BElWEEN 'mE SPECIES 70 which bear upon the casuistry of our rela ism. All this is written in a style particu tions with animals--e.g., "the relative value larly plain, simple, and pe.rsonal, and pro of animal and human life, the relative value vides, I think, the chief warrant for Frey's and weight of anirrL"l.l and human suffering, the presenting this book as a "critical introduc alleged impossibility of valuing animal su.f tion completely accessible to non fering without valuing animal life" (p. 168). philosophers, students, and the educated In his final footnote, he pror:lises to deal public" (p. ix). Despite the clarity of the with these issues in a forthcomi.ng book, prose, some of these constituencies will which is to be a critical assessment of mo likely find some later sections tough going; dern mJral vegetarianism. Rig~ts,. ~.lLLng at the srune time, bearing in mind the scope and ~~~ge.r:iQ.~ is that book. of the intended audience may explain features of the text which will strike philosophers as The focus of the first !x.JOk was to de odd. I have in mind here his rel::€ated app
71 BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES strongest possible form of the argument. For fore considering this part of Frey's posi ex~nple, in assessing the suffering argument tion, his criticisms of tile arguments from he balances off the savings in animal suffer rights and from the wrongfulness of killing ing against the costs in human suffering deserve some attention. which, given his premises, is fair enough, as far as it goes. But he completely fails to consider the savings in human suffering which RIGHTS could follow from a shift to a less wasteful, vegetarian diet. Part III is a sustained critique of While marrying both the animal and the moral rights. Rights, for Frey, are distrac human welfare strains of the argument might tions empty of tlleoretically defensible con bolster the case for moral vegetarianism, it tent. Rights appeals lnay have some rhetori wouldn't fundamentally change the character cal force, but they contribute nothing to of the position which Frey attacks. He in reasoned resolution of !!'Oral problems. veighs against a "conditional" or "negative" Rights impart no gain in clarity, preC1Slon, vegetarianisrn--i.e., a position which enjoins or insight to our handling of !!'Oral issues. meat-eating not because of the intrinsic What's more, if there were anything to be wrongfulness of consuming flesh but because gained by talk of rights, an act-utilitarian of vegetarianism's effectiveness as a tactic basis could be given for lliem which would be against factory farming. much superior to the current non-consequen tial approaches characteristically used to Factory farming is wrong, it is alleged, undergird rights. because (a) such methods of rearing and slaughter violate animals' rights or (b) such Frey explores three reasons why appeals methods involve the killing of animals, which to moral rights are vacuous. The first rea is wrong, or (c) animals so reared suffer son plays on the obscurities of the relation greatly and hence are wrongly treated. Frey ship between the concept of a rroral right and consistently tries to drive a wedge between the distinction between right and wrong. the alleged wrongs to animals involved in There surely are ways of wronging someone failing to respect tileir rights, killing that don't, on anyone's account, involve them, or causing them pain, on the one hand, violating any of their rights, Frey suggests. and consuming them on the other. This is an
D~portant feature of his overall case, since He may well be right about that, and it the second feature of his attack--discredit is an issue that deserves clear scrutiny. ing the grounds upon which intensive farming writers from Aristotle to John Ladd have is supposed to be wrong succeeds (on his own argued that moral notions like justice and account) only against the arguments from the oft-associated idea of rights are rele rights and killing. Frey admits that it is vant only in certain contexts. [2] But just wrong to cause animals to suffer. But that what contexts those are may be more proble:lla wrongfulness does not mystically transfer to tic than Frey realizes, to judge from his own eating animals--or even to purchasing dead example. Husband Heathcliff adamantly refu animals for food from those who have caused ses to serve wife Cathy fried eggs, despite them to suffer in the course of preparing her ardent desire for them, and further, them for market. Refraining from eating despite the fact that making eggs in that animals is only !!'Orally rnandated if that is fashion wouldn't discommode Heathcliff one the most effective way of reducing the all'Ount bit. Now, Frey would have his readers agree, of anirnal suffering. As Frey sees it, it is although Heathcliff may well be doing wrong not. to Cathy, it would surely be silly to under stand that as a matter of violating Cathy's Clearly, then, one issl;le that Frey's right to fried eggs for breakfast. book invites us to consider is the relation ship between engaging directly in an imll'Oral I don 't know that the matter is quite as practice and benefitting from and supporting plain as Frey puts it. One might wonder just that practice. This, indeed, is a crucial why Heathcliff is so indifferent to the de issue in tenus of his attack on moral vege