CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
1.0. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
Countries in transition to democracy are grappling with many contending models and concepts of democracy and governance. The debate over these and their applicability to African specificities and peculiarities is intense as in Nigeria. This study is a product of one of such intellectual engagements. In Nigeria, the euphoria for democratic change has become imperative that even military and civilian regimes have been influenced to embrace democracy. Moreover, democratization processes and discourses on democracy in Nigeria and other
African countries have also been influenced by the swift currents of globalization and events around the world, especially the demise of the Soviet Union and
Socialist democracy in some African countries influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideologies.
Since the onset of what Huntington (1991) dubbed as the ―third wave of democratization‖ in the late 1970s, intellectual pre-occupation with the concept and institutions of democracy has increased dramatically, especially in Africa, where a long history of brutal authoritarianism, and its systematic displacement since the 1990s, have raised serious concerns about the trials and tribulations of the processes of democratization. Hence, the New Partnership for Africa‘s
Development (NEPAD) in 2001, in its document stated that democracy and good
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governance are inevitable in Africa. NEPAD, therefore, in its Article 81, made proposal on democracy and good governance as follows:
. A series of commitments by participating countries to create or consolidate
basic governance processes and practices;
. An undertaking by participating countries to take the lead in supporting
initiatives that foster good governance and;
. The institutionalization of commitments through the New Partnership for
Africa‘s Development to ensure that the core values of the initiatives are
abided with.
To cultivate democracy and good governance, Article 83 of NEPAD‘S document states that leadership will engage in targeted capacity-building initiatives which will focus on:
. Administrative and civil services;
. Strengthening Parliamentary oversight;
. Promoting participatory decision-making;
. Adopting effective measure to combat corruption and embezzlement and;
. Undertaking judicial reforms.
Another novel inclusion in the democratization and good governance processes is the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which functions through the
Heads of State Forum. The APRM is meant to help uphold and standardize democratic and governance processes across the continent. According to the document on Article 84, the Heads of State Forum on the New Partnership for 2 Page
Africa‘s Development will serve as a mechanism through which the leadership of
NEPAD will periodically monitor and assess the progress made by African countries in meeting their commitment towards achieving good governance and social reforms.
The assumption that underpins these NEPAD‘s initiatives is that, through a process of self-assessment, African leaders, including Nigeria, will ensure that the standards that are expected of democratic governance are upheld in all participating states. The effectiveness of these initiatives will depend to a large extent on the collective moral pressure that African leaders can impose on their errant peers (Oche, 2004:64).
The contradictions, which have arisen from democratic transitions and processes of democratization, have led to increased interrogation of the relevance of the prevailing criteria specified by NEPAD. Paradoxically, democratic transition programmes in Africa in general, and Nigeria in particular, have been problematic. Though, various reforms had taken place in most African countries, the issue of corruption has evaded solution.
Moreover, the phenomenon of flawed elections in Africa, failing to meet the minimum criteria of multi-party democracy as proposed by Schumpeter (1942),
Ranney (1975), Dahl (1989) and Huntington (1997) has been a major challenge of democratization in Africa and Nigeria in particular. The result has engendered pseudo-democracy or what Bates (1994) has described as ―democracy without democrats.‖ 3 Page
The central argument of the thesis is that though democratization process may have opened up the closed political space, democracy is still under threat and far from ensuring popular empowerment of the Nigerian people.
1.1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The need to examine the historical and political foundations of democracy arises because they seem to be crucial in analyzing and explaining the democratization experience of Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. Though democratization process may have opened the closed political space, democracy is still under threat, in view of the fact that Nigeria emerged from prolonged military rule with profound legacies of militarizm and militarization of the polity.
Democratic practice, as experienced in Nigeria in the period being investigated, seems to be in partial compliance with the NEPAD‘s initiatives. Furthermore, there are, unavoidably, social, economic and political implications of the periodic eruption of violence witnessed in Nigeria‘s experience. The occurrence and persistent violence perpetrated by ethnic militia groups, such as the Oodua
People‘s Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) and police/para-military units are evidences of militarized polity even in the context of democracy.
Moreover, within the Nigerian pluralistic society, there are deep cleavages, cutting across ethnic, religious and socio-political lines as a consequence of which there is virtual absence of consensus on the fundamental issues that are necessary to unite Nigeria into a nation-state and for the promotion of 4 Page
democracy. This condition has not been helped by the existence of large groups of people especially amongst the political elite who have not adequately imbibed democratic values and beliefs. The consequences of the foregoing on the
Nigerian people have been negative. Hence, among the Nigerian people are wide-spread perception of deprivation, alienation, inequity, marginalization and neglect. This has been popularly seen as a lack of democratic dividends.
The consequences are disillusionment and frustration on the part of the discontented and the resultant manifestation of violent behaviour against the state and its symbols of authority putting democratic rule under threat.
From the foregoing, it becomes clear that discourse on democratization and sustenance of democracy in Nigeria needs to be fundamentally re-examined, so that illuminating ideas on how to promote democratic values and practices can be addressed. Hence, the need for this inquiry.
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The objectives of the study are to:
(i) Identify the challenges posed by militarized polity against democracy;
(ii) Evaluate the pattern and institutional foundation laid by the military
regimes for democratic process in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007;
(iii) Examine how the democratization process has influenced national
consciousness and the political participation of the citizenry;
(iv) Assess how Nigeria‘s democratization experience has prepared the
political elites for governance; 5 Page
(v) Examine how democratic practice in Nigeria has promoted
democratic dividends, good practice, political stability and economic
development.
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research is guided by the following research questions:
(i) What are the implications of militarized polity and economy on
democracy?
(ii) To what extent did the democratization process lay institutional and
behavioural foundations on which democracy can be sustained in
Nigeria?
(iii) How has the democratization process affected the level of national
consciousness and political participation of the citizens?
(iv) To what extent has Nigeria‘s political elites imbibed democratic
values for quality governance?
(v) To what extent has the political environment produced democratic
dividends and economic development?
1.4. RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS
This research work is based on the following assumptions:
(i) That democratization process is a change from the military dictatorship
to democratic governance;
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(ii) That democratization process is seen from the perspectives of setting up
civilian institutions, rules and practices that would result in preparing
political elites for democratic governance;
(iii) That the democratization process would promote national consciousness
and participation of the citizenry in democratic governance;
(iv) That political elites would imbibe democratic values and beliefs for good
governance;
(v) That the development of democratic values and culture would promote
the enabling environment for the realization of democratic dividends and
political stability.
1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The following are the significance of the study:
(i) This study will enable stakeholders to understand the nature and character
of the Nigerian State in pursuit of democratic process;
(ii) It will provide the basis for evaluating the progress of the democratization
process in new democratic nations such as Nigeria;
(iii) The findings of the study can also serve to promote national
consciousness and popular participation of citizens in the political process;
(iv) It will enable political elites to have in-depth understanding of how to
sustain the pursuit of democratic governance;
(v) The extensive critical survey of the literature will expand the scope of
knowledge in the field of democratization process in transitional polities in
Nigeria and other countries of the world.
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1.6. SCOPE AND DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY
The study focuses on democratization and sustenance of democracy in
Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. Specifically, the study focuses on the
following:
(i) Democratization and demilitarization of polity in Nigeria between 1999
and 2007, as prelude to democratic governance;
(ii) Patterns of democratization in terms of building new values and structures
in place of old order;
(iii) Establishment of institutions and super-imposing civilian authority on the
military and police, which would result to ―normal democratic life‖;
(iv) Establishment of rule of law and popular participation of citizens in
democratic practice or decision-making;
(v) The development of political education conducive to the realization of
democratic governance and its sustainability.
However, there were certain challenges encountered while collecting the primary and secondary data for the study. First, was the dearth of information as some documents were classified and statute-barred. Second, was the problem of logistics and geographical location of some respondents, especially from the federal, states and local government councils in Nigeria. There were also bureaucratic bottlenecks as well as the non-cooperation of some political elites during the period of data collection. However, in spite of these challenges, the study achieved its aims and objectives through the sampling and analytical methods undertaken by the study.
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1.7. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS
The following terms are defined as used in the context of the study:
CIVIL SOCIETY: This term refers to the registered electorates, charity organizations, non-governmental organizations, community groups, women‘s organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, human rights groups, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group. Civil society represents counter-weight of state power and serves as a critical agent of democratization.
DEMOCRACY: The concept of democracy has been given different interpretations by various scholars because of its dynamic nature and changes in the society. There are many definitions and many types of democracy practised all over the world. Democracy is a complex, ambiguous term and one which, of course, carries evaluative overtones. Most states claim to be democratic. In this study, democracy refers to liberal democracy. It means a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives. It contains certain principles and characteristics, that is, its procedure and institutional arrangement. Institutions are necessary for the realization of principles. Without principles, the institutions might be reduced to mere formality. The two must go together. Liberal democracy works on certain principles and certain mechanisms. These include government by consent, public
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accountability, majority rule, recognition of minority rights and constitutional government.
DEMOCRATIZATION: This refers to the establishment of a democratic political regime. It involves a conscious attempt to re-direct the social value system as well as individual behaviour to democratic norms, beliefs and culture.
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS: This refers to transition from military dictatorship to liberal democracy. It involves activities geared towards instituting new values and structures in place of the old order. This includes:
. Military disengagement from politics or demilitarization;
. Setting up of civilian institutions, rules and practices which would result in
normal democratic life;
. Development of attitudinal dispositions conducive to the realization of
democratic governance.
DEMOCRATIC CULTURE: This refers to the values, orientations, attitudinal dispositions, beliefs and practices required for the sustainability of democracy.
These are vital for the effective functioning of democratic structures and institutions. Democratic culture promotes good governance.
POLITICAL ECONOMY: Political economy emphasizes the dynamic and dialectical (causal relation within the domestic system and between it and external variables) character of social phenomena. It sees society in a condition of constant change, the change being propelled by the conflicts resulting from the 10 Page
interdependence and interconnectedness of various facets of our social and material existence in which the various classes play a role, the conflict being resolved for the better or the worse.
POLITICAL EDUCATION: Political education in a democracy involves conscious efforts for and by citizens to acquire cognitive, procedural and habitual democratic skills. Cognitive skills ensure a certain level of awareness of the political system‘s institutional structures, an understanding of functions within the system and the capacity to draw on empirical knowledge when assessing the impacts of a given political decision on group political interests. Procedural skills afford citizens the necessary knowledge and capacity to participate actively in the opportunities available for influencing political decisions. Habitual skills, on their part, are attitudinal; they are virtues that citizens possess and are ready to contribute to society in order to secure its survival.
POLITICAL STAKEHOLDERS: These refer to individuals, groups, politicians, officeholders and the electorates who participate in the political process.
TRANSITION: This refers to the transfer of state power from military to liberal democratic government. It also includes military disengagement from politics and demilitarization.
SUSTENANCE OF DEMOCRACY: The term describes the challenge of making new democracies secure and extending their life expectancy against military take-over of government. It also involves consolidation of behavioural and
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institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty.
GOOD GOVERNANCE: This refers to the urge to steer state and society according to defined rules and procedures, and ensuring that governance in all its ramifications serves the interest of the greatest number of people in society through a collective and participatory endeavour.
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REFERENCES
Bates, R. H. (1994). ―The Impulse for Reform in Africa,‖ in Jennifer A. Widner
(eds.). Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Africa. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth
Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
------(1997). ―Democracy for the Long Haul‖, in Larry Diamond,
Marc Plattner Yun-han Chu and Hun-mao Tien (eds.). Consolidating the Third
Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore and London: John
Hopkins University.
Oche, O. (2004). ―NEPAD: The Challenges of Democracy and Good
Governance‖, in NEPAD in the Dock. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs. NIIA.
Ranney, A. (1975). The Governing of Men: The Dryden Press, Hinsdale, Illinois.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York:
Harper and Row.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.0. LITERATURE REVIEW
Analyses and discourses on the issues of democratization and sustenance of democracy in the literature are widely spread across the globe. However, recent changes around the world have been more significant than the global spread of democratic governance. Though democratization has been an encouraging trend in many regions, countries that undertake democratic political reforms have no assurances that democratization will be long lasting, or that change of regime will produce desired improvements in the quality of governance (Anyang, 1992:105).
Many new democracies face immediate challenges of survival, as governments struggle to maintain constitutional rule and electoral processes that are threatened by conflict, military coups, or aspiring dictators waiting in the wings.
The long-term challenges include the question of how to improve the quality and depth of democracy, broaden personal freedom and encourage genuine political competition. By creating regular channels for political competition, with opportunities for citizens to evaluate and change leaders, elections represent a cornerstone of democratic rule, having become a litmus test for distinguishing democracies from other types of governments (Adeleke,2007:153).
Efforts to install democracy in African Countries are powerfully shaped by the continent‘s recent political and institutional legacies. In Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative Perspective, Bratton and Van De 14 Page
Walle (1997), analyzed the significant political reforms undertaken by some 40
(forty) out of 47 (forty-seven) sub-Saharan countries in the early 1990s, which included the first competitive elections in a generation. How can this wave of political liberalization be explained? Why did some countries complete a democratic transition, whereas others sustained only limited political reform or suffered authoritarian reversals? What are the long-term prospects for democracy in Africa? In the first study of its kind for sub-Saharan Africa, the authors propose systematic answers to these questions from a cross-national, comparative perspective and in the light of prevailing theories of democratization.
Drawing on an original quantitative data set, they demonstrate that economic and international factors provide the context in which political liberalization occurred, but do not by themselves explain observed outcomes. More powerful explanatory factors include the extent to which political participation and political competition were institutionalized under old authoritarian regimes, as well as political interventions by mass protesters and military forces during regime transitions themselves. The authors weave these factors into a theoretical framework that explains regime transitions principally in terms of Africa‘s heritage of neo- patrimonial rule.
The democratic quake which began in the Iberian Peninsula in the mid – 1970s, referred to as ―The Third Wave‖ by Huntington (1991) has engulfed the whole world. The unusual feature of this democratic ecumenism is that it leaves Africa no choice: to democratize is to discard everything which is African politically, the
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good and the not so good: and not to democratize is to play no part in contemporary world politics. Faced with this choice between the epidemic and the plague, including the new policy of Western countries by which they no longer extend economic aid to countries that will not democratize, authoritarian Africa is democratizing, albeit reluctantly. Democracy is understood in our context here as simply political pluralism formally introduced into a system through free and fair multi-party elections, and sustained thereafter, by a vibrant civil society (assisted by a reasonably critical press) that demands and secures accountability from public office holders.
Authoritarian African states have travelled towards democracy through several identifiable routes, which Omoruyi (1994:85-95) refers to as models. We mention only three of these. First, is the constitutional/national conference model, characteristic of Francophone Africa. Second, is the civil war model witnessed in
Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Ethiopia, Somalia, Algeria and others.
Third, is the model in which a sitting Head of State, under domestic and/or international pressure, calls multi-party elections as in Zambia, Kenya,
Cameroun, and others. Of course, there have been transitions to democracy which were clearly admixtures or mutant forms of some or all of these models.
Democratization in its simplest term is the process of moving from an authoritarian one-party system or military dictatorship to a democratic multi-party political system. It connotes political liberalization of the avenues of decision
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making. It is a process which attracts the participation of the greatest number of the citizenry in political decision-making.
Democratization drive aims at the establishment of democratic values geared towards the increased participation of the populace in decision-making. It is dependent on the expansion of societal values and structures to facilitate the increased participation in the exercise of state power. In most cases, this process required a transition agenda that clearly spelt out the process of democratization.
Such a process could be dictated by the geographic, demographic, cultural and past experiences of a given polity (Diane, 1990).
Democratization has to be seen from three interrelated perspectives:
(i) the military disengagement from politics or demilitarization;
(ii) the process of setting up civilian institutions, rules and practices
which should result to ―normal democratic life‖ and;
(iii) the development of the attitudinal dispositions conducive to the
realization of democratic governance.
Demilitarization could also be referred to as ‗military disengagement,‘‗re- civilianisation‘ and ‗re-democratization‘ or ‗re-equilibration‘. The rationale behind this type of regime transformation rests on the premises that military rule is a temporary arrangement put in when civilian politicians prove incapable of governing a country. Thus, the Military only intervenes to put the country on the right path and direction, after which they withdraw to the barracks. In effect,
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military rule is highly temporary and transitory by nature. This presupposes an orderly planning of the transfer process.
Democratization programme encompasses a fundamental or qualitative change in the state of being of the relevant entity as for example the revolutionary overturning of prevailing structures and relationships in a society and their replacement with a significantly new, and usually qualitatively higher network of ideas and symbols. Democratization, in this sense constitutes an epoch defining experience with boundary transcending and barrier breaking qualities which always result in definite change of place, nature and state of being of the subjects that experienced it. As a social policy, therefore, democratization involves a conscious attempt at re-directing the social value systems as well as individual behaviour (within it) to new ends (Diamond, 1999).
Democratization process, in other words, can be conceptualized as involving all activities geared towards instituting new values and structures in place of the old order (Sambo, 1994:213). Democratization process can also be conceptualized to mean leadership or elements of the society with or without meaningful socio- political reconstruction. This conceptualization of democratization entails either a grafting of new values on an extant social system or worse still, an aversion for new values and a defence of the same old, even if despised and inappropriate practices and behavioural patterns.
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Nigeria‘s transition to democracy under President Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida does not fall into any of these models. It was a programmed transition in its own class, and, arguably, the roller-coaster effect of a response to the abortion of a
Nigerian democratic dream consummated first by the civilian government of
President Shehu Shagari and second by the military regime of General
Muhammadu Buhari, which, rather than reinstate democracy after Shagari, aborted it even further (Adejumobi and Bujra, 2002). Transition to Democracy in
Nigeria (1985-1993), is an academic and fairly detailed study of the Babangida
Administration‘s programme of transition to democracy, the roles of the National
Democratic Coalition (NADECO) for the revalidation of the annulled June 12,
1993 Presidential Election during the military regime of General Sani Abacha in
Nigeria was so significant in the democratization process as it aimed at the transfer of state power from military to liberal democratic government.
Olugbemi (1996:49) conceptualized democratization as a transformative process involving the installation of consciously designed structures, procedures and rules to transform an authoritarian and such-like regimes into a democracy defined as a political order/system in which:
(i) There is a high degree of openness in the conduct of public affairs;
(ii) Equality of citizens and other civil liberties are guaranteed;
(iii) Governance as well as the exercise of authority is anchored upon
the consent of the governed;
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(iv) Citizens are afforded wide opportunities for participation in the
political process and more particularly in the leadership recruitment
and selection processes;
(v) Those in authority are accountable to the body of citizens through
the process of periodic elections amongst others;
(vi) The citizens is not unduly (unlawful) impaired in the exercise and
enjoyment of his liberties and;
(vii) The rule of law in state-society as well as in interpersonal relations
is guaranteed and respected.
This type of system-wide transformation is but one variant of the democratization process. It is reflected in what is now called the ―wave of democratization‖ whose successful cresting brought the number of ―free Countries‖ to 76 by December,
1994. Its success in Eastern Europe reflected in the collapse of communism in that area explains the glee with which Plattner and Diamond (1995:4), proclaimed communism as ―dead‖. The globalization of democracy may soon transform the world into a mono-ideological village (Fukuyama, 1992:5-14) with all the features of democracy as enumerated above.
Olugbemi (1996:49) further states that the other type of democratization found more readily in the older democracies is piece-meal in character, and hence, more restricted in scope and unit. It is directed in the main, at opening and expanding support motives in existing features for the sole purpose of strengthening the democratic ideal. The examples of it, include the setting-up of
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legal limits upon individual contributions to the electoral expenses of a party, group or individual, control of air-time on the electronic media during election campaigns as a means of ensuring equity and fairness to all parties to the contest; and the apportionment and re-apportionment programmes designed to equalize electoral opportunities between competing parties and individuals. The important process that no country, old or new, has attained or may even attain, its optimum, and that there will, therefore, always be room everywhere for improving and strengthening the system.
In Nigeria, the military government of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida started a programme of democratization in 1987 that was supposed to usher in a democratically elected civilian government in 1993. This programme was aborted halfway owing to the insincerity of the administration to hand over to a civilian president. This was designed by the military President to prolong military rule.
In Africa, the democratic transitions are so divergent and complex to be easily classified. These categorizations are so broad to obscure the distinct patterns of democratic transition in Africa. A categorization is, therefore, preferred with an additional category. He identified three patterns of transition to democracy based on the procedure for phasing off dictatorship or the mode of instituting democratic pluralism. These are the transition to democracy through:
(i) negotiation;
(ii) imposition of democratization from outside and;
(iii) granting democracy.
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In addition, these patterns are not homogenous and in-exhaustive of patterns in transition to higher democratic order beyond mere multi-partism. Transition to democracy through negotiation involved the authoritarian or dictatorial-one party military-regimes engaging in a rewarding discussion with the cross-section of the social and political forces on how to peacefully transit to democracy. The second, is the imposition of democratization from outside. Democratization has been viewed as the political conditionality, for economic aid from the western nations.
The west has increasingly tied the extension of aid to democratization from military and or one party rule and or personal rule to pluralistic and multi-party.
The third pattern which is not pattern of democratic transition as such, as it relates more to perfecting existing democratic structures in existing democracies.
The concern in this is not the desire for democratic pluralism, but the desire to develop, strengthen and improve it. The Senegalese example is apt here.
Senegal among other few African countries has a history of multi-party politics.
The general belief notwithstanding, for some, the quality of democracy is viewed as second and even third-rated. Although, Senegal was for several years more democratic, tolerant and pluralistic than other countries, has a vibrant opposition press and relatively liberal laws among other democratic ethos, the Senegalese situation does not preclude further transition (Baker, 1942).
How can the progress achieved by democracy in this state be sustained or made irreversible? provides a summary of the various criteria, principles and categories
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of transformation that favour democratic consolidation. The synthesis of the two prescriptions is useful for our purpose with greater reliance on Lijphart (1977:32).
To him, the existence of the democratic state, a democratic society and other presence of neighbouring democratic states are essential for an enduring democracy. To him, the democratic state is a bedrock as it offers the institutional structure that enables democracy to flourish. Therefore, a democratic revolution can only succeed if it is immediately put to use to further the purpose of a new state – protection of new democratic values. Such a state must be based on certain principles and rules that are essential for a worthwhile democracy.
The term democracy is not easy to define. Many different interpretations have been given because of the dynamic nature of the society. It is not surprising, therefore, that the definition of democracy has continued to be a subject of debate. The literal meaning of democracy as defined by President Abraham
Lincoln of the United States simply is government of the people, by the people and for the people. This speaks of democracy as government in accordance with the people‘s preferences (Lijphart, 1999:11), An ideal democratic government would be one whose actions are always in perfect correspondence with the preferences of all its citizens.
In most formulations of democracy, widespread participation by the population in influencing important political decisions is a recurring feature: In the definitions of liberal and representative democracy, for example, the designations and control of the leaders by the electorates is the key element. One writer, Dahl (1971) has
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used the term ―polyarchy‖ to refer to regimes which provide for extensive participation and a choice or competition between teams of leaders. These are systems which provide for a continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens considered as political equals; such institutions as: political parties, pressure groups and competitive elections, and such procedures as limits on government, constitutionalism, and so on, are means to this end.
However, there are other definitions of democracy, which look at the meaning of democracy in terms of majoritarian and consensus models. The majoritarian model of democracy means ―government by the majority of the people‖ (Lijphart,
1999:21). It argues that majorities should govern and that minorities should oppose. Democracy is in different perspectives. Some forms of democracy arise because of different political ideologies. There is socialist democracy and liberal democracy. Democracy, according to Schumpeter (1942:26), is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people‘s vote, independent of judiciary, bill of fundamental human rights, a free market economy and a two or multi-party system, in which every party has a chance of coming to power through periodic elections.
Democracy has become a much-abused concept even as it has gained a lot of currency across the globe. It continues to provide legitimacy for an array of regimes across the globe. Ake (1996a:5) argues that democracy has been
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devalued in order to make it convenient and less threatening to those in power or demanding on anyone. He went further:
Democracy spreads because it has been rendered meaningless
and innocuous without losing its symbolic value. While it spreads,
our world is more repressive. After the Cold War, there is only one
power bloc whose leaders act as though might is right. There is only
one ideology, liberal democracy, only one religion, market forces.
What exactly is democracy and what is the link with the concept of good governance? As Held (1993) has observed, democratic theory has been mired in an unresolved conflict between two meanings. The first conceives democracy as some kind of popular power, a kind of politics in which citizens are engaged in self-government and self-regulation. This perspective holds the view that democracy has a basic intent and objectives. These intents such as individual liberty, equality of citizens, fundamental rights can be realised within a variety of processes. Democratic government must be dedicated to the well-being of the people who should be able to hold leaders accountable and make them (the people) express their wishes and respond to their needs. The second perspective views democracy as an aid to decision-making, that is, a means of conferring authority on those periodically voted into office. Democracy through voting aggregates interest and expresses policy preference. The emphasis here is process; those institutions and processes designed to ensure the happiness of society as a whole while not trampling on individual liberty. These two ways of
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viewing democracy has led to the emergence of three models of democracy. The first is a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly involved. This is the original form that democracy took in the Greek city- state of Athens and is referred to as direct democracy. Direct democracy is indeed the foundation of republican government. The ideals of the Athenian polis include equality among citizens, liberty, and respect for law and justice. Citizen- governors (the demos) participate in public affairs by carrying out legislative and judicial functions. These citizens‘ participation is underlined by a commitment to the principle of civic virtue. The latter involved dedication to the republic and subordination of private life to public affairs (Anifowose and Aiyede, 2004).
With the emergence of empires, Athens was eclipsed and its democratic republican legacy was recovered only in the early renaissance, carried over in the city-states of Italy. Republican ideas of the Renaissance emphasise self- government as the basis of liberty, together with the right of citizens to participate in the government of their own common business. This was the case because the renaissance ideas of republicanism were later challenged on grounds of their alleged susceptibility to instability and were eventually supplanted by the rise of
Christian theocracies in the Middle Ages. The contradictions of the Christian theocracies in turn called forth the need to separate church and state in the sixteenth century. Debates on the church and state produced new ideas on the nature and limits of political authority, including the question of law, rights and duties, and how these are to be realised through public institutions. Thus, from the practical needs to operationalise democratic principles within an increasingly
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capitalist economic system emerged representative democracy. This brings us to the second model of democracy – Liberal democracy (Anifowose and Aiyede,
2004).
Liberal or representative democracy is hinged on the fact that private property suggests the need for authority in the form of a state that monopolises the means of coercion, the need for a sovereign power to secure the basis of trade, commerce, religion and the prosperity of the family. It also recognises that such a state holds the possibility of despotic rule by those invested with authority.
Representative democracy was therefore the institutional structure that it devised to protect individual liberty and at the same time ensure the general welfare.
Thus, liberalism moved democracy from being an association of active citizens in assemblies and public meetings to the process whereby citizens periodically elect representatives who determine and enforce the general will. Thus, the role of voting in the election of representatives into government becomes the most important element of democracy. Government is then conceived as a neutral umpire or referee among individuals and groups in civil society competing to realize their own interests within a framework of the rule of law (Bentley 1908).
Thus, liberal or representative democracy in the 20th century became ―a cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broadest participation of the majority in the selection of representative who alone can make political decisions‖ (Held
1998:20-21). Various marginalized groups in Germany, Italy, Spain and United
States expanded the broadness of the majority in these democracies only through struggle.
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Held (1993:21) identifies the third model as one party or Marxist democracy. This model takes off from the view that the ideals of ‗liberty, equality and justice‘ that produce the liberal tradition could not be ―realized by ‗free‘ struggles for votes in the political system together with the ‗free‘ struggle for profit in the market place‖.
The failure of liberalism to achieve these ideals is attributed to the dynamics of capitalism that produces systematic inequality and thereby limits individual freedom. There is also the tendency of inequalities and constraints in economic production, especially in capitalist societies, to abridge the realisation of justice and liberty. Thus, the state, instead of being neutral, has become the expression of the interest of the dominant class, thereby preventing the complete democratization of the society. As such, political participation, freedom and government accountability is limited by representation. Marx calls for a
―commune structure‖ in which society is broken into small self-governing committees who then send their representatives to larger administrative units such as districts. The districts in turn send their representatives to the national government. This pyramid structure of delegated democracy would restore self- reliance and freedom. It is Important to note that the number of countries meeting at least the requirements for electoral democracy in the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet and East European Communism and the diffusion of the wave of democratization in Sub- Saharan Africa has increased.
In Marxist-Leninist practice, the communists party represented this pyramid structure. In some African countries a variant of single party was considered ideal for meeting the demands of development in the post independence era in several
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states like Kenya, Malawi, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Tanzania some of which also adopted some form of socialism. The basic problem with this form of democracy is seen in the failure of socialism and development as practised in these countries (Thompson, 2000).
This conceptualization of democracy represents the liberalist view of democracy with the belief that there are free and fair elections as well as the institutionalisation of opposition. This is aptly supported by Dudley (1973:75), who argues that for the institutionalisation of democracy to be achieved, there should be participation by the citizens in deciding who rules and how decisions are made, equality of all citizens as implied in the rule of law, accountability and responsiveness of the leaders, freedom of speech and association and social justice, which involves treating individuals and groups fairly and justly.
For the Socialists and Marxists school of thought, democracy is tantamount to all power belonging to the people, which can only be ensured if they collectively own and control the means of production, thereby depriving the ―bourgeoisie‖ of all power. Marxist scholars argues further that the minority capitalists, who own the means of production in capitalist democracies actually rule, while creating erroneous impression that they can do a great deal, whereas, in actual fact, it is nothing more than a deceit. The masses can do nothing because all the wealth and capital are in the hands of ―bourgeosie‖ class. To Lenin (1977), bourgeosie democracy means the institutionalized suppression of the working class by the
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bourgeosie, with the conclusion that true democracy is possible only if class domination is eliminated.
The political reforms, which followed in the wake of the civil war in England in the
17th Century and the success of the forces led by Cromwell against the
Monarchy, made the evolving British political system, especially the British
Parliament, a model of representative legislatures and elected governments in
Europe. The phenomenon of industrial revolution provided the socio-economic context for the dramatic political changes that occurred, as the new propertied class, the bourgeoisie, began to assert itself, counter balance the powers of the monarchy and other remnants of the feudal establishment, and play decisive roles in politics and governance through elected representatives (Ujo, 2000).
The American Revolution, which culminated in the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and the establishment of a federal, constitutional democracy with a unique system of checks and balances of power; as well as, the French
Revolution of 1789, which displaced ―the grandest and proudest of the monarchies of the old regime‖ (Fontana, 1993:107) and replaced it with a republican form of government, with a grand declaration of the rights of man and citizen, provided the impetus for the spread and consolidation of modern notions of liberal, representative, democracy based on the ideology of free enterprise and capitalism (Lijphart, 1994).
By the end of the 19th Century, every major European Monarchy had adopted a constitution and given considerable power to the people, through elected 30 Page
representatives. The development of modern democratic institutions in the USA later became the key model for many nation-states and its version of liberal democracy became prevalent especially in the Third World countries (Dunn,
1993).
Discourses by 18th and 19th Centuries political theorists on: how best to protect individual liberties; whether it is possible to establish similar systems of popular sovereignty, as in the republican city-states, in large-scale territories covered by modern nation-states; and how to create a ―social contract‖ binding citizens to the modern nation-state, provided the philosophical and theoretical contexts of the rise of modern western liberal conceptions of democracy. In particular, political philosophers, especially, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Locke, Tocqueville, Burke and
Mill, helped to foster the change from classical to modern notions of democracy
(Appadorai, 1975).
In its classical formulation, democracy means broad-based and active participation of all those defined as citizens in the conduct of their public affairs in the polis. In the context of relatively small ancient Greek and Roman city-states, relatively large popular participation of citizens was possible, although governance still required some form of delegation of authority and representation
(Jega, 2005).
However, in the modern context, where nation-states are large, covering extensive territories and populations, and often plural ethnically and religiously, if not linguistically, modern formulations of democracy place less emphasis on 31 Page
direct popular participation, which was the major attribute of the classical notion.
Instead, they place greater emphasis on personal liberty, popular sovereignty and representative government, with entrenched checks and balances to reduce or eliminate arbitrariness and abuses of power (Jega, 2005).
In this context, all notions of democracy being ―rule of the people by the people for the people‖, seems very ambiguous and only relative, if not metaphorical.
Rather it would seem better to perceive western liberal democracy as at best, a system of elected representation in which the representatives are supposed to be responsible and accountable to the people who elected them to represent them.
That is, elected representatives, delegates with mandates, which mandates can be given or withdrawn during elections; representatives or delegates, so mandated, chosen through periodic elections, which are supposed to be free and fair; an elections based on affiliations to political parties on whose platform candidates canvass for support for election into public office.
Indeed, the capitalist ideology, which underpins the western liberal conception of democracy, is antithetical to very broad-based popular participation. The history of the evolution of parliaments and representative governments all over Europe and the Americas has shown that, participation was qualified by property or tax; certain groups were excluded; suffrage was restricted, for example, women did not vote until the 20th Century (Nwala, 1997). The dynamics of the evolution of democracy has led some leading western scholars to define democracy as either
―the rule of politician‖ (Schumpeter, 1950) or as ―polyarchy‖ (Dahl, 1971), to
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emphasize its real manifestations rather than its ideal conceptualization. Others have theorized on the elitist character of modern democracy, such as Michel‘s
―iron law of oligarchy‖, or Mosca‘s the ―ruling class‖.
From the ancient to modern times, the basic key institutions, which have accompanied the theory and practice of democracy, are those that discharge executive, legislative and judicial functions. These institutions were often embodied in a constitution, which defines their roles and gives them legitimacy.
In ancient Greece and in the Italian City-Republics, there were distinct institutions, which have defined functions and responsibilities, be they executive, legislative or judicial. However, the definitions and specifications of functions are not so often very clear-cut, as in modern times. For example, the Solon and
Kleisthenes Councils were not only essentially coordinative and executive, but they also had some sort of legislative roles, for example in the sense that the
Council also served as a committee that prepared the business of the Assembly.
The magistrates had clearly judicial and appellate roles, in many respects similar to what obtained in the Italian City-Republics (Jega, 2005).
In modern times, with few exceptions, these institutions and the constitutional framework, which define their roles and relationships, have subsisted. By and large, there is greater separation of powers amongst various levels and arms of government, especially between the executive, the legislature and judiciary.
However, even in this context, the separation is more clearly demarcated in some countries than in others. For example, there is some sort of overlapping of
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functions between the executive or cabinet and the legislature or parliament in
Britain, given the cabinet ministers‘ membership of the House of Commons. On the other hand, in the USA, the executive, the judiciary and the legislature have clearly defined and separated powers, which are constitutionally, carefully defined and balanced against one another (Douglas, 1989).
Among the major democratic institutions, which emerged in modern times, without classical antecedents, are political parties, which aggregate interests into the political terrain and seek to mobilize and rally support for the candidates they offer for election into public offices (Holden, 1988). As they emerged, operated and developed in the Anglo-American tradition, they revolved from parties of
―individual representation‖ to those of ―mass integration‖, from bourgeois interest aggregation and representation, to mass, ―catch-all peoples‖ participation
(Kirchheimer, 1977). Although over time, political parties played different roles in different societies, essentially, they primarily helped to form broad coalitions of interest groups and narrow down the choices of policy and personnel for the electorate, and ―structure the vote‖. Political parties also serve as pressure groups, although their being a platform for contestation for elective offices distinguishes them from ordinary run-of-the-mill pressure groups, such as professional associations, labour unions and other non-governmental organizations.
Reviewing the historical origins and philosophical foundations of democracy, as has been demonstrated before, is much easier than attempting to provide a more
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precise definition of democracy. As democracy evolved and spread worldwide as the dominant system of political organization in modern nation-states, attempts to conceptualize and theorize on it have become too amorphous and imprecise with the result that democracy is now, a heavily contested albeit over flogged concept.
Not only are there numerous, often contradictory definitions of the concept, it also seems to mean different things to different people, as illustrated by the following formulations: ―Peoples Democracy‖, ―Guided Democracy‖, ―Peoples Democratic
Dictatorship‖ (Chinese) (Jega, 2005).
If there is any consensus on what democracy means, it is perhaps in relation to the understanding that it is not personal rule, and that it is different from authoritarian / dictatorial rule. Also, it can be said that democracy is based on some form of participation and/or representation. It is assumed that in a democratic political system, government derives legitimacy from the people.
Government also exercises authority within the framework of a body of supreme laws called the constitution. Citizens have equal political rights to vote and be voted for (Eckstein, 1965).
There are three main models of democracy, along one of which many modern nations – states predicate their political systems, and which have dominated intellectual discourses and theorizing on democracy. These are: Liberal
Democracy, Socialist Democracy and Direct Democracy.
The dominant model, historically and contemporarily, in terms of the number of countries who have used, or are using it, is Liberal democracy. It is predicated on 35 Page
the following features/principles: individual freedom; equality before the law; universal suffrage (voting rights); election and representation. Additional features include: popular sovereignty; popular representation; majority government; guarantee of freedom (basic); consensus and accommodation; peaceful resolution of disputes; capitalism/free enterprise; and free market (Huntington,
1984).
Liberal democracy is also variously referred to as Bourgeois democracy, Elitist democracy, etc. In conceptualizing Liberal democracy, three categories of definitions can be identified in the literature as follows: i. Formal (procedural): define democracy according to rules and meaning of
politics (Minimalist); ii. Substantive or ―Real‖, define democracy in terms of
outcome of politics (Maximalist); iii. Middle – Range: define democracy as a balance of rules and outcomes.
According to Mainwaring (1992), formal or procedural definitions of democracy are derived from Schumpeter‘s early formulation as follows:
The democratic method is that institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions
in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of competitive struggle
for the people‘s vote (Schumpeter,1950:50).
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Most subsequent definitions modified Schumpeter‘s by adding for example, universal suffrage, which he neglected (Mainwaring, 1992:297). Robert Dahl‘s conception of polyarchy (1971) illustrates this.
Another example of a formal definition of democracy by Holden is that it is:
A political system in which the whole people,
positively or negatively, make, and are entitled
to make, the basic determining decisions on
important matters of public policy (Holden,
1988:5 quoted in Mainwaring, 1992:273-4).
Formal democracy obtains where the following, considered to be the minimal requirements exist: i. Basic freedoms are guaranteed; ii. Universal suffrage exist; iii. Multiparty system operates; iv. Periodic, ‗free and fair‘ elections are held and; v. Governance is based on the rule of law.
It does not matter who is elected, how narrow the electoral base is or how poorly government meets basic needs and aspirations. Once it can be said that these conditions exist, for the inimalists, democracy exists (Francis, 1995).
On the other hand, Substantive democracy, according to Martin (1993:7):
Goes beyond the formal trappings of democratic
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political systems (such as multipartism and
elections) to include such elements as accountability
and genuine popular participation in the nation‘s
political and economic decision-making processes.
In this conceptualization, a political system can be considered to be substantively democratic if it ensures socio-economic empowerment of the masses; if it is popularly – driven; if the leaders have a mass popular support and electoral base; and if it properly invests power with popular legitimacy; in addition to having formal/procedural attributes. In between formal and substantive conceptions of democracy falls what has been dubbed as middle of the range definitions of democracy. An example of these is Karl‘s (1990:2) definition of democracy as:
A set of institutions that permits the entire adult
population to act as citizens by choosing their
leading decision-makers in competitive, fair
and regularly scheduled elections which are
held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees
for political freedom, and limited military prerogatives.
The middle of the range definitions have several dimensions, such as: i. Contestation over policy and political competition for office; ii. Participation of the citizenry through partisan, associational and other forms
of collective action;
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iii. Accountability of rulers to the ruled through mechanisms of representations
and the rule of law and; iv. Civilian control over the military.
Socialist democracy, in contrast to Liberal democracy, is a conception of democracy based on Marxist-Leninist principles and popularized by the attempts of socialist countries to pose their political systems as credible alternatives to the western liberal democratic model. There were as many versions of Socialist
Democracy, as were socialist countries, ranging for example, from the Soviet, to
Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban and Tanzanian varieties. Essentially, these conceptions of democracy sought to prove that democracy is not only rooted in western values and capitalist ideology; but that it also has roots in the socialist and Marxist-Leninist ideologies. It sought to justify the differences between governance processes in capitalist and socialist countries on the basis of ideological differences (Hook, 1955).
A critical element in the theoretical formulation of socialist democracy is mass, popular participation and notions of equity in the distribution of societal resources. It seeks to counter the elitist aspects of Liberal democracy and the material base of involvement in representative democracy. In practice, however, this was breached, if not negated by other central aspects of Marxist-Leninist ideology, such as ―dictatorship of the proletariat‖ and ―democratic centralism‖ and the Chinese concept of ―Peoples Democratic Dictatorship‖. The politics of the cold war era and the authoritarian dispositions of many socialist regimes led to excessive denials of personal liberties and freedoms and erosion of any forms of 39 Page
democratic conduct and governance in many of these countries. The gains made in social welfare and service provisioning was, soon, eroded by excessive suppression and oppression, and systematic exclusion of minorities and
―dissidents‖ from the political process in so-called socialist democracies. Even the formal procedural elements, such as competitive elections, voting, membership of political parties, and participation, became highly restrictive, and citizens in many socialist countries became demobilized from political participation by either fear or apathy.
Direct Democracy, is the third model of democracy, which has been popularized by Libyans since the publication of the Libyan leader‘s Green Book decades ago.
It is essentially based on the notion that there is a third way of organizing politics and political systems, an alternative mode of political organization, which is neither based on the Western European Capitalist Ideology, nor on the East
European Socialist Ideology. It is instructive that the Green Book seems to promote the notion of ―positive neutrality‖, which fitted the framework of the struggles of the non-aligned countries in the beat of the cold war and super- power contestations for influence in the Third World countries. It seems to be predicated on a populist ideology of mass mobilization for organized, popular and active participation of citizens in their common affairs. Emphasis is placed on unity of purpose, some sort of corporatism and transparency and accountability in the management of resources and in discharging publicly assigned responsibilities as well as the conduct of public affairs in community based, popularly elected committees.
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The dividing line between this conception of ―direct democracy‖ and other notions of ―popular democracy‖ or ―participatory democracy‖ seems to be everything, especially as it uses institutions, which emanated from western liberal democracy, and as the major distinguishing characteristic of the model seems to be a mobilized citizenry for active involvement in taking their destiny into their own hands. However, its philosophical underpinnings seem to have aspects and elements drawn from capitalism, socialism and Islam. The Libyan model of direct democracy, many Libyan scholars argue, yields substantial benefits to the citizens and offer opportunities for direct active participation in governance. Some other African scholars, however, are critical of its perceived restrictions on personal liberties, such as freedom of speech, association, and so on. Many are, at best skeptical about the chances of its applicability or replication outside the
Libyan context.
The military institution is the offshoot of the need to secure the territorial boundaries of the state. The military is called forth by the need to enhance the safety of a nation‘s social, economic and political institutions against threat arising from other independent states. National Defence is itself one of the dimensions of security. The other side of national security is internal security, the effort to weaken or destroy the state by forces operating within its territorial and institutional confines. The latter is the realm of the police and other security outfits although the military could be called upon in exceptional circumstances.
The military is to be put under civilian control. This is the norm in the west. This is the legacy of colonial rule in Africa. Military take-over of governments became the
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rule rather than the exception in post-colonial Africa. The question of the role of the military in governance has therefore become an important one for countries like Nigeria that has had the misfortune of being under military misrule for several years. To be sure, Nigeria‘s constitutions have however upheld this western tradition of non-political role for the military (Anifowose 2002: 83, Ali 2001:244).
Early literature on political development in Africa did not quite see the military in this manner. Indeed, the military was originally viewed as the prototype of modernity and was portrayed as a bulwark against social unrest, ―a modernizing and stabilizing source of organizational strength in society, a last stand-by reserve which could be called in, or could take over, to prevent subversion or total collapse of the political order (Coleman and Brice 1962:5). Unlike politicians who where prone to corruption, ethnicity and indiscipline, the military was regarded as disciplined, technically rational, nationalist in character and interest.
The latter was therefore predisposed by training and organizations to promote modernization. But experiences of military rule in Latin America and Africa showed quite clearly that there was nothing final about the military mindset and organization that make them to be regarded as modernizing agencies (Adekson
1978). Indeed, military involvement in politics has become a problem for positive social transformation as many countries witness despotic rule and economic decay. Hence, the process of democratization has had civilian control of the military as an integral part in Africa and elsewhere.
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In Nigeria, the military had become the target of political contestation before 1999 when the country returned to democratic rule. During the transition to democratic rule supervised by the General Abdulsalami Abubakar military government, there were open calls for restructuring and reform. The military was then believed to have been hijacked by a most reactionary and backward group. In the event of the public debates, questions have been raised concerning military budget, discipline, professionalism, procurement, promotions, deployment, staffing and military doctrine (Anifowose and Aiyede, 2004). There are four issues at stake.
The first and central issue relates to how to keep the military permanently in the barracks, that is how to prevent military seizure of power, once the country successfully returns to democratic rule. Underlying all of these is the question of the appropriate civil-military relations for Nigeria.
The second has to do with the regional domination of the military institution. It was argued that the north‘s dominance of the officer corps of the military has enabled it to use the establishment as an instrument of perpetuating its hold on power at the centre. The objective situation is described by Ali (2001:210): ―with the Northern control of the Army thus established and consolidated, it was not long for the vital interests of the north to dominate the incipient political inversion of the Army into a political arm of the northern hegemonic resurgence.
The third perspective from the human rights movement accused the military of having an entrenched interest in politics. This of course refers to the privileges, rapid promotions and stupendous wealth that political soldiers have enjoyed once 43 Page
they succeeded staging a coup. The typical question raised in this regard is that put forward by Adekanye (1997:60). ―Whether soldiers who have been accustomed to being treated like lords as the politicians before them would be content with the drab and unprestigious life of the barracks‖. The fourth suggestion is a moderate view, which emphasises the need for civilian control of the military establishment. Experience since the return to democratic rule in 1999 shows that Nigeria has taken this last option of finding an appropriate civil-military relations framework. The Obasanjo government has been carrying out institutional reforms with the assistance of the United States Military Education and Training (UMET) programme.
Three suggestions have been put forward as a solution to the challenges raised under poser three above. The first call for a complete overhaul or disband of the military. The point has been emphasized by Ake (1996:15) who argued that perhaps the time has come for Africa to consider abolishing the military altogether in favour of an enhanced police force and civil defence – an arrangement that is cheaper, more democratic and inimical to coups. According to him, our military is very expensively redundant in the absence of a credible external threat and very expensively useless against a credible threat. The second was made by Nnamdi Azikiwe who proposed the formation of a
‗combined civil-military government‘ (dyarchy) for a period of at least five years after the withdrawal of the military from politics and the restoration of constitutional government. The third called for the decentralization of the military
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structure into zonal commands. This is to ensure that no particular region or ethnic group captures the military.
What the foregoing illustrates is the fact that new democracies as in Nigeria faces a real challenge concerning the role of the military in governance and were at critical moments unsure of what to do. The pressures for democracy while calling for the removal of the military from governance raises the issue of how to ensure capable and stable military institution and ensure that they remained confined to their constitutional roles.
The relationship between the military and democracy can be viewed at three levels. Two of these levels relate to countries that have not been able to establish stable civil-military relations and are experiencing one form of military rule or the other. The question here is how to return the military to the barracks and restore democratic rule-the question of military disengagement from politics. The second relates to new democracies, those that have successfully returned the military to the barracks and now face the task of ensuring that they remain under civilian control. The third relate to the question of militarizm, the influence and implications of military policies and culture for democratic practice in governance.
This applies to all countries with military establishments, a hallmark of the modern state system. In this thesis we reflect on the last two levels that are relevant to Nigeria currently.
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As Luckham (1995) has noted the military has the capacity to block expansion of the political space, reverse democratization process or return mid-way. They are also able to determine the terms, conditions and character of the return to constitutional rule. These provide a particular challenge of objective civilian control of the military once an elected government is put in place. What does objective civilian control of the military entail? How do we establish objective civilian control?
According to Huntington (1957) there are historically two types of control of the military in the west: subjective and objective control. Under subjective control, the military is subjected to the influence and control of the dominant civilian group or leadership within the nation. In other words, subjective civilian control is not a unified civilian control of the military. The varied character and conflicting interest of civilian groups come to bear on the nature of control over the military. Thus, the full civilian control of the military is only a reflection of the full control of a particular group or groups. In this wise subjective control is a reflection of the power relations between the groups in the nation. Subjective is fraught with difficulties. The most powerful group, which controls the army, may be tempted to use it to acquire and retain political power at the expense of the rest of society.
The emphasis of civilian controls becomes merely a slogan rather than a universal end in itself.
Civilian control may cover for a variety of sins. Subjective control have occurred in various forms in history. It may appear in the form of the maximization of the
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power of particular governmental institutions, particular social class, particular constitutional forms, and sub-national groups (Huntington 1957:80-83).
Subjective control of the military has been dominant in the various authoritarian/military regimes in Africa. Among the methods employed by these regimes include the following: formal legal and constitutional restraints; manipulation of the armed forces‘ ethnic composition; professional indoctrination; restricting the military‘s ―mission‘ to external defence rather than domestic public order, material and professional pay-offs (pay, promotions, barracks, equipment); privileged access to rent-seeking opportunities, such as land and government contracts; co-option of officers into government positions; political commissariats and party branches in the armed forces; establishment of paramilitary units to counter balance the armed forces, and reliance on foreign military protection
(Goldsworthy: 1981 and 1986) and Decalo (1989 and 1991). While military incursion into politics has been successfully averted in few African countries some of these methods have deepened the problem of military control such that a few country have imploded under the weight of the subsequent contradictions.
The lesson from Africa is that subjective control of the military is not only antithetical to democratic practice, it also holds the possibility of swamping democratization in a tide of armed conflicts between warring factions as in
Liberia, Somalia and Libya‘s Muammar Ghadafi when the military itself falls apart. Thus, there is no alternative to objective civilian control of the military.
According to Huntington, objective civilian control of the military involves four elements. The first element is the development of a high level of military
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professionalism and recognition by the military of the limit of their professional competence. That is, the recognition that there is an independent military sphere.
The military‘s attention is then focused on this sphere, removed from the politicking among the various groups in society. The second element is the effective subordination of the military to civilian leaders in the making of foreign and military policies. The military being highly professionalized is ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group, which secures legitimate authority within the state. The military is politically neutral. The third element is that there is a recognition and acceptance by political leaders that there is an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military. Hence, the leadership does recognize that the military profession has its own outlook on national policies that should be respected without necessarily undermining civilian control.
The final element is ensuring the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military.
However, it is difficult to achieve complete objective civilian control over the military. This is the case because of the tendency of many civilian groups to see such control in subjective terms. Rather than allow the military to be neutral, dominant groups seek to subordinate the officer corps to their own interests. The situation is even more difficult in countries like Nigeria, coming from the very antithesis of objective civilian control: military participation in politics. Until 1999, the Nigerian military was immersed in regional, ethnic, institutional and constitutional politics. Specific efforts are being made to professionalize the military, re-indoctrinate it on values of subordination to civilian rule, improve its
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capacity and give it a national apolitical outlook. The impact of these reforms being carried out with external assistance will unfold with time.
While in countries like Nigeria, how to bring the military under civilian control and avoid coups takes on particular significance, its military involvement in the West
African sub-region and beyond, makes it imperative that we also address the likely impact of military policies on democratic culture and practice. Nigeria‘s role in military intervention in conflicts situations in the West African sub-region and its aspiration as a regional power, render its susceptibility to this challenge inevitable.
Johansen (1993) has elaborated critical areas where the state system and military policies impede democratic practices in the USA that is of relevance to
Nigeria. This threat to democratic deepening is the offshoot of the recognition of the sphere of military competence which should be removed from political interference, as accentuated by the modern state system that we have inherited from the British. According to him, there is an increasingly dysfunctional connection between national military power and liberal democratic requirements in the global state system. The first is the spread of the military mind; the second is the complexity of modern war and weaponry. Others are the speed of world events and warfare, secrecy and deception as instruments of security, the concentration of military decision-making power, and traditional national sovereignty.
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The first point of relevance to new democracies like Nigeria is the conflict between the military worldview and culture and democratic values. The military mind upholds organization, and commends the subordination of the individual to the group. The emphasis is on hierarchy, loyalty, order, discipline and obedience.
Democracy places premium on non-conformity and freedom of thought and expression. The emphasis is on constant questioning of authority, discussion of issues and consideration of policy options that are non-violent and respectful of the lives of others. The ascendance of the military especially in times of war often meant that liberal democratic values are compromised (Anifowose and Aiyede,
2004). Indeed, the military mentality is one major reason why Ake (1996a:14) argued that military rule is a negation of what is uniquely human to rule. He in fact believed that military could never engender democracy because it is an anti- thesis of democracy in regard to its norms, values, purposes and structure. He states further:
The military addresses the extreme and the extraordinary while
democracy addresses the routine; the military values discipline
and hierarchy; democracy, freedom and equality; the military is
oriented to law and order, democracy to diversity, contradiction
and competition; the method of the military is violent aggression,
that of democracy is persuasion, negotiation and consensus- building.
Decades of military rule in Nigeria has left very strong authoritarian imprint on civil life and civil society that conscious effort has to be made to engineer the
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cultivation of civic virtue to advance democracy. This is very important to remove violence that continues to characterize electoral competition, itself crucial to the effort to crystallize civilian control of the military. So long as authoritarian practices continue to pervade society, democracy will remain fragile, and the threat of military incursion into politics real.
Secondly, modern warfare and weaponry have become so complex, with technical, political and moral dimensions that they defy the comprehension of ordinary citizens. Even those saddled with the responsibility of policy outside the military may not have adequate knowledge to be able to make informed judgement on the matters. Hence, few insiders of the military establishment often take decisions on such matters in secret and sometimes in violation of the legalities of democratic procedures. Thus, in modern representative democracies, decisions on national security have been ‗insulted from popular knowledge and control‘ (Russett 1990:147 as cited by Johansen 1993:217).
Furthermore, secrecy and deception as part of modern military and security policies promote public ignorance and misinformation on security matters. They also make it impossible for the public to monitor implementation of agreed policy preferences. Thus, officials could prevent embarrassment even at the expense of national security. Johansen (1993: 221-222) provides ample examples of such incidences in the USA, such as release of radiation, leaking radioactive wastes that caused hazards to employees and extensive radioactive contamination of the earth and atmosphere of which the public were not informed and the
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responsible officers never held to account. In Nigeria, this is a particularly difficult area, considering the literacy levels and closeness of government organization.
How intensive have the debates on defence budgets been? What has been the outcome of the investigation into the bomb blasts in the army warehouse in a
Lagos barracks that led to the death of many innocent citizens in January 2002.
There is also the influence of big corporation that produces armaments on the democratic process. Johansen (1993:223-225) talks about the political alliances of these corporations with the armed forces and with members of the US congress who are sponsored by these corporations, that can skew political decisions in an undemocratic direction. In Africa we are confronted daily with the role of these corporations in the proliferation of light weapons and their impact on the trade in diamonds and other precious minerals that underwrite the civil wars in Liberian, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Surely, easy access to such weapons affects the patience with democratic processes and the decision to resort to violence over certain issues. In Nigeria, we see how for many years the oil multinationals connived with the military regimes to suppress agitation against environmental degradation and inequity by the Niger Delta peoples, until the place became a war zone.
