Chapter 2 - in the Beginning
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Chapter 2 - In the Beginning Historical Context of the Raid To gain a better insight into the perspective of Federal law enforcement personnel toward the Branch Davidians, an understanding of the historical context of the initial raid is important. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), based upon their investigation, had very definite negative perceptions of David Koresh as a person, and a strong belief that some Branch Davidians posed a significant threat to other members of the group, the local community, and to law enforcement personnel. These perceptions provided the "terministic screen" through which raid preparations were made, and the initial "negotiations" post the shoot-out were conducted. Because the perceptions of the ATF and FBI are very important for this project, the bulk of the historical- contextual material will be drawn from two sources. The first is the Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh, published in September of 1993, hereafter referred to as Treasury Report or (DOT). This was the official report commissioned by President Bill Clinton instructing the Treasury Department to investigate events leading up to the raid on February 28, 1993. It best represents ATF views before and after the raid. The second source was produced by the Justice Department and entitled Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas February 28 to April 19, 1993, Redacted Version, published on October 8, 1993, and hereafter referred to as Justice Report or (DOJ). It details the roles played by the FBI in the Waco operation, and best represents the views of the FBI before and after the fire on April 19, 1993. There were three other volumes of material published by the Justice Department in relation to Waco: Lessons of Waco: Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement, written by Philip B. Heymann, Deputy Attorney General (hereafter referred to as Lessons); Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas: February 28 to April 19, 1993, Redacted Version, written by Edward S. G. Dennis (hereafter referred to as Evaluation); and Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco, a collection of reports written by various authors (hereafter referred to by the author’s names). The ATF involvement with David Koresh formally began in May of 1992, when the McLennan County Sheriff's Department alerted the Austin ATF office "that suspicious United Parcel Service (UPS) deliveries had been received by certain person residing at the Compound, known as Mount Carmel" (DOT, 17). These deliveries included thousands of dollars worth of firearms and firearms parts and large quantities of black gun powder, an explosive commonly used in antique firearms. The Sheriff's Department had also received reports that "a barracks-type cinder-block structure" was being constructed, and a buried school bus was on the grounds that was used as "both a firing range and bunker" (DOT, 17). ATF Special Agent Davy Aguilera was assigned to the case and began an investigation. During the early stages of the investigation, Lieutenant Gene Barber of the Sheriff's department provided Aguilera with "a detailed account of Koresh's alleged attempt to kill George Roden. George Roden was the Branch Davidian leader whose parents established New Mt. Carmel in 1959, and Barber recounted how Koresh seized control of Mt. Carmel and the Branch Davidians from Roden in 1987" (DOT, 19). Koresh and several other men were prosecuted on attempted murder charges, but the case ended in a mistrial and no jail time was served (DOT, D-3). This incident and its details were referred to numerous times during the 51 days of negotiations. As a result of subsequent investigation, Aguilera learned several "kits," that when combined with other parts and metal milling could be used to convert AR-15 rifles into machine guns, had been shipped to Koresh (DOT, 23-24). There were also reports of "automatic gunfire" coming from Mount Carmel (DOT, 22). Based upon this evidence, a formal case was started on June 9, 1992. The case was upgraded to "significant" and "sensitive," requiring a heightened degree of caution and oversight from ATF headquarters, because it "involved a large amount of weapons and explosives in the possession of a potentially volatile group with strong professed religious beliefs . ." (DOT, 24). Aguilera also gathered information that was unrelated to the potential weapons violations from "former cult members" (DOT, 27). These individuals reported that Koresh "dominated the lives" of residents, claiming that "Cult members surrendered all their assets to Koresh and permitted him to have sex with all the female members of the cult" (DOT, 27). It also was claimed that many of the females Koresh had relations with were under legal age, that he had fathered at least 15 children in Mount Carmel, and that he engaged in child abuse when disciplining children (DOT, 28-29). It should be 10 noted that none of these allegations falls under the jurisdiction of the ATF, although such claims figured prominently in the affidavit to secure the search and arrest warrants. However, the Treasury Department Report offers the following justification, "While reports that Koresh was permitted to sexually and physically abuse children were not evidence that firearms or explosives violations were occurring, they showed Koresh to have set up a world of his own, where legal prohibitions were disregarded freely" (DOT, 27). By late November 1992, Assistant United States Attorney Bill Johnson was satisfied that sufficient evidence existed for probable cause of criminal activity to obtain a search warrant, although the warrants were not sought until February 1993 (DOT, 32,37). However, tactical preparations for serving the warrant were initiated in December 1992 by Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Phillip Chojnacki and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Chuck Sarabyn from the Houston ATF office. The ATF had to decide between two ways to serve the search warrant, "a dynamic entry (raid) or a siege” (DOT, 43). The ATF planners ultimately chose the raid over the siege for several reasons. First, the open terrain around Mt. Carmel made it difficult to establish the perimeter a siege required. Second, the planners feared that a siege would allow Koresh time to destroy the evidence the warrant was designed to discover. This had occurred during a 1985 siege in Arkansas against a white supremacist group, The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA), and was widely discussed during the planning sessions (DOT, 38). Third, based upon reports from former members, the planners feared a mass suicide, believed the group had sufficient food and water to last an extended period of time, and assumed Koresh would refuse to leave, ultimately necessitating an assault "once public pressure on the ATF to resolve the situation grew and the government's patience wore thin" (DOT, 53). The ATF believed that a dynamic entry would allow them to surprise the men, who should be working outside in a pit, before they had time to get their weapons, which were believed to be kept locked up on the second floor of the complex. Additionally, intelligence reports indicated that no guards or sentries were posted, so it was thought the raid could proceed without alerting the residents (DOT, 54). The plan for the raid was developed over two weeks by Special Response Team (SRT) members, although it was “never committed to paper in any detailed form...” (DOT, 54). The plan called for the seventy-five ATF agents to be concealed under tarps 11 in two cattle trailers that would drive and park in front of Mount Carmel, and the agents would deploy. This ruse had worked in 1992, when agents had served warrants against heroin dealers using a 107 acre Texas ranch. Arrests were made and a search was conducted “without incident or injury” (DOT, 56). ATF planners also had enlisted three national guard helicopters that were designed to arrive shortly before the trailers and create a diversion in the back of Mount Carmel, thereby giving the agents time to deploy. Once deployed, three SRTs were to rush the construction pit and detain the men working there before they could arm themselves. Other SRTs, armed with “‘flashbangs’ - diversionary devices that produce a flash and a bang but no fragments and therefore do not cause injury -” were to use ladders to scale the roof and enter both Koresh’s bedroom and the “arms room” to prevent both a gunfight and evidence from being destroyed (DOT, 59). The remaining agents were to enter the front door and secure the bottom floor, as well as deploy through a trap door and tunnel that led to the construction pit. At this point, with the compound secured and the residents in custody, a proper search would be initiated and Koresh would be placed under arrest (DOT, 59). As part of the raid plan, an undercover house had been established across the road from Mount Carmel in January and several agents were living there, posing as students from Texas State Technical Institute (DOT, 33, 51). They were assigned to gather continuing intelligence in the form or pictures and videos of the Davidians, as well as infiltration of the group. The house also would be used to observe the Davidians the morning of the raid to determine if the residents had been alerted to the impending operation. Interestingly, most of the hundreds of photographs taken were not developed until after the raid failed, and the tactical planners looked at few of the photographs that were developed and none of the videotapes (DOT, 52).