Moral Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics
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BElWEEN 'mE SPECIES 70 which bear upon the casuistry of our rela ism. All this is written in a style particu tions with animals--e.g., "the relative value larly plain, simple, and pe.rsonal, and pro of animal and human life, the relative value vides, I think, the chief warrant for Frey's and weight of anirrL"l.l and human suffering, the presenting this book as a "critical introduc alleged impossibility of valuing animal su.f tion completely accessible to non fering without valuing animal life" (p. 168). philosophers, students, and the educated In his final footnote, he pror:lises to deal public" (p. ix). Despite the clarity of the with these issues in a forthcomi.ng book, prose, some of these constituencies will which is to be a critical assessment of mo likely find some later sections tough going; dern mJral vegetarianism. Rig~ts,. ~.lLLng at the srune time, bearing in mind the scope and ~~~ge.r:iQ.~ is that book. of the intended audience may explain features of the text which will strike philosophers as The focus of the first !x.JOk was to de odd. I have in mind here his rel::€ated app<eal monstrate that ai1irnals--indeed, all creatures 1:0 the "controversial" nature of some of the that lack language--fail to have interests claims made by some proponents of aniJnal which are deserving of moral consideration. rights as a basis for rejecting those claims. Interests and Rights, in my view, had naJ"ly It seew.s a bit odd for a philosofl!'1er--even if virtues: it was written in a clear and en working in an "applied area"--to be shy of gaging style and drew attention to important controversy; lnaybe Frey's idea is that dis f&"ltures of a crucial element of animal Ii cussions that ultimately need to engage the beration and animal rights-type argwnents, as public cannot proceed along lines that are well as of much of contemporary moral theory overly contestible. But !uore of this later. in general, vi~., the concept of interests. However, the general critical reaction to the Frey surveys a nwnber of possible ra !xXJk supports my judgment that it was not tionales for vegetarianism and concludes that successful in establishing its main thesis the fllDst promising, considered from the point (in fact, Frey himself retreats from at least of view of convincing people to lay aside one important position of the first brXlk, as their oITU1ivorous habits are moral. Arguments I discuss below) • [l] The current book is based on aesthetics, religion, waste, or fundamentally an attack on arguments for "personal style" are just too idiosyncratic; vegetarianism that hinge on the ability of the argument that vegetarianism is healthier animals to feel pain--or, as Frey prefers to than other diets is difficult to assess and put it, "unpleasant sensations" (p. 175)- not likely to overcome a widespread indiffer although arguments based on moral rights and ence to the relationship between entrenched on the alleged wrongfulness of killing are personal habits pnd our health. In any closely exrunined and found wanting as well. event, such points can be met my moderation The conclusion is that neither considerations in consumption and by applying pressure on of eights nor of killing nor even of suffer the meat industry to reduce toxic levels in ing provide one with good grounds to become a their products. vegetarian. The book shares in lnany of the virtues of the earlier one: it is clear, Frey's first part also lets us know that lively, and wide-ranging. It also raises a moral vegetarianism interests him only to the nwnber of points that people concerned about extent that it is based on concern for the morality in general, as well as about the welfare of animals. One may wonder why. moral status of animals, would do well to Surely, the argument that he focuses most of consider. Does it do any better with respect his attention on, the argwnent from suffer to its central claim? Finally, I think not. ing, must be as salient concerning Ethiopians But along the way there is a good deal to as it is respecting veal calves. His answer repay a reader's attention. is that it is concern for animal, rather than for human, welfare which has reanimated moral Rig~ts, Killing an~ SufferiQ.9.: is written vegetarianism; it is in the light of the rise in five parts, each generally consisting of a of intensive fanning ifrlat the whole question series of short chapters. Part I is intro of what we eat has asswned a new sense of ductory matter; it descends from broad re moral urgency. Thus, limiting his focus is flections on the relation of reason and ac certainly reasonable in principle; there are tion, through strata in which moral reasons hard issues in plenty just