Operations Research and Systems Analysis
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OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS Hugh J. Miser International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria RR-81-9 May 1981 Reprinted from Science , volume 209, 4 July (1980) INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS Laxenburg, Austria Research Reports , which record research conducted at II ASA, are independently reviewed before publication. However, the views and opinions they express are not necessarily those of the Institute or the National Member Organizations that support it. Reprinted with permission from Philip H. Abelson and Ruth Kulstad, editors, The Science Centennial Rei·iew, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, DC, 1980, pp. 121 - 128. The article was originally published in this form in the Centennial Issue of Science 209(4 July): 13 9 - 146, 1980. Copyright© 1980 American Association for the Advancement of Science. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means. electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright holder. iii FOREWORD One of the goals of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is to increase the understanding of what systems analysis is and what it can do . This paper, which was contributed by invitation to the Centennial Issue of Science, describes the genesis of systems analysis and gives a brief overview of the field , using exam ples to illustrate key points. Thus, it is designed to introduce systems analysis to a wide and varied audience . Another paper contributed by an IIASA staff member to this special Centennial Issue of Science provides a brief description of some key findings of a mature and comprehensive systems analysis: Wolf Hafele , "A Global and Long-Range Picture of Energy Developments," Science 209 :174- 182, 1980. This paper has also been reprinted, as IIASA Research Report RR-81-8. ROGER LEVIEN Director against possible air attack, with the re sult that, by late 1937, the key elements of an effective defense had been devised: radar and the Hurricane fighter plane. But combining them into an effective Operations Research and system could not be left to improvisa tion, as the disappointing results of an air exercise showed in July 1938. Con Systems Analysis sequently, A. P. Rowe, then leader of the radar development work on En Hugh J. Miser gland's east coast, proposed that re search into the operational-as opposed to the purely technical-aspects of the Operations research, unlike most sci as a coherent development but also The author, professor of industrial engineering ences, is able to point to a well-defined caused its name to be coined. After Hit and operations research at the University of Massa combination of circumstances and ler rose to power in Germany, England chusetts, Amherst, is on leave while serving as exec utive editor for the International Institute for Ap events that not only began its activities sought to prepare a suitable defense plied Systems Analysis. Laxenburg. Austria. 121 radar-fighter system be undertaken, and ysis of operations" and should be staffed terns. By the end of the first decade after the term .. operational research" was and carried out in the spirit of science the war, examples were available to give coined to describe the work (/ ). (3). This memorandum had considerable substance to this expectation (7), and by This new kind of research, conducted influence on both sides of the Atlantic. now their number and variety are very in close cooperation with the officers and Many of the scientists who became in great (8). A recent example typifies much men of the Royal Air Force, led directly volved with this wartime work were sur of what has been done. to substantial improvements in En prised to find that there were identifiable In 1979 Eric Brodheim of the New gland's air defense system, which was stabilities in situations that they had al- York Blood Center and Gregory P. Pras- given its most decisive test in the Battle of Britain during August and September of 1940. Summary . The science of man-machine operating systems, which includes opera The success of this partnership be tions research and systems analysis, has achieved a substantial body of theory and tween scientists and operating forces application over the last 40 years. Its current strength prompts it to attack difficult prompted the spread of operational re large-scale problems while challenging the other relevant sciences to unite, not only search to other British commands and with each other and operations and systems research, but also with society, to deal services. When the United States en with some of the most widespread and important problems of our time. tered the war, this British precedent was pursued by U.S. military commanders, with the result that, by late 1942 , groups ways considered to be totally formless. tacos of the University of Pennsylvania of scientists were undertaking similar For example, consider the outcomes of reported a notable study (9, 10) of blood work for both the U.S. Navy and Army air combat. While a commander can con distribution and utilization that they had Air Corps. However, the name had been trol his own tactics, he cannot control conducted in response to a national Americanized to .. operations research." those of his enemy, nor can he eliminate problem (9) . By the end of the war, England, Cana uncertainty in the weather. N everthe Each year over two million hospitalized da. and the United States had employed less, it was often possible to predict the Americans depend on the timely availability perhaps as many as 700 scientists in outcomes with considerable accuracy of the right type of blood products at 6,000 work loosely described by these terms (4). hospital blood banks (HBBs) in the United (2). The sense of wonder that such sys States. If the right blood products are not Some of the work that these scientists tems of men and machines operating in available ... when required, then medical complications or postponements of elective did merely exploited the technical back conflict in a natural environment could surgery can result, which translate to extra grounds that they brought to their war exhibit aspects of regularity was ex days of hospitalization and expense. On the time tasks. However, there was also the pressed by two of the most notable U.S. other hand, since most blood products may important novelty that they had studied operations research pioneers, Philip M. only be administered to a patient of the same blood type within 21 days of collection, over and evaluated the results of tactical oper Morse (a physicist from Massachusetts stocking at HBBs leads to low utilization, ations, devised tactical innovations and Institute of Technology) and George E. which increases costs and is wasteful of the predicted their possible consequences, Kimball (a chemist from Columbia Uni scarce blood resource. and. when the innovations were actually versity), when they wrote in 1946 that Thus, as Johanna Pindyck, director of used. compared expected results with .. large bodies of men and equipment car the Greater New York Blood Program those actually achieved. And this knowl rying out complex operations behave in (the largest in the world), expresses it, edge had often become the basis for an astonishingly regular manner, so that " We face the major problem of how to helping with tactical planning, and even , one can predict the outcome of such op maximize the availability of blood to during the later stages of the war, for erations to a degree not foreseen by most each of ... 262 hospitals ... while ef contributing important knowledge to natural scientists" (5). fectively discharging our implicit cove strategic choices. Too, the World War II experiences nant to our donors to see that their gift is History shows that operations re had exhibited the classic cycle of the efficiently utilized" (11 ). search workers made important contri method of science (6) . The scientists had Since there are approximately 200 Re butions to the war efforts of their coun observed nature (albeit the startlingly gional Blood Centers (RBC's) in the tries. However. another outcome of this new phenomena of military operations), United States, Brodheim and Prastacos work was also important: Many of these had built theories to account for these (9) viewed the problem from the RBC scientists saw in their wartime scientific observations, had used them to predict point of view, as well as from that of the achievements the germ of a new science future outcomes, and had tested these HBB: of operating man-machine systems that predictions against actual experience, could be developed for peacetime activi with frequent agreement. Indeed, many Most blood products in the United States ties and applied to their problems. of them had experienced several con are derived from whole blood that is collected by an RBC in units of one pint from volunteer nected and successive cycles, from donors. After laboratory processing and test which had emerged fairly comprehensive ing , whole blood and blood products derived The Science of Operations Research theories with accepted predictive value. from whole blood are distributed to the Thus, the novelty of wartime operations HBBs, where they are stored to be available for transfusion when requested. It is clear that many of these pioneers research did not lie in the method that The complexity of the blood inventory of operations research saw their work as was being used, but rather in the part of management problem is due primarily to the being scientific; for example, as early as " nature" to which it was applied: mili perishability of blood, the uncertainties in 1941 P.