sires of his wife and suspect that the objec tarianism, since he will allow that factory tionable character of Heathcliff's action farming is morally objectionable insofar as comes less from the frustration Cathy may it causes avoidable net suffering. But be actually feel and !!'Ore from a certain atti- BEIWEEN THE SPECIES 72 tude that Heathcliff's action expresses it seenB likely that there would be sane toward her. It may tu:m out, after all, to difficult priority disputes. But tile criti be hard D) capture this intuitive sense of cal line that Frey takes here is simply to what's wrong here with accounts that reduce point out that the kinds of rights claims everything to consequences, especially if tilat people actually dispute ~ut'--e.g., those are understood as consequences of which disagreem~t about U1e right to keep and bear CatllY has sanehow to be avlare. For, if arms--seem Ve:J:.y remote from the allegedly Heathcliff's recalcitrance here is a way of fundamental right. expressing his cont~npt for his partner, tilen it se~s plausible to say that he has failed However, this does not seem a decisive to dccord to Cathy the respect dUf~ her--and criticism. Dworkin, I take it, is carunitted thereby violated a right she has, not to to such rights following (if, in fact, they fried eggs, but to her spouse's respect i~~d do) from the right to equal concern and re concenl. spect; Frey is dubious. The way to resolve this is for Dworkin, or someone of like mind, Frey could surely respond that all tllis to take his best shot at working out a deri is slinply lY2gging the question; it doesn't do vation and then for Frey and his allies to the first thing toward showing that any of dig out flaws in it. C:l.t.':ty's "rights" have been violated. But the case was presented for intuitive judgment, If, taking anotiler tack, one postulates and it could well produce intuitions which several basic flDral rights, as do tlrinkers would ill fit act-utilitarianism. Some sort like H. J. McCloskey and J. L. Mackie, one is of non-consequentialist approach mi Frey's second line of attack is that rights are superfluous at best. They are justified, if at all, by the valid =ral principles which stand behind them, and if you allow the principles, the rights have no work to do. Sane non-consequentialist wri ters slip back and forth between rights-talk and principle-talk without seeing much of an issue. [3] For them, as for ot~ers, the real issue here may not be whether there are "rights" or "principles" but whether the best-defensible moral theory is consequen at a basic level. Such conflicts, as McClos tialist or not. Frey does not directly argue key admits, may not be resolvable rationally. that tile priority problem is a serious one; rather, he goes on to claim that the most If part of the point of secular et.'1ics fundamental problem is the arbitrariness of is to provide the conditions for public dis non-consequentialist accounts of moral norms. cussion of moral matters, tllen the intuition Such views leave us to fall back on our own ism which seems to infect rights-based theo viscera in order to discover fundamental ries to one extent or another is a serious moral principles (or rights) and to adjudi problem. Sane wo.rkers in this tradition- cate the conflicts which arise between them. like Tom Regan, whose discussion of the theo Recent efforts in the literature include retical foundation for rights in his The case systems which have but one fundamental fo~ Anlinal Rights is not mentioned by Frey- right--e.g., the right to equal concern or develop mechanisms designed to produce "qual respect, as prominently feature in Ronald ified" moral intuitions; the intuitions qual Dworkin's :raking Rights Seriously. All other ify if they pass a number of tests--which rights are derived, and rights conflicts themselves seem largely intuitive. But it settled with reference to the fundamental seems not unreasonable to believe that such right. But even with common ground of this "qualifying intuitions" may be rather broadly sort, without an additional battery of auxil shared. And, in any event, the general tac iary (and possibly contentious) principles, tic of checking theoretical judgments against 73 BEI'WEEN 'TI-lE SPECIES intuitions seems hard to avoid altogether; We can note, for instance, that rights are even given the difficulties of appeal to not all of a piece, neither in point of their intuition, it seems that a moral theory which moral importance nor in their resistance to is totally divorced from cO!lllOCln lTDral beliefs utility. We can note further that we think would be of no more use in providing the it sometimes wrong to exercise a right. Ob grounds for shared rational discourse on servations of this kind may support an act these matters than those which merely eleva utilitarian theory "amenable to individual ted the idiosyncracies of a particular social rights" using a concept of individual rights class to the status of absolute moral princi "amenable to (act-)utilitarian theory." pies. This approach seems to miss the point. Many rights theories--~Eckie's and Re Surely, the fundamental feature about anti gan's among them--dismiss consequentialism act-utilitarian intuitions is that they are because of their impression that such views expressions of the notion that there is some outrage basic moral intuitions, and