Total Force NDU Press Is the National Defense University’S 8 an Interview with Thomas F

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J O I N T F O R C E Q UARTERLY Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006

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25th Anniversary Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Contest coming next in... Reforming Pentagon Lessons from the Decisionmaking War on Terror Interagency Dialogue T N I O J Fingerprints and the

U.S. Joint E C R O F War on Terror Forces Command Y L R E T R A U Q plus Forging Provincial Reconstruction Teams and more in issue 44, st THE 1 Quarter 2007 of JFQ VALIDATING ToTAL RCE

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A Profession A l M i l i t A r y A n d s ecurity Journ A l Inside Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006

Editor Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF Managing Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) [email protected] Departments Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, PhD Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 2 From the Editor Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. JFQ Dialogue Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 3 Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 33 Strategic Studies Note Associate Editor Chaim Mandelbaum Associate Editor Jennifer C. Veilleux 93 Book Reviews Interns Christin McElrath, Matthew Williams, Joshua Peffley, Nikita Carpenter Design Rebecca White, Maureen Nugent, JFQ Forum Amanda Drake U.S. Government Printing Office Creative Services 6 Executive Summary: Validating the Total Force NDU Press is the National Defense University’s 8 An Interview with Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense cross-component, professional, military, and for Reserve Affairs academic publishing house. It publishes books, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and 12 The National Guard: Transforming to an Operational Force special reports on national security strategy, defense by H. Steven Blum policy, national military strategy, regional security affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is An Unrivaled Wingman: Air Force Reserve Vision part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a 18 policy research and strategic gaming organization. by John A. Bradley

Marine Forces Reserve in Transition by John W. Bergman This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department 26 of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions 29 Volunteer Military Organizations: An Overlooked Asset of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted by Brent C. Bankus without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. Special Feature COMMUNICATIONS Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly 2006 CJCS Strategic Essay Contest Winners online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and 34 Retooling the Nationbuilding Strategy in Afghanistan access to many other useful NDU Press publications. by Vincent M. Dreyer Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Please direct editorial Where the Streets Have No Names: Looking Past Operation Iraqi communications to the link on the NDU Press Web 40 site or write to: Freedom to Future Urban Operations by Stephen R. Dalzell

Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 43 How We Might Build Better Coalitions: It’s as Simple as “A, A, A” National Defense University Press by Nadja Y. West 300 Fifth Avenue Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319-5066

Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information Superiority in Networked Warfare

by David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins

The United States is presently unrivalled in military power and is assured of remaining so for the foreseeable future, thanks to its resources and the transformation of its forces based on networking principles. However, as adversaries of various sorts and sizes also adopt those same principles and exploit increasingly available and easily usable information technology, U.S. operational advantages and strategic equities could be eroded. The unstoppable spread of information networking and know-how gives rise to the need for a new edge—one that utilizes but transcends networks—by developing people, teams, and decisionmaking methods that convert information into better choices and outcomes. We call this new edge battle-wisdom. —from the Preface

The authors pose and explore complex questions and problems, such as:

n How can military decisionmakers make good sense and full use of the flood of information that networks are able to supply? n How do people think and solve problems in situations of urgency, danger, high stakes, complexity, confusion, and information abundance? 192 pp. n What are the respective cognitive contributions of reasoning and intuition in such situations, ISBN 1–57906–072–2 and how are they combined? n What policies could improve the key cognitive abilities in military decisionmakers, the better to exploit networked information and cope with complexity?

Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era

by Richard L. Kugler

The U.S. Government will continue to face many difficult decisions in the national security arena. System- atic analysis can help improve the quality of these decisions—sometimes only marginally, but sometimes hugely. . . . This book was written in the hope that it will result in better trained people, sounder analyses, and wiser policies. The Cold War generation has, by now, the benefit of years of experience in this field, but a new generation of young Americans is arriving that lacks such experience. The Cold War has passed into history and an entirely new era has arrived that will demand analytical methods of its own. —from the Preface

Richard L. Kugler, one of the foremost practitioners of the critical art of national security policy analysis, encapsulates more than three decades of his experience in this unique book. He virtually defines the discipline, breaking down policy analysis into three major components—strategic evaluation, systems analysis, and operations research—applying the latest methods of each to real world examples and the 637 pp. daunting issues facing the United States in today’s global environment. ISBN 1–57906–070–6

Published for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy by National Defense University Press Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2006 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. Purchase online at: bookstore.gpo.gov J O I N T F O R C E Q UARTERLY Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006

Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University JFQ

U.S. Joint E C R O F War on Terror Forces Command Y L R E T R A U Q plus Forging Provincial Reconstruction Teams and more in issue 44, st THE 1 Quarter 2007 of JFQ VALIDATING ToTAL RCE

ISSUE Fo F ORTY

J o I N T F o RCE QUARTERLY -THREE,

A Professional Military and Security Journal 4 TH

A Profession A l M i l i t A r y A n d s ecurity Journ A l Inside Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006

Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 Email: [email protected] JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu Photos above from left to right: International Security Assistance Force set for a mission (DOD/Al Lowery); civilian affairs Soldier with Iraqi civilians (Fleet Combat Camera Group/Bart A. Bauer); Iraqi soldiers conduct 4th Quarter, October 2006 live fire training (1st Combat Camera Squadron /Ken Bergman); Saddam Hussein makes public appearance ISSN 1070-0692 (AP/Wide World Photo). A Profession a l M i l i ta r y a n d S ecurity Journ a l PUBLISHER Commentary Gen Peter Pace, USMC Editor-in-Chief Stephen J. Flanagan, PhD 44 The Problem of Common Terminology by Milan N. Vego Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies 50 Future Approaches to the Economic Instrument of Power Advisory Committee by Philip Y. Kao LtGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC National Defense University BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman The Case for Alliances by Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall Maj Gen John J. Catton, Jr., USAF The Joint Staff 54 A. Denis Clift Joint Military Intelligence College RADM Patrick W. Dunne, USN Naval Postgraduate School Maj Gen Robert J. Elder, Jr., USAF Air War College Features Col George E. Fleming, USMC Marine Corps War College Brig Gen (S) Randal D. Fullhart, USAF Air Command and Staff College MG David H. Huntoon, USA U.S. Army War College Theater Civil Affairs Soldiers: A Force at Risk by William R. Florig 60 VADM Timothy J. Keating, USN The Joint Staff Col Walter L. Niblock, USMC Marine Corps Command and Staff College 64 NATO Stability Teams: The Next Stage of Capability Development Maj Gen Teresa M. Peterson, USAF National War College by Anne M. Moisan and Jennifer D.P. Moroney MG Kenneth J. Quinlan, Jr., USA Joint Forces Staff College RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN Naval War College 68 Reforming Pentagon Decisonmaking BG Volney J. Warner, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College by Christopher J. Lamb and Irving Lachow Editorial Board 72 New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign Stephen J. Flanagan National Defense University by Charles F. Wald Richard K. Betts Columbia University Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Interagency Dialogue Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) National Defense University Douglas N. Hime Naval War College Fingerprints and the War on Terror by Paul J. Shannon 76 Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College No Leader Is Ever Off Stage: Behavioral Analysis of Leadership 83 Col Anne E. McGee, USAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces by Brenda L. Connors Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. Joint Military Intelligence College Recall John J. Mearsheimer The University of Chicago LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF Air War College 88 The Enduring Relevance of the Battle for Stalingrad by Brian Hanley COL Robert E. Smith, USA U.S. Army War College Lt Gen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied Col Gary West, USAF National War College within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. CONTRIBUTIONS

Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from About the covers the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address below or by email to [email protected] “Attention A&R Editor” The front cover depicts Soldier patrolling near Mushahda, Iraq (Fleet Combat Camera, Pacific/Michael in the subject line. For further information see the guidelines on the Larson); [bottom left to right] Air Force Reserve member participating in mass casualty Exercise Life NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. Saver (U.S. Air Force/Matthew Hannen); Army Reserve Soldier talking with residents in Kirkuk, Iraq Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University (Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic/Jeremy L. Wood); Naval Reservist trains aboard USS Crommelin (USNR Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the FFG–37 Reserve Detachment); Coastguardsman on maritime interdiction patrol in South Pacific (USC- GC Galveston Island/Nathanael T. Miller); and Marine posting as lookout near Abu Ghraib, Iraq (1st Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal Marine Division Combat Camera/James J. Vooris). The back cover shows Soldiers clearing building in Al designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and Iskandariyah (U.S. Air Force/Kurt Gibbons III); joint tactical air controllers relay battle damage to anti- other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security aircraft gun in Iraq (U.S. Air Force (Russell E. Cooley IV); Marines checking direction of gunfire in clash policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; with Taliban insurgents, Operation Asbury Park (22d Marine Expeditionary Unit/Keith A. Milks); and and developments in training and joint professional military education Navy boarding team conducting maritime interdiction in North Arabian Gulf (Fleet Combat Camera, to transform America’s military and security apparatus to meet Atlantic/David C. Lloyd). tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today.

