12-1^'7L LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN NO
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3 . .. :. ^.`n ^y,. ^R1G^^AL IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 12-1^'7l LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN NO. Petitioner-Appellant, On appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, Eight Appellate vs. District STEPHANIE ANN LUCK Court of Appeals Case Nos. CA-097074 and CA-097075 Respondent- Appellee. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF NRISDICTION Suzanne M. Jambe, Esq. LARRY KLAYMAN . 1900 East Ninth Street 2020 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Suite 800 3200 National City Center Washington, D.C. 20006 Cleveland, Ohio 44114-3486 Attorneyfor Appellee Stephanie Ann Luck Pro Se .... CC^ ^ C ^^12 CLERK OF COURT TABLE OF CONTENTS Explanafion Of Why This Case Is A Case Of Public Or Great General Interest Or Why A Substantial Constitutional Question Is Involved ..............................................................................1 Statement Of The Case And Facts ........................................ ..............................................5 Argument In Support Of Propositions Of Law ................. ....................................................7 Proposition of Law No. I. A Contempt Action Filed To Enforce Child Support Payments Is An "Enforcement" Action And Is Subject To The Choice Of Law Provision Agreed Upon In A Consent Marital Agreement .............................................................................................................7 Proposition of Law No. II Blatant And Repeated Bias And Prejudice By A Magistrate And Judge In A Child Custody Proceeding Is A Violation Of The Due Process Rights Of The One Against Whom The Bias Is Displayed ........................................................................................................9 Proposition of Law No. III A Magistrate And Judge Cannot Make A Decision To Take A Person's Child Away Based On Only His Own Inferences When The Evidence On The Record Leads To No Such Conclusion .....................................................................................................12 Proposition of Law No. IV A Magistrate And Judge Cannot Take The Place Of An Expert Witness And Perform Psychological Evaluations Of Children During A Case In Which He Is Presiding ........................................................................................................................................12 Proposition of Law No. V The Wrongful Admission Of Records Into Evidence Does Not Alter The Clear Prohibition Set Forth In Ohio Rev. Code § 3109.04(E)(1)(A) And These Records Must Be Stricken From The Record ......................................................................................................14 Proposition of Law No. VI The Magistrate And Judge Wrongly Dismissed The Action When Due To His Financial Difficulties And Other Factors, Appellant Could Not Be Present On The Final Date Of The Trial Even Though He Had Requested A Continuance ...................................14 Proposition of Law No. VII Since This Case Must Be Remanded For Retrial, The Punitive And Prejudicial Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs Must Also Be Reviewed And Reversed At This Time ...............................................................................................................................................15 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................15 Certificate Of Service ....................................................................................................................16 App endix ........................................................................................................................................17 _ EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST OR WHY A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS INVOLVED APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED "Justice will not be served until those who are unaffected are as outraged as those who are." - Benjamin Franklin Appellant Larry Klayman has faced deliberate and disgraceful acts of judicial bias and misconduct, in a Cleveland family court that regrettably has been publicly criticized for its routine "dysfunction." This deprived him of his right of due process under the law. Outrageously, Appellant was ridiculed for his religious beliefs and was referred to as"evil" by the very magistrate and who decided to effectively take his children away from him. This clear and distinct bias was done in violation of appellant's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 1 of Article Sixteen of the Ohio Constitution. The Ohio courts recognize that "a fair trial in an impartial tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.i1 Cooke