then seek thing about moral situations that utility out accounts which can capture these intui does not capture. Successful secret killings tions. Such accounts seem crucially to in of persons are wrong, we think, and not be volve such non-consequentialist elements as cause v,e can rig things so as to make ·the "principles" and "rights." The acceptability consequences bad. In fact, it isn't clear, of such views rests on the probity of appeals on the act-utilitarian view, why we ought to to intuitions, on the assessment of the pre try to make sanething bad, if it isn't bad valence of anti-consequentialist intuitions, already. Why not reject the intuition, ra and on the correctness of the judgment that ther than cater to it? If people think that consequentialism hasn't the resources to something is wrong when it isn't or think it account for such ostensibly contrary intui is worse than it actually is, should we tions ~ as there are. Frey attacks all these strive to reeducate them or strive to change claims. the moral reality of the situation? Frey would presumably answer this question in The strategy here is encanpassing, to tenns of the consequences following on either say the least. Frey appears to be arguing course of action. It follows from such a that appeals to intuition are irrelevant and view that the proper response to take to that there are as many significant pro-conse actions or practices judged wrong on the quentialist intuitions as anti-consequential basis of anti-act-utilitarian intuitions will ist intuitions. At the same time, he tries itself be a matter of utility, and this re to portray act-utilitarianism as a moral view sult, I should think, will outrage anti-act which has the resources to deal with osten utilitarian intuitions as much as anything. sibly anti-consequentialist intuitions. I If the morality of secret and painless kill think his attempt here is unsuccessful. ings, say, in any fundamental part is a mat ter of whether there are effective techniques Rights can be seen as barriers against for brainwashing those of us who feel that it decisions made solely on consequentialist is wrong, then no non-utilitariaI) is likely grounds, in deference to the supposedly coun to feel that a proper account of the matter ter-intuitive character of these decisions. has been reached. But how high a barrier is required? The problem of determining the strength of rights As Frey goes on to admit (in Chapter is seen by Frey as affording an opening to 10), the system of act-utilitarian rights he the act-utilitarian. A carefully chosen offers gives us only "shadow" rights. They scheme of rights may have both a high accept do not "trump" utility; rather, they are ance utility and a (generally) high observ created on a foundation where the utilities ance utility; such a scheme will resist vio of accepting them and observing them as lation on the basis of merely marginal incre guides to action resistant to mere marginal ments in utility. Various measures can be increments of utility are carefully factored taken to increase the utility of observing in and buttressed round with extrinsic "Util the scheme--e.g., legal and informal sanc ity-intensifiers." But as we have seen, the tions for departing fran its provlslons. "extrinsic utility-intensifier" move sets up Additionally, we can review our concept of a serious conflicts with just the sort of moral right--or, as Frey puts it, "loosen certain intuitions that the strategy was originally preconceptions about rights"--which will make designed to accommodate. While in the ab the act-utilitarian account more palatable. sence of such intensifiers, the position BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES 74 seems more shadowy than ever. dubious, I think., because there is no good reason to suppose that resolving lTIOral dis Frey spends some time exploring R. M. putes in terms of explicit calculations of Hare's "two-level" acoount of moral thinking, utility will actually rnaximize the overall which distinguishes a "critical" and an "in uhlity. It may well be the case that the tuitive" level in our reflections, locates utilitarian good is best Pursued indirectly- rights at the intuitive level, and assigns i.e., by encX)uraging !!.oi J.2 If Frey is right, it seens that he has Many defenders of animals may not be at dealt his own position something of a blow. all distressed by Frey's sustained argument After all, his own attempt to locate rights against rights; with some notable exceptions within act-utilitarianism is defective, and (e.g., Joel Feinberg and Tom Regan) many of not only on the basis of the argument of this the rrost influential rights theorists find review; he himself admits that it yields only that animals have no place in their systems. shadow rights. Hare's attempt is also unsa 'utilitarian L~eories characteristically de tisfactory. . So, despite his claim to b'1e mand much less for moral oonsiderability; oontrary, Frey provides us with· no reason to mere sentience will do. For this reason, think that a rights approach is compatible Frey regards the utilitarian argwnent that with act-utilitarianism. Does this matter? oontemporary farming practices cause much After all, we ha.'Je been assured that rights llIOre pain and suffering than they do pleasure oontribute noti1ing to our deliberations about to be the vegetarian's