Battle of Blenheim, oil on canvas, by Joshua Ross, Jr., ca. 1715 (Courtesy Government Art Collection, London) The Duke of Marlborough and the Paradox of Campaigning in Long Wars By Gordon Muir he Duke of Marlborough was a Spanish Succession, stretching from source of understanding for joint mili- commander for the ages. For 10 1702 to 1711, he was never defeated tary commanders and practitioners on T campaigns during the War of the on the field of battle. However, the the complexities of campaigning. Using war ended in the failure of the Grand the U.S. Joint Concept for Integrated Alliance’s war aim to prevent Louis Campaigning (JCIC), this article XIV’s Bourbon dynasty from taking argues that the Duke of Marlborough Major Gordon Muir is an Infantry Officer in the British Army with the Royal Regiment of the throne of Spain. Marlborough’s adhered to many of the sound practices Scotland. campaign in 1711 provides a potent and concepts in JCIC but ultimately 88 Recall / The Duke of Marlborough and Campaigning JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 failed in two core areas by 1711.1 First, commander. Therefore, the campaign of and childless Charles II of Spain rein- he did not adequately adapt his cam- 1711 and Marlborough remain relevant vigorated the alliance in 1701 after he paign to changed circumstances and due to three factors. bequeathed his throne to Philip, Duke continued to seek decisive effect and First, there is a persistent relationship of Anjou. Louis XIV’s grandson had a military outcome when neither was between war and politics. Marlborough the Spanish inheritance in his grasp, possible. Second, Marlborough ceased was more than a general and wielded and France’s strategic position therefore to have honest and open dialogue with greater political power than many of became “exorbitant.”5 his newly elected political masters. today’s generals. Yet due to England’s European powers were in a constant These two failings could significantly burgeoning representative political con- state of competition during this period, contribute to defeat and disaster for trol, this power was always constrained utilizing the full spectrum of competi- any military commander. However, and at risk. He was not an absolute ruler tion mechanisms outlined in the JCIC, there is an underlying paradox to Marl- and military commander like Napoleon yet war was by no means inevitable. borough’s campaign: Despite these Bonaparte or Frederick the Great; con- However, Charles II’s revelation was failures, he secured the elusive endstate sequently, his role in the dialogue with followed by Louis’s hubris. Following of an advantageous political settlement. political leaders and subsequent creation aggressive maneuvers in Flanders, Louis Marlborough’s last campaign in 1711 and execution of a campaign are worthy recognized the Catholic heir to the illustrates the paradox of achieving of analysis. Second, the operational English throne in what Correlli Barnett national political advantage through context of Marlborough’s campaigns is describes as “one of the more notable military strategic failure.2 pertinent in the contemporary world. achievements of Louis XIV’s statecraft.” This article uses the JCIC as a handrail Joint, multinational operations subservi- This blatant threat to the Protestant suc- to discuss Marlborough’s exploits and ent to evolving political aims and coalition cession united all but the fervent Jacobite extrapolate lessons for the joint force. It intricacies are not modern or emerging sympathizers in England. It was “a dis- examines the four interrelated elements phenomena. Marlborough dealt with tinct and public declaration of war, not of campaigning and discusses certain con- these considerations continuously in the only against the reigning monarch, but cepts such as the competition continuum, War of the Spanish Succession. Third, the [also] against the established religion of demonstrating that there is great historical war was long, 11 years in duration—300 Great Britain.”6 continuity to not only what constitutes years before the term was coined to The unifying starting point and aims sound campaigning but also a warning explain the struggles in Afghanistan. of the Grand Alliance were to control that the complexities the JCIC identifies The United Kingdom’s recent experi- French power and partition the Spanish can lead to nonlinear outcomes. There ences are indicative of long war political inheritance to this effect. An alliance is also an inherent risk of transposing the expediency. Involvement in Afghanistan treaty clause articulated this clearly: “The Duke of Marlborough’s exploits to the began because of terrorism and al Qaeda, sovereignty of Spain and its Indian posses- modern day. His successes are over 300 but it morphed into a drugs eradica- sions should never appertain to any prince years old and certain aspects of integrated tion quest, then a training mission—all who should be, at the same time Emperor campaigning simply