Download cover as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu From the Editor lthough Joint Force Technically advanced aids to warfighting were designed for pro- Quarterly attempts to fessional military volunteers, with many recently redesigned to defeat advance the debate on amorphous and multinational post–Cold War threats. These advance- A timely and important ments create problems in training, proficiency, and system complexity security issues, we realize that strategic for the Reservist. How to balance the Reserve Component’s role and lessons are rarely new. Whether the how to increase predictability in order to retain skilled manpower are subject is the war on terror, transforma- perplexing questions for leaders. tion, or orchestrating multiple instru- Because of Joint Force Quarterly’s mandate from the Chairman ments of national power in a world rife to present relevant and diverse debate on strategic security issues, this with uncertainty and competing interests, themes typically remain the issue’s Forum deals with America’s Total Force, the combination of the same. They all have deep historic roots, unseen and apparent. Active duty military and its Reserve Component, including the National For example, America’s militias and Citizen Soldiers stand as icons Guard of each state and Service Reserve elements. of American individualism and patriotism. Yet their use and preservation Joint Force Quarterly is also proud to present a Special Feature are a conundrum for contemporary decisionmakers. showcasing the winning research from the 25th Annual Chairman of Voluntary military service has been an unbroken tradition for cen- the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest. This is the second year turies (though compulsories occasionally assisted the volunteers). The that National Defense University Press, with generous support by the U.S. Reserve Component—the National Guard and Service Reserves— NDU Foundation, has published the winners in the journal. This year, traces its lineage to the Massachusetts Militia of 1636. The New England to broaden the field, we expanded the competition to all intermediate, Militia fought in the early battles of the American Revolution at Lexing- advanced, and senior Service and joint professional military education ton and Concord, 2 months before Congress established the Continental schools, including international fellows and interagency students. Judges Army in June 1775. The Constitution and Bill of Rights subsequently representing all schools met at National Defense University to select the empowered militias with clauses that most Americans are familiar with, best from an outstanding group of finalists competing in three exciting such as providing “for the common defense.” In 1792, the Militia Act categories of essays. determined that men aged 18 to 45 years would serve in the compulsory This issue of JFQ also contains an expanded Interagency Dialogue militia, but during the 19th century, volunteer militias composed the bulk section with an exceptional article by Supervisory Special Agent Paul J. of the military. Shannon, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who is the Director for Law In the 21st century, the United States again has an all-volunteer Enforcement Policy on the Homeland Security Council at the White force. Individuals make the decision to serve through a personal cost- House. This cross-agency program is a useful example of interagency benefit analysis: some alone, some with spousal input, and some with cooperation to share information where no pipeline for such sharing parental approval. Active duty Servicemembers choose professional previously existed. military service as a career or sign a contract for a term of service. The We hope you find the information in JFQ useful and timely, inter- military then becomes their primary job for the tour of duty, which may esting and provocative. All articles are peer reviewed, though not refer- last 3 years or more than 30. Reserve Component members, however, eed, to keep the content on the cutting edge, while presenting a broad use a different calculus. range of research and educated opinion pieces; we do not homogenize Reserve Component volunteers, like their Active duty counter- or censor legitimate analysis and discourse, believing the risk of sharing parts, must also consider the effect of extended deployment not only information openly, in conduct of our mission, is less than the risk of on their families but also on their businesses or civilian careers. Indeed, impeding it. private sector companies bear war burdens beyond taxes. Some personal JFQ emphasizes scholarly research, carefully considered com- businesses cannot survive extended deployments, particularly with late mentary, and interagency synergy, international senior leader crosstalk, notification. and interviews. See our Web site for more research and added features. In a more positive sense, some companies have elected to support Please drop us an email; we appreciate candid input and requests for their employees in uniform by paying the difference between a lower specific subject matter and analysis. We would like to receive engaging military stipend and regular civilian pay, and some extend medical and articles on military and diplomatic history, national security and strate- other benefits to the families of those activated to serve full time in a gic studies, and innovative joint military operations research. state of emergency. Although there may be little “new” in conflict and warfare, Government leaders must gauge limited funds to achieve crucial security dilemmas, or human nature, there are always new ways to political aims, a difficult problem due to the increasingly sophisticated examine and consider contemporary issues. JFQ (and pricey) tools employed by the military instrument. The tradition of grabbing a flintlock from above the fireplace bears no resemblance to Colonel Merrick E. Krause, USAF modern reality. Today’s Minutemen must be proficient with night vision Director, National Defense University Press goggles, body armor, advanced personal weapons, conveyances, and Editor, Joint Force Quarterly communications systems; or they must be proficient at their station in [email protected] space control, flying fighter aircraft, using precision weaponry, or com- manding tanker jets.

JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu JFQ Dialogue DEADLINE Approaching Open Letter to JFQ Readers Joint Force Quarterly receives and greatly benefits from a large volume of unsolicited manu- for JFQ Issue 45 scripts on a broad range of national security topics. Moreover, authors submit relevant articles to the journal well in advance of these topics’ debut or recognition by the wider defense community. Even when manuscripts focus on technical or specialized aspects of security research, JFQ can usually find a way to incorporate the work and sometimes refers an author’s study to outside institutes and centers, such as the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. The editors not only desire that authors and research groups continue submitting the array of articles and thoughtful critiques unfettered but also would like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas in concert with future thematic focus. The following are areas of interest to which JFQ expects to return frequently, with no submission deadline: n orchestrating instruments of national power n coalition operations n employing the economic instrument of power n future of naval power FEATURING: n humanitarian assistance and disaster relief n industry collaboration for national security n integrated operations subsets (new partners, interoperability, and transformational U.S. European approaches) n joint air and space power Command n Just War theory (including security issues n defending against surprise attack n proliferation and weapons of mass destruction in Africa) n prosecuting the war on terror within sovereign countries n military and diplomatic history AND The following topics are tied to submission deadlines for specific upcoming issues: International December 1, 2006 (Issue 45, 2d quarter 2007): June 1, 2007 (Issue 47, 4th quarter 2007): U.S. European Command U.S. Pacific Command Relations and (including security issues in Africa) CJCS Essay Contest Winners International Relations and Coalition Operations September 1, 2007 (Issue 48, 1st quarter 2008): Coalition March 1, 2007 (Issue 46, 3d quarter 2007): The Long War Intelligence and Technology Stability and Security Operations Update Operations U.S. Strategic Command

JFQ readers are commonly subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money and lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the So what? question. That is, how does Submissions Due by your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the understanding or performance of the reader? Speak to implications from the operational to strategic level of influence and tailor the December 1 message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be interesting if presented with care! Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our NDU Press Submission Guidelines. Share your professional insights 2006 and improve national security.

Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our Managing Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Guide for Contributors. Share your profes- [email protected] sional insights and improve national security.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4 th quarter 2006 / JFQ Letter to the Editor To the Editor—Recently, I had the honor the other side with only a few strokes of the participate in bilateral exercises and, as we of speaking at the closing banquet for the 13th keyboard or a few minutes on a cell phone. reduce our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, will Pacific Area Special Operations Conference Terrorists spread their message to millions become available to help train partner nation (PASOC), where 22 Asian and Pacific nations of people over the Internet in seconds. An al forces at their request. Over the next 6 years, came together to discuss ways in which Qaeda propaganda video uploaded on a Web USSOCOM will grow by nearly 13,000 people, they could collaborate to isolate, defeat, and site will be translated into several languages significantly improving the capacity to work prevent the emergence of terrorism within and retransmitted to thousands of additional with and support partner nations. Theater their region. sites for further distribution in less than 24 special operations commands have grown U.S. Special Operations Forces hours. Their networks are fast and effective. substantially over the last 8 years, and we will (SOF) have always valued In truth, their ability to disseminate continue to add the resources and positions relationships with allies, information is faster than ours. necessary to help each region defeat terrorism. but today, these relation- Terrorism is a difficult We will work alongside partner nation forces ships are imperative. problem because it crosses all to win hearts and minds and eliminate threats Speaking at the PASOC borders and boundaries—state, as we continue to strengthen our relationships. conference, Maria Ressa, economic, political, and reli- Conferences such as PASOC are so important the lead investigative gious. To defeat it, we need because they create the foundation upon reporter for CNN Asia, to create a global counterter- which we can build our networks to defeat this stressed that the United rorism network. Before this threat. States is not a “lone network can be implemented, Last year we had the inaugural hero” in this fight. Indeed, however, we must have a USSOCOM International Special Opera- U.S. Special Operations common framework with the relations Conference. Building on the success Command (USSOCOM) clearly tionships and ties that allow us to work of PASOC, the conference brought together understands the importance of coali- together. In The Counter Terrorism Puzzle special operations leaders from 59 countries, tion partners in winning this global conflict for Decision Makers, author Boaz Ganor states all with the goal of building a world inhospi- and is executing it shoulder-to-shoulder with that defining terrorism is one of the most diffi- table to terrorists. From this initiative, we have its partners. cult problems we face in defeating it; not until started a regular series of meetings in Wash- USSOCOM is leading the Department a consensus on the definition is reached will ington, DC, with the defense attachés from of Defense (DOD) planning effort to defeat efforts to defeat terrorism become more effec- several nations to provide an ongoing discus- terrorism and has developed a series of plans tive. Ms. Ressa also pointed out that “borders sion on terrorism. Efforts such as these at both that synchronize the efforts of the geographic and nations cannot contain conflicts.” the global and regional level will encourage combatant commanders with a global perspec- Terrorists use violence against civilians international cooperation and eliminate places tive to ensure that there are no seams where to instill fear to accomplish their political where terrorists find sanctuary. These confer- terrorists can find sanctuary. While we are goals, force change, and promote their objec- ences provide the basis for building the coun- leading the DOD effort, we understand that tives. It appears that they are trying to “wea- terterrorist networks that will eventually defeat it takes the skills that all nations can bring to ponize culture” against us, another idea put global terrorism. the table. forward by Ms. Ressa. Many terrorists have On the wall of USSOCOM headquar- We often refer to this battle as the war reached this level of action only after decades ters is a statement President George W. Bush on terror. While not a war in the traditional of societies failing to check their radical ide- made when he visited. It reads, “SOF is the sense, this designation has merit because it is ologies. Mr. Ganor points out that it will take a worst nightmare of America’s worst enemies.” a global problem. Globalization has changed multigenerational effort to eliminate underly- I would add that the worst nightmare of the world dramatically. The world is intercon- ing and eroding conditions that contribute to terrorist leaders is nations of like-minded nected through instant communications. terrorism, to educate and inoculate our popu- people, building a world inhospitable to ter- Corporations and financial institutions used lations against the undermining effects of terrorists—countries of different sizes, religions, to be concrete buildings, but today they are rorism on society, and to eliminate the current politics, capabilities, and histories banding electrons in databases that may be located threat. It will be a long battle, but it is wrong together and sharing skills, intelligence, anywhere yet still function in real-time in any to characterize it as a “clash of civilizations.” resources, and tactics, techniques, and pro- time zone. The most widely used language in This is really a battle for security, stability, and cedures to mutually support friendly, willing the world is not Chinese, Spanish, or English. freedom for all nations. governments. The efforts of the countries It is binary: ones and zeros used by computers. Working together, governments can represented in these international confer- Thomas Friedman has estimated that there are establish counterterrorist networks covering ences are the keys to defeating terrorism. All 245,000 Indians answering support questions entire regions that identify, locate, and elimi- of us working together to destroy terrorism that come from around the globe, 24 hours a nate transnational terrorist threats while at the and eliminate its underlying causes is really day, 7 days a week—a situation possible only same time working to diminish the underlying the terrorists’ worst nightmare. through globalization. conditions that lead to terrorism. The United There is a dark side to globalization, States will do all it can to help while respecting —General Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, USA however. Terrorists can now live on one side the rules of law and international sovereignty. Commander of the globe and create catastrophic effects on Special Operations Forces will continue to U.S. Special Operations Command

