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CrQnsral Subjects Section ACADEMIC D^PAHIMUM TH^J INFANTRY 3CH OOL Fort Banning t Georgia
ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICER'3 C0UR3B 194? - 1948
PLANS AND OPERATIONS OF $H? 606th PARACHUTE INFANTRY (IQlst AIRBORNE DIVISION) IN TH1 INVASION OF NORMANDY, (NORMANDY CAMPAIGN) 5—30 JUNE 1944 (Personal Experience of Company Commander 3rd Battalion 5 to 7 June 1944,)
Type of operation described* PLAN3 AND OPERA TIONS OF PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT* I
m '&Jm Major John T« MoKnight, Infantry ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLA3S 10 1
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C0ST.lSgg3 PAOT, Indear • •*•»•.••*••*...... ,,,,,.,..., ...... 1 Bi bli ography «•»..«,•» ••••••••• ...•••.... 2 Introduotion...... 3 3 ii!^ii^^ 4 Detailed Plan, 1st and End Battalions. •••...., ...... *..*,. a 5 Plan of 3rd Battalion.... . •••... 6 6th Jane "D" Day.....,...... *, # 6 Operations of 1st and 2nd Battalions 14 Caran tan« * * *•••**••»••».••••••• •--. -...... -...... v. • •. • 17 Analysis and Grit ioism..,...... 20 Lessons. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•...»...,..,.. 21 Map A - Plan of Operation Map B - Drop Pattern Map C - Advance on D/ 1 Map D - Carentan Operation j^^^Vlf^ «£'5KOtyif^ >*###» *«*ii|RI A^f^^fWjro tfgfw*' * * -h jt M» • .-J»^«JS* mij^s»#pw;«*!!Hig4#*p- 1 fC , ! n , .-. *•*»•» ••-**•• «*«.v%*. **«k '^MV^'ATKMff^W< - • OM^VW •M»'yMwr#«^4ni«« io*> ' K" >M»r>i >w».i,j.1*)»«,f>«M'* » **..•»: '• -^ «»i**.M:-*'***#**rf»«)W #**» ««»8"a» ' M* iM»D* r wim* ' •• ^;i»lf^y^ *W«MP»WiS • '•» • J r, v * •• MWkWWli's ..*.,«« i»v«<, ,)l'Vni« ril BLI£2BAE£I # ^-» ~ *> «»1 Unit tjMv-^o **4' , , .. wA*»w»oriQ.V i/AWV 1 505 ParacHuyO "j** ^0 i!I3 library) By: History Section, ^iu v ByS DWl-on in the Invasion HM| o£ lOlat Airborne Bxvi.*on A-E Operations ui •*-« of Francs* rt S ll lo? R9P° , ° Jtaa H. coats, Infantry ^.r^.©l.on£X.-uAai*5_. * rs. ...g./„3_ „_. „. ..— *'„,. - ^^f^^oi^Ivision 1.13 Library) Mono* the 506th Parachute Infantry in O- AA.- 3 Operation Europe „ ftl0_al H. *• Hannah, Official Sport by Lieutenant ^f^ Personal Possession) Hafimentai 3-3, 506 Parachu,e -Intent War Departmen^ „„t* ObeeObserverr s Reporunt a A-4 \a jLiroorne p*a" ^ (2IS Library)- By: colonel Biavexx \ A_5 personal Knowledge '••m^' > ' ii V / ill' •>« i rf*' rt^fy^ .* ...... )• * '< #» 'r •r;'?#V' - ^"'-^,: . *. •'*.-(J-i8it#!?i».«*,s.»^#^ »*> «*>M mmmw*><- -»-<-*»#*-«^.« * *# V ' •. # «• «. IP w .„.- , *«M«r- i*«*frhv* »• *• ..•» l |V«»> ku&®3 AND OPERATIONS OF £Hf §06th PARACHtJTI? »»'•'.<>•,'? •*»vi»W.>l.»•-*•*»*)?• >""•*'•">">*' itfVASlOi* OF NORMANDI, (NORMANDY CAMPAIGN) 5—30 JfJW* 1941 (personal ^atperisnce of Company Commander 3rd Battalion 5 to 7 June 1944.) This monograph covers the plans and operations of the 506 Parachute Infantry, 101st Airborne Division in the in vasion of Normandy (Normandy Campaign), (5th June 1944 to <**''••• •>" SOth .June 1944} • personal Experience of Company Commander, 3rd Battalion 5th June to 7th June 1944- Ths first large scale use of Airborne troops in mil itary history was made on 6th of June, 1944, when two American Airborne Divisions (the 101st and the 82nd), operating under 711 Corps, landed during darkness on the Cotentin Peninsula* and carried out a coordinated plan to assist the beach land ing of the 4th Division st H-aour on D-day"morning. Six Para chute Infantry Regiments; the 505, 507, and 508 of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 501st, 502nd, and 506th of the 101st Airborne Division, together with the normal complement of Para chute Field Artillery and Parachute Engineers,totaling more than 14,000 men, were lifted in approximately 1,000 C-47 planes, and flown from bases in Southern England to designated Drop Zones in Normandy. (1) The 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment was in the Mar shaling Area (taice-off air fiald) eight days prior to D-Day« During these eight days, additional supplies, equipment, and A clothing were issued; medical and first aid instructions given. During this period the complete combat load was issued. After the Comp&nf Command*ra had been given %hm flrtt brief ing, the Drop Zone looationa of th#..jto£ijv*3t **•** 3L&u^l« ' ..'''?'. V •***»•* ?"7iC:!,::::.iS:: • £iZ3XJ&t C •** PV '-> '*# £>V*V&**>< *• t i rims ft ,mm,*-#*+•», ,*<».•* <•>•«*•** • v >t>i i •<"• • ' "'• » mQmm , M t «•*(#/•••»'•• '/• .«*# /"*.- •> ' v-"» '»/*•/»# •!'••••#'• * sp *»cf- trfttfti- 'J *- fit .*»* &*> .:^iJ #*. "P." -*-*«K 4 I *, /*. ,.*t,ft ,„,,, -«&tjMt i, .. .*•.,/«**». ^, '** , % \ n,%*fti # •«. ' -** * «r - * •/• #• » . « , i , '"VWIWWu'fii. > ^v, , M., *.»./* .^.^M',-*.- ^^.^,.. .,„, -ww^^^^-w^^^^-v **-.-».• .•**,#. ,- -«•<•*»,#,» iHvm,^*^**,: .^^^^^ « *»»*<**><9«.; *••**' 4W w v "•"'Oili/ tussA.^rvit)*- •»**,*« *rt-rfv #w- ,'} n.*1-*- 4*>j». "•'"-'i>MiWH»to» i rt /is<|»>f'*#»»,. S.'itf^lWw t Ai*.^(#i.. . u.iv -,w>.1„... *si <»• .,i-y* >.,. i Division had learned that the Germans had moved two addi ••'-.••.'>(.