Chapter 2 - In the Beginning

Historical Context of the Raid

To gain a better insight into the perspective of Federal law enforcement personnel toward the , an understanding of the historical context of the initial raid is important. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), based upon their investigation, had very definite negative perceptions of Koresh as a person, and a strong belief that some Branch Davidians posed a significant threat to other members of the group, the local community, and to law enforcement personnel. These perceptions provided the "terministic screen" through which raid preparations were made, and the initial "negotiations" post the shoot-out were conducted. Because the perceptions of the ATF and FBI are very important for this project, the bulk of the historical- contextual material will be drawn from two sources. The first is the Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell also known as , published in September of 1993, hereafter referred to as Treasury Report or (DOT). This was the official report commissioned by President Bill Clinton instructing the Treasury Department to investigate events leading up to the raid on February 28, 1993. It best represents ATF views before and after the raid. The second source was produced by the Justice Department and entitled Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at , February 28 to , 1993, Redacted Version, published on October 8, 1993, and hereafter referred to as Justice Report or (DOJ). It details the roles played by the FBI in the Waco operation, and best represents the views of the FBI before and after the fire on April 19, 1993. There were three other volumes of material published by the Justice Department in relation to Waco: Lessons of Waco: Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement, written by Philip B. Heymann, Deputy Attorney General (hereafter referred to as Lessons); Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas: February 28 to April 19, 1993, Redacted Version, written by Edward S. G. Dennis (hereafter referred to as Evaluation); and Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco, a collection of reports written by various authors (hereafter referred to by the author’s names). The ATF involvement with David Koresh formally began in May of 1992, when the McLennan County Sheriff's Department alerted the Austin ATF office "that suspicious United Parcel Service (UPS) deliveries had been received by certain person residing at the Compound, known as Mount Carmel" (DOT, 17). These deliveries included thousands of dollars worth of firearms and firearms parts and large quantities of black gun powder, an explosive commonly used in antique firearms. The Sheriff's Department had also received reports that "a barracks-type cinder-block structure" was being constructed, and a buried school bus was on the grounds that was used as "both a firing range and bunker" (DOT, 17). ATF Special Agent Davy Aguilera was assigned to the case and began an investigation. During the early stages of the investigation, Lieutenant Gene Barber of the Sheriff's department provided Aguilera with "a detailed account of Koresh's alleged attempt to kill George Roden. George Roden was the Branch Davidian leader whose parents established New Mt. Carmel in 1959, and Barber recounted how Koresh seized control of Mt. Carmel and the Branch Davidians from Roden in 1987" (DOT, 19). Koresh and several other men were prosecuted on attempted murder charges, but the case ended in a mistrial and no jail time was served (DOT, D-3). This incident and its details were referred to numerous times during the 51 days of negotiations. As a result of subsequent investigation, Aguilera learned several "kits," that when combined with other parts and metal milling could be used to convert AR-15 rifles into machine guns, had been shipped to Koresh (DOT, 23-24). There were also reports of "automatic gunfire" coming from Mount Carmel (DOT, 22). Based upon this evidence, a formal case was started on June 9, 1992. The case was upgraded to "significant" and "sensitive," requiring a heightened degree of caution and oversight from ATF headquarters, because it "involved a large amount of weapons and explosives in the possession of a potentially volatile group with strong professed religious beliefs . . ." (DOT, 24). Aguilera also gathered information that was unrelated to the potential weapons violations from "former members" (DOT, 27). These individuals reported that Koresh "dominated the lives" of residents, claiming that "Cult members surrendered all their assets to Koresh and permitted him to have sex with all the female members of the cult" (DOT, 27). It also was claimed that many of the females Koresh had relations with were under legal age, that he had fathered at least 15 children in Mount Carmel, and that he engaged in child abuse when disciplining children (DOT, 28-29). It should be

10 noted that none of these allegations falls under the jurisdiction of the ATF, although such claims figured prominently in the affidavit to secure the search and arrest warrants. However, the Treasury Department Report offers the following justification, "While reports that Koresh was permitted to sexually and physically abuse children were not evidence that firearms or explosives violations were occurring, they showed Koresh to have set up a world of his own, where legal prohibitions were disregarded freely" (DOT, 27). By late November 1992, Assistant United States Attorney Bill Johnson was satisfied that sufficient evidence existed for probable cause of criminal activity to obtain a search warrant, although the warrants were not sought until February 1993 (DOT, 32,37). However, tactical preparations for serving the warrant were initiated in December 1992 by Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Phillip Chojnacki and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Chuck Sarabyn from the Houston ATF office. The ATF had to decide between two ways to serve the search warrant, "a dynamic entry (raid) or a siege” (DOT, 43). The ATF planners ultimately chose the raid over the siege for several reasons. First, the open terrain around Mt. Carmel made it difficult to establish the perimeter a siege required. Second, the planners feared that a siege would allow Koresh time to destroy the evidence the warrant was designed to discover. This had occurred during a 1985 siege in Arkansas against a white supremacist group, The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA), and was widely discussed during the planning sessions (DOT, 38). Third, based upon reports from former members, the planners feared a , believed the group had sufficient food and water to last an extended period of time, and assumed Koresh would refuse to leave, ultimately necessitating an assault "once public pressure on the ATF to resolve the situation grew and the government's patience wore thin" (DOT, 53). The ATF believed that a dynamic entry would allow them to surprise the men, who should be working outside in a pit, before they had time to get their weapons, which were believed to be kept locked up on the second floor of the complex. Additionally, intelligence reports indicated that no guards or sentries were posted, so it was thought the raid could proceed without alerting the residents (DOT, 54). The plan for the raid was developed over two weeks by Special Response Team (SRT) members, although it was “never committed to paper in any detailed form...” (DOT, 54). The plan called for the seventy-five ATF agents to be concealed under tarps

