Battle of Blenheim, oil on canvas, by Joshua Ross, Jr., ca. 1715 (Courtesy Government Art Collection, London)

The Duke of Marlborough and the Paradox of Campaigning in Long Wars

By Gordon Muir

he Duke of Marlborough was a Spanish Succession, stretching from source of understanding for joint mili- commander for the ages. For 10 1702 to 1711, he was never defeated tary commanders and practitioners on T campaigns during the War of the on the field of battle. However, the the complexities of campaigning. Using war ended in the failure of the Grand the U.S. Joint Concept for Integrated Alliance’s war aim to prevent Louis Campaigning (JCIC), this article XIV’s Bourbon dynasty from taking argues that the Duke of Marlborough Major Gordon Muir is an Infantry Officer in the British Army with the Royal Regiment of the throne of Spain. Marlborough’s adhered to many of the sound practices Scotland. campaign in 1711 provides a potent and concepts in JCIC but ultimately

88 Recall / The Duke of Marlborough and Campaigning JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 failed in two core areas by 1711.1 First, commander. Therefore, the campaign of and childless Charles II of Spain rein- he did not adequately adapt his cam- 1711 and Marlborough remain relevant vigorated the alliance in 1701 after he paign to changed circumstances and due to three factors. bequeathed his throne to Philip, Duke continued to seek decisive effect and First, there is a persistent relationship of Anjou. Louis XIV’s grandson had a military outcome when neither was between war and politics. Marlborough the Spanish inheritance in his grasp, possible. Second, Marlborough ceased was more than a general and wielded and France’s strategic position therefore to have honest and open dialogue with greater political power than many of became “exorbitant.”5 his newly elected political masters. today’s generals. Yet due to England’s European powers were in a constant These two failings could significantly burgeoning representative political con- state of competition during this period, contribute to defeat and disaster for trol, this power was always constrained utilizing the full spectrum of competi- any military commander. However, and at risk. He was not an absolute ruler tion mechanisms outlined in the JCIC, there is an underlying paradox to Marl- and military commander like yet war was by no means inevitable. borough’s campaign: Despite these Bonaparte or Frederick the Great; con- However, Charles II’s revelation was failures, he secured the elusive endstate sequently, his role in the dialogue with followed by Louis’s hubris. Following of an advantageous political settlement. political leaders and subsequent creation aggressive maneuvers in Flanders, Louis Marlborough’s last campaign in 1711 and execution of a campaign are worthy recognized the Catholic heir to the illustrates the paradox of achieving of analysis. Second, the operational English throne in what Correlli Barnett national political advantage through context of Marlborough’s campaigns is describes as “one of the more notable military strategic failure.2 pertinent in the contemporary world. achievements of Louis XIV’s statecraft.” This article uses the JCIC as a handrail Joint, multinational operations subservi- This blatant threat to the Protestant suc- to discuss Marlborough’s exploits and ent to evolving political aims and coalition cession united all but the fervent Jacobite extrapolate lessons for the joint force. It intricacies are not modern or emerging sympathizers in England. It was “a dis- examines the four interrelated elements phenomena. Marlborough dealt with tinct and public declaration of war, not of campaigning and discusses certain con- these considerations continuously in the only against the reigning monarch, but cepts such as the competition continuum, War of the Spanish Succession. Third, the [also] against the established religion of demonstrating that there is great historical war was long, 11 years in duration—300 Great Britain.”6 continuity to not only what constitutes years before the term was coined to The unifying starting point and aims sound campaigning but also a warning explain the struggles in Afghanistan. of the Grand Alliance were to control that the complexities the JCIC identifies The ’s recent experi- French power and partition the Spanish can lead to nonlinear outcomes. There ences are indicative of long war political inheritance to this effect. An alliance is also an inherent risk of transposing the expediency. Involvement in Afghanistan treaty clause articulated this clearly: “The Duke of Marlborough’s exploits to the began because of terrorism and al Qaeda, sovereignty of Spain and its Indian posses- modern day. His successes are over 300 but it morphed into a drugs eradica- sions should never appertain to any prince years old and certain aspects of integrated tion quest, then a training mission—all who should be, at the same time Emperor campaigning simply are not applicable. while pursuing Western normative ideals. or King of the Romans, or either King Concepts such as multidomain and the in- Modern-day joint force practitioners have or Dauphin of France.”7 The religious teragency community, among others, are much to learn from this general who struggle is highlighted frequently by many not discussed and are out of scope for this served at the turn of the 18th century. sources. However, this was not the only, discussion. Nevertheless, Marlborough’s nor overriding, consideration. Alliances experiences in his long war continue to Understanding 1711 Through were made irrespective of religious beliefs, resonate during a period of ongoing oper- the Competition Continuum rooted, as the clause suggests, in preserv- ations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. According to the JCIC, a common ing the balance of power. understanding is the “unifying start As the designated allied com- The Continuing point” for campaigning.3 When war mander, the Duke of Marlborough fully Relevance of 1711 broke out in 1702 against France and understood the political concerns and The Duke of Marlborough’s campaign Louis XIV, England was a small land need for cooperation. Furthermore, in 1711 is one of the best cases for power. Cooperation was therefore vital he was at the forefront of coalition the study of campaigning in long wars for the subsequent prosecution of the negotiations. His political and courtier amid drifting political aims. Marlbor- war. However, as General Rupert Smith skills were in evidence as he sought to ough suffered the changing political stated 300 years later, “The glue that find consensus. Marlborough thus was landscape and the effects it was having holds a coalition together is a common “proclaimed Ambassador-Extra-ordinary on operations. His diminished per- enemy, not a common desired political and Plenipotentiary, with the right to sonal and political power after 9 years outcome.”4 This was especially true for ‘conceive treaties without reference, if of campaigning meant his role more the Grand Alliance that united against need be, to King or Parliament.’”8 This closely resembled that of a modern Louis XIV. The succession of the dying gave him tremendous power, but he also

JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 Muir 89 needed to remember that the English As a soldier Marlborough was wrong to victory at Malplaquet (1709). The JCIC narrative for war was unique and the throw up the opportunity; as a states- alludes to this conundrum of military English had their own desired political man, he chose the right course.”12 victories when it states that “tactical and outcomes. That is not to say Marlborough operational successes do not possess English involvement in the war was and the alliance were unsuccessful in intrinsic value but are worthwhile only not solely due to religion or balance of this approach, merely that campaign- to the extent that they support larger power. According to Brendan Simms, ing in a state of cooperation leads to policy aims.”16 Ultimately, although each the defense of England, which rested compromise and frustration and requires battle gave strategic advantage to the al- in the security of Flanders, stood above significant diplomatic skill. The root lies, and in the case of Blenheim certainly economic or religious factors. France of Marlborough’s personal frustration supported the larger policy, none proved was the major threat to Europe. A union lay in his design and construct of the decisive in ending the war. with Spain would mean the already- campaigns. dominant French power would become Changing Conditions Over Time overwhelming. England in the war acted Marlborough’s Campaign The war continued not only as a result to oppose the French as it threatened Design and Construct of warfare’s characteristics or the inter- to gain a “position of predominance” in The Duke of Marlborough’s outlook state order in Europe; the conditions the European system, which threatened on warfare and visualization of cam- also evolved in three core areas by England’s liberties, trade, and very paigning was to destroy the enemy 1711. The JCIC notes the complexi- existence.9 through battle and a decisive strike. ties caused by changing conditions but His approach caused friction within the should place greater emphasis on the Campaigning in a State coalition and was firmly at odds with profound effect they can have. Marlbor- of Cooperation the prevailing consensus of warfare. The ough suffered at the hands of a series The JCIC recognizes the need to balance between “risk tolerance and of far-reaching effects caused by the maintain the coalition during integrated willingness to expend resources”13 was erosion of the Grand Alliance’s war aim, campaigning. It further stresses the acute in Europe as battles were costly, the primacy of national political out- transactional nature of the relationship, robbing European rulers of the military comes, and overcooperation. a facet of cooperation that Marlborough means to hold onto power. Warfare was The Erosion of the Grand Alliance’s also endured.10 As 1702 got under attritional and diplomatically focused, War Aim. Spain would also ultimately way, England along with the rest of the with “slow operational tempo” and demonstrate how the aims of long wars Grand Alliance sought to defeat and short campaign seasons. Indeed, Marl- can end up being self-defeating. In April consequently “impose [their] desired borough conducted far more sieges 1711, the Habsburg Emperor died, giv- policy objectives upon” the French.11 than battles, and although he “displayed ing the Grand Alliance’s claimant to the However, Marlborough’s approach to [warfare’s] full potential,” he also, as Spanish throne, Charles, his own throne accomplish the defeat was at odds with John Lynn argues, represents warfare’s in Austria. The overarching aim that the the wider coalition. His campaigns of “abiding limitations.”14 allies had been fighting for—to prevent 1702 and 1703 showed not only his Moreover, decisive strategic victory, as hegemonic rule over Spain and Europe skill at maneuver but also the struggles it is today, was an oxymoron, an anomaly by a universal monarchy—would occur he endured fighting in a coalition. The incongruent with warfare at this time. if Charles was to remain the preferred coalition was a necessity for England, This was not through preference, a lack allied candidate. It would merely mean yet the understandable, although inher- of campaign visualization, or seeking to trading Bourbon for Habsburg dynasties. ently contrasting, views and acceptance change this paradigm by Marlborough.15 Therefore, a Grand Alliance victory in of risk led to missed opportunities. Blenheim in 1704 represented this il- Spain would equally upset the balance of Frank Taylor describes the years of lusion of decisiveness. In one of the power in Europe. Indeed, Ivor Burton 1702 and 1703 as the most divisive of greatest campaigns in the history of war, describes war aims at this point as being the war. However, alliance concerns Marlborough achieved a decisive tactical “absurd.”17 cannot be idly dismissed; they too had victory, with the clear strategic aim of National Political Outcomes. pertinent strategic considerations and keeping Austria in the Grand Alliance. The passage of the War of the Spanish Marlborough was on his first indepen- Furthermore, in defeating the perceived Succession also evinced further truth in dent command. As David Chandler invincible French, he heralded a new General Rupert’s statement by 1711. states of missed opportunities and the era in European history. However, it Within Great Britain, political calculus valid obstinacy of the United Provinces was not enough to secure a political shifted significantly with the removal of in the alliance in particular, “Here we settlement, and the war continued. He the moderate Tory Sidney Godolphin see the conflict between military and followed Blenheim with several other from power as Lord Treasurer in August political priorities; an aspect of these ten great tactical victories: Ramillies (1706), 1710. Godolphin was a vital cog in the campaigns which will all too often recur. Oudenaarde (1708), and the Pyrrhic war machine; he was willing to work