-'•' ,:. „<»'- •- ••»»•*•< '*^V*'> »^»#(i^***w.;^«*»VWi' tional Infantry Divisions into the Onerbourg Peninsula (2). The troops iere briefed after the first two days in the Marshaling irea; and ftontluuoua and detailed briefing con tinued until ths day of ta&e-off, or D~l. The thoroughness of this briefing in the 3rd Battalion was satisfying to all, and each man had a perfect mental picture of the terrain in the vicinity of the Drop Zone assigned* and the details the mission were clear to each individual* This briefing was carried out in a large barn, located in the Marshaling Area, by use of sand tables, maps, and aerial photographs. Sufficient time enabled small units to establish 3GPfs to meet various situations if they should occur* (£)* SITUATION AND MISSION the seaborne forces would mrriv® before ths sncmy could build up a strong counter force. ) A-4 T (3) A-6 twjBu^awwwBt r '»•'* tH it* >•<<•! t> '*••• #*• #t 0 tt'iftf '#*'• >i*r*9t •'«••• > «-,. (t » i. « f # t-,0 >?*./. 4 i, mmt>- 4»r. •» ¥ tf ti • «.«»«<*»». <„,. '0'*..-4t i- •#w* ».* *• i, f, „*.%••» -4 «-#v' m**<*>vri-"*t *t m- i y#«•/#-/• *> 1<:J0i*'m *• «» % »»•.-•*,•" WMMT '?,' / s»**BM- • I* , ^ - ., „ «, a . m n»; •*** •»** • •* ,,V rtjM4*»«.*>*<•>»"• •»-''-• ->*»• /t •^••r ["t *+.-j»r , •n?<\*«Mt*->~> +•*>•• 4*m «**>•*->• '*» ***<*-' *' «*:.*'-*"">*• ••*'•' •• »w>-^»p*»t*i**»l«lt*»jiri»^»i»»»»»«Mi«'» r«**> * M >..•<.» <•**" .»V M"W**> **.*-.*'*««*••••** ->« „..,> «*u »*«..«- -.-*. T A^SA.M. w* «**«* woauu, k ne osuaeway .v^', *<<< ?f. *•• «..->."> ,»!••#' identified in the operation plan as Sxit #1 , tied in with 4- *- to iirt hi^n^ay sat or %h» Cotentin JPsniasula just to the mast of Pouppeville f a Tillage &aar the mouth of the river Douve, about 5 silss northeast of Oarentan. PJxit #2, a little far ther to the North lad from the beach through Houdienvilie to 3t Marie du Mont. Both of these causeways were built tofan7"'"'^ average) of 6 feet above the marsh, which was an initial bar rier tothewestward advance of the forces landing on the beach. Over most of its area, the marsh could be waded and it was therefore not a formidable obstacle to the passage of troops; but it was criss-crossed at many points by drainage canals, which though narrow, ran to a depth of 8 feat or mora. The presence of these streams composed a very real danger; if the force coming by sea was denied the use of the causeways, many hours would pass before it could link up with the force which had arrived by air. The timeythus lost; might determine the fata of Utah Beach operation and finally, of the whole in**aion.]]/fJ-f)*py.c3* mTAlLVV PLAN 1st AND 2nd BATTALIONS The plan called for the 506 Begiraent, lass the 3rd Battal ion to land on Drop 2one ,fG". ^This zone was just to the south of Boutteville and to the west of 3t* Marie du Mont s which put it about as close to the western approaches of tha two lower causeways as was tactically practicable? (see Map *A"J \& JTMP rapidly as it oould complete its assembly ,f 2nd Battalion, ,.*# reinforced by one section of dazaolition man, was to move west ward along a line running north of St. Marie du Mont towarda Houdlanvllle*%\ fros that point, th# baltalions1 nortfcara 1% >• i^^im^^ -*, > pt+±*i<»> •**•*•-. 4» f* J"*—.. «>* -,* « * ion, was to launoh an attack eastward for the purpose of el*8rin& ?xit #S» "fha 3outHarn aieiaa&t. Company I, *ouid leave the column at Hebert* and attack toward Pouppsvill© and e*it #1* Company D and the Second Battalion Headquarter Company were to set up in Hebert as the battalion reserve* To divert the Germane, and prevent them from taking the Jf* f >• causewayforces in the rear/ First Battalion was to send a reinforced platoon from ^Qmif^-av " B" » ty the area just south of St.Maria du Mont; it would demonstrate strongly enough in that direction, to draw the attention of enemy forces, stationed in that village. The remainder of the 1st Battal- ion supported by Begimental Headquarters Company would a&Eff& at Hiesville as the Regimental reserve* (4) PLAN OF THIED BATTALION The third battalion supported by one platoon of the 526th Engineer Battalion, and Z demolition sections was to land on Drop Zone "D", which was located to the south of Vierville and west of Angoville au Plain. (See Map A) Ifrom this ground the force was to strike southward as soon as possible, and secure the tv;o bridges near Le Port, at the mouth of the river Douve* The bridges were to be Oaptured, and bridgeheads expanded, a3 rapidly as the tactical situa- tion permitted* By seizing the high ground in the direction of Brevands» the Battalion would be reaching toward the American forces, which were moving northward from Omaha Beach* It was believed that all these things could be accomplished .if on the fir#t &m$*x (S> IT® % #«*t *r?wt ,5~SAT V t\, „ iyrit,f>*< <'»V » *yv;ty Wjgjf >' if (4) A-l p. 3 (S) 4-0 '' ' « t •»' t » «• ,^| , i |ji fo il *'' U r.jp'jr **««•**»!#'*'" 4»-»-, ^H^ft4$-^^^i0^ f *f#$ #-tf if**Ai -f «* m ,#»» '»»#"»» > > »< ' • •* * ",k' A * '' ,,^-< M.r ••• ,yp (^ »*-••/<• • •'»• * . •* • V , -V- ->' '•- , »».»-,/».-»•" • • >"">•" '•'•' .•..-•TV" .* .