In the contemporary world, sovereignty though being limited by globalization has been enhanced for a few powerful states. National sovereignty means that a national government like the US recognizes no formal responsibility to any authority other than its own. A nation has a right to decide when to go to war
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without answering to any higher authority even in our increasingly interdependent world. This is the basis of the emergent unilateralism blatantly displayed in the decision to go to war with Iraq by the USA, with serious implications for the status of democracy in the global context. Thus, the ―military policies act as an anti- democratic force because they channel society‘s energies into the maintenance of traditional sovereign boundaries at a time when the very process of governance is escaping the reach of the nation state‖. We are witnesses to the transformations of the US political system as a result of the war on terror: the series of security alerts, codes and the patriot Act that increasingly make nonsense of personal freedom in the name of the demands of the national security.
Democratization processes and discourses on democracy in contemporary Africa are heavily influenced by the swift currents of globalization and western triumphalism, which have accompanied the end of the cold war. Experiments with variants of socialist democracy in African countries influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideologies have long been abandoned. The end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union and Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe dramatically opened up the African space for acceleration of the third and fourth ―wave‖ of democratization, with the result that many military and civilian authoritarian regimes collapsed and became replaced by caricatures of market driven and IMF inspired democratic transitions, which unfortunately are mostly illiberal, not desirably participatory, barely representative and constrained by lack of accountability and bad governance (Ihonvbere, 1994). Many African cases of
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transition to democracy have spawned up what can be referred to as democracy without democrats, or democratic dividends. Democratization may have opened up hitherto closed political space, but that space is still highly exclusive and restrictive, and populated by enormous threats to socio-economic and political stability, as well as to the aspiration for democratic consolidation and socio- economic development (Ake, 1994).
Frustrations with squandered opportunities under prolonged authoritarian rule, and the opportunities posed by the current changes, as well as those perceived as likely to accrue from ―Globalization‖, have all facilitated and enhanced the on- going democratization process (Chole and Ibrahim, 1995). The euphoria for democratic change has turned many blind to the evident of dangers embedded in the process, and has also drowned critical and same voices urging for reforms and careful selection of credible strategies for making the process beneficial and capable of satisfying the democratic aspirations of the teeming majority of
Africans (Ake, 1996).
However, despite this discouraging context, it is still very relevant for scholars of democracy in Africa to struggle to pose and address a number of mind-boggling questions, which relate to the African aspirations for socio-economic and democratic development: For example: In what ways is democracy possible in
Africa? How can genuine democratization be ensured? Can democracy be successful in the context of mass poverty? Is democracy incompatible with our tradition? Is democracy only possible in the context of a capitalist system? How
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credible and viable are alternative democratic conceptions? How can democracy be sustained? How can democracy be consolidated in countries such as Nigeria, which have emerged from prolonged military rule with profound legacies of militarism and militarization? (Jega, 2001).
The point simply, is that contemporary African discourses on democracy and democratization need to be fundamentally refocused so that they begin to more concretely address these pertinent questions and explore refreshing ideas on how democratization can be made to substantively move the African continent forward.
In the words of Kuna (2005), contemporary transformations have without doubt generated various complex questions about the nature, form, and structure of power in modern societies. In more specific terms, they have raised fundamental questions regarding the changing nature of state power, the structure of political communities, and the relationship between the two. Many scholars have drawn attention to some of these transformations. The most salient of these seem to include: the decline in the power of the state (Touraine, 1998); the eclipse of the two dominant cold war ideologies as ‗framers‘ of social/political conflicts and discourses; the expansion of financial exchanges through ever-widening networks of telecommunications (Harvey, 2000); the hybridization of culture and the state‘s inability to circumscribe sociality (Therborn, 2000); and the manifold ethno-religious tensions between and within communities (Eller, 1999).
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As can be expected, conceptualizations of these transformations vary; most however, draw attention to the implications of global transformations on state power and on the constitution of political communities (Held, 1987). The notion that these transformations have in some way led to a ‗denationalization‘ of national economies ‗through the establishment of transactional networks of production, trade and finance‘, that this process imposes a ‗neo-liberal economic discipline on all governments‘ wherein ‗politics is no longer the art of the possible but rather the practice of ‗sound economic management‘, and that this makes
‗social democratic models of social protection untenable‘ and hence ‗spell the demise of associated welfare state policies‘ are commonplace observations in the literature (Held , 1998).
As national economies increasingly become sites of transactional global flows, the nation-state faces intense challenges to its authority and legitimacy: national governments are increasingly unable either to control societal processes within national boundaries, fulfill demands of their own citizens, or resist the imposition of social and economic policies by international organizations. As institutions of global finance acquire bigger roles in global and national economic management, the sovereignty and autonomy of national states become further eroded (Held,
1998; Strange, 2000).
There is thus a perceptible, if still hazy reconfiguration of state power, a certain realignment of forces in the political arena that is radically affecting the form, nature, and practice of politics as well as of the constitution of political
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communities. These transformation raise serious questions about democracy as form of rule, and more specifically, about the nature and form of representation, the power of political establishments and their exclusionary tendencies, alternatives to representative democracy and the relationship of such alternatives to the expansion or restriction of political spaces, as well as of the deepening of the processes of political participation and accountability (Beckam, 1981).
While the argument that direct democracy expands political participation is commonplace, the counter argument that direct participation could be a major de- radicalizing force is worth pondering. Direct participation does give voice to claims outside of the normal political establishment; in doing so however, it also absorbs and normalizes such claims. This is not just blunts but also defuses/difuses the radical possibilities of mass action. It may also overload the political system and reduce the quality of decisions by blocking bargaining channels, reducing the number of decision points and, in this sense, pose a threat to regime stability. On the other hand, while representation may raise legitimacy by broadening regime acceptability in a political system, political representation could be notoriously exclusionary. It tends to promote politically inactive citizens and professionalizes politics at the expense of wider/deeper citizen participation (Papadopolous, 1995).
With reference to Nigeria, it seems clear that the current legitimacy crisis (the authoritarian tendencies of the executive, the numerous inter-group and other criminally motivated conflicts, the Anambra state debacle, the widespread
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corruption, and the apparent failure of the ruling class to adjust to a state in transition) arises in part from some of the exclusionary mechanisms and imperfections of representation. The absence of political parties with concrete structures and ideologies of mobilization, the increasing incapacitation of the state through criminal activities, and the growing authoritarianism of the executive branch of government at all governmental tiers are among the forces that have undermined and further eroded the value of representation (Kuna, 2005).
According to Lijphart (1997), the fundamental framework of Non-Western Politics is a communal one and all political behaviour is strongly coloured by considerations of communal identification. Such communal attachments are primordial loyalties based on common language, religion, custom and assumed blood ties. As each cultural group holds its own ways, nevertheless, they live side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. The peoples mix in market places or on ceremonial days, but in reality, they do not combine: for their geographical mixture is also characterized by mutual social avoidance. How do they work together?
In pre-colonial times the maintenance of political order entailed domination and force by one cultural section over another. But as colonial dependencies their unity was maintained by the undemocratic means of colonial domination.
Nevertheless, intra communal issues, communal decisions are made by consultations and consensus. Conversely, on inter communal matters; orders were given to them through tribal Headman (chief) who, in turn, holds
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consultations with community elders on how the order should be carried out. In that way the value system of the centre (that gives orders down) should be seen to be consensual one but attachment to it became attenuated in the periphery – which remained heterogeneous and divided in its values.
Despite the policy of Indirect Rule which stated that it was, ―desirable to retain the native authority and work through it and by the native emirs‖ (Lugard in Perham,
1960:140), colonial rule did not teach Nigerians democracy, as the policy was only meant to let the African Chief appear nominally in control while actually he was manipulated from behind the scenes by the colonial power. In fact, the colonial administration itself was not democratic although the ―mother country‖, was under democratic governance. Therefore, in spite of colonial government, the Nigerian native remained culturally heterogeneous and tribally differentiated as they were before the advent of the British. So, as John Stuart Mill (1958) argues, free institutions necessary to the working of representative government do not exist. Nevertheless, the decisions arrived at or agreements reached in the open-air tribal meetings are democratic because of the preceding consultation, which led to consensus decisions.
As for the Muslims Societies of the then Northern Region, the Islamic concept of
Shura (Consultation) compels a ruler to consider popular opinion and thus it establishes the foundation of an accountable government. In a modern context, such consultation can be implemented through the standard tools of democracy: elections, plebiscites and referendum. In the Islamic Ummah according to
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Prophet Muhammed‘s injunction, ―differences of opinion within my community is a sign of God‘s mercy‖ (Takeyh, 2001). This denotes a prophetic approbation of diversity of thought and freedom of speech. Perhaps, the only contrast between
Islamic Democracy and the Western systems is that, liberal democracy has elevated the primacy of the individual above the community and thus changed the role of religion from that of public conveyor of community values to a private guide of individual conscience; whereas the ―Islamic Democracy‖ attempts to balance its emphasis on reverence with the popular desire for self-expression, will have to impose certain limits on individual choice. The Islamic polity will support fundamental tenets of democracy – namely regular election, separation of powers, independent of judiciary and institutional opposition – though it is not likely to be a libertarian paradise (Maudidi, 1980).
Despite the different views about democracy, it is the most popular form of government, especially, the liberal democracy. It is the vogue in western industrialized world and other developing countries, including Nigeria. It contains certain principles and characteristics, that is, its procedure and institutional arrangements (Gauba, 2007:424). Institutions are necessary for the realization of principles. Without principles, the institutions might be reduced to mere formality.
The two must go together. Liberal democracy works on certain principles and certain mechanisms. Broadly speaking, the principles of liberal democracy include:
. popular participation;
. adherence to the rule of law;
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. majority rule;
. recognition of minority rights;
. citizens fundamental human rights;
. constitutional government and;
. government that exists and performs in the common interest of all.
These principles throw sufficient light on the nature of liberal democracy. Once these principles are accepted, the next step is to identify the characteristics that put these principles into practice. This distinguishes liberal democratic system from any other political systems (Bull, 2000).
Democratization as earlier being conceived or conceptualized is the process of discarding military rule and putting in its place (liberal) democracy (Olurode and
Anifowose, 2005). Yet the process and history through which liberal democracy came into being in Europe cannot be replicated in the new nations and with the same consequences.
This poses serious theoretical problems for democratization in these nations and its sustenance. And in those systems where democracy is in place, differences over who participates in it, and so on continues to make progress difficult.
Together, these historical/theoretical and problems of democratization in these new nations and suggestions of possible solutions to them, constitute part of our major focus of discussion in this thesis.
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Rustow‘s (1985:5) approach to democratization may be what these new nations need in practice in order to make progress. Democratization is beset by a lot of problems in practice. One of these practical problems is what to do with the opposition. That is, the individuals and groups who are either excluded or feel excluded from the democratization and who, on the basis of this, work to undermine the process. Based on the nature of the opposition, there may be demand for democracy immediately as in Kenya, Nigeria, Malawi, Togo and The
Cameroon and so on. Or, demand for a national conference to decide what kind of democracy is needed and how to go about it, as in Kenya, Congo, Zaire or
Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C.), Togo, Nigeria, Benin Republic before
Nicephore Soglo, and South Africa.
Democratization does not mean disregarding opposition members or suppressing them. Nor must it mean thoughtlessly granting opposition its demands. There must be negotiation over issues of importance to all parties involved for, ―the basis of democracy is not maximum consensus. It is the tenuous middle-ground between imposed uniformity and unplacable hostility‖ (Rustow, 1985:67). That middle-ground is discovered by negotiation. Conflict and conflict resolutions are essential to democracy.
Another practical problem of democratization in the new nations is the imposition of democratization from outside. Democratization has been viewed as the political conditionality, for economic aid from the western nations. The west has increasingly tied the extension of aid to democratization from military and/or one
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party rule and/or personal rule to pluralistic and multi-party. This helped to bring down Siad Barre in Somalia, Joseph Momoh in Sierra Leone, Mengistu Haile
Mariam in Ethiopia, Mathieu Kerekou in Benin Republic and Kenneth Kaunda in
Zambia. It has been used to start democratic demands or democratization process in Togo, Niger, Madagascar, Cameroon, Algeria, Gabon, Ivory Coast (at this stage, reference is therefore made to the threat to the democratization process in the Ivory Coast arising from the desperate desire of President Laurent
Gbagbo to stay in power despite his defeat at election by the opposition candidate Alasane Quattara).
The international community have lined up behind Quattara while calling on incumbent President Gbagbo to resign. Quattara has since been sworn in as the
President after the fall of Gbagbo from power. In addition, democratization has been used to mount pressure on Kenya, Sudan, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Malawi.
But pressure from outside, without African groups really prepared to take over power within specific African countries will not do. It could lead African autocrats to abandon power to an unready, probably imaginary, opposition, as witnessed in the case of Joseph Momoh in Sierra Leone. Caution is, therefore, advised.
African countries should not allow themselves to be trumpeted into premature democratization. This is because ‗like development, democratization is not something that one person does for another. People must do it for themselves or it does not happen‖ (Ake, 1991:38).
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A final practical problem of democratization is psychological. Those taking over from the autocratic regime-in-transition should not create the impression that the custodians of the transiting regime will be prosecuted or persecuted in a democratic order. Not only is such impression and its actualization in a democratic order undemocratic, it could lead those in custody of the regime being democratized to take steps aimed at forestalling that possibility. This could lead them to build into the democratization process and mechanisms in order to safeguard their interests in any regime that emerges. At the extreme, it could lead to military rules to succeed themselves as Samuel Doe did in Liberia and as
Blaise Campaore did in Burkina Faso. Thus, democratization should be managed in such a way as to guarantee to all, such rights as exist, including rights to freedom of movement, speech, participation, assembly, and so on.
In his own synthesis, Osaghae (1994:46) has identified several reasons why democratization could be difficult to manage. These are lack of value consensus, lack of compromise, differences in party political ideology, lack of proper planning and lack of expertise to provide the necessary direction to the set goals in the democratization process.
He also attributed lack of trust as one of the major reasons in the failure of democracy where political associations are based in line with regional, ethnic and sometimes religious lineage. The consequence of such association has always resulted in total chaos, hence the failure of democracy. In this vein, Anifowose
(1982), in his empirical study, demonstrated how the disputed, blatantly rigged
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parliamentary elections in Western Nigeria, led to wide-spread political violence in 1965. According to him, the violent outburst was a significant factor that contributed to the January 15, 1966 military coup in Nigeria.
The position of Omoruyi collaborates with the earlier ones enunciated by
Osaghae. Omoruyi (1994:198) also identifies certain anti-democratic attitudes and behaviours which run contrary to democratic consolidation. These are: lack of trust among political actors; lack of faith in regimes, low threshold of tolerance, and the perception of politics by people as business propositions. He enumerated those things that went wrong as a result of the foregoing, namely: electoral malpractices, use of political office as avenue for gross personal enrichment in the face of abject mass poverty, political thuggery, economic mismanagement, political intolerance, lack of intra-party and inter-party democracy, blatant manipulation of religion, ethnicity and geopolitical entities as spring-boards to personal political ambitions, disregard for constitutional rules of the game and political violence.
Anifowose (1982:3) defined violence as illegal and illegitimate acts carried out by aggrieved individuals and groups in the society. These actions cannot create the enabling environment for sustenance of democracy and political stability.
Omoruyi suggests that, to tackle all these problems what is needed is a more thorough – going psychological re-orientation; the elimination of fear through political exposure of the elite to the possibilities and benefits of accommodation which result, in the short run, in a ―modus vivendi‖, creation of numerous
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opportunities for the political elite to learn the rule of prudence, which, in its details, is a lower threshold of democratic tolerance; but which provides the polity with a convenient spring board to greater levels of tolerance and confidence building.
It is important to note that, the whole world is democratizing. Faced with the possibility of international ostracism should they refuse, the new nations are rapidly adopting this democracy most especially Africa, Yet liberal democracy thrives where there is fairly well developed civil society, which Africa scarcely has; it thrives where there is limited government, which most of these countries do not have; and definitional problems plague both opposition and custodians of regimes being democratized, such that there are differences in definition of ends and means to achieve them.
A more serious problem to the emergence of real democracies and the attainment of democratic consolidation is in respect of the dilemma which the countries face in respect of the relationship between democracy and much needed development. To Ake (1991:39) among others, development in Africa never started, ―because the appropriate political framework was lacking‖ and that the democratic movement is the beginning of a serious attempt to create this framework.‖ The problem then is in respect of the source of development. Does democratic reform inevitably lead to economic development? While it is true that democratic reforms are desirable it is equally true that the survival of democracy,
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democratic institutions and the possibility of democratic consolidation, depend on sound economics/economies.
Another problem in engendering an enduring democracy in Africa is the disregard for the cultural context of democratic processes and practices. The tendency in the on-going democratic transformation, as Ake (1991:40) noted, is the leaning toward the practice of liberal democracy, which is in vogue in the west. Africa and most of the new states depict different historical circumstances compared to the west, for example, lack of a developed system or capitalist mode of production, a market economy, social atomisation and organic solidarity of the west.To this end, the current democratic agenda is no more than an implementation of a western democratic agenda, although not with accurate precision.
More worrisome is the narrow conceptualization of the democratic agenda or objectives by most African democratic movements. Multi-partism, on which they focus has tended to mean no more than electoral competition without necessarily ensuring other essences of pluralism and respect for human rights. The speed at which democratic agenda are being executed and the rush to compete for state power are partly responsible for this.
The adoption of the western prescription through the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank seem to have worsened the problems for various reasons. The consequences of the above which include a drastic fall in the standard of living, reduction in public funding of essential services, inflation,
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unemployment, corruption among other hostile public policies–privatisation and commercialisation are hostile to democratic consolidation.
Since the democratic movements are reactions against improvement, the economic crisis might not lead to any difference even with the new leadership. It is important to stress that the debt problem which continues to escalate in the face of perpetually shrinking economic fortunes of African states is a more serious threat to democracy and democratic consolidation; it is less of a financial problem than a political problem. It is indeed ‗a crisis for development‘ in the continent (Aina, 1996:11).
For democracy to thrive and to prevent adaptation of democracy to death, the internal situation has to change beyond the political. The economic crisis in these new states that makes the management of democracy very cumbersome will have to be addressed. The economic crisis has to be urgently addressed in view of the gloomier picture painted by intellectuals of these nations. These new states, therefore, need more than democratization for meaningful and enduring democracy. Apart from economic assistance, it is equally imperative to emphasize the need for good governance, adopting effective measures to combat corruption and requisite socio-economic environment coupled with the empowerment of the civil society for sustained development and democratic consolidation (Olurode and Akinboye, 2005).
The most serious threat which transcends the economic, political and other limitations to the new or emerging democracies or democratic transitions is the 68 Page
military. Political education, incumbent military leadership vouching for the emergence of professional armies a non-coup situation as in the case of Nigeria and good governance might not do the trick. These are merely necessary to deter and not sufficient to prevent coups. Ultimately, the ‗red card‘ to democracy is with the military. This is not a remote possibility in many African states given the culture of military rule, the burden of democracy, its high standards and expectations without economic basis apart from the likelihood of poor leadership.
Consolidation of democracy in Africa may as well depend on the extent to which the military can physically and psychologically withdraw from politics and keep to their professional role.
Sustainable democracy is the key to a stable polity. A stable polity is a polity that enjoys political stability devoid of any sort of intervention in the political process or government. The abolition or elimination of authoritarianism and introduction of it will ensure better conditions of living for the citizens. All political systems are in transition. Politics is about conflict and the resolution of the scarcity problem. To the extent that the scarcity problem is neither static nor amenable to final resolution, so long will politics and political systems be in transition. They are in transition in the sense that options can never be exhausted. Politics and political systems are also necessarily in transition because their future developments are always problematic. Even where definite and historical contours or patterns of governance and of conflict resolution have emerged and have become part of the conventional practice of politics, political systems still have to regenerate and
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adapt themselves to changing circumstances. This is why sometimes reference is made to ―the living Constitution.‖
But at another level and when applied to the politics of Nigeria, the concept of transition is a specific generic reference to the cycle of democratization, authoritarian or one-party rule and of re-democratization that has characterized the politics of many countries in the two continents since the 1960s. The cycle itself is historically complex and diffuse. Sometimes, it is set in motion by military intervention to prevent the national descent into chaos and anarchy when
―politics as usual‖ gets out of hand. This is sometimes referred to as the custodian theory of military intervention. At other times, the cycle is triggered off by the long stay in power or ―overrule‖ by authoritarian or even pseudo- democratic regimes. In this case, delay in opening up the political space to competitive or plural politics may set off the trigger.
As already pointed out, there is a double meaning encapsulated in the notion of transition, namely transition from and transition to democracy. What then is the connection between transitions and democracy? This is not an easy question to answer. Let us approach it by first providing an intellectual context within which to ascribe meaning to democracy. Our point of departure is the observation that democracy is an apt example of what can be characterized as ―essentially contested concepts.‖ This is because there are fundamental differences in the formulation of democratic theory as well as in forms of democratic government.
This is what led Lijphart (1977:4) to assert that ―Democracy is a concept that
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virtually defies definition.‖ The question then becomes transition to what kind of democratic government? Or what theory of democracy informs transitions as projects of democratization?
The literature on transitions suggests that transitions to democracy are generally conceived of and discussed as transitions to liberal democracy, defined as limited or constitutional government. The institutional framework for this type of democracy is usually postulated as representative and responsible government based on competitive electoral and usually multi-party politics on the
Schumpeterian model. This model has been formulated by Schumpeter
(1942:26) as follows: The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people‘s vote.
The core of this Schumpeterian ―institutional arrangement‖ consists of a number of interrelated components. Competitive multi-party politics pursued in the context of periodic elections which are free and fair and which are conducted under universal adult suffrage is one component in this democratic ―institutional arrangement.‖ Another component is that the results of the elections are, to quote
Przeworski (1991:10) ―uncertain, (and) indeterminate ex ante‖. Other components of this ―institutional arrangement‖ are legislative or parliamentary oversight either in the form of parliamentary government or presidential government, and the guarantee, protection and enforcement of civil and political liberties, including the customary human rights, even against governments.
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The historical connection becomes even more compelling if we shift focus from the political to the economic components of these transitions. The emphasis on economic liberalization and on the autonomy and efficiency of market forces is but the other side of the liberal democracy coin; and the emphasis has come about as a result of the failure of state-directed economic planning in Africa and the consequent pressures on African and Latin American governments to impose
IMF and donor countries‘ conditionalities in the form of Structural Adjustment
Programmes in their various countries.
The liberalization of the political market-place to make it more competitive is analogous to the liberalization of the economic market-place to ensure more competition and more efficient allocation and use of resources. Hence, the increasing demand in recent years by donor countries and the IMF, as in the case of Kenya, that client countries in Africa and other countries of the Third
World should adopt liberal political reforms (―political conditionalities‖), if loans/grants and/or concessions on debt repayment are to be given to them.
The study does not want at this point to engage in the debate on whether the invisible hand of market forces is a much better and much more efficient rationaliser and allocator of resources; or whether liberal democracy as a political system requires free market economic arrangements to make it work well. The political and economic systems, and how this in turn is related to political and economic performance is, in our view, much more complicated than this and the empirical evidence appears too tentative to allow broad generalizations. But, we
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also realize that, particularly in Africa, there is a need for the reconceptualization of the role of the state in the management of the economy and for more vigorous, bolder and less parasitic involvement of the private sector in the production process. This is why, the African transitions offer strategic opportunities to reconceptualize notions of the African state and to rethink and redesign macro- economic policies and the re-orientation and redirection of African political economies in line with that of reconceptualization.
2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
What follows from the literature review has shown that the analysis of social reality ultimately depends on the methodological preference of the author. The author may make his methodological framework explicit or leave it to be inferred from his work. The study prefers the former since it attempts to state, as clearly as possible, the theoretical and conceptual framework for explaining and analyzing social phenomena (Ollawa, 1979) minimises the danger of semanticism and focuses the attention of the reader on salient rather than ephemeral issue.
For this study, therefore, the political economy approach, which is integrative, provides a ready tool for a deeper penetration of social phenomena. As a methodological approach it assigns primacy to material (economic) factors as opposed to cognition which depends on the former. In general terms, this approach postulates that in any society the economic factor is pre-eminent and ultimately determines the essence and character of other spheres of social
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existence such as: politics, religion, culture etc. It does not deny that the non- economic factors have impact on and influence the economic base:
In effect, the argument is that if you understand how the
economic system is organized, that is to say ―…. what the
material assets and constraints of a society are, how the
society produces goods to meet its material needs, how
the goods are distributed and what types of social relations
arise from the organization of production, we have come a
long way to understanding the culture of that society, its laws,
its religious system, its political system and even its mode of
thought.‖ (Ake, 1981:1).
Political economy also emphasizes the dynamics and dialectical (causal relation within the domestic system and between it and external variables) character of social phenomena. It sees society in a condition of constant change, the change being propelled by the conflicts resulting from the interdependence and interconnectedness of various facets of our social and material existence in which the various classes play a role, the conflict being resolved for the better or the worse. This method which proceeds from thesis to antithesis and synthesis, that rejects unobservable phenomenon and emphasizes social reality and that analyzes contradictory elements–abundance and misery, liberty and oppression, superordination and subordination, class conflicts, etc, represents in our view the most scientific methodology for penetrating the essence of social phenomenon of
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which the principles of democracy and human rights are a part. Many scholars have accepted that there is a relationship between democracy and economic development. This democracy-development nexus is perhaps one of the issues in the political economy discourse that has refused to vacate the front burner.
Currently, democracy, or the lack of it has been blamed for virtually every failure in the public sector, especially African economies. This is true of the so-called failed states, where available resources are not mobilized to improve the living standard of their people.
Moreover, the need for socio-economic and political empowerment of the citizens is imperative in the context of popular participation in decision-making. Mass participation in politics entails establishing electoral institution mechanism for voting by the masses for the ruling elite in order to spearhead the political commanding heights of governance. In spite of this, there are other components of mass popular political empowerment for articulating and agitating for particular vested interests. Various autonomous groups and institutions, such as civil rights associations, farmers‘ associations, Chambers of Commerce, inter alia, are some of the other forms of institutional means of popular participation (Diamond, 1995,
Jinadu, 2004, Kirk-Greene and Oyediran, 1998). The state is expected to facilitate and nurture institutional means of popular socio-political empowerment as key aspects of humanizing the social conditions of life in the economy.
However, these factors cannot work in isolation without good governance. Good governance imply meeting the peoples‘ needs, investing in human capital and the 75 Page
promotion of citizens‘ participation in the policy, promoting safety and security and promoting the human dignity.
Consequently, the choice of the political economy framework of analysis is informed by the nature of socio-economic formations that existed or exists in
Nigeria, that emphasizes the roles of the state in its interaction with political and economic factors, the nature and character of the polity, the quality of governance, the electoral laws that guarantee popular participation by electorates and sustenance of democratic values and culture. The roles of the various social groups and the inter-connectedness and interdependent character of our material and social existence-economic order, politics, culture and the psychic conditions of men, shows that they are better understood and influenced if they are clearly visualized as a comprehensive totality, not disjointed morsels of the historical process.
The study, therefore, predicates its analysis on democratization-political economy variables from empirical and historical perspective, by looking at democratization as a process of demilitarizing of the polity, encouraging national consciousness and popular participation, institutionalizing democratic values, attitudes, behaviours, norms, culture and sustaining them through good governance for economic growth and stability.
2.2. CONCLUSION
So far, we have succeeded in examining the various facets of democratic government from an analytical and theoretical perspective. It is only proper that 76 Page
we match the theories with practical reality as evidenced by happenings in some of the democratic countries of the world. Continuity is an important criterion in determining whether a particular country may or may not be considered as a democratic state. In most African and Asian countries, democracy has been seriously interrupted by the frequent intervention of military regimes. Among the long-term democracies, Switzerland is an odd case, because in spite of its long and democratic traditions, its female citizens were not granted the rights to vote in national elections until 1971.
Similarly, the United States did not qualify as a full-fledged democracy until the
1970s when restrictions on the voting rights of blacks were finally removed as a result of the civil rights laws. France is a doubtful case because its regular democratic processes were briefly suspended during the transition from the parliamentary system of the Fourth Republic to the Presidential Fifth Republic
(Azinge, 1991:26).
It is generally believed that the period between Nigeria‘s independence from colonial domination in 1960 and the military coup d‘etat of January 1966 was one of democratic politics, and that the latter event was conclusive evidence of the dismal failure of democracy. Oyovbaire (1989:7) explained the cause of failure from three angles. First, he connects the functioning of democracy in Nigeria with certain economic background conditions, such as: per capita income, economic status of political actors, economics of political action, relationship between the private sector and government, and the operation and performance
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of the economy. Democratic government is thus said to be crisis-ridden and unstable because, among other economic things, it lacked the capacity to meet the economic frustrations that accompanied independence, the rising expectations of the masses for welfare and employment opportunities, corruption of the political class resulting in misallocation of scarce resources and thereby stymied economic growth, unprincipled competition for power and status by individuals and by groups leading to inefficiency in government and administration.
The second explanation is the existence of certain beliefs or attitudes among members of the political class and the electorates that election is ―do or die‖. The third explanation is that certain elements in the social and political structure lack the precondition for social and political pluralism favourable to the operation of democracy. For example, constitutional democracy failed in the Second Republic in spite of the democratic bases of the 1979 Constitution.
As a matter of fact, the scope covered cannot in any way be seen as exhaustive.
Even at that, many issues have been raised. Some have been clearly and thoroughly examined. Others have been pursued to an extent which makes further inquiry inevitable. This is understandable when the uncertainty and unsettled meaning of the word ―democracy‖ is put in perspective. However, it can be said with some certainty that the classical approach to democracy is being abandoned for a modern approach. In some instances, the conclusion is
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that democracy is no more than elite competition, a polyarchy or an oligarchy.
This view has not gone unchallenged.
Democratic revisionism has attracted its own critique for anti-revisionism, revisionism robs democracy of its moral purpose and rationale, and conceives it as a method of making decisions which ensures efficiency in administration and policy making and yet requires some measure of responsiveness to popular opinion on the part of the ruling elite. As Oyovbaire (1989:3) posited:
Democracy is more than a political procedure. It is a political
framework from which public policies emerge and are
administered for society. These policies are propelled (through
articulation and aggregation) by members of a political class –
a class ideally open to recruitment and exit and assumed to
posses the confidence of the entire citizens of the political
system. Modern democracy is, thus, an elitist theory of
politics that depends upon the masses holding certain
attitudes and beliefs about who should govern and how
government should be conducted. The masses maintain
certain kinds of participation in which public opinion is highly
influential yet controlled.
Participatory democracy has not detracted from the classical standpoint. Many countries have guaranteed direct democracy in their constitutions, by ensuring, that universal franchise is enshrined as a political right. The bills of right and 79 Page
fundamental human rights which guarantee basic rights and freedoms of the citizenry contributed immensely to the sustenance of participatory and constitutional democracy. What seems to be lacking in places where democracy has failed is the ―political will‖ to enable democracy flourish. Political violence, intolerance, absence of political education, political instability arising from military coup d‘etat and flagrant violation of electoral processes – these have greatly affected the democratic process in many countries including Nigeria.
Finally, it must be said that for a long time to come, the controversy generated between realist democratic theorists and idealist democratic theorists will continue to excite comments from students and operators of democracy. The realists have made it abundantly clear that their theories are empirical (based on observation and subject to verification by experiment), whilst the idealists frankly state that their research and writing is normative, that is, relating to or prescribing desirable standards. While realists argues that democracy should be redefined to fit the facts, idealists assert that ―if classical or Jeffersonian democratic theory does not fit the facts of modern practice, change the practice.‖
Above all, the democratization and economic development relationship and its imperative of sustaining democracy raises the issues of demilitarization of the polity, popular participation, quality of governance, economic growth and political stability. Early literature on political development in Africa and Latin America see the military differently. Indeed, the military was originally viewed as the prototype of modernity and was portrayed as a bulark against social unrest, ―a modernizing
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and stabilizing source of organizational strength in society, a stand-by reserve which could be called in or could take over to prevent subversion or total collapse of the political order (Coleman and Brice, 1962:5). Unlike politicians, who were prone to corruption, ethnicity and indiscipline, the military was regarded as disciplined, technically rational, nationalist in character and interest. The latter was, therefore, predisposed by training and organizations to promote modernization. However, experiences from Africa and Latin America have shown that there was nothing like that (Adekson, 1978). Indeed, military involvement in politics has become a problem for positive social transformation as many countries witness despotic rule and economic decay. Hence, the process of democratization has had civilian control of the military as an integral part in Africa and elsewhere, including Nigeria.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0. RESEARCH DESIGN
The study adopts a combination of historical design and qualitative method of analysis. This obviously requires the reliance on secondary data for analysis. The justification for choosing the historical design was informed by the need to interpret past trends of events or facts in order to gain clearer perspective of the present happenings in the democratic setting. Moreover, historical records and textual information are required for secondary data analysis. Two qualitative data collection methods were used to complement historical analysis, namely: (i) Elite
Interview; and (ii) In-depth Interview. Social indicators were also constructed to measure and capture political and historical events that typified the character of democratization and sustenance of democracy. In addition, two qualitative analytical methods were adopted, namely: Content-analysis, and thematic analysis, to evaluate these historical and political evidences between 1999 and
2007.
3.1. STUDY LOCATION AND SITE
The study was conducted in Lagos and Abuja. These two locations were selected due to the positions they occupy in the Nigerian political history. Lagos was Nigeria‘s former capital, as well as the nation‘s commercial and economic hub centre; while, Abuja is Nigeria‘s Federal Capital Territory and the seat of power.
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3.2. STUDY POPULATION
The sampled population were drawn from INEC, Political Parties, selected electorates above the age of eighteen years as follows: elder statesmen, political elites, federal and state governments‘ officials, SIEC – State Independent
Electoral Commission, labour/civil society, government/government agencies; academics; and other important stakeholders in the Nigerian political system (see
Appendix 1 to 5).
3.3. SAMPLE SIZE
A sample size of 150 respondents (See profile in Appendix 2) was used for the collection of primary data. Two groups of people were interviewed. The first group of respondents were drawn from the government officials such as academics, the INEC officials, elected politicians and the mass media amongst others. The justification and choice of the population in this group was because of their varying degree of experiences and expert knowledge, as it affects democratization and sustenance of democracy in Nigeria between 1999 and
2007.
The second group of respondents were stakeholders in the Nigerian political system, such as: officials of political parties, elder statesmen, human rights groups and civil society, the labour unions‘ leaders, electorates, women and youths. The justification was that these people in different ways qualify as social notables; they often interact and play important roles with the state and its agencies on continual basis.
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3.4. RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS
Two research instruments were used for this study, namely: elite interview guide and in-depth interview guide (see Appendix 1). These two instruments were designed to obtain primary data from the sampled population based on the objectives and research questions of the study.
3.5.1. ELITE INTERVIEW
Elites, in the context of our research methodology are people with special knowledge and information relevant to our research problem (Manheim, Rich,
Willnat and Brians, 2006: 356). As a special form of personal interview, the elite interview method entails discussion with people, who are knowledgeable about the subject matter (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995: 262). Given their special knowledge, respondents in elite interview are often accorded ―non-standardized treatment‖ (Dexter, 1970: 5; cited in Johnson and Joslyn, 1995: 262, and
Manhein, 2006: 356). Furthermore, background profiles of the elite respondents assisted in the understanding of the respondents‘ personality and mental disposition and how these impacted on their perception and interpretations of events (Dean and Whyte, Dexter and Gordon, cited in Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:
265). Internal consistencies of responses are ensured in elite interview by comparing the different responses and adequate background knowledge of the research focus by interviewers (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995: 265).
In line with the methodological protocol of elite interview detailed above, we went about the research as follows: First, careful selection of political elites, who are
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knowledgeable, experienced and active participants in the Nigerian democracy, such as: academics, human rights‘ groups, mass media, INEC officials, officials of political parties and elder statesmen (see profile categorizing respondents interviewed in Appendix 2). Second, in order to tap into their wealth of experience on the issue, we had interviews with them in a free flowing manner.
The elites were allowed to dictate and control the flow and direction of the interview. This made them relaxed and willing to talk. Furthermore, preceding the interview proper with the elites, research into the background and profile of each elite to be interviewed were done in order to have a grip on their respective personalities and mental disposition so as to eliminate the negative influence of these personality factors in their responses.
Finally, we achieved internal consistency of the responses by checking individual elite responses with the background information and profiles hitherto developed on each of our elite. Elite interview is justified for collecting these primary data and can be used whenever it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic at hand. Elite interview serves to complement other research instruments (in-depth interview method and content-analysis method). This is consistent with the principle of triangulation, which ―entails using more than one method or source of data in a study of social phenomena‖ (Bryman, 2001:274).
This also helps to deepen the research findings (Hertz and Imber, 1995: IX), enrich the research, as well as help to generate ideas or concepts from respondents with expert knowledge on the research problem being investigated.
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3.5.2. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW
The in-depth interview, otherwise known as micro-approach (Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell 1984; and Shariff, 1984), is a discursive research methodology. In- depth interview is a veritable method for studying complex and multi-dimensional social phenomenon (Shariff, 1984: 6). Apart from being a semi-structured conversation, it entails extended discussion with respondents, such as: electorates, women, youths and civil society groups. In-depth interview was conducted through the aid of ―interview guide‖ (see appendix 1).
In-depth interview helps a great deal in balancing empirical data from other methods used for research. Similarly, in-depth interview method is not only flexible, but gives the respondents a free vein to chat the direction of the discussion.
Uncommon insights were obtained from respondents through open-ended questions. The method used was a ―no-hold-back‖ strategy to make respondents to say everything they know on the subject under discussions. Uncommon insights were obtained from respondents through open-ended questions.
3.6. SAMPLING PROCEDURE
Purposive or judgemental sampling techniques were adopted using sample size of 150 interviewees. The reason for adopting this technique was because random sampling for representativeness was not required. Moreover, an infinite population was being studied, where most sample subjects cannot be reached or the population elements can only be imagined. Beside, generalization of result is 93 Page
not intended, hence, the techniques were adopted to complement documentary record of analysis and deepen research findings. The sample population was divided into two groups. Elite interview was conducted on the first group.
The first group comprises 50 respondents and they include: government officials, academics, INEC officials, elected politicians and mass media experts amongst others. Snowball sampling technique was adopted for the elite interview. The interview started with few informants, but later grew to 50 due to referral made to network of individuals on the study, The justification and choice of the population in this group was because of their varying degrees of experiences and expert knowledge, as it affects democratization and sustenance of democracy in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.
On the other hand, in-depth interview method was adopted on the second group of 100 out of the sample size. Purposive sampling technique was adopted. The second groups of respondents were stakeholders in the Nigerian political system, such as: officials of political parties, elder statesmen, civil society, the labour leaders, electorates, women and youths. The justification was that these people in different ways qualify as social notables; they often interact and play important roles with the state and its agencies on continual basis.
3.7. PILOT STUDY
Before conducting the interviews, the instruments were first exposed to a pre-test in Lagos amongst samples drawn from the social categories that form the primary source of the data for the study. The pre-test helped shed light on the 94 Page
predictive, constructive and face validity of the instruments, as well as in sorting out ambiguities that existed in the questions that were to be administered. As a result, questions that were problematic were revised. The pre-testing also assisted in knowing the possible time frame for the different interviews. Data collection for the study took nine weeks to complete.
3.8. COLLECTION OF DATA
In carrying out the elite interview, a number of issues were factored into the research in order to cope with the peculiar demands and challenges of elite interview. We also ensured that some measure of rapport and skilful interpersonal relations privileges the interviews with the respondents. This facilitated free flow of information. Similarly, the study ensured that internal consistencies of responses by comparing and contrasting the responses from the different elites that were interviewed. Both formal and informal discussions were used to elicit the required information from respondents.
Similarly, there was flexibility in the order in which the questions for the elite interview were asked based on the conditional variables at the time and place of interview. This follows the advice of Gordon (1969: 49-50, cited in Johnson and
Joslyn, 1995: 262) that, there is a high possibility for valid responses from elite interview when order of questionnaire are flexible and informed by situational contingencies.
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In line with the above, we had several contacts and in-depth discussions with the respondents selected from the second group of the elite interview. The various discussion sessions involved questioning, probing and observations. These sessions helped in no small measure in the development of familiarity and closeness with the respondents such that they took the researcher into confidence. There were instances that the respondents requested to speak off- tape. These requests were granted. In this way, comprehensive information on our research problems were obtained.
To further enrich the study and increase its analytical generalization, primary data obtained through the above methods were complemented with secondary data obtained from historical records: books, newspapers, journals, periodicals and government papers. This latter method allowed the study to take into accounts: opinions, views and comments analyzed through content-analysis technique.
3.9. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
The study focused on secondary data analysis. These documents include: textbooks, journals, magazines, periodicals, government records, internet and newspapers.
Primary data were collected using elite and in-depth interview techniques to enrich the research findings. Evidences collected were also content-analyzed.
Content-analysis technique was used to analyze the collected data. With content- analysis, verbal and written evidences from different interviews and historical documents were transformed from their unwieldy raw forms to a more 96 Page
manageable one. Five basic steps were followed in conducting the content analysis:
(i) deciding on material sample to be used for the study, that is choosing of
appropriate sampling frame as well as material for analysis from the
chosen sample frame;
(ii) determination of the categories of content for measurement of key
variables elicited from the objectives of the study and research questions;
(iii) choice of recording units;
(iv) develop the procedure for coding the material and;
(v) choose the qualitative measure for analyzing the data (Johnson and
Joslyn, 1995:245).
Content-analysis technique was adopted because it reduces the free comments of respondents to as many brief statements as possible. Words or phrases were used for statements. Content-analysis technique helps us to identify substantive statement, high-lights the key ideas and concepts, identifies general patterns of variables and explores the possibility of using such variables to analyze and interpret evidences from the administrative records.
Concepts derived from the content-analysis of the primary data were operationalized, coded, and categorized into ―themes‖ ―in a systematic and replicable manner‖ (Bryman, 2001:183). A coding frame numbering ―1 to 5‖ was constructed, which enable similar concepts that were clearly defined to be matched, analyzed and explained.
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Efforts were made to ensure internal consistency and coherence of data. To achieve this, field notes were read and studied severally at the initial stage in order to have a thorough grasp and understanding of the responses as a basis of undertaking effective thematic classification of data. The reading process, especially after the second reading, entailed marking out key issues and similarities in responses which were in tandem with the objectives of the research with colour markers. Similar responses were marked with same coloured marker for ease of identification and classification.
Where it was difficult to classify themes that were too close, these themes were put off until much later for classification. Further critical analysis were undertaken in order to ensure the correct classifications of hitherto unclassified data. In this way, chances of ambiguities and unsystematic classifications were drastically reduced if not totally eliminated. Furthermore, to increase the reliability of the content- analysis, test of inter-coder reliability were conducted. To achieve inter- coder reliability using triangulation technique, the coding by the researcher and two other coders using the same procedures, conceptualization and operationalization were compared, before ―content categories or themes‖ were agreed upon based on key variables elicited from responses of respondents
(Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:246; and Orcher, 2005: 72). The data were further subjected to systematic and thematic analysis. Efforts were made to ensure theoretical linkages and relevance of the different themes to the social indicators of historical and political events.
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3.10. MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
To measure the independent variables (democratization) and dependent variable
(sustenance of democracy), social indicators were constructed as templates/or benchmarks of assessment. The variables derived from the research questions, include:
(i) demilitarization of polity;
(ii) institutional and behavioural foundation;
(iii) national consciousness and political participation of citizens ;
(iv) quality of governance and;
(v) democratic dividends and economic development.
Variables from (i) to (iv) represent the independent variables –―democratization‖; while variable (v) represent the dependent variable –―sustenance of democracy.‖
These variables were operationalized into social indicators, criteria and ranked on a 1 to 25 – point scale score, as follows:
1 = Very negative impact;
5= Poor impact;
10= Fair impact;
15= Good impact;
20= Very Good and;
25= Excellent impact.
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The wide range ensures a level of variability consistent with the actual events.
An indicator retains its score for the previous year if no major event took place to significantly alter its quality.
Since the 1990s when the third wave of democratization swept through Africa, a lot of intellectual attention has been paid to the democratization process in Africa.
Most of the outputs have however focused on the nature of the transition processes, patterns and dimensions, challenges, options and choices of competing elite within the processes. This is the case because the transition paradigm that dominated studies of the third wave of democratization led by scholars in the north also influenced most of the writings on Africa. Also as significant as the transition paradigm is the state-civil society framework in the study of political liberalization in Africa. The latter threw up a lot of studies on the emergence and vibrancy of Africa‘s nascent civil society. Civil society became celebrated as the source of the pressures for opening up the democratic space as well as the prospective agent of democratic consolidation and sustenance
(Anifowose and Aiyede, 2004:40).
The term governance became popular in debate on the development crisis in
Africa with the World Bank‘s description of the African problem as ―a crisis of governance‖. The Bank attributes Africa‘s crisis to the lack of countervailing power, which has enabled state officials in many countries to serve their interests without fear of being called to account. Consequently, because politics is personalized, patronage becomes essential to power as leadership assumes
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broad discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy. Information is controlled, and voluntary associations are co-opted or disbanded. The environment cannot readily support a dynamic economy (World Bank, 1989).
For the Bank, governance is simply the ―exercise of political power to manage a nation‘s affairs.‖ But governance takes on several meanings depending on the author. For instance, Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido - Lobaton (1999:1) define governance as ―the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for Institutions that govern economic and social interactions amongst them.
Governance captures the whole dynamic of organizational forms of citizens‘ involvement in the management of public affairs for development and growth.
Stoker (1998) has put forward five propositions of governance as drawn from the way the term has been used worldwide. According to him, governance:
(i) Refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but
also beyond government;
(ii) Identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling
social and economic issues;
(iii) Identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships
between institutions involved in collective action;
(iv) Is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors and;
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(v) Recognises the capacity to get things done which does not rest on
the power of government to command or use its authority. It sees
government as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and
guide.
Governance stresses the concerted nature of the management of collective action in a modern economy. The idea that the state needs to interact and co- operate with non-state agents for it to effectively play its role in securing order and progress for the political community. It emphasizes the essence of government as manager and guide in the concerted effort involving government agents and other actors to ensure growth and development. Although power is central to governance, it is not absolute, as accountability, transparency, and rules diffuses power. It pays attention to how political processes, rules and institutions affect economic outcomes and welfare. As the United Nations
Development Programme‘s (UNDP), Global Human Development Report 2002 put it, governance assumes that institutions, rules and political processes play a big role in whether economies grow, children go to school whether human development moves forward or backward. Development is an institutional and political challenge. Governance is purposeful, the goal being human development. In this regard governance seeks institutions and rules that ensure that human rights are protected, promote wider participation in the institutions and rules that affect peoples live in order to achieve more equitable economic and social outcomes (UNDP 2002:51-52). The very idea of governance, as we shall show presently, suggests that democracy is essential to achieve
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development. Indeed, the Report went further to argue that good governance is democratic governance.
Schumpeter‘s (1947: 269) minimalist definition views democracy as a system ―for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by the means of a competitive struggle for the people‘s vote‖. Huntington (1991:15), among others, explicitly embraces Schumpeter‘s emphasis on electoral competition as the essence of democracy. Over time, however, scholars have elaborated the term. A popular elaboration has been Dahl‘s (1971:13) concept of
―polyarchy‖ which requires not only extensive political competition and participation but also substantial levels of freedom and pluralism that enable people to form and express their political preferences in a meaningful way. Thus, scholars distinguish between the Schumpeterian conception, that is, electoral democracy and liberal democracy.
Liberal democracy extends beyond the minimalist or electoral democracy.
Diamond (1996:22) succinctly notes that in addition to regular, free and fair electoral competition and universal suffrage, it requires the absence of ―reserved domains‖ of power for the military or other social and political forces that are not either directly or indirectly accountable to the electorate. Second, in addition to the ―vertical‖ accountability of rulers to the ruled (which is secured most reliably through regular, free and fair elections), it requires ―horizontal‖ accountability of office-holders to one another: this constrains executive power and so helps protect Constitutionalism, the rule of law and the deliberative process. Third, it
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encourages extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism as well as for individual and group freedoms (belief, opinion, speech, assembly etc.)
(Anifowose and Aiyede, 2004).
Generally, certain important ideas are thrown up by the preceding analysis.
There is the conception of freedom both as an end and as an issue in the search for socio-economic well being of the political community. Equally significant is the problematic nature of authority and power in human society. It is clear from the foregoing analysis that there is a need to separate the state from civil society to realize a truly democratic order in our capitalist world. Democratization therefore entails the continuous restructuring of both state and civil society. It involves the restructuring of political institutions and the general approach to management of public affairs with an eye on efficient collective prosperity. Governance thus questions the social relevance of democracy. For developing countries, it implies a particular conception of development management that mobilizes citizen initiative and resources by their active participation in public affairs (Beckman
1989, Mkandawire 1988, 1997, Mamdani 1990). This can be referred to as extending the real meaning of democracy beyond the procedural model to encompassing substantive democracy (Alao, 2004: iv).
In Nigeria this challenge takes on a particular specificity. This is the case because we have adopted the liberal model of democracy that places emphasis on electoral competition in a context of high inequalities (individual and group) and an authoritarian state, such that people vote without choosing, and when
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they chose the only option is between two oppressors. Thus, the nature of the state, the ambivalent citizenship and thereby problematic civil society, coupled with poor social conditions (marked by widespread poverty and ignorance) limit good governance and threaten democracy. This makes the role of military in governance and the issue of civilian control and use of the military central to the democratization process as well.
Moreover, the general elections of 1999, 2003 and 2007 demonstrate a wide gap between electoral and liberal democracy. During this period, the quality of democracy (as measured by the extent of political rights and civil liberties) was eroded. Electoral competition was stifled, as the ruling party used the electoral institution as a mechanism to select preferred party loyalists rather than as competitive device for a free choice. This trend render Nigeria‘s new democracy precarious. By reflection on the previous republics, the erosion of democratic substance was a precursor to the actual suspension or overthrow of democracy through military coups. The path to military coups has been paved with the accumulation of unresolved problems, elite corruption and malfunctioning of democratic institutions, the gradual aggrandizement of executive power and popular disaffection with politics and politicians (Anifowose and Aiyede, 2004).
To sum up, central to good governance is the question of development and enhancement of the general welfare of the citizens. While it was originally thought that democracy should take a back seat in the quest for development in
Africa, the failure to achieve development after several decades of authoritarian
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rule, and military dictatorships has led to a return to the question of the relationship between development and democracy. Happily, several studies have in recent times shown that democracy is not inimical to growth and development
(Przeworski 1991, Bhagwati 1995). Hence democracy now enjoys a worldwide popularity as a key element of good governance and of promoting sustainable human development. In fact, the benefits of good governance, economic prosperity, are said to generate pressures for democratization in newly industrialized countries. According to these studies, the higher a nation‘s national income, the more likely its politics will be democratic. ―A people that enjoys even modest levels of property, prosperity and education is unlikely to become servile.
Indeed, the more means people acquire, the more likely they are to want a say in making the rules under which they live, the upshot is a wider domain of political freedom‖, writes Rowen (1995:53). Thus, democracy is the road to good governance, while the achievement of good governance and its attendant economic prosperity is a bulwark for democracy.
The concept of democratization is also very germane to our analysis. This concept makes it clear that democracy cannot be instituted by conducting an election to replace military dictators with civilians. Rather it has to be established and gradually institutionalized through the conscious efforts of the elites and political leaders over time. Such a process will involve political institutionalization, behavioural and attitudinal changes that normalise politics and narrow uncertainty. The challenge of democratization is therefore to ensure that democracy ―becomes the only game in town‖ (Linz and Stepan 1996). As
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Diamond (1996) contends, for the contemporary wave of democratization to endure, the overriding imperative in the coming years is to consolidate those new democracies, such as in Nigeria. In essence, consolidation is defined as the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation such that all political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is better for their society than any other realistic alternative they can imagine. As Linz and
Stepan (1996), among others, have stressed, this legitimation must be more than a commitment to democracy in the abstract. It must also involve a shift in political culture, a transition from ―instrumental‖ to ―principled‖ commitment to the democratic framework, a growth in trust and co-operation among the political competitors and a socialization of the general population. This can be achieved through both deliberative efforts and the practice of democracy in politics and civil society. Democratic consolidation thus involves a shared normative and behavioural commitment to the specific rules and practices of the country‘s constitutional system (Anifowose and Aiyede, 2004).
If the new democracies are to become consolidated, electoral democracies must become deeper and more liberal. This will require greater executive (and military) accountability to both the law and the scrutiny of other branches of the government, as well as the public. It demands the reduction of barriers to political participation and mobilization by marginalized groups, and more effective protection for the political and civil rights of all citizens. Deepening of democracy will also be facilitated by the institutionalization of political party system that stimulates mass participation, incorporates marginalized groups and forges
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vibrant linkages with civil society organizations and party branches and officials at the grassroots.
Democratic consolidation is also facilitated by a number of institutional and behavioural changes. Many of these changes improve governance directly by strengthening state capacity, liberalizing and rationalizing economic structures, securing social and political order while maintaining basic freedoms, improving horizontal accountability and the rule of law and reducing corruption. In addition to this institutional reforms and strengthening, it also requires a steady programme of reforms to reduce military involvement in non-military issues and subject the military and intelligence establishments to oversight activities and control by elected civilian leaders.
The question of democracy is located within the framework of development by governance. Democracy as a preferred form of governance throws up the challenge of dealing with the role of the military within the political system in countries like Nigeria that have experienced unstable civil-military relations. Four issues are germane here: democratic subordination of the military, the economic sustainability of the military, institutional stability of the military establishment, and check on militarizm. In Nigeria these translates into civilian supremacy, the need for the military institution to have national outlook and respect democratic values, the need to improve military efficiency and capability, and the demilitarization of society. All of these have to be achieved in a context in which the social relevance of democracy stands out as a major issue. Indeed, democracy has to
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empower the people, by reducing the levels of poverty, inequality, and social injustice. Successive civilian leaders must, at all times, ensure good governance and avoid unnecessary reliance on the military for their personal security and the perpetuation of their unpopular regimes in power. The prospects of an alternative governance outside of the military must be real. Where political parties are highly factionalised, the prospects of alternative governance outside the military become blurred. The increasing involvement of the retired military officers in
Nigeria‘s democratization may well be a factor capable of discouraging military direct incursion into civil politics.
Nigeria existed as autonomous political entities before the intrusion of British
Rule. These political entities had their own political systems, social and religious values distinct from the other groups (Okafor, 1997: 1). The introduction of British rule rather than bringing unity to the diverse ethnic groups, exploited on the differences and introduced the doctrine of indirect rule. The doctrine of indirect rule restricted administrative action within each locality and made ethnic interaction difficult (Ekeh, 1996: 35-6). The British style of administration emphasized the cultural distinctions of the disparate kinship groupings as the centre of political organization, thus providing a limited space for inter-ethnic interaction before the country‘s independence in 1960.
The post-colonial regimes largely continued the pattern of the receded colonialist style of administration without far-reaching policy measures to coalesce the differences among them into positive ventures that can create a pan-Nigerian
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identity. Although efforts have been made by successive regimes-military and civilian to resolve the basic problems of national integration and political stability through diverse structural reforms, such as: state and local government creation, introduction of the federal character principle in the 1979 constitution and the use of ―zoning system‖ as a mechanism for power sharing, the problem of national question still looms large in Nigeria. In fact, the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections, the sacking of the Shonekan-led Interim National
Government (ING), the return of the military on November 17, 1993 and the subsequent reversal of the transition to civil rule programme are all pointers to the tortuous path of Nigeria‘s search for a stable democratic social order and hegemonic struggle for control of state power have become the hallmark of
Nigeria‘s politics.
