The Raid on the Branch Davidians

Interviewer: Lauren Melvin Interviewee: Lewis H. McClam Instructor: Michael Chapper Date: February 22, 2010 Melvin 2

Table of Contents

Interview Release Form

Statement of Purpose 3

Biography 4

Historical Contextualization: The Raid on the Branch Davidians 6

Interview Transcription 16

Time Indexing Recording Log 39

Interview Analysis 40

Works Consulted 46 Melvin 3

Statement of Purpose

This project serves to provide an oral account of the tragic events surrounding the raid on the Branch Davidians compound in , , that was carried out by the United States

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) in 1993. This task will be accomplished through an interview with Mr. Lewis H. McClam, a former United States Secret Service agent, who assisted with the Federal government‟s investigation of the raid. This unique perspective will bring clarity to the various conflicting accounts of why and how this raid was undertaken by the ATF and whether events and actions leading to the deaths of Federal agents and Branch

Davidians members were justified. Melvin 4

Biography

Lewis H. McClam was born in 1945 in Kingstree, South Carolina. He attended

Tomlinson High School, from which he graduated in 1964. He described growing up in

Kingstree as difficult because of the many challenges and obstacles that he faced. These challenges included not having the books and supplies needed to adequately prepare him for college. Mr. McClam attended Clark College in Atlanta, Georgia and in 1968 earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business Administration. Following graduation, he went to work for a commercial credit company in St. Louis, and then soon after, was drafted into the United States

Army. He was stationed at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, where he was part of the military police. He later fought in the Vietnam War and received the Army Good Conduct Medal. Melvin 5

After leaving the Army and realizing he did not want to continue his job at the commercial credit company, Mr. McClam then began a 37-year career as a Federal Investigator for the United States government, including 25 years as a United States Secret Service Agent. As a member of the Secret Service from August 1971 to August 1996, he managed the Service‟s training division in Laurel, Maryland and Washington, DC; maintained liaison with officials of

Federal, state, and local law enforcement and other agencies; and planned, directed, and coordinated investigative activities. His job required him to travel throughout most of the world.

From April 1993 to October 1993, he served as a member of the team established by the

Department of Treasury to investigate the failed warrant execution attempt by the United States

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms on the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco, Texas.

He received numerous Outstanding Performance Awards and recognitions during his career. He retired in January 2008 and now lives happily with his wife in Gambrills, Maryland.

Melvin 6

Historical Contextualization

The Raid on the Branch Davidians

Over a 51-day period in early 1993, the United States government was involved in one of its most controversial battles ever. The country was not at war with another country, nor was it dealing with a foreign terrorist attack. Instead it was fighting against its own American citizens in Waco, Texas. This horrible tragedy, which began on February 28, 1993, included government officials “scaling the walls of buildings, breaking windows, and throwing grenades into a compound that housed approximately 80 members of a known as the Branch Davidians”

(Reavis 11). When the government raid on the compound ended on , 1993, four federal agents of the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) had been killed and over 70 members of the Branch Davidians were dead. This attack led to many questions about whether or not the government had been justified in its actions toward the sect or if the invasion on the compound had been purely a violent act. To understand how the government‟s actions turned into such a tragedy, one must examine who the Branch Davidians were, how the United

States government viewed them, and what investigations of the raid revealed about both the actions of the Branch Davidians and the United States during this controversial event in history.

The 1990‟s was characterized by a rise in groups, many with hateful messages, and terrorists who held negative views about the United States government. These groups included the Ku Klux Klan, as well as individuals: was in charge of the tragedies at Ruby

Ridge in Idaho in 1992; later, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were responsible for the

Oklahoma City bombings on April 19, 1995. Collectively, these kinds of groups referred to themselves as the militia movement. The militia “(sometimes called the “patriot”) movement was an informal network of paramilitary activists, whose members were increasingly frustrated Melvin 7 with the country‟s social and economic difficulties” (Andryszewski 15). At the time that the movement was occurring, the office of the president had just changed from George Bush to Bill

Clinton, and a new attorney general, Janet Reno, had just been appointed by President Clinton.

The militia members were trying to defend the American citizens from what they saw as threats toward their national freedom and heritage. For example, Lane, a member of an unspecified hate group, stated in his “Fourteen Word” motto that “we must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children” (Andryskewski 15). The members wanted to ensure that their moral thoughts were heard around the world by putting their words into the media, in hopes that their messages would then be assimilated into the mainstream culture. Some of these groups were characterized by extreme religious ideological views often associated with . In this regard, “America has hosted some of history‟s most notable separatist religious communities with behavior at odds with modern life; such communities have included…communal marriage, communal property, and belief in imminent millennium” (Kopel and Blackman 332-33). Other negative behaviors, such as polygamy and child abuse have also been associated with cults. Ultimately, many of these different people and groups aimed to get their view points across to the Federal government even when violent acts sometimes were required to do so.

One of the groups that played a prominent anti-government role was the Branch

Davidians. This sect was originally formed in 1833, as a part of the Seventh-Day Adventists, whose members followed the teachings of Baptist William Millar. The Seventh-Day Adventists believed that the Bible was to be studied as the literal way of truth and followed the in Revelations. The Branch Davidians proclaimed the Seven Seals to be the basis of their religion. The Branch Davidians viewed their religious beliefs as, “millenarian, sabbatarian, Melvin 8 authoritarian, and communal. Within these four beliefs they had set forth the principle that the

Bible was a complex document which can only be understood by a select people who know how to decode the words” (Kopel and Blackman 21). As an example of their devotion to the religion, one of the members of the original sect, Ellen G. White, believed that she was God‟s , put on earth for the purpose of providing the followers messages that she was receiving from God.