••' '» >/'*> ••> *>lfef!f»3 T^HIiout uUrryU^ or a train. About two hours prior 1 to t ^ ice off # tha troops arrived at thai" ' as^i^nsd planes t under the oomraand of their Jump masters* During the two hours tiiey put on and adjusted their equipment, :%&a Weste, and parachutes, and took their positions in the planes. At 2310 the load plane tools: off 8 -^his serial rendezvoused with the planesr carrying the 1st and 2nd Battalions *r**d Regimental HGadquart^rsCompany and attached units, ^oon after midnight the serials creased the English coast, and «ere headed over the channel toward the ?renoh coast and the enemy. The moon was bright as the English Coast was crossed, and the Channel could easily be seen beneath the formation. However, almost as soon as the Cotentin Peninsula came into view, the planes ran into heavy fog banks which obscured the ground and dis arranged the formation! The fog thinned in spots, as the formation continued across the peninsula* Flak was enooun^ terad soon aftar the peninsula was reached. Due to the fog banks and the flak encountered, some of the pilots took evasive action t o ge t away from the fire, and opened the for mation in the dense fog banks. Because of this action nearly all unity was lost; the chance for a successful concentration of elements of the 506 Regiment thus depended on the acouraoy and judgment of a large number of airmen who had no identity with the Regiment. (6) In practice, the plane pilot is the [formal) jump master; it is his task to find the Drop Sena. Four minutes before the men are to jump, £the piloj flashes a re^L light, when the green light la fleshed, this i# the signal that iu» yiune is 'J* in proper flying condition, and that the Drop Zone has been 4£ reached. "^ £*"««n U'Ji't'U in# * »0* **#**fl# ^P ^-A^^^^&^i^^ mf& #,* • •">' Agfe#» V+.-.V <*«** 4 t i-nsfit' . # 1V.-JVW4* , r. *-•*"* } •**< &r I***N«!W| *m#mi*0ffh&i*0fi-i'>" *• *"#(jf * *tf. "*" ..»•. «,,,• ,^-rt. •>>». ">••'v »-• •<>' •'•*•'•<&)• '••* *r> '" * " > •••"i •'i*' ^opened to tne t»U6 Regiment in the air, greatly tnoreftie* ,'(. W ''•»•)*< *h.« p-pnbabiu tv that it would encounter u2?Tr?s?t?a trrabls on the ground* the problem of keeping the Regiment OOBOSS- trated, had been delivered into too many hands* Because of • f tha aonditiona as stated above Sji of jihfij 81 Planes scheduled i I • / ; to drop their mmn on Prop lone **0* , only 10 found tha marka i (See Map B)«/''first Battalion had a comparatively good pat- I J I I tern, only one of its sticks being dropped far distant from] tfee--»p,e-s4gn-ate4-••Br-o^-'Sone-;'•'evon so tha •pa-t-te-rn--,waa seerftared - enough that an additional 4. hoars "were required, to get the ttalion moving toward its objectiveV The Second Battalion passed over Drop Zone H0,f but only one plane unloaded its sticks anywhere near the designated zone. (See Map B). Ehe planes carrying fthe] Second Battalioni had simply overshot the mark* The paratroopers occupying the planes of this seriali recognized the Drop Zone as the planes flew over. fhey reported seeing 3 large green T*s formed of lights pass under them and recognized them as the zone mark ers which had oaen set up by the Regiment's pathfinders* The planes continued to fly and no jump signal was given for several minutes, when the signal was given the Battalion came to earth with its center about 5 miles from its des- ,—, — ffh*y we A* "tUvsJ \ ignated Drop Zone. [Because of this, the Battalion was^denled j any initial contact «ith the remainder of the Regiment, and CrAe&f had no way of knowing whether the first Battalion and Beg- j I imental Headquarters had experienced any better fortune in \ getting on the designated Drop Zone.I^fhiri Battalion, aiming j at Drop Zone HD% had a slightly better pattern than [the] first Battalions but not enough to give it any praetieal advantage* It, too, had lost many hours because of a faulty drop* (7) , ,\ ,C ' "I, . ^ _ ,1 •!< »l I. (71 A-l p.5. 'i^btiitf&fti^^ u J i <*•&$$**' •**»«*!'*K..f##^,4tij«-.*i. { ' , • t^f"****"*****"****^ •|0*|H**#MW*«J|IWP '• s:^2m , jsa *&*, mtn-rm * .• «? ss"*&e»':%*» •»ymf .,•.,.» «.»'.iv ,• »< •» '•'»• ',• *• •••' f/0''« »• *• •'>'* ''"'" '"•*'!» >• *'' '-' '"•»'•* .••*»* '>* '•**'»' '*•' *" It Drop Son® D, ihere^ «a^ ^W^M,^t,.^^feAT«^?^ 1,-1 ;*<%*•# ••••,:>'»•'*#• ,»lr»i •'»" .lA'/.'wAW1 ! psthfindsFft ?i» ) ipated/that the Invaders might use this area for just such a j J pur pose s fjinqy had ringed it with machine guns* and mortars, and j • 1 jwere sitting at their arms in readiness, whan the lyfclrdj Battalion 1 \cama in* fihojj pathfinders had knocked out two machine gun posi tions with hand grenades before the arrival of the main body* [ #/ By that time, however, the field was well illuminatedby...-s.