Each ethnic group in Nigeria struggles to gain prominence and by it determines the allocation and distribution of resources. The implication of this, is that the policies and responses of the government towards addressing these problems have culminated into the issue of ‗national question‘, which Jimoh (2001:40) noted, revolves around how a state made up of diverse nations, ethnic groups or peoples should order relations among its constituent parts.
This forms the central thrust of this chapter, but first, we focus on the conceptualization of pluralism and how it could be exploited to mitigate and minimize destructive instability in the polity. The question that comes to mind is: can there be political, social and economic stability, if a new approach is adopted
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in dealing with pluralism and ethno-nationalist expression? This question will be answered in the course of this chapter.
The term plurality is used in two senses, one broad and the other narrow. In its broad sense, plurality is a belief in, or a multiplicity (the existence of many things). As a descriptive term, plurality may be used to denote the existence of party competition (political pluralism), or a variety of cultural norms (cultural pluralism).
As a normative term, it suggests that diversity is healthy because it safeguards individual liberty and promotes debate, argument and understanding. More narrowly, plurality is a theory of the distribution of political power. It holds that power is widely and evenly dispersed in society rather than concentrated in the hands of an elite or a ruling class (Heywood, 2007:82). In this thesis, plurality is seen as a theory of ―group politics‖ in which individuals are represented largely through their membership of organized ethnic groups, and all such groups have access to the political process.
The issue of plurality and the consequent problems of peaceful co-existence in the polity can be explained in two dimensions. The first dimension is inter-group relations, that is, the tension and contradictions that arise from inter-group relations on issues of marginalization, domination, inequality, fairness and justice among ethnic groups and is reinforced by the second dimension, the exacerbation of class inequalities and antagonism in society dichotomized as rich and poor, the affluent and the underclass. As such, the main issue on plurality 111 Page
and ―national question‖ revolves around how to structure Nigerian federation in order to accommodate groups in a way that can guarantee access to power, equitable distribution of resources and sustain political stability.
The political elite and ethnic group, each has a firm idea of what it wants from
Nigeria. Ethnic consciousness and assertiveness resurrected as a result of return to democratic rule. To mitigate and minimize this destructive inter-ethnic rivalry, the ruling political elites in Nigeria resorted to multiplying centres of political competition through state and local government creation. However, these political divisions have not doused tensions and agitation, rather, the process seems to compound the issue, as these new divisions exposed the hidden heterogeneity that replicates ethnic politics at that level, making the situation uncontrollable. It is this distrust among the various ethnic groups that brought about the enshrinement of the Federal Character clause in the constitution and the establishment of the Federal Character Commission to ensure that all ethnic nationalities are duly represented in appointments into public service. The insincerity in the application of the principle of federal character and quota system, meant to give accommodation and sense of belonging to the various ethnic groups did not helped matters. The result is that Nigeria has been plagued by multiple of political crises and instability.
THE NIGERIAN STATE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS
Nigeria is a multi-ethnic state with high ethnic identification. This engenders fierce competition for control of resources and raises the quest for power into a zero-
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sum game. The only avenue of support mobilization available to the elite is along ethnic line.
Thus, the fierce political competition among different ethnic groups has resulted into violent cleavages, communal crises, such as the civil war (1967-70),
Kafanchan uprising that spread to other parts of Kaduna State in 1987; the conflict in Wukari and Takum in Taraba State between TIV and Jukun which began in 1990 and the mass killing in Tafawa Balewa local government area of
Bauchi State between the Semayi and Hausa communities. Others include the
1992 Zango-Kataf clashes between the indigenous Cattle rearers and the Hausa-
Fulani migrant community, the Adoni/Ogoni bloodshed in 1993, as well as the
Aguleri–Umuleri feud and the Ife-Modakeke clashes that were rather intra-ethnic.
Other forms of intra-ethnic clashes include Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo, ethno- religious riots in Kano, Kaduna and Jos; the Niger-Delta of South-South‘s agitation for resource control and the Boko Haram terrorist activities in the North against Christians, government and Southerners in the North.
These activities have raised concerns about the urgent need to stem the tide of intra-ethnic violence in Nigeria and maintain stability in the polity. The question now is what can be done?
A strident call for a Sovereign National Conference which government partially agreed with the National Political Conference in 2002 was highly criticized for its failure to properly address the issue of diverse ethnic groups (pluralism) and how
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to manage them to achieve social, economic and political stability, then, what is the way forward?
THE WAY FORWARD
(A) POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING OF NIGERIAN STATE
The structure of the Nigerian State makes ethnicity inevitable. The government appears unable to come to grips with the reality of these new ethnic tension in the country. It lacks the effective tool for managing ethnic relations. Piecemeal, ad-hoc and half-hearted measurers, which have been the hallmark of successive governments‘ responses to ethnic assertiveness have failed to deal with the crises and are unlikely to work as a strategy for dealing with the issues raised by the country‘s ethnic plurality in the new forms it is manifesting (Agbese, 2001:
147).
(B) CONSOCIATIONALISM AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM
In effect, an institutional structure within the political system is required in order to provide fair and predictable rules for competition, enhance ability of groups to co- exist peacefully and stability in the polity.
Therefore, the adoption of a system that accommodates the numerous ethnic groups in Nigeria based on a process fashioned through popular participation and consultation may be an appropriate panacea to the surge in ethno- nationalism. Consociationalism entails a power-sharing agreement within government brokered between clearly defined segments of society joined by citizenship but divided by ethnicity, religion or language . 114 Page
Consociationalism seems appropriate because it can be distilled into four basic elements that have to be present, viz:
(i) Executive power sharing arrangements among the representatives of all
significant groups. Such arrangements can ensure stability and have the
additional advantage of establishing a basic level of consensus in the
management of the instruments of violence;
(ii) A high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it;
(iii) Proportional representation and proportional allocation of civil service
position and public funds. In Nigeria this will allow all diverse groups and
interests in areas such as revenue allocation and placement into strategic
federal parastatals to have sense of belonging, increase trust, national
unity and integration and;
(iv) A system that accommodates minority veto on most vital issues. The
existence of mutual veto will enhance the empowerment of oppressed
groups and give each segment of the people a complete guarantee of
political protection.
According to Lijphart (1977), these four basic elements will ensure that the government becomes an inclusive multi-ethnic coalition. According to Ricker
(1962), they are not just desirable in plural societies, but are most rational product of bargaining. This bargaining should not be an elite pact but must significantly involve the masses.
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(C) ADVERSARIAL ATTITUDE TO POLITICS AND WINNER TAKES – ALL
SYNDROME
The adversarial attitude to politics and winner-takes-all or zero-sum syndrome in
Nigerian politics have greatly contributed to instability of post-colonial state of
Nigeria. There is, therefore, the urgent need for considering models of governance that consciously takes into consideration the complex and plural nature of the Nigerian federation. According to Ihonvbere (1995), ―this must begin with removal of institutions, processes and structures which enable the political elites dominate society without accountability‖. In Nigerian context, the federal character principle and quota system for admission into both State and Federal institutions of learning have been turned into tools of nepotism, ethno-regional and sectarian chauvinism, which are destructive to the very survival of the country and its peoples.
(D) EMPOWERMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF OPPRESSED
PEOPLE
Previous policies have not empowered the people (workers, students and peasants) who are the agents and essence of development. The process of empowerment involves transforming the economic, social, psychological and currently powerless institutions and people. It involves the emergence of group identities, the development of autonomous and coherent popular organizations and the defence of and education about the legal rights of the popular sectors. In the words of Ihonvbere (1995: 153), empowerment involves:
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a form of socio-economic and political restructuring
which removes the locus of power form the current
custodians of state power, and enable the currently
disadvantaged to meet their basic needs, fully
participate in decision-making and provide
opportunities to challenge internal and external
oppression.
Therefore, the locus of power should shift from political elites to workers, students and people. They should be empowered through political education and enlightenment for political participation.
(E) TRANSFORMING PLURAL VALUES INTO NATIONAL VALUES
Nigeria as a heterogeneous society has continually faced the problem of ethnicity in her national life. Ethnic groups are social formations differentiated by communal boundaries. According to Nnoli, (1980), ethnicity is ―social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different ethnic groups. Ethnicity as a phenomenon is behavioural in form and confliction in content. It can only exist within a plural political state. It is the relations between the diverse ethnic groups within the political state that produces ethnicity. In the case of Nigeria, it is ethnic competition for scarce resources. It is often characterized by inter-ethnic discrimination in jobs, housing, admissions into tertiary institutions, scholarships, managing distribution of welfare services etc.
This is often accomplished by nepotism and corruption.
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The result of ethnic competition was the emergence of political parties along ethnic line after independence. National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East, Action Group (AG) in the West and Northern Peoples‘ Congress (NPC) in the North. They openly used emotive ethnic conflicts to canvass for votes.
Their struggles for power and positions generated antagonism and hostility along ethnic divide. The tendency has been for the ethnic elites to promote their ethno ideas and beliefs, such as, language and religion in order to gain control of the subject class in its quest to corner the resources of the state. And in situations of conflict, the tendency is to fan the embers of ethnic tension by accusing others of marginalization.
From these perspectives, ethnicity as a principal factor in our plural society can be viewed as negative, disruptive and conflictual in nature. However, ethnicity could be cooperative, non-conflictual and positive. Osaghae (2003) is of the view that ethnicity has been helpful in the mobilization of resources and community based developments. This is typified by the activities of urban based town unions, social clubs and ethnic women organizations, vigilante organizations, which through levies and cooperation build schools, water projects, health centres and facilitate security of lives and properties. For example, the Oodua
Peoples‘ Congress (OPC) often mobilized their members to safeguard lives and properties in Yoruba controlled States. The Bakassi boys also helped to check the cases of armed robbery and kidnapping in Aba and Onitsha in Eastern
Nigeria. Moreover, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was able to articulate propaganda on the neglect and degradation of their
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environment that attracted national and international attention. Such emancipator roles should be viewed positively because they do not only help to develop the economy, but stabilize the polity and engender harmony.
Beside this, our diverse social and cultural values, such as: sports, culture and language can be transformed into national values. ensuring Sport activities, especially international competitions can be used as avenues to build national consciousness, by making sure sport activities are located in different state of the federation. The National Youths Service Programme currently under threat by ethno-religious bigotry should be revitalized, such that graduates of tertiary institutions are encouraged, re-oriented to respect the cultures and beliefs of other members of Nigerian community. Among the NYSC programmes, language studies and social interactions with local people of abode should be encouraged among serving NYSC members. This may metamorphoze into inter-tribal marriages and mutual respect of each others religious beliefs. At the primary and secondary schools‘ levels, civic education, citizenship and leadership should be taught and made compulsory. These organized activities by the various arms of government, that is, federal, state and local government, would facilitate the transformation of our plural values into national values and collective aspirations in the social and political realms.
The thrust of the argument is that plural and parochial values of Nigerians that often result in conflict can be transformed into or replaced by a single set of national values. Although efforts have been made by both civilian and military
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regimes to address the pluralist nature of Nigerian federation and how to ensure political stability through the policies of state and local government creation, federal character principle, zoning or quota system and rotational power sharing among six geo-political groups, the endemic problems of ethno-regional, religious and sectarian bigotry persist and constitute serious threats to the survival of the
Nigerian federation and enthronement of a stable democratic socio-political order.
I suggest that to ensure political stability, political participation and empowerment, it is necessary to establish mechanisms of power sharing as exemplified by the consociationalist model. The restructuring of the Nigerian state along consociationalist model of governance will enhance political stability, which is necessary for economic transformation of Nigeria.
Furthermore, some scholars averred that the undue attachment to ethnic groups hamper the development of Nigeria. However, I posit that it is not in all situations that the deployment of ethnicity becomes a negative factor in governance.
Ethnicity and other plural values of people in Nigerian society can be transformed into national values.
Revitalization of National Youths Service Programme for graduate of tertiary institutions, civic education for pupils in primary schools, citizenship and leadership training programmes for secondary school students, if properly organized and managed by Federal, State and Local Governments would be
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boosters to national consciousness and collective aspirations in the social and political realms.
The Proposed review of the electoral law should substantially reflect the report and recommendations of the Justice Mohammed Uwais – led electoral review committee set up by the Late President Umaru Musa Yar‘Adua. These include the appointment of the INEC chairman, presently done by the President- Dr.
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, contrary to the Uwais committee‘s recommendation. It is sad that government appears to be disinterested in the committee‘s report after spending huge public resources and a great deal of time and energy on it.
The state as a political organism is erected on the bed-rock of efficacious structural organisation. This structural political organisation is one of the indispensable determinants of administrative efficiency of any given state. And all over the world, there exists various types of this structural political arrangement though with various degrees of relevance and utility. One of such organisations that has weathered the test of time in most democratic countries of the world is federalism. It is a common thing to accord federalism the characteristics of polity building. Federalism has continued to be more relevant and acceptable as many countries now adopt it as a political arrangement.
The idea that there exists a ―true‖ federalism is contentious right from the conceptual platform. Every federal system is unique and determined according to its environment. This, however, does not deny the existence of certain
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distinguishing features that set federations apart from their constitutional and political opposites, that is, unitary and confederal systems.
At the level of conceptualization, federalism is seen either as an alliance or as decentralization, while alliance school argues that federalism allows for the surrender of powers to the centre and gives allowance for self-government. The concept of federalism has been defined in various ways by different scholars.
Federalism is a system in which two levels of government – federal and regional
(state) exist side by side, with each possessing certain assigned powers and functions(Wheare, 1963). For Elaigwu, (1993:3), federalism is a kind of compromise between advocates for a strong central government and those who push for autonomy and respect for the rights of the sub-national units. Frederick
(1968) defined federalism as ―a situation whereby the federal and regional (state) governments are limited to their spheres and within those spheres should be independent of the other‖
In spite of these plethora of definitions, the general nature of federalism which has endured for a long time is the one given by Wheare (1963:14). To him, the fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of a federal system is that neither the central nor the regional (state) governments are subordinate to each other, but rather, the various levels of government are coordinate and inter-dependent.
Each operates directly with the people and neither may arrogate to itself powers assigned to the other. In other words, a federal structure entails a structured dispersion of power among many centres whose legitimate authority is
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constitutionally guaranteed. It also involves the provision of well-defined permanent structures and boundaries for the major political sub-divisions through which power is dispersed. There will also be cooperative public-private power- sharing relationships that operate within the framework of the constitution to translate governmental authority into action.
However, in a federal system, the nature and pattern of power-sharing between the centre and sub-regional units differ from one country to another, depending on the nature and agreement reached by the multi-national units. Some countries operate federal principle of formal division of governmental and legislative powers between the centre and subordinate units, but their component units are called different names. For example, in Nigeria and United States of America, subordinate units are called regions or states. In India and Canada, they are called provinces; while, in Switzerland, they are called Cantons.
In Nigeria and United States of America, for instance, powers and functions are shared among its various levels of government. The powers and functions are classified into the following categories:
(i) EXCLUSIVE LIST
This category of powers and functions are exercised by only the
federal government. Such legislative powers are exercised in the
following areas: defence, currency, military, external affairs, customs
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and excise, foreign trade and commerce, Maritime, passport and visas,
aviation and so on.
(ii) CONCURRENT LIST
This category provides for subjects where both the federal and
component units of government can legislate at the same time on the
same subject. These subjects include: education, health, agriculture,
health, works, construction and communication and so on.
(iii) RESIDUAL LIST
This comprises all functions to be exercised and reserved for the state
alone. They include rural development, traditional and customary
affairs, and so on.
The United States of America and Nigeria‘s first and second Republics constitutions maintained exclusive legislative powers, while residual powers were listed for the state/regional governments, respectively.
THEORIES OF FEDERALISM
CLASSICAL OR DUAL FEDERALISM THEORY
This nature and pattern of federalism conforms to the two major theories advocated by two school of thoughts. The first school of thought referred to classical or dual federalism theory which emphasizes the autonomy of the various levels of government. Wheare (1963) is one of the chief proponents of 124 Page
the classical theory, who explained that federalism is a method of sharing power among the various levels, so that the central and state/regional governments are within a sphere, coordinate and independent. The theory prescribes certain conditions which must exist for a true federalism to emerge. Some of these conditions include: having a written constitution with a rigorous process of amendment; the existence of an independent judicial body for settling all conflicts of jurisdiction between governments; division of legislative powers among the various levels and each level having adequate revenue derived from independent sources.
COOPERATIVE THEORY
This theory emphasizes cooperation between the various levels of government and that governments must have interdependent relationship among themselves.
They have to cooperate and interact cohesively for the system to survive. Since it is practically impossible to achieve rigid adherence to the constitutional provisions, the government has devised ways and means of interaction among the various levels of government. This has resulted in the establishment of structures and institutions to facilitate their interactions and cooperation. It is through these institutions that meetings, consultations and discussions are held among government functionaries. These interactions are referred to as inter- governmental relations.
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For this thesis, we adopt the two theories as our framework of analysis, with each complementing the other, but focus more on Wheare‘s classical theory. From this perspective, what is Nigeria‘s experience in the practice of ―true‖ federalism?
FEDERALISM: NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE
Nigerian federalism was a product of British colonial rule. The amalgamation of
Southern and Northern protectorates in 1914 by Lord Lugard, which resulted in an entity called Nigeria. But for this forced marriage, it is a matter of conjecture whether a state called Nigeria would have emerged. Although, Dudley (1982) argues that several ties which existed between these diverse people could still have provided the basis for a state like Nigeria without colonial intervention. This is in the realm of academic speculation.
What is, however, incontrovertible is that the structure of Nigerian state is an imposition, since joining the imbalanced structure for economic and administrative convenient has posed problem of power struggle on post- independence Nigeria. In other words, the balkanization of Nigeria into three major regions, namely: Northern, Western and Eastern regions has brought the issue of domination of major ethnic groups on other ethnic minorities in these regions. These imbalanced structure of the federation has become a source of concern in Post-independence Nigeria, as it has become a determining factor in deciding the future of the people, especially in politics, party formation, bureaucracy, revenue allocation and so on. A review of Nigeria‘s experience
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since independence in the practice of federalism would reveal to us the distortions in the system, as illustrated below:
THE TAFAWA BALEWA’S ADMINISTRATION (1960-66)
The structural imbalance of the federal system paved way to agitations for creation of new states as soon as Nigeria became independent. Meanwhile, the independent constitution of 1960 enshrined a provision which set out conditions under which a new region might be established. This criteria was followed in the creation of Mid-Western Region in 1963. Nigeria remained a four-region- structure until the military intervention in 1966. Beside, power and resource concentrated at the centre. The fiscal autonomy between the regions and central governments, especially the powers to impose and collect taxes was still in favour of the federal government. J. Raisman and Tress Commission of 1957, emphasized the need for the central government to exercise fiscal powers on custom duties, sales taxes and mining rents and royalties (Ugoh, 2011:58).
THE AGUIYI IRONSI/GOWON’S ADMINISTRATION (1966-1975)
General Aguiyi Ironsi took over power in January, 1966. His administration even reversed the practice of federalism to unitary system of government. This was the major cause of his overthrown by Northern officers in July, 1966, who felt that more educated Southern people would dominate the Northern Region. General
Gowon became the Head of state, while Colonel Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu , the governor of Eastern Region refused to recognize his government. The subsequent killings of the people from the South, particularly, the Ibos in
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Northern Region, resulted in a secession bid by the Eastern region in 1967, making ―Biafra‖ their republic. This brought about 30 months civil war that eventually ended in 1970, with the slogan of ―NO VICTOR, NO VANQUISHED‖.
In the course of the civil war, General Gowon created twelve states from the four- region-structure. Political analysts viewed that decision to create states at the time of the civil war as a war strategy to disintegrate the Eastern region and dislodge internal cohesion within Biafra republic, especially with the minority ethnic group that has been agitating for self-determination. Of-course, it worked for Gowon‘s regime. However, more agitations continued after the end of the civil war. Though, General Gowon promised to create more states, he could not accomplish that promise before he was overthrown in July, 1975.
On fiscal federalism, effort was made in 1968 to seek a workable and acceptable formula of revenue allocation among the three tiers of government. Dina
Commission of 1968 was established. The Commission made the following recommendations:
Federal government should assume full responsibility for the financing of
higher education, which was the bone of contention;
To have uniform income tax legislation in the whole country;
Mining rents in respect of onshore operations to be distributed on the
basis of 15 percent federal; 10 per cent state of derivation; and 70 per cent
Joint Account;
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Off-shore rents along with the royalties be distributed on the basis of 60
per cent federal; 30 per cent Joint Account and 10 per cent special
Account and;
Pricing and financial practices of marketing boards to be harmonized
(Shut, 2005:51).
This report in all ramifications showed the desire of government to have a strong central government as it allocated more resources to the centre.
THE MURTALA MUHAMMED/OBASANJO’S ADMINISTRATION (1975 -79)
On assumption of office in July, 1975, General Murtala Muhammed did not hide his interest in the radical transformation of the country‘s political structure. He made extensive consultation between the government and leaders of thought in the country, to find out the extent of the demand and possibilities of creating more states. From the report of the Panel on December 23, 1975, seven more states were created to make the number of states in the federation to be 19. No sooner had this happened than he was assassinated in 1976. He was subsequently succeeded by General Olusegun Obasanjo.
General Obasanjo ruled the country up to 1979, and handed over power to civilian regime, headed by President Shehu Usman Shagari. Before then, a constitution was enacted in 1979. The constitution recognized the federal character principle as a way of bringing the less disadvantaged states to be part of state affairs. This brought about discrimination, inequality and social injustice into politics and bureaucracy. Coming from educationally advanced states, 129 Page
particularly the south, becomes a sin and a disadvantaged in employment, admission to schools, bureaucracy and politics. In true federalism, this ought not to be so. In the words of Chief Obafemi Awolowo:
Under a true federal constitution, each
group, however, small is entitled to the
same treatment as any other group, however,
large. Opportunity must be afforded to each to
evolve its own peculiar political institution. The
present structure reinforces indigenous colonialism-
A crude, harsh, unscientific and illogical system
(Cited in Ihonvbere, 1999:2).
The federal character principle has become a major concern as it has become a permanent feature, instead of transitional programme, making room to inequality, discrimination, social injustice and promoting mediocrity in running of state affairs.
Another issue on federalism was the reform of the local government system in
1976, as the third-tier of government. It restructured the council into 774 in the entire country and aligned to the practice of presidential system of government.
On resource allocation, General Obasanjo instituted Aboyade Technical
Committee in 1977. The commission made the following recommendations:
Federal government ------57 %
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State governments------30 %
Local governments------10 %
Special grants accounts------3%
The committee further proposed five (5) new principles for its distribution:
(i) Equality of access to development opportunities;
(ii) National minimum standard for national integration;
(iii) Absorptive capacity;
(iv) Independent revenue and minimum tax effort and;
(v) Fiscal efficiency.
The complexity in the application led to the government to accept the report but rejected the five weighting principles. The report showed that more resources was allocated to the federal government. However, when the report was presented to the Constituent Assembly prior to the take off of civilian regime of
1979, it was rejected.
THE SHEHU SHAGARI’S ADMINISTRATION (1979 -1983)
No sooner had President Shehu Shagari took oath of office than agitation for creation of more states intensified. As the 1979 constitution made provisions for the creation of more states in its section 8, sub-section 1, a committee was set up to that effect. However, the committee set up could not come up with any
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acceptable guideline, when the regime was overthrown by General Muhammadu
Buhari.
Prior to this, another bogging problem was revenue allocation. Shagari‘s regime appointed the Pius Okigbo‘s Commission to recommend a suitable revenue allocation formula. The commission in its report drew attention to what it identified as the special problem areas in the Nigerian federal system. They include:
The Federal Capital Territory (FCT);
The financial survival of newly created states;
The rehabilitation of war ravaged areas and;
The hazardous experiences of the mineral producing areas.
In its report, it recommended that the pool account should be shared as follows:
Federal government------53%
State governments------30%
Local governments------10%
Special Fund 7% to be distributed as follows:
2.5% for initial development of the FCT
2% for special problems of mineral producing areas
1% for controlling ecological and similar problems; and
1.5% was to serve as revenue equalization fund
The 30% allocation to states was to be shared based on the following:
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National minimum standards------40%
Population ------40%
Social Development represented by primary school enrolment--- 15%
Internal effort 5% (Ugwu, 1998 :68)
The commission‘s report was presented to the Joint Finance Committee‘s deliberation and ended up with some unresolved controversies. Some aggrieved persons – members of opposition parties led by Governor Ambrose Alli of the then Bendel State and now Edo State took the Federal government to court on the issue. However, the court ruled in their favour.
THE GENERAL MUHAMMADU BUHARI’S ADMINISTRATION (1983-85)
General Buhari‘s administration was short-lived, as General Ibrahim Badamosi
Babangida over-threw his regime in August 1985. Not much was recorded in the area of resource control and changing the structure of federal system of government.
THE GENERAL BABANGIDA’S ADMINISTRATION (1985-1993)
General Babangida seized power from General Buhari in August, 1985. He immediately set up the Political Bureau which received about ten requests for the creation of more states. The report of the Political Bureau culminated in the additional creation of two more states in 1987. He further created additional 9 states to bring the total number of states to 30 in 1991. On revenue allocation,
Danjuma‘s commission was set up in 1989. In their report, the commission recommended Federation Account to be charged as follows:
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Federal government------47%
State governments ------30%
Local governments ------15%
Special Fund------8%
FCT ------10%
Stabilization ------0.5%
Savings------2%
Derivation------2%
Development of oil Producing areas------0.5%
General ecology------0.5%
The commission further recommended some principles, which are as follows:
Equality of states ------40%
Population------40%
Social development ------15%
Internal revenue effort------5%
On the whole, it was obvious that power and the control of resources were concentrated at the centre.
THE ERNEST SHONEKAN/ABACHA’S ADMINISTRATION (1993-1998)
When General Babangida ―stepped aside‖ and appointed Ernest Shonekan as the President in interim administration, the administration had hardly settled down for business than General Abacha took over power. In 1996, Abacha created additional six (6) states to bring the total number of states to 36 states. This regime also introduced the 1999 constitution. Part II, Sections 4 and 5 stipulate
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the powers of the three levels of government. These powers were divided into
Exclusive, Concurrent and residual lists. It was obvious that too much powers were given to the federal government. Moreover, the 4th schedule of the constitution re-stated the functions of all local governments in Nigeria, as the third-tier of government, as was done in 1979 constitution of Nigeria.
The 1999 constitution of Nigeria recommended for the establishment of Revenue
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) to oversee the sharing of revenue allocation formula among the federal, state and local governments.
Subsequently, the RMAFC was incorporated into the 1999 constitution.
THE ABDULSALAMI ABUBAKAR/PRESIDENT OLUSEGUN OBASANJO’S
ADMINISTRATION (1998-2003)
Following the death of General Abacha, General Abdulsalami Abubakar took over the leadership as the military Head of state in 1998 and administered less than one year transition and conducted election that led to democratic government of Nigeria. Olusegun Obasanjo, who emerged winner of 1999 general election took over power.
To address the Niger Delta lingering problem of resource control, he dissolved
OMPADEC (Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Corporation) and established the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC) and voted more funds to the corporation for the people of Niger Delta.
Moreover, the agitation of equitable revenue allocation continued to surface in the polity. 135 Page
In 2001, RMAFC came up with revenue allocation formula as follows:
Federal government ------41.3 %
State governments ------31%
Local governments ------16%
Special Fund to be Supervised by federal Government----11.7%
There was controversy over the issue of special fund. The federal government initiated suit against the state governments in the Supreme court for adjudication of the issue. The court judgement made the commission to reverse the revenue formula in 2002. The reversed formula gave the:
Federal government ------48.5%
State governments ------24%
Local governments ------20%
Special Funds------7.5%
In November 2003, President Obasanjo wrote to the National Assembly asking for the withdrawal of the revenue formula. He alleged that there were several omissions in the versions of the revenue formula bill in circulation. By December
2003, the new revenue formula released gave the:
federal government------46.6%
State governments ------33%
Local governments ------20.3%
Not satisfied with the formula, President Obasanjo still sent the revenue formula back to RMAFC and asked for a fresh revenue formula. In September, 2004,
RMAFC recommended a new formula as:
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Federal government ------54.68%
State governments ------24.72%
Local government ------20.60%
Special Fund ------7.5%
A breakdown of the special fund include general ecological fund 1.5%; science and technology research fund for solid minerals development 1.75%; national reserve fund 1.5% and national agricultural development fund 1.75%. Hence, the special fund should be under the control of federal government.
The commission further recommended that decision on the special fund should be jointly taken and administered by all the three tiers of government. Another major issue was who would be responsible for the funding of the primary school education. The commission stated clearly in the recommendation that the burden should be transferred from the local governments to the state governments.
In spite of the efforts of the RMAFC, it was obvious that the bulk of the resources still concentrated in the control of federal government, with states becoming dependants to the federal government for socio-economic development.
THE YAR’ ADUA / JONATHAN’S ADMINISTRATION (2007 – 2011)
When Yar‘ Adua became president of Nigeria after the 2007 general election, the Niger Delta Region agitation for resource control and marginalization greeted his administration. To appease the Niger Delta militants, who were vandalizing pipelines, kidnapping expatriates and killing innocent citizens, more funds were allocated to Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC) for development of 137 Page
Niger Delta Region. In addition, the Ministry of Niger Delta was created to concentrate on affairs of the people of Niger Delta.
In spite of these, the Niger Delta militants continued their vandalizing of oil pipelines of multi-national oil companies, forcing many of these companies to close their operations. To bring peace to the area, the federal government initiated Amnesty programme for the militants and sponsored all those that surrendered to government to acquire skills for self-employment and general employment.
When President Yar‘Adua died after protracted illness, President Jonathan took over affairs of the state. The amnesty programme and training for skill acquisition reached with the Niger Delta militants continued with Jonathan‘s regime.
Furthermore, the Federal government has continued to legislate on labour and super-impose on states for implementation. Federal government reached agreement with Association of Academic Union of Universities on wages, benefits and retirement age and urged state universities to comply. To add sore to injury, a law on minimum wage of N18,000.00k was passed and all states and local governments plus private sector employers were compelled to comply, irrespective of federal system of government in operation. Moreover, the 1999 constitution empowered Electoral body, Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC) to conduct elections for Governors, Deputy Governors and
States Houses of Assemblies, instead of limiting it to federal elections. Even, the
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State Electoral Commissions are not independent of INEC. All these are distortions in the practice of ―true‖ federalism.
Furthermore, in terms of revenue allocation of the RMAFC, it continued to be:
Federal government ------52%
State governments ------26.72%
Local governments ------20.60%
After the general election of 2011 and with the emergence of President Jonathan as President, a Presidential Committee was set up, headed by Governor
Babatunde Fashola of Lagos State to review the revenue formula, following agitations by Governors‘ Forum for upward review of the revenue allocation, to enable them meet the statutory law on minimum wage of N18,000.00k The committee proposed the following formula:
Federal ------35%
State governments ------42%
Local governments ------23%
This proposal is still on agenda of President Jonathan and action is yet to be taken. In any case, is Governors‘ Forum now parts and parcel of RMAFC recognized by the constitution in recommending revenue allocation? Or has the federal government breached the constitution in terms of revenue allocation?
More crucially, for a developing country like Nigeria where institutions of checks and balances are weak, if not non-existent, handing such carte blanche powers
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over to a few people to have access to the innermost thoughts and actions of the populace may prove even more lethal than the worst sort of terrorism. To illustrate, in the heat of the Watergate Scandal in the United States of America in
1972 ( the secret wiretapping of the Democratic Party office by President Richard
Nixon and some members of his administration who are of the Republican Party), both the Supreme Court and the Senate were able to exercise their powers to subpoena presidential tapes. Nearly 40 years after, such an action may still not be possible here today.
It was the former Vice President Alex Ekwueme who first suggested a six unit geo-political zone structure that Nigeria currently smuggled into its lexicon and the basis of which the current political experimentation has hitherto enjoyed its limited success. It is my humble opinion that the six zone structure be allowed to metamorphosise to six federating units. This would have corrected several obstacles to unity and development: for example, there are equal number of zones in the North and South of the country rather than the present ratio 19:17 states North and South. The South East will no longer have to plead for the creation of more states as the south eastern zone would have become the federating unit rather than the states. There are also equal number of minority zones in the North and South: North Central and South South, respectively.
Beyond that, it would therefore be possible to practise true federalism since the geopolitical zones would command greater respect than the present states that depend almost entirely on the centre for their existence. Cultural affinity of
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groupings in these zones also means there would be less acrimonies, especially when adjustments are made for minority tribes to go with minority regions and majority regions to go their separate ways with their tribes. The apparent competition among the federating units would then be bringing about accelerated development and greater cohesion among states. Zones which would become regions will be able to have their separate parliaments rather than the unwieldly
Federal House of Representatives, where many elected representatives hardly make any meaningful contribution all the year round. Only the Senate, where every region (present geo-political zones) would have equal representation, would be at the centre. Each region will therefore decide whether or not to retain the present states and local government council structures or amend them to suit the yearnings of their people. Lagos State would, for example, be able to have its
57 local government councils, while states and local government council agitators in the respective regions will only have their own people to contend with on the appropriateness or otherwise of their demands.
It will no longer be fashionable to raise ethnic militia to fight any cause, be it religious, economic or political, since the people in each region would largely share the same or similar views on issues relating to their respective regions.
The issue of cross-citizenship of those from other regions would also be better addressed and enshrined in the constitution, in such a way that those wanting to belong to a region from other regions will know what it takes to belong, and the people accepting them would also be in a position to integrate them into the socio-economic structures of their respective regions. The issue of rotational
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presidency or collegiate presidency would be better addressed and a more equitable fiscal control would be in place to address most of the injustices of the past.
Advanced democracies ensure that there is a persuasive interaction between the state and the society, with the state represented by the institutional and administrative apparatuses of government developed from within the society, reflecting in whole the political, economic and social desires of the inhabitants.
But in Nigeria, the state lacks the internal dynamics that can propel it to the status of a real state. The absence of these internal dynamics defined in terms of efficient and effective institutional arrangements has constantly exposed the state to the rule of man as against the rule of law and many abuses since the institutions of governance have not been appropriately arranged in such a manner that would mitigate abuses against the state which supposedly is the highest social formation in a society.
This scenario has tactically redefined the notion of statehood in the Nigerian context. The theory of state as a politically organised community of people formed for specific purposes seems to have been displaced in Nigeria. Frankly speaking, the federal state of Nigeria would not translate to anything more than a mere geographical expression as once contended by the late sage Chief
Obafemi Awolowo. Arguably, this is true because the properties of a state including territory, population, sovereignty and monopoly of force have constantly been shared with the Nigerian state by the centrifugal forces inherent within the
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different socio-political and ethno-religious groups in the society always looking for how ―things will eventually fall apart‖.
One theory that has held sway since the enthronement of the current transitional democracy in 1999 is the systematic transfer of the ultimate powers and responsibilities of the state to the individuals. The management of the affairs of this country both economically and politically has tremendously moved away from the statist nature to that of individualism. The serious implication of this trend is the fact that individuals and groups now assume the position of the state by ensuring their security and promoting their welfare since the raison d‘etre of the
Nigerian state as stipulated in Section 14(2)b of the 1999 Constitution has long been defeated. It is therefore not surprising that the much-appeased Niger Delta
Militants and the now dreaded Islamic sect Boko Haram chose to confront the supremacy of the state since they know quite well that the state lacks the capacity to demonstrate its real stuff.
Factually, the recent killings in the Niger Delta and the sporadic spate of bombings in Nigeria are symptoms of a state that is fast loosing its hegemony.
Hypothetically, how can such a state launch itself into global reckoning first as
Africa‘s voice and a regional power and second as intending permanent member of the United Nations Security Council? Let me say that it would be difficult to achieve these objectives if the country continues to be managed in this manner.
It remains unresolved how to reconcile the economic potential and the
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development trajectory of Nigeria. Maybe these staggering revelations could reconcile the contradictions.
The United Nations Development Programmes, Human Development Index
(HDI), ratings placed Nigeria at 158th position out of 177 countries; Nigeria is the only OPEC member that is ranked among the 10 poorest nations and the 13th least viable country in the world; over half of Nigeria‘s 150 million population are poor; no Nigerian University is ranked among the best 1,000 in the world; Nigeria is potentially Africa‘s largest economy; every year the nation produces over
200,000 graduates of tertiary institutions; the nation has the sixth largest Gas
Reserves in the world, 10th largest oil producer with abundant but largely untapped natural resources and 60 per cent of its arable land lying fallow. This is incredibly incomprehensible. Indeed, ―it is wants amidst plenty, scarcity amidst abundance‖. What a paradox of the Nigerian state! The only industry that is thriving and flourishing in Nigeria churning out graduates is the crime industry, forcing citizens to resort to self-defence as the state has almost failed in its constitutional obligation of protecting lives and property of the citizenry.
A summation of democratic governance in Nigeria since 1999 abysmally exposed the facts that the Nigerian economy has been hijacked by a few bourgeoisies who have monopolised the means of production, exchange and distribution through a daylight robbery called privatisation, usurped the powers of the state and exercise such against it. Fundamentally, the Nigerian state is not conditioning the economy as the country has not moved away from being a
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rentier state hence the deepening of poverty and underdevelopment in the land.
The state and its apparatuses have been personalised by few individual political gladiators and economic merchants thereby making a supposedly strong state weak, irrelevant and incapacitated from discharging the real functions of a state.
According to Wheare (1963), in federal system of government, each level of government should have adequate resources to perform its constitutional functions without appealing to the other levels of government for financial assistance. Thus, as far as Wheare‘s classical theory is concerned, financial subordination of one level of government to the other portends serious danger to
―true‖ federalism, no matter how careful the legal forms may be. It means that the
Federal, states and local governments in their inter-relationships must be given power and control to their respective financial resources. The Nigerian experience on federalism from independence to date has shown that too much powers and resources have been concentrated to the control of federal government, making state governments dependants to the centre for their needs.
The military era witnessed what could be termed ―command federalism‖ as power was centralized. Powers of the state governments and local governments were usurped by the central government, making people to find solace in micro-ethnic politics, leading to ethnic militias, such as the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB), the Movement for the Niger Delta (MEND), Oodua People‘s
Congress (OPC), AREWA Consultative Forum and so on. The control of power and resources by the federal government in Nigeria has been one of the major
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causes of the struggle to capture power at the centre, ethnicity in politics, mutual suspicion and fear of domination in the management of state affairs.
THE WAY FORWARD
In view of the distortions in the practice of federalism, the following suggestions would move Nigeria forward:
(A) There is urgent need to review the constitution. The military hurriedly
packaged the 1999 constitution, without proper consultation with major
stakeholders in Nigeria. Major areas of concern in the 1999 constitution
include:
(i) the federal character principle- the federal character principle
should be revisited, so that Nigerians will not be discriminated
against in employment, admission policy and politics in their own
country;
(ii) State‘s secularity- the religious rights of every Nigerian should be
respected;
(iii) Fiscal federalism or resource control- Each of the three tiers of
government should be given power by the constitution to collect
taxes, control its resources derived from the area and pay taxes or
royalties to the federal government;
(iv) Local government administration-State governments should be
empowered to create and manage local governments;
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(v) Labour laws in a federal system- Federal government should not
legislate on labour laws to state employers, local government
employers and private sector employers, but allow various
components units to manage their affairs;
(vi) Policing to maintain adequate security in the country- the issue of
community police or state police should be introduced and;
(vii)Electoral system in a federal state- The Independent National
Electoral Commission should conduct election on federal political
offices and allow State Electoral Commissions autonomy in
conducting state elections.
Obviously, these issues need to be addressed not solely by the National
Assembly alone, but by organizing a ―Sovereign National Conference‖ of
all stakeholders in the country. Decisions reached from such conference
would be passed on to the National Assembly, made up of the Senate and
House of Representatives for enactment into a new constitution of Nigeria.
(B) There is need to devolve and ―deconcentrate‖ power to other component
units of the state as prescribed by the principle of federalism. A situation
where the central government controls everything, including the
construction of roads, housing in every part of the country, secondary
education in every part of Nigeria, and so on, is not acceptable in a ―true‖
federalism. In the Exclusive list, the federal government of Nigeria has the
power to legislate on 68 subject matters. In the concurrent list, the federal
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government still share in the legislation of 30 subject matters allotted to
the state governments. This is an absurd as too much powers have
concentrated on the federal government. To this end, more powers
should be given to the states and local governments that are closer to the
people at the grass-roots. The unending cries of marginalization, zoning or
rotational presidency, resource control, power struggle laden with
violence, are outflow of the monopolization of power and inequitable
resource allocation master-minded at the centre.
(C) Therefore, there is need to increase the functions of lower levels of
government and their resources with proper checks and balances on
transparency and accountability.
(D) There should be land reforms to reflect ―true‖ federalism. A situation
where the federal governments owns land in other states and local
governments without paying compensation to the state governments or
local governments does not reflect the practice of ―true‖ federalism but
rather portends great danger.
In summary, every state should control its resources and revenue allocation should be through derivation. State governments and local governments should be made to pay taxes or royalties to the centre on resources domiciled in their territories for the administration of common services. This will help build initiative, reduce dependency and promote a sense of self-reliance and development to the component units. Moreover, it would put a stop to the
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clamour for the creation of more states, since there would be not much resources from the central government.
3.11. CONCLUSION
These scales would help capture the historical and political events as highlighted by the indices. This would also help other researchers to adapt the scales for replication of the study quantitatively.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1999
4.0. INTRODUCTION
The concept of democracy is derived from two Greek words: Demos – the people, and Kritian – Government or Rule. Based on this etymological source of the concept, democracy may mean Government or Rule of Human Beings (man).
It is about how human beings govern themselves (Nwala, 2005). When Abraham
Lincoln, in his much quoted definition says that ―democracy is government of the people by the people for the people‖, he means, therefore, that: democracy is government of a set of human beings (men) organised or established by themselves and for themselves. In short, rules of governance are made or established by the people concerned. The implication of this is that any mode of governance imposed in the name of a unquestionable cult, religion, divine rights, tradition or ideology, is ruled out as non-democratic. Thus, slave rule, feudal mode of governance (such as monarchical) are not regarded as democratic.
People, however, may by themselves and in a formal conscious manner accept or ascent to being governed by a set of cult rules, ideology, religious or traditional precepts. When they do so in a free uninhibited choice, such mode of governance can be called democratic as far as they are concerned. The caveat, however, is that, while they may choose to be governed by a set of cult, ideological or religious charter, they also retain the right to reject or review such charter any time they wish to do so.
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The second interpretation of democracy, according to its etymological derivation and the Lincolnian definition, is that democracy is self-governance, which is to be contrasted with alien rule such as colonialism or even local rule (such as dictatorship) over which the people have no control. Similarly, government by manipulation, e.g. neo-colonialism, hegemonism or self-styled messianic style of governance cannot be called democracy. Freedom of choice and participation is the litmus test of a democratic system. Political Sovereignty is that which tells us whether democracy is possible in a given setting or not.
The person so referred to in the popular definition, of democracy is a definite aggregation of human beings in a given territory, irrespective of size. However, history, culture and tradition have imposed on us the nation-state as the most general limit of governance within which democracy can be examined and tested.
International organizations can be described as democratic or not ―but the nation state is the laboratory where scholars test democracy as a system of governance‖. In other words, we generally talk about democracy in reference to how people govern themselves in the context of the nation-state.
Democracy is often said to have originated in the Greek City-State. This view- point implies reading history in a zig-zag manner. The so-called primary democracy (non-representative) has been recorded in several studies of other peoples with no link with the Greeks. Primary Democracy recorded in many non- feudal communities in pre-colonial Nigeria has nothing to do with the Greek. The concept of democracy may have Greek origin but the practice does not. 158 Page
Democracy is defined different by different school of thought. Let us examine each system.
4.1. SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM
The socialist democratic model, however, promises that its democracy shall be a transitional one. This means that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a historical project, it is for a short span of existence (unlike the other models that existed for centuries before being transcended by other models), and, in a very important respect, it is only an instrumental mechanism to construct a communist society, a higher society in which man shall emerge much freer than in any previous historical period. According to the Marxian theory, it is not possible to construct such a society without this dictatorship just as it has happened with the dictatorships of other previous dominant models. What makes this historically more important and relevant in the socialist models is that the bourgeoisie, in close alliance with the other previous classes of privileged, would not stop at anything to reverse the gains of the socialist revolution and go back to the ancient regime or the status quo ante. In essence, therefore, the dictatorship of the proletariat is meant to safeguard the revolution, rather than an instrument for the coercive control of the citizenry, particularly the working class. (For further explication of these points, see Lenin, 1977:238-327).
The future society, which is now communist, would be guided by the principle of
―from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.‖ The entire society would have transited from a ―regime of scarcity‖ to a ―regime of
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abundance‖. This would be a society where all are workers, contributing according to their abilities to the social product or surplus. People would also get from the society on the basis of their need. In other words be a society in which cooperation rather than cut-throat competition would be the basis of inter- personal relationships. It would, in short, be a ―society for the management of things rather than people.‖ All the coercive apparatus of the state would be superfluous and uncalled for, because there is no more any class to dominate.
Thus, not only would there be no need for the further development of phenomenal weapons for offensive and defensive purposes, those that might have been used during the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be destroyed (Overstreet, 1960). It is only in such a society that the full meaning of democracy can be realized, as the society is thoroughly democratized. At this point, as we have pointed out, the dictatorship of the proletariat would come to an end as there would no longer be classes to oppress. (For further articulation of the issues, see Marx and Engels, 1983:98-137).
One implication of the socialist models of democracy, which distinguishes it from bourgeois democracy, is that while democracy is procedural (this is the reality in both democracy types), the processual nature of the socialist democracy terminates the moment the communist society is established. Even though it has been propagandized that history has ended because of the supremacy of liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1992), bourgeois democracy is still a process (although in bourgeois mythology, it can and should not be called an event, as it is being made to look. As a process, therefore, it is historical to argue that history has
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ended. History can only end, from the philosophical point of view, if no tinkering of any sort can be effected or, in a more dialectical nuance, if bourgeois mode has no other historical mode to succeed it.
The foregoing discussion on the dictatorship of the proletariat should be considered a theoretical rendition rather than in concrete reality. It is theoretical because there was or has never been a socialist state that had or has successfully transited to the communist stage. This point is very significant to the analysis of the nature of democracy that was actually practised in the socialist states. Worse of all, in terms of the experience of the practice of socialist democracy, the experiment towards the end of the 20th century, the socialist state system virtually collapsed, except in a few isolated places such as Cuba and
North Korea, which are not very central to the system especially in terms of their being able to sustain bipolarity in global politics since the Soviet Union dissolved or disintegrated (Rupert, 2003). From the October 1917 Revolution in Russia to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the experiment effectively lasted for only 72 years. What was responsible or, specifically, to what extent was the alleged or the much talked about lack of democracy in the socialist model to blame for, the collapse? Before looking at the issue of the so-called inherent lack of democracy in the socialist model of democracy, let us direct our searchlight to the least discussed of the other factors responsible for the collapse. This is referring to the role of global imperialism (Sandbrook, 1997). There was little doubt that there was a mortal battle for global hegemony between the capitalist and socialist systems before the collapse of the latter. This was actually the basis for the
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emergence of the Cold War that was one of the results of the anti-fascist war of
1939-45. The battle for hegemony called for use of all manner of strategies
(especially espionage activities) and weapons to supplant the other. It is a factual statement to say that in the battle between the two systems, the capitalist system gained the upper hand – and with the victory, the general acceptance of liberal democracy (Morgan and Swebach, 1992).
But such victory would need to be put in perspective. Global imperialism was not only fighting a mortal battle with the Soviet Union and the East European socialist states in particular, but was equally determined to prevent the emergence of socialist-oriented regimes in other parts of the world. This explains the foray of
American imperialism not only in Cuba, erstwhile backyard of the United States before the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the diabolical role played in Chile in the overthrow of the first-ever democratically elected Marxist government in the world, but also in plunging needlessly into a most ferocious war in far-flung places as Vietnam, as well as the propping of the apartheid and racist regimes in
Southern Africa (Barrow, 2008).
While imperialism was succeeding in making sure that the tentacles of the socialist system were not extended beyond what the exigencies of the war in
Europe brought about in 1945, it was simultaneously involved in eroding the internal strength and dynamism of the system wherever it existed before 1989.
Under the slogans of ―human rights‖, various assistance measures were made available overtly and covertly to motley groups that spring up to champion
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―democracy,‖ ―self-determination‖, and ―political pluralism.‖ In addition, the Soviet state‘s apparatus, for instance, was infiltrated. This was what made it possible for the likes of Mkhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and other revisionist elements to mushroom while occupying most important, most serious, and most sensitive positions in the state (Nowack, 2008).
Another important factor that contributed to the collapse of the socialist model of democracy when it did was internal to the system. There were two important dimensions to or features of this development. Firstly, there was an issue of the improvement in the material existence of the citizens of the former Soviet Union in particular, and the other socialist states of Eastern Europe in general.
Secondly, there was the important issue of the nature of the practice of democracy in all the erstwhile socialist states. To take the issue of the improvement in the material existence of the citizenry first for explication, it is on record that the defunct Soviet Union, particularly, and, as a historic fact, transformed its society from a rural and industrially backward one to a technologically and militarily strong and modern nation-state within a generation
(Chibber, 2004).
As a matter of fact, up to the early eighties of the last century, the cultural and material existence of the Soviet citizenry improved considerably – to such an extent that one could aver that the standard of living to the period specified in this paragraph was not dramatically different from what obtained generally in the western world, especially after due accounts of some commodity scarcities that 163 Page
were unique feature of all the socialist countries have been taken care of. In statistical terms, the achievements of the defunct Soviet Union in the areas of socio-economic development and culture were put out as follows:
In building their new society Soviet people voluntarily accepted
hardships and sacrifices. They successfully carried out the first
five-year plan in four years and three months. During that
period more than 1,500 industrial enterprises were put into
operation. Total industrial output doubled. The output of heavy
industry and its core machine building, rise 4.5 – fold. At the
beginning of the five year period industry accounted for slightly
over 40 per cent of the gross national product. At the end of the
period the figure reached 70 per cent …….. Within a short period
of time the USSR turned from an agrarian into an industrial country.
It will be recalled that it had taken the United States, Britain and
France one hundred and even more years to industrialize. By the
end of the five year plan period the Soviet Union had advanced
to second place in the world in the output of oil, big iron and
machines and to the third place in production of electricity …..
Today (1975) the Soviet Union‘s basic production assets – machines, equipment, factory buildings, etc. – are valued at 623,000 million roubles, or three times the
1960 figure: What the Soviet Union now produces in one day is ten times more than it did in the 1930s, when the USSR completed the building of socialism.
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The USSR occupies a leading place in the world in the manufacture of tractors, steel and a number of other industrial goods. In 1950 the industrial output of the
USSR was slightly under 30 per cent of that of the most developed capitalist country, the United States; today the figure exceeds 75 per cent….
The rise in the educational level of the working people
is one of the greatest achievements of the cultural
revolution. From an average of 3.5 classes education
in 1932 it rise to 6 classes in 1959. Then, there were
386 workers with a complete or incomplete higher
or secondary education per every 1,000. Today, the
figure is 640 per 1,000, exceeding one-half of the total
number of workers. In the course of the cultural
revolution a multinational socialist intelligentsia was formed.
In the number of engineers trained nowadays the USSR is far
ahead of all the capitalist countries, the United States
included (Datsyuk, 1975).
Apparently, the Soviet Union‘s leadership from the time of the death of Stalin did not fully appreciate the importance of these developments – hence it continued to use the archaic and primitive method of coercion in dealing with its citizenry, particularly the working class at whose behest a dictatorship was supposed to be instituted. As a consequence, instead of allowing the fullest expression of the creative energies of its citizenry, they were gagged and were physically and
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psychologically assaulted. It was not necessary, in our view, disallowing the people to have alternative organs to carry out their private vocations, particularly if these were done within the ambit of the law. (Even the liberal democratic state, in spite of its liberalness, would not countenance any threat to its corporate existence, i.e., its soul.).
Thus and remarkably too, this has been where the strength of the capitalist system has been; that is, in what Gramsci (1977) would refer to as ―ideological hegemony‖ of the liberal democratic state. In other words, the capitalist order provided the make-belief that everyone enjoyed equal amount of freedom when, in reality, this was not the case. With the kind of suffocation existing in the erstwhile Soviet Union and the other socialist states as well as the economic down-turn getting more precipitate from the 1970s, it did not take the United
States and other imperialist states much time to realize the huge dividends, both ideologically and politically, they could derive from supporting and championing the victims‘ cause. This was also the period that coincided with the swelling up land mushrooming of the rank of refusniks across the length and breadth of the erstwhile socialist states of Eastern Europe. It was not surprising that the refusniks and their bureaucratic godfathers (the apparatchiks) in the politburo came up with the ideological and political claptrap called glasnost and perestroika
(respectively, meaning openness and economic restructuring), as agendas for reviving the socialist social order in its entirety. The result is now history: for, instead of revival, the entire edifice crumbled (Beeson, 2007).
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Whatever may be the misgiving about the tragic end to the socialist states and their mode of democracy, one must still say one thing regarding the practice of democracy in all the erstwhile and still existing socialist states. As has been indicated above, the simplest form of democratic practice – i.e., of allowing and encouraging members to have, hold, and/or express their opinions as well as be a stakeholder of a sort in the system – was muzzled. This led to the emergence of the worst form of leadership style – the phenomenon of ―personality cult‖. The leadership was or would be venerated and deified to the extent of making them both indispensable and infallible or unimpeachable consequently, whatever the leader said or did was correct from the point of view of the members, whether or not this was actually the case and whether or not this was in the way and manner the party was supposed to be run or in the pursuit of national as well as state affairs. Another consequence was or is still being expressed (especially in the extant socialist states) in low leadership turnovers (Mkandawire, 2007).
Apparently, all this was or is still being done to prevent the dilution of the pristine principles of the revolution or, putting it in its more elegant language, to nip in the bud the possible emergence of ―counter-revolutionarily tendencies,‖ which might or could still serve to pose a serious threat or challenge to the socialist system.
But it has been evidenced by the defunct Soviet Union, the practice did not prevent the nurturing within the system fifth columnists that eventually dealt it a mortal blow. Such negative development could have been prevented if, within the socialist practice (just as it is the case in the capitalist system), a framework within which tactics alone would determine or manifest the difference that may
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exist in the quest for a communist social order. Instead, the bottling up of such tactical differences led to the emergence of strategic errors and mistakes that in turn created schisms, which eventually undermined the system and led to its disintegration.
4.2. CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY (OR CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY)
Classical democracy is based mainly on the notion of one man one vote and the majority carrying the day. Under normal conditions, (or as it is often said, all things being equal), one man one vote is vital for the realization of popular participation as well as for actualizing political, economic and social equality.
Similarly, the principle of majority rule is the most logical answer where consensus fails.
However, we have seen the problems incident to the application of these principles with regard to the minorities or even the true majorities that mainly be excluded if we adopt these principles without qualification. What has come to be called Consociational Democracy (or Consensus Democracy) has been advocated as a more realistic democratic model particularly for a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic state. Lijphart, in his book, Democracy in Plural Societies: A
Comparative Exploration emphasizes four major characteristics of Consociational
Democracy, namely: ―Grand coalition,‖ Segmental autonomy‘. Proportionality‘, and ―Minority veto‖ (Lijphart 1977, p.xiv).