focusing on animal for acting as a vegetarian are distinguished welfare. But it should be kept in mind that from non-moral reasons for so acting, to a the form of argwnent for moral vegetarianism discussion of the types of moral vegetarian which he ultimately rejects is not the 71 BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES strongest possible form of the argument. For fore considering this part of Frey's posi ex~nple, in assessing the suffering argument tion, his criticisms of tile arguments from he balances off the savings in animal suffer rights and from the wrongfulness of killing ing against the costs in human suffering deserve some attention. which, given his premises, is fair enough, as far as it goes. But he completely fails to consider the savings in human suffering which RIGHTS could follow from a shift to a less wasteful, vegetarian diet. Part III is a sustained critique of While marrying both the animal and the moral rights. Rights, for Frey, are distrac human welfare strains of the argument might tions empty of tlleoretically defensible con bolster the case for moral vegetarianism, it tent. Rights appeals lnay have some rhetori wouldn't fundamentally change the character cal force, but they contribute nothing to of the position which Frey attacks. He in reasoned resolution of !!'Oral problems. veighs against a "conditional" or "negative" Rights impart no gain in clarity, preC1Slon, vegetarianisrn--i.e., a position which enjoins or insight to our handling of !!'Oral issues. meat-eating not because of the intrinsic What's more, if there were anything to be wrongfulness of consuming flesh but because gained by talk of rights, an act-utilitarian of vegetarianism's effectiveness as a tactic basis could be given for lliem which would be against factory farming. much superior to the current non-consequen tial approaches characteristically used to Factory farming is wrong, it is alleged, undergird rights. because (a) such methods of rearing and slaughter violate animals' rights or (b) such Frey explores three reasons why appeals methods involve the killing of animals, which to moral rights are vacuous. The first rea is wrong, or (c) animals so reared suffer son plays on the obscurities of the relation greatly and hence are wrongly treated. Frey ship between the concept of a rroral right and consistently tries to drive a wedge between the distinction between right and wrong. the alleged wrongs to animals involved in There surely are ways of wronging someone failing to respect tileir rights, killing that don't, on anyone's account, involve them, or causing them pain, on the one hand, violating any of their rights, Frey suggests. and consuming them on the other. This is an D~portant feature of his overall case, since He may well be right about that, and it the second feature of his attack--discredit is an issue that deserves clear scrutiny. ing the grounds upon which intensive farming writers from Aristotle to John Ladd have is supposed to be wrong succeeds (on his own argued that moral notions like justice and account) only against the arguments from the oft-associated idea of rights are rele rights and killing. Frey admits that it is vant only in certain contexts. [2] But just wrong to cause animals to suffer. But that what contexts those are may be more proble:lla wrongfulness does not mystically transfer to tic than Frey realizes, to judge from his own eating animals--or even to purchasing dead example. Husband Heathcliff adamantly refu animals for food from those who have caused ses to serve wife Cathy fried eggs, despite them to suffer in the course of preparing her ardent desire for them, and further, them for market. Refraining from eating despite the fact that making eggs in that animals is only !!'Orally rnandated if that is fashion wouldn't discommode Heathcliff one the most effective way of reducing the all'Ount bit. Now, Frey would have his readers agree, of anirnal suffering. As Frey sees it, it is although Heathcliff may well be doing wrong not. to Cathy, it would surely be silly to under stand that as a matter of violating Cathy's Clearly, then, one issl;le that Frey's right to fried eggs for breakfast. book invites us to consider is the relation ship between engaging directly in an imll'Oral I don 't know that the matter is quite as practice and benefitting from and supporting plain as Frey puts it. One might wonder just that practice. This, indeed, is a crucial why Heathcliff is so indifferent to the de issue in tenus of his attack on moral vege sires of his wife and suspect that the objec tarianism, since he will allow that factory tionable character of Heathcliff's action farming is morally objectionable insofar as comes less from the frustration Cathy may it causes avoidable net suffering.