JFQ / issue 43, 4 th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu New Titles from NDU Press. . . SUBSCRIBE Today Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 4 China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools Phillip C. Saunders notes that economic imperatives and strategic challenges are driving China to expand its international activities into different regions of the world. His study examines the rationale, drivers, and extent of this phenomenon, and assesses the implications for the United States. (Available from NDU Press only)

CD-ROM China/Northeast Asia Publications Collected on this CD are more than two dozen NDU Press publications—many out of print—on China and other key countries in the Northeast Asia region. For example, it includes titles like Chinese Views of Future Warfare, ‘Oil for the Lamps of China’: Beijing’s 21st Century Search for Oil, Korea on the Brink, and Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy. (Available from NDU Press only)

Strategic Forum 220 Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy combines elements of two approaches—one associated with former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and the other associated with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick—to international and regional order in articulating a “hedge strategy” toward China. James J. Przystup and Philip C. Saunders highlight some conceptual and policy questions that arise from efforts to integrate these approaches to Asia. (Available from NDU Press only)

Strategic Forum 221 Reforming Pentagon Strategic Decisionmaking Christopher J. Lamb and Irving Lachow identify prerequisites for good decisionmaking, describe problems and conditions that currently diminish the quality of Pentagon decisionmaking, and make a case for a new decision support capability that would improve Pentagon decisionmaking. (Available from NDU Press only)

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper 4 $ Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 20/Year In this extensively researched study, Dr. W. Seth Carus summarizes how the term weapons of mass destruction has been used differently in disarmament talks, U.S. security policy, Soviet and Russian military doctrine, and American political discourse. He Subscriptions for individuals assesses the key policy issues associated with alternative defini- and nonmilitary organizations: tions, and proposes a definition appropriate for the Department http://bookstore.gpo.gov/subscriptions of Defense. (Available from NDU Press only)

Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ Strategic Studies Note Joint Force Safety Protection and Provision