11 in two cattle trailers that would drive and park in front of Mount Carmel, and the agents would deploy. This ruse had worked in 1992, when agents had served warrants against heroin dealers using a 107 acre Texas ranch. Arrests were made and a search was conducted “without incident or injury” (DOT, 56). ATF planners also had enlisted three national guard helicopters that were designed to arrive shortly before the trailers and create a diversion in the back of Mount Carmel, thereby giving the agents time to deploy. Once deployed, three SRTs were to rush the construction pit and detain the men working there before they could arm themselves. Other SRTs, armed with “‘flashbangs’ - diversionary devices that produce a flash and a bang but no fragments and therefore do not cause injury -” were to use ladders to scale the roof and enter both Koresh’s bedroom and the “arms room” to prevent both a gunfight and evidence from being destroyed (DOT, 59). The remaining agents were to enter the front door and secure the bottom floor, as well as deploy through a trap door and tunnel that led to the construction pit. At this point, with the compound secured and the residents in custody, a proper search would be initiated and Koresh would be placed under arrest (DOT, 59). As part of the raid plan, an undercover house had been established across the road from Mount Carmel in January and several agents were living there, posing as students from Texas State Technical Institute (DOT, 33, 51). They were assigned to gather continuing intelligence in the form or pictures and videos of the Davidians, as well as infiltration of the group. The house also would be used to observe the Davidians the morning of the raid to determine if the residents had been alerted to the impending operation. Interestingly, most of the hundreds of photographs taken were not developed until after the raid failed, and the tactical planners looked at few of the photographs that were developed and none of the videotapes (DOT, 52). Additionally, although the raid plan was dependent on substantial numbers of the Davidian men to be in the pit at 10:00 am, the agents in the undercover house were not informed of this, resulting in vague intelligence reports. And surveillance was officially terminated on February 17, eleven days before the raid (DOT, 64). A major complication with the raid concerned a newspaper expose on David Koresh by the Waco Tribune Herald, called the "Sinful Messiah" series (DOT, 67). The expose, based upon the investigation of reporters Mark England and Darlene McCormick, detailed child abuse allegations against Koresh, deviant sexual lifestyles of group members, militant religious beliefs taught by Koresh, and large numbers of weapons believed to be stored at Mount Carmel (DOT, 76). The ATF was concerned

12 that publication of the series would anger Koresh and alert him of the impending raid (DOT, 71). The raid was originally scheduled to be conducted on February 22, but was later postponed to March 1. ATF was unsuccessful in persuading the paper to delay publication of the series, and the first article was published on February 27. Because of the publication, the raid date was moved up to February 28 (DOT, 72). More serious complications concerned major leaks about the timing of the raid. The Waco media, through contacts with American Medical Transport (the ambulance service ATF had contacted to standby during the raid), established plans to cover the impending activities at Mount Carmel (DOT, 74). Several news crews arrived at Mount Carmel before the raid began, reducing the element of surprise. A more serious problem involved reporter Jim Peeler, who became lost and asked for directions from mailman David Jones, who turned out to be a resident of Mount Carmel. Peeler asked for directions and "warned Jones that some type of law enforcement action was about to take place at the Compound" and that "the action was likely a raid of some type and that there might be shooting" (DOT, 85). Jones subsequently left and went to Mount Carmel and secretly reported the information to David Koresh. At the time, undercover ATF agent Robert Rodriguez was inside Mount Carmel engaged in a Bible study with Koresh (DOT, 88). Koresh returned from receiving the news and told Rodriguez, "neither the ATF nor the National Guard will ever get me. They got me once and they'll never get me again" and concluded with, "They're coming, Robert, the time has come" (DOT, 89). Rodriguez subsequently left for the undercover house and attempted to warn his superiors that Koresh knew the raid was imminent. The tactical commanders decided that since Rodriguez had seen no weapons being deployed, the raid should be expedited and proceed according to plans (DOT, 90-91). According to the Treasury Department Report, as the agents were proceeding to Mount Carmel in the cattle trailers, the Davidians were arming themselves and preparing to engage the ATF (DOT, 92). While the agents were deploying from the trailers, the helicopters finally arrived behind the Center, but did not create the necessary diversion. At 9:47 am, the agents deployed and noticed the men were not in the pit. Koresh appeared in the front door and according to the Report yelled, "What's going on?" (DOT, 96). Because it was discussed quite frequently during negotiations, details of Koresh's interpretation of the front door encounter will be elaborated in subsequent chapters of this project. The agents identified themselves and ordered Koresh to "freeze" and "get down." Koresh subsequently slammed the door shut and the gunfight

13 began, with shots being fired from virtually every window in the “Compound,” and through the front door at agents (DOT, 96). As a result of the shoot-out, four ATF agents were killed and twenty more suffered gunshot and shrapnel related injuries (DOT, 102). Six Branch Davidians were killed, and another four, including Koresh, were wounded (DOT, 104). By 12:12 p.m., a cease-fire had been negotiated, all the dead and wounded ATF agents had been evacuated and the situation was officially declared a "standoff" (DOT, D-18). The violent nature of the confrontation created a very tense negotiating situation. Both sides had suffered deaths and injuries and emotions were running high. While the worst fears of the ATF about the armed and dangerous nature of the Davidians had been realized, the Davidian's interpreted events through their apocalyptic Biblically based worldview. This worldview was verbally articulated and played a prominent role during the fifty one days of negotiations, and will be discussed in the following chapters. To provide a context for development and discussion of the Davidian belief system, a brief history of the group and an overview of Koresh's teachings (including their interpretation of the raid and siege that developed) is needed.

Mount Carmel Davidians - History and Doctrines

History

The Mount Carmel Davidians inhabited a religious tradition whose root can be traced through various leaders back to William Miller in the 1840s and varied Adventist denominations. Virtually all of the members of the Mount Carmel Davidians had branched off of the Seventh-day Adventist denomination founded largely by Ellen G. White. The distinguishing characteristics of that denomination included a Saturday Sabbath, a belief in the imminent return of , and the necessity to prepare a remnant of individuals for Christ's return (Anderson, 41). White's death in 1915 was a shock to the denomination, who viewed her as the last living . As the years passed after her death, some Adventists believed that the denomination began to stray from its foundational message and mission (Samples et.al, 113). One such individual was Victor T. Houteff, who actually founded the original community in Waco. Houteff was a Bulgarian immigrant who was baptized into the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 1919. He became a teacher in an Adventist church in Los Angeles,

14 but based upon his personal studies he began to change some established doctrines concerning interpretations of Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Revelation (Samples et.al., 115). He was banned from teaching, but continued to propagate his "present truth" in non-church locations. The "present truth" included condemnations of the denomination for worldly compromises. Houteff viewed his mission to convince 144,000 Seventh-day Adventists to reform themselves, thus ushering in the return of Christ (Pitts 1994, 34). He formed an organization called the "Shepherd's Rod" and moved his followers to Waco, Texas in 1934, establishing the Mount Carmel community (Pitts 1993, 44). The group incorporated and the name was officially changed to Davidian Seventh-day Adventists in 1942, signifying their belief in the imminent restoration of David's kingdom in Palestine (Pitts 1993, 40). Houteff died in 1955, which created a severe crisis for the community. Houteff's wife Florence took control of the group and ultimately moved them to a site outside Waco, which was named New Mount Carmel, the site of the 1993 siege and fire. She prophesied that the Kingdom of would be re-established in Jerusalem on April 22, 1959, and urged followers to congregate at the new site to wait (Pitts 1993, 50). When the day came and went, most of the followers left. By 1962, Florence Houteff had publicly admitted her prophetic errors, disbanded the group, and sold most of the Mount Carmel property. Although Houteff was gone, his teaching would continue to influence the movement, which "would remain millenarian, sabbatarian, authoritarian, and communal" (Pitts 1994, 36). A core of about fifty individuals ultimately remained, and would form the nucleus of the group who would follow Ben Roden, the next Davidian leader. Benjamin Roden, a trucking contractor, was originally an elder in an Adventist church in Odessa, Texas, but became a Davidian in 1946 (Samples et.al., 118). His formal connections with the Mount Carmel group occurred shortly after Houteff's death in 1955, when God told him to write seven letters to Florence Houteff (Johnson 1978, A8). Roden believed that Victor Houteff had served as the fourth angel of Revelation 8:12, and that he had been called by God to serve as the fifth angel of Revelation 9:1. (Melton, 38). He also claimed that while writing these letters, God spoke to him and told him to sign it "The Branch" (Maguire, 87). This referred to the writings of Ellen White, and also to numerous Bible verses that mention the word "branch", a key one being Zechariah 6:12 which reads, "Then say to him, 'Thus says the Lord of hosts, 'Behold a man whose name is Branch, for He will branch out from where He is; and He