llIOSt plausible line. morality. But before eXffinining "the pain and suf As I understand it, much of utilitarian fering argument," Frey oonsiders the attempt ism's appeal comes from its promise to afford to found llIOral vegetarianism upon an appeal a oontext for shared discourse about norali to the wrongness of killing. He is skeI;'tical ty. The appeal to non-oonsequentialist con about any such attempt on what seems pritnari siderations--whether they be rights or prin ly rhetorical grounds: it is simply going to ciples--is vitiated by the fact that they be hard to oonvince people that they ought to rely on inbJitions to adjudicate disputes, become vegetarians on such a basis, given how and it is precisely such intuitions tl1at are re(~ndite the issues are. Frey regards the likely to be in dispute. But if oonsequen issue of the morality of killing to be one on tialistic results outrage widely shared in which we are deeply split along utilitarian/ tuitions, it seems unlikely that the added non-utilitarian lines; the oonsiderations efficiency of that approach will compensate that either side adduces to explain just why for its revisionist nature. And, what is killing is wrong strike the other as hardly more, it is not clear that utilitarianism to be credited, especially when someone on will actually be a better basis for public either side tries to advance an argument for moral discourse, in part because of disputes extending the prohibition against killing to about what oonsequences mi']ht actually ensue cover anitnals. fran what decisions, about how those oonse quences would affect utility, and so forth. It is, I suppose, quite appropriate for Its place in public disoourse is all the rrore applied philosophy to be particularly oon 75 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES cerned about the persuasive force of a given research (as shown by the appeal to benefit) line of arg1.11'nent, as well as about the argu and since there are no morally relevant dif ment 's soundness. I don't, however, think ferences between such animals and sorne humans that the situation is just as he paints it; (e.g., profoundly mentally retarded infants) in my view, the account of the wrongness of such humans are also permissible subjects of killing put forward by act-utilitarianism such research. Utilitarians would generally constitutes one of its major theoretical appeal to "side effects" to ward off such a embarrassments. result, but Frey isn't impressed-the revul sion that Harry would feel at this rncdest Perhaps it is from a sense of the vul proposal is a matter, after all, of psycholo nerability of act-utilitarianism in this gical contingencies of which education of the respect that Frey is concerned to derronstrate proper sort might well rid us. (Recall my the weakness of other positions as well. One objections to Frey's own use of contrived would think that if Frey chose at this point side effects to bolster "act-utilitarian to discuss the work of others, he would se rights.") Perhaps Frey would put more weight lect someone like Regan, or Steve F. Sapont on side effects if he tried to defend another zis, whose views about the wrongness of kill ing animals are well-known fu,d carefully argued. Instead, he chooses to discuss a writer of less philosophical sophistication, Michael W. Fox, whose position, as Frey shows, suffers from a number of confusions. Fox is taken as attempting a defense of the "reverence for [all] life" position, which isn't hard to make look dubious. others of Frey's arguments in this con nection are directed more carefully, and at implication of his account here: that rrar more substantial targets. Using a distinc ginal humans could be produced for the table tion introduced by James Rachels, between as well as for the laboratory. "being alive" and "having a life," Frey ar gues persuasively that the Ilajor fcod animal, In another place I have discussed Frey's the chicken, cannot reasonably be said to "inverted espousal" of the marginal cases have much of a life; this point is particu argument and have argued that his failure to larly deft in that it brings to mind Torn examine the erootions surrounding the birth of Regan's "subject of a life" notion and the a "marginal human"--in particular, the sense associated criterion introduced in his The of tragedy such an event evokes in us--allows Case for Animal Rights of "one year old mam him to miss morally relevant, counter-factual mals" as rroral paradigms. Mother target differences between such humans and animals. that brings Regan to mind is the "marginal Frey is himself much affected by these feel cases argument"--i.e., the claim, often ap ings--his conclusion here is one he is uncorn pealed to by Regan in his earlier work, that fortable with--but he is willing in the end since many animals are on a par with many to disown them and mark for elimination via (damaged) humans in all rrorally relevant re-education. As I see it, his erootions are respects, whatever noral status the latter responding to a richer set of features than enjoy must be accorded as well to the fonner. those he consciously considers and finds In past work, including Interests and Rights, wanting as noral disanalogies. [4] Frey was inclined to think that morally rele vant differences could be found in such areas All this also serves once again to high