After her death in 1915, Adventist member, Victor Houteff, took on this role, believing that he was the next prophet of the Lord. However, after several years, the sect‟s members started disagreeing with what Houteff was saying, and he left the sect and formed another group known as the “Davidian Seventh-Day Adventists” (History of the Branch Davidians). He moved the group to Waco, Texas and then built the Mt. Carmel Center, the compound where he and his followers lived and worshipped. Houteff and his people then implemented the “Davidic

Kingdom” which they considered to be a society of pure righteousness. As advocates for peace, in 1942, after the enactment of the military draft, the members of the Branch Davidians made it known that they were “conscientious objectors” to the draft. Following Houteff‟s death in 1955, his wife, Florence, took over and continued their way of thinking. However, Florence predicted that the world would end on April 22, 1959. When this failed to happen, her prediction was considered “The ,” and led to the group splitting up. The members then started following fellow prophesier, Ben Roden, who incorporated the practice of observing the

Hebrew feast days such as Passover and the Day of Atonement within their religion. Roden was later replaced by his wife after he died in 1987. Once she became president of the sect, she was attracted to an up-and-coming living prophet—a sect member, Vernon Wayne Howell—who was later to become the ultimate leader of the Branch Davidians. Melvin 9

Vernon Wayne Howell was born on August 17, 1951 in Houston, Texas. At the age of nine, he and his mother started attending Seventh-Day Adventist services in Dallas, Texas where

Vernon started to love the “‟s theory of a small remnant of godly people in a faithless world, emphasis on , and recognition of modern-day ” (Kopel 22). As he became more indoctrinated into the Adventist ways, Howell started to believe the church had become too worldly and mainstream and that it was moving too far away from its original mission. While continuing his belief in Adventism, at the age of 20, he arrived at the Mt. Carmel

Center in Waco, Texas in 1981. There Vernon Howell and others at the center believed that he was “chosen by God to free the people, to be Sirus, a final, annotated that is mentioned in the book of Revelations” (“Waco: The Rules of Engagement”). Later in 1990, Vernon Howell changed his name to and introduced his beliefs to the group. Within his beliefs, the tradition of a closed community continued to be emphasized, in which polygamy and communal living were accepted. In addition, he forbid those living at the Mt. Carmel Center from watching television or eating anything, including livestock, that was grown outside of the community because he saw it as consuming the American culture (“Waco: The Rules of Engagement”).

Nonetheless, even with these restrictions, David Koresh and the other members did not consider themselves to be a , but instead, a seriously religious and peaceful community. He and his followers saw this as the way in which life should be lived.

Starting in the summer of 1992, the lifestyle and learnings of the Branch Davidians community began to be noticed by the Federal government and others living outside the community. Awareness of the sect grew in particular after a United States Postal Service driver reported to the McLennan County, Texas Sheriff‟s office that he and other drivers had been delivering firearm components and explosives to Mt. Carmel. Soon after, the ATF determined Melvin 10 that Koresh had been heavily involved in gun ownership and that he regularly attended gun shows. Further, according to the ATF, “the residents of the compound were constructing what appeared to be a barracks-type cinder-block structure, had buried a school bus to serve as both a firing range and a bunker, and apparently were stockpiling arms and other weapons” (United

States: Executive Branch 17). Although the members of the community had never used their guns to harm people and claimed to own them only for their personal stock, the Federal government began examining the actions of the Branch Davidians in August 1992. The government “was concerned that the Davidians would use the weapons against their neighbors outside the compound” (“Waco: The Rules of Engagement”). Thus, the ATF, and then later the

Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), planned a surprise attack on the Mt. Carmel Center to arrest David Koresh on gun law violations.

The government‟s surprise attack began on February 28, 1993 at 9:30 a.m. with the ATF attempting to execute an arrest warrant for David Koresh. Almost immediately, however, gunfire occurred, leading to a standoff between the ATF and the Branch Davidians members. At that time, four ATF agents were killed and many others, including the members themselves and government officials, were injured. Several hours later, the situation escalated and the FBI was brought in to lead the government‟s efforts in what had now become a standoff between the

Branch Davidians and the United States government. For approximately the next 50 days, government officials were engaged in war. The FBI started bringing in equipment such as heavy armor—including tanks, tear gas, and other machinery—that it believed was necessary to control the situation. One of the government‟s objectives was to get the Branch Davidians members to leave the compound so that they could apprehend David Koresh. However, the Branch Davidians put on an unexpectedly huge resistance, leading the FBI to take a number of actions to force out Melvin 11 the Branch Davidians. These actions would later become the center of the controversy surrounding the raid. For example, one tactic the officials used for getting the members to come out of the center was by telling them that if they came out immediately, no charges would be filed against them and their families would remain together. However, in actuality, as the members came out of the compound, they were arrested and families were split apart from each other. The most disturbing negotiation reported was the government‟s use of psychological warfare. In this case, the FBI played loud music, used stadium lights so that the compound was always brightly lit, and made it so that the people became sleep deprived. They also challenged

David Koresh‟s religious beliefs by playing such songs as „These Boots Are Made for Walking‟.

Over the days during the standoff, some members left, but many of them chose to stay with

Koresh because they believed God would save them and they would not die (“Waco: The Rules of Engagement”). Specifically, from the start of the standoff through March 23, 1993, “35 persons, including 21 children, left the residence and surrendered to the FBI. From March 23 to

April 18, however, none of the remaining Branch Davidians left the residence” (United States:

House of Representatives 2). The government‟s inability to force the members to leave caused the FBI to increase their intensity, and on April 19, 1993, the members who stayed in the center would meet their fate, with the FBI taking drastic measures to accomplish their goal. So that everyone knew what was about to take place, according to one Branch Davidian member, the

FBI officials shouted: “The siege is over. We are going to put tear gas into the building. Come out with your hands up. Carry nothing. There will be no shooting” (Thibodeau and Whiteson 7).

However, none of the members followed this order. Various documents indicate that after the

FBI made this demand, 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrite (CS) powder was fired into every window of the compound. After several minutes, the CS powder dissolved into methaline chloride—a Melvin 12 volatile chemical which then ignited into several fireballs and sent the whole compound into flames. After the building had been completely demolished, over 70 members were found to have died and only 9 members had survived.