15 will build the temple of the Lord" (Roden, 1970). Roden argued that Christ's new name was "The Branch," but that he had a prophetic mission to lead the Branch believers, a major work being to help rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem, restoring David's kingdom on earth (Roden, 1977). Based on these teachings, he was to call his followers "Branch Davidians" (Samples et.al, 118). When Roden presented his message to Houteff's followers in 1955, many rejected it. However, in 1958, he and his wife Lois and some followers went to Israel and attempted to found a community there in anticipation of rebuilding the temple, but the effort died (Maguire, 87). When Florence Houteff's 1959 failed, Roden did gain a following from those who remained at the New , and who considered him a prophet. (Johnson, A8) In a subsequent 1962 court battle over property, Roden made a down payment on the seventy-seven unsold acres, and the "Branch Davidians" had a home (Bromley and Silver, Unpublished, 4). Daily activities at the New Mount Carmel Center were very much like living at old Mount Carmel under Houteff, although the number of residents was smaller. By 1978, there were about 35 residents living in frame houses on the property (Johnson, A8). They grew their own fruits and vegetables organically, and got water from an artesian well. They also raised dairy cattle for milk, but continued the vegetarian tradition, adopting many Old Testament Jewish feast days and dietary restrictions as well (Samples et.al., 118). Children attended school on site, and were taught agricultural and household skills as well as academic subjects. Many of the adults had jobs in Waco, with two serving as nurses at Hillcrest Hospital. Members worshipped at 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. in the chapel, with hour-long studies taught by Ben Roden. These worship times were considered scripturally significant, and were called the "Dailies," as Roden explained: The Angel, Who is Christ Himself, "in the messenger He sends" is today teaching the "Daily" ministration of His blood in the Sanctuary above and is calling all Israel to the daily worship hours, 9 and 3, that each may be prepared to stand in the great and dreadful day in which Elijah commands all to, "Remember ye the law of Moses, my servant ... with the statues and judgments. Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord." Malachi 4:4,5 (Roden 1976, 7) Roden was greatly concerned with world events as they implicated biblical prophecy. For example, he believed that the 1967 Six-Day War was prophetically significant as a

16 foreshadowing of the end times. A good synopsis of his teaching can be found in a pamphlet entitled, "The Master Plan For America" published in 1979. For over twenty years The Branch message has been sharing with us the wonderful revelations of the living Spirit of Prophecy showing the trials and glorious future of God's remnant church. In 1976 Ben L. Roden, in "The Energy Crisis and Sunday Sacredness," revealed the imminent national health program outlawing independent evangelism and the Sunday law hidden in Kennedy's 1975 Energy Bill. In 1977, "Constantine to Carter," revealed the coming Catholic-control of America, and thrilled us with the prophecy of America's deliverance like Esther from Haman's death decree. Since publication of these tracts, events have transpired showing us the validity of The Branch predictions. This tract brings us to the very "opening of the curtain" of Jacob's time of trouble over Sunday laws. Now as never before let us seek the truth and power of the that we may stand firm for the Sabbath truth, separation of church and state, and become holy instruments through which God will deliver America (Assyria) into the Kingdom (Isaiah 19: 23-25). (Roden, 1979) , Ben's wife, had begun receiving visions of her own in 1977. Her most significant one concerned the feminine nature of the Holy Spirit, which she saw as a "shining, silver angel" which "represented the Holy Spirit Mother," while studying Revelation 18:1 (Samples et.al, 119). She continued to develop this doctrinal theme and ultimately published a magazine called Shekinah, "which won the Religion in Media Award for Excellence in 1983" (Maguire, 87). Based upon her extensive study, she was granted Davidian ministerial credentials, which were not recognized by the general Seventh-day Adventist Conference (Haliburton, B5). In 1978, Ben Roden died. Based on her prophetic role as the sixth angel of Revelation 9:16, Lois Roden assumed control of the Branch Davidians (Melton, 38). However, her theological views on the feminine nature of the Holy Spirit were not accepted by everyone in the group. Additionally, her son George Roden, viewed himself as the rightful heir to leadership. Over the next several years, the dispute between George and Lois became so bitter that she ultimately obtained a court order barring him from the Mount Carmel property (Bromley and Silver, Unpublished, 5). It was into this embattled situation that Vernon Howell, later David Koresh, entered the group. Vernon Howell was born in 1959 in Houston Texas. At the age of nine, Howell began attending a Seventh-day Adventist church in Richardson, the denomination of his

17 mother. He also attended school at the Dallas Seventh-day Adventist Academy. He became engrossed in Bible study, and memorized large portions of Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Jeremiah. He also read extensively in the writings of William Miller and Ellen G. White, and reportedly became interested in the continued role of living in the modern church (Samples et.al, 22-23). He continued to attend various Seventh-day Adventist churches and began to develop his own interpretations of Bible passages he deemed in conflict with SDA teachings, interpretations he believed were directly God inspired. Because of these teachings and his disruption of meetings, he was "disfellowshipped" from the church (Samples et.al., 26). In 1981, Vernon Howell was introduced to the Branch Davidians living at Mount Carmel. He joined the group and began working as a handyman for Lois Roden. This began an intense period of spiritual growth and soul searching, including long crying spells and physical denial of food, as he absorbed the teachings of Lois Roden. He also became popular for his musical contributions to the group. He became Lois Roden's prodigy, and she eventually allowed him to teach some lessons, increasing his status with the membership (Samples et.al., 32-35). By 1983 it was rumored that Howell and Roden were romantically involved, and were supposedly married in a private service before they took a trip together to Israel. Upon their return from Israel, the leadership conflict with George Roden flared up again, and Lois named Vernon to succeed her as the prophetic leader of the group. An invitation by Lois was issued to the various Branch Davidian adherents not living at Mount Carmel to come and hear him teach (Samples et. al, 39-40). In 1984, Howell married fourteen year old Rachel Jones, whose father Perry was one of the longtime members of the Branch Davidians. This strengthened Howell’s following with some members in the group, while conflict and dissent broke out among others. George Roden had discovered Howell's involvement with his mother, and was greatly angered by his marriage to Rachel. Howell's marriage to Jones also upset Lois Roden, who reportedly became very hostile and began doing strange things like showing a positive pregnancy test to members and accusing Howell of sexual abuses with her. In 1985, George Roden forced Vernon and Rachel to leave Mount Carmel, and had himself elected as leader of the group by the members who chose to stay. Many had left and followed Howell as a result of the turmoil (Samples et.al, 40-43). It was also in 1985 that Rachel and Vernon visited Israel. While there, Howell claims to have had a vision where God told him to change his name to David Koresh,