90 Recall / The Duke of Marlborough and Campaigning JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 with the Whigs and was an extremely close ally of Marlborough. The Tories led by Robert Harley now commanded the agenda, and they sought a secretive, unilateral peace with France. For Great Britain, national political aims were valued more than cooperation by this stage. The logic and appeal of this Tory position attracted popular support. The Tories came to power based on an election, regardless of the limited fran- chise. Furthermore, the unique free press, a wide-circulation, evident public interest, even “natural obsession,” with containing Louis in Great Britain resulted in an in- formed audience. Marlborough remained popular, however, and as 1711 began, the Tories needed him to both hold the alliance together and put pressure on France to negotiate. Great Britain’s allies also must not have suspected any foul play, or they might have been tempted to seek their own peace.18 These factors led to a changed operational environ- ment by 1711. This, in turn, should have led to the refinement of Marlborough’s operational-level logic and the mecha- nism employed.19 As Marlborough’s employment of forces would show, however, neither his logic nor his defeat mechanism evolved. He was certainly limited by the warfare of his age, but that alone cannot account for his inaction. A key factor of integrated campaign design John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, oil on canvas, by John Closterman, ca. 1685–1690 (Courtesy reveals Marlborough’s struggles and why National Portrait Gallery, London) in 1711 he stuck to the operational-level logic and mechanism that he had em- The Breakdown in Civil- Whig differences, Queen Anne, other ployed throughout the war. Military Dialogue British interests worldwide, and state Overcooperation. The unifying start- JCIC defines effective civil-military and financial complexities, all while ing point of the coalition and basis for dialogue as a “continual round of Marlborough fought. The formula- cooperation evolved during the course engagement featuring discussion, tion of policy and strategy in England, of the war. In negotiating Portugal’s feedback, adaptation, and refinement therefore, was “formulated through inclusion into the Grand Alliance in of policy and actions to achieve an a complex interchange of ideas and 1703, the allies became committed to evolving set of desired strategic out- perceptions.”21 “no peace without Spain.” The “moder- comes.”20 Marlborough recognized The Godolphin-Marlborough part- ate” aims and strategy established at the the political support and economic nership was a great example of military war’s outbreak expanded significantly. underpinnings of war. However, his and political integration. Their work- This committed the allies to winning successes during the War of the Spanish ing relationship as political leader and Spain and placing their favored Austrian Succession are attributable in no small military commander spanned 8 years candidate on its throne. Politics emplaced measure to the Lord Treasurer Godol- before Godolphin’s dismissal in 1710. the military in a war that now stretched phin. Godolphin had to conduct the By the following year, the disintegration the length of Western Europe. With arduous process of political agreement of Marlborough’s political power was hindsight, this overcooperation and need and funding every year to raise the almost complete, and he returned for the to secure Spain meant the war became troops and pay for the allies. It was 1711 campaign under much different unwinnable. Godolphin who dealt with the Tory- circumstances.

JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 Muir 91 The Duke of Marlborough at the Battle of Oudenaarde (1708), oil on canvas, by John Wootton (Courtesy Sotheby’s)

The Tories distrusted Marlborough’s ensure a commander does not end up Marlborough subsequently performed motives and had their own agenda.22 in the same predicament as the Duke of masterful operational art. He outmaneu- Civil-military dialogue and transpar- Marlborough.23 vered a larger force, achieved complete ency were significantly eroded and the tactical surprise, and crossed the perceived foundations of his operational-level logic The Employment of Force: impregnable lines of Ne Plus Ultra with and mechanism gave way. Modern joint Marlborough’s Final Flourish virtually no casualties. He took the fortress force commanders will likely not enjoy In 1711, Marlborough consequently at Bouchain while keeping logistical lines as close a relationship as Marlborough faced an extremely difficult situation. of communication open and fending off and Godolphin, but they, too, expect The aims of the French by this stage any French attempts to relieve the city.26 transparent and honest dialogue. This have modern connotations for Western Marlborough achieved this after 10 years is especially important in a long war, as powers. Suffering from supply short- of campaigning, with dwindling support at circumstances change and political aims ages, Louis attempted to wear down the home, while out of favor with the Crown, evolve. The concept of follow-through allies, break the alliance by diplomacy, and with peace being clandestinely sought. also then comes to the fore. Military aims and sicken them through huge casual- Although there was no great battle such as are subordinate, while political outcomes ties—the embodiment of the definition Blenheim in 1704, 1711 was undoubtedly must be clearly articulated to allow the of degrade provided by JCIC.24 To do one of Marlborough’s finest campaigns joint force to plan appropriately. Follow- so, the French constructed a series of and one where he was “only” a military through, an “essential ongoing task,” defensive fortifications, coined Ne Plus commander.27 would simply not be achievable without Ultra, to protect France. It was the last The military successes of 1711 were dialogue. The national interests the joint line before Paris and the French com- his last. He was removed from command force is striving for need to be known to mander described them as perfect.25 as peace negotiations continued during