are not applicable. while pursuing Western normative ideals. or King of the Romans, or either King Concepts such as multidomain and the in- Modern-day joint force practitioners have or Dauphin of France.”7 The religious teragency community, among others, are much to learn from this general who struggle is highlighted frequently by many not discussed and are out of scope for this served at the turn of the 18th century. sources. However, this was not the only, discussion. Nevertheless, Marlborough’s nor overriding, consideration. Alliances experiences in his long war continue to Understanding 1711 Through were made irrespective of religious beliefs, resonate during a period of ongoing oper- the Competition Continuum rooted, as the clause suggests, in preserv- ations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. According to the JCIC, a common ing the balance of power. understanding is the “unifying start As the designated allied com- The Continuing point” for campaigning.3 When war mander, the Duke of Marlborough fully Relevance of 1711 broke out in 1702 against France and understood the political concerns and The Duke of Marlborough’s campaign Louis XIV, England was a small land need for cooperation. Furthermore, in 1711 is one of the best cases for power. Cooperation was therefore vital he was at the forefront of coalition the study of campaigning in long wars for the subsequent prosecution of the negotiations. His political and courtier amid drifting political aims. Marlbor- war. However, as General Rupert Smith skills were in evidence as he sought to ough suffered the changing political stated 300 years later, “The glue that find consensus. Marlborough thus was landscape and the effects it was having holds a coalition together is a common “proclaimed Ambassador-Extra-ordinary on operations. His diminished per- enemy, not a common desired political and Plenipotentiary, with the right to sonal and political power after 9 years outcome.”4 This was especially true for ‘conceive treaties without reference, if of campaigning meant his role more the Grand Alliance that united against need be, to King or Parliament.’”8 This closely resembled that of a modern Louis XIV. The succession of the dying gave him tremendous power, but he also JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 Muir 89 needed to remember that the English As a soldier Marlborough was wrong to victory at Malplaquet (1709). The JCIC narrative for war was unique and the throw up the opportunity; as a states- alludes to this conundrum of military English had their own desired political man, he chose the right course.”12 victories when it states that “tactical and outcomes. That is not to say Marlborough operational successes do not possess English involvement in the war was and the alliance were unsuccessful in intrinsic value but are worthwhile only not solely due to religion or balance of this approach, merely that campaign- to the extent that they support larger power. According to Brendan Simms, ing in a state of cooperation leads to policy aims.”16 Ultimately, although each the defense of England, which rested compromise and frustration and requires battle gave strategic advantage to the al- in the security of Flanders, stood above significant diplomatic skill. The root lies, and in the case of Blenheim certainly economic or religious factors. France of Marlborough’s personal frustration supported the larger policy, none proved was the major threat to Europe. A union lay in his design and construct of the decisive in ending the war. with Spain would mean the already- campaigns. dominant French power would become Changing Conditions Over Time overwhelming. England in the war acted Marlborough’s Campaign The war continued not only as a result to oppose the French as it threatened Design and Construct of warfare’s characteristics or the inter- to gain a “position of predominance” in The Duke of Marlborough’s outlook state order in Europe; the conditions the European system, which threatened on warfare and visualization of cam- also evolved in three core areas by England’s liberties, trade, and very paigning was to destroy the enemy 1711. The JCIC notes the complexi- existence.9 through battle and a decisive strike. ties caused by changing conditions but His approach caused friction within the should place greater emphasis on the Campaigning in a State coalition and was firmly at odds with profound effect they can have. Marlbor- of Cooperation the prevailing consensus of warfare. The ough suffered at the hands of a series The JCIC recognizes the need to balance between “risk tolerance and of far-reaching effects caused by the maintain the coalition during integrated willingness to expend resources”13 was erosion of the Grand Alliance’s war aim, campaigning. It further stresses the acute in Europe as battles were costly, the primacy of national political out- transactional nature of the relationship, robbing European rulers of the military comes, and overcooperation.