&e-my • flares* Float ing^ into this well lit and, fire core.rad araa3 the Battalion lost about EG men from enemy action, before its first groups could collect themselves* [Yet it was an odd icind of _j aotionj with all their advantages, the Germans could not get their heads up* They fired fromAcover, fend few menj among r thsm moved oat to engage the invaders in personal encounter. This seemed to ba true in all sections in which the Airborne forces landed* {8} i}rop Zone M0M had also been strongly covered by the en emy with rifle pits and automatic weapons all around the pe rimeter. Around the northeast corner especially, the Germans were in strength* ^Wherever the men dropped, they came in fire contact immediately with small enemy groups. The major ity jpf the men who dropped on the Drop ZoneJ got out of this deadfall, by lying quietly for a few minutes, until the atten tion of the defenders was drawn elsewhere, and then crawling off into the dark* At Drop Zone f,0rt, the assembly areas for the Second Battalion, Regimental Headquarters Company, and First Battalion, [there] ware 3 orchards strung across the sons from north to south* '<*§aeond Battalion was supposed to assemble on the northern orchard, mn^ from there* move off to attack the eaUta. Vf irst Bat taiion had planned'" i o "aaaaaolt on the southern *¥,ir-#>i m%m «• i,''0im> #*» I i ** f ^^v-rr^r. H •*- - • •"•» • -v J VJ •J « Y|* > «>cif » tilt.* '.•>* r ; ( v . »*f v- .i»iy ••> M"-* • !«• .- * quartera, aft&r assembling in *h%,j^*^^jx~»^~^ **h-y-«l**sLiw&-'~ >.<«• '» .W-V****"**'''"*'**' 1 1/£ lilies southward, %Q set up a at Ouloville» Taad the drop takes** plaoe in this manner, it is quits possible that tha greater breadth of the target would have given the waiting Germans a greater opportunity for billing. Is things worked out, tha relatively small force that was delivered, according to schedule, eame to earth well strung out among the apple trees."* Most of the ten planes which dropped their stick on or -ii-6^^^^ loaded wi'th^Regimentall Headquarters men. Of these personnel the total loss was not more than 10 % including dead and wounded, llsewhere, however, the Headquarters paction] had taken great losses which serious ly crippled this operation. Three of the planes had missed the [pro^J Zone by 20 miles. These planes included a majority of the communication platoon. Only 5 Communication mon ware; at hand when the Regiment began to fight^ (9) Not one of /the Battalions of the 506 Regiment]had a drop pattern which was as good as the lowest mark which it had es-j [tabllshed during any training operation. Whether the great spread of the drop pattern contributed materially to the cas ualty figures, is something of a question, but it undoubtedly slowed down assembly and acted as a drag on local operations.r (j3tj+ "2/!lhat was lost to tactics by these delays and misadventures was probably compensated for, in the bewilderment and the strat logical miscalculation of the enemy, which resulted from having i Jparaohute drops reported from all parts of the peninsula. The"! / doubts which must have assailed the enemy in the critical hourji when the defending foroes were being redeployed to meet the in vasion thFtttj doubts* which were Intensified by inadvertent work of oarritr pilots who stravad from th*Ar '.t^n^Mi>••% •$-s>* r# '*mm£$$£ fleeted in ths war Alary of the *(J#f|§iit,4£pr llgb. Qommfy** ^ ^ ___ w < .%*. >^ty*'^*#iw*»M»t#*'r'i V •"•#«.**>•»w!•*#*'' . iv»l0t |**W*f .,'««•*•<•**«• 1 "»#!!** •«* * * »* * <•»" V* "» "» " •"*! ** '"#•«* "»*»>• «;-," •" * *t pe-., j-tvf 1,^,4 4r ft®? ^m< 4V i** *< / JV'1*' *> 9 **t lif • v i' '3iM*-ii- ^Tt't'V** »'" *!! !T .•- «• * .? > 3 ^*•#. ,C ..**' ** >• «* * I*? * * M-rf%V* ,,, .•,»• <•* 1944-nQtea that "Parachutists haveto* e n dront>*d ainoe 0105 ,v*w .^yMKiiiwjrtWfljpr ,r t*nr >>r> > -f ..)*>"• «j».^«rt* ^'>•"»'" y «) •'./> V V V # £^ **,••"•**.•«**•' r1"*^^ and Montebourgi both aides of the Tire and on the ^aat Const of Coteatinl?| and 0200 hours? "it ia reported that Airborne landing embraces Monteboarg" and " there is fighting by LaHam.?t Some of these were points far outside the section oi the in vasion* It appears that these reports of eruption resulted from the ohanoe landings of parachute forces, in areas, where they were not supposed to be committed as ih3N^I • In coase-* ^ quence of the reports, the German High Command marked time for several hours, while trying to determl&s whaV-these" varying: Jr thrusts indicated* At 0240 there was still debate, as to the *\ ^Jf measure of the danger, the Commanding General of the West v> J Group maintaining that the defenders were not confronted with H? ^ a "major ^ctiotx" ; while the Chief of Staff replied that's #lit could be nothing less than that, in view of the depth of the airoorna penetration in the 84th Army Corps Area*" It was af ^ 0400 hour that the Commander of *-ha Corpa reported to the Chief) of 3taff , 7th Army High Command, his conclusion that "the gen eral plan seems to be to tie off the Ootentln Peninsula at its /•• • narrowest point." Another hour passed before the Germans knew >^ that they were also about to be hit from the sea* ("From the War diary of the German 7th Army High Command")* (10) JJL P» n^f ##e.*u*#s wt'ir a4**ie /Assembly Points^" " Before daylight, Beglmaatal Haadquartjera had bean establish ed at Coul*vilX^; however the 2nd Battalion had not reported (T0» A-3 ?•* 13 j^r;V4^»9'-/ * m * 'i ** •**<*<• ^'i**'****1 '••ms*">,m ¥ *" " *vm*-m> #> ,-4f* f l .I' ' Vr •»'• • t»'» ».