as potentiality, the possibility of ensoul light the discrepancies between act-utilitar ment, and in physical resemblance. He now ianism and cOlllUOn morality. It is perhaps (wisely, it seems to me) regaIds all of these worth bearing in mind in considering Frey's points as inadequate bases for any morally defense of intensive meat production that it important difference. But although he now is mere contingencies--in principle elirnin accepts the marginal cases argument, he able--which make it wrong for factory farms stands it on its head: it is the moral to be turning out h= meat. status attributed to damaged humans that needs to be revised downwards. Since animals Frey's "killing" section also contains are acceptable for use in serious scientific substantial chapters on the doctrine of dou BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES 76 ble effect and on problems in the development Frey responds that there is more to the ga~ of a genuine or "deep" ecological ethic. eration of utility than mere numbers, that Both of these chapters are significant in the these people need to maintain a certain qual light of the currently vigorous discussions ity of life for their existence to be of real of these topics in the literature, but their overall benefit, and that there's no reason relationship to the central theme of the why t~e availability of meat resources book--the examination and rebuttal of tlrree shouldn't be one of the criteria determining types of argument for moral vegetarianism--is em optimal population policy. a bit eccentric. This argument is very weak; one can only suppose that it has been influenced by the SUFFERING lamentable way vegetables are prepared in Frey's British hane. There is no reason why In a transition trom his consideration the availability of meat resources should be of killing to that of suffering, Frey exa among t~e criteria for optimal PJPulatioo--no mines Peter Singer's views on the "replace reasons affecting either health or the quali ability argument." This argument is anotl1er ty and variety of available gustatory sensa-· of the curious features of act-i1tilit~'irian tions. If, all other things being equal, a ism's account of the wrongness of killing. hunan population of, say, 2x could produce It points out that since the wrongness of two time:3 the amo\mt of utility as could a killing many animals cannot be explained in population of x, minus on!:i whatever utility terms of their own preferences to remain loss accrues solely fran the eating of fruits alive, nor in terms of side effects, L~en it and vegetables rather than meat, it seems must reside solely in the diminution of the incredible that this one loss could overbal sum total of happiness in the world. But in ance all the other positive features supplied the case of hillldreds of millions of food by the larger population. Perhaps the PJint animals, the utility lost by their death is that Frey ought to make here is that the made up for by their replacements--the next argument attempts to rescue moral vegetarian huge generation of food animals who will lead ism in a way that does not directly regard lives of roughly equal utility. So, in point anirral interest. For, if such arguments are of the loss of utility, killing animals for to be allowed, the population point as dis food is not objectionable. It is also im cussed here is academic; the fact is that port.-:mt to PJint out that we are not in a there are presently irrmense munbers of people position to substantially increase utility whose lives might well be enhanced--even simply by ceasing to kill food animals, while saved--if we were to alter our wasteful me cont.inuing to allow new generations of equal thods of protein production. size to enter the world, nor is it likely that we could even maintain current levels of Frey's response to the second point- animal-generated utility if we stopped using that ralslng and replacing miserable, inten those animals for food. Were we to do so, it sively farmed animals represents a net drain seems lmlikely that we could maintain any on utility--is more interesting, particularly thing like current levels of animal popula in that it sOilllds what will be a major theme tion. in his response to moral vegetarianism' s ~st eDrnpelling eDnsideration, the argument from So, the Singer-type vegetarian--him!her suffer.ing. He names this theme the "amelior self an act-utilitarian--needs to maintain ation" argument; in the present context, it either that vegetarianism will provide com eDnsists in ~~e claim that meat-eaters could pensatory utilities elsewhere or that L~e respond to Singer's challenge not by becaning lives of intensively farmed animals are an vegetarians but by working to improve eDnm actual utility drain, so that the replacement tions on factory farms such that the anil11rJ.ls strategy actually only replaces net misery living there might enjoy a positive utility with net misery. balance and, hence, would be replaceable without diminishing overall utility. One Singer has made both moves, and Frey important consideration here is how much colmters both. The "greater compensation" these conditions would have to be improved; strategy takes the particular form of noting Frey suggests that the required improvements that with non-rneat diets, the earth could may be fairly manageable; not all farm ani