oint force safety is as decisive as on joint force safety may soon be developed as firepower, tactics, and leadership in rarely is information joint safety concepts mature. combat performance. When safety on internal threats found in n Materiel Solutions. Often there are J is viewed as a resource—both an joint publications materiel solutions that affect risk exposure. asset and an essential component of force New technologies can be introduced to protection—the outcome has far-reach- prevent mishaps. Some technologies, such as ing benefits for all warfighters. Joint force dards, and the standards would be reinforced seatbelt improvements, can reduce injuries to safety is defined as a fully integrated and by leadership. Innovative materiel solutions the warfighter. functioning safety program, and when it such as chamber blocks may also prevent the n Operational Changes. The method of is recognized as a vital military capability, consequences of negligent discharge. operation can be changed or implemented to commanders can exercise it at decisive times Of course, the Services can pursue efforts control, reduce, or eliminate risk to the force. and places. Indeed, the desired outcome to mitigate brownouts and negligent discharge n Leadership. Safety is an inherent of joint safety is to develop a warfighter individually; however; it is more effective leadership responsibility at all levels. mindset of asset preservation as a means to to leverage this knowledge by way of a joint Leadership seeks a balance between accom- mission capability. safety effort. Moreover, while there are many plishing a mission and accepting the lowest Approximately half of all Department joint doctrinal references on protecting the possible risk. Whenever protecting the of Defense (DOD) mishaps since fiscal year force from external threats, rarely is informa- force takes a backseat to the mission, the 2002 have occurred in a joint or multi- tion on internal threats found in joint publica- unit’s safety culture is eroded and mishaps Service arena. In Iraq and Afghanistan, tions. Consequently, Services rely on their own invariably occur. there have been a number of accidents that safety centers for information, doctrine, and n Training. Safety concepts and principles are common to all the Services. For example, safety program architectures. must be embedded in individual and collec- helicopter “brownouts” occur when a pilot To remedy the disconnect among the tive training opportunities. Units with good loses visibility from sand kicking up in the separate Services, the Joint Force Staff Safety safety records fight as they have been trained. desert landing area outside the aircraft. Office, when established, will collect mishap Training devices such as simulators can often Training, tactics/techniques/procedures, and data, share information across the Services, enhance safety awareness and modify high- potential materiel solutions, such as dust resolve differences in safety policies and doc- risk behavior. palliatives or cockpit devices that enhance trine, and assess and disseminate best practices pilot situational awareness, are solutions to from one Service to the others. Today, joint force safety requires this problem. The Armed Forces can prioritize their coordination among two or more Services Negligent discharge mishaps are safety efforts to mitigate the most prevalent or joint force components, and each offers another serious problem that joint force risks according to resources. Risk mitigation unique and viable capabilities, perspectives, safety can help solve. Doctrine change could can be accomplished through the following and data to the risk management and joint outline appropriate procedures for clear- framework: force preservation process. Joint safety—as ing and cleaning to prevent an unintended an integral part of joint warfighting—ensures discharge of a weapon. Proper training in n Doctrine and Policy. Doctrine and policy that the Armed Forces are prepared for any weapons handling would be based on the gaps should be reviewed to address appropri- challenge. JFQ appropriate conditions and trained to stan- ate safety standards. Handbooks and policies

Chief Warrant Officer Alfred L. Rice, USA (Ret.), is a Safety Analyst with Quadelta, Inc.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 33 NEW from Book Reviews NDU Press for the Center for Technology and ormer Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, the father of the Total Force concept, recently commented on the role that the Reserve Components play in National Security Policy F current operations: Nearly 80 percent of the airlift capacity for this war and about 48 percent of the troops have come from Reserve and National Guard units. The high percentages are due, in part, to the specialized missions of those troops: transporting cargo, policing, rebuilding infrastructure, translating, conducting government affairs—in short, the stuff of building a new nation.1

Secretary Laird’s observations suggest the evolution of the concept he proposed over 30 years ago: the Reserve Components, conceptualized as a strategic reserve, have truly become an operational force. As of June 14, 2006, over 100,000 National Guard and Reserve personnel had been mobilized to Active duty. With this new reality comes the need to transform the Reserve Compo- nents to fit their new roles, and numerous scholars and strategists have met to address the task. The products of two of the most recent of these endeavors are brought to your attention here. “The Reserve Component at War” was one of five panel discussions that took place during “Schwerpunkt,” A Nation at War, the 17th annual strategy conference held April 11–13, 2006, at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Panelists included:

n BG Dave Burford, USARNG (Assistant to the Director of the Army National Guard), who Defense Horizons 54 discussed imperatives for National Guard transformation as it moves from a strategic reserve to a Lee’s Mistake: Learning post-9/11 operational force from the Decision to n MG William T. Nesbitt, USARNG (Assistant Adjutant General–Army and Commander of the Georgia Army National Guard), who pointed to the unpredictability of mobilizations, sub- Order Pickett’s Charge standard equipment, and uncertain budget as the main stressors on the Reserve Components At the Battle of Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee n MG Donna L. Dacier, USAR (Commander, 311th Theater Signal Command), who made a mistake that doomed the hopes of the applauded the flexibility and resourcefulness the Reserve Components have shown so they can Confederate States of America to compel the participate fully in Active duty missions but warned of shortfalls in training for combat support United States to sue for peace. Why one of the and combat service support troops great generals of his time made such a blunder n BG Michael Squier, USARNG (Ret.), who questioned whether, in the face of many vari- continues to be a topic of research and intense ables, the Reserve and the National Guard are prepared to fight the Long War debate. Authors David Gompert and Richard n MG Robert Ostenberg, USAR (Deputy to Commander for Reserve Forces, North Ameri- Kugler explain Lee’s fateful decision not with can Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command), who linked the usefulness of new facts but with new analytical methods to lessons learned by the National Guard during Hurricane Katrina recovery to a potential domestic illuminate decisionmaking in combat. terrorist attack.