92 Recall / The Duke of Marlborough and Campaigning JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 an abbreviated and convoluted campaign his 61st year in 1711. Marlborough was of competition, which meant cooperation season in 1712 that saw the French human, and all these factors had to affect was transient and firmly based on national regain ground. The Treaty of Utrecht his outlook. However, he returned and aims. The way the war ended was also not followed in 1713. Despite missed peace once again sought to engage the French. the fault of the politicians. The 10 years overtures in 1706 and 1709, the eventual He failed to adapt his operational-level of campaigning had come at a vast cost. peace met the majority of the original mechanism and sought success on the The manner in which peace was sought British policy objectives. Territorial gains battlefield even though his previous hard- was poor and harmful; however, the Tories in and Nova Scotia gave great won victories had not ended the war. acted out of the interests of the state. national strategic advantage, and the Marlborough’s assessment was that The result and gains from the Treaty of recognition of the Protestant succession one more campaign would herald results. Utrecht vindicated this approach. eliminated the threat to the state itself. Although his execution in changed Great Britain maintained control of the conditions remained brilliant, it would Reframing Requires Civil- balance of power and valuable trade not secure the Grand Alliance’s aim. The Military Dialogue rights were secured. The outcome was JCIC identifies as a required capability Political masters masked their true not accomplished militarily, regardless of “the ability to respond to changes in intentions in 1711; policy evolved, the conditions it may have set.28 This was policy with multiple approaches/options but the operational logic and design the epitome of achieving an “advanta- in the integrated campaign design, con- remained static. Therein lies the fun- geous political settlement” as the JCIC struct, and employment.”30 Marlborough damental flaw in Marlborough’s final discusses.29 Marlborough was not in com- did not respond adequately, irrespective if campaign: Politicians ceased to have mand when this outcome was secured. he was shorn of political influence and his open and transparent dialogue with dialogue with civilian leaders had broken Marlborough, a fact made apparent by Assessment and Adaptation down. However, his failure to assess and his commitment to a political aim that The last factor of integrated campaign- adapt and his overall steadfastness of was unaccomplishable. If he had known ing discussed in the JCIC, assessment approach led to numerous advantages of the peace overtures, then his mili- and adaptation, played a role in Marl- for Great Britain. This dichotomy con- tary strategy could have been to attain borough’s removal. To assess and adapt, sequently reveals several lessons for the a better negotiating position. In this the mindset and willingness of the staff joint force. regard, Marlborough would have been and commander to analyze appropri- vastly successful. However, this was not ately are paramount. They must heed The Limitations of the policy he strategized. He may have the changing conditions and ensure Military Action wished for peace, yet he fought for a their outlook is not clouded by their The instrument of military action could peace secured by decisive French defeat. experiences or biases. Marlborough’s not achieve the policies as devised by Continually since 1704 and Portugal’s outlook in 1711 is hard to discern. politicians. Political calculus is decisive; entry into the alliance, policymakers He was, as always, set on battle with military conditions are not. This is the asked for more than a military campaign the French to compel them to peace critical deduction of Marlborough’s could deliver. Despite Marlborough’s terms. Despite the few previous battles long war. The enlargement of allied war skill and results, he faltered as he resulting in great tactical success and aims to include the conquest of Spain, forsook the evolution of policy. He con- some strategic exploitation, they did not combined with newly elected masters ducted military operations in isolation manufacture peace. The war, typified in 1711, fatally undid the Duke of from the new political reality that the by siege and positional warfare, raged Marlborough. As Ivor Burton alludes, Tory electoral triumph brought. on. Nevertheless, neither his frame nor diplomacy “should always be conducted To reframe, joint force commanders outlook truly changed. within the limits set by military possibil- and their staffs must know the aims of Marlborough did appear more ity.” Spain’s war aim became unachiev- their political masters. Dialogue does not methodical by 1710. He was certainly able, yet the war continued regardless. automatically eliminate the possibility limited by politics and a French un- It is testament to Marlborough’s skill that the military will be used in roles alien willingness to fight, yet the 9 years of that “he almost succeeded in achieving to its makeup or will have to pursue am- campaigning undoubtedly had an effect the impossible.”31 bitious or ambiguous policies. Dialogue on Marlborough himself. The Pyrrhic Furthermore, with historical hind- may, however, remove from the table victory at Malplaquet in 1709 weighed sight, the War of the Spanish Succession unachievable aims and highlight the need heavily on a commander renowned for must be seen as a part of a continuum for continual reassessment while seeking his concern for the welfare of his soldiers. of wars during this period. Continuing the desired outcome. More critically, that battle’s costly and advantage with accrued benefits was the The use of military force was misap- bloody stalemate eroded support from best that could be achieved with the limit- plied in 1711 for the purpose of the the coalition. He was also an old man ing character of warfare. In addition, the policy Marlborough envisaged. He was by the standards of his time, entering European system at this time was in a state certainly bereft of influence, yet he must

JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 Muir 93 Paradoxes abound and endure in war, and it is certainly mendacious to suggest military victories are inconsequential. Indeed, the War of the Spanish Succession showed that although great military suc- cess may not achieve victory, it attains great advantages, which must be seized by politicians. Things have changed; the means and technology are seismically dif- ferent. However, the assessment remains: Military strategy must be pursued in accordance with policy and national inter- est. If the policy drifts, as it has in and Afghanistan, and loses sight of the origi- nal national aim, then politicians must be brave and decisive enough to secure an advantageous settlement. Joint force commanders and planners may feel undermined by political aims generated in a long war. This is further compounded in a democracy when a change in government or president may decisively change political aims or reinforce failure, making military strategic coherence even harder. Further analysis of campaigns such as Marlborough’s will assist a joint force in the most critical aspect and start- ing point of a campaign: understanding an operating environment in which military success fails to secure overall victory.