sustain a larger PJPulation of persons, pre mals, it must be admitted, are treated as sumably richer potential utility generators. badly as veal calves or as battery caged 77 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES hens. Another question concerns the level of has been or will be at all effective in this improvement that would be acceptable; the regard. Further, the reform position advo replac~ility argument would seem to support cated by the concerned individual can pro the view that morality is satisfied so long gressively reduce animal suffering without as animals don't suffer an altogether miser exacting the cost that vegetarianism entails. able existence. Singer sometimes writes as though he espouses what is here called a What cost? As Frey portrays it, com "single (p:tinful) experience view," and in plete conversion to vegetarianism would have other places as t.l-tough he accepts the miser a massive negative imp:tct on the economies of able life perspective; other cut-off points entire nations. The collapse of the meat are, of course, at least imaginable. A third industry would have terrible repercussions question will be one of tactics: how may we throughout the entire food industry. Great best obtain whatever level of amelioration we numbers of people would be thrown out of determine to be necessary? work, and tax revenues would be seriously reduced at just the time when subsidies and Frey takes a more sanguine view than social programs to offset lost earnings would Singer concerning the inmensity of farm ani be p:trticularly required. 0ti1er sources of mal suffering and more consistently espouses livelihood--the clothing, phanoaceutical, the miserable existence view. But the major veterinary, p..lblishing, and advertising in difference is that Frey advocates a very dustries--would be depressed as well. different tactic than does Singer in respond ing to animal suffering. His champion is not Frey, I think it must be admitted, has a the nural vegetarian but, rather, the "con point in principle. If act-utilitarians cerned individual. II Concerned individuals really are going to base moral decisions are nnved by the arguments and descriptions solely on consequences, then they have to in Singer's writings; they wish to end the spend more time than they generally do in p:tinful raising and killing of animals. But working out just what the consequences will they express this conviction not through be. Nonetheless, some scepticism about forswearing the consumption of meat. Rather, Frey's dire predictions is perhaps warranted, they and, as mentioned earlier, Frey omits to list the benefits to humans accruing from a shift (a) strive to improve conditions on to vegetarianism. factory farms, to eradicate some of the devices and practices upon Steve F. Sap:Jntzis, in his forthcoming them, and to replace them with more 11orals, Reason, and ~imals, has noted that, humane ones, (b) divert resources grave as they are, Frey's points have the into the developnent of new and character of temporary dislocations; the relatively painless methods of utility deficit they cause would in time be breeding, feeding and killing ani made up for by the lack of animal p:tin, a mals, of new pain-preventing and source of positive utility which will contin pain-killing drugs, of new types of ue indefinitely. But I think that this re tranquilizers and sedatives, etc., sponse doesn't quite meet Frey's point. On and (c) seek further appropriate his account, the concerned individual's stra breakthroughs in genetic engineer tegy would secure the benefit of lessened ing. (p. 182) animal pain without the expense of massi ve corporate, cultural, or individual disloca The remainder of Frey's book is largely tions--dislocations that would be likely to an attempt to show that the concerned indivi occur even if the shift were a gradual one. dual's choice of tactic is far sounder than This is because the goal of the concerned that of the moral vegetarian. individual includes a thriving meat industry in which animals have lives that are worth The most fundamental p:trt of Frey's living--ideally, p:tin-free lives. argument in favor of the "concerned indivi dual tactic" is the complex clai.rn that it is This consideration is buttressed by the by no means evident that the interests sup claim that the concerned individual's tactics porting factory farming can only be combatted are more likely to work than the vegetari effectively through vegetarianism, Singer to an's. Frey notes that despite the rise in the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, it the number of vegetarians over the p:tst thir isn't clear that the call to vegetarianism ty years, the amount of meat produced has BEIWEm THE SPECIES 78 skyrocketed. In the face of this, it will their industry. But why should they feel any such threat, if Frey is correct about the obviously take a massive nm~ of converts to luoral vegetarianism to significantly miti impotence of the vegetarian strategy? gate the suffering of fann animals; the im pact of anyone person will be· extremely The deepest issue, however, must be small--perhaps nil--and this will certainly this: ~ shoul~ IlDral ~~~tarianism and ~~ tactics of the concerned individual be seen reduce the odds that enough people will join ------_.