why we have detailed at some length the nature and mechanisms of economic and social progress in Chapter 3. In Sri Lanka, as in most political societies, but somewhat more so, politics is a question of economic well-being which in terms of governmental survival means nothing more than providing as many social services as possible to the vast majority of underprivileged people. In this way violence and revolution was postponed until only the other year (the 'Che Guevara' rebellion of April 1971), but the price has been, in terms of arrested balanced economic growth, almost disastrous. The fact is that the problems of Sri Lanka's multi-communal society are linked with her social and economic progress and these in turn underpin constitution and government as well as patterns of political conduct and behaviour. The question today is how long will the system last? Have we reached the limits of tolerance? Can democratic institutions survive in the context of rapid economic contraction? Political leaders pose a centralised state system of socialist democracy and a private-enterprise oriented democratic socialism as the possible alternatives. But survival is linked with increasingly pathetic dependence on assistance from the rival power blocs and international credit agencies. Nonalignment in foreign policy may suit a big nation such as India where the stakes are considerable, but will it pay much dividends to a strategic speck on the Indian Ocean? There is an unwillingness to face up to the realities due to a variety of considerations, chiefly economic and political. In the meanwhile the tendency is for governments especially of the post-1956 phase to lean on one side or the other while protesting to tread the middle path. Our chapter on foreign policy and defence arrangements seeks to describe this frustrating exercise which at times has tended towards self-stultification. In effect democracy and parliamentary institutions in Sri Lanka today can survive only as long as artificial economic respiration can be rendered by the nations of both power groups. But will either be satisfied with a 'non-commitment' that does not go far enough to support its interests on issues that could be vital to it? xxx Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979

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MODERN SRI LANKA Provincial Divisions end Principal Towns