No written transcript of the proceedings is available, but videotape of this panel discussion Defense Horizons 53 is viewable at . Countering Terrorism

The International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Across the Atlantic? (CSIS) has produced a comprehensive study of the National Guard and the Reserve in the 21st Kimberley L. Thachuk discusses ways to century as part of the larger CSIS “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project. The study analyzes bolster the U.S.–European Union counterter- military command structures and the defense acquisition process while primarily focusing on rorism relationship, such as capacity-building, the future of the Guard and Reserve Components of the Total Force. The study is available on the anticorruption measures, and strengthening CSIS Web site at . L. Yambrick multilateral agreements.

n o t E

1 Melvin R. Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (November/Decem- ber 2005). For more information on this and other CTNSP publications, visit the Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 93 On Point: The United States Army The work then segues to the awareness, and other technologi- in Operation Iraqi Freedom shaping of the battlespace during cal enhancements, fog and fric- by COL Gregory Fontenot, USA (Ret.), the second phase and covers the tion remain a timeless aspect of LTC E.J. Degen, USA, and importance of Coalition con- war and reward only well-trained LTC David Tohn, USA tributions in sustaining combat and -led combined arms teams Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, operations, examines how the with victory. The Army’s perfor- December 2005 degradation of Iraqi command mance across the spectrum of 519 pp. $34.95 and control was achieved, illus- combat in Iraq demonstrated this ISBN 1-59114-279-2 trates how the Coalition Forces historical strength and highlights Land Component Commander how joint the ground fight has Reviewed by helped to maintain Coalition become. The maturation of the JAMES HERSON political will and resulting mili- American way of war seen in tary synergy, and explores other this campaign will testify to how factors that directly or indirectly essential our joint partners are his team-written book Although Army opera- influenced the fight. in conducting successful ground should rank among the tions and challenges are the Most of the book details operations. The authors’ clear T classics when future centerpiece of this quickly the broad operational fight and prose tells the Army OIF story in historians debate the strategy, written work, the larger, broader the challenges Army forces faced a compelling way that articulates mistakes, and exercise of aspects of OIF and the strategic in breeching defenses from theater strategy and then weaves operational acumen demon- and diplomatic considerations Kuwait and the ensuing 360- in illustrative tactical vignettes, strated by U.S. Army forces surrounding it are captured, degree asymmetrical fight, the all spotlighting the Soldier, not throughout Operation Iraqi allowing the reader to under- frustrations of the 4th Infantry technology, as the victor. As the Freedom (OIF). Army Chief stand the land campaign in Division in trying to join the authors note, “Humans, not high- of Staff General Peter Schoo- contextual detail. Recognizing fight after being denied transit tech sensors, remain indispens- maker has continued the On the long-term shaping that U.S. through Turkey, the use of the able, even in the 21st century.” Point project commissioned by Central Command components 173d Airborne Brigade to provide Although the story is fas- his predecessor, General Eric underwent to prepare to intro- a reinforcing conventional cinating and infused with rich Shinseki, to capture and docu- duce forces prior to offensive capability to special operations detail, the book’s graphics, pho- ment the challenges and lessons operations in 2003, the authors forces elements in the north, and tographs, and other inserts are of learned in executing OIF. describe the changes in the numerous other complementary poor quality and detract from the Schoomaker recognized the theater’s design from the end actions in this distributed battle overall excellence. With luck, this project’s importance for future of Desert Storm until the eve that were linked by commander’s minor flaw will not be repeated in Army transformation initiatives of the second invasion of Iraq. intent and a rapid operational the sequel, On Point II, in which and for documenting the role of This stage-setting (overlooked in tempo. The V Corps’ fight up the authors intend to focus on land forces in campaigns such many military histories) enables the Euphrates River Valley, and the shift from decisive combat as OIF and the Army’s continu- the reader to see the value of this in particular the 3d Infantry operations to encountering and ing relevance in achieving joint in-depth preparation, mostly Division’s “thunder runs” and combating the current insurgency. victory. The Chiefs’ support accomplished by Army Central 1–15th Infantry’s running gun If the sequel is half as good, it too ensured the authors’ access to Command, which provided battles, chronicle the drama of the should be added to every Soldier’s and the cooperation of numer- reception, staging, onward combat and the rapidly changing library. JFQ ous units, agencies, and dozens movement, and integration and face of battle. The remainder of of contributorsto enable On sustainment to Coalition ground the book covers consolidation, Point to document the Army’s forces. The largest challenge the regime change, the collapse of story in this campaign. This Army faced in Iraq was not the vestigial Iraqi security forces, and broad brush gives the work enemy, but rather its own logis- the outbreak of looting and public balance and not only tells the tics. The authors properly note disorder, and expands on the story of commanders and their that it was only through hard future implications for the Army plans, but also showcases the work and improvisation that in Iraq without pointing fingers. exploits and valor of American Army logisticians were able to On Point clearly documents Soldiers who continue to serve sustain their combat arms broth- that despite advances in digita- with distinction in Iraq. ers at barely a subsistence rate. lization, increased situational

Colonel James Herson, USA, is a Professor of Strategy and Joint Warfighting at the Air War College and has authored numerous articles on military history.