After the compound had been destroyed, many questions arose about the circumstances surrounding the raid. These questions mainly focused on whether there was a necessity to conduct the raid or the government had acted too aggressively. Many in both the private sector and the government questioned whether there was a less dominating way that David Koresh could have been arrested without destroying the compound and killing so many. Historian Dick

J. Reavis concluded that the government did not have adequate reasoning to investigate Koresh, withheld key documents justifying its actions at the raid, and lacked a solid basis for carrying out the raid (Reavis 11-18). As the investigation into what happened began soon after the raid, two sides were formed. One side, the ATF and the FBI, stated that their actions were a necessary defense. A spokesman for the ATF stated, “Three members of the sect came out of the compound and began shooting at agents, in which the raid then started” (Verhovek). However, on the other side, evidence, including accounts by surviving members of the sect suggested that the United States government had initiated the attack. For example, videos of the incident captured by infrared thermal imaging, showed from an aerial view surveillance camera that the

FBI had shot into the compound first. Also, the video indicated that the government officials were shooting from sides of the compound in which no one could see them, further suggesting that the government had shot first since the officials were in non-visible areas (“Waco: The

Rules of Engagement”). In addition, the surveillance showed people inside the compound trying to leave, but unable to do so because they were being run over by tanks and other machines that the FBI had brought with them. Moreover, contrary to what the ATF had stated in its defense, Melvin 13 there was no video or other evidence recovered showing that the Branch Davidians had fired the first shots.

In addition, based on further examination of the case, it was strongly thought that the government officials had set the compound on fire because Texas firemen were not allowed to come and help. One FBI agent, Mr. Sage, stated that they “would not let fire trucks in to fight the fire because they did not want the fireman to get shot at” (“Waco: The Rules of Engagement”).

Meanwhile, it did not appear that the Davidians themselves were shooting at anyone, and that the members were trapped in the dining room because someone outside was firing at them. Further, the FBI stated that they did not want the Texas medical examiner to come to the scene because they wanted to examine the damage themselves. Although, it was agreed that everything

(including human bodies) would stay at the scene, Captain Dave Byrnes of the Texas Rangers said that in the end, the FBI did not live up to this agreement and in actuality had removed evidence from the scene (“Waco: The Rules of Engagement”). It was thought that the government removed certain evidence because they did not want it to seem as though what they did was wrong.

Through reading the different sources and articles that have been written about the

Branch Davidians, it is apparent that the members of this sect were not typical American people.

The sect lived in isolation and its members did not want to base their lifestyle on what was happening within society in general. Robin Bunds, one of David Koresh‟s former “wives” said that by living in this type of compound, a person is “brainwashed. You are not exposed to the outside world” (qtd. in Niebuhr and Hamilton). The members in the compound always believed what David Koresh said and that he had their best intentions in mind. However, research into the cult indicates there were plenty of reasons to be concerned about the teachings of the Branch Melvin 14

Davidians. For example, as the cult became more known to the public, allegations formed stating that David Koresh “had sexually abused girls as young as 11 or 12. They also reported that he beat infants when they were crying during his church services” (Jordan). These charges were never proven in court, however, and this view was not indicative of how everyone felt about the cult. The McLennan County, Texas Sheriff at the time, Jack Harwell, stated on behalf of the behavior of the Branch Davidians, “I had met many Branch Davidians before, and, although they believed in an odd religion, they all seemed to be likeable, normal people” (qtd. in Kopel and

Blackman 28). While the members were thought as religious people to be very strict in how they lived their lives and often were referred to as weird, they considered themselves to live their life based upon the Bible and believed they were doing something that was good for themselves and the rest of the world.

Thus, the raid on the Branch Davidians tragedy brought a multitude of questions about one of the most controversial times in modern United States history. Although as time passed and many questions were answered, the nature of the event and the tremendous bloodshed left doubts among many people that are not likely to ever be erased. Although government officials insisted that they were doing what they thought was best, many people may always believe that the officials were more concerned about how they and the United States government were perceived than about how this event impacted the many individuals that were a part of the raid.

Janet Reno, the former Attorney General for the United States, indicated that there was no evidence showing that the FBI did anything that was not justified, and many believed that what happened at the compound was ethical. However, although the government had a responsibility to protect those communities that could have been impacted by the beliefs and the actions of the Melvin 15 compound, it nonetheless can be said that the government acted too aggressively and in the end, unjustifiably killed people who were just trying to live their lives. Melvin 16

Interview Transcription

Interviewee/Narrator: Lewis H. McClam Interviewer: Lauren Melvin Location: Mr. McClam‟s Home in Gambrills, Maryland Date: December 30, 2009

Lauren Melvin: This is Lauren Melvin and I am interviewing Mr. Lewis H. McClam as a part of the American Century Oral History Project. This interview took place on December 30, 2009 at 6 P.M. Mr. McClam, I would first like to start by asking you, what was it like growing up in your hometown of Kingstree, South Carolina?

Lewis H. McClam: Actually Lauren, it was a little difficult because I grew up in a segregated town, which meant when I was in school, the resources we had in my high school was not as good as resources in the other schools. Therefore, that was the major obstacle I had to overcome once I got to college.

LM: Okay. As you were growing up, what did you think you would be doing when you got older?

LHM: You know, that‟s a good question. My aspirations were to become a doctor, would you believe. So when I went off to undergraduate school, my first courses were science and math.

LM: What influenced your decision to become a Secret Service agent?

Melvin 17

LHM: Funny story, when I graduated from college, I actually, I changed my major and went into Business Administration. When I graduated from college, I went to St. Louis, Missouri where I started working for a commercial credit company as a customer service rep. During those days, we were susceptible to the draft, so shortly after graduation, my classification changed to “1A” and I was drafted about six months later. I went into the military—military police. After I got out of the military, I did not want to go back into finance or work for commercial credit, so I went back to my old alma mater for an interview, and when I got in to the college campus office where the placement director was and talked to her about opportunities on campus, she said, “There‟s some guy here from Secret Service. You might wanna go talk to him.” And I said, “Well, what‟s Secret Service?” and she goes, “I don‟t know, you just go talk to him.”

