Appropriating the Masculine Sacred Islamism, Gender, and Mosque Architecture in Contemporary Turkey
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15 Appropriating the Masculine Sacred Islamism, Gender, and Mosque Architecture in Contemporary Turkey Bülent Batuman The mosque has been a major architectural element in Islamic societies. Representing the materializa- tion of religion in the public sphere, mosques have also emerged as landmarks in cities of the Islamic world. As a space of prayer as well as socialization, they have served as a means of maintaining the sense of community and the spatio-practical production of identities built on shared religion. In this respect, their significance has lasted into the modern era. Yet, this does not mean that the social and iconographic functions of the mosque have remained unchanged. On the contrary, mosques have gone through significant transformations under the influence of historical dynamics. This chapter aims to discuss the mosque as a field of contestation regarding two intertwined themes of gender and modernism through the case of Turkey. Mosque architecture in Turkey has always been controversial due to the country’s republican his- tory marked by radical secularism, which has significantly influenced the cultural dynamics of both gender and modernism. One outcome of Turkish secularism was the limiting of religion to the private sphere, denying the mosque a place in the public realm. In contrast to other Muslim societies where mosques have been used as public spaces of gathering and socialization, Turkish mosques have been treated as strictly religious spaces. As I will show, a significant—if unintentional—outcome of this policy was the discouraging of women from attending the mosque and the designation of home as the feminine space of worship and socialization. While the Turkish state succeeded in creating a modern society that has adopted a secular lifestyle, this top-down modernization process has also triggered conservative discontent. The ensuing tension politicized mosque design in the second half of the twentieth century and led to the identification of modernism with state-led secularization. The mimicry of classical Ottoman mosque architecture, in response, emerged as an expression of conservatism. The last decades of the century witnessed the rise of Islamism as a political force in Turkey, similar to other parts of the Islamic world. As a result, all of the cultural signs, symbols, and performances of Islam and Islamism gained visibility in the public sphere. This was simultaneously a process of liberalization and one of scrutiny: in particular, the gendered aspects of piety were subject to criticism raised by female Islamic intellectuals. Mosque architecture has not been free from this process of increased scrutiny. Especially after the rise to power of an Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in 2002, the field of mosque design witnessed an unforeseen level of plurality along with criticisms of the mosque space’s patriarchic character. In this chapter, I will discuss modernism and gender in relation to mosque architecture through the example of two recent mosques built in Ankara and Istanbul. These examples embody significance 270 Appropriating the Masculine Sacred in terms of the long-lasting tension between modernity and tradition in mosque architecture. Inter- estingly, both of these mosques were originally designed by male architects but were “appropriated” by female interior designers throughout their construction processes. I will argue that the political tension that has defined modernism in mosque architecture, together with the rising (feminist) criti- cisms of the intrinsic patriarchy of the social use of mosque space, have opened room for women’s intervention not only as users but also as designers of mosque space. The Mosque in Republican Turkey In Turkey, the radical secularism of the single-party regime that lasted until the end of World War II resulted in the strict control of the religious domain by the state. One of the first measures taken by the young nation-state was the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (hereinafter Diyanet) in 1924 to control all religious activity in the country, including the administration of the existing 12,500 mosques. 1 Within this context, mosque building was merely a response to communal needs. The mosques built in this period were relatively small in size, and no major examples were executed. They were built by builders who followed local traditions in the provinces and followed the example of the existing Ottoman mosques in the larger cities. Mosque architecture was not part of the cultural manifestations of nation building throughout the early republican years, which made Turkey an exceptional case among the nation-states established in countries with Islamic populations. This in turn resulted in the lack of a debate on the iconography of the mosque until the 1950s. Ottoman mosque architecture was continued due to the persistence of building traditions. While the radical modernism of a single-party regime enforced in the early republican years was hostile to the mosque as a national