18 and that he would be given the keys to unlock the of Revelation (Tabor, "Religious Discourse…,” 1995, 268). Gordon Melton explained the meaning of the name: From Isaiah 45, he assumed the name David Koresh (Koresh being a form of Cyrus). Cyrus was the only non-Israelite who was given the title "anointed" or "a messiah" or in Greek, "a christ." As a modern-day Koresh, he saw his role as that of the Lamb mentioned in . While traditionally this Lamb has been identified as Jesus Christ, Koresh dissented and claimed that the Lamb was identical with the rider of the White Horse who appeared in Revelation 6:1-2 and 19:7-19. The rider was clearly not Jesus. (Melton, 38) When they returned in May, Koresh purchased some land in Palestine, Texas and his following joined him there. The accommodations were primitive, consisting of tents, buses, and plywood shacks, with no heat or running water. The group also began acquiring firearms, as a means of self protection from George Roden, and to be sold for profits at gun shows (Samples et.al, 43). By this time, George Roden had renamed the Mount Carmel community Rodenville and by ruling it with an iron fist, had caused most of the inhabitants to leave, many of whom joined Koresh (Pitts, 1995, 37). This created financial problems for Roden, who was unable to pay property taxes on the land. His mother, Lois Roden, died in 1986, further undermining any hold he had over remaining members. In an effort to regain control, George issued a leadership challenge to Koresh in 1987. The test would be to raise Anna Hughes, who had died twenty years before, from the dead. Instead of accepting the test, Koresh and some followers went to Mount Carmel and covertly attempted to photograph Hughes's body and coffin, to be used as evidence to force Roden from the property. While on the property, a gun-fight ensued, and Roden was shot in the arm. In the subsequent trial, attempted murder charges were dismissed against Koresh, but Roden was held in contempt of court for violating the 1979 restraining order against him filed by his mother Lois, and for filing profanity laden legal motions (Samples et.al, 54-56). George subsequently moved to Odessa, Texas, and shot a man in 1989 who he claimed was sent by Koresh to kill him. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity, and is currently confined in a mental hospital (Melton, 38). Koresh and his followers moved back to Mt. Carmel on the day of Roden's initial incarceration in 1987. A wealthy Davidian paid the back taxes owed on the

19 property, and the property became theirs. Much of the property had fallen into disrepair, and a major cleanup and renovation effort was established (Samples et.al, 56). Buildings and living quarters were expanded over several years, and the community became much more communal under Koresh's leadership. Like the Houteff and Roden periods, many members worked in the outside community and contributed wages to the group. They grew much of their own food, and made their own clothes. They also set up an automobile repair and renovation shop, called the Mag Bag, and a firearms business, buying guns and hunting products mail order then selling them at gun shows (Melton, 38). Koresh also became adept at recruiting younger converts among Seventh- day Adventist and Davidian congregations through this teaching and his music. By 1993, there were about 100 Branch Davidians living in and around Mount Carmel: It was a multiracial and multinational community, reflecting the diversity in the SDA church, the primary target of Branch Davidian evangelizing. Blacks, Mexicans, and Asians constituted about half of the Branch Davidian community. Although Americans were the largest nationality, there was a sizable contingent from the United Kingdom and smaller groups from Australia/New Zealand, Canada, Jamaica, and the Philippines. (Bromley and Silver, Unpublished, 10) Although the inhabitants came from diverse cultures, they shared a common schedule. Daily life at Mount Carmel began around six a.m., when members would eat a communal breakfast. Some members would go to work in town, while others would stay and work at the center. Some children were home schooled, while others were sent to local schools. These were the daily activities that were occurring when the ATF raid occurred on February 28, 1993.

The Revelation of Saint John the Divine

The Revelation of Saint John the Divine is the last book in the Christian New Testament of the Bible. It is an apocalyptic eschatology, as Norman Perrin explains: Apocalyptic is from the Greek apocalypsis, “an uncovering,” and it describes a movement in and that characteristically claimed that God had revealed to the writer the secrets of the imminent end of the world and so had given him a message for his people. It features a distinctive view of the end of the world… Eschatology is from the Greek eschatos, “furthest,” and logos, “word” or “teaching,” and it therefore means “teaching concerning the end of

20 things.” … In considering the world of the New Testament, apocalyptic is a particular form of eschatology. (Perrin, 121) The book, which the text claims to have been written by the apostle John while in exile on the island of Patmos in A.D. 95, sought to encourage early Christians (followers of Jesus Christ) who were facing intense persecution at the hands of the Roman Empire (Perrin, 137-138). John begins the book by establishing the credibility of his message as coming directly from Jesus Christ himself: 1 The Revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto him, to shew unto his servants things which must shortly come to pass; and he sent and signified it by his angel unto his servant John: 2 Who bare record of the word of God, and of the testimony of Jesus Christ, and of all things that he saw. (Revelation 1: 1-2) John then provides a warning concerning the visions he is about to relate: 3 Blessed is he that readeth, and they that hear the words of this prophecy, and keep those things which are written therein: for the time is at hand. (Revelation 1:3) For the early Christians and for later groups like the Branch Davidians, John’s words were taken literally. Revelation can be divided into several sections, although the text was meant to be incorporated in its entirety. Because of the nature of apocalyptic texts (mythic development and archetypal symbol usage), they are difficult to outline. However, Norman Perrin, an expert on early Christian apocalyptic writings, provides the following outline: 1:1-3 Opening address 1:4-20 The prophet’s vision validating his authority to write to the seven churches. 2:1-3:22 The letters to the seven churches. 4:1-5:14 The prophet’s further vision, validating his message as an apocalyptic seer (this vision shows the influence of Ezekiel 1 and 2) 6:1-7:17 The necessary first stages, the overture to the coming of the End itself. 8:1-14:13 The preparation for the End, including an explanation of the status of Christian martyrs. 14:14-20 Interjected prospect of the final judgement.