LM: Great story…

LHM: So when I went over and talked to the recruiter—whom I found out later on was my fraternity brother—he talked about travel around the world and the glamorous life of being an agent with the Secret Service, so he suckered me in.

LM: Nice. What was a typical day like for you as an agent?

LHM: We really didn‟t have what I would call typical days because we knew at any one time when we walked into the office something could occur that we weren‟t anticipating. For example, we could walk in and we could find out that there was a foreign dignitary coming into Melvin 18 town, so all of a sudden you were assigned to a detail. You could walk into the office one day and find out that there is a major counterfeit operation in your area and all of a sudden you‟re on surveillance. So there was never really a typical day, which was kind of neat. You never knew what you were going to run into when you walked into the office.

LM: What did you like most about working in the Secret Service?

LHM: The unknown; you never knew what was gonna happen. One day you could walk into the office and you could sit down at your desk and prepare to write a report on an investigation and find out that, in a couple of hours, you have to go home and pack your bags because you are going around the world with the President.

LM: Interesting…

LHM: So, the spontaneity of not knowing what was happening and the quick change was always exciting.

LM: When you first heard about the raid on the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, what was your reaction?

LHM: I really didn‟t think a lot about it till I got tapped to be a part of that investigation and then all of a sudden it became the forefront of my attention.

Melvin 19

LM: How and why were you selected to be a part of the team that conducted the investigation?

LHM: That‟s a very interesting story. One of my good friends, whom we had been friends for several years in the service, became the deputy director, no I‟m sorry, he became the deputy assistant director over the Office of Inspection, and at the time when Waco occurred, I was in the

Office of Inspection and so the deputy director, I‟m sorry, assistant deputy director, Lew Merletti said…after he was called to the director‟s office about the Waco situation…said he was gonna be required to be responsible for the investigative unit; and when he came back, Lew said, “If I have to go, you gotta go.” (Laughs) So he tapped me because I was a good friend of his.

LM: What specifically was your role on the investigation?

LHM: Mine was no different from the other investigators: we went out and we interviewed those folks who were in the compound at the time ATF orchestrated its raid just to try to find exactly what occurred. We would interview them, we‟d come back, discuss what we had found out, and try to piece together what exactly happened. Now what I did find out that I contributed directly to the investigation was, on one occasion, I was interviewing the agent who was in charge of the command post. On a raid, you have agents that are in charge of the command posts who sit and listen and monitor radios and write down what occurred. At the end of the interview,

I asked him, well I showed him a copy of the raid plan that we had received from management.

When he looked at the raid plan, he said, “This is not the raid plan I had on the day of the raid”; and we stopped, cause I had another agent with me who was conducting the interview, and we said, “Okay, what are you saying?” He said “This is not the raid plan.” So we asked him, “Well, Melvin 20 do you happen to have a copy of the actual raid plan that you used on the day of… ATF went into the compound?” He said “Yeah I do.” So we got a copy of that and found out unfortunately that management had changed the actual raid plan from what was actually presented on the day of the raid.

LM: As a part of the investigation team in Waco, what was a typical day like for you?

LHM: Again, there were no typical days. We…if we were in the field, we would go out and conduct interviews of those individuals who were involved in that raid from the Davidians side.

We would come back in the afternoon and sit down and critique what we had found out. If we were in the office back at main Treasury—because when this thing started, main Treasury set up an office for us—we would go back and sit around in the room and discuss what we had learned about the raid plan and about the actual raid.

LM: When you first arrived in Waco to participate in the investigation, what was the first thing you did and saw at the compound?

LHM: First thing we did was we took a tour of the compound, and at that time naturally, it had been burned completely down. It was very disturbing to realize that 70-plus people lost their lives in a situation that could have been averted.

LM: What are your personal views about cults and other extremists and the ideas and beliefs that they had? Melvin 21

LHM: Cults…will manipulate those people that don‟t have very strong constitutions. The majority of people that are in cults are people that are looking for some stability or some, some love, if you will, or someone to care for them and normally, the leader of this cult will take advantage of that weakness and manipulate those individuals.

LM: Did your views of them change as a result of your involvement in the investigation?

LHM: Actually no, what it did was it solidified my, my view along those lines. After talking to some of those people and looking at how they reacted whenever they heard the name, David

Koresh, I realized that they were…there was massive brainwashing.

LM: What were your opinions of David Koresh during the investigation?

LHM: He was very manipulative, used that skill to control those people who were weak in character, if you will.

LM: Did the Treasury Waco review also investigate the FBI‟s siege on the compound?

LHM: No, it did not. Treasury…since ATF was at that time an investigation agency under

Treasury, Treasury strictly had its investigation curtailed to what happened with the ATF. The

FBI is under Justice, so Justice would handle that…would have handled that investigation involving the Justice department, the FBI.

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LM: Throughout my research, one main question that kept arising was whether the ATF was justified in their actions. I know your team prepared an extensive report based on your investigation. Can you please elaborate on the official conclusion of your team‟s investigation?

LHM: Yeah, I can to some extent. The investigation was simply to try to determine what exactly happened, what went wrong, why did the raid fail. We found out that the agents who were involved in the investigation, correction, who were involved in the raid, performed admirably under stressful conditions, but we also found that management was lacking in that they didn‟t prepare properly, there wasn‟t adequate intelligence gathering, and they also falsified some reports as in the case of the raid plan.

LM: What was your reaction to the controversy on whether or not the ATF was justified?

LHM: It wasn‟t. We found out that David Koresh had been off the compound on several different occasions, and that at any one of those times, ATF could have executed the arrest warrant without having to go into the compound and have other people in harms way.

LM: Within your personal beliefs, to what extent did responsibility for these events lie with each involved group: 1) The Branch Davidians and 2) the ATF?