«»- to the Hegimeasai OP, nor, had Begim<#nt be ' imately 200 men with the Battalion Commander, had as so mbled, vf"' \ and were moving out to the location of their assigned mission, the lower ^Tbclts. This force soon encountered the enemy and movement was slow. Its objective lay a considerable distance to the South, and Sagiment could not be contacted* So far as this Battalion knew, the original assignment remained un changed* The column continued to work its way south, until after 0900 hours when the head of the column was stopped by a German artillery battery, which was laying intradictory o fire aoross the road. Part of Company HDM was passed around $ the rear of the [enemy] battery with the mission of hurrying 1 [on to ]Rxit* #2* fhis part of Company "V", arrived at its v objective at 1330 hour. The causeway leading to Eoudlenvllie was brought under control, practically without fighting* The •••*$a:*i's*** *i .|i»eiitJe40n4. Battel ion Mpt the derman battery 1 .;; ""' ' 1 • .... '* *•. #•#» V" f***» • « *• te,*^'* ^0f-: V 1 **<*»<;- «?•> •• . rm- .^....i ,,'^V *',',»»> »*o<*>^'«»«' ' •>*»*» •*»' ''.'„?' '•"'"•'^' .%•• # ' > '•» •••» ri <*W^t^' S**W* ,»#*-> »• •* ' ' •,,..,: * .»."•;•»». entOrtainQd, Until £>*•»*«£ ?rnrn tn« Haa** t. «a ~« HI»/-.,».« > * -*-», £Ti£ •>«.•>. ••Wr*N»*'i^y^^*i*^*«'^W'»*,V*i .<»•*> ;>,.;> 4w*t-»- f***»vr»» *f*^ •. ., »••> .t>.»JM*t*'#-*<"«*T' ^f^r"HWi^xan" o^f¥¥^¥«^lrdye'"a. ""fine 3eoond Battalion rejoined Company **£** about 1600 hours. 3^ 1800 hours, the 3©oond Battalion was well organised at Ixit #2. wit& about 300 men on hand including tho strays from other units. Third Battalion had played In worst luck initially, but a mere handful of it a men had set a shining example in initi ative, for the remainder of the Begiment. When the planes carrying the Third Battalion passed over the flooded area be tween Garentan and St Come du Mont, heavy antiaircraft fire enveloped the formation and dissolved it. The planes taking evasive action in all directions resulted in the formation losing all semblance of a command. This ground fire leaped up at the parachutists as they responded to the jump signal; this signal had been given just a flash too early* The sticks were delivered a little short of Drop Zone MDH, to the South and East of it. Square on the Zone, the Germans had pre pared a giant torch by soaking a house in oil. They lit it as the first planes approached, and it blazed fiercely, illum- inating th^ entire countryside* (lX).JMrTTht e 3att allon" that originally assembled, consisted of 3 officers and 30 men. This group set oat to accomplish the Battalion mission, and] reached the canal bridges near LaPorte, at 0430 hours. Upon reaching the western approaches, this group was joined by 5 Officers and 15 Men who had also worked their way to the area of the assigned Battalion mission* [fhia foroej decided to force a crossing of one of the bridges, and establish a bridgehead. The bridges were covered by German machine guns, mt up vi: %h* last bankt I-wo, t> men patrols , managea to cross 1 tb§ ana*!.* ky .*•*»»!ing -OTV tki c^rt^rs-ttaaor-ttwi •%vt'&$4'''''ilvv*i ' 1 <^^^» 4 hsf */#.« I >4.»-.*»..v ...«..<...l-,:,.,,, • ****** ,>. ***** ,/ „ , •-, J.^^^^^M^ .,*, _^^>^.^^Ww^^^^^#,?. v**»' \•i'.',*V"i» ' *ut^yf~'*,l"i' •">•••**"••*• * """ """ •"'" " """ ' [ present in such numbers that thay could bring up fr&%h guna | 4* J faster than the patrols could proceed against them. After engaging for about two hours the force was compelled to wlth- draw to the west bank for lack of ammunition, ffhis "skeleton Battalion" waajwithout communication, and knew nothing of the aitu&ti^on elsewhere in the Regiment. One Officer and two en listed men were sent in an attempt to break through the German line's, in order to get help. Ammunition -was running- L&m...a.&.d... the group was small, in comparison, to the force it faced across the canal* " " It was not an exceptionally favorable situation, but at , least, though they did not know it, they could stand on one t i thing; they were the only element of the regiment, which had |succeeded in reaching their objective £on schedule^ and they had (done more than their share toward assuring the link-up of the Omaha Beach and Utah Beach f oroesj The Officer in command of tlxiF f oroe was the 3-3 of the 3rd Ba11a 1 ion• The Battalion £ • Commander and the Executive Officer/were kilieu immediately after landing* OPERATIONS Oi? FIRST AND 3BC0O BATTALI0N3 iPvfirst Battalion detachment , upon receiving orders from Regiment to assume the original mission of the Second Battal ion and secure Ixit #1, departed from Culovilla for Pouppeville and Sxlt #1. The Battalion Detachment was gone all day, con ni tact oould not be maintained with Regiment. It reached "Exit #1> after sevaral aklrmiih«at but found that the town of Pouppa- vili* u*4 bean ascared* fh# fl^at Battalion dataabmiat ra». trnfi'*-' • •"*»» •J 0 ?',•&**•'••* ik$fiwW •/*.-'.ifa.i,ji' •*'|4* «f, ,^^#^ »-°r= >*S%3%^-* m r* '*» %r'W^s#fci«r •**>••«**mm-m .;i '»4fcf *»». '< *•*>•* . , ,.,J ., . . 'k • »n •, .(nr i /•i '.*».(• J^ ,.'^f: / «KiJ*/«.)M»(('.».i.r,J.'