21 15:1-22:5 Visions of the coming of the End itself. 22:6-21 Concluding postscript. (Perrin, 141) David Koresh was particularly interested in the sixth chapter of Revelation, which described the seven seals that were opened and released different judgements by God upon the people of the earth. He insisted that the King James version of the Bible was the most authoritative, and that is the version used in the following passage: 1 ¶ And I saw when the Lamb opened one of the seals, and I heard, as it were the noise of thunder, one of the four beasts saying, Come and see. 2 And I saw, and behold a white horse: and he that sat on him had a bow; and a crown was given unto him: and he went forth conquering, and to conquer. 3 ¶ And when he had opened the second seal, I heard the second beast say, Come and see. 4 And there went out another horse that was red: and power was given to him that sat thereon to take peace from the earth, and that they should kill one another: and there was given unto him a great sword. 5 And when he had opened the third seal, I heard the third beast say, Come and see. And I beheld, and lo a black horse; and he that sat on him had a pair of balances in his hand. 6 And I heard a voice in the midst of the four beasts say, A measure of wheat for a penny, and three measures of barley for a penny; and see thou hurt not the oil and the wine. 7 And when he had opened the fourth seal, I heard the voice of the fourth beast say, Come and see. 8 And I looked, and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him was Death, and Hell followed with him. And power was given unto them over the fourth part of the earth, to kill with sword, and with hunger, and with death, and with the beasts of the earth. 9 ¶ And when he had opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held: 10 And they cried with a loud voice, saying, How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth? 11 And white robes were given unto every one of them; and it was said unto them, that they should rest yet for a little season, until their fellowservants also and their brethren, that should be killed as they were, should be fulfilled.

22 12 And I beheld when he had opened the sixth seal, and, lo, there was a great earthquake; and the sun became black as sackcloth of hair, and the moon became as blood; 13 And the stars of heaven fell unto the earth, even as a fig tree casteth her untimely figs, when she is shaken of a mighty wind. 14 And the heaven departed as a scroll when it is rolled together; and every mountain and island were moved out of their places. 15 And the kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and the chief captains, and the mighty men, and every bondman, and every free man, hid themselves in the dens and in the rocks of the mountains; 16 And said to the mountains and rocks, Fall on us, and hide us from the face of him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb: 17 For the great day of his wrath is come; and who shall be able to stand? (Revelation 6: 1-17) Koresh claimed to have been given by God in a vision the “keys of David” to unlock the “mysteries” of the seven seals. These apocalyptic Seven Seals not only form the basis of Koresh’s theology, as will be developed below, but were used to provide meaning to events that began with the February 28 raid.

Koresh Doctrines

Theology played a vital part in the lives of the Branch Davidians. They still observed a Saturday Sabbath, and followed many Jewish dietary restrictions such as not eating pork or pork products. They also studied on a daily basis, continuing the "Dailies" that Ben Roden had established. After a communal supper, members would engage in long study sessions with David Koresh, sometimes lasting all night. There were also often morning and afternoon studies as well. It was during these sessions that Koresh continued to develop and teach his doctrines that served to galvanize, and in some cases, divide the group (Samples et.al, 57-58). Koresh's teachings are vital to understanding how the Branch Davidians perceived the 1993 raid on Mount Carmel. David Koresh viewed himself as part of the line of succession in the Branch Davidian tradition. He believed that "Truth" had been revealed down through the ages and that he was the last prophet in that tradition. explains.

23 According to this belief, each figure is associated with a key step or insight that brought the people of God closer to the original, primitive truth of the early Church: Luther (faith), Knox (spirit), Wesley (grace); Campbell (baptism), Miller (), White (sabbath), Houteff (Davidic kingdom on earth), Ben Roden (Jewish feast days), Lois Roden (feminine nature of God). (Tabor, "Religious Discourse," 1995, 280) Koresh taught that he was the seventh and final messenger in the Davidian tradition, "who would restore all things before the return of Christ" (Tabor, "Religious Discourse," 1995, 269). As mentioned before, his role took the form of the Lamb mentioned in Revelation 5. 1 ¶ And I saw in the right hand of him that sat on the throne a book written within and on the backside, sealed with seven seals. 2 And I saw a strong angel proclaiming with a loud voice, Who is worthy to open the book, and to loose the seals thereof? 3 And no man in heaven, nor in earth, neither under the earth, was able to open the book, neither to look thereon. 4 And I wept much, because no man was found worthy to open and to read the book, neither to look thereon. 5 And one of the elders saith unto me, Weep not: behold, the Lion of the tribe of Juda, the Root of David, hath prevailed to open the book, and to loose the seven seals thereof. 6 ¶ And I beheld, and, lo, in the midst of the throne and of the four beasts, and in the midst of the elders, stood a Lamb as it had been slain, having seven horns and seven eyes, which are the seven Spirits of God sent forth into all the earth. 7 And he came and took the book out of the right hand of him that sat upon the throne. 8 And when he had taken the book, the four beasts and four and twenty elders fell down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odours, which are the prayers of saints. 9 And they sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation; 10 And hast made us unto our God kings and priests: and we shall reign on the earth. (Revelation 5: 1-10)

24 Koresh claimed that God had given him the knowledge to interpret (unlock) the mysteries of the seven seals of Revelation, which he taught his followers. Koresh believed that the tribulation period had already begun, and that he and his disciples were the, '"wavesheaf,' God's faithful, courageous followers who are the elite that will ascend to heaven prior to the 144,000 exemplary souls selected to reign with the Messiah during the millennium" (Bromley and Silver, Unpublished, 8). Koresh originally thought that the Branch Davidians would migrate to Israel and begin converting Jews, triggering an international conflict, with the United States involved. He later determined that Armageddon, the final battle of Revelation, would begin with an attack on the Branch Davidians in the United States. This prompted his referring to Mount Carmel as "Ranch ," beginning in 1992. It also promoted the survivalist mentality, which resulted in many weapons and food supplies being stored at Mount Carmel (Bromley and Silver, "Davidian Tradition . . .," 1995, 61). As proof for his message, Koresh used Psalm 45 as a "key of David" to unlock the mysteries of the first seal. In that Psalm, the earthly king is described as having multiple wives. David interpreted this literally, and revealed his "new light doctrine" in 1989 (Samples, et.al, 62). The doctrine made him the "spiritual” husband of the women of the group, and the "physical husband" for potentially all the women for purposes of bearing children. The "legal" husbands of female group members would be united with their spouses in heaven. These children would eventually, "erect the House of David and ultimately rule the world" (Bromley and Silver, "Davidian Tradition," 1995, 59). He subsequently "married" several women, who gave birth to numerous children. This doctrine would eventually lead to some membership defections, which began the civil and criminal investigations of the Davidians, leading to the 1993 raid. As this brief theological overview reveals, the Branch Davidians viewed themselves as a divinely inspired people led by a messianic prophet. When the 1993 raid occurred, they interpreted events in the light of Bible . Koresh was the most recent leader of the group and incorporated the doctrines and teachings of past leaders, as well as adding new doctrines and new interpretations to prophetic books of the Bible. He developed an elaborate hermeneutic system of using the Psalms as "Keys of David" to interpret passages in Revelation, specifically the "Seven Seals." Based upon this hermeneutic method, Koresh argued that he was the "Lamb" who was empowered by God to unlock the mysteries of the seals, and open them. When the