LHM: Well, ATF was acting under color of law. They had gotten information that the Branch

Davidians had automatic weapons, and automatic weapons are a violation of ATF‟s law. So they Melvin 23 were acting within their scope. How they went about trying to execute the warrant is questionable and could have been done much better.

LM: The Branch Davidians themselves?

LHM: Well, they were at, again, fault in that they had automatic weapons, which is a violation of federal law.

LM: My final question is, is there anything I failed to ask you that is essential for my understanding of the raid on the Branch Davidians?

LHM: Well, let me give you a little bit about what happened on that day. The day of the raid, the

Branch Davidians had found, well there was a news truck that showed up because the news media had been briefed by ATF, which was wrong. Prior to that raid that particular day, they briefed the news media the night before. So there was a news truck on the scene before the agents arrived for the raid, which is not something you would normally do, number one. Number two, the agents for ATF were transmitting their information in clear text and in an unsecured line. The Branch Davidians had bearcat scanners and were picking up the information, so they knew exactly when the agents were coming on the compound. So all of these things led to the deaths of the four agents, and it canceled out any surprise that the ATF would have had in going into the compound, to try to control the compound before anybody could get hurt.

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LM: Mr. McClam, I would like to thank you for participating in this interview and for providing this historical perspective on the events surrounding the raid on the Branch Davidians.

LHM: You are most certainly welcome.

Melvin 25

Interview Transcription

Interviewee/Narrator: Lewis H. McClam Interviewer: Lauren Melvin Location: Telephone call to Mr. McClam‟s Home in Gambrills, Maryland Date: January 6, 2010

LM: This is Lauren Melvin and today‟s date is January 6, 2010, and the time is 4:20 [P.M.] I am conducting a follow-up interview with Mr. Lewis H. McClam as part of the American Century

Oral History Project. Mr. McClam, thank you for meeting with me again to discuss your involvement in investigating the raid on the Branch Davidians in 1993. The initial interview raised several additional questions that I would like to ask you. First, I wanted to ask you some additional questions about your background and growing up in Kingstree.

LHM: Okay.

LM: In what years did you live in Kingstree?

LHM: From the date of my birth in 1945 up until I left in 1968 to go up to undergraduate school.

LM: What was the name of your high school?

LHM: ?Tomlington? High School in Kingstree, South Carolina.

LM: What was it, I‟m sorry?

Melvin 26

LHM: ?Tomlington?

LM: Homlington?

LHM: No, Tomlinson.

LM: Oh, Tom….

LHM: T-O-M-L-I-N-S-O-N, Tomlinson.

LM: In your high school, what resources did you lack in particular?

LHM: What? I‟m sorry, say again, what?

LM: In your high school, what resources did you lack in particular?

LHM: Adequate books, number one; current textbooks like the other race had; supplies for our lab—science lab; adequate transportation, buses; everything you can think of, we were in short supply of.

LM: A lot of prejudice?

LHM: (Laughs) Extremely, yes. Melvin 27

LM: Okay.

LHM: In other words, the folks in my school, we got the hand-me-downs, things that were rejects from the other schools.

LM: Where did you go to college?

LHM: Clark College in Atlanta, Georgia.

LM: In what years?

LHM: 1964 to 1968.

LM: What challenges did you have while you were there?

LHM: Lack of proper preparation from high school, so I had to study extra hard and I had to have, initially when I went to school, I had to have tutors to help me through the first year of undergraduate school.

LM: Where did you serve in the military?

LHM: Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. The U.S. Army.

Melvin 28

LM: In our first interview, you stated that your friend had indicated that life as a Secret Service agent was glamorous… (LHM laughs)

LM: Was life as a Secret Service agent as glamorous as you thought it would be? If so…

LHM: Yup...

LM: In what respect? If not, why?

LHM: I wouldn‟t say it was glamorous, I would say it was adventurous. We never knew what was gonna happen from one day to the next. In other words, you could, as I said earlier, go into the office, go work on an investigative report, and when you left the office you were heading home to pack for a trip around the world. So it was… the spontaneity of the job was exciting.

LM: Where are some of the places that you traveled to?

LHM: Countless cities throughout South America, Europe, Far East, Middle East. I went to every continent or every location except for China; never got a chance to get to China.

LM: You also explained how you…how and why you were selected to be a member of the investigation team. What was your initial reaction to being selected?

Melvin 29

LHM: I didn‟t want to go. I was more involved with other activities because I was in the Office of Inspection and I enjoyed being in the Office of Inspection where we inspected different field offices around the country, so I was more interested in that than going and getting involved with the Branch Davidians investigation.

LM: Did you view this as a…unique opportunity relative to other assignments that you had been given before?

LHM: No, just the opposite. I did not want to go so I didn‟t view it as an opportunity.

It was a requirement that I had to fulfill, so that was a part of the job.

LM: Was what you encountered worse than you imagined it would be?

LHM: No.

LM: In what way?

LHM: Well, we went in, interviewed individuals, so it was what we normally do in my job at the time.

LM: Okay. In our prior meeting, you stated that you interviewed most folks who were in the compound at the time—for example, the agent who was in charge of the compound post. Can you specifically identify some of the other people that you interviewed? Melvin 30

LHM: Yes, all of the agents who were involved in the raid. When I say we, the entire team was of ______--the interviews were broken up into groups, so all the members of the team had “x” number of people to interview, so we all went out and interviewed everyone who was involved in the planning, preparation, and execution of the raid.

LM: Did you specifically interview any of the Branch Davidians…Branch Davidians members who survived?

LHM: Yeah I did.

LM: Did you, I‟m sorry?

LHM: Yes, I did.

LM: If so, who and what did you learn from them?

LHM: Well, I learned, as I indicated in my document, that they were all mesmerized by David

Koresh. They thought that he was the new Messiah and most of those folks were brainwashed by his rhetoric.

LM: How would you characterize your or the review team‟s conversations with the Branch

Davidians? In other words, what did they talk about? Were there any…were they open or willing to talk, or were they hostile? Melvin 31

LHM: Some were hostile, most were willing to talk about Koresh and their beliefs and the fact that they believed in Koresh and that he was the Messiah.