During the 1994 – 1995 Abuja Constitutional Conference, the delegates adopted principles analogous to the Consociational model. For the conduct of the 168 Page
Conference itself, Consensus was adopted as the basis of taking decision. This enabled the delegates to resolve, through hard bargaining, such major issues as
Rotational Presidency and Power Sharing, Principle of One-term only for the
Chief Executive, Federal Character Commission, Devolution of Power,
Government of National Unity to eliminate the winner-take-all syndrome, Tribunal for the Recovery of ill-gotten Wealth, etc.
As a matter of fact, after independence, Nigeria experimented with the
Parliamentary System borrowed from the British (Westminster) Model. She had to abandon this in 1963 when the country became a Federal Republic. Between
1960 and 1963, the country witnessed series of political crises. In 1963 and
1964, there were problems associated with the National Census and the Federal
Elections. The resultant disagreements between the Ceremonial Head of State and President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and the Executive Prime Minister, Sir
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa led to major constitutional crises. It was such experiences, common in the Parliamentary Model that led to the adoption of the
U.S. Presidential system in 1979.
We have tried to examine the concept of democracy in order to situate the parliamentary system within that background. The parliamentary model is a species of the representative democracy. We have seen the problems of democracy in the context of the large nation-state. The ideal democratic model is, without doubt, primary democracy, in so far as all normal adult and female citizens directly participate in governance. When viewed in the context of the
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basic democratic principles, it was clear that representative democracy, whether parliamentary democracy or the presidential system, does not guarantee equal access to power to all individuals on account of class and social differentiations.
Similarly, it does not guarantee same to the minorities and the less disadvantaged geo-political zones.
The application of majority principle promotes the tyranny of the majority or the hegemonism of the dominant ethnic or geo-political zones. In Nigeria, for example, if the principle of majority rule is adopted as the sole basis of political decision, then the North, as a dominant geo-political zone would always produce the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This is why through consensus, the nation has been settling down to the adoption of the principle of rotation and power-sharing. By this, a measure of stability necessary for national integration is being injected into the system.
We have also seen that the parliamentary model is very deficient in the application of the principle of separation of powers. The executive arms of government (i.e. the Prime Minister and his Cabinet) is selected from members of parliament, whose membership they retain. In addition, since the executive is formed by the dominant party (i.e. the leadership of the party), there is a dominance of the executive over the legislature. Indeed a fusion between the executive authority and the legislative authority prevails and checks and balances no longer exist. The role of the legislature as the watchdog of the electorate meant to checkmate executive recklessness is weakened. The Prime Minister
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indeed is not first among equals. He could wield excessive power to the detriment of democracy, accountability and good governance.
The parliamentary system is a form of representative democracy and, therefore, it is prone to all the contradictions inherent in all representative democracy. It has its own inherent contradictions, such as:
(a) It cannot guarantee adequate separation of powers and the necessary
checks and balances;
(b) It may promote political instability if the functions of the Head of State and
Head of Government are not clearly defined by the Constitution. The
situation could
be worse where both of them do not belong to the same political party or are
elected separately;
(c) The parliamentary system is prone to serious crises in a multi-party system
especially when the government in power has a slim majority and where the
vote of no confidence is frequently used.
The principle of collective responsibility is more applicable to the Parliamentary system in which the entire cabinet (The Prime Minister and his Cabinet) is collectively held responsible for the failure of governmental policies and programmes. At the same time, all Ministers (members of the cabinet) must support all government policies. However, they are individually held responsible for their actions within the respective ministries under their control. Executive
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authority in a parliamentary system is said to be collective. And the Prime
Minister is said to be first among equals. In actual practice, the Prime Minister exercises enormous powers. Parliament may, through a vote of no confidence, force the entire cabinet to resign and call for a new election.
Majority Rule: Decisions are taken on any law or policy through majority vote, at any level of governance. Even the election of representatives is decided on majority vote. However, the majoritarian principle is more suitable to the parliamentary system in a relatively homogenous state. On the other hand, the
Principle of Consensus applies more to a multi-cultural state.
A Free and Fair Determinate Process of Election: This is a fundamental condition of Representative Democracy. This includes the election of representatives in a general election as well as voting to pass or approve laws and policies. the parliamentary model of democracy, as we have said above, is a mode of
Governance and a form of representative democracy. To critically assess this model, we shall examine a typical parliamentary system and compare its actual workings in the light of certain basic principles of democratic governance.
In the British Parliamentary System, there is a Head of State separate from the
Head of Government. The Head of State (in this case, the Queen of England), is the Ceremonial Head. She summons and dissolves Parliament, appoints the
Prime minister, and governance is carried out in her name. In fact, the government is called Her Majesty‘s Government. The Queen presides over major
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state ceremonies; ambassadors are appointed in her name. She receives foreign ambassadors to Britain.
The Head of Government or Prime Minister is the actual ruler of Britain. His appointment as Prime Minister is virtually automatic, as he must come from the
Party with the majority of elected representatives in the House of Commons. He appoints members of the Cabinet in the name of the Queen. He assigns responsibilities to them. He also may dismiss them as the need arises. The cabinet exercises executive functions. Both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet
Ministers are appointed from the elected members of the Legislature.
Although the legislature has a speaker who presides over its proceedings, in essence, the Prime Minister is the actual Head of both the government and the legislature. The Prime Minister is also the Head of the Civil Service, which is the
Administrative Organ of the Executive Arm of Government. As the Chief
Spokesman for the nation on International Affairs, he exercises regular contact with and control over the activities of the nation‘s Ambassadors and High
Commissioners overseas. In Party affairs, he is in-charge of discipline. Control over the Legislators is exercised through Party whips appointed by him.
The British Parliamentary system theoretically incorporates the Principle of
Separation of Powers. The Executive Arm, the Legislative Arm and the Judiciary make up the three Arms of Government. They are meant to be independent of one another according to the principle of Separation of Powers. The aim is to reduce the chances of concentration of excessive power in one person. 173 Page
However, in practice, the Executive Head of Government (i.e. the Prime Minister) is virtually the Head of Parliament because he is Leader of the Majority Party in
Parliament. He thus effectively controls the activities of Parliament. Even the
Speaker, who presides over Parliament, is a member of the Prime Minister‘s
Party. And hence, he has influence over the Speaker‘s appointment as well as his removal.
On Judiciary matters, the House of Lords (an Arm of the Legislature) is the
Highest Court of Appeal in Britain. That means in practice, the Judiciary is not independent of the Legislature.
4.3. CLASSICAL DEMOCRACY
There is what scholars call Classical Democracy for which a number of basic tenets have been identified. These include: i. Popular participation. ii. Majority rule. iii. Freedom and Fundamental Rights. iv. Equality of all Citizens.
The popular participation implies that all citizens shall have the opportunity to participate in taking decisions on how they are to be governed, including decisions on the policies and programmes to be implemented in the management of their affairs. They also have the right to vote for, or be voted for, as the case may be and when the need arises. Such direct participation, or primary
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democracy as it is called, was possible in small city-states, However, in ancient
Greek City-States, women, children and slaves did not participate. Several studies reveal, however, that in certain communities in Africa, adult men and women exercised such democratic rights.
As a result of the size of the modern nation-state, direct participation has become practically impossible. Hence, democratic participation has assumed the character of representative democracy, in which the people, through a process of election, chose those to govern them. Such elected representatives exercise legal authority on their behalf, though they remain subject to Recall or Re- election, as the case may be, by the people. What the people have in such a situation is political sovereignty, but not legal sovereignty.
The only activities of the people that come close to direct participation in a modern democratic setting is a Referendum through which the people vote to approve a certain policy or law (e.g. the fundamentals of the law or Constitution).
Another form of direct participation in modern nation-states is what is called
Initiative which allows the people the right to initiate policies or bills of passage into law by the elected law-making body.
The principle of majority rule evolved historically to shore up the process of reaching consensus or general consent in a democratic system. Jeremy
Bentham and his Utilitarian school of thought advocated this majoritarian principle in representative democracy. It is meant to simplify the cumbersome process of dialogue and consultation needed to reach a general agreement or 175 Page
consensus on any particular policy or law. However, majority rule leaves the minority in the cold, whether it is in a homogenous state or in a multi ethnic-state like Nigeria. The existence of a so-called official opposition does not adequately address the problem. The opposition can be, and generally do get ignored. It is often said that the opposition may have its say but the majority will always have its way.
Freedom and fundamental rights implies that for any system to be described as democratic the people must have the right to decide how they are to be governed and those who should govern them or govern on their behalf. Secondly, certain fundamental rights necessary for the exercise of this freedom must not be unnecessarily abridged. Such rights include freedom of speech, freedom of thought and belief, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, freedom to legitimately acquire, own and dispose of personal property, and so on.
In a genuine democracy, equality of all citizens implies that all citizens are treated as equals with regard to the exercise of political rights (democratic participation); legal rights (equality before the law); economic rights (equal access to the creation, acquisition and enjoyment of wealth); equal social rights (enjoyment of basic freedoms of speech, thought, assembly, association, movement), and so on.
There are basic and general modes and structures in and through which governance takes place in any democratic system. These modalities and 176 Page
structures evolve through culture and history. The way a state comes into existence; the people that make up the state and the challenges of history and common experience give these modes and structures certain basic characteristics.
Modes of Governance in a Modern Democratic nation-State:
(a) Direct participation-Primary Democracy.
(b) Indirect Participation-Representative Democracy.
(This may be Presidential or Parliamentary).
The mode of governance in a modern nation state, which can be considered to be democratic, is Representative Democracy. However, as we saw above, the
Referendum, Initiative and Recall are forms of direct participation.
The structure and character of the state often determine the principles, which are meant to inform them.
A modern nation-state may have any of the following structures.
i. Unitary Structure
ii. Federal Structure
iii. Confederal Structure.
These also give rise to corresponding systems of democratic governance. The first two are more common. Nigeria is a Federal Republic while Ghana is a
Unitary Republic. While the Federal system is suitable for multi-ethnic and multi- cultural states, the Unitary system is common in homogenous states.
This may be Presidential system or Parliamentary System. 177 Page
i. Presidential System: In the Presidential system, there is a Head of state
who is also the Head of Government. The Executive Head of State is
often called President. He appoints his Ministers and Heads of major
Departments of the State subject to the approval of the Legislature. He
cannot be removed by the Legislature except through an impeachment as
prescribed by the Constitution. This is the system of Government found in
the United States, Nigeria, etc.
ii. The Parliamentary System: The British Model offers us the most
outstanding example of Parliamentary Model of Democratic Governance.
There is a Head of State as the symbol of the sovereignty of the state. He
summons and dissolves Parliament and presides major state ceremonies.
Unlike in the presidential system, the Head of State in a Parliamentary
system is merely a ceremonial Head of State. The Head of Government,
otherwise called the Prime Minister, appoints his Cabinet and carries the
functions of government through the Cabinet or Council of Ministers.
In both types of Representative Democracy, Presidential and Parliamentary, the structures of government have three basic parts namely:
(a) The Executive (Head of State/Head of Governments/Ministers);
(b) The Legislature (Parliament, Congress, National Assembly) and;
(c) The Judiciary.
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4.4. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
Democratic Governance in Representative Democracy is itself guided by the following principles: Separation of Powers between
(a) The Executive which initiates, policies, ascents to and execute the laws
as passed by the legislature;
(b) The Legislature, which makes laws for the country; and
(c) The Judiciary, which interprets laws and adjudicates in civil and
criminal cases.
The principle of Separation of Powers enables the system of Governance to avoid sliding into dictatorship or to one-man rule, reminiscent of the feudal system or monarchy.
The principle of majority is one of those basic principles of the democratic system in general and the Parliamentary system in particular. It is meant to advance the process of decision-making in the governance of the State. It ensures a minimum criterion for judging the soundness and correctness of a policy of law.
A policy or law must be in the interest of the majority or must be acceptable to them.
The limitations of this principle are quite obvious. As applied to elections, for example, the man who is elected in a situation where three or more candidates stand for election may be indeed a minority candidate. For example, out of 100 votes cast, the man who secures 35% , while the other two secure 33% and 32% respectively is, indeed a minority candidate. The two candidates represent the 179 Page
majority, in this case, 65% of the electorate. It is thus possible for such a minority to continue imposing its will on the majority. However, in a situation where there are only two choices, the 33% and the 32% who voted for the other two candidates could go into coalition and vote for one choice, thereby, ensuring that the viewpoint or interest of the actual majority prevails.
Even when the actual majority prevails, as in this hypothetical case, we are faced with a situation where the interest of the minority could be ignored or eliminated from all consideration. This gives rise to what is called the tyranny of the majority, which is possible whether in a homogeneous or plural society. It is however, more problematic and crisis-prone in a multi-ethnic society and could lead to instability in the body politic (Bayart, 1991).
The Principle of Consensus has been advocated as a mere democratic mode of decision-making. It ensures the accommodation of the interest of both the majority and the minority. However, its limitations lie in the cumbersomeness of the process of arriving at a consensus.
As a matter of fact, popular participation in governance is the key to the realization of a democratic system. It entails freedom and equality of all citizens, barring natural limitations such as age, physical and mental disabilities. All citizens in a democratic polity should have equal access to power and resources in the society. There should be equal opportunity for them to exercise their political, legal, economic and social rights. The truth, unfortunately, is that in
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modern representative democracy, (Presidential or Parliamentary), participation exists more as a formal right than as an actual right.
All citizens may have equal opportunity to vote, but not all have opportunity to be voted for. The cost of running for elections is so prohibitive that majority of the people are permanently excluded. In the British Parliamentary System, the existence of the House of Lords composed mainly of un-elected aristocrats, further exposes the class character of the British Model of Democracy. In the
United States and Nigeria, for example, only the topmost layer of the materially privileged class can fully participate in most elections. You must have a minimum of N50 billion to contemplate running for the Presidency in Nigeria.
Winner-Takes-All, after elections, Government is formed by that Party which secures majority of seats in Parliament to the exclusion of other Parties. In some cases (particularly in a Multi-Party situation), the Party, which forms the
Government may be a minority Party. That means that the majority is excluded from governance.
Unless there is coalition between the victorious party and some other party or parties we may have a state of instability of government. The combined votes of the other parties may impede the passage of bills proposed by the government party. A vote of no confidence, common in the parliamentary system, could force the government to resign, paving the way for another election.
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The Majoritarian Principle and Geo-political Marginalization: Geo-political marginalization is common in a multi-ethnic society where the majoritarian principle is the yard-stick for determining government‘s policies. In some multi- ethnic states, parties may have ethnic base. This certainly would mean that the major ethnic group could control the dominant or ruling party. In a situation where there is concentration of power at the centre, the minorities may become victims of economic and political domination. The situation gets worse in a unitary system of government.
Since independence in 1960, the Nigerian State has been crises-ridden as a result of its multi-ethnic character and the application of the majoritarian principle.
Even in the British system, the Welsh and the Scot suffered these limitations until certain steps were taken to give those minorities greater access to political participation through the creation of local legislatures and devoting certain powers to them (Said and Momoh, 1999).
Introducing elements of federalism such as devolution of power to ethnic or geo- political legislatures. Through this measure, the Welsh and the Scot in Britain were given increasing local autonomy through the devolution of powers by the
Central Government. The Nigerian State is bedeviled by this problem. The hue and cry over marginalization and domination re-echoes in every Constitutional
Conference or Assembly. Even the Nigerian civil war of the late sixties was a reflection of the fear of ethnic domination.
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The creation of more States and Local Governments as well as the six geo- political Zones for purposes of power and resource sharing, new revenue allocation formula emphasizing the principle of derivation, emphasis on
Government of National Unity, etc., these measures have gone a long way towards increasingly giving various ethnic groups in Nigeria some sense of belonging. These measures, many of which came in the wake of the 1994-95
Abuja Constitutional Conference, are however, seen as inadequate. There is still more demand for a more radical restructuring to give the minorities greater access to power and control over the natural resources from thier areas.
The presidential system has been experimented with, on three occasions since
1979. These were during the Second Republic (1979-83), when Alhaji Shehu
Shagari became the first president ever to be elected under the system; in the short-lived (or aborted) Third Republic (1992-93) when late Bashorun MKO
Abiola would have become the second executive president; and, currently, since
May 1999 when the Fourth Republic began with Obasanjo in the saddle. On each occasion, a constitutional blueprint or document was put in place to guide its operation. Zone can say that the major difference between the various constitutions to usher in and undergird the smooth operation of the system has been manifested in the number of the constituent parts that are to be so guided by the documents. For instance, in the 1979-83 period, there were one federal government, 19 state governments and 301 local government areas. As for the
1992-93 period, there were, one-federal, 30-states governments, 574-local government structures; while in the current dispensation, there are one-federal,
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36-states governments and 774-local units of governance. Other than these structural reorganizations and differentiations, the various constitutions did not differ much on matters of substance and procedure, except in details and in one matter only. That one major exception was the attempt to extend the presidential system to the local government councils during the Babangida Administration.
This was in the essential aspect of separating the executive and the legislative functions at that level of governance. The judicial powers and functions were to be left as they were previously arranged.
Since the adoption of the presidential system of government from 1979, the country has had to form and administer political parties on not less than three occasions: in 1978-83; 1989-93; and 1999 to date. On each occasion, especially where the parties were registered by military regimes transiting to civil rule, the parameters for transition were set by the authorities. For instance, there would be the setting up of the state agency (ies) that was (were to superintend the activities of the parties). These were usually the bodies that would register the parties and conduct elections into the various (elective) offices. On various occasions specified above when the system was implemented, the bodies set up for these purposes were known as the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), the National Electoral Commission (NEC), and the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC). From the activities of these bodies on each occasion, it was the parameters set by them that largely determined the nature and complexity of the emergent political parties. In essence, the requirements for parties to be national (by having their presence felt in not less than two-thirds of
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the constituent states at any point in time) instead of being parochial and particularistic electoral machines were wealthy and had the necessary political connections to enable the parties registrable. Also, the time constraints (usually not more than one year within which to organize and create the necessary impact) contributed to their jostling for ―political notables‖ from all over the country.
As a condition for registration, the parties would have to embark on the process of establishing secretariats in at least two-thirds of the constituent states of the federation, to make their presence truly felt. The secretariats were also to be manned through recruitment of party apparatchiks. Particularly from the Second
Republic when stringent conditions for party formations and administration became the vogue, capable and experienced hands were thus recruited to man the offices of the political parties. These ranged from those who actively participated in the politics of the First Republic such as the late Chief M.C.K.
Ajuluchukwu, the late Alhaji Suleiman Takuma, late Mazi Sam Ikoku; or those that cut their mass mobilization teeth through students union and bureaucratic administrative experiences such as the late Chuba Okadigbo, Abubakar Rimi,
Ibrahim Tahir, Uche Chuckwumerije, Ebenezer Babatope, and so on.
In general, the political parties throughout the periods of military transition were competently administered and well managed. This was particularly the case during the Second Republic when the parties were generally led by the leaders that were party leaders during the First Republic. Discipline was demonstrated by
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the bulk of the membership just as loyalty to party principles and programmes was commendable. What was witnessed in these regards in the 1979-83 period was certainly against the grain of the behaviours of the members of and politicians in the proto-type American party shystem. Unlike the parliamentary party system where such issues are germane to the stability of the party, particularly when the party is the dominant and ruling party in the parliament, the
American party system is loose and not disciplined unless the issue before members is particularly important to warrant absolute loyalty to the party. The issue has to be extremely partisan to generate and guarantee such loyalty.
Consequently, in this party system, consistent and favourable dispositions to the party are better described as fluid and capricious. It is only in the extant 1999 dispensation that a truly American-type system is instituted, where members are want to desert the parties under which they have come to power or office with reckless abandon or without compunction.
Though elections are not the only features essential for a healthy, functioning democratic system, they however play some roles particularly in developing democracy. A regular cycle of campaigns, voting and the turn over of government can be a very powerful affirmation of the rule of the people often regarded as the foundation of democracy. Competitive elections provide citizens with political choices. Another benefit associated with the electoral process is access to information.
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Furthermore election provides essential validation for democracy by increasing the confidence of individual citizens in their ability to meaningfully participate in public life and an important ritual for regularly confirming and reinforcing the legitimacy of the system.
However where elections are flawed, much of the above stated benefits would turn in the deficits threatening the survival of democracy. Repeated episodes of election rigging, political violence and disorderly administration would dissipate the people‘s fundamental trust and confidence in the institutions and processes of electoral rule. A troubled election forecloses political choices, for without genuine political competition, in which there is a realistic chance that power can change hands according to the will of the voters, the simplest promise of democracy is denied. When elections are not fair and transparent, citizens may become disillusioned and withdraw into apathy or cynism, sometimes becoming aggravated, militant and confrontational leading to breakdown of law and order and even disintegration of the political society (Edigheji, 2005).
This analysis attempts to provide insights into the evolution of the concept and institutions of democracy, so as to facilitate an informed discourse on the relevance of contemporary processes of democratization especially in Africa.
For, as John Dunn, (1993: vii), aptly observed:
if we are to understand the hazards and
opportunities of modern democratic life, we
still need to grasp the odd and paradoxical
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past of this simple idea, the sources of its
continuing force, and the reasons for the
sense of disappointment and distrust which,
has haunted it ever since it began .
Just as the modern conception of democracy has come a long way from its classical notion, so has its practice, whose history can be traced to ancient
Greece. This is in the sense that democracy is generally believed to have emanated from the attempts in the Greek city-state of Athens to reform, organize and manage its political community (polis) about two thousand, five hundred years ago (Dunn, 1993).
Democracy, when it emerged in Athens during the time of Kleisthenes (in
508/507 BC) was such a simple but powerful and appealing idea. According to
Dunn, (1993):
The power and appeal of the idea come from its
promise to render the life of a political community
something willed and chosen …. to turn the social
and political existences that human beings share into
a texture of consciously intended common action. In a
democracy, the people (the demos), its human members,
decide what is to be done, and in so deciding they take their
destiny firmly into their own hands. The power and appeal of
democracy comes from the idea of autonomy …of choosing 188 Page
freely for oneself.
The context or precondition for this, were the economic and social reforms introduced by Solon, which ―tended to move the emphasis away from the household or family and towards the polis or community‖, (Hornblower, 1993: 6).
For example, Solon‘s economic reform was ―a kind of emancipation of the serfs‖, which abolished the requirement of payment of one-sixth of the agricultural produce by ―the many‖ to ―the few‖. This ―shaking-off of burdens‖, by Solon,
―produced the mentality of an exclusive ‗citizen elite‖ (Hornblower, 1993:3), which gave the citizens of Athens a distinct and yet binding identity. With time, the possession of slaves enabled the ‗citizen-elite‘ to acquire ―the leisure for political discussion and office-holding‖. Also, Solon introduced a Council of 400 members
(ekklesia), which prepared the business for the popular Assembly. Then, he established a popular court, called the heliaia, to which appeals could be made against unjust decisions of magistrates. Lastly, he also made magistrates accountable given their enormous judicial powers, including that of entertaining appeals from the Council and the Assembly (Hornblower, 1993: 4-6).
Kleisthenes who came after Solon embarked upon the most critical reforms in
Athens generally perceived as the classical foundations of democracy. His major contribution is seen in terms of the creation of tribe and democracy, the former perceived primarily as sub-divisions of the citizen-body used for political organization. The tribes were artificial constructs, defined by geography, and organized territorially, associated either with the city, the inland or the coastal
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regions. Members of each tribe trained and fought together militarily, imbibed with a sort of espirit de corps, which strengthened their bonds and reinforced their common identity.
Kleisthenes replaced the old four tribes, or sub-divisions, which existed under
Solon, with ten new ones, based on residence, not just birth. The tribes were based on demes (Constituencies), of which there were 140 and the demes supplied Councilors to the Council of 500, which replaced Solon‘s Council of 400 members. The 10 tribes each sent 50 Councilors to the new Council, drawn from the demes, in accordance with their population. As Hornblower observed, the
Council was the first institution consisting of ―a circle of men for whom the interests of the polis became of paramount concern‖ (Hornblower, 1993:6-8).
Under Kleisthenes, the enlarged Council was given definite functions and responsibilities in relation to the Assembly. For example, it prepared the business of the Assembly and served as a sort of an executive committee. The
Councilors served a year at a time and only twice in a lifetime. Again, as
Hornblower noted, this ―complex Council of 500 members, with its rotating membership and restrictions on re-election, succeeded in extending political participation in an organized way across the entire geographical sweep of Africa‖, the larger territory encompassing the city-state of Athens (Hornblower, 1993: 9).
On the other hand, the Assembly under Kleisthenes may have a defined membership of a total of 30,000, with a quorum of 6,000 or one-fifth. Provision was also made for monthly meetings of the Assembly ―sitting down, on a hill
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called the Pnyx‖. Hornblower noted that in the next century and a half, meetings of the Assembly increased to 3-4 times a month, but ―at most forty times a year‖
(Parry and Morgan, 1994). In effect, the membership of the Assembly consisted of all legally defined citizens of Athens, who were basically freeborn, property- owning adult males. It would seem that, one major criterion of defining
‗citizenship is ability to fight in wars‘, which more or less automatically excluded women. Despite these restrictions, however, in comparison to political participation in modern times, the large number of participants in the Assembly was indeed significant. All of which meant that, ―in important positive ways democracy had arrived‖ in Athens (Hornblower, 1993: 9).
This kind of ―participatory democracy‖ involving all legally defined citizens was possible given the context of a small, ‗self-regulating city-state and its surrounding territory. With the restricted definition of demos, the classical notion of democracy in Athens was that of a political system in which freeborn male citizens in the City-State collectively participated in the management of their common affairs. They could all meet together, deliberate, vote in regular assembly meetings and determine their affairs, which were then given practical effect by paid officials and a small council in which they were adequately represented. Thus, they participated in deciding what is to be done and they, literally, held their destiny in their own hands.
This political arrangement, initiated by Solon and reformed by Kleisthenes, was improved upon in the next century by Ephialtes and Pericles, to make it more
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democratic, with the following additional reforms: reduction of the power of
Areopagus (Council of Elders); pay for those serving on the juries, in the Council and the Assembly, etc., which took away decision making from the hands of the better-off and increased mass participation of the commoners (Hornblower, 1993:
40).
But, by 403 BC, these additional reforms ensured that Athenian democracy had become ―more efficient ….But less democratic‖ (Hornblower, 1993:11). When
Athens became an imperial power as a result of the Persian Wars (490-479 BC), the enabling conditions for the consolidation of its democracy were created. For example, the war situation gave the Council and Assembly important matters to deliberate upon. Tribute derived from the empire gave the resource base for the introduction of pay to political office-holders. Also, ‗Athens‘ imperial power facilitated the export of Athenian democracy; and citizen-elite consciousness and identity were greatly increased (Hornblower, 1993: .9-10).
However, it is significant to note an important point made by Hornblower as follows:
The Athenian democracy was one of the most
participatory of all time … if one focuses on the
powers and privileges of those who were included
in its operations. But the total of those excluded was
large … slaves, women, subject-allies in the two
periods of naval hegemony, metics … There were 192 Page
degrees of exclusion, and exceptions were made for
occasional privileged groups. But a quorum of
6,000 voters was needed for citizenship to be conferred
on an individual, and there were very heavy penalties for
usurpation of citizenship (Hornblower,1993: 12-13).
The subsequent political theories and philosophical works of Plato and Aristotle were attempts to grapple with the challenges of ―political (and particularly democratic) existence‖, particularly the tension that existed ―between personal and civil identity‖ in ancient Greece (Farrar, 1993:18). For example, it was based on his experience with the conduct of democracy that Aristotle ―argues that the best form of democracy is one which is the least democratic, that is, does not embody the defining characteristics of democracy: most of the people are not poor, the poor do not govern and they do not act as equals‖ (Farrar, 1993: 33-
34).
4.5. THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC LED TO FIFTEEN YEARS
OF MILITARY RULE (1984-1999) AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF
NIGERIA’S DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE BEFORE 1999
The collapse of the Second Republic led to fifteen years of military rule (1984-
1999). A brief period of three months of an un-elected Interim National
Government (ING) contrived by the military junta of General Ibrahim Babangida was the only interregnum in this period. The ING could be regarded as part of the military process since it was installed by the military and served its purposes.
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Successive military regimes during this period took the nation on circuitous, but dubious political transition programmes, which did not produce any civilian rule
(Adejumobi and Momoh, 1999, Diamond, Kirk-Greene and Oyediran, 1996 and
Oyediran and Agbaje, 1999). It was the brief Abubakar regime (1998-1999) that quickly transferred political power given the circumstances in which the regime was born, and the political pressure it came under. Even when transferring political power the regime was not an uninterested actor in the process, and sought to carefully manage the disengagement agenda.
The political context of the disengagement also ensured that a particular geo- political zone was a beneficiary of political power at the centre. The new civilian political arrangement was also factored in a presidential mode. A new constitution was put in place – the 1999 Constitution – to serve as legal framework for the presidential system. The 1999 Constitution takes after the
1979 Constitution except that the number of states in the country by 1999 had increased to 36 and over 700 local government areas had been created by this period. The PDP won the presidential polls held in February 1999, with its candidate, General Olusegun Obasanjo emerging as president of the country.
The trend with the Obasanjo presidency has been the emergence of what Robert
Fatton refers to as ―presidential monarchism‖ (Fatton, 1992:47-48). According to him, presidential monarchs often dominate their political environment. He described it in these telling terms:
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The centrality of the presidential monarch is continuously
emphasized by the ideological apparatuses of the state. In
an effort to legitimize his rule, these apparatuses incessantly
nurture the cult of his personality, imparting to it supernatural
power and unlimited knowledge ….. the presidential
monarch has an all encompassing sphere of competence.
His presence is felt everywhere; he is the father of the
nation to whom filial respect is always due.
Fatton continued that the presidential monarch is the:
the only sun of the political system; the courtiers‘ radiance
can only be reflection of his rays. People must be led to
believe that without him there could be only darkness
and disorder. Presidential monarchs know that their rule
depends on their capacity to suppress alternative centres of
authority. A ruler does seek to keep his courtiers at his
mercy and makes sure that they all know It. He is the ultimate
dispenser of favour and disfavour, of gift and confiscation,
of privilege and ruin. He places himself above the law;
indeed, he is the law.
The point being underscored is that the presidency in the current democratic dispensation has assumed enormous powers and the entire political system tends to revolve around the person of the President. There are structural and
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behavioural dimensions to this. The structural basis is that the 1999 Constitution grants enormous powers to the Federal Government to be exercised by the
President. He appoints and controls his cabinet, fill the boards of parastatals and government agencies, and also appoint members to virtually all federal commissions including sensitive ones like the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC), and National Population Commission (NPC). The federal
Government also controls enormous financial resources, which leaves other tiers of governmental at the mercy of the Federal Government. This reinforces the centrality of the position of the President. The behavioural dimension to it has to do with the urge to consolidate political power by counteracting alternative source(s) of political power and contest. Some have adduced this to the military and authoritarian background of the president, while others argue that it is simply one of deft political manoeuvering.
The logic of presidential monarchism has been played out in two major instances.
The first is the nature of legislative executive relationship. The executive, in order to have leverage in the National Assembly has involved itself in the politics of the legislature overtly interested in who leads the two Houses of National
Assembly and who does not. The politics leading to the removal of Chuba
Okadigbo as Senate President in August 2000 and the subsequent ascendance of Pius Anyim as his successor was not unconnected with the presidency. The seeming ―tug of war‖ between the presidency and the leadership of the House of
Representatives has not been based on principles, but on the issue of power and
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control. Executive meddling in the politics to the legislature has left the National
Assembly weak and less independent.
The second instance of presidential monarchism is on the issue of the controversial Electoral Act of 2001. After the electoral bill had been passed by the two Houses of Assembly and sent to the president for his approval, the presidency was alleged to have illegally amended Section 80 of the Electoral Act without recourse to the National Assembly. The amendment was targeted at new political parties seeking registration. That those parties would have to win at least
10% of councillorship and chairmanship positions throughout the country for them to be eligible to participate in the general elections. This meant technically that new parties could not participate in the 2003 general elections as the local government elections which were to be the basis of their registration was scheduled to be contested last after the Presidential, National House of
Assembly, Governorship and State House of Assembly elections.
The politics was one of re-election, which the new parties may threaten. Ghali
Umar Na‘Abba, the then Speaker of the House of Representatives claimed that he warned the President against this action, but he had to be careful as ―I didn‘t want him (the president) to feel that he has a problem and his problem is the
House of Representatives‖ (Newswatch, January 14, 2002:24). This issue generated uproar (Akinadewo, 2001 and Haruna, 2001) and condemnation, yet the presidency was unrepentant about it. Indeed, a civil society group, the
African Centre for Democratic Governance (AFRIGOV) in a communique issued
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in February 2002 insisted that ―individuals involved in the fraud that attended the passage of, and assent to, the Electoral Act of 2001 should be thoroughly and openly investigated and punished accordingly‖ (Weekly Trust, February 15-21,
2002:14). No such investigation took place. It took a Supreme Court judgment to nullify the Electoral Act, and clear the way for the registration of new political parties.
Apart from the legislature and the arena of the law, the weight of presidential power is also felt in the cabinet and the bureaucratic machinery of the federal state. A sense of divine mission and messianism tend to becloud presidential personality. As (Adejumobi, 2002) noted:
The logic of messianism with a sense of divine
mission tends to have become the raison d‘etre and
driving force of governance in the country.
Everywhere in government circles an aura of a
messiah pervades the air even in the language of
communication. The president reports have it is
generally referred to a ‗Baba‘ (father); even by his
ministers just as Pentecostal pastors are referred to as
―Daddy‖ by their congregation. The seat of power,
reports have it has assumed a site of worship, where
ministers and aides of the president converge on a
daily basis to seek divine intervention for the nation,
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and rally round the leader. For them, this is the only
surest way to keep their jobs and have the ear of the
president in whatever they do.
While presidential monarchism may promote charismatic leadership and may spur nationalism, it is predicated on personality and not the institutionalization of the law, institutions and procedure. Indeed, presidential monarchs often undermine the law. Also, it promotes what Huntington call ―executive arrogation‖
(Huntington, 1977), which constitutes a danger to the democratic process in developing countries.
After about two centuries, the idea of democracy was first suppressed by
Macedon in 322 BC, and subsequently eliminated from the history of Greece and the world, until about two thousand years later, when it resurfaced in a reinvigorated manner and in different socio-cultural and political contexts, with varying degrees of refinement and institutional adjustments (Prothro and Grigg,
1960).
Some of the significant dramatic happenings occurred in the 11th Century, with the emergence of the Italian City-Republics in defiance of papal as well as imperial suzerainty, and with ostensibly democratic structures, processes and institutions, although they never referred to their political system as a democracy.
For example, these City-Republics, first, appointed Consuls and invested them with supreme judicial authority (Rosberg, 1963). Then, in mid-12th Century, the
Consuls were gradually replaced by a form of government centered on ruling 199 Page
councils chaired by officials known as podesta, who were given supreme power
―in executive as well as judicial affairs‖. By mid-13th Century many of the leading communes of Lombardy and Tuscany had thus acquired the status of independent city-states, with written constitutions guaranteeing their elective and self-governing arrangements, with fairly elaborate procedures and mechanisms for appointing public officials and managing public affairs in the republics.
These developments, in self-governance and political representation, as Skinner observed, were extraordinary in the context of the then prevailing ―feudal and monarchical structures of Western Europe‖. Later in European history, opponents of tyranny and absolutism drew inspiration from these Italian City-Republics, in spite of the great instability, which characterized them, and the fact that this experimentation with republican governance was never referred to as
―democratic‖ government (Wiseman, 1993).
Indeed, the term ―democracy‖ became current only after Aristotle‘s book was translated into Latin in the middle of the 13th Century, as Demokratia, by
Moerbeke. The major contribution of the Italian City-Republics to modern democratic governance was in the sense that they provided post classical literature from which a lot of arguments were drawn in favour of government by the people, as well as institutions, which increasingly made ―self-government no mere utopian fantasy, but capable of being turned into political reality‖ (Lijphart,
1999). The principles of popular sovereignty, elective offices, demarcated electoral districts, electoral colleges, and limited tenure for holders of public
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offices were all derived from writings about the experiences of the City-Republics in contrast to monarchical rule (Jega, 2005).
Modern notions of democracy evolved from attempts to address the question of absolutism and the assumptions of sovereign power of monarchs over their people and their societies. The 17th Century popular rebellion against the
Monarchy in England, led by Oliver Cromwell (1642) gave birth to a political movement, which questioned and challenged absolutist monarchical rule, and created the atmosphere within which the notion of popular sovereignty and representative government flourished (Sachikonye, 1995). A political movement dubbed ―The Levellers‖, arguably, helped to nurture and reinforce the modern notion of democracy based on popular sovereignty and representative government in the context of the English Civil War in the mid 17th Century.
Wootton, for example, noted that:
They are the first who want a written constitution in
order to protect the rights of citizens against the state.
The first with a modern conception of which rights are
inalienable: the right to silence (torture to extract a
confession was a normal judicial procedure over most
of Europe) and legal representation; the right to freedom
of conscience and freedom of debate; the right to equality
before the law and freedom of trade; the right to vote and,
when faced with tyranny, to revolution. The Levellers are
thus not merely the first modern democrats, but the first
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to seek to construct a liberal state (Wootton,1993:71).
If there is any consensus on what democracy means, it is perhaps in relation to the understanding that it is not personal rule, and that it is different from authoritarian / dictatorial rule. Also, it can be said that democracy is based on some form of participation and/or representation. It is assumed that in a democratic political system, government derives legitimacy from the people.
Government also exercises authority within the framework of a body of supreme laws called the constitution. Citizens have equal political rights to vote and be voted for (Eckstein, 1965).
Soon after independence in 1960, political disorder set into the polity. Nigeria experienced eight military regimes. Nigeria experimented the parliamentary and presidential systems of government.
The country has had over a decade experience in parliamentary government under British guidance. The important question to ask here is: Why parliamentary system of the Westminster Model? Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (1952:5) has answered the question for us; thus:
Thanks to the growth of political consciousness in this
country, our people are becoming acquainted with the
practice of parliamentary democracy. This has been
used as criterion to determine the political maturity of
any people under the rule of others and we can be no
exception. As a matter of fact, it is a declared policy of 202 Page
Britain that no colony can be considered ready for self-
government until it has made parliamentary democracy
a political reality. In plain words, Britain is unwilling to
confer the honour of self-government on any of its colonial
territories until there is a full-fledged two-party system in
operation.
Despite the British imposition of the parliamentary system of government and in spite of Nigerian experience in running the system for well over twelve years, it was abandoned in 1963 when the country became a Federal Republic but, more importantly, the experience in operating the system proved rancorous. So, when the opportunity to review the constitution came, after the military take-over of government in 1966, and thus following the military interregnum of thirteen years,
Nigeria adopted the United State of America (U.S.A.) type of Presidential system of Government in 1979. But why was the parliamentary system considered a failure and why was it replaced with the presidential system?
The reasons are many and varied. But the most important point is that the success story of the parliamentary system of government anywhere, largely, lies on the congruence of views between the political leaders and, to some extent, the administrative leaders, in the conduct of governmental administration. That was not the case in Nigeria and, in fact, part of the reasons given for the advent of the military in January 1966, was the prevailing political friction between the political leaders in the country.
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Furthermore, the social cleavages analysed above, underlined and conditioned political behaviour in the whole country hence the accusation of ‗tribalism‘ and
‗nepotism‘ levelled against the political class by the new military rulers (Forest,
1987). It is important to add that economic competition, conducted in the most crudest manner, between incompetent politicians, led to ‗drift‘ and ‗muddle‘ in public affairs and these disturbed the conscience of dedicated Nigerians who remained loyal to the idea of a united Nigeria and so they became frustrated, dissatisfied and, indeed, embarrassed by the turn of events in the country (Iyayi,
1986).
Accompanying that worrisome situation was the open disagreements between the Head of State and Ceremonial President (Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe) and the Head of Government and Prime Minister (Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) on issues like census, elections, etc. These were some of the divisive experiences of Nigerians in parliamentary system of government that led to the adoption of the U.S.A. style of Presidential system of government as an assumed viable alternative.
In adopting the Presidential system of government it was believed that what
Nigerian people needed was a strong president unconstrained by other political actors; that Nigerians seemed more comfortable with a balance of power between the president and parliament and thus they do not want the Federal
Government to have unbridled power from the Regional Governments; that
Nigerians prefer an effective power at the Federal level but that power should be 204 Page
split between the centre and the regions, in order to enable the regions to look after their respective peculiar regional affairs and to allow each region to develop at its own pace (Osoba, 1978).
However, once the politicians fail in governance, the military intervened and came up with programmes or time-table of transition from military to civilian rule.
Even though, other competitors for power as well as the international community expected the military to keep to the programme or time-table, it became difficult to ascertain how long the military intended to remain in power, paving way for unending transition (Diamond, 1997). Except Murtala/Obasanjo and Abdulsalami
Abubakar military regimes, who kept to the time frame for transition, Gowon‘s,
Babangida‘s and Abacha‘s regimes were failures. If we recall these transition experiences, General Yakubu Gowon did declare in 1974 and said that the earlier promised date of 1976 for military hand-over of power to civilians was unrealistic and therefore cancelled was received with public apprehension.
On his part, General Babangida manipulated the country several times over handing over dates. For example, he refused to accept the handover date of
October, 1990, as suggested by the Political Bureau, but instead accepted the argument of the minority report, which preferred October, 1992, even though, he rejected their substantial findings. In his bid to prolong his rule, Babangida had to rely on such characters as Abimbola Davies and Arthur Nzeribe of the infamous
Association of Better Nigeria. These individuals and their organizations together
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with others sponsored lavish advertisements in the popular press urging
Babangida to extend his rule, otherwise, there will be chaos (Olurode, 1993).
After several vacillations, however, the presidential election was held on June 12,
1993 between Chief M.K.O. Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and
Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa of the National Republican Convention (NRC). Prior to the Presidential election itself, the two political parties had been launched by the military President Ibrahim Babangida in December, 1989.
Government not only built offices for these two political parties in all the local government and State headquarters as well as in Abuja but it also funded them and appointed their workers. It also wrote the constitutions of the political parties which were contained in a 29 page publication each. The SDP was officially labeled as a political party with a little to the left of centre whereas the NRC was a little to the right of centre.
So in reality, Babangida and the military were unprepared for the consequences of their own political engineering. It was possible that they expected nothing but failure from the political processes that were triggered off by their political programmes. Thus, the major recommendations of the Political Bureau on socialism as the most desirable form of government by the people and the
October 1990 date for handover were rejected. It was, therefore, not surprising that 1993 internationally recognized election won by M.K.O. Abiola was annulled.
However, local government election was held in December, 1990, a year after the inauguration of the political parties. Governorship and National Assembly 206 Page
elections were held in 1991 and 1992, respectively. In November, 1992, all the
23 Presidential aspirants were banned from participating in the election because the primaries were allegedly rigged. This paved the way for Abiola and Tofa.
On June 12, 1993, presidential election was held and it turned out to be a huge success by all (local and foreign observers) that witnessed the election. The usual thuggery, violence, rigging and intimidation that were the hallmarks of previous elections disappeared (Olurode, 1990).
In spite of the successful conduct of the 1993 election, it was nevertheless annulled. The annulment of the election angered Nigerians that were waiting for an end to military rule. The first few months of the annulment witnessed riots, looting and killings. Prominent as well as lowly placed Nigerians described the annulment of the election adjudged as the best ever in Nigeria‘s chquered history as diabolical and provocative.
The military was unable to successfully wade through the public resentment that it hurriedly packaged an Interim National Government (ING) headed by Chief
Ernest Shonekan to which it handed over power. The ING was inaugurated on
August 28, 1993 and Babangida was forced to step aside. Nigerians, however, refused to accept ING. Both legal and extra-legal means were pursued to unseat
Shonekan‘s ING. The court of Justice Adeyinka later declared it as illegal
(Olurode, 2004:15). Without much push, Shonekan‘s ING was swept away by the military on November, 17, with General Sani Abacha as the new Head of
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State. General Abdulsalami Abubakar later became Head of State after the death of General Sani Abacha.
4.6. CONCLUSION
The background of the candidates was essentially national bourgeois; they typified Fanon‘s characterization of the national bourgeoisie in Africa, in his classic work: The Wretched of the Earth (1967). The national bourgeoisie was never anywhere, especially on the morrow of independence in the African continent, able to provide the effective leadership that its citizenry required. The citizens were merely confronted by a new type of leadership that was only different on account of the skin of those who had succeeded the white man. If we stop our characterization of the national bourgeoisie here, we would merely be very charitable as; in addition, it was completely bereft of any idea that could advance the material needs of the African.
Apart from not being in possession of the idea(s) that could advance the material needs of the African, the inherited structures from colonialism were badly managed. In Marxist parlance, both the substructure and the superstructure were very defective. One of such inherited structures was the liberal democratic edifice that colonialism wanted to implant in Africa.
This particular structure simply felt under the heavy yoke of maladministration and corruption and before long the military wing of the national bourgeoisies began to take over governance undemocratically. In the literature, the explanation for this eventuality is usually that the material basis for expanded 208 Page
accumulation was generally lacking; and the continued exploitation of the African social formations in their entirety by imperialism merely accentuated the problem of governance, in particular. The concept of ―effective leadership,‖ in the instance it was used above comprises two senses: firstly, that it was able to organize production efficiently and rationally; and, secondly, that it was reasonably independent in thought and action.
The point being made may have to be put in its dynamic context: while it is correct, as Fanon has done, to accuse the first generation and the immediate post-independence. African leaderships of a general lack of the appreciation as well as a deeper knowledge of the dialects of decolonization and particularly, to correctly decide on whose side of the ideological divide to pitch their tent, the whole situation had begun to change in the second decade of independence, i.e., in the seventies (Soyombo and Taiwo, 1996).
Because of the heavy investments in education and the consequent expansion in university education in particular, and, in some countries, the increase in the reading habit of the public, many intelligentsia and intellectual ideologues of the ideological divide had mushroomed at this point in time. Given the limited liberal and democratic space available to them, class and ideological issues were joined and clarified to the extent possible for the benefit of the improving and the increasing reading public (UNHDP, 2000/2001).
In Nigeria, in particular, the ideological tone had risen and this was evident by the
1979 transition. Issues ranging from the type of constitution, the type of party 209 Page
system to the broader concern of the type of society to be constructed as well as the nature of the state to be instituted and the role of that state in the economy were passionately and emotionally discussed (Yaqub,2005). This was to the extent that a certain level of ideological polarization had begun to take shape in the Nigerian society. Thus, from the Constitution Drafting Committee stage to the point when the embargo on the formation of parties was lifted, it increasingly became clear that ideological issues could not be left in the back-burner during that transition, at least, or, any longer, on a long-range time frame (UN and
Okunade, 1991). Consequently, when parties were formed (originally, 52 political associations were formed; 35 collected forms for registration, although only 19 returned the registration forms, with only five eventually registered) (see, among others, Adamu and Ogunsanwo, 1982:30-32; and Kurfi, 1983:92-94), it did not come as a surprise that left-leaning political parties emerged to contest the high political ground with the right-wing parties. Among the five parties that we registered in 1979, two – the PRP and the UPN – were left of the centre; while the remaining three parties – the GNPP, the NPN, and the NPP – were right of the centre. By 1983 when the NAP was registered as the sixth political party, ideological politics was still very much alive, important, and relevant. The sixth political party could thus be pigeon-holed as also belonging to the left of the centre (Yaqub, 2005).
Of course, questions could be asked as to the seriousness and the extent of the radicalism (that is, revolutionary fervour) in the ideologies of the parties that called themselves or that were regarded as left-wing. For purposes of balance, a
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similar question as to the seriousness and conservativeness of the parties of the right could also be raised. The PRP and the UPN mouthed various shades of ideological sophistication. In the case of the former, there were the aspirations of
―building a new social order, where there would be socialization of the means of production and distribution‖, the emancipation of the down-trodden elements ―in the local vocabulary – the talakawa – in the society;‖ etc. As for the UPN, its ideological agenda was encapsulated in its four cardinal programmes of free education; free health services (both curative and preventive); integrated rural development; and full employment for all Nigerians who are able and willing to work (Ake, 1992).
Although the ―ideology‖ of the PRP appeared to be more radical than that of the
UPN, there was no clear indication from the two parties how they, respectively, intended to carry out the envisaged societal changes they talked about; this was notwithstanding the aspiration of the PRP to build a new social order. In particular, there was no mention of the specific roles the agent(s) on whose shoulders the envisaged changes would be carried out had to perform. In other words; which class (es) would be the vanguard of the revolution? Were the agent(s) having a foothold in production? What was the nature of the mode of production: pre-capitalist (slave, feudal), or capitalist? If it was revolution they were at all concerned with, how strong were the footholds of these two parties in the labour movement? There was certainly no such strong foothold in the labour movement, apart from the association of a few of their members in the labour movement (Ake, 1995).
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Considering that the two parties were a collection of middle class elements (both upper and lower), it would be expecting too much to see them ―commit class suicide,‖ as Cabral would require the petty bourgeoisie in the Guinean society to do in order to consolidate the revolution in that society. In the specific case of the
UPN, there was no articulation of the manner of production (i.e., the nature of the ownership of the means of production and distribution as well as the role of the state in the entire process), which could guarantee the availability of the net social surplus that could be deployed for the provision of the ―free social services‖ it sought to champion. The conclusion one could come up with is as follows: these two parties were characteristically electoral machines that ambitious politicians set up to capture political power at the experimental stage of the implementation of the presidential system of government. The Socialist Forum
(June 1980:7) calls this ―populist political talk,‖ which the professional politicians use:
…to disguise their own political and economic class and
self interests. And so far, at least, they have succeeded
in deceiving the people with it. It is a clever and successful
way of keeping themselves – the ruling class – in power.
Populist talk means making promises to the people, empty
promises, promises they can never keep. They talk as if
they had the interests of the people at heart. They flatter
the people to get their support. But what they really have
at heart is their own interests. Emphasis in the original.
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It was therefore not surprising that the organs that they attempted to use to transform the extant social order that the PRP in particular eloquently analyzed were far from revolutionary instruments. Even the performance of the parties after four years in the states that they controlled did not in any sense point at transformation. This eventuality once again confirms the thesis of the African revolutionary theoreticians that inherited structures meant for a different social order could and, indeed, should not be appropriated without transformation for revolutionary purposes. It even got so ridiculous that upon the forceful removal of the politicians of the Second republic by the military, the leaderships of these parties largely did not escape the strictures (alleged involvement in corruption) that befell the leaderships of the other parties who incidentally did not mouth ideologies remotely associable with societal change (Lewis, 1996).
Coming to the analysis of the other parties that were right of the centre, i.e, the
GNPP, the NPN and the NPP, one could say emphatically that they did not have any illusion about the sort of society they each wanted to build. In other words, they each wanted to build a capitalist-oriented socio-economic formation, which was encapsulated in the ideology of a ―mixed economy‖ that the 1979
Constitution more or less legitimized. The ―mixed economy‖ ideology, enshrined in the constitution, emphasized that the state should play a key role in the economy –hence it was to be given the ―commanding height‖ of the economy to control or direct. Before the commencement of the presidential system in 1979, of course, the state had been involved in the economic process – as an owner of the means of production and distribution and as a general regulator of the pattern
213 Page
of accumulation. In essence, these parties merely aspired to consolidate the bourgeois social order that was inherited at the commencement of the Second
Republic in October 1979. Because of the weak leadership that the NPN government at the centre provided, the inherited social order could not be guaranteed (sustained) or advanced. Many state governments contracted foreign debts that were at best dubious; while some of the well-connected individuals obtained ―Form M,‖ which conferred on the owners instant access to foreign exchange to import raw materials and other goods that should have added value to the economy had the form been properly utilized. Consequently, the country witnessed not only the most stupendous corruption and mismanagement in its history up to that moment, but the economic recession that resulted has up to date been with the citizenry as an albatross. For details of the extent of the mismanagement (see, among others, Osagie and Edodi, 1992:387-444).
In the 1999 transition process, on the other hand, a total of 50 political associations were formed in anticipation of getting eventual registration for participation in the electoral process. Similar to what happened in the 1979 transition, as many as 30 of the political associations obtained registration forms from the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), although only 26 returned the completed forms by the given deadline. In contradistinction to the pattern of the 1979 transition, the Abubakar Administration gave provisional registration to the following parties: the Alliance for Democracy (AD); All Peoples
Party (APP); Democratic Alliance Movement (DAM); Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP); Peoples Redemption Party (PRP); United Democratic Party (UDP); the
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United Peoples Party (UPP); and the Movement for Democracy and Justice
(MDJ). The registration was provisional because it was contingent on the relative performance of the parties at the local government elections scheduled for
December 1998. At the end of the process, only three – the Alliance for
Democracy; the All Peoples Party; and the Peoples Democratic Party – were registered (Yaqub, 2005).
In comparative terms, once again, this time around there was a blatant absence of ideology beyond the respective bland slogans of ―progress‖ (AD); ―victory‖
(APP); and ―power to the people‖ (PDP) that they mouthed. Although political parties are usually formed on the basis of the common interests of the members for the main purpose of capturing power, the 1999 experience came up with developments that saw members hopping from one political party to another with so much ease that could not be contemplated in the Second Republic. As a result of the fluidity in such a process, for example, one person – the late
Attorney General of the Federation and Honourable Minister of Justice in a PDP government, Chief Bola Ige – ended up writing the constitutions of all the three registered political parties then! One could possibly explain this development as one of the results of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of the centrality of ideology in the discourse and praxis of politics. All the same, even if the salience of political ideologies could be abandonment of principles? What has happened from the 1998 transition to date (that is, in the wake of the recent registration of some additional 27 parties to bring the total to 30 for the 2003 elections that led to the process of the party leaderships seeking accommodation
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with any party without giving a damn to underlying principles and beliefs) should simply be seen as the enthronement of crass opportunism in the Nigerian political system. This may well in the future portend serious problems for the system, especially the inability of the parties to develop sound party machinery to the extent that the opening of the political space that was generally hailed and welcomed as a prelude to the deepening of the democratization process could be reversed to the status quo ante (i.e., the possible return of the system to a one- party, or, at best, a two-party system).
There is also the issue of what should be the relationship between the political elites and their followers. This is considered important because the interests as well as the aspirations of the latter are not often taken into consideration by the former, and this should not be the case. In the developed democracies, the political elites would literally be committing political suicide if they embark on the sort of escapades that their Nigerian counterparts have indulged in with gusto in the most recent past. In such political environments (i.e., the advanced democracies), attachment to parties is a tradition or habit that is not only well cultivated, but it is also jealously guided. No political leader or elite can afford to toy with it. In short and at all cost, a symbiotic relationship is forged to the mutual benefit of both parties. Why it is responsible for this practice in our own setting is not unconnected with the fact of prolonged military dominance of the polity during which politics was, literally speaking, fossilized. In addition, the Nigerian political followership is still largely culturally bound, unsophisticated in discerning its political interests beyond how political issues affect the group rather than the self.
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This explains why as the political leaders decamped from one party to another
(as was witnessed during the recent ―transition elections‖), they had it at the back of their mind that the followership would always be there for them to use instrumentally to bolster their electoral fortunes. It may be pointed out that, for some, it was actually misfortune they reaped instead. These included the governors of Anambra and Borno States who lost their bids to get back to the respective government houses under different political platforms that initially brought them to power in May 1999.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE EMERGENCE OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC IN NIGERIA
5.0. INTRODUCTION
The Nigerian nation-state has witnessed a spate of transition to democracy or democratic governance in its chequered history. Several transition to democratic governments have taken place in the country from one period of transition to another. Some were unsuccessful while some were successful. The transition of
General Yakubu Gowon‘s regime 1970-75 was unsuccessful. While the transition programme under General Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo, 1975-79 was successful. The transition programme under General Ibrahim Badamosi
Babangida was unsuccessful. General Abacha‘s transition programme failed.