25 seals were "opened," they took the form of actual manifestations in the life of the community. The Davidians believed that seals one through four of Revelation had already been fulfilled in the life of the community prior to that time (Arnold, 25). When several members were killed in the initial raid, they became convinced that the fifth seal of Revelation 6:9-11 had been fulfilled, which reads in part, "And when he had opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held..." The Fifth Seal described the deaths of martyrs at the hands of Babylon, and a little "waiting period" before the rest of the faithful would be killed. This would be followed by the Sixth Seal, when God's judgment would rain down upon the heathen of the Earth, the Babylonians. Koresh had initially taught that the final confrontation between Good and Evil would begin in Israel. But based upon his new understandings, he believed that events could start in Waco. Although by some accounts, the guns in the compound were used as investment opportunities, they also had prophetic connotations. Koresh cited passages from the Gospels concerning Christ's admonition to, "sell your cloak and buy a sword" as justifications for acquiring weapons (Tabor, Why Waco?, 1995, 65). He also believed that according to prophecy, he and his followers would ultimately be killed in an apocalyptic battle. But the specifics as to "where" and "when" this battle was to take place were not defined in the prophecies. This prophetic ambiguity allowed for multiple interpretations to be offered based upon events in the life of the community. Two theologians, James Tabor and Phillip Arnold, discussed Koresh's interpretations of Revelation on the radio, and offered a counter interpretation of the events of February 28, and a tape of the conversation was sent into Mount Carmel. When the February 28 raid occurred, Koresh proclaimed that the Davidians were living out the Fifth Seal based upon his prophetic interpretation of events that had transpired. This is supported in both the negotiation transcripts and in conversations he had with the press prior to the FBI preventing media contact. Several of his followers had been killed in the initial gun battle, and a waiting period was at hand while discussions with law enforcement were occurring. Koresh claimed on March 3, after initially agreeing to come out, that God ordered him to "wait." The waiting period lasted for the next 51 days. However, on April 14, Koresh claimed his waiting period was over. God had ordered him to write his interpretation of the Seven Seals and to exit Mount Carmel. This was made clear in both a letter he sent out with his attorney, Dick DeGuerin, and in the negotiation transcripts. He seemed to accept Tabor and Arnold's

26 counter interpretation that the "waiting period" of Revelation 6:11 did not specify a definite period of time, and could span a number of years, even years spent in jail. Additionally, Koresh seemed to accept Tabor and Arnold's interpretation of Revelation 10 that mentions a "little scroll" carried by an angel. They argued the “little scroll” was referring to his explication of the Seven Seals, that would be released to the world, holding back God’s final judgment for a while longer (Tabor, 1993, 31-32). Koresh was in the process of writing his interpretation - the "little scroll" - when the gas attack occurred on April 19. The gas attack confirmed to those in Mount Carmel that the Tabor and Arnold interpretation was incorrect, and that the Davidians were indeed tangibly experiencing the fulfillment of the Fifth Seal. Most inhabitants continued to "wait" on God, even as the building around them was demolished by tanks, and they were ultimately consumed by fire. They believed that they were to remain in Mount Carmel until the rest of them were killed, bringing God's judgment down on Babylon, and ushering in the (Arnold, 25-26). For fifty-one days prior to the fatal fire, there were negotiations with law enforcement personnel. The next section will briefly develop the negotiations’ doctrines and the actual strategies employed in Waco in order to lay the groundwork for explication of the fifty-one days of negotiations.

FBI Negotiation Doctrines

FBI negotiators, like the Mount Carmel Davidians, had a tradition that guided their actions. Training, past experience, FBI negotiations’ policy, as well as orders from the on-scene commander all played a role in determining negotiating strategy. Background information about the Davidians and "" also played a role in the Waco negotiations strategy, and will be discussed during the actual negotiation analysis. Most sources cite the “Munich Massacre,” which occurred at the 1972 Olympic Games, “as providing the impetus for the development of modern hostage negotiations” (Soskis & Van Zandt, 424). The “contain and negotiate” approach was first developed by Dr. Harvey Schlossberg and Captain Frank Bolz at the New York Police Department shortly after the Munich incident (Hare, 152). These techniques were later adopted by the FBI and taught to both its own agents and other police departments in the United States and around the world. (Soskis & Van Zandt, 424). Anthony Hare describes the fundamentals of this approach:

27 This approach emphasizes tactically isolating the incident scene (containment), delaying assault to rescue, minimizing confrontation, engaging the negotiated subject in open-ended, non-judgmental dialogue, and stalling to permit the passage of time to work physical and psychological effects upon the subject(s). Containment and negotiation has been one of the most effective, inexpensive, and lifesaving innovations in modern police work. (Hare, 152) Although initially developed for situations where suspects were holding hostages, these techniques are now used in any crisis negotiation situation, the three most common being “hostage takings, barricade situations, and suicide attempts” (Wind, 8). The situation in Waco was defined by the FBI as a “complex hostage / barricade situation” (Heymann, 2). In the years since Munich, negotiation techniques have evolved and improved through trial and error, and certain basic negotiations doctrines have been developed. Two cardinal rules control any crisis situation. First, any crisis situation must be contained, with both an inner and outer perimeter (Wind, 9). The inner perimeter keeps the potential injury to suspects, hostages, and law enforcement from spreading. The outer perimeter prevents outside groups, such as the press, bystanders, or family members from undermining the law enforcement operation, and removes an “audience” that the suspects might “play to.” The perimeters must be established before any negotiations or tactical decisions are made. Second, “negotiation” is the presumptive initial action, as opposed to tactical assault (Wind, 8). Not only does “society demand it” (Wind,8; Fuselier 1988, 179), but “it is virtually impossible to return to negotiating … after an assault has taken place” (Fuselier 1984, 1). Once those two rules are met, a number of guidelines have been established as standard operating negotiations procedure. Time is one of the chief assets of the negotiator. As long as nothing harmful to either hostages or law enforcement personnel is occurring, negotiators view time as their ally (Fuselier 1986, 13). Quiet intervals are referred to by negotiators as “dynamic inactivity” (Wind, 9). The passage of time creates several beneficial outcomes. It allows the immediate tensions of the situation to diffuse, reducing the potential for accidental escalation of violence on both sides. It also allows the suspects to become tired and hungry, making them more susceptible to persuasion, and giving the negotiators some negotiation instruments. Time gives law enforcement the opportunity to gather intelligence about the subjects, facilitating more personal negotiation strategies.