« f IjtjSfr i , yi. . -A _< •*•*:•"*»»; -*5 »•;* «»•^»|lBsMr(a^^.*A. '<** tJt&**' «*> .•>v**'« *r •. prior to the arrival of the 4th Division troop* from the of*aoh, thus completing its miaolo&t I* •**; «% <& ^Kan mmrati baclc ! , to Culoville. ihaT^i *ilea^Tr^ .*M^<«y>,«|i>MiM"w>^V i"* ^|.K ^•^^•Fi•.^l^•A&>^!''"'" MfKVQFlfr* during D-Day» ware assembled tactically at Culoville before dark* At this time the Third Battalion had not bean con tacted 5 nor any word received by Begiment. At 2000 hours D-Day , the Begimantal Commander received orders f rom^JDivisi on, to gather all available forces and pro- '''Ye'e¥'~aT"~Taw1^ {^Wua*4->£t-&---*-&9- , „. South^to protect the South£flank of] the Corps from enemy forces advancing from Carsntan. (12) That night - (6~J-ane) the order for the movement was issued by Begiment. The movement was to get under way at 0480 hours lD/l) (7-June). The strength of the Begiment ready for the day's operation, included about 225 men from first Battalion/ 300 men from Second Battalion, a platoon of AT Suns, about 40 men from the 82nd Division and men from various other units to number about 100. The 401st Glider Infantry Battalion, which had come off the Beach that afternoon was attached to the 506 Begiment for the operation. The 401st (Hider Infantry Battalion was to be the leading element in this advance through Yiervllle to St. Come Bu Mont. Phe next morning (D/ 1, 7 June) the 401st aiider Battalion failed to keep its appointment on time and the Begiment moved oat with the First Battalion, the leading element. ^ r * , - Almost from the moment jjthls element started outj enemy snipers became very active, using the numerous hedgerows for Iconoealment of movement. (13) The column was slowed down and /S was £or«s*d to move on a broad front through the fields. By 0900 heutVr'tlrit Battalion h*u r**ah«§4 ?icrville* 41 *%•*- vUi* anieimlatl cwsmf r**if?tiin#f vt* aaaouutered, but aftsr - fit •? ••*>•• 0* "i>f • • i>f> •' ' M^- n';i ,'W' ** «> ! v.* / ^ ;J" v;^;^; ^r''.'"."'." ** r:'"*"*'"" • * - *•"—••• ••- ' •••• • *•-»•- - ••••• •.•?*••• • < i3 I * § .f>. > * v,Q*tifnqrfi • «.•»-* »>r' **«^" J* i • v r "• ' " * "W * «w»t •'--*•"»'•''••*•"••'«*••—«*---«,,:w;,.v;- sharp fighting the !o*n was woo *** tfcs c-ne!2j +mtT*miVl&''*WWiiw$t* 3t« uome Du Xcst ai" ***??. i»«* 3&ttslion ^**$ ordered to continue ''W*-.',^ tKe »lTdfJ^^4WP^^^^»^oro»a road** to -tfc« Son % la of it. Gome ''^^'••••'m.^imimmtk Da Mont* Angoville au Plain waa captured about noon but tike '*&*!* 7V-'^*.A ,.fc- further advance ^aa held up about 1000 yards to tha South- Wo a t • Late in the afternoon (D/X) (? June) Eegimental Head- quartera and Headquartera Company moved to a large houae in Angoville au Plain, and aet up the CP» Late that night, an attack plan *?aa iaaued for the noxt day X.Qjf&Y^V'ttw*f-i-***•- 506 legia^nt b&oame, a combat team for the attach The town of Angoville au Plain was very small and all available build- inga nere uaed for supplyf' oommunlcation»?! and Aid Sta tion purpoaea. t>c ' / The Third Battalion of the 501 Parachute Infantry Eegi- ment, with a strength of about &60 men isas attached to the fs06 Regiment. The Firat Battalion of the 401at Slider In- 1 'pit] \ fantry, and 8 available tanka of Company .HD»; 70th Light Tank j Battalion, plua Battery nln » 81st A»T* Battalion, were also (attached to the 506 Hegiment for the aasault* The a8aault againat St. Coma Du Mont usae to take place the following morn ing (D/2) {8 June). #* **'^ C~~ The attack on 3tt Come Du Mont fas launched at daim (D/2) ](8 June) and aavere {hedgerow/fighting took plaoe throughout ithe day. The town vaa^taken and all realatance eliminated by 000 hours. The 506 Regiment v»as ordered to bivouac in tha loinity of 3t Come Du Mont with atrong protecting feroea a8 far aouth aa the main bridge over the Douva Biver. Thia bridge fa cf«taA*»fft/J*/r had been blown by retreating Germana during the coarse of the ''-j* day. 5y $100 houiit tlia *06 Btglment ««* occupying the do* feaait* factor from h§§%m&nll9 iiottg the Doute Elver tv W T^.J^W%'jpf,. ">(*•, 3Sra«^«w** •*W- ># / A*WPf, -•• -'•#*• ^i. ^, 4*v»«mm#-*m*iA' .. *- M*A»-. # (KM*.***,*, > „ ., ..•*.w^^Ml.,r .. >>»',,»«.:,. vy,',,-! i^ ?/f«8g •' - *--»**fe,A-»** «>»*w< w '''^'vir-''^^ J[RM) first oontaat w^,mim*m '•"' •-nW?Y%, was established with elements of the Third Battalion. On D plus 3 (9 June) the Regiment was oooupying the defensive seotor, including the guarding of the La Bourquette Looks8 the Main Causeway over the inundated area into Garentan, and the general line of the Douve River from th8 Locks to a point 2500 yards Northwest of 3t • Come Bu Mont. The Second Ba'tTalion was gi ven• the le-f t s-ec-tor>• In<*l-u4i~ng. .