Nonlinear Campaign Outcomes Joint force practitioners must therefore study appropriate examples of cam- paigning. As the JCIC states, “The acknowledgement that campaigning John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, oil on canvas, by Godfrey Kneller, ca. 1706 (Courtesy National will occur over long periods to achieve Portrait Gallery, London) evolving policy objectives under chal- shoulder some of the responsibility for the there is a great paradox to 1711. The lenging conditions is the actual histori- strategic failure of the allied war effort.32 1711 campaign worked brilliantly for cal experience of American wars.”35 The The means—sieges and attrition—were the British politicians. A military com- example used in the JCIC of World unlikely to win the war. The human ele- mander does not need to win the war to War II is apposite. Too often case ment of military command and analysis achieve the political aim. There was no studies depict a fraught process but one was revealed by his own flawed outlook, decisive victory, rather a pure example that still suggests there is a coherent framed by the battlefield destruction of of Dolmanian strategy.33 As Donald flow from policy to tactics to national the French, requiring time and coali- Barr Chidsey notes, “It was called the success. However, Marlborough’s tion support he simply did not have. He War of the Spanish Succession, and its exploits demonstrate that there is a gap faltered as he sought decisive strategic vic- principal object was to keep a Bourbon between military successes or failures tory through epochal constrained military from occupying the throne of Spain. and the attainment of an advantageous operations in a single theater of war. But a Bourbon sat upon that throne political settlement. Understanding this even after the . A nonlinearity is vital for joint force com- Embrace War’s Paradoxes Bourbon sits upon it today.”34 The year manders and staffs. Nevertheless, irrespective of the flaws in 1711 represented political advantage, Commanders and staffs must con- Marlborough’s understanding, design, achieved by military brilliance seeking sequently acknowledge the nonlinearity construct, adaptation, and assessment, an unaccomplishable purpose. between any measurement of success