28 And the passage of time also helps build rapport between the negotiators and suspects, creating credibility and trust and increasing the likelihood that a peaceful resolution will occur (Fuselier, 1986, 13-14; Fuselier 1984, 6). Because time is such an ally, deadlines pose problems for negotiators. In the vast majority of instances, deadlines by suspects are negotiated away. Only very rarely has a negotiator’s inability or refusal to meet a deadline resulted in loss of life (Fuselier 1986, 14). Consequently, the literal demands and threats made by suspects are rarely taken at face value. As Bruce Wind explains: When a subject demands “$1 million,” the negotiators actually hear “a six pack of soda.” Likewise, if the on-scene hears a subject say, “If I don’t get the car by 2:00, I’ll kill a hostage,” negotiators actually hear, “Good, now we are really negotiating.” (11) The deadlines that do create serious problems for negotiators are the ones imposed by commanders. (Fuselier, 1986, 14). Commander deadlines are very difficult to negotiate past and undermine the benefits of time. Only in situations where the loss of life appears imminent should tactical decisions be rushed (Wind, 11). As Wind notes, “Field commanders should keep in mind that patience is a virtue” (Wind, 9). Another doctrine concerns who should actually negotiate. The commander of the operation should not negotiate for several reasons (Fuselier 1986, 14). First, negotiators always work in at least pairs. If one negotiator becomes frustrated or too attached, the second can step in and take control (Wind, 9). If the commander gets frustrated or biased, it is very difficult to countermand or replace her / him. Second, the commander has to evaluate and make decisions concerning both negotiation and tactical options, and mediate the tensions that naturally arise between the two camps (Wind,7). Becoming too involved in the negotiations or tactical operations can cloud necessary command objectivity. Third, negotiators use their lack of authority as a bargaining chip. If suspects realize that the negotiator has command authority, the ability to shift blame for command decisions and to seek concessions for desired responses is lost (Fuselier 1986, 14). It is also standard procedure that individuals who are not trained negotiators should not negotiate (Wind, 9). Family members and/or friends may actually be the impetus that precipitated the crisis, or may enrage or entrench the suspects and undermine the negotiation’s process. And if a decision to “go tactical” has to be made, it is unlikely that interested parties will be willing to play a role in creating a situation

29 that may bring injury or death to suspects and may actually warn them that a tactical operation is imminent. (Fuselier, 1986, 14). Another vital aspect of crisis negotiations is that negotiators and tactical people must work as a coherent team (Wind, 7,8). Tactical units must be available to take immediate action if the situation becomes unstable and death or injury occurs. However, there is always tension between the tactical officers and the negotiators based upon their personalities and training. Tactical officers are governed by the “action imperative,” the drive to “do something” to resolve a situation (Stone, 1995, S7593). Negotiators, as explained above, view inaction as a virtue. It is vital that tactical operations are integrated into a coherent negotiations’ strategy. Tactical pressure should be utilized to reward concessions and punish intransigence. On the other hand, tactical actions should not dictate or undermine or negotiations strategy. The final guideline is that there are no negotiations absolutes (Wind, 8). Each crisis situation is different because the people in them are different. If some particular negotiations strategy is not working, another should be tried. Sometimes novel techniques are called for, but only gradual steps that deviate from standard practice should be taken. This gradual deviation prevents shocks from occurring, and allows an easy transition back to known negotiations territory. But the strategies utilized should always be tailored to the individuals involved. This did not occur in Waco, as the tragic outcome demonstrated.

Waco Negotiations Plan

When the initial raid was planned for February 28, 1993, there was no negotiation plan formulated. The ATF assumed that they would surprise Koresh and his followers with overwhelming force and surprise, resulting in a quick surrender. However, the ATF was met with armed resistance and was ultimately forced to retreat from the Mt. Carmel property. James Cavanaugh, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) for the ATF out of Dallas, had repeatedly requested that the ATF have a contingency plan to negotiate with individuals inside Mount Carmel, but his requests were not implemented. As the Treasury Department Report notes, " The raid commanders did not even arrange to have the telephone number for the Compound on the day of the raid" (DOT, 150). Some independent reviews of the raid plan contained in the Treasury Report criticized the ATF for failure to integrate negotiators and

30 equipment into the operation (DOT, B-52). One reviewer argued that part of the reason the siege option was not pursued was because the "ATF did not have negotiators and expertise for a siege" (DOT, B-103). Because of poor planning, no dedicated communications equipment was in place to allow the ATF to talk directly to Koresh or others inside Mt. Carmel for several hours after the beginning of the raid. It was the Davidians who initiated the first telephone contacts with law enforcement when at the beginning of the raid Wayne Martin, a Davidian who was also an attorney, and Steven Schneider called McLennan County "911." They spoke with Lieutenant Larry Lynch of the McLennan County sheriff's department during the gunfight and after the gunfight had ended. David Koresh himself was also in contact with Lt. Lynch. As the analysis of the "911 Tapes" will demonstrate, Lt. Lynch had a monumental task on his hands. He was forced to talk with three Davidians, quite often two at a time, while also trying to contact the ATF command post in the field, in an effort to effect a cease-fire. It took almost two hours to finally negotiate a cease-fire, which allowed the ATF to extract their dead and wounded, and to begin direct negotiations (DOT, D17-D19). Interestingly, the Justice Department report claims that ASAC James Cavanaugh established contact "shortly after the firefight began" and established a cease-fire (DOJ, 127-128). This claim is at odds with the 911 transcripts and with the Timeline of Events in the Treasury Department Report (DOT, D17-D19). Needless to say, there was no negotiation "plan" at this stage in the developing siege. Lynch's goal was to attempt to diffuse the situation at hand by stopping the shooting, and to place the ATF in contact with those inside Mt. Carmel. The FBI functionally became involved in Waco beginning on February 28, the day of the shoot-out, when FBI Special Agent James Fossum, along with Cavanaugh, engaged in dialog with those in Mt. Carmel (DOJ, 128). Formal FBI control began the following day, March 1, when Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Gary Noesner arrived from Quantico and began coordinating negotiations (DOJ, 128). Noesner, a negotiation instructor from the FBI academy in Quantico, Virginia, took over primary day negotiations until March 2, when Cavanaugh returned and was the primary day negotiator until March 5. FBI Special Agent Henry Garcia was the primary night negotiator during this entire negotiations period (DOJ, 128). One of the initial difficulties facing the negotiators was the lack of facilities to negotiate from. Ultimately, space was made available in a hanger at the Texas State