symbol, the Democrat Party that came to power in the wake of World War II sought reconciliation with the country’s Islamic identity. Although the Democrat Party also supported secular modernization, it did not hesitate to use the mosque as a symbol of national identity. Thus, the party initiated the construction of a mosque in Ankara, the new capital and the modern showcase of the republic. The winning project of a national competition in 1957, the Kocatepe Mosque project by Vedat Dalokay and Nejat Tekelioğlu, displayed a modernist design. The scheme followed the traditional mosque layout in its central dome, minarets, and physical organiza- tion. Yet, its innovative thin concrete shell structure defined the main prayer hall as a unified space flooded with light from all sides. The corners where the shell touched the ground were marked with four slender minarets, which, with their abstracted forms resembling rockets, were perceived as quite alien ( Figure 15.1 ).2 While the government proudly embraced the modernist mosque design, conservative circles raised subdued criticisms. Interestingly, in the wake of a military coup toppling the Democrats in 1960, the modernist design of Kocatepe Mosque (which was still under construction) was identified with the military intervention and understood as yet another symbol of radical modernism. Under increasing conservative pressure, the project was abandoned and its foundations destroyed in 1966. A new project, a colossal Ottoman replica mostly imitating the sixteenth-century Şehzade Mosque, was approved in 1967 after a speedy competition and its construction was begun. Not only the style but also the size of the mosque was dramatically changed to house ten times as many people. 3 The termination of the modernist project for Kocatepe Mosque was a breakpoint. After that, mosque design in Turkey reverted to the conscious mimicry of classical Ottoman examples, which for the conservatives was both a victory of tradition over modernism and a nostalgic representation of imperial power. Aside from a few exceptions, the neo-Ottoman mosque form became a paradigm for the following decades. This would only change with the rise of the AKP to power in 2002 and the emergence of a pious bourgeoisie as patrons of new mosques. The establishment of an Islamist government for the first time would also trigger new debates in gender politics, as a parallel to Islam’s visibility in the public sphere. 271 Bülent Batuman Figure 15.1 Unbuilt Project for Kocatepe Mosque, Designed by Vedat Dalokay and Nejat Tekeliog˘lu Source: Vedat Dalokay Archive. Turkish Islamism and Gender Politics Islam as a political force began its global rise in the 1960s. The decline of secular nationalist govern- ments in the post-colonial Islamic world, the disappointment of the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, and the suppression of left-wing movements against the backdrop of the Cold War led to the rise of Islamism 272 Appropriating the Masculine Sacred as a political force. 4 This trend gained pace with the end of the Cold War, as Islam began to assume a global identity as a populist response to neoliberalism across the Third World. With the dismantling of welfare mechanisms, Islamic networks of solidarity, successfully deployed by the Ikhwanul Muslimin (“Muslim Brotherhood”) in the Middle East, became more influential than ever. Especially where authoritarian regimes were marked by corruption and the failure to maintain popular consent, politi- cal Islam rose as the major oppositional power. A similar process took place in Turkey. Parallel to various cases in the Middle East, Islamism had a largely middle-class character, yet also spoke to the poor with its emphases on morality and religion. 5 Islamism was spearheaded by provincial entrepreneurs who had felt marginalized by the dominant establishment since the 1970s. Beginning in the late 1980s, Islamists succeeded in developing grass- roots ties in larger cities as well as in the provinces, and expanded their electoral base under conditions of deprivation caused by neoliberal restructuring.6 Their first success was winning the municipalities of various cities including Istanbul and Ankara in 1994. After that, they consolidated and expanded these grassroots networks, which led to the rise of the AKP to power in 2002.7 Female activists played an important role in this process. 8 House visits were an important activity and they were vital to the early grassroots organization of the Turkish Islamists as well as the making of female activist identi- ties. 9 It is crucial to note the spatial character of this activist political activity: the home emerged as an important space for not only Islamist mobilization but also for the making of an Islamic habitus. Coded as a feminine space, home became a key locus. On the one hand it was the space of activist work, allowing direct contact with the household. On the other hand, as an essential metaphor in the Islamic imagination, it derived its sacred significance from its feminine character.10 While face-to-face networking contributed to Islamist mobilization, it empowered the women seeking self-help and individual achievement.