Under the regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar, 1998-1999, the transition programme was successful.
One thing about the different transitions is the fact that they were entirely designed and carried out by the military. A contentious political issue in Nigeria since independence on 1st October, 1960 has been the politics of power shift.
The struggle among contenders for power from the North and South geographical zones of the country, for the control of the centre, the federal government, has dominated the Nigerian political landscape since this date. In this chapter, the study will examine the transition from the military to civilian democratic governance of General Abdulsalami Abubakar between 1998 and
1999, leading to the emergence of the Fourth Republic in Nigeria.
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5.1. THE POLITICAL EVENTS PRECEDING 1999 ELECTIONS AND THE
FINAL HAND-OVER OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE MILITARY REGIME TO
THE CIVILIAN DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT
It would be pertinent to state that the annulment of the June 12, 1993
Presidential elections is the starting point of this discourse. From every conceivable perspective, the 1993 elections were supposed to be the end of transition of General Babangida. It was not to be. The junta could not fulfil its promise of handing over to a democratically elected government by its set terminal date of 27th August, 1993. The Abacha regime had already created six new states and over 186 local government areas to bring the total of the former to 36 and that of the latter to 774, as part of the transition programme. Prior to this, parties were formed from the third quarter of 1997. The five registered political parties were: the United Nigerian Congress Party (UNCP), the
Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), the National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), the Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM) and the Convention of Nigerian
Citizens (CNC). The entire transition programme was billed to end by October 1,
1998. However, it was clear from the time parties were formed until when Abacha died that it was a charade. Abacha had prepared himself for self succession.
Suddenly, news spread that General Abacha had died. That opened the gate to power for General Abdulsalami Abubakar, the former Chief of General Staff, who was then appointed to succeed Abacha. General Abdulsalami Abubakar was now faced with the challenge of midwifing the transition process to a successful
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completion in May, 1999. What was the texture of Abubakar Administration‘s transition programme?
5.2. THE TRANSITION PROGRAMME OF GENERAL ABDULSALAMI
ABUBAKAR’S ADMINISTRATION
Following the demise of General Sani Abacha on June 8th, 1998, General
Abdulsalami Abubakar took over the mantle of governance. So, he was able to midwife the transition process to a successful completion in May, 1999. General
Abubakar released his transition programme shortly after consolidating himself in power. On July 20, 1998, the administration set up a committee to design or recommend a constitutional document to guide the transition (Presidential
Advisory Committee Report, 1999). Though, the committee merely reviewed the draft constitution of 1995 and subjected the outcome to debate among Nigerians.
At the end of the day, the military junta amended where it deemed fit and promulgated it as the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. There were also the registration of political parties, the holding of elections, and the hand over to a democratically elected civilian regime as components of the programme.
General Abubakar‘s transition was very short and business-like. What it took other transition regimes to years to fashion was achieved within 11 months, that is, from June 1998 to May, 1999. One of the unique aspects of the programmes was the way the registration of the parties was to be conducted. For the first time in the history of electoral politics, registration exercise was based on relative
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performance of only the nine political associations, which were provisionally registered to participate in the 5th of December, 1998 local government elections.
It would be recalled that 26 political associations submitted their papers for registration. Out of that number, nine political parties participated in the election based on their performances and three parties were registered. They include:
Alliance for Democracy (AD), the All People‘s Party (APP), and the People‘s
Democratic Party (PDP) were finally registered on the basis of the modified criterion that the provisionally associations should score not less than 5%
(reduced from the 10% originally set) of the total number of votes cast in each of at least 24 states of the federation.
The issue of formal party registration has been a political discourse in Nigeria‘s political space. Same was the debate on why Alliance for Democracy should be registered by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). To critics, AD is rooted to Yoruba ethnic group (South-West) and its performance during the election of 27th February, 1999, could not be acclaimed to be national outlook.
However, as the transition programme was essentially geared towards the hand over to civil authority, its most important aspects were the elections. Thus, after the local government elections of December, 1998, upon which the parties were themselves accorded formal recognition, other elections that followed included the Gubernatorial and State Assemblies held on 9th January, 1999;
Senate/House of Representatives conducted on 20th February, 1999; and the presidential held on 27th February, 1999.
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During this transition period, another development came up. This was the issue of power shift. There were many notions of the concept of ―power shift‖ that rent the political air in the transition programme of General Abubakar‘s regime. The power shift in this context was on generational basis whose origins could be traced to the concept of ―new breed‖ that the Babangida‘s administration popularized in his convoluted transition programme. This was not what the concept this time around portended, even though at the state level, quite some youthful elements made it to the executive positions. Properly put, the ―power shift‖ debate or concept was on the need to shift power geographically or geo- politically. The Southern part of Nigeria, particularly, the South-West, felt that the annulment was meant to marginalize them and therefore demanded for ―power shift‖( Yaqub, 2004)..
It was this agitation, which compelled the Hausa-Fulani – the major culprit in the alleged Northern domination of the country – or the fact that the Alliance for
Democracy wanted to graduate from its ethnic shell to embrace or be embraced by other people from the other geo-political zones, which led to the unprecedented fielding of two candidates for the presidency that came from the
Yoruba ethnic stock. These were Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and Chief Olu Falae.
Whatever might have been the explanation, power actually shifted with the emergence of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the President in May, 1999 – most probably to compensate the Yoruba ethnic group that felt shortchanged by the
1993 electoral debacle. The repercussions of the power shift are going to
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reverberate for a long time to come, as Nigerian politics, constitutionalism and democracy can never be the same again.
After two protracted aborted transition programmes under the military regimes led respectively by two army Generals, Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha,
Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic was ushered in at the Eagle Square, Abuja, on May 29,
1999. The baton of leadership was handed over to the then president-elect,
General Olusegun Obasanjo, by General Abdulsalami Abubakar, successor to the late Sani Abacha. The latter was stubbornly adamant in his decision to succeed himself as ―civilian‖ president, in spite of the widespread opposition by pro-democracy groups against his self-succession ambitions (Anifowose, 2004).
A contentious political issue in Nigeria since independence on 1st October 1960, has been the politics of power shift. The struggle among contenders for power from the North and South geographical zones of the country, for the control of the centre, the Federal government, has dominated the Nigerian political landscape since this date. Thus, while inaugurating the National Constitutional Conference on June 27, 1994, General Abacha himself observed that Nigeria had, since independence, been plagued by a vicious cycle of crisis. According to him: Our nearly thirty-four years of sovereign existence have been beset with a history of continuous political uncertainties. We have had crisis of legitimacy, crisis of succession of authority and crisis of nationally acceptable leadership. Our country is today resolved to terminate this vicious cycle of crisis (Abacha, 1995).
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The cycle of crisis was exacerbated by the annulled results of June 12, 1993 presidential election by the military government of General Babangida. The election, which was popularly presumed to have been won by Chief M.K.O.
Abiola, under the platform of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), was said to be the freest and fairest to have been conducted in post-independent Nigeria. The election was regarded as a departure from the past troubled and turbulent electoral history (Anifowose: 1982) which had favoured a particular section of the country, the North. Indeed, Abiola‘s candidacy really created a plausible opening for a power shift, an opportunity for a southerner to capture the national leadership, the Presidency. More significantly is the fact that Abiola, in the poll, was believed to have captured major Northern and Middle-Belt states, apart from the overwhelming support received in the South-western domain.
The annulment, accordingly, generated intense ethnic, populist and regional antipathy, particularly in the South-western part of the country, where it was felt that injustice had been meted out by the power that be. This also reinforced the contention that there existed a northern oligarchy, ready at all times, to resist any shift of power away from the North.
As tension mounted, there was public restiveness and pressure from within and without, which impelled General Babangida to hurriedly package an Interim
National Government (ING), under the leadership of Chief Ernest Shonekan.
Babangida later decided to ―step aside‖ and subsequently handed over government to the Head of the ING on August 26, 1993. The ING, apparently,
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lacked the legitimacy as well as the power to govern. Chief Shonekan‘s government could not stand the test of time, as there was concerted resistence to its existence by forces of opposition, which consistently agitated for the actualization of the June 12 presidential election result and installation of the presumed winner as civilian president of Nigeria (Anifowose, 2004:56).
Added to the mounting opposition against the ING, was its declaration as an illegal regime by a Federal High Court in Lagos. Accordingly, General Sani
Abacha, who was the ING‘s Minister of Defence, moved swiftly to topple the government and installed himself as the Head of State in November 1993. To consolidate his power. Abacha embarked upon a gradual total elimination of all opposition to his new military regime.
Although, democratic rule was enthroned in 1999, with the emergence of a multi- party system, yet, as this thesis argues, there is a growing public apprehension concerning the future of the sustainability of Nigeria‘s nascent democracy. This fear is predicated on the nature and intensity of party competition, which had invariably engendered tremendous bickering, political uncertainties and disorder in many parts of the country. From the inception of the restoration of civil rule in the Fourth Republic, the political scene has witnessed frequent discords, unresolved political issues, recriminations, threats of impeachments of
Executives, treacheries, flagrant breach of party rules, carpet-crossings, inter- communal rivalries and resurgence of factional cleavages within the parties,
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which have continued to threaten the functioning of democracy in Nigeria
(Anifowose, 2004).
In the on-going Fourth Republic, the first set of registered political parties the people‘s Democratic Party (PDP), the All People‘s Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy, (AD) have not known peace. They have been engulfed by an unrelenting struggle by various factions within these parties for ascendancy, and notably for the control of the party machinery at national, state and local government levels. As aptly observed by Nwomeh (2001):
Ever since, state and local government party executives of the three parties, have been repeatedly dissolved while leading party stalwarts are habitually suspended for ―anti-party activities‖. Parallel national executives have emerged in the APP and the AD while a factional war of attrition continues to rage within the ruling PDP, even with the defection of some disgruntled founders of the party to seek the registration of a new party …… Even the new political associations seeking official recognition have not been spared acrimonious rifts and divisions.
This thesis examines critically the emergence of political parties and party system in the Fourth Republic. In particular, the thesis focuses on party politics within and between the competing parties, including a critical examination of nature and intensity of intra-party conflicts and national political issues. It will be argued that a sustainable democratic order in Nigeria depends upon the ability of the parties to manage successfully the conflicts both within and among the existing political
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parties. The immediate challenge that faces the emerging party system in Nigeria is the politics of succession, the General election of 2003 (Anifowose, 2004).
These elections are to determine political succession to the present set of office holders at the expiration of their first four-year term in office. The success of a democratic electoral system is measured by the willingness of political contestants to abide by the rules of the game, including the acceptance of the verdict of the electorate at the end of the election contest by both parties.
Political parties are found in the vast majority of countries and in most political systems. Parties may be authoritarian or democratic: they may espouse ideologies of the left, right or centre, or indeed, distance political ideas altogether.
Parties are indeed the most essential institution of representative government and are vital instruments of the effective mobilization and organization of public opinion. They stand between the amorphous body of ideas, demands, and attitudes comprising public opinion and the formal instruments of government
(Anifowose, 2004).
Political scientists have defined political parties from different perspectives. They may be defined, in the words of (Ranny and Kenall 1956:1), as ―autonomous organized groups that make nominations and contest elections in the hope of controlling personnel policies of government.‖ Essentially, parties are a means of organizing the people so that they can select from among themselves an elite group, which will control the process of public decision-making on their behalf.
Parties must participate in the task of articulating the needs of the electorate and
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must eventually collate or aggregate these needs and when they are in power, develop and execute policies, which reflect these elements.
Joseph La Palombara (1974: 323), defines political party as ―a formal organization whose self-conscious primary purpose is to place and maintain in public office, persons who will control, alone or in coalition, the machinery of government‖. And in the words of Schattschneider (1942: 1), ―Political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable, save in terms of parties.‖ Maurice Duverger (1954:129) argues that ―the liberal ideas of party as an association, is founded on ideology or interest‖. Umar Ghali Na‘ Abba the then
Speaker of the House of Representatives defines political party in normative terms. In his words, it is:
An association of like-minded individuals who share same outlook, the same ideas on how society should be organized as well as offering some clearly defined objectives the pursuit of which makes its existence and its activities meaningful and directly relevant to its membership and larger society.
Thus, many political scientists have maintained that the most important institution in a democracy is the political party. Democracy exists where the principal leaders of a political system are selected by competitive elections in which the bulk of the populations have the opportunity to participate. As a matter of fact, the condition of the parties, in a political system, is the best possible evidence of the nature of any democratic regime (Anifowose, 2004).
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A political party is thus a group of people that is organized for the purpose of winning government power through nominating and electing candidates legally to public offices in order to influence and/or control the personnel and policy of government.
A political party are distinguished from interest groups or pressure groups in many ways. While a political party is more or less permanent institution with the goal of aggregating interests, presenting candidates for elections with the purpose of controlling government and representing such interests in government, pressure groups are bodies that seek to exert influence or lobbies for the benefit of its members. They do not present themselves as political replacement for the existing government; rather they only seek to pressurize government into taking a desired line of action (Key, 1964).
Political parties perform numerous functions in a political system. Although they are defined by a central function, (the filling of political offices and the wielding of governmental powers), their impact on the political system is substantially broader and more complex (Winter and Bellows: 1981, 165-66, Heywood, 1997,
233-37, Ranny, 1975, 203-7).
The general functions of political parties include: legitimizing the political system by providing an organization through which the more venal and compelling claims can influence government; integrating individuals and groups into the political system through participation and avoiding massive alienation which could engender sustained violence, acting as a two-way communication process
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between decision-makers and the average citizen; contributing to the orderly succession of political leadership.
In the process of developing collective goals, parties help to articulate and aggregate the demands of a multitude of individuals and groups in society: and through internal debate and discussion, campaigning and competition, parties constitute important agents of political education and socialization. Also, parties recruit or provide an avenue by which politically ambitious persons can aspire to, and achieve political elite status. And, parties out of power, provide a constant source of criticism, which should illuminate and influence government policy and contribute to maintaining personal and political liberty (Winter and Bellows:
1981,194).
As we argue in this thesis, the experience of the performance of political parties and the nature of interaction among the parties in the last eight years of Nigeria‘s democratic experiment, have fallen short of expectations.
Scholars disagree among themselves on what constitutes a party system.
Harry Eckstein (1968:436), for example, explains the concept as the competitive interaction among parties in the process of electoral competition. Maurice
Duverger (1964:203) refers to it as ―the forms and modes of their existence‖.
Dunmoye (1990: 84) simply contends that the concept of a party system denotes the way they interact and compete with each other, the function they perform and the way they relate to the overall political institutions and processes.
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A party system is a network of relationships through which parties interact and influence the political process. The most popular way of distinguishing between different types of party system is the reference to the number of parties that are competing for power. On this basis, Duverger (1954) distinguished between ―one party‖, ―two party‖ and ―multiparty‖ systems. In one-party system, a ruling party effectively functions as a permanent government. In two-party system, power alternates between two major parties. In multi-party systems, there are no restrictions on the number of parties that can compete in elections. However, in the Nigerian context, there have been legal controls limiting the proliferation of parties especially in the post-First Republic period. Thus, in the Second Republic, which operated a multi-party system, only five political parties were legally allowed to operate. In the Third Republic, we had a two-party system established by the government, the Social Democratic Party SDP and the National
Republican Convention (NRC).
In the 1999-2007 political dispensation, the number of parties has also been legally restricted to six: the People‘s Democratic Party (PDP), All Nigeria
People‘s Party (ANPP), The Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Progressive Grand
Alliance (APGA), The National Democratic Party (NDP) and the United Nigeria
People‘s Party (UNPP).
It needs to be mentioned that we cannot simply reduce party system to a number game. The mere presence of parties does not guarantee the existence of a party system. Also important as the number of parties competing for power, is their
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relative size as reflected in their electoral and legislative strength. As Giovanni
Sartori (1965) pointed out, ―what is vital is to establish the ‗relevance‘ of parties in relation to the formation of governments and, in particular, whether their size gives them the prospect of winning or, at least, sharing government power. Also important is how these ‗relevant‘ parties relate to one another. Is the party system characterized by co-operation, tolerance and consensus, or by conflict, unbridled competition and polarization?
The pattern of relationships amongst parties only constitutes a system if it is characterized by stability and a degree of orderliness. Party systems shape the broader political process in various ways. They influence the range and nature of choice available to the electorate and affect the cohesion and stability of government. They structure the relationship between the executive and the legislature. They also shape the general character of the political culture
(Anifowose and Enemuo: 1999).
As this thesis demonstrates, apart from the tendency towards a single-party dominance by the People‘s Democratic Party (PDP), Nigeria‘s party system is very weak. It has been riddled by unmitigated conflicts, unbridled competition for power, polarization and the pursuit of sectional interests.
The independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) registered three Political
Parties in 1998 in preparation for participation in elections for transition to democratic governance in 1999. These were the PDP, APP and the AD.
Although, only two of the three parties met the commission‘s requirement for 242 Page
registration. The parties were assessed on their performances in the 1998 local government election. In that election, the AD won 5% of votes cast in 14 states, including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) as against 24 states required by the
INEC guidelines for registration. The AD was registered in compliance with the constitutional provision to do so. Six political associations failed to qualify for registration as political parties. In the local government elections, the PDP won a total of 459 Chairmanship seats and 4,650 Counsellorship seats. The APP won
188 Chairmanships and 2,589 Councillorships. The AD came third with 102
Chairmanships and 1,071 Councillorships.
The PDP, has the most convincing attributes of a national party envisioned by the makers of the 1999 constitutions. It does not only control the presidency and the
National Assembly but also a total of 21 of the 36 states, cutting across Nigeria‘s ethno religious divides. The APP and the AD do not enjoy wide national support.
In particular, the AD‘s support is limited to the South-West where it won majority seats into the local government and state Assemblies. The party also won the
Governorship elections in all the south-west states (Ogun, Lagos, Ekiti, Ondo,
Osun and Oyo). Thus, many people describe the AD as a Yoruba Party.
In June 2002, three new political parties were registered out of the 24 political associations that applied formally. These are, the All Progressive Grand Alliance
(APGA), the National Democratic Party (NDP), and the United Nigeria Peoples
Party (UNPP). An in-depth analysis of the forces behind the three parties showed some realignment of interests and political persuasions embracing past military
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leaders, politicians of the Abacha era, disgruntled aspiring former AD and APP supporters, and other politicians who were desperate for independent political change.
Although security and intelligence reports did not favour the registration of new parties, especially for government‘s fears that anti-democratic elements, including former military leaders, politicians, and businessmen, who have scores to settle with the Obasanjo Administration, might use the new parties to derail the democratic process, yet some factors made the registration inevitable. These included, the subtle blackmail of the 27 political associations that initially applied for registration: the constant recourse to court by these associations to insist on their right to be registered: the seeming demise of two parties (AD and APP) out of the existing three political parties as a result of mass defection of their stalwarts to the PDP; the intra-party conflict within the ruling party, the PDP; pressure by the international community on Nigeria to allow wider democratic opening and political participation in the democratic process; the fear of turning
Nigeria into a one-party state under the ruling PDP; the resolve by INEC to defend its integrity and the oath of office, and the ability of the new parties themselves to mobilize sufficient resources to meet the conditions for registration.
However, the Federal Appeal Court in Abuja, has ruled recently against INEC‘s claim and guidelines on the registration of new political parties. The implication of the Appeal Court ruling is that there is no constitutional restriction on the number of political parties that may form and contest elections. Thus, instead of the
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existing six officially recognized political parties, Nigeria‘s multi-party system may be made up of an unlimited number of political parties.
In varying degrees, the APP, AD and PDP have been ripped apart by internal squabbles. The turmoil in the parties, however, originated in the circumstances of their birth as well as the intense partisan inordinate ambition of some members of the various parties. Of the three political parties, which emerged legally for contest in elections in the run-up to the Fourth Republic, the PDP was the most popular. It had the largest followership that spread across the country.
The PDP originated as a conglomeration of 15 or more disparate political associations most of which had unsuccessfully sought official registration as political parties during the failed transitions of the previous regimes. These included the People‘s Democratic Movement (PDM), the successor to the
People‘s Front of Nigeria (PFN), founded by the late Yar‘Adua and now led by the then Vice President Atiku Abubakar, Tony Anenih, Yomi Edu, Chuba
Okadigbo, Dapo Sarumi and other prominent politicians; the All Nigeria Congress
(ANC), largely a reincarnation of the defunct National Party of Nigeria (NPN), led by Adamu Ciroma, Sunday Awoniyi, Bamanga Tukur, etc; the Social Progressive
Party (SPP), a blend of the ‗progressive‘ in the Nigerian People‘s Party (NPP), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), and the People‘s Redemption Party (PRP) of the Second Republic and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) of the Third
Republic and led by Solomon Lar, Abubakar Rimi, Iyorchia Ayu, and the People‘s
Consultative Forum (PCF).
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The PDP was thus an amalgam of these groups representing contrasting political convictions from the ultra left to the conservative right, the moderates and an omnibus of the so-called ―progressives‖. All these were united by their determination to put an end to military rule. The founders of the party were pre- occupied with winning elections or lacked the ability to formulate an elaborate development plan or ideology to implement while in office. Consequently, the
PDP has become the strongest opposition to itself with sporadic quarrels which create obstacle to democratic governance. As one observer lamented, ―never in our history have we been confronted with the monstrosity of an assembly so vulnerable to self – mortification and self – annihilation‖. Another observer of the conflict- ridden party commented that: The various political groups which fused to form the party (PDP) refused to dissolve their identities into one another, in order to produce an organic whole. People believe they are still representing their unregistered groups instead of regarding themselves as members of the PDP.
It is clear from the present political situation that, the PDP like the other political parties, lacks effective party organization. The PDP-controlled federal government is, for instance, on its own, unable to carry along various PDP governments in the states on many important issues-anti-corruption crusade, resource control, local government council elections, the electoral bill and the controversial 2002 budget. All the Fourth Republican political parties operate on an ideological vacuum. In this vein, Na‘Abba laments that ―there is no guidance whatsoever for the PDP‖. He goes on:
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If I may be allowed to ask, what is PDP‘s agenda for women? For workers? For our professionals? For the unemployed? For the teeming masses in our Towns and villages? In short, what is the party‘s agenda on the state of our infrastructures. There does not seem to be any convincing answers for all these questions‖ (Na‘Abba, 2001).
Although ideology is not synonymous with party manifesto, yet as Graf argues,
―catalogue of promises cannot be equated with ideologies, if not enunciated within a framework of ends and means, they amount to mere demagogic devices.‖
In his own study, on ―Nigerian Political Parties and Party Manifesto‖, Browne
Onuoha, concluded that: experience over the years has shown that many political parties and the politicians see manifesto as mere ritual or routine document needed only for party registration. Most politicians are neither conscious, conversant to their party manifesto, nor do they see it as a philosophical foundation for their party activities. Also, most of the electorate do not know what party manifesto means; they are not aware of its existence, and therefore are not in the position to judge the performance of political parties, and know whether or not to vote them into power (Onuoha, 2002).
The PDP is thus said to be a ―mixed bag party‖ bereft of any ideological soul or spine, a conglomeration of disparate entities who are not held together by any ideological underpinning‖. In his own assessment, the then President Olusegun
Obasanjo described the PDP as ―a dynamic amalgam of interest groups held 247 Page
together by, if anything at all, the fact that the party is in power and therefore by the resultant strong expectation of patronage‖.
In a similar vein, Anifowose and Akinbobola observed that all the six Nigerian political parties in the Fourth Republic are made up of political groups with various and divergent ideological orientations which fused to join as political parties but refused to dissolved their identities in order to produce organic wholes. This explains the absence of party discipline, self-restraint, moderation and the ability to bargain and compromise, which are the essential ingredients of party cohesion and democratic stability (Anifowose and Akinbobola, 2002).
Ironically, the motion for impeachment threat against Obasanjo was moved by the leader of the All Nigeria People‘s Party (ANPP), an opposition party, a motion which however, members of the ruling PDP, constituting the majority in the
House, voted overwhelmingly in support.
The other parties, the APP and the AD, do not enjoy wide national support. In particular the AD‘s support is limited to the South-West where it won majority seats into the local government councils and State Assemblies. The party also won the Governorship elections in all the South-West states. In an attempt to improve their electoral performance, in the presidential election of February
27,1999, both the AD and the APP formed an alliance and produced a joint presidential candidate, Chief Olu Falae, who ran on the platform of the APP.
However, this strategy failed to improve the electoral fortunes of the parties.
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The present party system contains inherent contradictions. Taken together, the three parties cannot really be said to be competing effectively with one another.
There is no meaningful inter-party competition. The PDP‘s strength is formidable.
For example, the APP hardly exists in the southern states where it is not in control of any gubernatorial seat. Even in the North, where it controls nine states, what remains of the party structure is built around the various governors because of their control of patronages, which they disburse to party faithfuls. As a result, the only opposition from the APP has emanated from the northern governors of the party (those who initiated the controversial Sharia legal system) rather than the party hierarchy, which has been riddled with internal crisis, and the poaching of their leaders by the presidency with lucrative jobs.
The Alliance for Democracy (AD), on the other hand, has been debilitated by intra-party crisis. There are two factions of the party in the South-West where it is in control of all the Yoruba state. The AD is an offshoot of the pan-Yoruba socio- political organizations, Afenifere; Not all members of the Afenifere are members of the AD. The majority of those who were in the fore-front of the struggle to free
Abiola through the pro-democracy group, the National Democratic Coalition
(NADECO), transformed into the AD, and was largely embraced by the majority of people in the South-West. Before the official registration of the PDP, the
People‘s Consultative Forum (PCF), the main organ of the Yoruba group, pulled out of the Party on the ground that the party had been hijacked by the ―Abacha boys‖. The PCF was later known as Afenifere which became the vehicle for mobilizing the Yoruba for political participation.
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As we stated earlier, a discordant note in the politics of the Fourth Republic is how to transit peacefully to the general election year, 2003. There are ominous signs of the breakdown of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The latter refers to the enthronement and sustenance of good governance by avoiding activities that may lead to democratic erosion. It involves the stability and sustenance of democracy, popular legitimating, the diffusion of democratic values, the elimination of authoritarian enclaves, party building, the routinization of politics, the decentralization of state power, the alleviation of poverty and economic stability (Diamond; 1997:14-15, Schedler: 1998: 91-2).
Party politics within the last eight years of democratic rule in Nigeria show clear indications and cases of democratic breakdown and erosion. Onuoha‘s brilliant summary of this development is instructive. He observes that: The degree of
PDP intra-party feud over the local government party primary election has posed a lot of concern about what could be the level of violence in 2003 General
Elections. The legislative executive power struggle, including the removal of
Assembly mace and the invasion of the official residence of the then Senate
President by the police, the series of threats of impeachment of elected officers at various levels (including President Olusegun Obasanjo, who on August 13,
2002, was given a 14-day ultimatum to resign from office, or risk an impeachment process at the expiration of the ultimatum: the inability to pass into law the national budget for over seven months, general insecurity, the hijack of party machine, the degree of corruption and of primitive accumulation by both the executive and legislature, are political struggles and issues which have eroded
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confidence in the new democracy and thus reduced the prospect of democratic consolidation. They have created misgivings whether the political parties can create the atmosphere of democratic consolidation in Nigeria.
Perhaps, the other sources of concern, which Onuoha did not catalogue, include the spate of political assassinations which are manifestations of intra-party political feud, factionalism and the bitterness of party politics. A case in point is the gruesome murder of Chief Bola Ige, the former Minister of Justice and
Attorney General of the Federation by unknown assailants. It also includes, the controversies over resource control, the up-dating of voters‘ register by INEC, the uncertainty over the conduct of local government elections, the on-shore-off- shore oil, the identity card project, as well as the sit-tight syndrome of those elected into public offices by the various political parties at the local, state, and federal levels. The latter, having tasted the spoils of office in the last three years, are more than determined to seek re-election in the 2003 elections, even against the popular wish of the electorate in their various constituencies. Such people are ready to employ undemocratic practices, including the use of violence, to achieve their inordinate political ambition in order to remain in office.
In particular, in contemporary Nigerian politics, is the contentious issue of power shift and rotational presidency. As we have said earlier, at the state and national levels, most elected office-holders are obsessed with re-election by hook or crook, a do or die affair, to ensure their victory and stay in office for another term, thus, creating an atmosphere of political warfare and general insecurity in most
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states. This situation has thus led to the resurgence of the politics of the First and
Second Republics, characterized by thuggery, hooliganism and political violence
(Anifowose, 1982). The most sensitive and divisive are the issues of power shift and power sharing at the center. The resolution of the problem posed by these sensitive issues sends dangerous signals to the stability of Nigeria.
Power shift, within the Nigerian context, connotes different meanings. Some believe that power shift should be generational, that is, the replacement of the old breeds (long serving politicians, the members of the political class) by ―new breed‖ politicians. This notion was particularly popularized during the Babangida
Administration. The most current usage of the concept of power shift is geographical, that is, the need to shift power geographically, particularly, from the
North to the South. This view informed the division of Nigeria into six geo-political zones as well as the introduction of the concept of rotational presidency into the
1995 Abacha Constitution. This followed the acceptance by the government the recommendation by the 1995 constitutional conference, which by consensus, agreed that the Presidency shall rotate between the North and the South
(Anifowose, 2004).
Notably, the South resents the perceived Hausa-Fulani domination of political power at the center. According to this view, political power had remained virtually in the hands of leaders from the North for most part of Nigeria‘s existence as a sovereign nation, both under civilian and military rule. In other words, the South holds that it has not had its fair share of control of political power in the Nigerian
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federation. The aborted June 1993 Presidential elections presumed to have been won by a southerner, Chief M.K.O. Abiola, further exacerbated the fears of the southerners in general, and in particular, people from the South-West. They felt that the annulment of that election was the evil machination of the North to perpetuate the political domination of the North.
However, on May 29, 1999, power moved to South, following the emergence of
Olusegun Obasanjo as the civilian president. However, the controversy over power shift does not end there. Given the reality of Nigeria politics, especially, its multi-nationalities, power shift also means, zoning the presidency to the other geo-political zones of the Federation, including the South-East and the South-
South.
In particular, the issue of power shift has sharply divided the rank and file of the
PDP into antagonistic camps. In spite of the pressure on Obasanjo to limit his term as President to one, he declared his intention to seek re-election for another four-year term. Notably, the pan-Northern socio-political group: Arewa consultative Forum, (ACF), is in favour of power shift to the North and therefore resented Obasanjo‘s ambition for re-election in the 2003 presidential election.
This group contends that Obasanjo, from the South-west, who was installed by the North shortly after he regained his freedom from prison, has not shown any appreciation: the North has not reaped any dividend of democracy since his election as President.
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To this end, many prominent political leaders in the North opposed Obasanjo‘s re-election, exploring all possible avenues. Accordingly, political re-alignment, such as that between the APP and the United Nigeria Democratic Party (UNDP) and the possible fielding of presidential candidate of Northern origin (Buhari and
Babangida), were strategies to stop Obasanjo‘s re-election bid.
In the South-East, the Igbo people also eyed the Presidency. Dr. Alex Ekweme, a prominent PDP member, was prodded to take a shot at the presidency as he attempted to do in 1999. The position of the people in the South-South was similar to that of the North and South-East. The people in the Niger Delta areas, for example, are in favour of powershift because of the perceived injustice to their area by the Obasanjo administration. Apart from their disenchantment with the performance of the Niger-Delta Development Commission (NDDC), they are unhappy about the outcome of the resource control suit. The people in this area hold that Obasanjo was wrong, in the first instance, to have considered the court option for an issue which they thought, required no more than a political solution.
However, their disapproval of Obasanjo‘s second term ambition would depend largely on the emergence of a more acceptable presidential aspirant either in the
PDP, at the party‘s primaries, or candidates of other parties, including the newly registered ones.
From the Middle-belt, where the PDP had massive support in the 1999 general elections, the pains of Obasanjo‘s handling of the Tiv-Junkun ethnic crisis created bitter resentment against the plan for re-election. Chief Barnabas
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Gemade, the former National Chairman of the PDP, and other prominent political leaders and supporters held the president responsible for their plight in the interplay of power with their Idoma neighbours. The loss of the chairmanship position of the PDP to Audu Ogbeh at the November 2001 party‘s national convention, despite his desire to retain this post, is another source of disillusionment with Obasanjo. As a manifestation of disappointment with
Obasanjo‘s style of administration and political manouvering, Barnabas Gemade declared his Presidential ambition for the 2003 election.
In his home base, the South-West, Obasanjo who won less that 30% of the total votes cast during the 1999 Presidential election, now enjoys the support of the majority of the Yoruba. The Yoruba Council of Elders, led by Chief Emmanuel
Alayande, canvassed Yoruba‘s support for Obasanjo‘s re-election. However, the president had to contend with the overt influence of the Afenifere, led by Senator
Abraham Adesanya, and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) which controls the geo-political zone.
The Yoruba council of Elders (YCE) was formed to mobilize the support base for
Obasanjo. This group sent a delegation to Otta in April 2001 to join other prominent politicians to persuade the president to seek re-election. The group‘s belief is that the Yoruba now have a chance presented on a platter of gold to rule the country for two terms and therefore enjoined all Yoruba to rally round their
‗son‘ for re-election in 2003. On the other hand, Afenifere, which dictates the political tone of the South-West zone, while it does not openly oppose
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Obasanjo‘s re-election declaration, believes that as President, he should be committed to improving socio-economic development in the zone.
As the preceding analysis, has demonstrated, the Nigerian Political parties, as well as the existing party system, have been bedevilled by numerous factors- intra-party differences and conflicts, party indiscipline, lack of party cohesion, absence of ideology, and the pursuit of individual and sectional interests - which impede democratic consolidation. In order to evolve a stable and vibrant democratic party-system and sustainable Fourth Republic therefore, efforts should be directed at reducing the areas of conflicts and issues that are vulnerable to political crisis and instability. To this end, the following policy agenda are critical for consideration and positive action by stakeholders in the democratic consolidation process.
First, the entire citizenry must be prepared to take their destinies in their own hands by being politically efficacious. The people at the grass roots should, in particular, be alive to their civic responsibilities. They should participate actively in the political process by voting in all elections, reject corrupt, selfish, unresponsive office-holders who are seeking re-election in preference for responsible, selfless and accountable candidates. Civil society organizations should act as ―watch-dog‖ on the activities of the politicians and political institutions in order to ensure good governance. The electorate need to be educated on the use of their ultimate power of recall and their voting power to reject politicians and political parties whose activities are inimical to democratic
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consolidation. Civil society association, associations including the youth, must be sensitized against the enthronement into power, of political leadership, especially those who see ―politics as business‖.
Second, there should be continuous sensitization of the people to the negative effects of political violence. This can be achieved through political enlightenment, political education and socialization, on the need for cultivation and institutionalization of a democratic political culture, exemplified by political tolerance, attitude of interpersonal trust and co-operation, constant dialogue, negotiation and compromise. Accordingly, the family, educational institutions, traditional authorities, religious organizations cultural and village associations, as well as non-governmental organizations, can all serve as agents of mobilization and sensitization of the people. The negative consequences and dangers of apathy, undemocratic practices (election rigging, selling of votes, political violence) as well as disregard for the rule of the game, should be highlighted and vociferously condemned (Anifowose, 2004).
Third, the inordinate political ambition of leaders should be checked. Aspiration to offices or position should not be seen as a do-or-die affair. Thus, the rigging of election, as a means of access to power, should be discouraged. Losers should accept defeat in good faith while the winners should be magnanimous in victory by being fair and just, so that the result of democratic electoral processes will be found acceptable to all.
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Fourth, there should be total acceptance of democracy and democratic values as a method of governance and political participation by both the leaders and follower-ships. There should thus be strict adherence to the rules of the game by all parties in the political process while political competition should be devoid of bitterness among contestants.
Fifth, poverty alleviation programmes should be put in place. Wider employment opportunities should be created, especially for the restive youth, who are always ready to serves as tools in the hands of desperate politicians to be used for political thugery, hooliganism and political violence.
Sixth, the Anti-corruption and other Related Offences Act, 2001, should be vigorously enforced. It is discordant to observe that in the past three years, no prominent individual has been caught and brought to book for corruption and related offences by the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) since it was established, in spite of the stinking nature and level of the prevalence of the cankerworm in high official places. Good governance requires the demonstration of the political will to transparently prosecute the war against corruption by Obasanjo‘s government. It is also necessary to make the public service, especially elective offices at local, state and federal levels, less attractive in order to discourage prebendalism (Joseph, 1991) and cut-throat political competition. As we have noted earlier, public offices in Nigeria from post independence to the present, have been converted into lucrative instrument for personal accumulation of wealth.
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Seventh, it is of urgent necessity to resolve the National Question which includes the sharing of the national resources, the issues of resource control and marginalization, as well as power-sharing with due regard to the principles of equity, justice and fairness. It is necessary for the government to consider, for immediate action, the convocation of the much advocated Sovereign National
Conference (or a National Conference) for the resolution of the National Question and reaching broader consensus on fundamental issues in the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria.
For good governance and democratic stability to prevail, important components of democracy should be incorporated into governance. These include availability of opportunities for broad inputs in governance and decision-making processes for all elements of the civil society: greater transparency, predictability responsiveness and accountability of government; respect for civil and political liberty of the individuals; the presence of free and unfettered media; check on the arbitrary exercise of power; independence of the judiciary; unrestricted opportunity for effective transfer of power and periodic renewal of leadership through representative and multi-party system.
5.3. CONCLUSION
We have shown in this thesis that political parties constitute the cornerstone of democratic government. No democracy can exist without two or more healthy and active political parties. However, as noted by an eminent political scientist,
Giovanni Sartori (1976: 14) ―one of the serious mistakes western scholars have
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made is to ensure that democracy which requires competitive political parties can be exported very easily‖. The Nigerian experience has revealed bitterness and cut-throat political competition both within and among political parties. The
Nigerian political parties have exacerbated division within society to the point that self-restraint, moderation, tolerance, negotiation and compromise, which are necessary for peace and democratic stability, become difficult, as party leaders indulge in undemocratic behaviour for their own selfish ends.
Today, the popular mode of governance is democratic leadership. It is therefore necessary for the Nigerian political elite to believe in the democratic myth: that ordinary citizens ought to participate actively in decision-making and that governance is meant for the promotion of the welfare of the people and that they are in fact influential.
For the security of Nigeria‘s fledgling democracy, to ensure uninterrupted democratic rule by soldiers, the civilian leaders must imbibe attitudes which facilitate political cooperation, limit the stakes of politics by checking the unbridled, negative or intense partisanship of political elites of opposing views.
The leaders must maintain an open government, discard the common sit-tight approach to political power and therefore free from too much dependence on the military to perpetuate themselves in office. For the president to be nationally acceptable, he must demonstrate energetic and self-less attributes and should be more of a statesman and less of a politician.
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My cup has become even now more than half-full, in the hope that both the
Uwais‘ recommendation for electoral reform, which should not be treated with kid gloves or decided by incumbents with vested interests, and the resolution with intensive and extensive development of the Niger Delta, will lead ultimately to peace and the development of the Nigerian society after fifty one years of chequered history (Otite, 2010). We have no confidence that Dr. Goodluck
Jonathan will vigorously continue to tackle his predecessor‘s seven-point agenda of solving the nagging problems of power and energy, food security, wealth creation, transport, land reform, security, and education.
What Nigeria needs, and the people demand, is a new and different political discourse capable of pointing the way to a new politics. Such a discourse must be informed by the grievances, demands and lessons of the defeat of the first phase of resistance to colonial occupation. It must suggest the modern equivalents of these grievances, demands and lessons, as well as the kind of politics that should be informed by them. In addition, it must suggest ways and means of breaking away from the contemporary petty bourgeois politics. In other words, what is needed is an appropriate political discourse for a third phase of resistance, this time, against neo-colonial political occupation (Nnoli, 2010).
In such a discourse, priority must be given to production. The demands of production must define the character of Nigerian politics. This means that the state must formulate and implement concrete incentives to increase creatively the productivity of the vast majority of the people. Priority must go to the
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organization of increasingly creative and modernised jobs, and the provision of social welfare services in education and health to enable the people produce more as well as better. The state must ensure that economic enterprises, public or private, maintain a viable R and D activity with a view to creating new products related to the needs and traditional consumption habits of the vast majority of the people, using local resources. It may be necessary also to subsidise various aspects of production in order to encourage its stability or growth. Without increased and increasing production, distribution soon reaches a dead end.
How to eliminate the coercive unilateralism of the state should also receive priority in the new political discourse. It is necessary to find a way to prevent such state high-handedness and unprovoked projection of power as in Bakolori, Niger
Delta, Mambilla, Bachama, Odi and Zaki Biam crises. The same high- handedness is also reflected by the use of state machinery to rig elections. All these are possible because of the undemocratic nature of the neo-colonial state.
The most important element of its authoritarianism is the arrogance of government; its penchant to project power as personal and group power; its tendency to make and implement policies without consulting people likely to be affected by them and without making efforts to achieve consensus in the formulation of these policies; its hostility to dialogue in preference for dictation in the governmental process; and its partisanship in the implementation of policies.
Nigerians are unanimous in their demand for the democratization of the neocolonial state. The task of achieving this belongs to the new political discourse.
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Other demands of the first phase of resistance also need to be addressed by the new political discourse. They include exploitation. This is reflected in the pervasive and high incidence of corruption. Another is injustice, which is evident in the wide (and widening) gap between the rich and the poor, the consequent differential in the access to opportunities for progress in society, and nepotism rather than merit as the basis for recruitment into positions in politics and the economy. Illegitimacy, regrettably, is still present in spite of the elimination of foreign rule. It manifests itself anytime there is an election. It gives the vote to the poor while remaining indifferent to the crippling constraints of poverty on the use of the vote to exercise genuine choice. The new political discourse must go beyond petty bourgeois electoral reform to empower the people to make informed and genuine self-interested electoral choices.
Finally, the fact that, today, the masses are politically fragmented, with no history of joint struggles, no political organization of their own, no co-ordination of their activities, no national outlook, no class consciousness, no strategy and tactics of politics and, therefore, no political militancy, shows that the lessons of the defeat of the first phase of resistance have not been learnt. The new political discourse must redress this situation. This means that it has to elucidate how organizations of the masses may be formed, sustained and joined in alliance one with the others and with other progressive organizations in the country. The truth is that the masses will remain ineffective outside a bottom-up organization of their various classes.
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An important focus of these organizations must be how the masses are to achieve courage, self-confidence, unity, strategy, tactics and organizational strength. At the same time, the new organizations must explode old myths, reveal unexpected and unexposed facts, disperse the most deeply rooted political illusions, and forewarn the masses of all attempts at mystification. Otherwise, as
Frantz Fanon has aptly observed, ―there is nothing but a fancy dress parade and the blare of trumpets. There is nothing except a few reforms at the top while at the bottom, the masses are still endlessly marking time‖ (Fanon, 1967:65).
Above all, this thesis has looked at the emergence of Fourth Republic in May,
1999. It examines the perfornmance of the transition programme of General
Abdulsalami Abubakar‘s administration. The thesis examines the content and ideology of the transition programme. From the performance of the transition programme and given the popular feelings of revulsion against military adventurism, there is as yet a faint hope that the democratization process may endure. Feelings alone are, however, not enough to dissuade the military from intervening in the country‘s politics; rather it is the position of the study that these should be accompanied with transparency, good governance and the current policy of professionalization of the military.
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Anifowose, R. (1982). Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The TIV and Yoruba
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Anifowose, R. (eds.). Issues in Nigeria‘s 1999 General Elections. John West
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Anifowose, R. and Akinbobola, A. (2002). ―Party Discipline and the Electoral
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Dunmoye, A. (1990). ―Critical Analysis of Party System and Ethnicism in Nigeria‖ in J.R.S. Amdi and W. Hinjari (eds.). Party Systems, Democracy and Political
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Na‘Abba, U. G. (2001). ―PDP in the eyes of an insider, being the text of a speech delivered by the then Speaker of the House of Representatives at the 2001
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Nnoli, O. (2010). ―Nigerian Politics‖: ―The Tyranny of Petty Bourgeois Political
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Otite, O. (2010). ―The Nigerian Society at Fifty‖, in S. O. Akinboye and M. M.
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CHAPTER SIX
A GENERAL SURVEY OF NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY
UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
6.0. INTRODUCTION
A legal framework for good electoral system is therefore an imperative for every democratic society because of the roles of elections in the society. Countries, both developed and developing democracies continue to formulate and reformulate their electoral laws and regulations in a bid to enhance their democratic system which system has come to be regarded generally as the best form whose worst form is even considered better than the best form of any other system of government. The imperative of every electoral system and its reform is to ensure free and fair elections. A good system must ensure that elections are held without physical or psychological intimidation and in accordance with the provision of fair electoral laws in force. The essence of a good electoral system that can assure free and fair elections is underscored by the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights, which provides in its Article 13 that every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with provisions of the law.
The idea of election was introduced into Nigeria by the Clifford Constitution of
1922. Successive constitutions since then have made provisions for the principle of election as a means of recruiting political leaders and representatives. The
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1979 and 1999 Constitutions went further to establish electoral bodies to administer and conduct election. Specific laws were made by the government to regulate the conduct of elections. Thus the Shagari government enacted the
1982 Electoral Act. This was followed by the 2001 Electoral Act.
Following the Supreme Court declaration of several provisions of the Act as unconstitutional, the Act was repealed and replaced by the Electoral Act of 2002, which was also repealed by the 2006 Electoral Act. The constitutional basis for the enactment of electoral law is to be found in item 22 of the first part to the second schedule and item 11 and 12 of the second part of the same schedule.
The 2006 Electoral Act was enacted to consolidate the various laws governing the electoral process, strengthen the electoral body and improve on earlier electoral Acts.
6.1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTIONS IN
NIGERIA (THE ELECTORAL ACT OF 2006)
The Electoral Act of 2006 consists of 166 sections arranged into 10 parts. It also has 3 schedules dealing with procedures for election petitions and forms. Part one deals with the establishment of INEC and its funds, its offices and committees. Part two of the Act deals with the office of the secretary to the
Commission while part three deals with the register of voters and voters registration. Part four establishes procedures for elections. It directs that elections must be held on the dates appointed by the Commission but may be postponed to another date, if the Commission has reason for this. The part listed
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the proper persons to announce election results and mandated all staff appointed by the Commission taking part in the conduct of an election to affirm or swear an oath of loyalty, neutrality and impartiality in the performance of their functions. In addition, the part also makes provisions for notice of elections, submission of list of candidates and their affidavits by political parties, prohibition of double nomination, change of candidates by political parties, publication of nomination, withdrawal of candidate, death of a candidate, invalidity of multiple nomination, contested election, the three instance where poll is required, establishment of polling stations, ballot boxes, polling agents, notice of poll, hour of poll, display of ballot boxes, issue of ballot papers, etc.
To underscore the importance of political parties to the electoral process, part five of the Act contains provisions relating to political parties. The part in section
78 makes it mandatory for the Commission to register any political association
(within 30 days of application) which complies with the provisions of the
Constitution and this Act on registration, if application for registration is made not later than 6 months before a general election. Under section 79, a decision of the
Commission refusing registration can be challenged if commenced within 30 days from the date of receipt of letter of non-registration. Other provisions of the
Act relating to political parties dealt with under this part include requirements of political parties to be body corporate, contravention of section 227 of the 1999
Constitution, symbols of political parties, allocation of symbols and political mergers. Section 84 specifically directs that any two or more registered political parties seeking to merge may do so on approval by the Commission of an
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application for merger received not less than 6 months before any general election given by each of the political parties jointly signed by the National
Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer of each party and supported by a special resolution passed by the National Convention of each political party proposing the merger as well as the proposed full name and acronym, Constitution,
Manifesto, symbols or logo of the party together with the addresses of the
National office of the merged party and evidence of payment of administrative cost of N100,000.00 or as may be fixed from time to time by the National
Assembly.
Other salient features of the part include provisions on notice of convention, congress etc of parties, monitoring of political parties, offences in relation to finances of a political party, period to be covered by annual statement, statement as to election expenses, grants to political parties for election. In contrast to the
30% and 70% sharing formula in the 2002 Electoral Act. The Act introduced a new sharing formula for the grant made by government to the parties by directing it to be shared in the manner of 10% equally among all the registered parties and
90% in proportion to the number of seats won by each party in the National
Assembly. The Act under the part further made provisions for limiting the contribution of any person or group to a political party as well as election expenses. Other provisions include disclosure by political parties, conduct of political rallies, prohibition of certain conducts, use of force or violence etc.
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Part six places the conduct of elections of the chairman, vice chairman and councilors for each electoral ward in an area council in the Federal Capital
Territory (FCT) and the recall of any member of an area council under the direction of the Commission. The part also established the qualification criteria and the disqualification for any person to be elected in section 109 and 110 respectively, the part also provides for the date of elections to the council, the method of voting, procedure for area council for elections, procedure for nomination, election of area council chairman, death before oath taken, dissolution of area council, vacation of seat of members, removal of chairman or vice chairman.
The Act in part 7 laid down the procedure for local government council elections in sections 120, 121, 122 and 123 of the Act. The Act in part 8 makes provisions for offences relating to elections. These include offences in relation to registration of voters, nomination, disorderly behaviour at political meetings, improper use of voters cards improper use of vehicles, impersonation and voting when not qualified, dereliction of duty, bribery and conspiracy, requirement of secrecy in voting, wrongful voting and false statements, voting by unregistered person, disorderly conduct at elections, offences on election day, treating, undue influence, and offences relating to recall.
Part 9 makes provisions for the determination of election petitions by stating the time for presenting election petitions and the appropriate court or tribunals to hear the petitions, persons entitled to present election petitions, grounds of
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petition. The Act, under this part in section 146 makes provision for the doctrine of substantial compliance in resolving election disputes. This is to the effect that an election shall not be invalidated by reason of non compliance with the provisions of this Act if it appears to the election tribunal or court that the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the principles of the Act, wherein the non-compliance did not affect substantially the result of the election. Other provisions of the Act relate to nullification of election by tribunal or court, accelerated hearing of election petitions, remaining in office of an elected person pending determination of appeal, legal representation of the Commission as well as rules of procedure for election petition.
Part 10 of the Act makes provisions for miscellaneous matters such as conduct of referendum, loss of registration card, trial of offences, inspection of documents, delegation of powers of the Commission, regulations, validation and interpretation. By section 165 of the Act the following enactments are repealed; i.e. The Electoral Act 2002. Independent National Electoral Commission
(Establishment Act No 17 of 1998 and Independent National Electoral
Commission (Amendment Act No 33 of 1998). The citation section, i.e. Section
166 provides that this Act may be cited as the Electoral Act 2006.
Writing on the 2006 Electoral Act, Abubakar noted that whereas the Electoral Act
2006 has succeeded in consolidating all existing legislations on the electoral process, to what extent it has achieved the other objectives of its being enacted remained to be seem as the various novel provisions of the Act had be put to test
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in the general elections of 2007.
A major landmark provisions in the Act are those which place ceilings on the amount a candidate could spend on his or her election as well as on the amount other individual or other entity could donate to any candidate for election. Section
93 limits such amount in the case of a presidential and gubernatorial candidate, such candidate must not spend more than N500, 000,000:00 and
N100,000,000.00, respectively (Electoral Act of 2006). This provision is intended to reduce the influence and power of money in politics. But the significance of the provision is reduced by Section 93 (8) which provides that in computing what a candidate spends, for election, no account shall be taken of political party expenses in respect of the candidate.
Democracies thrive on openness and accountability, with one very important exception: the act of voting itself. To cast of free ballot and minimize the opportunity for intimidation, voters in a democracy must be permitted to cast their ballots in secret. At the same time the protection of the ballot box and tallying of total votes must be conducted as openly as possible, so that citizens are confident that the results are accurate and that the government does, indeed rest on their consent.
A corollary to the concepts of openness and accountability is that of the loyal opposition. This idea is a vital one, however, it means in essence, that all sides in a democracy share a common commitment to its basic value. Political competitors don't necessarily have to like each other, but they must tolerate one 275 Page
another and acknowledge that each has a legitimate role to play. Moreover, the ground rules of the society must encourage tolerance and civility in public debate.
6.2. THE USE OF POLITICAL POWER AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Any governance system is fundamentally preoccupied with political power: how it is to be acquired and the end to which it is to be directed: It could be seen from this conceptualization that both processes are value-laden or value-driven.
Political power invariably has a purpose and perhaps, more importantly, a value.
Ideally, the purpose is instrumental and it comprises the basket of goods and services that a government and/or a party can deliver or provide after it might have been in the mandate by the electorate. On the other hand, the value (in our conceptualization which is distinct from the Eastonian definition of the broader terminology of politics) has no ideals that inform it; but it is expressed in the way and manner the provision of the basket of goods and services is to be prioritized.
Thus, while the basket of goods and services could be described as the objectified tangible aspect of the political process that communities or social groups always aspire to gain (from participating in politics), the value is the subjective expression of the power that the politicians wields to so distribute the former. Although, the goods and services that are to be provided should take precedence over the subjective factors/considerations that may go into their distribution, one finds out that in practical politics the order is invariably reversed.
The reason why this is so is not unconnected with the fact that the average politician is more attracted to the calculations of what would serve their best 276 Page
interest. This interest could be class-oriented or could be crass selfish one, exhibited by an incumbent ruler or a transient wielder of power. Whatever is the case, the calculations would invariably be in the direction of attending to some of the aspirations of the forces or communities that made some of the aspirations of the forces or communities that made their acquisition of power possible or cost effective. These are the ones plus the self that shall first be compensated. On the other hand, the forces of communities that have not rendered any commensurate services (i.e., electoral supports) are also commensurately punished or denied services, no matter their need for them.
The Nigerian political parties as well as the system under which they normally have been operated have never been seen or known to be neutral to the aphorism of how to capture power and/or how to utilize it. This explains the centrality of the political party in the governance system that has been operated in the country; whether this was the parliamentary or the presidential set up.
Because of the tradition of self-service in Nigerian politics, firstly, the struggle for power is usually very keen and intensely passionate, sometimes tending towards violence. As a matter of fact, it has been seen as a ―war by another means‖, in the general discourse of the Nigerian politics. The second feature is that political power is invariably used recklessly and selfishly. The result is, unfortunately, the destruction of the soul of politics and the arrest of development in the social formation. Emanating from this is the cultivation or enthronement and, certainly, the consolidation of corruption. It is becoming apparent that there is a positive correlation between the strengthening of the presidential system and the rate of
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corruption in the country. This is not to say that corruption has not been a problem of governance in Nigerian social formation. Indeed, before independence and since then, especially in the heydays of military misadventure in governance, corruption has been a topical issue of concern to the citizenry and even the foreign partners involved in the development process. But what has been noticed right from the Second Republic when the presidential system was adopted till today leaves much to be desired. Both those operating in the executive and the legislative branches of government turned governance into what Joseph (1991) has since aptly analyzed and described as ―prebendalism‖.
Any critical assessment of the presidential model of democracy in Nigeria has to be situated on two nodal points: the system in its pristine form; and the way it has been operated by those charged with its operation. As for the system, it would appear nothing is wrong with it considering the integrationist and nation-building potentialities that can easily be associated with it. This is, in the important respect, that national leadership candidates would have to present themselves as leaders that have, in appearance at least, overcome their primordial hang-over.