v. United Dairy Farmers, Inc. (2006), 2006 Ohio 4365 (Ohio Ct. App., Franklin County Aug. 24, 2006) citing In re Murchison (1955), 349 U.S. 133, 136. Ohio's legal standard for judicial bias is clear, with a relatively low threshold for recusal or disqualification. In the landmark case of State v. LaMar (2002), 95 Ohio St. 3d 181, 189, the Court held that "Judicial bias has been described as a`hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or fauoritism toward one of the lifigants or his attorney, with the formafion of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts."' As set forth below, the magistrate's and the trial court's 1 As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to be recused not only when actual bias has been demonstrated or when the judge has an economic interest in the outcome of the case, but also when "extreme facts" create a"probability of bias." These two situations apply in this case. (Emphasis added). ,^ outrageous and prejudicial behavior in this case far exceeds this relatively low threshold for his disqualification. The magistrate's 93 page opinion ridiculed Appellant and called him "evil" along with several other disparaging remarks and personal attacks. And the magistrate, Jewish like Mr. Klayman, mocked him for being messianic. These among many other outrageous statements were brought to the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District ("appellate court")'s attention and were ignored. There can be no clearer example of actual bias. This bias and prejudice demonstrates the need for a new and impartial trial. APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO RAISE HIS CHILDREN HAS BEEN VIOLATED This case involves Appellant' right to raise his children. Appellee in effect kidnapped Appellant's children from him and he has not been able to see or talk with them in over five years. Appellant's right to raise his children has been essentially ignored while he has suffered years of biased court rulings based on false accusations of sexual abuse. As the Supreme Court of Ohio has frequently found: "The United States Supreme Court has stated that the right to raise one's children is an"essential" and "basic civil right." See Standey v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645, 651; Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), 262 U.S. 390, 399. Parents have a "fundamental liberry interest" in the care, custody, and management of the child. Santosky v. Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 753. Further, it has been deemed "cardinal" that the custody, care and nurhxre of the child reside, first, in the parents. H.L. v. Matheson (1981), 450 U.S. 398, 410; Quidloin v. Walcott (1978), 434 U.S. 246, 255; Stanley, supra, at 651; Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), 321 U.S. 158, 166. "Similarly, this court has long stated that parents who are suitable persons haue a"paramount" right to the custody of their minor children. In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St. 2d 89, 97, 6 O.O. 3d 293, 297, 369 N.E. 2d 1047, 1051-1052; Clark v. Bayer (1877), 32 Ohio St. 299, 310, Numerous reported decisions demonstrate that this principle has become the foundation for child custody cases faced by lower courts. See, e.g., In re Fassinger (1974), 43 Ohio App. 2d 89, 91-92, 72 O.O. 2d 292, 294, 334 N.E. 2d 5, 8; In re Massner (1969), 19 Ohio App. 2d 33, 39-40, 48 O.O. 2d 31, 35, 249 N.E. 2d 532, 536; In re 2 DeYore (1959), 111 Ohio App. 1, 3, 13 O.O. 2d 376, 377, 167 N.E. 2d 381, 382; In re Duffy (1946), 78 Ohio App. 16, 18, 33 O.O. 381, 382, 68 N.E. 2d 842, 843-844; Ex Parte Combs (C.P. 1958), 77 Ohio Law Abs. 458, 460, 150 N.E. 2d 505, 507; In re Zerick (J.C. 1955), 74 Ohio Law Abs. 525, 530, 57 O.O. 331, 333, 129 N.E. 2d 661, 665; In re Routa (P.C. 1955), 71 Ohio Law Abs. 574, 576, 2 O.O. 2d 80, 130 N.E. 2d 453, 454; In re Swentosky (P.C. 1937), 25 Ohio Law Abs. 601, 602, 10 O.O. 150, 151, 1 Ohio Supp. 37, 38." In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St. 3d 155, 157. This long-established black letter case law demonstrates precisely why Appellant is entitled to review by this Court as a matter of right, as well as the Court's discretion. Appellant's fundamental and basic right to raise his children must be restored. 2 EPIDEMIC OF FALSE SEXUAL ABUSE ACCUSATIONS IN THIS STATE HAVE PLAGUED THE COURT SYSTEM AND MUST BE ADDRESSED This lawsuit involves manufactured allegations of child sexual abuse, which types of false allegations have become epidemic in Ohio family courts. As the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth Appellate District found, "the introduction of sexual abuse charges into bitterly contested custody actions seems to have become epidemic. Yet, as one expert in this case testified, such allegations are unsubstantiated in as many as eight of ten