Russian Duma Elections in the Territorial Districts: Explaining Patterns of Proliferation of Independent Candidates, 1993-1999
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Russian Duma Elections in the Territorial Districts: Explaining Patterns of Proliferation of Independent Candidates, 1993-1999 Carlo Gallo London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2004 2 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with me as its author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 88,082 words. Abstract In the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent candidates have proved remarkably successful in Russian parliamentary elections, more so than in other post-communist countries with comparable electoral systems. Existing explanations of the proliferation of the independents have been mostly cursorily and have focused on the national level, thus failing to address wide sub-national variations. This thesis presents a quantitative analysis of the sub-national variation in the proliferation of independent candidates in the first three Duma elections. A macro- political framework relies on aggregate data, with single-member districts constituting the units of analysis, in order to study how causal relationships vary across federal units. The phenomenon under study, i.e. independents’ success, is measured as the district vote share received collectively by non-partisans. Explanatory variables are measured at the level of federal units and electoral districts. Given that the data structure is hierarchical (i.e. districts are nested within regions) and that the proposed explanatory framework posits regional level effects, multi-level modelling provides the appropriate quantitative tool of analysis. The main findings include the positive impact of centre-regional conflicts on independents' success under institutional rules discouraging regionalist parties, and the growing importance of the political alignment of regional governors. 3 Contents FIGURES, TABLES AND MAPS ............................................................................................... 6 ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................ 9 RUSSIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTORAL BLOCS AND ASSOCIATIONS .............................. 9 OTHER .................................................................................................................................. 9 A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION ......................................................................................... 10 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ 11 1. INTRODUCTION: INDEPENDENTS, PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY ...................... 14 1.1 PARTIES, DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND FEDERAL STABILITY ......................... 16 Parties and democratic consolidation ................................................................. 17 Parties and federal stability ................................................................................. 20 1.2 RUSSIA AND THE OTHER PARTY SYSTEMS OF THE THIRD WAVE .............................. 22 Party system (under)institutionalisation .............................................................. 24 Patterns of independents' proliferation in Russian SMDs ................................... 27 1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................................... 40 CONCLUSION AND PLAN OF THE THESIS ............................................................................ 43 2. RUSSIAN PARTY UNDERDEVELOPMENT: THE EXISTING LITERATURE ....... 46 2.1 EARLY INVESTIGATIONS: FROM DESCRIPTION TO EXPLANATION (1988-1993) ........ 49 The causes of the initial underdevelopment ......................................................... 52 2.2 THE UNFOLDING OF PARTY POLITICS (1995-1999): PESSIMISTS AND OPTIMISTS ...... 64 2.3 TERRITORIAL DISTRICTS AND TERRITORIAL POLITICS .............................................. 69 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 77 3. EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................... 79 3.1 THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS: TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGES AND INDEPENDENTS' COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE ....................................................................................... 81 The independents' representation function .......................................................... 83 Contents 4 What is a territorial cleavage and what is it in the Russian context? ................. 87 3.2 THE MODERATING EFFECT OF CENTRAL APPEASEMENT AND (PSEUDO-)REGIONALIST PARTIES ..................................................................................................................... 90 (Pseudo-)regionalist and interregional parties ................................................... 91 Central response to regionalist demands ............................................................ 92 Sub-regional assertiveness? ................................................................................ 94 3.3 THE "SUPPLY SIDE": NOTABLE CANDIDATES AND PARTY CHALLENGERS ................. 96 Candidates' personal resources ........................................................................... 96 Party challenge .................................................................................................... 98 Geographic accessibility of regions..................................................................... 98 3.4 ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES ................................................................................ 100 The governor's support of Duma candidates ..................................................... 101 Governor's control of regional politics .............................................................. 101 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 103 4. FROM HYPOTHESES TO DATA: OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS ........................ 108 4.1 "MEASURING" REGIONALIST ASSERTIVENESS ........................................................ 110 Dowley's index ................................................................................................... 111 For a time-specific index ................................................................................... 114 Corroborating the index .................................................................................... 119 Central appeasement ......................................................................................... 124 4.2 THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE ELECTORAL MARKET ...................................................... 128 Notable candidates ............................................................................................ 128 Party challengers ............................................................................................... 131 The electoral process and Governor's involvement ........................................... 132 Urbanisation and Campaign access to districts ................................................ 135 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 137 5. DESIGNING THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ................................................................. 138 5.1 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND MEASUREMENT ................... 139 A) The district winner ........................................................................................ 142 B) Highest ranking ............................................................................................. 142 C) Average ranking ............................................................................................ 143 D) Total vote share ............................................................................................ 143 5.2 CASE SELECTION AND DATA STRUCTURE ............................................................... 145 Data structure: SMDs in regions ....................................................................... 146 Contents 5 SMDs socio-demographic characteristics ......................................................... 148 5.3 THE STUDY OF CONTEXT ......................................................................................... 150 Quantitative technique: Multilevel modelling ................................................... 152 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 158 6. THE 1993 DUMA ELECTIONS ....................................................................................... 160 6.1 BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 161 The contestants .................................................................................................