Nobody is going to emerge as a national leader who has been tucked in a corner and got elected in the process; the entire country would have to be the constituency of such a candidate and/or leadership, if they are successful at the polls. Both the constitution and the Electoral Law that is usually a derivative of the fundamental law of the land equally underscore this national exposure. In the case of the electoral law, the stipulations are often so stiff and strict that, in 1979 at least, it nearly marred the whole transition process when an exact two-thirds
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majority of the 19 states in existence then could not be generally agreed upon.
The lesson learnt since then has somehow influenced the process of state creation; such that at various points in the recent past the process was embarked upon the eventual numerator has to be divisible by three. This has led us to hypothesize that any future state creation shall have to take into consideration this ‗correct political sense‘ (Yaqub, 2000:82-113), for further explication of this point.
The presidential system of the American type is also noted for regime stability. It is a process that the parliamentary system cannot guarantee either because the governing party only has a slender majority either singly or in coalition in the house; or that it is entirely a minority party vis-a-vis the other parties in parliament put together. Whatever may be the case, the parliamentary system is not as stable as the presidential system. For the latter system, therefore, it is a very veritable instrument for an administration to use in order to plan and monitor the execution of its programmes. In addition, the presidential system normally stipulates a maximum of two terms of four years each. After spending eight consecutive years in office, the president has to give change to another candidate, except these is an extenuating situation that makes it impossible for the incumbent to leave office at the expiration of the maximum tenure. (In
America, President Franklin Roosevelt 1932-45) benefited from such extenuating circumstance during the Second World War to stay in office beyond the constitutionally stipulated two terms of eight years. All said and done, nothing stops the president that has exhausted his maximum term of eight years from
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taking a shot at the presidency after vacating office, even if it is after the first four years succeeding their tenure. This particular feature of the American-type presidential system makes it peculiarly suitable for the politics of both federalism and democracy in Nigeria. This is in the sense that a maximum term of eight years would enable many a geopolitical zone to have a shot at the presidency as well as the other elective offices – just as it enhances the democratic system because of the wider scope it provides for participation.
As a matter of fact, in January 1989, students marched out of classes at the national university in Cotonou, the capital city of the West African country of
Benin. They demanded that the government immediately disburse long-delayed scholarships and restore guarantees of public sector employment for university graduates. By July, civil servants and schoolteachers also took to the streets with threats of a general strike to protest having gone without salaries for months.
The government of Benin could not respond to these demands because it was bankrupt Tax revenues had been slumping for years, capital flight was increasing, and top public officials were embroiled in embarrassing financial scandals. Unhappy with the government‘s failure to put into effect an economic austerity programme, foreign donors withheld disbursements of the budgetary support that was keeping the governments afloat. In response to this economic quandary and to the mass street protests, Benin‘s military-installed president
Mathieu Kerekou began to make political concessions. In August 1989, he invited a prominent human rights activist and legal reformer into the Cabinet; in
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September, he announced a broad amnesty for political exiles and released some 200 political prisoners.
The protesters were not assuaged , however, escalating their demands to include an end to the ill treatment of political detainees and a clampdown on corruption.
Endeavouring to recapture the political initiative, Kerekou surprised his compatriots with a landmark announcement on December 5, 1989, that the
People‘s Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB) would abandoned both its ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism and its monopolistic grip on political affairs. Four days later, he accepted the principle of a return from single-party to multiparty politics. Most important, the president created a commission to prepare a ―national reconciliation conference‖ to which political and trade union organizations, religious associations, and Beninois living abroad would be invited to discuss the country‘s future.
Perhaps sensing the leader‘s weakness, key elements in the ruling coalition began to defect. Senior military officers distanced themselves from Kerekou, declaring the army politically neutral and agreeing to withdraw from public life and return to the barracks. Led by teachers and postal workers, trade unionists broke away from the government-chartered National Federation of Workers‘ Unions of
Benin (UNSTB). Demonstrations grew apace with as many as 40,000 citizens paralyzing downtown Cotonou at the end of 1989. In an attempted show of strength, Kerekou walked among the protesters but was booed and jostled. For
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the first time, government-controlled television screened pictures of demonstration holding placards with slogans hostile to the regime.
By the time the National Conference of Active Forces was convened in a downtown Cotonou hotel on February 19, 1990, Kerekou had clearly lost control of political events. Declaring ―l will not resign, I will have to be removed,‖ he apparently hoped the national conference would provide last-ditch opportunity to retain office. Yet the 488 conferees soon declared themselves sovereign, suspended the republic‘s constitution, dissolved the national assembly, created the post of prime minister and appointed to it Nicephore Soglo, a former World
Bank official. The nine-day proceedings of the national conference turned into a devastating personal indictment of Kerekou and his cronies for mismanaging the economy and pillaging the public treasury. Although retaining the offices of head of state and army, the fatally wounded strongman had no choice but to support a new constitution that allowed for presidential term limits and multiparty elections, and to accept the installation of an interim government composed of independent technocrats.
Following a massive ―yes‖ vote for the new constitution by 96 percent of eligible
Beninois in December 1990, competitive elections were planned for the legislature in February 1991 and the presidency in march 1991, A total of 24 political parties contested parliamentary seats, and 13 candidates, including both
Soglo and Kerekou, vied for the presidency. Despite polling irregularities in several northern Paliamentary departments and violent ethnic clashes during the
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second round of presidential balloting, the elections were certified by domestic and international observers to have been generally free and fair. Soglo‘s loose electoral coalition, called the Union for the Triumph of Democratic Renewal, not only won the largest bloc of assembly seats, but Soglo himself trounced Kerekou in the presidential race by a two-to-one margin.
Following this decisive electoral defeat, Matthieu Kerekou asked forgiveness for abusing power during his tenure in office and vowed his ―deep, sincere, and irreversible desire to change. In a parting act, the interim government agreed not to prosecute the outgoing dictator for any crimes he may have committed previously. Kerekou responded by pledging loyalty to the new government and asking the people of Benin to rallybehind its programme for national developments.
As an isolated event, the demise of a local strongman in a West African backwater would normally attract little attention. But Benin was among the first of a much larger number of countries in Africa that went on to experience a regime transition; Kerekou‘s downfall was simply an early harbinger of unprecedented political changes soon to follow all over the continent. Moreover, the emblematic drama that unfolded in Cotonou‘s public arenas combined in one country‘s experience the core attributes of a landmark transition to democracy, however fragile the institutions of this type of regime subsequently proved to be. In Allen‘s words, ―Benin may lay claim to the most extensive and impressive peaceful
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political transformation of any formally one-party African state in the present period‖.
The general objective of this study is to understand what happened politically to
African countries in the early 1990s. Why did political protesters rise up? Why did incumbent leaders accede to the demands of their opponents? Why, in some countries, were dictators displaced in multiparty elections? Why, in other countries, did they survive and continue governing according to well-established authoritarian methods (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997).
Apart from stability of tenure, one good thing for the presidential system is dispatch and decisiveness. The underlying factor for this may not be unconnected with the ample discretionary powers (even though these are subject to the oversight roles of the National Assembly), that the president has in the appointment of his aides, particularly the ministers. This freedom to appoint these from any quarters (i.e., within and beyond the parliament), enables the president to get the best brains to assist their administration. One may extend the argument to suggest that this may be the cost suitable system of government that economically backward Third World Countries can use to overcome such backwardness. Of course, it must be appreciated that it is not going to be all roses for such countries that may wish to adopt the presidential system of government; there are costs often associated with it. Although we shall soon come to examine what these are, it is necessary for countries aiming at adopting it to come to terms with issues such as: how exorbitant and efficient the
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presidential system could be. It is important to stress, in addition, that decisiveness and dispatch are not positive factors simply inherent in the system; they may have to be cultivated. There is therefore the crucial role the individual incumbent of the office has to do to ensure that these are brought to bear on the system. For instance, if the president is a lackluster performer, no matter how beautifully written the presidential constitution is or how loyal their aides are prepared to be, the system will simply be mired in the leader‘s quagmire of indecisiveness and non-performance. On the other hand, where a presidential leader is effective and creative and it is only the constitutional framework that has some problems, such leadership virtues could modify somehow and turn around the limitations of the constitutional framework for the greater benefit of the citizenry.
From the foregoing discussion, it could be seen that the presidential system is somehow also mired in some contradictions. See the paradoxical characterizations of the American Presidency in (Cronin, 1989:419-429). In the first instance, the presidential system is too expensive for a Third World Country such as Nigeria, with her burgeoning illiterate population and unproductive as well as debt-ridden economy, to efficiently and cost-effectively make use of. In this instance of cost, we have to disaggregate it for better appreciation. There is the cost occasioned by the large retinue of presidential aides and the new bureaucracies that the president would have to bring on board. They are often too many; and the cost is not helped by the constitutional stipulation that political appointments should reflect the ―federal character‖, meaning every state and not
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geo-political zone must be represented, in the federal cabinet and other public appointments. The same practice is expected to be extended to the state and even local governments wherein all the constituent parts of these tiers of government must also be represented at their policy making and implementation levels. It is not a bad thing that every part of the country or state or local government should be carried along or be made to feel a part of the governance system, but where there is continuous proliferation of the units of the federation
– in the name of state and/or local government creations – we are bond to have the following scenarios in our hands: the simultaneous proliferation of appointment units or agencies with which to satisfy the constitutional requirement
(in the Nigerian parlance, the president is forced to create jobs for the boys). The end of result is the recruitment of people who may not necessarily be the most competent for a job that may also not be relevant for the rapid socio-economic development of the country, which nonetheless has to be created because the president is to be seen to be obeying/observing the constitutional stipulation.
It is also pertinent to mention that it is not only at the executive branch that cost is incurred; the legislature represents another huge drain pipe to the economy.
Here, it is not appointment person that is the concern as with the executive branch, but the way representatives seek to monetize their constituency functions as well as perquisites of office. One would even like to extend the argument further by saying that it is not the monetization of the functions that is the concern, but the way the entire process is corrupted with members collecting the constituency allowances without using them for the purpose for which they are
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meant (Fatolu, 2003). For instance, researches which some of the allowances are meant to be used for are never carried out; and where this is done, it is perfunctory. And the requirement that members should maintain a properly functional constituency office (aimed at ensuring the close contact of the representatives and those they represent) is equally observed in breach for a number of them, as such offices are anything but constituency offices.
(Unfortunately, part of the money appropriated is for the purpose of setting up such office.) All this practice exerts a big toll on the economy. Thus, a prostrate economy such as the one Nigeria has been having since the adoption of the presidential system of government in the late seventies is not the kind that should also be encumbered with the huge cost associated with the presidential system.
It may be important at this juncture to suggest that an empirically based research on the exact cost of the presidential system should be carried out to determine the suitability or otherwise of the system (Morse, 1991).
There is the other aspect of the cost of running the presidential system that needs to be looked at. This is with respect to the priori advantage conferred on politicians with the means to participate in the system vis-à-vis those without the means. The nature of cost in this instance is different from what has been mentioned earlier. Here, the cost is with respect to the ability of all eligible participants in the democratic process doing so if not equally but fully. It can therefore be seen that this cost is not peculiar to the system but is organic generally to the broad liberal democratic system within which it is a variant
(Arrighi, 2002).
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Everybody cannot participate in the liberal democratic system either fully or equally because the system does not inherently provide for a wholesome level of participation; direct democracy is presumably dead. Putting the issue somehow simply, it can be argued that everybody is not equally empowered to participate fully and actively in the liberal democratic process, even if the system glibly and ideologically talks of the equality of all, especially those who can exercise franchise. The ideological smokescreen is provided by the system of universal adult suffrage; and this has remained one of the illusions of the liberal democratic system, i.e., that a citizen with one vote is the equal of the other citizen who, in addition, to his one vote go on to determine the conditions of existence of that one who can only cast his single vote at ritual electoral intervals. Again, the ensuing cost of this ―nominalization of democracy‖ has not been seriously questioned and an empirical enquiry into the phenomenon is equally advised.
The consequence of this nominalization process is that the Nigerian presidential system, like its American prototype, is only amenable to the few who are rich and powerful in society. This is graphically illustrated by, one, the type of people that can actively participate; and, two, the ridiculous extent to which the participation can be carried, especially through the mediation of money. Of course, we have already alluded to an aspect of this discussion when we talked about the ease with which the politicians who could not find their bearings in one political party would jettison such a parly for another without first reflecting to see whether or not the party of berth had anything in common with their points of disembarkation from the original party. In other words, principles do not appear to matter; what
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matters are: would I be able to actualize my presidential, gubernatorial, or legislative ambition in the new organ? What this development clearly points to is, like in its American prototype, only the very rich and very powerful are the participant in the charade called the presidential system of government in
Nigeria. This is why whoever has money, irrespective of how this money was made, declares it a manifest destiny that their destination is how to capture political power. Money, consequently, becomes the most important determinant of who is who in the presidential system of Nigeria in recent times. Cognate experience does not any longer count nor is the need to properly and roundly develop party machinery for the sustenance of democratic politics given a serious thought. Money is the totem to be worshipped and used at the same time to achieve political ambitions. This was outrageously displayed in the way jockeying for power was organized and/or realized at the primaries of the political parties in the preparations for the 2003 elections, being characteristic of the wheeling and dealing of such phenomena in the highly monetized and competitive political contests. We briefly proceed to discuss these in what follows.
It would not just be a fanciful thing to use a colourful language to describe the primaries of the major parties to select especially the presidential candidates in the 2003 General Elections as orgies of ostentation; it largely and accurately describe a phenomenon that has assumed an odious dimension. Of course the level of each of the political parties‘ participation in the orgies differed from one to the other – with the ones with lots of money spending more in order to get more votes and, to put it in other words, out do the other at the polls. Whatever has
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been the scale of spending should, however, be understood to have brought out in bold relief the harm the process of monetized politics is likely to wreak on democratic politics, in general, and presidential democracy, in particular. In one sense, the high monetization of elections seen in recent times has only gone far enough to compromise the electoral system. It is little wonder that, although the
April 2003 elections were adjudged one of the most peaceful in the annals of electioneering politics, yet they would also go down as one of the most compromised with extensive and intensive rigging and the denials of the citizens‘ free expression of their franchise. Before we look at the ‗psychology of rigging‘ as one of the direct consequence of monetized politics, it is important to take a briefly review at the manifestation of these orgies in the light of donations to support some of the candidates standing for some of the elections. Of the 30 registered political parties that were billed to contest the 2003 General Elections, it was the PDP that displayed the orgies of ostentation most, perhaps because it was also the party that could boast of wealthy members and well-wishers that were prepared to donate generously to it, as well. As a result, different types of donation, as can be seen from the Table 1, came the way of the party:
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TABLE1: FUND RAISING FOR OBASANJO/ATIKU CAMPAIGNS IN THE 2003
GENERAL ELECTIONS
Donor Amount Friends of Atiku N1 billion Aliko Dangote N250 million Emeka Offor N200 million 21 PDP Governors N210 million Group from Europe 1 million euros (N144 million) Rivers‘ Friends of Obasanjo/Atiku N150 million Grand Alliance Boeing 727 and two luxury buses for campaign Another Group Two luxury buses Construction Companies in the N200 million country Dr. Solomon Uche N50 million PDP Caucus in the Senate N12 million Principal Staff of the Villa (Aso Rock) N10.6 million Air Vice Marshal I.A. Shekarri (rtd.) N10 million First Atlantic Bank N10 million Ministers N10 million Otunba Fasawe N6.5 million 50 Parastatals N5 million PDP National Working Committee N3.6 million Dr. Ngozi Anyaegbunam N500,000.00 Dr. Gamaliel Onosode N100,000.00 Corporate Nigeria Pledged N2 billion Source: E. Ezomon with additional reports by F. Okoror, “Campaign Finance: Donations or Buying up the Democratic Process? The Guardian, Friday, January 24, 2003, pp. 22-23. 291 Page
The same authors of the article from where the Table was obtained also mentioned that the presidential candidature of the All Nigerian Peoples Party
(ANPP) – the main challenger to the PDP‘s presidential candidate – reportedly boasted of close to N86 billion, to be used to ―push President Obasanjo out of office by May 29, 2003‖. But given the fact that at the height of the campaigns, there were noticeable financial strains in the campaign organization of General
Buhari, it is either the reported amount was exaggerated or it never materialized, since it was largely based on pledges with even some external components built- in. Whatever may be the case, it is pertinent to make some observations of the figures in the Table. Who could the friends of Atiku be, who would contribute the whopping sum of N1 billion? Were they government workers or government contractors? What would be the implication of this donation to transparency and integrity in governance. If the bulk of the donations would come from the latter?
How many were they? Could the money have come from the pocket of the Vice
President, only to be masqueraded as coming from the ‗friends‘? This latter question is pertinent as another Newspaper: The Sunday Sun, March 23, 2003:7, within the same time ―his friends‖ donated this sum to the Obasanjo/Atiku campaign funds, reported that within six weeks, he became a ―Father Christmas‖ who had donated the sum of N1.6 billion to the campaign funds of a number of politicians seeking elective appointments.
Apart from the concern about Vice President Atiku Abubakar‘s manner of spending, there is also the case of the 21 PDP governors who on average donated N10 million each to the same Obasanjo/Atiku Campaign Funds. Again,
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one could wonder whether such monies were personal donations or they were their State Governments‘ Funds. If personal, were these in conformity with the ethics of holding public office? Even if the monies were governments‘; how justifiable could these actions of theirs have been, given that public funds are usually public trusts, to be dispensed within the parameters guiding their disbursement? In addition, if they could freely disburse the sums entrusted to them for the benefit of others, how far could they go in coercing officials under them to similarly donate to their own campaign funds? Overall, what is the implication of the orgies of ostentation on the drive to wipe out corruption in public service, as well as to strengthen the democratic process?
In all this, however, there is the need to raise a most pertinent issue brought about by the Table 1(one): the position of law on contribution to campaign funding and how that position has been implemented or closely monitored. The
1999 Constitution, indeed, has ample things to say on this issue, among others.
For instance, Section 221 on the ―Prohibition of Political Activities by Certain
Associations,‖ states that: ―No association, other than a political party, shall canvass or votes for any candidates at any election or to contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any candidate at any election.‖
This means that the faceless as well as the known contributors to the
Obasanjo/Atiku Campaign Funds are guilty to the violation of the Nigerian constitution: this is more unfortunate with the public officers, such as the governors and the ministers, who swore to the same constitution before assuming office.
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Aside from this constitutional provision, Section 225(3) (b) stipulates that: ―No political party shall … entitled to retain any funds or assets remitted or sent to it from outside Nigeria.‖ And where such funds or assets are sent or received,
Section 225(4) provides as follows: ―Any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a political party from outside Nigeria shall be paid over or transferred to the
Independent National Electoral Commission within twenty-one days of…receipt with such information as the Commission may require.‖ From this, it is obvious that the constitution has been contravened especially by those who donated physical assets such as an aircraft and buses as well as the euro payment.
Although the constitution has also made provisions or the punishment of those who infringed on these provisions (vide Section 228), there was no record that the defunct first legislature of the Fourth Republic bothered to prosecute any of the above who clearly were in breach of the constitution, most probably because the members of the National Assembly seeking a return to the Assembly or any other elective office gained or stood to gain from the orgies of ostentation that were replicated at all levels and with all manner of contestants.
One may even have to probe deeper into the basis of this political behaviour.
Such probing may have to be put in a comparative context, especially within the
American context where the presidential system itself was borrowed from. In the
American setting, contributions are sought for and received; but, because of the institutionalized nature of the process, there are laws that guide the amount individuals and corporate bodies can contribute. This is not to say that ―smart alecs‖ may also not lurk behind the cover of anonymity to make multiple
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donations that, in aggregate, may surpass the legally prescribed limit. Whatever may be the case in respect to the practice in the United States, such contributions are not intrinsically made to intimidate, harass, or corrupt the electorate as it is routinely and wantonly done here in Nigeria. This perspective tallies with the view that Chief M.C.K. Ajuluchukwu is quoted to have said:
It is not out of place to inject money into electioneering campaigns.
In the USA, they use money for publicity, including adverts (in)
television, newspapers, etc. In Nigeria it is normally used
to intimidate opponents and to rig elections. It is unfortunate
that the advent of money in Nigeria‘s politics has eroded true
democracy. From the way things are going, we are not likely
to get a free and fair election due to the negative influence of
money (Quoted in Ezomon and Okoror, op.cit.:23). For a
glimpse of how campaign fund raising events are organized in
the USA as well as the laws pertaining there to,
(Pious, 1986:277-282).
Ajuluchukwu prediction came to be a self-fulfilling prophecy as the 2003 General
Elections were neither free nor fair as all manner of foul plays trailed them, as highlighted below. It is relevant at this point to go back to the issue of the psychology of rigging that we referred to earlier to underscore its nature, prevalence and likely consequence.
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The psychology of rigging in the Nigerian context has to be understood even though it may well be that it is the same thing in other climes; only the scale may differ from what it has assumed here. In the Nigerian context, electoral contestants take off from the assumption that the opponent would also rig and, probably, would rig in a big way. Consequently, it would be foolhardy to concede the ‗right‘ to rig to only one side (Yaqub, 2005). Having decided to rig, the next thing uppermost in the mind of the rigger is to ensure that the rigging is done in a manner that whatever the opponent does or has done or may not do shall be a child‘s play compared to their deed. A variety of methods is usually resorted to consummate this electoral offence. In relation to the 2003 and based on the premise already developed, all the political parties rigged. The following excerpts are from the accusations of the Arewa Consultative Form (ACF) of the manner of rigging that the PDP carried out, which were typical of the riggings carried out by the other parties:
Built-in mechanisms to facilitate rigging and facilitate the
production of predetermine results. These include the
total elimination of transparency, which was done by: (a)
INEC‘s insistence that voters should not be allowed
to witness the counting of the votes; (b) preventing
party agents from accompanying the ballot boxes to the
collation centres and onwards, and preventing them from
getting copies of the forms containing the details of the
results at the polling stations; (c) refusal to announce the
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results at every centre in public whether at collation centres
or at local government or at the state levels thereby
facilitating the falsification of the actual results or their
substitution with something else that bears no relations
with the true results. Stuffing of the ballot boxes with false
ballot papers, and rewriting the results. This was perpetrated
on a large scale throughout Nigeria. One of the most notorious
instances took place in one village in Kiru Local Government of
Kano State near the border with Kaduna State. There some people
in police and military uniforms cordoned off an area and the stuffing
was carried out without any disturbance.
There were instances where, while the correct results,
were being collated, or where the correct had actually
been arrived at and declared at the collation centres, the
process was halted (in the one case) or reversed
(in the other) and false announcements were made.
This happened in such places as Adamawa, Taraba,
Bauchi, Gombe, Katsina, Kaduna and Niger States.
In some places voting did not take place at all, but
―results‖ were announced. This was the case in most
of the South-East and , South-South. Specifically in
Rivers State, where a combination of a heavy downpour
and a day-light curfew imposed by the State Government
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on …. 19th April prevented voting; yet INEC declared
a turnout of over 96% of over 2 million registered voters,
almost all of whom voted for the incumbent Governor and
President.
All the above acts were preceded by (or accompanied with)
various acts of intimidation and harassment, including assaults
and even murder, of opposition agents and in some cases
the opposition candidates themselves …. (Arewa Consultative
Forum, 28/05/03:22).
It should be emphasized at this point that some of the various limitations of the operation of the presidential system in Nigeria are not inherently Nigerian or peculiar to the country‘s presidential system; some of them are also as inherent in some other countries – that is, if they may not be more in those systems. Our constraints to contextualize those being experienced in Nigeria stem from the fact that one would like to know their dimensions, complexities, etc., with a view to providing a scientific explanation of how to overcome if not all of them at least most of them. At this experimental stage of the operation of the presidential system, there is little doubt that it will be buffeted by problems or challenges; pretending that they are either not in existence or not big enough to require some attention may merely postpone the strengthening of the good aspects that will serve the country‘s democracy.
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6.3. THE RELEVANCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA
There has been argument in the literature as to which of these institutional arrangements of liberal democracy is more effective and durable. The urge has been to identify the strength and weaknesses of these models. Parliamentary system of government is considered to be more inclusive, less expensive, and accountable. It encourages coalition building and the actual involvement of political parties in the governmental system through its role in political bargaining and coalition processes. Added to this is that the stakes are much higher in a presidential system than in a parliamentary system, as the desperation to win the presidential office is usually very high in presidential democracy. Furthermore, presidential democracy may also generate executive-legislative stand-off especially in situations in which different parties control the two arms of government. In terms of its weaknesses, parliamentary system of government may create friction and tension between the two executive offices, of the constitutional Head of State (President) and Head of Government (Prime
Minister). Also, the doctrine of separation of powers is not clearly delineated in the parliamentary system. Furthermore, governmental activities are usually constrained by the overriding influence of the parliament in executive operation
(Adejumobi, 2005).
For the presidential system of government, the major persuasion is that the locus of executive power is clearly delineated, which may engender rapidity of actions and decisions and make for executive responsibility in a clear and concise
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manner. As Ayeni noted, the major conviction for presidential democracy is that
―society is best run by a government that is effectively organized under a clear and definite authority‖. A plural authority situation often leads to confusion, unnecessary conflict and inability to locate responsibility (Ayeni, 1994).
Extant studies suggest that parliamentary system of government is more durable than the presidential democracy. Scholars like Joan Linz (Linz, 1990) and Adam
Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi (Przeworski,
1997), have pointed out in different cross-country studies the basis of this and provided statistical data to justify such. Adam Przeworski (1997:301), in a study of about one hundred and thirty five countries between 1950 and 1990 noted that the possibility of survival of parliamentary system is much higher than that of the presidential system. Their finding is quite revealing:
The probability that a democracy would die under
Presidentialism during any year of our study was
0.049, the comparable comparison under
parliamentarism was 0.014. If this difference
appears small, think in terms of expected lives:
democracy‘s life expectancy under presidentialism is
less than 20 years, while under parliamentarism it is
71 years.
There are variations and mixed types in the nature of the governmental systems adopted by some countries. As such, generic models are fashioned that take on 300 Page
attributes of both the presidential and parliamentary systems of government. For instance, the constitution of the French Fifth Republic while being essentially parliamentarian establishes a presidential office that has significant executive powers. Although the Premier is vested with the power of the operations of government and to execute the law, however, the President has the power to appoint and remove the premier from office. As such the ―Executive Government under the French Constitution of 1955‖ can therefore be described without impropriety as essentially presidential in character, notwithstanding that it also contains features of the British parliamentary system (Nwabueze, 1974).
In some African countries like Botswana, Kenya and Uganda in the immediate post- colonial era, the president was made a member of the parliament. There was also the phenomenon of parliamentary executive in which the ministers are members of the parliament. The Ministers may be drawn from either the parliament or outside it, but as soon as they are made Ministers, if from outside the parliament, they automatically become parliamentarians. In Kenya, the
President has the right to nominate twelve members of parliament, in Zambia-five and Gambia-three (Nwabueze, 1974:39). The import of the foregoing is that institutional arrangements are not rigid constructions. They may be adapted to suit local peculiarities depending on the kind of consensus negotiated by the power elite in different societies. Most British colonial territories assumed political independence with a Westminster model of government (parliamentary democracy). Apart from Botswana and Zambia, this was the model in commonwealth Africa. However by the early 1970s, most of these countries
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have opted for the presidential system of government. What accounts for this and how can it be explained? Various explanations have been put forward to explain this development.
The first explanation is that of autonomy. This, as Ben Nwabueze points out, has to do with the search for a national identity that is separate from the colonial image. It therefore represents the desire of the former colonial countries to give their political systems a distinct national character and form. However, the extent to which the modern presidential system of government is endogenous is open to conjecture. The second rationale for the rise of presidential democracy has to do with its supposed interface with the African traditional political system. It is argued that in traditional African political life, the locus of political power is easily identifiable and highly concentrated. The chief or king is the centre of political power, and wields it in the entirety of social life. The idea of dual power structure or an encumbered power system constrained largely by the legislature as dictated by the parliamentary system of government is therefore considered
―unAfrican‖. Two quotes are quite relevant in this regard. First is by Julius
Nyerere, the former president of Tanzania and the second by the Constitution
Drafting Committee (1978) in Nigeria which both justifies the presidential system of government on the ground of ―Africanness‖. Julius Nyerere noted in July 1962 in a letter to the Observer of London:
Our constitution should fit in with the tradition of our people;
it should be felt to belong to the country. Only then can it foster
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a sense of nationhood and inspire a sense of loyalty. First as far
as possible, the intuitions of government must be able to be
understood by the people. There must be no confusion of outward
forms, which are meaningless in the light of our experience and
history. This alone requires a republic, a one with an executive
president. To us, honour and respect are accorded to a chief monarch
or resident not because of symbolism but because of the authority
and responsibility he holds. We are not used to the division between
real authority and ―formal authority‖ (Nyerere cited in Nwabueze,1974., 65)
(Emphasis mine).
This argument of the traditional African source of the presidential system of government is not only nebulous but also self-seving. This is because the argument homogenizes traditional African political experience, which is not the case. Traditional or pre-colonial African societies had different political systems ranging from the highly centralized political systems of the Hausa-Fulani empires and the Yoruba kingdoms to the decentralized and acephalous system of the
Igbo political communities. Second, the discontinuity, which African traditional political system had experienced especially with colonialism, makes the nostalgia of African political system more of a self-serving argument (Adejumobi, 2005).
There are other more plausible reasons that justify the ascendance of the presidential system of government in Africa. These include the growing influence of the United States of America (USA) in the 1970s in Africa and the apparent
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―success story‖, which America‘s presidential democracy embodies. Many
African Countries were fascinated by, and sought to emulate the United States.
More so as increasing number of its political elite had their academic training in the USA. Also, the legacy of military rule is another reason for the adoption of presidential democracy in many African Countries. Military authored political transition programmes often show a predilection for presidential system of government. In the Nigerian political transition experiment of 1976-1979, then the Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed specifically admonished the CDC to seriously consider the presidential system of government. They did and recommended it. The preference of the military for presidential democracy has to do with the clear lines of authority and control that presidential system embodies, which in a sense conforms to the authoritarian logic of military rule. Military regimes often have a clear line of command and control. The tendency therefore is to recommend something similar when disengaging from power (CDC, 1976).
The final basis why presidential democracy was on the ascendance from the
1970s in Africa was borne out of the practical experience of the ruling class in
Africa in the post-independence era. The parliamentary system of government could not assuage the factional struggles of the ruling class in the post- independence era, which led to the collapse of those experiments. The challenge therefore, was to look for alternative model of power arrangement that could mediate and manage the crisis of power that afflicts the ruling class (Ollawa,
1990).
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Essentially while both presidential and parliamentary systems of government are designed to further the same goal, that is promote liberal democracy, the roadmap by which they seek to do so differ. While one is predicated on the concentration of power at least in terms of executive responsibility, the other emphasizes the diffusion of power. It is the organ that has the leverage of power either the parliament or the president that defines what the institutional arrangement is (Hutchful, 2001).
NIGERIA: BEYOND THE PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS
The foregoing analysis clearly suggests that institutional arrangements between the presidential and parliamentary systems of government have not been a safeguard against the collapse of democracy in the country. The feat of the First
Republic was repeated in the second and signposts in the current political dispensation are not too promising. Intra and inter party feuds have assumed dangerous proportions, politically inspired assassinations are occurring and virtually all the current elected officials have taken it for granted that there would be re-elected back to power through all means possible. This situation has led some to suggest that there is no marked difference between the presidential and parliamentary system of government on the political fortune of the country. As a matter of fact (Suberu, 1988) argues this quite poignantly:
The supposed advantages of the presidential system of
government over the parliamentary system are nebulous if
not preposterous. While it has been argued that the executive
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presidential system furnishes a clear focal point of loyalty,
which not only avoids the clashes and conflicts inherent in the
separation of the head of state from the head of government in the
parliamentary system, but is also functional and indispensable
for national integration, there is indeed no a priori basis on which
to determine which form of government, the presidential or the
westminster type is more suitable… In a word, the change
from the parliamentary to the Presidential system can be seen as
cosmetic and of no consequence in ensuring governmental stability.
(Emphasis mine).
Suberu (1988) further argues that the departure point on government stability should be the underlying social, economic, and cultural forces as the decisive factors influencing the dynamics of political processes and the prospects of stable and effective government. Suberu‘s observation is quite relevant. A critical analysis of the issue of governmental stability and the survival of democracy in the country would turn our attention in three directions. First is the issue of federalism.The whole logic of federalism is about power decentralization.
Nigeria‘s federalism has tended towards the concentration of power at the centre such that the challenge for politicians and parties is to seek to capture federal power. In order to diffuse the internecine political struggles that characterize the centre, there is need to devolve more powers and resources to the sub-national units and make federal power less attractive than it is. The federal government
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may simply be a coordinating house for things in general to the commonwealth- customs, immigration, external defence and national security, currency issuance and all other matters that may be mutually agreed to by commonwealth. It is these issues about federalism that constitute the crux of the national question.
Confronting the national question through the federal idea may be an easier but politically expedient way than the convocation of a sovereign national conference. There should be no illusion that adopting a much-decentralized federal system will fully resolve the question of political power in the country; it would not. What it would have done is to change the site of political contestation from the national to the sub-national levels. However, this would have changed the constellation of inter-ethnic group relations and tensions as currently manifests and produce patterns of political behaviour and negotiation in the different sub-national units.
The second issue that is germane to the question of democratic stability and consolidation in Nigeria is that of institutions. Key state institutions need to be reformed and restructured for them to support the democratic process. This will include the INEC, the judiciary and the security apparatuses especially the police force and also the political parties. With regard to INEC the major kind of reform to be carried out is in the composition of the body. A situation in which the federal government appoints members of INEC is unacceptable, as it cannot make for fairness in the electoral process. The composition of INEC should be broad based representing key social interests and forces like civil society groups of
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labour and the human rights community, and political parties. The second reform with regards to INEC is about the electoral process. The ―first past the post‖ or majoritarian electoral process that the country uses makes for a deadly contest for political power. It is a ―winner takes all‖ game. Those who win do so handsomely and those who lose are bad losers. There is need to change this.
The proportional representation system may provide an alternative electoral model for the country. The reform of the judiciary and some other state institutions should provide relative autonomy for them to act independently of executive control and to be accountable to the people rather that the executive.
These institutions need to be purged of corruption, especially the police force.
The third dimension of democratic stability in Nigeria is the foundations of the economy. The Nigerian economy must at the same time promote economic growth, distribution, and social welfare. If this does not happen, politics will remain a bourgeois class project, social alienation would intensify and political participation will continue to dwindle. The net result will be the promotion of what
(Mkandawire, 2007) referred to as ―choiceless democracy‖.
THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND THE SEARCH FOR
DEMOCRATIC STABILITY
Election provides essential validation for democracy by increasing the confidence of individual citizens in their ability to meaningfully participate in public life and an important ritual for regularly confirming and reinforcing the legitimacy of the system. However, where elections are flawed as cases in Nigeria‘s General
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election of 2003 and 2007, much of the above stated benefits would turn in the deficits threatening the survival of democracy. Repeated episodes of election rigging, political violence and disorderly administration would dissipate the people‘s fundamental trust and confidence in the institutions and processes of electoral rule. A troubled election forecloses political choices, for without genuine political competition, in which there is a realistic chance that power can change hands according to the will of the voters, the simplest promise of democracy is denied. When elections are not fair and transparent, citizens may become disillusioned and withdraw into apathy or cynism, sometimes becoming aggravated, militant and confrontational leading to breakdown of the law and order and even disintegration of the political society.
The search for democratic stability and consolidation in Nigeria should go beyond the institutional differences between the parliamentary and the presidential systems of government. The solution should not lie in a mixed model of both. So, will the logic of presidential messianism take the nation too far? What would guarantee democratic stability in Nigeria will be a confluence of three things?
First is re-examining the federal idea as presently practised in Nigeria. In terms of political and administrative management, Nigeria currently tends towards a unitary state. The federal idea should be reclaimed with considerable degree of political and economic decentralization to sub-national units. This is where
Olaitan‘s position (2006) in his paper entitled: ―Rethinking the State and
Citizenship in Africa‖ Should not be taken for granted. The second dimension is to begin to rebuild institutions and strengthen them. The two foregoing issues will
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have to be accomplished through a process of constitutionalism. The third dimension of democratic stability has to do with the economic bases of society.
The triple cord of economic growth, distribution and social welfare must go hand in hand. Extreme and pervasive poverty constitutes a threat to democracy. It is when this socio-economic context is re-engineered that the politics of consociational democracy, which (Lijphart, 1999) talks about could begin to germinate and take firm root in Nigeria.
6.4. THE FOURTH REPUBLIC EMERGED IN MAY, 1999 FOLLOWING THE
TERMINATION OF MILITARY RULE AND THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL
POLITICS
This discourse is provoked by the realization that military intervention in politics is an aberration and that it is no longer fashionable for the military to unseat democratically elected civilian authorities. The thesis demonstrates that the re- emergence of constitutional civilian rule in Nigeria after a sustained era of military authoritarianism presents challenges and opportunities for checkmating military intervention in politics and fostering harmonious civil-military relations.
Democratization in fact poses challenges and provides opportunities for the military to disentangle itself from civil governance ambition.
The evidence revealed that previous constitutional governments in Nigeria collapsed as a result of certain endemic factors including ethnic politics, corruption, electoral fraud, economic slide and breakdown of law and order.
These constituted the hallmark of the first few years of the post-independence
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period and the bane of democratic process in the First Republic, leading to military intervention in politics. The same scenario was replicated in the Second
Republic as the political structures and processes became highly distorted by the politics of ethnicity, intolerance, corruption, profligacy, misuse of power and electoral malpractices that characterized the period. The military again seized the opportunity to stage a coup d‘etat (Akinboye, 2004:85).
The Third Republic was more problematic as the political class surreptitiously collaborated with the military to subvert the political processes. The collapse of the Republic was therefore not surprising given the dubious manipulations inherent in it and the deleterious anguish it evoked. The Fourth Republic emerged in May 1999 following the termination of military rule and the emergence of civil politics. Given the journey so far into the Fourth Republic, the thesis submits that there is the need to consolidate and strengthen the existing civil-military relations in order to prevent a future slip towards military dictatorship.
To achieve this end, the military should be refocused towards a redefinition of its role to reflect more fully the existing complex civilian political environment within which it operates. The civilian authorities should, equally demonstrate the necessary political will to justify their dominant position and legitimate claim to supremacy over the military.
The central problem of civilian succession to leadership under the military has consistently centred on two fundamental premises. According to Adekson, the first is the pertinent question of whether a ruling military junta accepted
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demilitarization as a desirable goal; While the second is the extent to which it was willing to proceed in realizing the objective by fully disengaging from politics.
(Adekson, 1979:212). Situating the problem within the context of West Africa,
Adekson articulates three major approaches to military disengagement namely:
The Countercoup – Inspired Approach, The Military- turned-Political Pattern and the Constitutional-Evolutionary model (Adekson, 1979:214 – 217).
The countercoup –Inspired approach results where a ruling military regime is unwilling to relinquish power. Under such circumstance, Adekson states, a countercoup is hatched to transfer power to other hands. The objective may not necessarily be motivated to achieve civilian succession, but simply to replace one set of officers with another. It is often characterized by the use of counter military force sometimes co-joined with popular revolt. The Babangida palace coup
(1985) against Buhari clearly exemplifies this.
The Military-turned-Political Pattern, in Adekson‘s view, involves a higher level of demilitarization than the first. Although, the leadership divests itself of some control of the army, it nonetheless portrays a military-backed regime in which its members propose to transform themselves into a new form of quasi-civilian political elite, deceitfully planning to replace the former professional politicians. A typical example of this typology is the Abacha‘s self-succession plan in which he surreptitiously attempted to transmute himself into a civilian president.
The third model of military disengagement as adumbrated by Adekson
(1979:215-216) is the Constitutional-evolutionary approach under which the
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military junta proceeds beyond mere civilianization to disengaging completely from the political scene and working towards the maintenance of a realistic civil- military relationship. The emphasis in this approach to dimilitarization, Adekson stresses, is on methodical and constitutional procedure of military disengagement. It entails elaborate political transition programme designed to eventually transfer power to the civilians. The Abubakar military junta is a clear example of this form of military disengagement. Although, the Gowon administration demonstrated this commitment, he reneged on his promise to transfer power to the civilians in 1976. The Mohammed / Obasanjo regime however renewed the commitment and indeed fulfilled it, thus ushering in the
Second Republic when power was transferred to Shagari. The Babangida‘s junta attempted it, but the end failed to justify the means as the June 12, 1993 presidential election which would have ushered in the Third Republic was surreptitiously annulled under questionable circumstances after a convoluted transition programme. On this methodical and procedural approach, Alao
(2004:vi) has provided an incisive analysis wherein he distinguished between procedural democracy and substantive or what was referred to as epistemic democracy. In procedural democracy ―the value is in the procedure, and any outcome, which is in compliance with stipulated procedure, is correct and valid.
There is no independent truth outside of the procedure‖ whereas ―democratic proceduralists of less formal bent require that elections should be free and fair, with voting proceeding without intimidation or corruption, and all valid ballots being counted; that the franchise should be broad and elections regular and
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frequent; that the rules governing voting and elections should be common knowledge and procedure by which votes are transformed into decision by publicly transparent. It is clear that Nigeria‘s democratization processes are more in conformity with the formal proceduralists‖.
Hence, the constitutional-evolutionary model best approximates the demilitarization that ushered in the Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic. Indeed, it was the adoption of this form of military disengagement, coupled with the dogged determination of the Abubakar‘s regime to relinquish power that led to the actual demilitarization and the subsequent civilianization of the polity. It also resulted in the transformation to a new civilian political dispensation after a protracted era of military authoritarianism (Akinboye, 2004).
In practical terms, Abubakar‘s demilitarization commenced with series of institutional changes that were effected in the country‘s political landscape. The first landmark action taken by the new regime towards the civilianization of the country was the outright cancellation of the Abacha‘s deceitful transition to civil rule programme and its replacement by a new political transition agenda. The bold action, though significant, did not restore the confidence of the electorates in the ability and readiness of the military to relinquish power given past attempts to scuttle the democratization process (Akinboye, 2001:8).
Many Nigerians indeed remained unconvinced that the Abubakar military administration was capable of realistically demilitarizing the polity and evolving a credible transition programme. Abubakar however exhibited a high level of 314 Page
commitment and sincerity to his procedural political transition agenda by ensuring that it was not inconclusive or unduly protracted, interminable hypocritical unlike that of his predecessors who, by their elaborate and elongated transition to civil rule programme subverted the sovereign rights of the Nigerian people to elect their leaders (Akinboye, 2002). The demilitarization programme became a success story at least procedurally and it culminated in a complete disengagement of the military from the nation‘s political scene and the advent of the Fourth Republic.
Two typologies of civilian control of the military have been distinguished –
Objective or Liberal and Subjective or Penetration (Huntington, 1957; Nordlinger,
1977; Anifowose, 2002).
The Liberal mechanism is best adumberated by Western democracies in which there exists a clear distinction between military and civilian roles and functions.
Civilian control of the military is achieved in several ways. In the first instance, the military is kept out of politics and thus subordinated to civilian leaders who are accountable to the people directly or through an assembly. Secondly, while the military is required to provide input in form of advice and as well implement defence policy, the formulation of policy in the realm of defence is to be the sole responsibility of the civilian authority.
Thirdly, there exists strict political neutrality within the military as a means of ensuring its loyalty to the government of the day, irrespective of the political party that constitutes the government (Anifowose, 2002: 84). The United States and
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the United Kingdom provide good examples of civilian control of the military.
While subordination is maintained through the power of the U.S. President as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, it is secured in Britain via the authority of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Thus, a liberal model of civil-military relations has been consistently maintained with a history of political and constitutional stability preponderantly prevailing.
The subjective or penetration method on the other hand employs the systematic and thorough-going politicization which has been achieved in varying degrees in dictatorial or one party state. Hitler for instance attempted in 1934 to turn the
German Army into ―political soldier‖ while Stalin inaugurated series of bloody purges in the Soviet military in the 1930s. Under the institutional penetration mechanism, civilian control of the military is maintained through a level of interpenetration between the Armed Forces and the Party.
To a large extent, the liberal or objective control of the military has been the better option. As Huntington observes, objective civilian control of the military has been in the best interest of both the civilian and military officers. The latter, he surmises, have realized that sustained involvement in politics by the military has had disastrous ramifying effects on the efficiency, coherence and discipline of the armed forces (Huntington, 1995: 13). Thus subordination of the military to civilian authorities is therefore better achieved through the liberal or objective mechanism.
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The contention that the military should be subordinated to civil authority is predicated on the premise that the military is an arm of the state and an important tool of state policy. Hence, it is to serve as a potent instrument of political authorities which has the constitutional right to determine its use (Emokpae,
2001: 46). The 1999 Nigerian constitution articulates the position more forcefully.
Section 217(2c) of the constitution stresses that one of the fundamental objectives of the Armed Forces of Nigeria is ―suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the
President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the
National Assembly‖ (1999 Constitution) Section 218 (1) similarly underscores the President‘s supreme and constitutional power over the military:
The powers of the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Federation shall include power to determine
the operational use of the Armed Forces of the Federation(1999
Constitution).
Against the background of these constitutional powers and as a device for clearing up the mess that had been perpetrated by the past military regimes,
President Obasanjo invoked, within a month of being sworn in, two fundamental measures. First, he retired all military officers that had held political appointments in the country between 1984 and 1999; secondly, he brought to trial some top military officers (Akinboye, 2001: 9).
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While the first action incurred the wrath of young military officers whose cherished career had been cut short, the second, was gladly received by officers that had felt alienated and oppressed by the top echelon of the military. It was heralded with enthusiastic applause by civil society organizations which had been completely emasculated and subjugated by military arbitrariness and autocratic contraption.
The rationale for purging the erstwhile ‗political‘ military officers was premised on the perception that all officers that served previous military regimes in various political positions might not be fully amenable to life in the barracks any longer, and could therefore disturb the efforts at re-professionalizing the military under civilian political leadership (Olukoshi, 2000: 27). Similarly, as part of the effort at reforming the military, new service chiefs for the Army, Navy and Airforce were appointed while a massive reshuffling of the officer corps was undertaken.
Although these appeared to be bold attempts to institutionalize civilian control of the military and re-professionalize the Armed Forces, they are insufficient to checkmate future military intervention in the nation‘s body polity. It is only good and transparent people-oriented governance that can call the bluff of ambitious soldiers who are impatient with the ballot box (Akinboye, 2004)
Good governance constitutes the major antidote to military incursion into politics.
Anifowose underscored this more perceptively:
The major guarantee of political stability and antidote for the
resolution of the military question is good governance,
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characterized by a dynamic, democratic polity, based on
the principle of justice, fairness and equity, responsiveness,
accountability and transparency with in-built mechanism for
coping with recurring challenges (Anifowose, 2002: 96).
Dare equally emphasized that:
…the best security against military usurpation is a responsive
and effective civilian regime. Even though there would always
be officers who nurse political ambition, they would have
difficulty in justifying their actions if they intervene against
a popular civilian regime (Dare, 1998).
The concepts of Governance and Good Governance have elicited serious debates. Within the context of the state, governance connotes the art to direct the state in order to ensure good functioning for political institutions and of the state organs for a harmonious societal development (Sylla, 2001:66). According to
Sylla (2001), it ―serves to further the interaction between state and society, offering a means of improving public action by co-ordinating a manifold variety of otherwise disparate social actors-public services, pressure groups, consultants, citizens movements, consumer associations, to name but a few‖. It has also been conceived as ―the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm‖. (Hyden, 1993: 7) It is a bold attempt to use political power for the management of a nation‘s public affairs.
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The notion of Good Governance, as derived from the term governance, arises from different attempts at reforming the society, economy and the state from the remotest antiquity. It implies the efficacy of the elites, and a responsible leadership that is capable of prompt action, as well as ―creative intervention through structural modification that frees human possibilities‖ (Sylla, 2001: 72).
From the perspective of the World Bank, Good Governance denotes ―giving back to the people the right to express their views and to decide without transferring responsibility either to an ideology or to a market‖ (World Bank Report, 1989).
Good Governance, Sylla surmises, proceeds generally from political representation of the collective sovereign (of the people) through the electoral principle, which legitimizes power. It embodies separation of power and the democratic election of people in a political system. It embodies not only the rational arrangement of state organs, but also good functioning of political institutions (Sylla, 2001: 67).
For a long time, Nigeria has been in search of Good Governance. The various military governments that had previously ruled the country have failed to accommodate the existence of rule of law, public debate, concensus-building as well as open and accountable system of governance (Babawale, 1999: 121).
Since these constitute the hallmarks of democracy which Nigeria had been longing for, there has been the hunch that without good governance, democracy in its real sense, may remain a mirage for Nigeria.
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The concept of good governance has been popularized by the donor agencies.
Olukoshi has put the thrust of the World Bank‘s position on Africa‘s development problems within the context of ―a fundamental crisis of governance‖. To him:
This has manifested itself not only in the quality of government,
growing bureaucratic obstruction, and weakened Judicial system,
but also in increasing political and administrative arbitrariness,
the collapse of the rule of law, and an all-pervasive culture of
corruption and rent-seeking (Olukoshi, 1998:22).
The country‘s Fourth Republic commenced on a somewhat good note with
President Obasanjo setting a relatively inspiring example of good governance and efficient management of the nation‘s resources for development. His public speeches bore testimony to this concern. This is against the background of the rapacious manner in which the resources had been managed by his predecessors. Although, there has been some lapses, the administration has successfully overcome some of the major political and economic constraints inherited from the past military dictatorship including the promotion of human rights and rule of law and the elevation of public debates in financial matters.
However, it need be stressed that critical to good governance project, is the performance record of government.
After a period of eight years in office, the performance record of the Obasanjo administration has been less than satisfactory in terms of such evaluation indices as the level of accountability, transparency, corruption, and in particular what
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Nigerians refer to as democracy dividends. For instance, the country is still neck- deep in corruption in spite of the various anti-corruption slogans including the anti-corruption bill and the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related offences Commission (ICPC). Transparency International has rated the country as the Third most corrupt nation in the world in 2004. The country was rated second in 2003. Similarly, the much clamoured democracy dividends have been elusive as exemplified by the high level of poverty that pervades the nation with 70% living on less than one dollar a day. The underlying ethnic and religious cleavages as well as the state of insecurity, which had spurned recurrent outbursts equally constitute a bane to good governance in the past eight years.
Hence, certain fundamental issues inherited from its predecessors in office, particularly social, ethnic and religious conflicts, the pseudo-federalist structure, defective constitution and the demand for a national conference should be fundamentally resolved in order not to undermine efforts at sanitizing the polity
(Akinboye, 2002). As Dahl maintains:
Just as the preceding authoritarian regimes were beset with deep and
persistent problems that undermined support for their rulers, so too many
of the countries with new democratic governments face problems that
weaken their support and strengthen their anti-democratic opponents
(Dahl, 1995: 1).
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Failure on the part of the regime to resolve the national question and the enduring socio-political and economic problems that persistently afflict the nation, can strengthen anti-democratic forces and evoke bitter criticisms, which may eventually provoke military intervention that could lead to calamitous outcomes.
Since the re-emergence of civilian political dispensation in May 1999, civil-military relations have been relatively stable essentially as a result of the relative stability that had pervaded the polity. This is at variance with the deteriorating level of civil-military relations that characterized the previous authoritarian periods when the military exerted direct political control. Since the challenges of civil-military relations in the Fourth Republic are daunting, it is imperative, that peaceful co- existence reins supreme between the military and the civil society as a means of strengthening civil-military relations and thus consolidating democracy.
The tide of using the military for internal security operations should be stemmed.
A situation in which the military will constitute itself as a terror rather than protector of the state is extremely provocative and portrays the institution in bad light. Similarly, a situation in which the military is dependent upon to quell internal conflicts is at variance with its traditional role of defending the nation against external aggression. As the Commandant of the National War College, Rear
Admiral G. A. Siyanbade emphasized at an Inaugural Lecture on September 13,
1999:
It is in the best interest of the Armed Forces for the members to
pre-occupy themselves with the functions for which they are
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established (Quoted in International IDEA, 2001: 179).
The assigned functions are clearly articulated in section 217 (1) of the 1999 constitution. The most important being the defence of Nigeria from external aggression, and the maintenance of the country‘s territorial integrity and securing of its borders from violation on land, air or sea.
Siyanbade enumerated the danger in using the military to perform internal security roles:
The use of the Armed Forces for internal security roles on a long
and sustained basis carries with it the danger of weakening
the organization‘s combat readiness, morale and capacity for
effective external missions whenever these become
necessary (International IDEA, 2001: 179).
He submits that the use of Armed Forces to suppress domestic discontent is capable of provoking major resistance from elements of the population. The persistent mayhem in the Niger-Delta area of the country is a case in point.
Indeed, certain unpalatable incidents that had occurred since the inception of the
Fourth Republic have been widely cited to further underscore this point. The repressive attitude flagrantly displayed by the military during internal security operations at Odi in Bayelsa State in November 1999; Zaki Biam, Gbeji Agbaji and a few nearby villages in Tiv land of Benue State in October 2001 are classical examples. In Odi‘s case for example, the military unleashed terror of indescribable magnitude on the innocent people of the quiet community in the oil- 324 Page
rich Bayelsa State. The incident in Zaki Biam, Gbeji, Agbaji and surrounding villages was similarly pathetic. The Armored Brigade in Yola unleashed retaliatory terror on the civilian communities who were accused of harbouring civilians that allegedly murdered soldiers. The scenario was similar to the ugly incidents in Kaduna, Jos, Lagos, Oshogbo, Ago-Iwoye, Yenagoa, Warri, etc. where the military has been surreptitiously used for internal security operations.
(http://www,dawodu.com/omoigui10.htm).
This flagrant and repeated use of military might portray a dangerous trend for civil-military relations in the Fourth Republic. The use of the military in Argentina,
Brazil and Peru has clearly demonstrated that the dependence on the Armed
Forces for the maintenance of internal security is highly despicable and detrimental to the development of sound democratic principles http://www.faoa.org/journal/columbia.html). While a recourse by the civil society to armed confrontation with the security forces is inexcusable, there is no justification for the military to descend on innocent people and unduly attack them in the manner it has been done in Odi, Zaki Biam, Gbeji, Agbeji and others. Thus, the military should be detached from internal security assignments. Rather than depending on the Armed Forces to quell internal conflicts, the Nigeria Police should be further strengthened in terms of training, logistics and equipment to enable them confront internal conflicts in all ramifications rather than being busy with bribe, extortion at illegal check points from motorists.
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Equally, the military should remain a neutral force and not be enmeshed in partisan politics that is capable of undermining its professional ethics. As Matlosa and Pule have stressed in the case of civil-military relations in Lesotho:
Stable civil-military relations cannot be premised upon patronage
or the politicization of the Armed Forces, although this should not
suggest that the Armed Forces are apolitical. What should be
stressed however, is that the Army should not be involved in
partisan politics in a manner that portrays it as aligned to one
or another political party. This can only undermine its
professionalism and effectiveness in discharging its national
duty (Matlosa and Pule, 2001: 72).
Aside from the civil control over the military that should be exercised by the
President and the National Assembly, the civil society also has a vital role to play in the process of building virile and stable civil-military relations. Civil society groups should be empowered to serve as a counter-weight against threats of military re-entry into politics. There is the need to put in place a well-articulated programmes of empowerment that supports the evolution of a strong non- governmental component of civil society that is able to participate in public debates on defense and security policy; and this should present alternative views and programmes, pointing out the drive costs involved in different choices
(International IDEA, 2001: 181). A crucial aspect of the civil society‘s role could be achieved through organized political enlightenment and public dialogue on the
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need for efficient, effective and disciplined Armed Forces as well as the imperativeness of re-professionalising the military towards achieving its constitutional and traditional role of defending the nation against external aggression. It should also articulate and strategize harmonious civil-military relations in a free and unfettered civil society. This is more important now that the civil society operates in a freer political environment. The eldorado in civil-military relations is however yet to come. We now turn to the conclusion.