31 Technical Institute airport, and a main command post was established that housed the negotiators, behavioral scientists, investigators, and commanders, including FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Jeffrey Jamar (DOJ, 18). Jamar was the "on-site commander" in command of everything that occurred in Waco. A secondary command post was established near Mt. Carmel and was used mainly by tactical personnel. Twenty-five negotiators were assigned to negotiation "cells" in Waco. The initial two cells covered twelve-hour periods: 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 am. The number of cells was later increased to three, covering eight hour periods (DOJ, 125). The Justice Department Report describes the composition of the cells: The negotiation cell for each shift consisted of the following positions: a team leader, a primary negotiator, a secondary negotiator, a scribe-historian, and a situation report (SITREP) preparer. The team leader -- an FBI agent serving as the primary point-of-contact between the negotiators and SAC Jamar and other decision-makers in the command post -- was responsible for advising the command module of all items of significance gleaned from the negotiation process. Additionally, the team leader was charged with working in concert with the overall negotiation commander. The primary negotiator -- a position variously assumed by members of the FBI, ATF, and Austin Police Department (APD) -- conducted the live telephonic negotiations and discussions with individuals inside the compound. The secondary negotiator and coach, an FBI agent, was responsible for assisting the primary negotiator in developing and executing a negotiation strategy. The scribe-historian, from the FBI and the APD, maintained the hostage negotiation log and the chain of custody for the audiotapes of the negotiations. Finally, the SITREP preparer - a post filled by representatives of the FBI, ATF, and APD -- maintained a record of all significant issues and developments during the process. (DOJ, 126) The negotiations were conducted in a separate room in the main command post, and outside law enforcement officers, typically ATF officers and McLennan County police, were allowed to observe. Given that negotiations were the initial primary method the FBI chose to use to resolve the situation in Waco, it is odd that the Justice Department Report provides very little discussion of negotiation strategy formulation and planning. The Report describes the "overall strategy" in the following way:

32 [T]o seek a negotiated settlement, to shrink the perimeter gradually, to deny the Branch Davidians creature comforts n an effort to secure their surrender and departure from the compound, and to resort to deadly force or conduct an assault only as a last resort. (DOJ, 120) The initial negotiation strategy, approved by President Clinton, was described by FBI Director William Sessions as a "waiting strategy, whereby the FBI would negotiate, watch and contain" (DOJ, 126). This broad and general strategy was used during the first five days of the standoff. Based upon negotiation efforts of playing a short radio message in exchange for the release of two children, four children were released on February 28, and ten more were released on March 1. By March 6, seven more children and two elderly women had left Mt. Carmel. (DOJ, 128) On March 5, according to the Justice Department Report, the negotiation team had generated several "themes for its negotiation efforts" (DOJ, 128). The first theme focused upon appealing to parents inside Mt. Carmel whose children had left. Pictures and videotapes of the children were sent inside, as well as verbal appeals that the children missed and needed their parents. The second theme involved continued reassurance to all persons negotiators spoke with that "they would not be harmed and would be treated fairly if they came out" (DOJ, 129). The third theme involved the use of twice daily FBI press briefings that the Davidians could watch on television and/or listen to on the radio. As stated, the goal of the use of the briefings in negotiations was [T]o accentuate the positive reasons for the individuals to come out, to demonstrate concern for their safety, to clarify press distortions or inaccurate speculations about persons inside the compound, and to use psychology to get the Davidians to doubt Koresh's leadership. (DOJ, 129) Part of this strategy also involved attempts to "'drive a wedge' between Koresh and Steve Schneider, his second-in-command" by constantly urging Schneider "to take charge and to bring the people out." (DOJ, 129) The final theme involved specific appeals to Koresh himself. These included discussions implying weaknesses in the prosecution's case against him, and appeals to gather a larger religious following through press access, book, and movie deals (DOJ, 129). The Justice Department report also briefly describes some other negotiation tactics that were utilized during the siege. Videotapes and batteries were provided for the Davidians to record themselves stating their decision to remain inside, to videotape the remaining children, and to videotape Koresh himself to document the existence and

33 seriousness of his injuries. The FBI used the tapes as a way to gain intelligence information about what was occurring inside Mt. Carmel during the standoff, including assessments of the physical conditions of the remaining children. Another tactic involved a face-to-face meeting between Davidian's Wayne Martin and Steve Schneider and FBI Negotiator Byron Sage and McLennan County Sheriff Jack Harwell. Koresh had expressed affection and respect for Harwell, and Harwell was allowed to negotiate over the telephone with Koresh and Schneider. The FBI also believed that a personal meeting with a negotiator and Harwell might expedite the exit from Mt. Carmel. The meeting occurred on March 15 outside the center and seemed fruitful from the FBI's perspective, but the Justice Department report states that further meetings were vetoed by Koresh (DOJ, 133-134). Another mechanism for communication by the FBI involved the use of a loudspeaker system that would broadcast directly into Mt. Carmel, bypassing Koresh or Schneider as information gatekeepers. The FBI felt that information was being restricted "to a small core of insiders," and they wanted to be able to communicate with all residents at once (DOJ, 135). Most of the announcements were made by Byron Sage, but other things were broadcast as well, including positive statements of individuals who had come out, recorded portions of negotiations, and annoying sounds and music designed to inhibit sleep. The broadcast of recordings of Davidian statements began on March 17 (DOJ, 71), and those of recorded negotiations, including one where Byron Sage claimed to have "nailed Koresh to the wall" was played on March 18 (DOJ, 73). The playing of sleep depriving noises began on March 22 on Jamar's orders (Joint Hearing, 1995, pt. 2, 317) (DOJ Report says it began March 21, 78). A final avenue of communication that was utilized was to allow Koresh and Schneider's attorneys, Dick DeGuerin and Jack Zimmermann respectively, to talk to their clients by phone and ultimately to enter Mount Carmel. The attorneys were allowed to enter the center five times for extended periods of time between March 29 and April 4 (DOJ, 143). Jamar's decision to allow the attorneys "into the crime scene" was an unprecedented move, and was met with much disagreement from other FBI personnel. In fact, SSA Noesner argued that "the negotiators lost control" when the attorneys were allowed in (DOJ, 144). SAC Jamar ultimately concluded that this decision was mistaken and "that Koresh had used the attorneys to buy time and make it appear that he was interested in resolving the standoff" (DOJ, 144).

34 Conclusion

The FBI began on the right track when negotiations were initiated after the inner and outer perimeter of Mt. Carmel was secured. However, the patience of and other commanders finally wore thin, and tactical decisions to insert tear gas were made. The result was that fifty-three people died in a burning building. The following analysis of the fifty-one days of negotiations will seek to determine whether that tragic outcome was inevitable, as the FBI and other “experts” claim, or whether with more patience and strategies tailored to the Davidian’s worldview, a more “comedic” outcome might have occurred.

35