LM: What did you….it sounds like they were brainwashed, correct?

LHM: Correct.

LM: What did you learn from them?

LHM: Again, that they were mesmerized by Koresh. They thought he was the Messiah and when he told them not to leave the compound, they would not leave the compound.

LM: Okay. In addition, you talked about how the agent in charge of the compound post having a different raid plan than what management had given you. What was different about the plans?

LHM: That was the agent in charge of the command post.

LM: What was different about the two plans?

LHM: I don‟t remember exactly, but there was some language that was different from what was initially given to him. The raid plan that was given to us, there was different language. I don‟t know, really remember. After going, after showing the command post agent the raid plan that was given to us by the supervisory personnel, he indicated the different, the change. He gave us, Melvin 32 as a result, a copy that he had kept from the original command post. Those differences are outlined in the report that we prepared for Treasury.

LM: Okay. What explanation did the agent in charge give you for having a different raid plan than what management had provided to you?

LHM: The command post agent wasn‟t the agent in charge. What he simply said when we interviewed him was…showed him the raid plan that we had from management, he simply said,

“This is different, it‟s been changed, this is not the one I had in the command post.”

LM: Okay. Also, did management have an explanation for this?

LHM: No, there is no explanation. Actually, it was a violation of a federal law because what they did was, they changed an official document; so there is no explanation for changing an official document. We knew when the document was changed that they were trying to portray themselves in a much better light than they actually were in. This follow through with regard to collecting proper intelligence information, they had gotten information from the undercover agents who had gone into the compound that Koresh knew they were coming. They proceeded anyway, so they were trying to paint themselves in a better light.

LM: Okay. So was the difference in the plans not justified?

LHM: Changing an official document is never justified—ever. Melvin 33

LM: Why is that?

LHM: It‟s a violation, in other words, they‟re falsifying a document, they are violating a law.

LM: Okay. In your view did the changing of the raid plan affect your team‟s ability to effectively determine what happened during the raid?

LHM: No, the raid plan itself had nothing to do with the actual raid. What occurred was they changed the raid plan to put themselves in a better light during this investigation.

LM: Okay, did the changing of the plan indicate or suggest that the raid was flawed or could/should have been handled differently?

LHM: No, the changing of the raid plan was to portray themselves in a much better position than they were actually in.

LM: What condition were they in?

LHM: They falsified a document. They went into a compound when information had been presented to management that indicated that Koresh knew they were coming. They proceeded anyway.

LM: Okay. Did the changing of the plan hide key evidence? Melvin 34

LHM: No, changing of the plan was to try to put themselves in a better light, to make them look less horrible, and less culpable in what they did.

LM: In our initial discussion, you stated that seeing the compound was very devastating. What are some of the specific types of things that you saw?

LHM: I saw debris, I saw burned clothing; the place was completely burned down, we knew that people had lost their lives in that and just by being there looking at the devastation that was left behind was enough to bring tears to your eyes.

LM: Had all of the bodies been removed by the time you had gone to the compound?

LHM: Long time before, yes.

LM: Did you smell the stench of human flesh?

LHM: No, it was quite a time after, that going into the compound, for the review and what had happened.

LM: When you went, did you have to wear any special clothing or gear, for example, masks, etc?

LHM: No. Melvin 35

LM: Also, you stated that the situation could have been averted. Can you please elaborate on how the situation could have been averted?

LHM: Sure. Koresh had been off the compound on a number of occasions. ATF knew he had been off the compound. As a matter of fact, Koresh was an avid car buff and he had a Mustang being restored at a nearby repair shop off the compound in Waco. They could have arrested him at any time when he was off the compound to take a look at his Mustang.

LM: Why do you think they didn‟t arrest him off the compound?

LHM: Because they wanted to show off; they wanted to be hot dogs.

LM: Okay (laughs). When I first visited you, you mentioned that it was very hard for you to sleep when you came back home. Why was that?

LHM: Well, because again, I knew that a lot of people had lost their lives in the tragedy; seventy-plus people had lost their lives in this travesty that could have been averted, and that was very troubling.

LM: What impact did your experience at the compound have on you personally?

LHM: Besides being a little angry at what ATF did and not being able to sleep at night, beyond that, nothing else. Melvin 36

LM: How long did it take you to overcome your difficulty in sleeping?

LHM: I don‟t remember. Don‟t remember.

LM: How did you overcome handling everything you saw?

LHM: Put it in the back of your mind, and you go about doing your job. You have a job to do and put away, put aside your feelings and go ahead and conduct business as usual.

LM: Okay. You provided your views of David Koresh. My research suggested that many of the

Anti-American movements of the 1990‟s, such as the Branch Davidians, were fed by fears and anxieties about the country‟s economic status and future. Do you believe that David Koresh was engaging in this type of movement, and why?

LHM: No, Koresh…we went back and searched the history of Branch Davidians and they were more religious fanatic, and Koresh was brought up in that environment.

LM: What did some of these audio tapes reveal about him and his teachings?

LHM: That again, he was in his words, the prophet, and that there was gonna be another coming of the Messiah. The way he taught it is the way he read the teachings. He was the prophet for the

Messiah. So a lot of the folks in the command viewed him as the Messiah.

Melvin 37

LM: Okay. In my research, I learned that the FBI used psychological warfare such as playing loud music or the use of stadium lighting so that the compound was always brightly lit. Although your investigation did not involve the FBI, what are your views on the use of psychological warfare as a strategy for forcing the Branch Davidians out of the compound?

LHM: It didn‟t work.

LM: And your…why didn‟t it work?

LHM: They didn‟t come out, so the FBI ended up going in and destroying the compound.

LM: In your view, why does psychological not…psychological warfare not work in general?

LHM: Well, I have no key knowledge of psychological warfare so I can‟t answer that question.

LM: Overall, did you think that the approach that the government used was a case of sensationalism? By sensationalism, I meant did the ATF undertake the raid in a manner that drew unnecessary attention to what they were doing or that dramatically increased the possibility that violence would occur?