-the. LO.,Q£a,*.,... and the First Battalion, the right aector, including the Causeway and the town of 3t« Come Bu Mont* The Third Battalion had returned to the Eegiment and fas in Regiment reserve north of 3t« Come Du Mont. During the defense phase••»• the t roops mere abls to rest for the first time. The Regiment continued the defensive during B plus 3 and D plus 4# (15) CAB'S NT AH The original mission of the 101st Airborne Division did not include the oapture of Carentan. The city is in a strong position with respect to ground and attack, but is not on commanding ground, and is open to observation from across the inundated area, however it was strongly defended* The Divi sion was given, the mission of seizing Carentan. {16) The situation! Prior to the commitment of the Regiment on the night o£ D plus 5, the 327 Glider Infantry and the 501 parachute Infantry had made suooessful orossing of the Douve River, east of Carentani and were ready for a move against and around the city toward the Wcstt The 602nd parachute In 1 fantry fcad attempted tor two day® to o*oa§ ti*# Oauaetay »*4 « take the city, but wert uaablt "to 4o *** «*«* vitt* .*§ti-~ng *y- ^*#^*-^ II*****3****!**! w* ^iiwnrtbw«|iWili|iiiiinr^ifiitil,'^y^t''4>Si (it) A*#- ' U^i A"5 .' *•»» .^ *»&£$*. • ^.%^,4«^ VT. #» ^ jt. >. A**-*** «flfe' M*v.n «*<*»n»*W^fP^*» '*'*". #.* -^ ;*#»^,r#«*».V -if^r-.v:«-v^ > iv.,* —/:.'(' *•>** **"-':V»;t t *<*• & ••»••"'> .„ «,** v*f ••.(••HsMWTtJifrri'* «*"?^.'i**!^*.?^!»*'i*,;,',"'-"'l? **'' • '-v*"""' .iMMnri;^'*"*"***' •v ir, ?#rt»j*»w* v?,*.y ".-.^'W ;'' *+&Mfiu*™%- <&*"**•• ,.vtA*>,m •<•••• •- •r^ "•., vir^.is iiij>*si w*. JI> j/i«« -o • ; ne &w Itdigirssnt received orders to move through the 502 parachute Regiment, and ad vance to the South of Carentan and seize Hill #30, located west- of the city* The mission was to hold the high ground and contact the enemy, while other units of the Division attacked Carentan from the last* At dawn the Regiment was to attack Carentan from the West and contact the forces at tacking^ from ,J.he _S.a.s.l* {.IS-} - -- —•—- - """' "'""" The First and Second Battalions moved during darkness and went into position West and Southwest of Carentan..vi,jt..ho.u.1i opposition* The Third Battalion remained North of St Come du Mont in Division Reserve. After the First and Second Battal ions were safely across, Regimental.Headquarters Company cross ed the Causeway and attempted to get into either the First or 3econd Battalion Area. This group had difficulty in that they were unable to locate the position of either Battalion* The /^f Command Group halted, set up their radios and contacted the I Battalions* At this time it was getting daylight and the enemy t commenced firing at the group from all sides. The First Battal ion was ordered by radio to cross behind Regimental Headquarters ? Company to relieve the pressure. The Battalion was guided to / c the correct place by the sound of enemy fire. Later orienta tion showed that Regimental Headquarters Company had set up its CP just outside Carentan and between the First and Second Battalions* At dawn, (Vf6) (12-Juna), the Second Battalion launched the attack toward Carentan from their position west of the city. This Battalion met units of the 401st ®lid$r Infantry Battalion in Oar#i?ltSf as contact «n made tho §§rmm$ mad* a vigorous * attack on the rear and flank of the ieoond ialtali6»» on* ft»'t> t*'of >h * \ v * * ». u r,nfm (TV. * » * * T "*iF,i id *r J* %&*# JE.„n*|«*.*«W I*- i i$f fjtiy? «#*W mr-t '*r'»«» «-- .iifc*^^^*'*"*1** -f I jffflRllw , , , w , <><••< ;./v -'.'••.•*-'*•. >•-», >l»v/,< ,v.»i};.'))t''>.* V* rt*i'^'t.*'*. ,,,.,,.';, <*,i»ft'«'l '«*^"'"'.'vn ' '"•*•««'' w!»lt;- oi*y nad oaan lubiuntiiny slsarcd of 3ss«sy All 5 AO /u«3 jti% a 1 -»*»">>*»*»*.«; was set up southwest of tha city, The^506 Regiment reorgan- I ised and proceeded to the wast and southwest, alons? the main / i roads within its Sector* Very stiff resistance was encounter-, 1 •;,• ed» and aavar^ fighting ensued throughout the day7 Losses In I , , /fi the [J? Ira t and/Second Bat tal ion£7 of the 506 Regiment were high.! jf? A counterattack by the Oarmans about 1800 hours, forced them ii to withdraw some distance. The Third Battalion which had been \j ihtrlilworth of the DWe In DI vis ion ra'ai'rva, was released to I £SoQ the£RegImentj as of 2200 hours, and joined its parent unit im mediately. (18) ~~ K Uarly in the morning (D/7* (13 June) the attack was re- l aamad by.S' the 506 Regiment, and the reserve Battalion was oom- jmittod. The 506 Regiment was again struck by a heavy enemy r I counterattack, and forced back to within 500 yards of the west / •' \\ j edge of the city. The Regiment was reinforced at this time f • .. j by units of the Division; this halted the counterattack and •i ^^^ j enabled the 506 Reginent to regain some of its lost ground* J The {Reginent was relieved and) wi thdrawn to Division reserve, | in the vicinity of Bassin a Flot. (19) 1 ^ The following day (D/8) (14 June) the 506 Regiment was r I ordered to prepare a strong reserve defensive position Just I wast and southwest of Carentan, and spsnt the day organizing this position". On D/9 and D/10, the defensive positions were ; strengthened and an anti-tank mine belt was placed in front • of the Regimental Sector. On D/15 (21 June) the 506 Regiment relieved the 501 Regiment on the Main Line of Resistance, 2 miles southwest (18) A~& p*f? (19) £-2 f,f/ *>V4 ** * *) M *! t s»* t *t *m •" *l ''••'" **^' ^'f.'jV^ ^Mi^ll^M^Ml1- *r»>n«l #•• * •>'' ••-1Ji*S^tU^r" "J?.UiV- •ihfft**«r-**"*Hil-•*!'