- - ~ exclusiv~ choic~? t..'1e boycott (aw-etreness of this J;Xlint will mutually Consider yet a third possibility: the CY.:mcerned moral vegetarian. Concerned moral vegetarians both refuse to eat meat and at the same time engage in other activities designed to improve t.'1e lot of animals. It seems likely that it is this strategy which is of optillal effectiveness, for it would put the meat industry in the position of having to face both ethical argwnents for ending the exploitation of animals and an economic boy cott that would force the industry to change it,,; behavior. If it is known that the lead ers of the luovemeJlt have behind them a group of people not only willing to write legisla tors and to attend rallies but also to put a crimp in the profits of agri-business, they are likely to get a muc'1 luore syrnpathetic hearing. Perhaps Frey could concede that a con cerned individual can be a vegetarian if he/she wishes; he might simply say that there is nothing obligatory about it. But, given the political effectiveness of vegetarianism, anyone properly sensitive to the very "pain fu..~er damage enthusiasm for vegetarianism, ful practices" (p. 195) characteristic of and so on). intensive farming, but who nevertheless re fuses to stop eating meat, has sane explain Are things different for the concerned ing to do. Vegetarianism is, for him/her, at individual? Surely, there isn't much that least a E!:-~ facie obligation. Further, one person can do in the face of the power of given the myriad of lUOrally worthy causes in the agri-business lobbies--a mass luovement is this world, there may well be uany who are needed to have much of an impact. And, given concerned about the i.mm:>ral aspects of . cur that fact, won't exactly the same .pressures rent food production but who are too involved work against someone contemplating whether to working for the women's mova-nent or . opJ;Xlsing become a concerned individual as those work the arms race, and so fort..h, to spend the ing against the potential moral vegetarian? sort of time and energy required by the con ce.med individual strategy. In such a case, Frey takes considerable pains to rebut they can aid the alnelioration of animal suf the charge that the concerned individual is fering by joining the boycott--a strategy insincere or inconsistent in continuing to recommended by the fact that it consumes very eat meat, but it seems that the deeper issue little extra time or energy--and thus streng is why the individual's scheme is likely to then the hand of the concerned moral vegetar be any more effective than its competitor. ians who spearhead the movement, carrying the Perhaps he bases this idea on the hope that fight into legislatures and board rooms. The the meat industry will see the amelioration obverse of this strategy--relinquishing vege route as an acceptable C01-npromise between tarianism while retaining one's concern--is continuing the current path of optimizing open to this objection: among the strategies profit by regarding animals simply as "bio the concerned individual will use is the machines" and the virtual elimination of economic power of boycott. He/she will thus 79 Bl'..""'IWEEN THE SPECIES advocate that others ought to boycott meat and wil~ be inconsistent if he/she urges this up:>n others yet shirks it him/herself. This is not because of sane principle that we must Strong the arm, strong the bow have nothing to do with anything of which we The crystal stream • • • morally disapprove but for the particular And so falls the doe. reason that he/she must advocate vegetarian ism for others and, unless he/she is rele Strong the arm, strong the bow vantly different fran his/her audience, he/ The red-yellow leaves she must tak.e his/her own advice. Mother, I saw you go. Frey might p:>int out here that even if Strong the arm, strong the bow the concerned maral vegetarian strategy is The November frost liable to be more effective than either the They said you were spared the snow. concerned individual or the maral vegetarian alone, the target of the campaign is not one Strong the arm, strong the bow at which ~1imal liberationists custanarily The crystal stream • aim. It is not the reform but the elimina You drank there once long ago. tion of factory fanning that is called for. Of course, the question of how much refonn is Now, another autumn necessary cannot be said to have been an Another bow • • • s-wered by Frey's text, and until that is clarified, whether the needed reform is can patible with any kind of factory fanning is unclear. But even if it is, the alteration in the lives of fann animals will have to be substantial. If, after needed reforms, there is still something morally objectionable about the rearing, killing, or consumption of animals, it will take something other than act-utilitarianism to illuminate just what it is. Notes 1. See, for example, reviews by Sumner, (Philosophical Review 92 (1983», Steinbock, (Philosophical Books 22 (1981», Clark (Mind 91 (1982», and VanDeVeer (canadian Philoso phical ~eview (1981». 2. See Ladd's "Legalism and Medical Ethics," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (March, 1979) • 3. Regan's The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) is a good example. 4. In my "Tragedy of Marginal Cases, \I AN N COTTRELL FREE presented to the American Philosophical Asso-' ciation in March, 1985. Bethesda, MD BElWEEN THE SPECIES 80