LHM: ATF did what they did because they wanted to show off; they were showboats. They did not…if they had followed the raid properly, they could have executed the plan without losing a Melvin 38 life. But they didn‟t listen to their intelligence information and they decided to go in anyway, and they wanted to, wanted to showboat.

LM: Mr. McClam, I would like to thank you again for participating in this interview and helping me under…get a better understanding for what happened.

LHM: You‟re certainly welcome.

LM: Thank you. Melvin 39

Time Indexing Recording Log

1. Interviewer: Lauren Melvin

2. Interviewee: Lewis H. McClam

3. Date of Interview: December 30, 2009 and January 6, 2010

4. Location of Interview: Mr. McClam‟s Home and Via Telephone

5. Recording format:

Audio—Compact Disc

Minute Mark Topics Presented In Order of Discussion In Recording

5 Mr. McClam‟s life, his job as a Secret Service Agent, and his learning of the raid on the Branch Davidians

10 Accounts of Mr. McClam‟s interviews of the Branch Davidians survivors and the ATF agents involved in the raid, and his views on cults and David Koresh

15 ATF‟s actions immediately preceding the raid on the Branch Davidians

Follow-Up Interview

15 Mr. McClam‟s life and education (Continued)

20 Mr. McClam‟s travels and activities as a Secret Service Agent, his role in investigating the raid, and his views on how the Branch Davidians members were mesmerized by David Koresh

25 Investigative findings regarding the ATF‟s execution of its raid plan and Mr. McClam‟s experience at the Branch Davidians compound

30 David Koresh and his religious teachings, the FBI‟s use of psychological warfare, and the government‟s actions that led to the destruction of the Branch Davidians compound Melvin 40

Interview Analysis

My interviewee, Lewis H. McClam, became involved with the investigation of the raid on the Branch Davidians in approximately September 1993. At the time, he worked as a United

States Secret Service agent. As a participant in the investigation, he serves as a primary source of historical knowledge, offering through his own words, a living account of this very important, but tragic event. Mr. McClam‟s oral account of his work and the findings from the investigation added important historical context to other accounts of what happened during the raid, as discussed in books and video documenting the event. His experience and ability to recall important behind-the-scene details about the investigation that were not included in other secondary sources reinforced my research and conclusions about the actions of the government in carrying out its raid.

Oral history is the study of past events that have been transmitted through speech. It is different from written history because it involves interviewing and recording accounts of events that have happened, as they are told by the people involved in or living during the time of the events. As oral historian Donald Ritchie states, “Memory is the core of oral history, from which meaning can be extracted and preserved. Simply put, oral history collects memories and personal commentaries of historical significance through recorded interviews” (qtd. in Whitman 3). Oral history differs from secondary sources that describe past events because when relying on those types of sources, the reader learns from a master narrative style, or a more general direction about the events that took place within history. An oral interview, however, can be used to obtain an eye-witness account of what actually happened. With oral history, there are strengths and weaknesses. One strength is the ability to learn about local narrative—when a person can learn about certain aspects of life or history in detail. On the other hand, a weakness of oral history is Melvin 41 that sometimes the mind can be faulty. One‟s mind may be distorted, might add information that was not originally a part of the situation, or the person simply may not remember certain events.

In addition, when providing an oral account of events, a biased opinion may be given. According to historian, Edward Hallet Carr, “…history…consciously or unconsciously reflects our own position in time...”. He adds, “The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: It is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order of context” (The Historian and His

Facts). Carr‟s interpretation suggests that within any type of historical writing, there is always a bias present. Thus, when relying on oral history, it helps to understand why someone would think the way that they do from their life‟s perspective.

My interview with Mr. McClam about the Branch Davidians and the investigation of the

United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms‟ (ATF) raid gave additional viewpoints about three main aspects of this event. First, Mr. McClam explained his personal involvement in the investigation. He stated that he interviewed some of the Branch Davidians members who survived the fire at the compound, in addition to the government officials who participated in the raid. Mr. McClam also visited the compound and got a first-hand look at the destruction. He stated, “I saw debris, I saw burned clothing; the placed was completely burned down; we knew that people had lost their lives in that and just by being there looking at the devastation that was left behind was enough to bring tears to your eyes” (qtd. in Melvin 34). Second, the interview gave a picture of who David Koresh was and how strongly his followers believed in his teachings. According to Mr. McClam, “the followers of Koresh were always mesmerized by his teachings and were massively brainwashed,” and “the followers were mostly willing to talk about Koresh and their beliefs in what he was saying and how it was believed by all that Koresh was going to be the new Messiah” (qtd. in Melvin 30-1). Thus, when Koresh refused to obey the Melvin 42

ATF‟s orders to leave the compound, many of his followers remained with him. Third, the interview answered questions about how effectively the government had performed in carrying out the raid and whether they had needed to take the steps that led to the destruction of the

Branch Davidians‟ compound. In discussing this matter, Mr. McClam stated, “We found out that the agents who were involved in the …raid performed admirably under stressful conditions, but…the management was lacking in that they didn‟t prepare properly, there wasn‟t adequate intelligence gathering, and they also falsified some reports as in the case of the raid plan” (qtd. in

Melvin 22). Overall, Mr. McClam‟s account of the investigation suggested that there were strong emotions on both sides—the government‟s and the Branch Davidians‟—about how the situation should have been handled. It appeared that neither side was willing to give in on its position, even when it meant that unnecessary deaths of innocent people would occur.