6.5. CONCLUSION
The study has shown that political parties constitute the cornerstone of democratic government. No democracy can exist without two or more healthy and active political parties. However, as noted by an eminent political scientist,
Giovanni Sartori (1976: 14) ‗one of the serious mistakes western scholars have made is to ensure that democracy which requires competitive political parties can be exported very easily‘. The Nigerian experience has revealed bitterness and cut-throat political competition both within and among political parties. The
Nigerian political parties have exacerbated divisions within society to the point that self—restraint, moderation, tolerance, negotiation and compromise, which are necessary for peace and democratic stability, become difficult, as party leaders indulge in undemocratic behaviour for their own selfish ends.
Today, the popular mode of governance is democratic leadership. It is, therefore necessary for the Nigerian political elite to believe in the democratic myth: that ordinary citizens ought to participate actively in decision—making and that
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governance is meant for the promotion of the welfare of the people and that they are in fact influential. Above all, for the security of Nigeria‘s fledgling democracy, to ensure uninterrupted democratic rule by soldiers, the civilian leaders must imbibe attitudes which facilitate political cooperation, limit the stakes of politics by checking the unbridled, negative or intense partisanship of political elites of opposing views. The leaders must maintain an open government, discard the common sit—tight approach to political power and therefore free from too much dependence on the military to perpetuate them in office. For the president to be nationally acceptable he must demonstrate energetic and self-less attributes and should be more of a statesman and less of a politician.
Since the first military putsch of January 15, 1966, Nigeria has experienced frequent change of government and several attempts to demilitarize the polity without much success. The military disengagement that culminated in the advent of the Fourth Republic however seem to have set the pace for a stable and enduring political terrain. There is therefore the need to sustain the trend and checkmate future military incursion into the nation‘s body polity. The thesis has demonstrated the necessity to free the country from the strangulating clutches of the military and entrench harmonious civil-military relations in the Fourth Republic and beyond. It is important to mention that perhaps the antecedents of President
Olusegun Obasanjo as a former military head of state are factors in projecting and consolidating Nigeria‘s democracy.
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The series of truncated political transition programmes by the military clearly revealed that the constitution of an articulate, enduring and responsible democratic system of governance cannot be achieved by the military. Its inability to create a stable political order is inherent in the contradictions within it. This is manifested in the intra-elite jostling for power as well as coup plotting which continually erode the confidence reposed in military authorities as champions of socio-economic change and development, and impartial arbiters in politics
(Anifowose, 2002: 95 – 96).
The thesis argues that professionalization of the military and engendering of good governance by the civil authority are the keys to addressing the fundamental issue of creating a stable and an enduring political order. While professionalization will facilitate civilian control of the military and maximize its professional skills, good governance, which is predicated on transparency, accountability, popular participation and rule of law, will enhance the legitimacy of the state and eliminate military incursion into politics.
For a meaningful engendering of good governance, there is the need to develop and strengthen the institutions of democracy including the legislature, executive, judiciary, political parties, security forces and the press. The democratic process involves the domination of the political and economic space by the populace with a view to evolving participatory governance and benevolent state that rallies the social groups behind the state policies. These policies should emerge in the context of popular debates, consultation and dialogue. Hence, the imperative
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need for a national conference to resolve the multifaceted problems of the
Nigerian State.
The task of subordinating the military to civil control can be achieved through constitutional provision that goes beyond the level of illegalizing coup d‘etat but also making it a punishable offence at all times. We allude to retired Colonel
Emokpae‘s submission that civil disobedience and uprising should be mounted in the event of military coup and that even after the benefactors of a successful military coup had left the office, stiff penalties should be imposed on them
(Emokpae, 2001: 53).
In order to re-professionalize the military, there should be internal re-education and re-orientation of the officers and men of the Armed Forces on the role of the military within the broad spectrum of national political objectives. Similarly, there should be a defense and security policy, which should adequately address all issues relating to defense and security matters including budgetary allocation to defense/security sector. At the same time, the welfare of the Armed Forces should be well packaged in order to restrict them to the barracks to perform their constitutional duty of defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation.
The anti-democratic tendencies of the political class should not be allowed to derail the current civil politics. On its part, the civil society organizations must muster sufficient political weight to monitor the security system of the nation and
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provide necessary support needed by the civil authorities to control and checkmate the military against arbitrary incursion into the nation‘s body politic.
According to Osaghae (2010), the concept of fragile states is appropriate for characterizing problematic and troublesome states that have potential not only to self-destruct but also endanger global peace, prosperity and security. As an empirical construct, it is valid and therefore likely to remain a buzzword for sometime to come in development discourses. It does not have the ideological image and baggage of rogue state, for example, or the finality of failed or collapsed state, and bears a ‗window‘ of opportunity for redemption and strengthening, if the right diagnosis is made and appropriate medicines are applied, which is the framework within which the World Bank/ IMF and international development partners ought to be engaging fragile states. However, this conceptual logic has not been followed through for at least two reasons.
First ‗fragile states‘ remains a characterization/typological construct, and the assumption is that the pathologies of the states are inherent to deviant statehood.
But certainly, weak institutions, poverty, social inequalities, corruption, civil strife, armed conflicts and civil war, cannot be, and are not, original conditions second the failure to historicise state fragility and to assign the full weight of externalities and externally induced disarticulations has so far paved the way for wrong therapies. The tendency to ignore the local internal conceptions of state fragility and the struggles to redeem them and the preference for curtailment or possible elimination of the threat potential of fragile states (through isolation or military
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intervention or outright neglect and indifference for instance), which is the essence of the dispensability thesis advanced by Kothari and discussed earlier, misses the point about superpower complicity that can only be remedied through composite global-local action, the argument in this thesis is that the external and internal factors of fragility have to be fully interrogated if they are to get the kind of assistance and empowerment that they so clearly deserve, at least for the sake of global peace, prosperity and security, if not for that of the impoverished citizens of fragile states. But, ultimately, the responsibility for determining when states are no longer fragile is that of citizens of the countries concerned and not that of ‗benevolent‘ donors and the international development community whose motivation for supposed state-strengthening interventions is to ensure that fragile states take their ‗rightful‘ places in the hegemonic global order. The development of African perspectives of state fragility would provide a useful framework for doing this.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
AN ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY, 1999 -2007
7.0. INTRODUCTION
At the inception of democracy in 1999, people accepted the new democracy in
Nigeria with high hopes and expectations, citizens expected that one year of democracy would be better than 30 years of military dictatorship.
They expected that there would be government based on the people‘s constitution; there would be respect for human rights and people‘s freedom and liberty would be guaranteed. They also expected better economic governance resulting into better welfares for the citizens. A crisis free society was hoped for because they expected welfare for the citizens. A crisis free society was hoped for because they expected democracy to address the historical anomalies created by colonialism and military authoritarianism.However, these expectations seems utopian.
No sooner had the transition to a democratic rule been effected in May, 1999, than the new government trying to settle down was taken aback with sharia crisis that had claimed a lot of lives both in the Northern and Eastern part of the country. More to this, Northern Nigeria has become a haven of incessant conflicts between the dominant Hausa – Fulani and Minority groups canvassing for autonomy and accommodation, which suggests that paradoxically, democracy in
Nigeria has become, at best, a majoritarian tyranny against minority interests.
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Nigeria‘s fourth Republic commenced on a somewhat good note with President
Olusegun Obasanjo setting a relatively inspiring example of good governance and efficient management of the nations resources for development.
President Obasanjo‘s introduction of National Economic Empowerment and
Development Strategy (NEEDs) and working within the framework of Millennium
Development Goals Agenda, bore testimony to this. This is against the background of the rapacious manner in which the resources had been managed by his predecessors. Although, there has been some lapses, the administration has successfully overcome some of the major political and economic constraints inherited from the past military dictatorship including the promotion of human rights and rule of law and the elevation of public debates in financial matters.
However it needs be stressed that critical to good governance project is the performance record of government.
After a period of eight years in office, the performance record of the Obasanjo administration has been less than satisfactory in terms of such evaluation indices as the level of accountability, transparency, corruption and in particular what
Nigerians refer to as democracy dividends. For instance, the country is still neck- deep in corruption and in particular what Nigerians refer to as democracy dividends. For instance, the country is still neck-deep in corruption in spite of the various anti-corruption slogans including the anti-corruption bill and the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences
Commission (ICPC). Transparency International has rated the country as the
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third most corrupt nation in the world in 2004. The country was rated second in
2003. Similarly, the much clamoured democracy dividends, have been elusive as exemplified by he high level of poverty that pervades the nation with 70% living on less than one dollar a day. The underlying ethnic and religious cleavages as well as the state of insecurity which had spurned recurrent outbursts equally constitute a bane of good governance in the past eight years.
Hence certain fundamental issues inherited from its predecessors in office particularly social, ethnic and religious conflicts, the pseudo federalist structure, defective constitution and the demand for a national conference should be fundamentally resolved in order not to undermine efforts at sanitizing the polity
(Akinboye, 2002). As Dare (1995) maintains:
Just as the preceding authoritarian regimes were beset with
deep and persistent problems that undermined support for
their rulers, so too many of the countries with new democratic
governments face problems that weaken their support and
strengthen their anti-democratic opponents.
Failure on the part of the regime to resolve the national question and the enduring socio-political and economic problems that persistently afflict the nation can strengthen anti-democratic forces and evoke bitter criticisms, which may eventually provoke military intervention that could lead to calamitous outcomes.
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The study focused on documentary analysis of democracy in Nigeria between
1999 and 2007. These documents include: textbooks, journals, magazines, periodicals, government records, the internet and newspapers.
Primary data were collected using elite and in-depth interview techniques to enrich the research findings. Evidences collected were also content-analysed.
Content-analysis technique was used to analyse collected data. With content- analysis, verbal and written evidences from different interviews and historical documents were transformed from their unwieldy raw forms to a more manageable one. Five basic steps were followed in conducting the content analysis:
(i) deciding on material sample to be used for the study, that is choosing of
appropriate sampling frame as well as material for analysis from the
chosen sample frame;
(ii) determination of the categories of content for measurement of key
variables elicited from the objectives of the study and research questions;
(iii) choice of recording units ;
(iv) develop the procedure for coding the material and ;
(v) choose the quantitative measure for analyzing the data/choice of an
enumeration system for coded content (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:245).
Content-analysis technique was adopted because it reduces the free comments of respondents to as many brief statements as possible. Words or phrases were used for statements. Content-analysis technique helped us to identify substantive
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statement, high-light the key ideas and concepts, identify general patterns of variables and to explore the possibility of using such variables to analyse and interpret evidences from the administrative records.
Concepts derived from the content-analysis of the primary data were operationalized, coded, and categorized into ―themes‖ in a systematic and replicable manner‖ (Bryman, 2001:183). A coding frame numbering ―1 to 5‖ was constructed, which enable similar clearly defined concepts to be matched, analysed and explained.
Efforts were made to ensure internal consistency and coherence of the data. To achieve this, field notes were read and studied severally at the initial stage in order to have a thorough grasp and understanding of the responses as a basis for undertaking effective thematic classification of data. The reading process, especially after the second reading, entailed marking out key issues and similarities in responses which were in tandem with the objectives of the research with colour markers. Similar responses were marked with same coloured marker for ease of identification and classification.
Where it was difficult to classify themes that were too close, these themes were put off until much later for classification. Further critical analysis were undertaken in order to ensure the correct classifications of hitherto unclassified data. In this way, chances of ambiguities and unsystematic classifications were drastically reduced. Furthermore, to increase the reliability of the content- analysis, test of inter-coder reliability were conducted. To achieve inter-coder reliability using 344 Page
triangulation technique, the coding of the researcher and two other coders using the same procedures, were compared, before ―content categories or themes‖ were agreed upon based on key variables elicited from responses of the respondents (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:246; Orcher, 2005: 72). The data were further subjected to systematic and thematic analysis. Efforts were made to ensure theoretical linkages and relevance of the different themes to the social indicators of historical and political events.
7.1. MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
To measure the independent variables (democratization) and dependent variable
(sustenance of democracy), social indicators were constructed as templates/or benchmarks of assessment. The variables derived from the research questions, included:
(i) demilitarization of polity;
(ii) institution and behavioural foundation;
(iii) national consciousness and political participation of citizens;
(iv) quality of governance and ;
(v) democratic dividends and economic development.
The variables from (i) to (iv) represent the independent variables –
―democratization‖; while variable (v) represent the dependent variable –
―sustenance of democracy.‖ These variables were operationalized into social indicators, criteria and ranked on a 1 to 25 – point scale score, as follows:
1 = Very negative impact;
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5= Poor impact;
10= Fair impact;
15= Good impact;
20= Very Good and;
25= Excellent impact.
The wide range ensures a level of variability consistent with the actual events.
An indicator retains its score for the previous year if no major event took place to significantly alter its quality. Below are illustrations of the ranking of social indicators according to the evidences of historical and political events derived from the research questions:
7.2. TEST OF RESEARCH QUESTION ONE (1): WHAT ARE THE
IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARIZED POLITY AND ECONOMY ON
DEMOCRACY?
The evidences collected from the literature and content analysis of elite/in-depth interviews are represented in Table 2 and discussed:
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TABLE 2: DEMOCRATIZATION (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)
Variable Indicators Criteria Status of Ranking Percentage change (scale 1- of image (%) impacts (1999- 25) 2007) Demilitarization of Civilian Capacity building Good impact polity. supremacy over organized for on military. 15/25 60% military and professionalism. other security agents.
The human rights Respect for the Highly negative 1/25 4% abuses through human rights. impact on police, military and citizens. paramilitary units‘
brutality.
The Rule of law. The disobedience of Fair impact on 5/25 20 court orders. democratic practice.
The militarized The existence of Highly negative 1/25 4% polity. ethnic militia, for impact example, OPC, on democracy. ACF, MASSOB, MEND, etc.
The political The establishment Good impact, but orientation and of MAMSER, Basic poor result. 15/25 20 education. Election and Administration workshop , etc.
Source: Researcher’s Designed Measurement Scale 347 Page
INTERPRETATION: DELIMITARIZATION OF POLITY
The evidences from the documentary analysis showed that the effects of militarization had permeated all facets of the society and economy in terms of attitudes, beliefs, orientations, customs and actions of the new political elites who took over power from the military in 1999. There were cases of political violence, assassination of political opponents, involvement of police in election rigging and high rate of violent crimes.
Since 1999, over 50,000 have been killed in ethno-religious violence and over
80,000 displaced. In the North, an explosive growth of strident Christianity has confronted an upsurge of puritanical, reformist Islam. In the Middle Belt, the mainly Christian local farmers have collided with predominantly muslim settler herdsmen in Plateau State, requiring the president to declare a state of emergency. In the Niger Delta, new rebel groups such as the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have escalated their attacks on government and multinational installations, including the use of car bombings.
There have been a number of violent incidents linked to the elections in Akwa
Ibom and Bayelsa States. The proliferations of small arms in the country has further helped to bring violent conflict closer to the surface. Nowhere is this crisis more pronounced than the Niger Delta.
The ethnic militia groups (the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Ijaw Youths Movement) emerged in the political space, especially in the
Niger Delta Region. The cases of kidnapping spread to other geo-political zones.
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Violent crimes became widespread as a result of high rate of unemployment and under-employment. The Police brutality and human rights abuses became issues of daily occurrences. Moreover, there were cases of human rights abuses, as soldiers and police have become strangers to democratic practice.
Corruption has become the vogue in both private and public sectors of the economy, stifling socio-economic growth and development. To advance the democratic project, the Nigerian public needs to gain confidence in its institutions.
The public needs to feel that there are organs of the political system that can guarantee fairness and justice and that are not undermined by wealth through corruption. Common citizens must have recourse to democratic institutions in order to express demands and resolve conflicts. At this point, the public has little to no confidence in turning to any branch of the government to help directly resolve problems without the benefit of wealth.
These empirical facts revealed in documentary records are collaborated by analysis in table 2, thus: restoring civilian supremacy scored 60 per cent; respect for human rights scored 4 per cent; rule of law scored 20 per cent; existence of ethnic militia impacted negatively, democratic governance scored 4 per cent and political orientation and education to citizenry scored 20 per cent. These findings were supported by the views of respondents in both elite and in-depth interviews, that, ―where there are wide-spread perception of deprivation, alienation, marginalization, inequity and neglect, the resultant manifestation is violence‖. In other words, the polity has not been adequately demilitarized from military
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authoritarianism and its spill-over effect on the political class before hoisting democracy in Nigeria.
7.3. TEST OF RESEARCH QUESTION TWO (2): TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS LAY INSTITUTIONAL AND BEHAVIOURAL
FOUNDATIONS ON WHICH DEMOCRACY CAN BE SUSTAINED IN
NIGERIA?
The evidences from the documentary records analysis are shown in Table 3, below:
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TABLE 3: DEMOCRATIZATION (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)
Variable Indicators Criteria Status of change Ranking Percentage impacts (1999- (scale 1- of image (%) 2007) 25) Institutional Behaviour of Elitist or imbibed Still elitist and Fair 40% and Political elites. democratic ethno-centric (10/25 behavioural values. because of history foundation. and character of state. Political Establishment of Political education Fair education on orientation through workshops. (10/25) democracy. Agency. 40%
Repealed of Supremacy of Education through Fair military the rule of law. workshops. (8/25) 40% Decrees/Edicts.
Establishment of Existence of Repealed, but Fair independent electoral body to rule of law not (5/25) 60% electoral body. conduct election. properly observed. Preparation of Timely preparation FEDECO/NEC/ Poor electoral register of electoral INEC established (5/25) and verification. register and other but not 20% electoral matters. independent. Capacity of Delivery of Election register Poor polity to nurture election was a poorly (5/25) and sustain materials. humidly prepared 20% democratic election. values. Sustain shock Dialogue instead Very Neutrality of and pressure in of intimidation poor 4% security agents. time of and threat (1/25) tension/crisis . Colluded to rig election. Neutral role by the security agents.
Source: Researcher’s Designed Measurement Scale
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INTERPRETATION: ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL AND
BEHAVIOURAL FOUNDATION:
The evidences from the content-analysis of documentary records showed that the political actors were still elitist and parochial in democratic practice because of historical influence and the character of the state. A central concern for building democracy in Nigeria is thus to alter this relationship between the oligarchy and the citizenry, so as to reconnect the state to its citizens in a more responsible and responsive manner. Another emerging opportunity arises from the relations within the elite, where democratic institutions and practices are increasingly used for competition within the oligarchy. The starting point for democratization must thus include not only the formal democratic institutions that have been slowly progressing since 1999, but also the informal system of oligarchs and their subordinates which overlays the formal institutions of government. Since 1999, Nigeria has not yet transitioned to a legal system or political culture that can be described as fully democratic. A disconnect between the legal and political processes has been a direct consequences of the military‘s approach to governance. The result has been citizens being subject to arbitrary government officials. To move away from the extra-judicial means of pressing for political demands will require a different orientation towards respecting the rule of law regardless of who is in power. In the Fourth Republic, the documentary analysis revealed that there were challenges with the government observing the rule of law. The challenges include:
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Authoritarian, clientelistic patterns of politics with elites acting extra-legally;
Ethnic militias, some of which are growing increasingly autonomous of
their former politician masters;
Biases in the electoral system, especially the state commissions;
Poor executive respect of legislative and judicial constitutional
prerogatives, especially in budgetary matters;
Weak lower-level judiciary;
Endemic police corruption encouraged from the highest levels and in
response to the lack of proper compensation of the police force as well as
civil servants;
The lack of a proper independent judiciary, especially the lower courts;
A lack of adequate human rights safeguards in the enforcement of law
and;
Confused roles of federal and state enforcement agencies.
In spites of these problems confronting democracy in the Fourth Republic, there were positive trends revealed. They are:
Increasing active judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court and federal
appellate courts. The Supreme court and Federal Courts of Appeal are
clearly emerging as islands of integrity in what is commonly viewed as a
bleak judicial landscape;
Growing budgetary capacity at the National Assembly;
Normalization of the Sharia system in the North and;
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Increasing civil society – particularly women‘s groups – utilization of Sharia
Codes to extend human rights protections and to force improved social
policies.
Thus, the rule of law as a factor fairly impacted on the political space and scored
40 per cent. Moreover, there was no adequate political education to the political actors and electorates, even though, there were established institutions such as: the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), the Independent Electoral
Commission (INEC) and the repealed of military Decrees and Edicts. Election registers were poorly and hurriedly prepared, with little and no room for verification. In terms of status of change, it scored 20 per cent. In a democracy, dialogue is the norm, but it never happened. Rather, there were cases of political violence, intimidation of opposition and even assassination of political opponents.
In the period under consideration, it scored 20 per cent. Finally, the security agents scored poorly because they conspired with the ruling parties to rig election.
Hence, the role of security agents negatively impacted on democratic governance in Nigeria, with a score of 4 per cent. All these factors conspired to put the economy in bad shape with internal and external debts and suffocating service fees. The infrastructural facilities in health, education and agricultural sectors were almost out of extinction. The state treasury was looted, as new political elites that emerged alleged that they met empty treasuries, especially at the State level of governance. No capacity-building for administrative and civil
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services. There were lack of modern facilities, (biometric capturing machines, electronic voting machine, and so on), that would ensure free and fair election and no effective measure to combat corruption.
Furthermore, political leaders that emerged in the democratic space had no ideology, ideas or programmes for nation-building. Problems confronting Nigeria in her pursuit of liberal democratic goals, such as: economic growth, poverty alleviation and bridging of the gap between aspirations for technological and the limited managerial capacity for achieving them were not pro-actively addressed.
The capacity utilization of manufacturing sector was low. The character of the state in terms of socio-economic relations made it impossible for equitable distribution of material resources to the citizens. The state is characterized by class interests. Nigeria is a peripheral capitalist country by global standard. As such, the state exists to defend, sustain and promote the interests of the class or alliance of classes that own the decisive means of production and distribution of material resources to members of the society.
Hence, mass poverty abound because of the exploitative relationship that exists between political elites and the citizens. The documentary evidences showed that virtually all social and economic infrastructures collapsed, coupled with energy crisis, which made the economy prostrate (Abiola and Olaopa, 2008:30), because the political elites exploit and appropriate resources made to the citizens for their interests. There were also reported cases of widespread looting of government treasuries, misappropriation, unprecedented capital flight (Abiola and
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Olaopa, 2008:31), occasioned by authoritative mis-allocation of resources. The mindsets of politicians as elections drew near was to align to a political godfather, raise private militia to do electoral battle, assassinate political opponents, rig election, cause electoral violence and snatch ballot boxes.
Hence, democratization process in Nigeria during the period of study did not lay adequate institutional and behavioural foundation on which democracy could be sustained. Furthermore, the content-analysis of responses of interviewees in
(Elite and In-depth interview) supported the above findings. The majority of respondents believed that ―the geo-political (ethno-regional) mappings of Nigeria, allocated double land mass to the Northern region, hence, they had more numerical strength in any election results‖. Other opinion from respondents claimed that ―political struggle witnessed in 1960 to 1966 for control of political power at the federal level, which is still witnessed in political divide between
North and South, is consequences of ethno-regional mapping‖. The study agreed with both positions that the struggle for the spoils of national political power has promoted mutual political suspicion, parochial partisan politics, religious bigotry and ethnic politics in democratic governance.
7.4. TEST OF RESEARCH QUESTION THREE (3): HOW HAS THE
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS AFFECTED THE LEVEL OF NATIONAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE CITIZENS?
The evidences from the documentary analysis are represented in Table 4, below:
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TABLE 4: DEMOCRATIZATION (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)
Variable Indicators Criteria Status of change Ranking Percentage of impacts (1999- (scale 1- image (%) 2007) 25) National Political education Orientation to Poor Poor 20% consciousness and to the electorates. democratic orientation of impact political values and political actors (5/25). and participation. practice. electorates on
democratic practice.
Good 60% Voters Increase in Increase in impact registration. registered citizens (15/25). voters/vote participation. cast.
Regularity of Election Election held Good 60% election. held every 4 every 4 (four) impact (four) years. years. (15/25).
Power change. Peace or Election held Highly violent. every 4 (four) negative 4% years. impact (1/25).
Stakeholders‘ Respect for Violent and Highly involvement in oppositions crisis-ridden negative democratic and citizens elections. impact 4% governance. contributions. (1/25). Opposition intimidated, Negative 20% harassed and impact assassinated. (5/25).
No respect to negotiated agreements and bad governance.
Source: Researcher’s Designed Measurement Scale
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INTERPRETATION: NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND POPULAR
PARTICIPATION
The evidences from the content-analysis of documentary records showed that though transition to democracy opened up hitherto closed political space, it is still highly exclusive and elitist in nature. This is because parochial or primordial interests still pervade the political space. Political elites from rural and urban centres could not unite for nation-building, as sectional interests and ethnic politics dominated the political space. Democracy is not yet participatory, as only the few political elites who amassed wealth illegally during military dictatorship could afford to take active part in politics. The documentary analysis of Nigeria‘s democratic experience has revealed certain problems. They include:
Elite and class nature of politics: poor Nigerians excluded from substantive
involvement;
Undemocratic political parties in terms of observing internal democracy;
―Sit-tight‖ incumbency syndrome;
Settler-indigene conflicts over problematic citizenship laws and;
Youth exclusion and hopelessness due to unemployment. The majority of
the youths impoverished and disenfranchised from the political process,
which has contributed to deep anger to the system and consequential
criminality and violence.
However, there are positive trends emerging in the polity, such as:
Civil society groups rebuilding and growing in political importance;
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Increasing political participation of women, particulary key government
offices;
Introduction of Sharia in the North has had the counter-intuitive effect of
enabling women to use the law to seek to better their lot.
Collaborating these findings with the indicators confirms the research questions.
Thus, though, the electorates participated during elections from 1999 to 2007, valid votes cast often stood lower than the total registered votes. For instance, a comparative analysis of the 1999 and 2003 presidential elections showed increase in civilian participation from 29,484.441 to 42,018,735 (INEC, 1999).
Table 4 showed that increase in popular participation of citizens was scored 60 per cent. Elections were held every four years, which was scored 60 per cent. In spite of this, popular participation was still elitist in nature. Participation of stakeholders – civil society, academics, professional groups, youths and women were not yet fully involved in democratic governance. This was because of the poor political orientation of electorates, as it recorded 20 per cent. The control of power at the centre has continued to create divisions among political elites as to who governs. Ethnicity and religious bigotry became the basis for the control of power at the centre. Hence, political violence borne out of frustration became the norm of democratic governance (Anifowose,1982). Opposition parties and political actors suffered intimidation, harassment, assault and in the extreme assassinations, as witnessed between 1999 to 2007, for examples : Mr Odunayo
Olagbaju, a member of Osun State House of Assembly, murdered on December
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21, 2001; Senatorial Candidate, under the ANPP in Imo State, murdered in
February, 2003; Chief Harry Marshall murdered on March 5, 2003; Chief Kala
Dikibo, National Vice-Chairman, PDP South-South Nigeria (Arowosegbe, cited in
Onu and Momoh, 2005:255). Hence, respect for opposition recorded 4 per cent.
In some cases negotiated agreements were reneged, such as: the cases of the
Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and the Federal government on the salary review and minimum wage on one hand; and the Academic Staff Union of
Universities (ASUU) and Federal government, over improvement on remunerations and infrastructural development. On each occasion, agreements were reneged by the federal government. This led to what brought national strikes and loss of man-hour by public and private sector organizations. The respect for negotiated agreements was scored 20 per cent, as it negatively impacted on industrial peace in the country.
The content-analysis of responses of majority of respondents interviewed (Elite and In-depth interview) showed that ―democratic norms and values that uphold democratic governance were yet to be imbibed by political elites, as political violence, ballot snatching, ballot stuffing, election rigging, violence against opposition and thuggery, dominated the polity in 1999, 2003 and 2007 general elections‖.
All these factors had conspired to promote apathy among the electorates and discouraged popular participation by the electorates in democratic governance.
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7.5. TEST OF RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR (4): TO WHAT EXTENT HAS
NIGERIA’S POLITICAL ELITES IMBIBED DEMOCRATIC VALUES FOR
QUALITY GOVERNANCE?
The evidences from the documentary analysis are represented in Table 5, below:
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TABLE 5: DEMOCRATIZATION (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)
Variable Indicators Criteria Status of change Ranking Percentage Percenta of Image impacts(1999-2007) (scale 1-25) ge of (%)
image (%)
Poor (1/25) Quality of Executive quality Service-oriented Mass poverty, 4%
Governance. of administration. that empowers unemployment and Poor (1/25). 4% citizens. poor human
Consultation with conditions.
optical Poor (1/25). 4% 4% Poor (1/25). stakeholders. Involvement of
Transparency. stakeholders in 4% 4% Ethics and policy formulation Poor (1/25).
Legislative Good accountability. and mplementation. 60% quality of Bills passed that (15/25). 4%
administration. 4% 60% impact on Integrity and Good 4% citizens. honesty in (15/25). 60% Responsive to governance. 4% constituencies Highly
interests. negative 60%
Transparency and Poor performance impact 40%
efficient over-sight Poor response to (1/25). 4%
functions. constituency‘s
Constitution fully in interests. Fair (10/25).
Judicial quality of operation. Poorly executed 40% administration. Independence of programmes. judiciary. Constitution fully in Judicial corruption operation. present. Independence of judiciary.
Executive and Corruption present. legislative Legal obedience to court interpretations fair. orders. Source: Researcher’s Designed Measurement Scale 362 Page
INTERPRETATION: QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE
The evidences from the content-analysis of documentary records showed that quality of governance in the three arms of government did not impact on the citizens. Both the Executive and the Legislative arms of government performed poorly. In the Executive arm, people-oriented policies were not formulated or implemented. There were mass poverty and unemployment in all segments of the society.
Results from the documentary analysis have shown that there are problems confronting democracy on good governance. They include:
Corruption is endemic in the political system;
Growing public frustration over the lack of a ―democracy dividend‖. Issues
of critical concern to public–poverty, unemployment, health and education
– remain largely unaddressed by government at any level;
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission(EFCC) and other critical
agencies are seen as politicized and;
Persistent oil dependency.
However, there are positive trends emerging from democratic governance. They include:
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Rising role and assertiveness of the National Assembly;
Growing impact of macro-economic reforms and public sector reforms,
although the public is not expected to feel much impact for another three
to five years;
The EFCC, although politicized, has moved the anti-corruption agenda
forward, and forced dormant agencies like the Independent Corrupt
Practices and other Related offences Commission (ICPC) and the Code of
Conduct Bureau to reform in order to be relevant and;
The media is playing an important role in scrutinizing the actions of public
figures, but it remains impoverished and susceptible to influence.
This documentary analysis is supported by measures from constructed indices.
Thus, in Table 5, measurement for service-oriented policies that could empower the citizens scored 4 per cent. Lack of integrity and honesty in government also recorded 4 per cent.
General performance for the period between 1999 and 2007, was scored 4 per cent. Legislative arm did not fair better as bills passed could not impact on the citizens.
Moreover, responsiveness to constituencies needs was poor. Both indices scored 4 per cent. In the judiciary, the Constitution is fully operational and independence of judiciary guaranteed. However, there have been reported cases of corruption and abuse of office by judicial officers. This negatively impacted on citizens, as they believe that the arm of government is the only hope 364 Page
of citizens. This is because the success or otherwise of electoral practice in a democracy depends to a very great extent on the performance of the country‘s judicial system, especially the manner in which electoral litigations are handled by election tribunals, charged with the task of hearing and determining various election petitions emanating from the conduct of all the elections. However, in terms of obedience to court orders and the rule of law by executive and legislative arms of government, the judiciary was able to perform fairly well. It scores 40 per cent in the scale of measurement.
Majority of respondents expressed the view that ―judicial officers should be the last hope of the common man.‖ They were shocked with the 2003 general elections that generated a lot of legal tussles between the declared winners and declared losers over allegations and counter-allegations of electoral malpractices/forgeries that occurred. The way and manner election tribunals prosecuted most of the cases, amounted to almost eroded the sanctity of democracy and credibility of electoral tradition, they were meant to protect or uphold. These opinions were collaborated by many observers of the post-2003 general election tribunals. According to Omelle, (2005: 77):
there were proven cases of bribery, cover-ups
and arm-twisting that took place, while election
tribunal lasted, involving very high Federal,
State, and most disturbing, not excluding strong
allegations of bribery against some members of
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the Supreme courts, eroded public confidence
in the country‘s judiciary.
While the literature on civil society emphasises the pressures from organised non-state opposition groups, the transition paradigm places emphasis on the role of the political elites, their interests, negotiations and pacts that usher in political liberation. In the transition paradigm, significant attention is paid to the interests and role of the military elite, especially in the works on Latin America. However, remarkably little attention has been paid to the military dimensions of democratization process in Africa, yet even here the institutional ills of the military and the problem of civil-military relations is no less significant for the sustenance of democracy (Hutchful, 1998:599).
The need to pay serious attention to the military question as it relates to democracy and good governance is particularly significant for Nigeria for two reasons. The first is the rapid increase in the number of inter- communal conflicts buttressed in some instance by sub-nationalism and religion. The second of these is the question of welfare as poverty continues to increase contrary to popular expectation that democracy will bring about improvement in the well being of the average Nigerian (Anifowose and Aiyede, 2004:40-41). Though
President Obasanjo disputed the view by the World Bank and other international agencies that Nigeria‘s poverty level stands at about 70%, the poverty profile of most Nigerians remain frightening (The Guardian, November 11, 2004). In both cases, the country faces the possibility of a breakdown in social cohesion and
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erosion of commitment to democracy. This trajectory of development raises a serious concern about the possibility of a return to military rule. Indeed, in the early life of the Obasanjo presidency, a motion was moved in the Senate calling for a military pact with the United States against military incursion, underscoring the fear that the military may yet strike. Against these backdrops, the thesis examines the challenge of deepening democracy in Nigeria while ensuring that the use of power in public affairs is such that gives premium to human development and political accountability. It explores the peculiar challenges of the military as an important and essential institution with its own culture that poses for governance and democracy. It argues that Nigeria needs to effectively deal with issues concerning civilian control, military efficiency and capacity as well as the impact of military culture on democratic governance. The issues have been given a particular salience by the nature of the Nigerian State, economic and social conditions and the Nigeria‘s military role in the West Africa sub-region and beyond.
The main thesis in this chapter is that, fifty years after independence, the most critical issues in the country‘s leadership question should be earnestly resolved.
These include: the urgent need for the actualization of the country‘s visions; the need to create a sense of mission in the generality of the people by exciting them; the need to inspire and awaken them from their slumber by transforming the economy; the urgent need to ensure that those in authority do not serve themselves alone but the people too; the need to curb corruption and promote transparency and probity, and institute people‘s confidence in their government.
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In addition, there is an urgent need for the leaders to develop a clear sense of right and wrong, promote equity and social justice, manage conflicts and generally pursue sustainable development to promote public good (Yagboyaju,
2010).
Disturbingly, the country‘s ten-year democratization, which commenced amidst great expectations and hope, is yet to lay a solid foundation for the actualization of all the goals stated above, not to mention consolidating them. In order not to relapse into its unenviable past, especially under the military, the Nigerian political system should, in our opinion, be reorganised in such a way that real political powers would be located at the community level. Primarily, this means that genuine political leaders, who must be selfless and daring, must first be discovered, preferably at the grass roots level. Obviously, this should ensure a process whereby each community can indentify and properly relate with its leader. One important net effect of this is that the fast growing bottom-up approach to governance and nation-building can also be adopted in Nigeria through this method. In addition, intellectuals and professionals that are still engaged or retired, and civil society organizations should engage more in governance and public affairs in general. More importantly, a people-oriented constitution with Nigeria‘s indigenous leadership values should be fashioned out.
While the final product should reflect the peculiarities of the different entities in the country, these can be harnessed by the joint efforts of the selfless leaders, from different backgrounds, at the national level. Finally, it should be noted that
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this move requires discipline, dedication and encouragement in form of support from the generality of the citizenry.
This thesis has examined the issues of ethics and accountability in the Nigerian civil service since independence. Apart from analyzing the theoretical basis of ethics and accountability, the thesis has achieved its objectives, analysed cases of ethical misconduct and accountability and appraised government-established institutional monitoring mechanisms since independence. The conclusion drawn from this analysis and appraisal is that government and its institutions cannot fight corruption alone. Corruption is a multi-faceted social phenomenon. The fight against corruption should be collective, involving families, churches, mosques, civil society, press, traditional rulers and the judiciary. The role of the press and civil society is most important. The established monitoring institutions should not be allowed to fight it alone (Eneanya, 2010).
To minimise corruption and unethical behavior at all level requires, among others, a strong political will and commitment; reform of the bureaucracy; alleviation of poverty by paying workers fairly; and alerting a vigilant civil society on the need to support government programmes. Ethical behaviour, transparency and accountability should be entrenched in the civil service. This is not yet the case in post-independence Nigeria, where political and administrative executives have thrown ethical behaviour and accountability to the wind.
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What is, therefore, urgently needed to move Nigeria forward after fifty one years of independence is an open government, where discipline, social justice, transparency, morality, integrity, probity and accountability reign supreme.
Corruption in Nigeria‘s political history has impacted so much negatively on our national development. This is because this hydra-headed monster called corruption, combined with rent-seeking, has led to the production and reproduction of a very weak public bureaucracy and a politically weak state. The weakness of the public service is indeed telling on all spheres of our national life- lack of stable electricity, running inflation, high cost of foodstuff, weak agricultural sector, failed manufacturing sector, weak legislative arms and politically ruling elite. In this thesis, we have argued severally that the quest for materialism in the nation‘s civil service and government circles is indeed responsible for the problem of corruption in Nigeria today, and this culture is better exemplified by the culture of ―Ghana Must Go.‖ We also argued that the political economy of accumulation in Nigeria is predicated on primitive accumulation of capital, which makes it impossible for the productive forces like the manufacturing industry to have a proper take-off. This is why Nigeria finds it difficult to run a corrupt-free government and as well conduct a free and fair general election (Adisa, 2010).
In many respects, the broadcast media have grown enormously since their debut in Nigeria in 1932. Recognising the role of the mass media in national development, Nigerian constitutions have since independence been assigning the press the responsibility of making the government accountable to the
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citizenry. Government too has been using the media as an agent of mobilization and creation of awareness when the need arises. The press, in the performance of its watchdog role, occasionally clashes with government agents (Sunday,
2010).
Unfortunately, the Nigerian media have not been given a conducive environment to operate. Apart from the constitutional provisions affecting the freedom of the press, there are frequent incidences of harassment of journalists by security agents, threats to life and outright killing of journalists in Nigeria.
These problems will, no doubt, affect the journalists in the performance of their watchdog role and hinder their contributions to the overall growth and development of Nigeria. For, in the view of Akinfeleye (1995), one thing that is very clear is that effective governance in any society is built on a solid communication network, whether in a democracy or under the military. Therefore, an effective mass media system is always central to meaningful, peaceful and sustainable democracy.
Based on the fact that rent-seeking stifles government efforts at improving the standards of living of the ordinary citizenry and facilitating economic growth for sustainable development, the following recommendations are hereby made:
Nigerian governments at all levels need to reduce the over-bloated public
bureaucracy ;
The Federal Government should strengthen existing M and E (Monitoring
and Evaluation) in government ministries; 371 Page
There is a need for radical Value re-orientation at all levels of government
and the Nigerian society at large;
A special commission needs to be established to deal with graft in the
conduct of elections so as to strengthen the nation‘s democracy;
Weak public institutions should be re-organised or privatised for efficiency;
Governments at all levels should be focus on the bidding process in their
ministries, parastatals, units, etc and;
Anti-graft agencies must sharpen their focus on bribery between civil
servants and multinational corporations. By doing this, we would be able
to uncover new networks of rent seeking in the public sector.
Politics in Nigeria, as advanced in this thesis, has assumed the new meaning of
―polling tricks.‖ The political history and the theoretical explanation examined reveal that though the colonial legacies have a telling effect on the aftermath of
Nigeria‘s independence, the situation is deepened by the fact that at the threshold of independence, the 1959 election was fiercely contested because the three major parties were aware that it would determine the political balance of power at independence. This distrust, coupled with the political crises in the
Western Region and the Middle Belt, eventually put an end to the First Republic
(Abdul-Wasi, 2010).
Be that as it may, the military legacy has bestowed on Nigeria an authoritarian political culture. The struggle for power and consolidation of same on the part of the political elite, more often than not, have helped to exacerbate violence in the 372 Page
state, because, as alluded to earlier, political office seekers see violence in itself as a viable tool for achieving political relevance. This, in no small way, has retarded democratic consolidation in the country, with a backlash effect on the whole process of development, stifled the growth of the democratic culture, as well as encouraged bribery, corruption and gangesterism within the political terrain.
However, for democracy to thrive, the institution of justice must be strengthened, our economy should be improved; education and employment should be given prominence in our national policy; our security machinery should be overhauled and strengthened. Really, all these are possible if there is political will and attitudinal change on the part of the political elite, which, it is hoped, will permeate all strata of our political life. For, Nigerians cannot afford to compromise democratic consolidation which already is being frustrated in the country.
Nigeria‘s post-independence history has been characterized by a crisis of national integration. The serious tension in interethnic relations has not contributed to the deepening of integration in the country (Obiyan, 2010). While
Nigerian leaders put in place a federal arrangement to minimize interethnic conflict and create unity in diversity, the operation of the Nigerian state has limited the ability of the federal structure to serve as a solution to the problem of diversity in Nigeria. To be relevant in addressing the problem of diversity in the
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country, some reforms would be necessary. These reforms have been discussed in this thesis.
Capitalism in Nigeria, like many other countries in Africa, has a different coloration from what obtain elsewhere because of the way colonialism began in
Africa. Thus, instead of instituting an integrated economy, capitalism and colonialism fostered disarticulated and non-complementary economy, thereby engendering incoherent social classes. Consequently, instead of normal class stratification, ethnicity was tacitly enshrined in the Nigerian political system.
Hence, rather than have nationalistic dominant classes, what obtain in the country are ethnic-based dominant classes which use ethnicity as a springboard to attaining state‘s power (Adilieje and Ekwenugo, 2010).
Thus, state power has become the centre of attraction and the surest means to capital accumulation, thereby making politics intense and the struggle for state power among the ethnic-based elite pervasive. The results is violence, and those trained for such usually emerged victorious as soon as civility is divested from politics; hence the frequent cases of military intervention in Nigerian politics.
Nigeria‘s renewed experiment with democratic rule has not resolved the various challenges of power and politics in the heterogeneous country. These problems have increased and manifested in numerous forms, including the proliferation of ethnic militia groups making various demands on the state, with the rising level of violence associated with their activities. Palliative measures directed towards the resolution of the problems include, for example, the inauguration of the Oputa 374 Page
panel to hear cases of injustice meted out to individuals and groups between
1966 and 1999; state and local government creation exercise; National Political
Reforms Conference (NPRC); war against corruption; and the establishment of
ICPC, EFCC, etc.; have not and may not resolve the challenges of class and ethnic nationalism in Nigeria.
As evident in the operations of Nigeria‘s democratic experiment, the political framework is hardly the desired elixir for class and ethnic nationalism in Nigeria.
It may, however, provide the basis for the interrogation of the existing framework and the establishment of the fundamental tools for their resolution. For, class struggle elsewhere is between the exploiter and the exploited. But in Nigeria, the exploited class is drawn into an intra-elite class struggle masking itself as ethnic nationalism. Thus, instead of waging war against the exploiter class, the exploited class is wrongly mobilised and confused into waging ethnic wars by the exploiter class. In such a situation, the consciousness of the oppressive role of the exploiter class and all it represents becomes impossible. For example, the
NLC, which should have been the champion of the masses, cannot effectively mobilise them through the formation of a revolutionary party whose sole aim is nothing but to capture state power and gradually abolish social classes and consequently, ethnic nationalism.
The Above analysis of the constitutional and political parameters of interaction between federalism and the conduct of Nigeria‘s external affairs suggests that
Wheare‘s hypothesis that ―federation and a spirited foreign policy go ill-together‖
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and that ―happy is the federation that has no diplomatic history‖ (Wheare, 1963:
183-6) lacks universal validity. This is to the extent that it ignores the relevance of two critical variables that have a decisive bearing on whether, or the extent to which, the federal nature of a political system creates difficulties for the conduct of a country‘s foreign policy and management of its external affairs. One variable is the form of federalism, particularly as revealed in the specific constitutional allocation of responsibilities for the whole gamut of the country‘s foreign relations and external transactions. The other is the extent to which the governing political party or institution through which political processes operate has been able to interpenetrate and therefore link the ―central‖ and the ―regional‖ political arenas, thus facilitating intergovernmental consultation and co-operation even in fields where both authorities have well-defined legislative responsibilities for governing the same group of people (Bolarinwa, 2010).
By and large, then, federalism as a constitutional system of government has not hamstrung the conduct of Nigeria‘s external relations, despite the ―irritations‖ which the politically strong regional governments caused between 1960 and
1966. A critical indicator of a successful marriage of federalism and foreign policy is provided by the constitutional provision for the implementation of treaties exclusively contracted by the federal government. It is absolutely necessary to ensure that the central government in a federation is not given the opportunity to encroach on the legislative fields of the regional (state) governments through the back door which federal competence to legislate for the implementation of treaties provides. The possibility of this happening is especially high where
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certain legislative powers are exclusively given to the component units of a federation. In a federal political system which aims at striking a reasonably stable equilibrium between unity and diversity, it is absolutely essential that foreign policy, indeed any public policy, should not be made to appear to reflect consistently the interests of some component units of the political community and therefore engender persistent resentment from the other units.
As for federal pressures on foreign policy during the last four decades of various governments, especially the military era, all that need be said is that they were situationally irrelevant. Under the praetorian political order from 1966 to 1979 and
1983 to 1999, foreign policy issues have had no ―state‖ or ―regional‖ constituencies. The conduct of the country‘s external relations has, therefore, been largely carried on outside the framework of any federal-state controversies which might exist.
Over the past fifty one years, Nigeria has emerged from a relatively obscure position under colonial domination to a major power in international affairs. This position, as well as the commitment underpinning it, has been expressed more forcefully in the defence of Africa which, in co-operation with other countries within the continent and in the Diaspora, has helped in keeping alive the pan-
African idea. From its first international assignment of peacekeeping in the Congo and the subsequent ones in chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d‘lvoire, to its active involvement in various ways in the struggle against colonialism in Southern Africa, Nigeria has demonstrated its will, ability and
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commitment to maintaining peace across Africa. The country has also demonstrated its resolve for the promotion of economic, political and diplomatic cohesion in Africa by helping to establish and continuing its support for
ECOWAS, the OAU, now African Union (AU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) through its commitment of oil resources, political and diplomatic tactics (Ojo,
2010).
Nigeria‘s commitment of its oil resources, economic aid and military capability to the pursuit of these laudable foreign policy objectives has not only promoted and secured peace and security regionally, continentally and globally, but also confirmed the country‘s status as an important actor in global politics. The major concern in this thesis, however, is the observable trend of Nigeria‘s greater commitment of its economic resources and military capability potentials to certain foreign policy goals to the neglect of the country‘s domestic responsibilities of nation-building and promotion of the citizens‘ welfare and human security issues.
The policymakers and executors of Nigeria‘s foreign policy have been committed to responding to demands, pressures and influences from the external environment to contribute to regional and continental peacekeeping. They also need to respond appropriately to domestic pressures from the citizens and inhabitants for improved standard of living and sustenance of human security.
The purpose of writing this thesis will be incomplete if some policy options are not suggested. First, there is need to diversify Nigeria‘s economic base through proactive measures, which include, but are not limited to, investment in other
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sectors of the economy and infrastructural development. Diversification of the economic base would serve as a resistance to effects of fluctuation in the global price of petroleum on the Nigerian economy and indeed promote Nigeria‘s pursuit of a coherent, stable and pragmatic foreign policy. Second, there is also the need to strategise the formulation and implementation of Nigeria‘s foreign policy with a view to accommodating the vigorous pursuit of foreign policy objectives that invariably promote the country‘s numerous social, political, economic and other domestic demands and pressures. It is the neglect of these foundational and fundamental domestic structures and demands by the citizens of this virile, influential regional power and an important international actor called Nigeria that is partly responsible for the pockets of ethno religious crises and youth restiveness of the last one decade. Third, and finally, Nigeria‘s foreign policy should be targeted at countries or regions with potential or apparent opportunities as returns on the spent resources for the perceived altruistic policies. This policy orientation would enable Nigeria to separate permanent interests from the issues of friends or foes, good or bad and emotional or irrational policies. The basis of a country‘s existence is its domestic environment; therefore, the foreign policy goal of any staid country should be the prompting, promotion and sustenance of its domestic base.
7.6. CONCLUSION
In specific language, political leaders that managed the affairs of the state between 1999 and 2007 did not perform in terms of the quality of governance.
Many of the challenges of nation-building facing Nigeria, such as: the tasks of
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establishing political stability and socio-economic development are still awaiting solutions. This is a challenge to democracy and democratic consolidation in
Nigeria.
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Consolidation in Nigeria‖, in S. O. Akinboye and M. M. Fadakinte (eds.). Fifty
Years of Nationhood? State, Society and Politics in Nigeria (1960-2010).
Published for Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos by Concept Publications Limited, Lagos.
Adilieje, C. and Ekwenugo, S. (2010). ―Class and Ethnic Nationalism in Nigeria‖, in S. O. Akinboye and M. M. Fadakinte (eds.). Fifty Years of Nationhood? State,
Society and Politics in Nigeria (1960-2010). Published for Department of Political
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE SUSTENANCE OF NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY
8.0. INTRODUCTION
The political landscape of Nigeria has undergone a dramatic transformation since independence in 1960. Nigeria has spent most of the fifty-one years since independence struggling with political, social and economic failure. Repeated attempts to sustain and consolidate democratic government have faltered. The resurgence of ethnic and religious conflict all over the country has once again fuelled pessimism concerning not only the future of democracy in Nigeria, but also the existence of Nigeria as a political entity. The way the Nigerian government resolves these challenges will determine whether Nigeria‘s fledgling democracy is transient or sustainable and more importantly whether Nigeria disintegrates or reconfigures itself as a nation-state. In the light of this, the chapter attempts to assess how democracy in Nigeria has been sustained, leading to political stability and economic development.
8.1. INSTITUTIONALIZING AND CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
It is generally accepted that the years of military involvement in politics negatively impacted on military professionalism. The Military Armed Forces treat Civilian
Authorities with disdain and find it difficult to respect democratic institutions. Yet, both professionalism and loyalty of the armed forces to democratic authorities are induces of sustenance of democracy.
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Scholars have identified two typologies of civilian control of the military, namely: objective or liberal and subjective or penetration (Huntington, 1957, Nordlinger,
1977, Anifowose, 2002).
The liberal mechanism is best adumbrated by western democracies in which there exists a clear distinction between military and civilian control of the military and this is achieved in several ways. In the first instance, the military is kept out of politics and thus subordinated to civilian leaders who are accountable to the people directly or through an assembly. Secondly, while the military is required to provide input in form of advice and as well implement defence policy, the formulation of policy in the realm of defene is to be the sole responsibility of the civilian authority. Thirdly, there exists strict political neutrality within the military as a means of ensuring its loyalty to the governance of the day, irrespective of the political party that constitutes the government (Anifowose, 2002: 84).
The subjective or penetration method on the other hand employs the systematic and thorough-going politicization which has been achieved in varying degrees in dictatorial or one party state under the institutional penetration mechanism, civilian control of the military is maintained through a level of inter-penetration between the armed forces and the party.
To a large extent, the liberal or objective control of the military has been the better option. As Huntington observes, the objective civilian control of the military officers, the latter, he surmises, have realized that the sustained involvement in politics by the military has had disastrous ramifying effect on the efficiency, 386 Page
coherence and discipline of the armed forces (Huntington, 1995:13). Thus, subordination of the military to civilian authorities is therefore, better achieved through the liberal or objective mechanism.
The contention, therefore is that the military should be subordinated to civil authority is predicated on the premise that the military is an arm of the state and an important tool of state policy. Hence, it is to serve as a potent instrument of political authorities which has the constitutional right to determine its use
(Emokpae, 2001:46).
However, loyalty and subordination of the military professionalism require changes in structure and organization of the army; re-orientation, re-socialization and re-training. Moreover, democratic consolidation requires good governance which in Nigeria presently requires the restructuring of the federation to boost citizens participation in the polity, transparency and sustenance of democracy will also require the development of a virile civil society organizations that would serve as countervailing forces to curb the excesses of democratic authorities.
Another move to lay an institutional foundation for the sustenance of democracy was the announcement of President Olusegun Obasanjo in October, 1999 of ―the compulsory retirement of all forces of the Nigerian Armed forces who tasted political power or served in state political position during the years of military rule‖
(Olurode and Anifowose, 2004:112).
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8.2. CORRUPTION
On corruption and sustenance of democracy, the retired generals who are actively involved in party politics now constitute a group of the ―richest citizens‖ because of the perceived expropriation from the state treasury, this would make the fight against corruption very difficult making it impossible for citizens to enjoy the dividends of good governance can be summed up to comprise the rule of law, accountability and responsibility. These would make the army to play its constitutional role as well as desired re-professionalism. However good governance is relative.
8.3. ROLE OF LABOUR UNIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
In addition, the development of a virile society including labour unions and professional associations will help to sustain and protect democracy to the point where the civil society becomes the vanguard of democratic order. Once that level is attained, the loyalty of the army will be taken for granted; and their commitment will shift to their constitutional role of the defense of sovereignty.
8.4. GOOD GOVERNANCE
Thus, good governance, becomes an imperative to sustenance of democracy.
Good governance implies meeting the peoples needs, investment in human capital and the promotion of citizens participation in the policy, promoting safety and security and promoting the human dignity.
The chapter argues that professionalization of the military and engendering of good governance by the civil authority are the keys to addressing the 388 Page
fundamental issues of creating a stable and an enduring political order. While professionalization will facilitate civilian control of the military and maximize its professional skills, good governance, which is predicated on transparency, accountability, popular participation and rule of law will enhance the legitimacy of the state and eliminate military incursion into politics. To engender good governance, therefore, there is the need to develop and strengthen the institution of democracy, including the legislature, executive, judiciary, political parties, security forces and the press.
The democratization process involves the domination of the political and economic space by the citizens, with a view to evolving participatory governance and benevolent state rather than the social groups behind the state policies.
These policies should emerge in the context of popular debates, consultation, and dialogue. The question is: to what extent has the political environment produced democratic dividends and economic development?
8.5. TEST OF RESEARCH QUESTION FIVE (5): TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT PRODUCED DEMOCRATIC DIVIDENDS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT?
The evidences from the documentary analysis are represented in Table 6, below:
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TABLE 6: SUSTENANCE OF DEMOCRACY (DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
Variable Indicators Criteria Status of Ranking Percentage of Change (Scale 1- Image (%) Impacts 25) (1999-2007) Democratic Government Efficiency and Fair impact 10/25% 40% dividends and legitimacy. effectiveness in the (10/25) economic use of resources. on development. democracy.
Improvement in participation of civil Fair impact the standard of society in sustaining (10/25) 10/25 40% living of good governance. on citizens. democracy.