94 Recall / The Duke of Marlborough and Campaigning JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 4 and military outcomes. Military action’s Rupert Smith in Emile Simpson, War from as many characters of the time, led a delicate the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat balancing act; he remained in correspondence interpretative structure is vital. This is as Politics (New York: Cambridge University with the Jacobites, and the war did much to as relevant now as it was in 1711. If Press, 2012), 34. further his own wealth and position. Duplici- military strategy’s perceived failures, let 5 James W. Gerard, The Peace of Utrecht tous and self-serving he may undoubtedly have alone successes, result in a better national (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1885), been, or merely a canny operator, a survivor in outcome, then commanders should 77–79. tumultuous times. 6 Correlli Barnett, Marlborough (London: 23 JCIC, 16: “Leaders and planners ensure accept and indeed embrace this reality. Eyre Methuen, 1974), 27; John B. Hattendorf, proper follow through so campaigning yields Integrated campaign design would ben- England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A acceptable and sustainable outcomes. Military efit greatly from this approach and ensure Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand operations are subordinate to policy and must the construction of a far more persuasive Strategy, 1701–1713 (New York: Garland Pub- remain orientated on the achievement of ac- narrative and interpretive structure. This lishing, 1987), 226–229. ceptable political outcomes.” 7 Gerard, The Peace of Utrecht, 65. 24 Claude C. Sturgill, Marshal Villars and approach would ensure that national 8 J.R. Jones, Marlborough (Cambridge: the War of the Spanish Succession (Lexington: advantage, rather than tactical action, is Cambridge University Press, 1993), 60; David University Press of Kentucky, 1965), 103, paramount in military minds. Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander 104–107; Chidsey, Marlborough, 271. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 54. 25 Ne Plus Ultra figuratively means “thou In correspondence with Godolphin, 9 Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a De- shalt not pass.” Some sources also use non plus feat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire ultra. The term originates from a boastful letter the Duke of Marlborough stated, (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 16–18, 45, from Commander Claude Louis Hector de Vil- “Whatever is good for my country I shall 48–49; Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process lars to Louis XIV. Chidsey, Marlborough, 266; always wish and pray for.”36 Marlborough in International Politics (New York: John Wiley Archibald Alison, The Life of John, the Duke failed to secure a decisive military result and Sons, 1957); Per Maurseth, “Balance-of- of Marlborough, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: William in the War of the Spanish Succession. Power Thinking from the Renaissance to the Blackwood and Sons, 1852), 280; John Hussey, French Revolution,” Journal of Peace Research “Marlborough and the Loss of Arleux, 1711, National political aims and those of the 1, no. 2 (1964), 127. Accident or Design?” Journal of the Society for coalition evolved and drifted throughout 10 JCIC, 9. Army Historical Research 70, no. 281 (Spring his long war. He lost honest and trans- 11 Ibid., 8. 1992), 7. parent dialogue with political masters. 12 Chandler, Marlborough as a Military 26 Success is never due solely to one factor, He also failed to reframe. However, Commander, 101. the “genius of Generalship.” Marlborough 13 JCIC, 11. benefited greatly during the war from several Marlborough’s successes in defeating 14 John Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV factors: Earl Cadogan’s logistical exploits, his the armies of Louis XIV transcended 1667–1714 (Essex, UK: Longman, 1999), 286, partnership with Prince Eugene, the strong the events of 1711. He secured national 370–375. Dutch contingent, and an increasingly well- advantage and created power for Great 15 Ibid., 370–375; Chandler, Marlborough trained army. Britain. There is much contemporaneous as Military Commander, 62–64. 27 Chidsey, Marlborough, 281; Simms, Three 16 JCIC, 23. Victories and a Defeat, 55. discussion in the United States and the 17 Ivor F. Burton, The Captain General: 28 Hattendorf, England in the War of the United Kingdom of conditions-based The Career of John Churchill from 1692 to 1711 Spanish Succession, 269–271: “Although the missions or drawdowns in the Middle (London: Constable, 1968), 180; Henry L. means [military to political/diplomatic] to East and Afghanistan. Military com- Snyder, ed., The Marlborough-Godolphin Cor- this goal were altered in 1711, the goal was manders campaigning in today’s long respondence, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, achieved.” The English/British method in the 1975), 1665; Donald Barr Chidsey, Marlbor- war was also to become the “British way of wars continue to mistake a conflict’s end ough: The Portrait of a Conqueror (New York: warfare” for the next two centuries. and military stalemate for failure. There John Day, 1929), 267. 29 JCIC, 25 is only one condition for a successful 18 Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, 30 Ibid., 30. campaign. The Duke of Marlborough’s 53, 54; Burton, The Captain General, 177; 31 Burton, The Captain General, 193–194. experiences with war’s paradoxes prove Hattendorf, England in the War of the Spanish 32 Jones, Marlborough, 194–196. Succession, 219. Public opinion did not amount 33 The formation of strategy is, according to campaign success can be measured only to “serious consideration” of “war strategy” Dolman, “unending” and “a plan for attain- by achieving national advantage. JFQ but rather concerns rooted in simultaneously ing continuing advantage.” It is, furthermore, pursuing a “policy of defence of the nation, fluid and flexible. See Everett Carl Dolman, trade and offensive with France.” See Barnett, Pure Strategy: Power and Principles in the Space Notes Marlborough, 252. and Information Age (New York: Routledge, 19 JCIC, 12. 2005), 1–10. 20 34 1 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaign- Ibid., 13. Chidsey, Marlborough, 283. 21 35 ing (JCIC) (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, “England beat France with the purse JCIC, 26. 36 March 16, 2018). as much as the sword, and great credit is due Snyder, The Marlborough-Godolphin Cor- 2 The Acts of Union in 1707 complicate the to Godolphin’s finance.” See George Macau- respondence, 1680. use of England vs. Great Britain, especially as lay Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne: some authors interchange the term. For ease, Blenheim (London: Longmans, Green and Co., England will be used prior to 1707, and Great 1948), 187; Hattendorf, England in the War of Britain thereafter. the Spanish Succession, 53. 22 3 JCIC, 7. Marlborough is a complicated figure. He “betrayed” his Catholic sponsor in 1688 and,

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