The information that I obtained during my interview with Mr. McClam provided much historical value by clarifying my understanding of the events and helping to explain the government‟s actions related to the raid. Mr. McClam‟s account put many of the key events into context, and provided significant contradictory points of view relative to what was discussed in my contextualization paper. As stated in my paper, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the ATF said they had to take drastic actions to make Koresh leave the compound so they could arrest him. However, Mr. McClam provided evidence to the contrary. He indicated that the ATF had made it seem as though it was impossible to arrest Koresh outside of the compound, but that was not the case and the death of over seventy people could have been averted:

“Koresh had been off the compound on a number of occasions. ATF knew

he had been off the compound. As a matter of fact, Koresh was an avid car

buff and he had a Mustang being restored at a nearby repair shop off the Melvin 43

compound in Waco. They could have arrested him at any time when he was

off the compound to take a look at his Mustang.” (qtd. in Melvin 35)

My research also indicated that the government believed it had a legitimate reason to arrest

Koresh because they were concerned that the Branch Davidians would use a large personal stock of firearms that they owned against their neighbors outside the compound. “The key evidence in the ATF director‟s mind—based upon his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee— appears to have been Koresh‟s religious views, pro-gun rights views, criticism of federal gun laws, and hostility toward the ATF…” (Kopel and Blackman 65). However, Mr. McClam indicated that there was little evidence suggesting that Koresh and his followers intended to harm the neighbors. Further, my research found that the government officials believed they had taken the most appropriate steps to try to arrest Koresh and that his resistance had caused the deaths and destruction. However, according to Mr. McClam, the ATF “did a number of things that led to the deaths of the four agents, and canceled out any surprise that the ATF would have going into the compound, to try to control the compound before anyone could get hurt” (qtd. in Melvin

23). He added that the “ATF did what they did because they wanted to show off…if they had followed the raid properly, they could have executed the plan without losing a life. But they didn‟t listen to their intelligence information and they decided to go in anyway, and they wanted to showboat” (qtd. in Melvin 37-8). Overall, these specific accounts of the raid, as discussed by

Mr. McClam, contradicted key aspects of the government‟s justification that I found during my research of this event.

There were some very distinct strengths and weaknesses present in the oral interview. As one strength, I went into the interview with a lot of prior knowledge because of the many available books and other sources of information that helped me understand the subject. Thus, I Melvin 44 had a sense of familiarity about my topic which enabled me to follow the conversation easily.

Further, my interview was strengthened because of Mr. McClam‟s extensive knowledge about this subject. He had a very strong appreciation for what I was trying to accomplish with this project and he clearly took his job of telling me about what happened during this period very seriously. Because he was a member of the team that actually conducted the investigation of the raid (rather than a secondary source that could only restate what others had said about it), his discussion of the investigation and findings have strong validity and relevance to my project. At the same time, there were limitations in our discussion that could be seen as weaknesses in the interview. In particular, because of his professionalism, Mr. McClam did not feel that he could discuss certain areas related to the raid that he was not directly involved with. For example, my contextualization paper talked about the FBI‟s use of psychological warfare to force the Branch

Davidians out of their compound. Although Mr. McClam was familiar with this issue, he was cautious in what he was willing to say about the FBI‟s actions because his investigation did not include reviewing how that agency was involved in the raid. Also, I believe I could have improved the discussion by asking more follow-up questions during the initial interview.

Although we had a very informative discussion, I later realized that I lacked certain details needed to clarify his points. As a result, I conducted a second interview with Mr. McClam over the telephone. This discussion provided additional information that enhanced my knowledge and research, but the lack of face-to-face interaction made it difficult for me to read his expressions and emotions when we talked about sensitive matters such as his inability to sleep after visiting the burned-out compound. As a result, I was cautious about pursuing this line of questioning because I did not want to make him uncomfortable. Nevertheless, the interview was a success Melvin 45 and I was able to gain a better understanding of what occurred during the raid and the investigation.

My interview with Mr. McClam taught me, as a student, how important oral history can be in gaining a better knowledge and understanding of past events. The project increased my ability to comprehend the events surrounding the Branch Davidians raid and how it affected those who were involved. Although it did not provide clear explanations of all the actions and decisions that were made, it did add to the fullness of my knowledge about this tragedy. The information that I obtained through this process strengthened my conclusion that the government took a number of unnecessary actions in its raid that contributed to many unfortunate deaths.

Nonetheless, determining what was accurate among the conflicting accounts of the raid proved to be very challenging. In the end, I realized that history can be complex and is not something to be taken for granted. Historians play an essential role in making sure that we understand the actions and events in our past and how they influence decisions that we make in our lives today. Melvin 46

Works Consulted

Andryszewski, Tricia. The Militia Movement: Before and After Oklahoma City. Brookfield, Connecticut: The Millbrook Press, 1997. Print.

Carr, Edward Hallet. "The Historian and His Facts." What Is History? N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print.

"History of the Branch Davidians." http://binternet.com/~fountain/koresh/history.html. N.p., n.d. Web. 13 Dec. 2009. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/waco/timeline.html. N.p., n.d. Web. 13 Dec. 2009.

Jordan, Mary, and Sue Pressley. "Believers in Isolation." The Washington Post 3 Mar. 1993: A1+. Web.13 Dec. 2009.

Kopel, David B., and Paul H. Blackman. No More Wacos: What's Wrong with Federal Law Enforcement and How to Fix It. New York: Prometheus Books, 1997. Print.

McClam, Lewis H. Personal Interview by Lauren Melvin. 30 Dec. 2009.

Melvin, Lauren A. "Raid on the Branch Davidians." N.d. MS.

Niebuhr, Gustav, and William Hamilton. "Cult's Isolation From Society Seen as Factor in Violence." The Washington Post 2 Mar. 1993: A4. Web. 13 Dec. 2009.

Reavis, Dick J. The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. Print.

Thibodeau, David, and Leon Whiteson. A Place Called Waco: A Survivor's Story. New York: Public Affairs, 1999. Print.

United States: Executive Branch. The Department of Treasury. Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell Also Known As David Koresh. N.p.: n.p., September 1993. Print.

United States: House of Representatives. The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the Committee on the Judiciary. Investigation Into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

Verhovek, Sam Howe. "4 Federal Agents Are Killed in Shootout With A Cult." The New York Times 1 Mar.1993: A1+. Web. 13 Dec. 2009.

Waco: The Rules of Engagement. William Gazecki. Film.