.''"'• * .»••$•?<+#%••*'*• j- ) w ,».»-,(«-Vir,»*«*ft, V >y ,"$ "';•>>**JUM^M£ M vrmwr wrHeww*»r-V$' •* ^s»***ww*S. -ww.* *»•*»*«. ;*v;fc W «M3)«M»**W- «JT«II*W&»*>I^ ^i;.t^«^*!^«^^r^^ •1 • > "fet* ..'**•* «Wfrt<*.< .>'«•«.«#*»•->. >U'>"&»>£ $»• «|MMp».,-* •WJrtpHWllWIW**.. ,•> » ;«% ;• ci« .* ''vv^rfUMiiMMtwwMr "4- til j/ £x {&7 June), when the Bagiment iga moved into the tactical bivouac position, generally «iat of 3%. 3auveur da ?i0O!Ete* {20) On 29 Jams, the Bsgiment movsd with Division to a bivouac area approximately & miles south of Cherbourg* The lOlat Division tooie over the military protection of the Penin sula north of an east-west line through Mounte Bourg. fhe 506 Hegiment... Jsa-a in re-sra-rvef duringthis t ime , but one Sat talion was motorized and alerted to move on short notice against an enemy thrust in any part of the area* On D/3^, the 506 Begimant was relieved and on D/35 load ed into L3T'& and returned to the United Kingdom to be re- equipped, receive replacements, and train and prepare for another mission. (21) ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM In recalling the events leading up to this operationf it is my opinion that the mission assigned was a good one for Parachute troops, and was within the capabilities of the Beg- iment. Assignments to the Regiment, of Unlisted men and Offi cers, were made under highly selective standards, designed to secure men with maximum physical capabilities and the proper mental attitude. This high standard was maintained during the training pa riod, prior to this operation. Physically, the troops were in excellent condition. This fact assumed particular importance during the first three days of the invasion, when Officers and men found little time to sleep or rest. fhe fact that units weft operating with only a fraoti on of (20) A~2 p»9| (21) .* " " 'ft' * , •w — »»«*******"">*»* , ti*#ij»\j,.<«* 4m«< **»-+-• *>jj||#*«4flMi*< i MV*<"" *** •'"•• *'f-;:f>«»'.rf^V*V*f f.^V^ ,»,.: .* :*f, „ •>:"•; ^^^.^^.4.,,. »,V.,>;:, ,...,. ..^ ,^^^ ,v^(..^ >t.^, ,, ^ ,. ..,„„„ .^^y,.t-Vrt. w F *^**JMWw-*wfo. r**f" 'W*w*m»**-' «ti*m ??•>>.- #v^iflrf IMMK-*'ww* »**.. •*» »** < *• / vvci*1 **•.•»«•*» r>*>." H'Wie1 »>*J»AAt tag* She diasrganisat ion aetn**d by the faulty drop disrupted the carefully made plana, although the missions of the Begiment were successfully completed. Share is a question aa to vhet&er the faulty drop caused more disorganization among the enemy forces, than could have been created had the drop taken place according to plan. The principle organizational weakness of the Heglment was "the rre"k of a t-Mr4~--rifle J.qttA.4....Aa,..^hJI ^Ail?.....Platoon- Th* aU~ thorized f/0 strength of a rifle company in a Parachute Hegiment ias 121 men* With a unit of this size all men are essential in an operation. Much credit is due the Officers and men of this Hegiment for the successful accomplishment of the missions assigned. The strength of the units were only a fraction of the organi zations anticipated strength; generally speaking, the equip ment and weapons of the Hegiment proved to be suitable. To sum up this operation? The units of the Regiment either completed the assigned missions, or upon arriving at the desig nated objective found that the objective was in friendly hands. For sustained action a Parachute unit should have personnel replacements and additional heavy vehicles and equipment pro vide d# M9 9.0*3, - 3ome of the lessons emphasized by this operation are? 1. Plans for Airborne missions must be thorough and de tails given to all participants as the possibility of a split command is highly probable. Et AlternAit mifsions aluHiid fce plaa*«& tor saoh unit, #M i>njfc» $hould be thoroughly familiar with thsnw •BiTii^^ f fumh® 4*emm'*i$&% I m*r*m •-•?*#***&(_ .. ,.» IT****--!' •* *«•*; ; •»> *>.»«•* ,-; : •.;... •„ /•."••.. (a) Belief should be made man for man. (b) Complete information of situation passed from man and Officers to his relief before he leaves posi tion. to) Communication must beT oompleite. 5. Accurate and continuous observation and patrolling is essential so that your fires will be effective against enemv concentrations, and to secure information essential for success ful attack plans. mtmmmmmmmmmmmmhmmt • §5* M?Tl • W^fi% ! • #% % * In? f* %T f% US- f\ fl f* f* fl ** •> * » *»» • • « * at * earn*** r*"> A # K #«j^6 I a M* j**% « j mm * # * «•«*« #*f ,#*% jt»% #*% •-' #%g%' mm m* m ' * i n | •** # If # t • au# JL tLini m* W a I V'' J*r ¥&&* § f f §* a - *k « j M J 31/11 # ftf.ifiw tifit #* i %* tJrilUyhyi I • /'- >• V,'*;: ' ,^;''.-,"" /'.SV *V'"V>* , .j',_ ',«*' ...... 'is,'-' «' •' < ' ' '-'• ;*i' .; .'• *''/ '.$ / ^ 4 A" 4- £ i' .. •: .t~ .v M y .- -' y" * fi ^ :* #* & Mn m&mk Ml umM; '--.'Mm f jig «nw«iK "j- .jwfefej* .. 'fP- flr -W ™ ^"'"W JF' * ••• •• : ) ' ""* ••••••'•. . . ; • •• ,.• ••• '• • Ultf riMiriir iiittr' •*», * *H • .. - . . . ,, -,:•:•},,.aiim^uimmmmmii' MST" e.W • 111 i S .•.ty-..j-*j- _—. mm mm m* •» . mi m m. warn mm m . mmmqm \ mmum j | I 1 Am i | t ..,^,.t #*-*»">••—ggg^ $5* #$' h. M< f* *