Respect for Civic education of human rights. citizens and Poor impact leaders. (5/25) 5/25 20% on democracy.
Respect of Empowerment of Fair impact 10/25 40% electoral laws. citizens from (10/25) poverty and on deprivation. democracy.
Opposition Human Highly 1/25 4% accepting rights negative election verdict. abuses. impact (1/25) on democracy.
Tension in the Electoral Fair impact 1/25 4% polity. malpractices and (10/25) fraud. on democracy. Law and order. Equity and Poor impact fairness (5/25) 10/25 40% Political on violence. democracy.
Regularity of Crisis and insecurity elections. of lives. Good impact 5/25 20% ` (15/25) on democracy. Capability to Successful withstand transition from 15/25 60% pressure or civilian to civilian. shock without abandoning electoral process.
Nationalism and patriotism. 5/25 20% Source: Researcher’s Designed Measurement Scale 390 Page
INTERPRETATION: DEMOCRATIC DIVIDENDS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
The evidences from the content-analysis of the documentary records showed that the votes of the electorates and their rights were not respected, bringing to question government legitimacy with the election results. Table 6 above shows the measurement from indices constructed.
Thus, measurement of civil society in checking good governance was scored 40 per cent. The relevance of civil society to democratic survival cannot be over- emphasized. Civil society can make demands for particular needs on the state and then try to mediate as fairly as possible to benefit the common good of society at large. Civil society organizations engage in public advocacy, analyze policy issues, mobilize constituencies in support of policy dialogue, serve as watchdogs of government performance, and act as agents of reform in strengthening democratic governance. Thus, civil society serves as a bulwark against excessive expansions of state power into the social realm. The three sectors of society – the state, business and civil society organizations must work together for the common good of society.
Civic education to citizens and leaders scored 20%. Civic education is fundamental to democracy. Civic education includes strengthening participation in civil society as well as setting up programmes to enhance civic behaviour. It is much more than teaching civics – governmental structures and procedures. It involves what is now known as ―Democracy Education‖- the broader dimension of
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teaching civic knowledge, skills, character development and community services.
Democracy should be taught in workplaces in support of the occupational training that is built on a premise of good citizenship as the foundation. Civic education reproduces and strengthens civic culture. When civic education and civic culture function effectively, large numbers of people who have the formal status of citizens in a liberal democracy actually develop the attitudes, dispositions and values proper to citizenship. Liberal democracies can exist only if these numbers are sufficient to meet whatever political challenges that may arise. The result of
Almond and Verba‘s (1963) pioneering empirical research on political culture revealed that the more educated a society is about civic responsibilities, the greater the chance that democracy will thrive in that society.
Though, there was increase of registered voters in 1999 and 2003 general elections, respectively, though, votes cast were never counted. This negatively impacted on respect of the electorates and opposition in electoral process. This showed in the ranking in table 6, with a record of 4 per cent. This was evident from the reports of many election monitoring groups. According to Babawale
(2003:218) civil society organizations observed the following lapses in the conduct of the 2003 general elections:
Ballot snatching and ballot stuffing;
Falsification of results;
Use of under-age and multiple voting;
Use of security personnel to intimidate
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electorates and party agents, especially
in the South–East;
Inadequate preparation by INEC resulting in
logistic problems and inefficiency of officials
especially on April 12, 2003.
Amplifying the observations of local monitors were the report of the international observers. The European Union in its own report insisted, that ―the presidential and a number of gubernatorial elections were marred by serious irregularities throughout the country‖ (Cited in Babawale, 2003: 218).
Government‘s performance in terms of improving the standard of living of the citizens was rated poor, on a scale of 20 percent. However, there was regularity of elections, transition from civilian to civilian, which scored 60 per cent on the measurement scale. Tension and threat of political violence dominated the polity.
It impacted on the polity to the tune of 40 per cent. Though, political crisis and insecurity pervaded the political environment, the polity was able to withstand the pressure without abandoning the electoral process. Hence, political stability scored 60 per cent.
There is no doubt that a relatively prosperous nation with an equitable distribution of wealth provides the best context for democracy. Starving people, by contrast cannot encourage citizens participation. Where economic power is concentrated and political power is concentrated, well-to –do nations have a greater chance of sustaining democratic governments than those with widespread poverty. 393 Page
The documentary evidences also showed that in economic terms, the fiscal operations of the Federal Government of Nigeria indicated an overall fiscal deficit/GDP per capita ratio of 4.0 per cent in 2001. This was higher than the 2.1 per cent recorded for 2000 and the deficit was financed entirely from domestic sources. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita from 1999 to 2003 did not only remain static but deteriorated in real terms (Abiola and Olaopa,
2008:32). The Nigerian Human Development Report (NHDR), in 2000 ranked the country 151 position out of 174 countries and among the poorest in the world
(UNDP HDI Report, 2000). The implications of these are indicative of poor dividends of democracy.
8.6. AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY AND ITS SUSTENANCE
As a matter of fact, since the multi-party elections of 1999, Nigeria has experienced a large-scale transformation from military authoritarianism to democratic political dispensation supposedly built on constitutionalism, rule of law and protection of fundamental rights. This significant feat constitutes a great relief to the generality of Nigerians who had been yearning for democracy after a protracted and highly repressive military dictatorship presided over by General
Sani Abacha. The political significance of the 1999 multi-party elections in Nigeria indeed transcended the reactions that they generated internally. The international community had consistently maintained a hard-line position on Nigeria‘s autocratic rule and the blunt refusal of the military to democratize the polity. This was clearly demonstrated by the vehement condemnation of the annulled June
12, 1993 presidential election presumably won by the Late Moshood Kasimowo
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Olawale Abiola and acclaimed internationally as the freest and fairest election ever conducted in Nigeria (Akinboye, 2004).
It had been thought that the injustice would be expeditiously redressed by the military through a de-annulment of the election. This was however jettisoned as the military flagrantly vacillated at authenticating the result. The effect was the protracted era of political crisis which lasted till the late 1998. It was General
Abacha‘s sudden death that paved the way for the charting of a new political agenda under the leadership of General Abdulsalami Abubakar. The 1999 presidential election which took place on February 27, 1999 was particularly significant as it represented the culmination of a complex but realistic transition process which began with the Local Government election in December, 1998 and ended with the transfer of power to the civilians on May 29, 1999 (Akinboye,
2004).
A crucial element of a democratic state is elections. As Mackenzie argues, elections ―are ‗rituals of choice‘, their binding character being derived from the participation of the individual as a chooser in a social act which confers legitimate authority on the person chosen‖. (Makenzie,1968). Elections, indeed, determines, who exercises power, and constitute the supreme political act as well as a complicated administrative exercise. They determine, to a large extent, who leads by a set of routine tasks: and because the stakes are quite high, failure to conduct elections efficiently and impartially could result in violence (Pastor, 1999:
75).
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The process of election has its philosophical foundation in the political event of the 13th Century which prescribed the conduct of elections following the legalization of the positions of high nobility and clergy in England. The suffrage was however limited while the elections were conducted by different methods in various localities. The assumption was that all were created equal and should be able to exercise equal rights in the society. Indeed, the thinking became rife that every man, by virtue of being homo sapien, ought to be allowed to vote. Hence, as Alfred de Grazia poignantly observed, much of the intense struggle for representation in government takes place quite often through a fight for the vote during which different social groupings within the society try to exercise disproportionate influence. Thus, all adults of all politically organised communities who are not affected by certain limiting disabilities have the legal right to vote and be voted for in equal measure (Alfred de Grazia, 1962: 160 – 163).
In general, electoral process has been conceived to have at least three major dimensions. The first is voting behaviour i.e. that act which provides and decides rather ultimate outcomes. The second dimension entails activity designed to produce a favourable outcome. It involves campaigning and campaign strategies.
The third dimension has to do with contextual and contingency factors i.e. a host of variables which condition voting behaviour and campaign strategies, and which in turn, are conditioned by the same phenomena. The factors include belief systems, rules of the game, political sub-cultures, functional pre-requisites and institutional frameworks (Jennings and Zeigler, 1966).
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More comprehensively, election conduct involves a comprehensive process which includes:
(a) appointing and training registration and election officials;
(b) delineating the boundaries of voting areas;
(c) designing a voter registration system and establishing voting sites;
(d) registering voters on site or at home and aggregating and publishing a
registration list at national and local levels;
(e) publishing and distributing the list widely enough to provide voters and
parties an opportunity to review and correct the list;
(f) establishing and enforcing rules on campaigning, access to the media and
financing;
(g) ensuring security of the voters, the candidates and the polling stations;
(h) registering and qualifying political parties and candidates;
(i) collecting information on all voters and processing the data onto voter
identification cards;
(j) distributing voters identification cards;
(k) ensuring that they are received by the right people;
(l) producing election materials;
(m) printing and securing the ballot;
(n) delivering the election materials to the appropriate sites;
(o) certifying that voters are on the registration list and that they vote privately
and in accordance with the procedures (often including dipping one‘s
finger in ink);
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(p) counting the ballots;
(q) ensuring that the results are delivered to the election offices;
(r) adding the count and announcing the results;
(s) investigating and adjudicating complaints and;
(t) certifying the final results (Pastor, 1999: 77 – 78).
Similarly, the electoral system constitutes the framework within which citizens exercise their absolute right to choose among alternative leaders and programmes; hence electoral rules must command the utmost respect of all political players, and must necessarily be adhered to so as to retain that public respect (Mphaisha, 2000: 131– 132). Nigeria operates a universal adult franchise system in which every citizen aged eighteen or over, unless specifically disqualified, is eligible to register as a voter. This is in conformity with the universal suffrage system listed by Butler, Penniman and Ranney as the first criterion for an election to be deemed democratic (Butler, Penniman and Ranney,
1981: 3). Essentially, every registered voter is eligible to vote and be voted for once he has satisfactorily fulfilled the electoral requirements as stipulated in the nation‘s constitution. Electoral systems differ widely in their rules. Broadly speaking however, they may be divided into two major types according to how the number of votes cast is related to the number of representatives. One type, the proportional system, emphasizes, to a large extent, the importance of a given number of votes electing a given number of representatives whilst the other, the plurality system, divides the country into constituencies with each electing a
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single number, this being the candidate obtaining the highest votes (Dowse and
Hughes, 1972: 331).
In Nigeria, like many other states, several problems have emanated from elections and electoral processes. Since the First Republic in Nigeria, the problems have consistently been due to the perception of the politicians in the country that election is a matter of life and death. This is because of their strong belief that the easiest means of acquiring wealth is through the instrumentality of the state, which can be garnered through victory at elections (Nwosu, 2000: 152).
Hence, during the First Republic in Nigeria, politicians did all at their disposal to outwit their opponents in elections. Some of their actions in this context include frustration of opponents from filing in their nomination papers, stuffing of ballot boxes with illegal papers, inflation of voters registers as well as other dastardly acts including arson and killing of political opponents particularly by those occupying certain positions which they felt should be retained at all cost
(Akinboye, 2004).
This has been a recurring trend in Nigeria‘s electoral system. It occurred in the
First Republic and manifested in both the Second and the ill-fated Third
Republics. Although it was a bit contained during the elections that ushered in the
Fourth Republic, it nevertheless reared its ugly head. The inability of the political class to imbibe the tenets of democratic culture has largely been responsible for it. As Joseph stressed, ―it would probably take a few electoral cycles before the mere practical business of casting and counting votes in Nigeria achieved general acceptance and became a routinized aspect of the political process 399 Page
(Joseph, 1999: 171). While hoping that some lessons have been learnt to stem the tide of this ugly scenario in the nation‘s electoral system.
The period before elections was marked by heightened uncertainty and intrigue arising from past experiences when commitment to hold democratic elections failed, and attempts to democratize were scuttled (Akinboye, 2001: 4-6). It was common knowledge for instance that General Yakubu Gowon reneged on his promise to hold elections and hand over power to a democratic regime in 1976 when on October 1, 1974, during his independence anniversary broadcast to the nation, he announced that the 1976 hand over date was unrealistic.
General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, in a similar fashion, while accepting the minority report of the Political Bureau on July 2, 1988, announced that the 1990 date he initially set for handing over to a democratically elected government was no longer feasible because in his view, and judging from past experience, political programme needed to be gradual, purposeful and effective; and should be such that a new political culture that aimed at ushering in a new social order must be created (Babangida, in Tell Magazine, 1992). Although, he later allowed elections to hold after almost eight years of dilly dallying, the Presidential election conducted in June 1993, was, in a despicable manner, annulled leading to a protracted political logjam and eventual transfer of power first to an Interim
National Government (ING) led by Chief Ernest Shonekan and later to General
Abacha through a coup-de-tat. Although General Abacha planned to have elections conducted in 1998 to usher in a democratic government, there was no assurance that the election process would not have been derailed going by the 400 Page
tougher measures he introduced to preclude popular participation in the electoral process, as well as his grand design to transmute into a civilian President.
Hence, the biggest problem to overcome, given the foregoing scenarios, was fear of the unknown.
However the fear was tempered, and inspite of efforts by certain anti democratic forces particularly within the military to have the elections postponed, General
Abdusalami Abubakar refused to succumb to their wishes. Rather, he yielded to the yearnings of Nigerians, who were more than determined to change their government through the ballot box, by keeping to his promise to hand over to a democratically elected government within a short time frame Akinboye, 2004).
Thus, in July 1998, a new political transition programme that would terminate in
May, 1999 was announced. Details of the programme are as follows:-
(a) September 24, 1998: Release of provisionally registered political parties;
(b) October 5 – 19, 1998: Voters Registration;
(c) December 5, 1998: Local Government Council Election;
(d) December 23, 1998: Submission of names for Governorship and State
Assembly elections;
(e) January 9, 1999: State Governors and Assembly elections;
(f) January 20, 1999: Release of Guidelines for presidential and National
Assembly elections;
(g) February 12, 1999: Submission of names of Presidential candidates;
(h) February 13 – 15, 1999: Screening of Presidential Candidates;
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(i) February 19, 1999: End of election campaign by Presidential candidates;
(j) February 27, 1999: Presidential election;
(k) March 6, 1999: Run-off elections if needed for National Assembly and
President and;
(l) May 29, 1999: Swearing in of elected President.
General Abubakar also dissolved the National Electoral Commission (NECOM) and replaced it with a new body, Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC). The Head of State similarly disbanded the existing five political parties set up under General Abacha and directed INEC to formulate guidelines for the formation of new political parties. INEC subsequently produced new guidelines for party formation following which 26 (twenty-six) parties submitted applications for registration out of which nine (9) were deemed to have met the requirements and thus granted provisional license to operate. These are Alliance for
Democracy (AD), All People‘s Party (APP), Democratic Advanced Party (DAM),
Movement for Democracy and Social Justice (MDSJ), National Solidarity
Movement (NSM), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Peoples Redemption Party
(PRP), United Democratic Party (UDP) and the United Peoples Party (UPP).
These nine political parties were to pass INEC‘s additional tests before their final registration. These included the performance of the parties in the scheduled local government elections, winning five percent of the total votes cast in each council in at least 24 states, and having party offices in at least two thirds of the country.
These additional requirements were designed to ensure that only political parties that have wider spread across the country were eventually registered. The
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philosophy behind all these being the need to guide against the formation of political parties with narrow ties of ethnicity and religion.
Elections thereafter commenced at the local government level on December 5,
1998 to have Councilors for the 774 Local Government Councils in the federation. At the end of the elections, only three political parties fully met INEC‘s requirements and were consequently registered. These are Alliance for
Democracy (AD), the All Peoples Party (APP) and the Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP). The three also became the only political parties given the go-ahead to contest the remaining elections billed to usher in a democratic political dispensation i.e. State Assemblies, Gubernatorial, National Assembly and
Presidential elections. This led to the commencement of full scale political campaign across the country (Akinboye, 2004).
The announcement and the formal registration of the three political parties that scaled the INEC‘s hurdle ushered in a fierce campaign for various positions particularly the most covetous presidential seat. Earlier, several candidates had joined the presidential race, though the number eventually reduced to two following the results of the parties‘ primary elections as well as an agreement between the APP and AD to jointly field one candidate under the platform of APP.
Thus, while Olu Falae became the consensus candidate of the APP/AD election coalition, Olusegun Obasanjo got the mandate of the PDP to contest the presidential election. The two presidential aspirants claimed to be best suited for the exalted position and hence made painstaking and elaborate preparations for the election. The choice of the two presidential candidates from the same geo- 403 Page
political zone was not accidental. There appeared to have emerged a consensus among the key political players that the presidency is conceded to the South-
West following the death of Chief M.K.O. Abiola in detention whilst the Northern
Political Group held the sway.
A wide range of strategies were evolved by the different political parties to put across their messages to the electorates. The campaign was much more party- dominated than individual-dominated although the personalities of the two contestants also counted. The campaign was hard fought as each of the contestants visited every nook and crannies of the country preaching his party‘s manifesto. Campaign by presidential candidates was focused mainly in the urban centers of Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu, Kano, Kaduna, etc where the population is large, while campaign at the local level was mainly handled by party officials and indigenes of the various local areas.
The dominant themes in the campaign included ending the political crisis that had shaken the country‘s political fabric since the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, ensuring political stability, resuscitating the economy particularly the appalling living standard of the average Nigerian household, eliminating corruption which has eaten deep into the fabric of the nation‘s polity, reducing youth unemployment and maintaining peace, law and order among others. Each of the contestants had access to the print and electronic media to carry out his campaign and inform the electorates about his programme of action if elected. The mass media indeed played a noble role during the campaign as there was extensive press coverage which provided real hope for a free and fair 404 Page
election. Campaign by the two presidential aspirants was relatively peaceful and continued till the last day designated for it by the INEC i.e. 20th February 1999.
This was followed by the conduct of elections.
It should be pointed out however that while elections into all levels i.e. local, state, and national, and the two arms of government i.e. legislature and executive are important, more emphasis has been placed on the executive arm at the national level i.e. the presidential election. This is because it is considered indisputably the most crucial as far as the emergence of the Fourth Republic is concerned. Some emphasis is also placed on the local government election since its results were to be used in determining which political parties were eligible for registration and participation at subsequent elections.
As earlier stressed, the local government election was conducted on December
5, 1998. Of the 26 (twenty-six) political parties that initially applied to INEC, nine
(9) were provisionally registered by the electoral body to contest the local government election, 26, 658, 512 Nigerians voted at the election. (see Table 7 for number of States with 50% votes won by each of the parties). Following the declaration of the results, only 3 (three) political parties that fulfilled the registration requirements laid down by INEC were registered and allowed to contest the remaining elections under the transition to civil rule programme, while the other six (6) parties that were provisionally registered to contest the local government election but failed to meet the conditions for final registration were deregistered (Vanguard, December 15, 1998).
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Details of the parties‘ score sheet are as contained in table 7 below:
Table 7: Local Government election results showing number of states with
50% vote.
Party Number of states where 50% vote was scored
AD 14 States (including the FCT)
APP 35 states (including the FCT)
DAM NIL
MDJ 3 (including the FCT)
NSM 1 state
PDP 36 states (including FCT)
PRP NIL
UDP NIL
UPP 1 state
Source: Vanguard, December 15, 1998 p 1.
It is quite evident from the table above that only the PDP, APP and AD satisfied the INEC‘s conditions for registration and were accordingly registered. In terms of the number of seats won, the PDP led convincingly by clinging 460 (or 59.4%)
Chairmanship seats and 4,787 (or 56.1%) Councillorship slots; while the APP secured 188 (or 24.3%) and 2,653 (or 31.1%) Chairmanship and Councillorship seats respectively. AD trailed behind with only 100 (or 12.9%) Chairmanship
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positions and 1,092 (or 12.8%) Councillorship seats (Newswatch, March 8,
1999).
The State Houses of Assembly and Gubernatorial elections were held simultaneously on January 9, 1999. The results of these elections revealed a similar trend. In the gubernatorial election, the PDP secured 21 states, APP got 9 states while AD won in 6 states. PDP again proved its winning strength in the
State Houses of Assembly elections as it clinched 528 seats while APP secured
251 and AD won 166 seats.
The National Assembly election which took place on February 20, 1999 was without any major hitch. The three (3) registered political parties contested the
109 Senatorial seats and the 360 House of Representatives slots allocated to the
36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Although the turn-out of voters was not as heavy as was expected, the seats were keenly contested. The National
Assembly election results as released by INEC revealed that in the 109 member
Senate seats, the PDP led with 59 seats followed by the APP which took a distant second position with 24 senatorial seats; the AD trailed behind with 20 seats. In a similar version, PDP secured 206 seats from the 360 member Federal
House of Representatives, APP placed second with 74 seats while AD came last with 68 seats. The results also showed that a combined strength of APP and AD in the Senate and the House of Representatives would not be enough to challenge the PDP‘s dominance as it still enjoys a comfortable lead in the
National Assembly. The spill-over effect of these elections had serious impact on the presidential election results won by General Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP. 407 Page
The contentious issue of power shift in Nigerian politics has attracted considerable scholarly attention. As Emeka Anyaoku (former Commonwealth
Secretary General) submits, ―the power shift debate that characterized the politics of transition from military to civil rule and which has persisted several months after arose largely out of the frustration of large segments of the population with the structure of the political system that has shut significant sections out of the corridors of power for most of the post-independence period‖
(Anyaoku, 2001).
This scenario recently witnessed a dramatic change following a prolonged political scheming and consensus on rotational presidency which impelled that power should shift to the South-precisely South West zone of the country. The presidential election process thus reveals a fundamental new development in the electoral history of Nigeria. For the first time, the presidential seat was zoned to the South-Western part of the country. This zone had persistently expressed its displeasure over continued marginalization in the mainstream of the country‘s political process. The annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election believed to have been won by the late M.K.O. Abiola who hailed from the South
West zone has consistently been cited as a recent clear case to justify this point.
The adoption of rotational presidency structure therefore provided the South
West alone the unique opportunity to field candidates for the February, 1999 presidential election. However, since the two presidential candidates were from this Zone, a choice had to be made between them. Certain factors informed the choice of the favoured presidential candidate. First, the Northern political elites
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seems to prefer Obasanjo to Falae. This is perhaps because he was seen as someone that could be trusted having, as Military Head of State in 1979, willingly handed over power to President Sheu Shagari against the wishes of his Yoruba ethnic clan who preferred that he handed over power to Chief Obafemi Awolowo
(Newswatch, March 8, 1999).
Secondly Falae had his NADECO background to contend with in the North.
There was the fear by certain powerful Northerners that Falae, if given the presidential nod, might implement a NADECO agenda, especially the restructuring of the country through the much clamoured Sovereign National
Conference. Thirdly, there was the hunch that the military had a hidden agenda to preserve the military institution and its estate, and that they therefore preferred an Obasanjo Presidency in order to maintain the status quo (Newswatch, March
8,1999). The enumerated factors had much ramifying effect on the election result which revealed that General Obasanjo obtained the bulk of his votes from the
North. Arising from the factors, the general opinion held by people from the area was that there was not much that General Obasanjo did for his victory, particularly since he could not penetrate most parts of the area during his electioneering campaign. While this is an incontestable verdict, it amounts to an error of judgement to think that he must, consequent upon this, dance to their tune as purportedly perceived. The fact is that once elected, the entire country became his constituency and he should be seen to act in accordance with the dictates of this imperative.
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On February 28, 1999, millions of voters across the nation patiently lined up to cast their votes in an historic presidential election designed to usher in a democratic system after more than fifteen years of uninterrupted military adventurism into the nation‘s politics. Generally, the election was relatively peaceful and smoothly conducted, although there were pockets of disruptions and irregularities exhibited by unruly behaviour of some party members at the voting centers.
The electoral officials, who had earlier been recruited and trained by the INEC to ensure that they understood the election process, worked closely and conscientiously with INEC and Local Government officials in their respective locations to ensure a successful conduct of the election. However, a closer investigation of election preparations in the rural areas reveals a more complex picture. Most of the electorates were not fully informed of the procedures to be followed in conducting the election. In some cases, electoral materials were either not available or grossly inadequate due to organizational deficiencies; while in other cases, some places in the riverine areas were inaccessible to electoral officers due to transportation logistics.
Inspite of these teething problems, it is remarkable that, on balance, the election was successfully conducted. Nigerians in general appeared to have developed a total commitment to the election having been tired of protracted military dictatorship. The security forces, particularly the police, maintained peace in the various electoral locations to which they were deployed nationwide. The polling
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centers were firmly secured and potential trouble spots, particularly in the urban center, were closely monitored.
At the end of the voting exercise, the election materials were taken to the various designated counting centers. The results from the various Local Governments were then collated and taken (under police escort) to the state electoral office
(headquarters) where they were further collated and forwarded to the national headquarters of INEC where the final results from all the states of the federation were collated and announced. At each electoral collation centre, agents of the political parties were permitted to monitor the counting of votes in accordance with the nation‘s electoral law. Overall, a total of 29,848,441 electorates cast their votes in the historic election (Daily Times, March 2, 1999) which recorded more impressive turn out than was the case under the Local Government,
Governorship, States and National Assembly elections that had been held previously. Counting of votes commenced immediately and was followed by the announcement of results.
On March 1, 1999, the INEC Chairman who doubled as the Chief Returning
Officer for the Presidential election, Justice Ephraim Akpata (now deceased) announced at a press conference the election results. According to him, General
Obasanjo polled 18,737,154 votes or 62.78 percent of the total votes cast as against Chief Falae‘s 11,110,287 votes or 37.22 percent (see the breakdown in table 8 below).
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Table 8: Breakdown of Presidential Election Result
Name of state Total votes APP Name of % of votes PDP Name of % of votes Cast Candidate O. scored Candidate O. scored Falae Votes Obasanjo Scored Votes Scored Abia 535,918 175,095 32.7 30,823 67.33 Adamawa 845,107 177.868 21.05 667,239 78.95 Akwa Ibom 883,278 152,534 17.27 730,744 82.73 Anambra 833,178 199,461 23.94 633,717 76.06 Bauchi 1,17,541 342,233 29.09 834,308 70.91 Bayelsa 610,032 152,220 24.95 457,812 75.05 Benue 1,252,957 269,045 21.47 983,912 78.53 Borno 915,975 334,593 36.53 581,382 63.47 Cross River 876,156 283,468 32.35 592,688 67.65 Delta 816,574 240,344 29.43 57,230 70.57 Ebonyi 345,921 94,934 27.44 250,987 72.56 Edo 679,784 163,203 24.01 516,581 75.99 Ekiti 713,690 522,072 73.15 191,618 26.85 Enugu 835,586 195,168 23.36 640,418 76.64 Gombe 844,539 311,381 36.87 533,158 63.13 Imo 736,106 314,339 42.70 421,767 57.30 Jigawa 548,596 237,025 43.21 311.571 56.79 Kaduna 1,676,029 381,350 22.75 1,294,679 77.25 Kano 904,713 222,458 24.59 682,225 75.41 Katsina 1,193,397 229,181 19.20 964,216 80.80 Kebbi 512,229 172,336 33.64 339.893 66.36 Kogi 984,710 476,807 48.42 507,903 51.58 Kwara 659,598 189,088 28.67 470,510 71.33 Lagos 1,751,981 1,542,969 88.07 209,012 11.93 Nassarawa 597,008 173,277 29.02 423,731 70.98 Niger 871,130 140,465 16.12 730.665 83.88 Ogun 475,904 332,342 69.83 143,54 30.17 Ondo 801,797 668,474 83.37 133.323 16.63 Osun 794,639 607,628 76.47 187,011 23.53 Oyo 921,178 693,510 75.29 227,668 24.71 Plateau 672,442 173,370 25.78 499.072 74.22 Rivers 1,565,603 213,328 13.63 1,352.275 86.37 Taraba 871,039 81,290 9.33 789,749 90.67 Yobe 311,578 165,061 52.98 146,517 47.02 FCT 99,022 39,788 40.18 59,234 59.82 TOTAL 29,848,441 11,110,287 37.22 18,738,154 62.78 Percentage Spread APP – 23 States plus FCT PDP = 32 States plus FCT Source: Daily Times, March 2, 1999, p 1.
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The Chief Returning Officer thus declared General Obasanjo as the winner of the election and the duly elected President of Nigeria. This verdict was in conformity with the nation‘s electoral law which requires a winner to fulfill two basic requirements i.e. score the highest number of votes and win 25 percent of the votes cast in two-thirds of the 36 States of the Federation and the Federal Capital
Territory. According to the Chief Returning Officer, General Obasanjo scored two-third of the votes cast in 32 states and the FCT, while Falae had two-thirds in
23 states and FCT (Newswatch, March 15, 1999).
The breakdown also shows that the APP obtained the bulk of its votes from the
AD‘s South West states of Lagos, Oyo, Ondo, Ogun, Osun and Ekiti, while the
PDP garnered much of its votes from all the zones of the federation-except the
South-West. The election results revealed a strong correlation between ethno- regional affiliation and voting behaviour as clearly seen in AD‘s overwhelming performance in its traditional South West states. Certain old political habits became discernible from the outcome of the election results. Although the party has made an in-road into other parts of the country e.g. the South East which it penetrated minimally, and its Chairmanship position which had been zoned to the
North, it remains, like its predecessors an ethnically and regionally based political party. Its overwhelming victory in the predominantly Yoruba speaking states of the South-West clearly underscores this. Indeed, its landslide victory in the zone had been predicted by political analysts who had seen the influence of the
Afenifere – a pan- Yoruba Movement which the AD is strongly attached to- looming large.
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We can draw some conclusions from the voting behaviour that emerged.
Probably for reason having to do with the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, the Yoruba decided to look more inward and thus voted for the AD which was perceived as theirs (tiwantiwa). They probably felt betrayed by other ethnic groups that failed to strongly identify with the Yoruba sense of loss and outrage at the annulment. The clamour for restructuring and confederation became louder among the Yoruba. There was an acute sense of mistrust. The
Yoruba leaders merely concluded that there was no gain in a political arrangement with other ethnic groups which can readily compromise.
The election verdict announced by INEC notwithstanding, the APP presidential candidate, Chief Olu Falae rejected vehemently the results and headed for the
Federal Court of Appeal to contest the results which he alleged were fraudulent and characterized by serious irregularities and malpractices. In a 13-page petition, Chief Falae made several allegations against General Obasanjo.
Prominent among these were that General Obasanjo was not qualified to stand for the election because he belonged to the Ogboni Secret Society, and that he had been found guilty of treasonable felony by a tribunal. His political opponents however described the allegations as baseless, and lacking merit since there were no sufficient evidence to prove the allegations; and by a unanimous decision, his petition, which was filed on March 15, 1999, was dismissed by the five Justices of the Court of Appeal sitting in Abuja. On the allegation that
General Obasanjo was a member of the Ogboni secret society, for instance, the
Appeal court ruled that Chief Falae failed to adduce any evidence to prove this.
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Similarly, on treason charges, the court ruled that the State pardon granted
Obasanjo was unconditional, and that it had mitigated the punishment for the offence alleged to have been committed; it had also restored the rights and privileges forfeited on account of the offence. Inspite of the ruling in favour of
General Obasanjo, Chief Falae decided not to pursue the case further to the
Supreme Court in the wider interest of ensuring that transition process was not derailed by some ambitious military personnel who were determined to truncate it at the slightest opportunity.
The decision seems to be wise and debunks the notion that election is a matter of life and death. It is also not unconnected with the logicality of the contention that although Obasanjo and Falae belong to different political parties, the two are
Yoruba and their choice was not accidental. The political parties had come to concede the presidency to the Yoruba after the travails and the injustice meted out to the progressive force which the Yoruba represent in Nigerian politics. The imperative of power shift and the widespread notion that power had resided for too long in the North influenced the choice of the two presidential candidates.
The core North, without much ado conceded to the agitation for power to shift to the South, particularly South-West with which the North seems more comfortable and specifically with Obasanjo for reasons of his antecedents.
The question then is, why was General Obasanjo not acceptable to the South-
West? The zone saw in him an agent of the North. The North, to the Yoruba, symbolizes oppression and arrogant display of power, conservatism, whereas the
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South-West is liberal and progressive in its political behaviour and detest the idea of their being destined ruler or untouchable leaders.
Considering the freshness of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election by the Babangida junta, much external presence was apparent during the February
29 presidential election in Nigeria. The international observer team includes the
Carter Center of Atlanta which worked in collaboration with the National
Democratic Institute of Massachusetts (NDI). Both the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and the United
Nations (UN) as well as a network of Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) also observed the election throughout the country, particularly in the urbanised volatile areas of Lagos, Enugu, Abuja, Kano, Kaduna, Port-Harcourt etc. The international observers, led by the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and comprising 66 members, toured the six geo-political zones of the country and visited 335 polling stations in 112 wards located in 61 Local Government
Councils of 20 states including the FCT. They monitored the election from the time that voting commenced in the morning and the time it ended in the evening.
Generally, the election was said to have been conducted peacefully although there were alleged cases of malpractices. In its comprehensive report on the election, the team noted the ―peaceful conduct of the balloting and pre-election campaign, the general lack of intimidation of voters, and the thorough and fair coverage by the Nigeria media‖ (Newswatch, March 15,1999). However, it nevertheless observed that there were various cases of ―inflated vote return‖ at
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polling centers particularly in some states. It was also reported that there was evidence of ballot stuffing and thumb printing of ballot papers as well as some cases of disenfranchisement of voters resulting from late arrival or insufficiency of election materials. Similarly, cases of electoral fraud was reported by ―The
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG)‖ i.e. a coalition of local democratic non- governmental organizations, which confirmed that both parties were involved in electoral malpractices. While calling for investigation of the anomalies, the two observer groups were, no doubt, in agreement that the electoral frauds associated with the process were not sufficient to invalidate the entire result
(Newswatch, March 15,1999). Thus, the election result reasonably reflected the preferences of the voters, and hence its acceptability not only by the generality of the Nigerian people but also the international community as relatively free and fair.
8.7. CONCLUSION
Prior to the advent of the Fourth Republic, and particularly, since the fall of the
Second Republic, Nigeria has had a legacy of unended transition or what has been described as transition without end (Diamond L, Kirk- Greene, A. and
Oyediran, O. (eds.), 1996). The multiparty elections, especially the Presidential election and its outcome, have therefore become an important issue of concern for Nigerians in general, especially since it was conducted again by the military.
The key questions in the presidential election were two-fold. First, would there be high turn out on the election day given the peoples‘ apathy which was informed by the military‘s unilateral cancellation of the 1993 Presidential election? It was
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strongly held that there could be no confidence that anyone elected would be adjudged suitable by the military leadership. As it turned out to be however, there was an unprecedented turn out of voters thus reflecting the people‘s yearning for democracy. More importantly, the skepticism on whether the results would be released or not was removed as the Chief Returning Officer announced, at the end of the polls, the results of the presidential election without government‘s interference or intimidation, thus confirming the sincerity and neutrality of the
Abubakar administration (Akinboye, 2004).
The 1999 multiparty elections in Nigeria constituted the climax of the transition process which was initiated in July 1998 by General Abdulsalami Abubakar and terminated peacefully in May 1999 when he handed over power to the incumbent
President Olusegun Obasanjo who had earlier been declared winner of the
February 1999 presidential election. The election took place after the horrendous annulment of the June 1993 presidential election considered substantially free and fair, and presumed to have been won by the late M.K.O. Abiola. The elections, relatively successfully conducted in a peaceful atmosphere, symbolise a triumph for democracy and a steady growth of a democratic culture. It also demonstrates the total commitment of Nigerians to democracy after a protracted era of military authoritarianism. Nigerians were obviously no longer inclined to give the military any alibi for not handing over power to civilians; hence, their resolute determination to support Abubakar‘s efforts towards democratizing the polity. The high turn-out in the presidential election is a reflection of peoples‘ yearning for democracy. It also clearly indicated a strong measure of popular
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support for the Abubakar‘s political transition programme which was pursued with total commitment and without deceit.
The relatively successful conduct of the 1999 multiparty elections helped in no small measure to bolster peoples‘ confidence in the new political transition programme as voters behaved in a remarkably matured manner; while the outcome of the elections was generally acceptable having been endorsed by both local and international observers. The relative success is however attributed more to the people‘s desire to let the military go before commencing the real clamour for true democracy. More saliently, the vexed issue of power shift which had been unthinkable particularly by the Northern Oligarchy became a thing of the past as the South clung to power under a negotiated political expediency and a peacefully conducted presidential election that was considered to be procedural and relatively free and fair. But it must be emphasized that it was the North that packaged the political platform that gave birth to the power shift. The North still called the shots. The whole thing was more of a facade; hence its inherent instability and unending profile. By and large, the 1999 multiparty elections in
Nigeria is experimental. It is highly significant and monumental in the chequered history of electoral system in the country. It constitutes a serious challenge to the political class in the conduct of elections in a legitimate, free and democratic electoral and political order.
This thesis investigates the management of secularism in Nigeria since independence. We note that sordid manner of religious clashes and its effect on
419 Page
our democratic institution in the early phase of independence influenced the adoption of secularism. In spite of the rationale at which the adoption was borne out, leaders‘ peculiarity and constitutional contradictions negate its effectiveness and heralded regime of pronounced religious crisis having political interpretation.
Importantly, failure in the management of secularism is not only limited to her incapability to proclaim neutrality in religious matter but also in the inability of the
Nigerian state to create an environment for alienation and subjugation of the
‗minor‘ religious affiliates to the majority. The display of bias attitude defies institutionalization of secularism into Nigeria socio-political milieu. Thus, the
‗nursed‘ ideology becomes a threat to the survival of Nigerian state (Paul-Sewa and Shamsudeen Adio, 2010).
Reverting religious differences and genuine practice of secularism in Nigeria requires a great deal of responsibility. A holistic approach is necessary. An approach which requires not only the addressing of the problem of weak political institutions, but also the social reengineering of sociological context of existence.
Reviving and strengthening the capacity of political institutions should take cognizance of the need for collective effort by politicians, populace and the government. People should be sensitized and enlightened about political context at which politicians had undertaken religious crisis, level of illiteracy should be highly reduced; most especially in educationally deprived region in Nigeria, and campaign against religious crisis should form the caprices of every government.
On a final note, it is important to point out that in order to maintain the secular nature of the Nigerian state, the adoption of a particular religious legal code
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should be downplayed. In a related development, the Nigerian state should reduce its attention and overconcentration on the two major religious in the country at the detriment of other minor religious beliefs. The Nigerian state should not been seen as adopting Islam and Christianity as state religious.
Above all, it is clear that the social indicators of democratization: demilitarized polity, institutional and behavioural foundation; popular participation; quality of governance; democratic dividends and economy are the ingredients for good governance (UNDP, Country Report, 1997:19). There is, therefore, a nexus between good governance and the sustenance of democracy.
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CHAPTER NINE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
9.0. SUMMARY
The study evaluated how genuine democratization can entrench
democratic values, norms, attitudes and culture in Nigeria in a
transition political economy. It investigated the patterns of institutional
foundation laid by the military before handing over power; the extent
of participation of the electorates; the attitudinal or behavioural
mindsets of the political elites; the quality of governance; and how
these have helped to promote democratic dividends, political stability
and sustenance of democracy in Nigeria. It adopted historical and
qualitative research methods to capture events that typify the
character of democratization and democratic consolidation in Nigeria
between 1999 and 2007. The following findings were revealed:
9.1.1. EFFECT OF MILITARIZED POLITY ON DEMOCRACY
The evidences from the content-analysis of documentary records showed
that the effects of militarization had permeated all facets of the society and
economy in terms of attitudes, beliefs, orientations, values and actions of
the new political elites who took over power from the military in 1999.
Certain cases were revealed, such as: there were human rights abuses by
military, police and para-military units. They often take the laws into their
own hands in any conflict situation with citizens. In measuring civil-military 426 Page
relations, it scored 4 per cent. Cases abound of disobedience to court
orders. Though, the independence of the judiciary was guaranteed, respect
for the rule of law scored 20 per cent. The militarization of the polity was
clearly manifested with the existence of ethnic militia, for example, the
Oodua Peoples‘ Congress (OPC); the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF);
the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and other militia
groups in the Niger Delta. Cases of kidnapping spread to other geo-political
zones. There were also cases of political violence, assassination of political
opponents and high rate of violent crimes. Violent crimes became
widespread as a result of high rate of unemployment.
9.1.2. ABSENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL AND BEHAVIOURAL FOUNDATIONS
The evidences from the content-analysis of documentary records showed
that the behaviour of political elites are still parochial, ethnic-centred and
exploitative. This could be traced to historical and political antecedents, such
as: unhealthy rivalry between the North and Southern political elites to win
and control the central government of Nigeria. In Table 3, it scored 40 per
cent. There was no political education and orientation. Though, the military
repealed Decrees/Edict in order to pave way for supremacy of the rule of
law, there are cases of disobedience to court orders, such as President
Obasanjo‘s failure to release Lagos State Local Governments‘ fund seized
by the Federal government.
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This negatively impacted on democracy. In the scale of measurement, it scored
20 per cent. Besides, there was no timely preparation of voters register, verification and delivery of electoral materials. It also scored 20 per cent. The security agents colluded with the ruling party, the People‘s Democratic Party to rig elections. Their impact on democracy was highly negative, with a score of 4 per cent. No capacity-building for administrative and civil services.
Furthermore, the political leaders that emerged in the democratic space had no ideology, ideas or programmes for nation-building. The mindsets of politicians as elections drew near was to align to a political godfather, raise private militia to do electoral battle, assassinate political opponents, rig election, cause electoral violence and snatch ballot boxes. Hence, democratization process in Nigeria did not lay institutional and behavioural foundation on which democracy could consolidate during the period of study.
9.1.3. LACK OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND POPULAR
PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS IN DEMOCRACY
The evidences from the content-analysis of documentary records showed that though transition to democracy opened up hitherto closed political space, it is still highly exclusive and elitist in nature. The electorates were still apathetic to democratic election because of political violence and insecurity. This impacted negatively on democracy and was scored 4 per cent. There was poor political education for political elites and electorates, turning election contest to a ―do or die affair‖. Table 4, it was scored 20 per cent. However, election has been held
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every four years. There was increase in voters‘ registration to participate in election in the 1999, 2003 and 2007 general elections. These indicators scored
60 per cent, respectively.
The popular participation of the electorates would be higher when the political environment is free from violence and insecurity and the electorates know that their votes would count. This is a challenge to democracy.
9.1.4. LACK OF CIVIC EDUCATION ON CITIZENS AND LEADERS
The evidences from the content-analysis of documentary records showed that political leaders that took over power from the military did not imbibe democratic values and practice. Generally, the three organs of government – executive, legislature and judiciary scored low in quality of governance. They all scored 4 per cent. The executive arm has not been empowered the citizens. There are cases of mass poverty and unemployment. The executive scored 4 per cent on that. The legislature could not pass bills that impact on citizens. There was poor response to constituency interests. They scored 4 per cent. The judiciary fairly impacted on democracy as they made both executives and legislature to obey court verdicts. They scored 60 per cent. However, the executive, legislature and judiciary scored low on areas of the transparency and accountability, they all felled to the monster of corruption. Generally, they scored 4 per cent. The dismal performance of the three organs of government in quality of the governance showed that democratization is a process and political leaders are yet to imbibe democratic values for good governance.
429 Page
9.1.5. POOR DEMOCRATIC DIVIDENDS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The evidences from the content-analysis of documentary records showed that the votes of electorates and their rights were not respected inspite of the existence of electoral laws. Electoral malpractices and fraud abound in 1999,
2003 and 2007 general elections. In Table 6, the indicator was scored 20 per cent. The standard of living of citizens became worse. In Table 6, it scored 20 per cent.
9.2. CONCLUSION
From these findings, the study concluded that constitutional democracy was a far cry from the expectations of the people. The voting process was no more than a rubber stamp for the ruling party to operate and continue in office. There were poor accountability and responsiveness of political leaders to the governed.
For example, members of the National Assembly, instead of being bothered by the urgent need to legislate towards improving on power supply, transport, infrastructure, education, housing, security, employment and national economic growth, they were busy with padding their individual pockets with outrageous salaries and allowances. In spite of the condition of long suffering Nigerians, primitive accumulation of wealth has become the primary motive of democratic governance.
430 Page
9.3. RECOMMENDATIONS
The study made the following recommendations:
(i) The government should embark on the demilitarization of the polity to
allow elected civilian leaders have authority on the military, para-military
units and police. Political education should be embarked upon to make
the military and police force focus on their professional calling.
(ii) Popular participation should be entrenched to empower some sections of
society that are presently disenfranchised due to the exclusionary
mechanisms of contemporary politics, especially the women, minority and
disadvantaged groups in civil society. Democratic practice is still elitist in
nature and should therefore be broaden to accommodate the electorates.
The high cost of election for participation in electoral offices should be
erased. Political education is also a significant step in raising the level of
national consciousness and participation in the political process.
(iii) Imbibing democratic values and beliefs by political elites should go beyond
the institutional differences between the parliamentary and the presidential
systems of government. The solution should not lie in a mixed model of
both, but, emphasis should be on imbibing the appropriate or congruent
democratic electoral values and practice that would pave way for good
governance. The political process should be permeated by the facilitating
attitudes of democracy. These include social trust, tolerance and
interpersonal co-operation.
431 Page
(iv) Political education should be extended to the electorates in order to know
their constitutional responsibilities and rights. This would make them
judge their elected leaders not on the basis of ethnic origins or federal
character balancing, but on the fulfillment of election promises against
future elections. They should see themselves as watchdogs of their
political leaders. There is need for the electorates to understand their
common needs across ethnic nationalities – one that appreciates that
poverty and deprivation are direct outcomes of misrule in the midst of
plenty. The effects cut across ethnic boundaries. In other words, there is
the need for institutionalization of political education as part of the nation‘s
democratization process to enable the electorates, political elites and
other stakeholders practice democracy in order to reap the dividends of
democracy and promote economic development.
(v) In conclusion, the Nigerian political parties as well as the party system
have never been seen or known to be neutral to the aphorism of how to
capture power and/or how to utilize it. Political Parties should practise
democracy at primary elections and avoid the imposition of candidates.
They should be the pillar of maintaining discipline to members, articulate
public policies, programmes and act as pivot through which democratic
culture can be sustained.
432 Page
9.4. CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE
(i) The study has revealed that democratic practice in Nigeria between 1999
and 2007 did not prepare the political elites in terms of imbibing democratic
values and norms before they assumed power. This was revealed from the
findings that the polity, economy and civil society were still militarized and not
conducive for democratic values and practice. The implication of this is that
elected political leaders should be re-oriented on democratic culture, values
and norms in order to enhance their performances in the management of
government affairs;
(ii) The study also revealed the nature and character of the Nigerian state. The
State of Nigeria can be categorized into higher class- owners of the means of
production and distribution and those who do not have the means of
production and distribution. In other words, those who have the means of
production and distribution dominate in participation in politics; while, the
―have not‖ watch from the sideline. This nature of the state affects politics of
popular participation. This has made it difficult for political leaders to unite
and promote socio-economic development in Nigeria.
(iii) The study revealed that there is need to integrate rural and urban political
elites in the task of nation-building through the democratic process of
―consensus and accommodation‖ of different political opinions on national
issues that cut across ethnic boundaries, especially issues that border on
433 Page
national interests. There is need for political education, which would improve
their understanding of the democratic norms and quality of governance.
(iv) Methodologically, the use of social indicators constructed for measuring
democratization and sustenance of democracy in qualitative research is an
innovation in the field. The indices are departure from the existing measures
used earlier for research passing through democratization process in
transitional polity (See Gastil, 1991 and Dinneya, 2006:225). Constructing
political indices on actual historical and political events made it possible to
capture democratization process and how to sustain it. It makes the study
objective and opens the indices and procedure of measurement to
verification.
(v) Hypotheses can also be developed from this qualitative study to conduct
quantitative study on the subject. Such hypotheses would provide the basis
for evaluating the progress of democratization process and the sustenance of
democracies in transitional nations, in transition politics and how to sustain
their democracies. For example, a tentative hypothesis that ―the lower the
level of democratization in a nation, the less the likelihood of the sustenance
of democracy in such nations‖, can be tested. This will elicit new interest in
the evaluation of democratization and sustenance of democracy. Above all,
the study has added to the volume of the literature on democratization and
sustenance of democracy.
434 Page
9.5. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There is need to adapt these indices and replicate the study quantitatively, to determine if a relationship could be established between democratization and sustenance of democracy. This will elicit new interest in the evaluation of national political development, which appeared to have been ignored, in favour of cross-country comparative analysis.
This study can also be replicated by expanding the scope to extend to 2011
General Elections. In other words, the new study can capture between 1999 to
2011, covering three transitions from civilian to civilian.
Above all, research should move towards the adaptation (rather than replication) of the indices developed in this study, in order to study democratic developments in other transition politics in West Africa sub-region and Africa in general.
435 Page
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APPENDIX 1
INTERVIEW GUIDE (IN-DEPTH/ ELITE INTERVIEW)
(i) Greetings and Introduction.
(ii) Background (socio-economic background of respondent: age, sex,
religion, education etc.).
(iii) Duties/Responsibilities of respondent.
(iv) Kindly describe the patterns and techniques of democratic process in
Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.
(v) What do you understand by demilitarization of the polity between 1999-
2007?
(vi) What is the degree of national consciousness and citizens‘ participation in
democratic process?
(vii) Explain the level of sustenance of democratic practices and norms
between 1999 and 2007.
(viii) Mention various political events in the polity in terms of political stability
between 1999 and 2007.
(ix) Suggestions to move Nigeria forward in sustenance of democratic culture
and political stability.
475 Page
APPENDIX 2
PROFILE OF 150 RESPONDENTS IN ELITE/IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS
150 PERSONS INTERVIEWED DURING THE ELITE/IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS,
USING PURPOSIVE OR JUDGEMENTAL SAMPLING TECHNIQUES, WERE
AS FOLLOWS:
(i) 6 INEC Officials, (Abuja);
(ii) 5 Political Parties- 12 Politicians (5 from PDP, 3 from ACN, 2 from ANPP,
1 from Labour and 1 from APGA) (Abuja/Lagos);
(iii) 12 Elder statesmen from the six geo-political zones, (Lagos);
(iv) 24 Selected Federal and State Governments‘ Officials, SIEC – State
Independent Electoral Commission, (Abuja/Lagos);
(v) 12 Experts from the academics, (Lagos);
(vi) 24 Electorates above the age of eighteen years from the six geo-political
zones of Nigeria, (Abuja/Lagos);
(vii) 12 Experts from civil society, (Lagos);
(viii) 12 Experts in the Mass Media, (Lagos);
(ix) 24 Persons from the Nigerian Youths, (Lagos) and;
(x) 12 Women (Lagos).
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APPENDIX 3 NIGERIAN INFORMATION
Physical Features Lying 10' north of the Equator and 8' East of the Greenwich Meridian, Nigeria is located on the being in 1967, at the outbreak of the Civil War (1966-1970), and was increased to West Coast of Africa. Nigeria is variety personified her people, cultures, vast land and water nineteen states in 1976, the same year the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, was created. Then, n 1987, this was further increased to twenty one states and in 1991, mass, human and natural resources, belief systems and, often vividly, her political evolution- thirty states. The present 36 states structure came Into being In 1995. The thirty six reflecting a nation of different shades. Nigerian clocks are set at Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) states of the federation fall under six political zones viz. North East, North West, plus one hour. North Central, South East, South West and South South zones. At the end of May 2007, there were 774 local government councils in the country.
Nigeria is bordered at the south by the Bights, Benin and Bonny and the Atlantic Ocean. Her One of the prominent features of Nigeria's political experience has been the neighbours in the North, East and West are Niger, Republic of Cameroon and Republic of Benin dominance of the military in the managements of the country. However, since May 29 respectively. They all maintain responsible relationship with her. 1999, the country has been operating a Democratic System of Government.
Nigeria has two distinct seasons the dry and the rainy season. The dry season runs Visitor Information from November to March while the rainy season runs from April to October. Being the Nigeria has a network of air, waterway, land and rail routes all attracting increasing levels of Tropics, (Tropic of Capricorn) the rains are understandably heavy. In the north of traffic in persons and cargo. Prospecting visitors will benefit from contacting any of the Nigeria, the dry season is longer. The landscape runs from equatorial rain belt in the numerous travel agencies for practical advice on the best means of accessing different south to arid desert in the north. Most visitors prefer visiting during the dry season. sections of the country. There are also a number of good hotels that can render this service
and also provide reliable hospitality services. The country's currency is the Naira and kobo Nigeria is richly endowed in mineral resources which include crude oil, coal, lime stone, (N:k), wit6h One hundred Kobo equaling One Naira. The Central Bank of Nigeria is tin, iron ore, gold, bitumen, and bauxite. She also has a rich supply of timber, cocoa, responsible for issuing currency notes and coins; and there are 25 banks which offer a wide palm produce, corn, rice, beans, cassava, groundnuts, soya bean and edible salt as spectrum of services including international money transfer. well as cash crops. Her population is put at about 140,020,952 million, making her the most populous Black Country in the world. Nigeria's numerous ethnic groups speak several distinct and related languages, its lingua
franca is English. It may also be useful to contact the Nigerian Tourism Development Nigeria is the world's sixth largest producer of crude oil which makes her a prominent Corporation or the National Association of Nigerian Travel Agencies (whose addresses are member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and African included in this Executive Desk Diary). Petroleum Producers Association (APPA). There has been a concerted effort to exploit the country's natural gas resources, an initiative being driven by the Nigerian liquefied Today, aside from the Federal and State owned radio and television stations and newspapers, Natural Gastimited (Nigerian LNG limited). there are a good number of privately owned, ultra modern radio and television stations, some
Her Rich cultural and artistic values are another significant quality of the country. Her of which have satellite services, linking Nigeria to the international media. There is also a rich people are industrious and hospitable, with most of the population running small scale pick of privately owned newspapers, magazines and professional journals published on a commercial activities in urban and rural sellings. Nigeria has rich cultural antecedents. daily, weekly, monthly or quarterly basis. Most of these publications utilize that latest These cover sculpting (including the Nok culture), painting, poetry, drama and music. technology in their operations. There are also a number of companies, Nigerian There is unassailable evidence that people in the Nok era were very knowledgeable Telecommunications included, offering telecommunication services for local and international about iron smelting. There are also the terra-colla sculptures and Igbo-Ukwu castings purposes. The scope of operations of the organizations in this sector is expected to increase which date back to many centuries. This is in the form of works such as the Nok Tsrra- with time. cottas and Igbo-Ukwu castings of an area suffused in rich culture for many centuries. Visitors are expected to arrive in the country only after obtaining a valid visa for the Political Structure duration and purpose of their visit (only citizens of the Economic Community of West Known today as Nigeria, (culled from Niger area) this did not come about until 1914 African States are exempted). when the protectorates of northern and southern Nigeria were amalgamated. Today, Nigeria operates a federal system of government with 36 states and Federal Capital Visas are usually issued within 72 hours of the request. They are expected to have Territory known as Abuja. Nigeria obtained her independence from Great Britain on received vaccinations against smallpox, malaria and yellow ever. They are allowed October 1, 1960. in October 1963, she became a Republic. At that time, there were no more than four liters of liquor at the point of entry while items such as three regions i.e. the Northern, Western and Eastern Regions. In 1964, a fourth, Mid- wristwatches, cosmetics, cameras and other personal effects are allowed duty free Western Region was added. A twelve-state political structure came into subject to quantities. Other goods attract 'on-the-spot' duties. Internationally known illegal substances are not allowed in the country.
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APPENDIX 4 STATES, CAPITALS, LGAS AND APPELLATIONS
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APPENDIX 5 STATES AND THEIR NATURAL RESOURCES
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