94 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Military Power: Explaining Victory and alerts readers to the critical issues Allies should have had a clear Defeat in Modern Battle to watch for when reading the offensive victory, the end result by Stephen Biddle case studies Biddle uses to dem- was a win for German defense. Princeton University Press, 2004 onstrate his theory. The Germans had defense in 337 pp. $37.50 The next three chapters depth, and the Allies attacked ISBN: 0-6911-1645-8 present three case studies to on a narrow front that prevented demonstrate the modern system them from using modern system Reviewed by theory and its validity. Operations tactics such as cover, conceal- CRAIG STONE Michael (the second battle of the ment, and small unit independent Somme, March 21–April 9, 1918), maneuver. Goodwood (the penultimate Operation Desert Storm was Allied attempt to break out of picked as a case study because Normandy, July 18–20, 1944), and while the breakthrough was Desert Storm (January 17–Febru- predictable, the low loss rate was tephen Biddle argues that, Biddle argues that the real ary 28, 1991) are examples of not. The modern systems theory contrary to the belief of causes of battlefield success have an event’s outcome supporting attributes this outcome to the S some observers, warfare been remarkably stable since the modern system rather than interaction between force employ- has not actually changed much 1917–1918, due largely to what he the orthodox view despite the ment and new technology used since the early 1900s. Using case refers to as the modern system of attacker/defender force ratios. against traditional system defen- studies and a quantitative statis- force employment, or the doctrine In each example, Biddle explains sive methods. tical analysis model, he presents a and tactics by which forces are why the case was selected and The final chapters move new way of viewing warfare and used in combat. He defines this what outcome the orthodox from the small-n case method to determining outcomes. system as “a tightly interrelated theory and the modern system large-N statistical analysis and Particularly compelling is complex of cover, concealment, would imply. The second battle of computer simulations. Biddle uses the connection among the actual dispersion, suppression, small- the Somme provides a most likely the University of Michigan’s Cor- practice of war, international unit independent maneuver, and case to support the orthodox relates of War dataset, the Army’s relations theory, and the current combined arms at the tactical theories of capabilities and a least CDB90 dataset, and a self-devel- defense debate regarding the level” (p. 3). Although military likely case for the modern system oped dataset to test and prove his importance of technology. Within members might find this concept theory. Operation Michael was an modern system theory. Though the context of military power, obvious, the value of Biddle’s work example of what should have been he admits the results are imper- some modern international rela- is the rigorous and broad use of a British defensive success based fect, they do display a preponder- tions theorists have focused on case studies and multimethod on orthodox theories but was in ance of evidence to support the numerical strength, while others statistical analysis to support his fact a German offensive success, modern systems theory. The have concentrated on technology assertion. which is what the modern system same holds true for the computer changing the advantage from The author begins by predicts. It was a case of what simulation. defense to offense. Biddle argues defining the modern system and should have been the success The author summarizes his that both views are unsound and explains how it is connected to of defense-dominant technol- study with a number of important that the military underpinnings technology and the use of force ogy and numerical imbalance conclusions ranging from the role of international politics require a by examining how changes in for the Allies. But the Germans of military power in international more detailed explanation of how military technology since 1918 broke through, which supports relations to the lesson for histori- numerical strength and technol- have altered the battlefield. Next, the modern systems theory’s ans in interpreting the outcomes ogy interact and work. He coun- he deals with the issue of superior predictions that shallow forward of battles. One of the most terbalances the contemporary numbers (which, he argues, help defenders would not succeed important findings is that the U.S. debate about superior technology but are neither necessary nor against German modern system focus on RMA and technology dominating future warfare. sufficient for success) and the use of cover, concealment, and as a revolutionary change on the Revolution in military affairs consequences within the modern combined arms. battlefield is misplaced. According (RMA) advocates who argue that system. He then summarizes Like Operation Michael, to Biddle, most of the important technology is revolutionizing the the modern system theory that Operation Goodwood was a case variances in combat outcomes are battlefield need to read this book he presents in more detail in in which orthodox theory implied not from technology change, but if only to better understand the subsequent chapters. This section an outcome other than the actual rather from the failure of states weaknesses in their position. is particularly useful because it result. Unlike Michael, in that the to implement modern systems methods such as cover, conceal- Craig Stone recently retired after 29 years as an Artillery Officer in the Canadian Forces. He is an Assistant Professor and ment, and maneuver. JFQ Deputy Director of Academics at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Ontario.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 95 German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: other commanders’ views of last century of warfare. Although Erich von Falkenhayn and the warfare, as well as the German some historians refer to the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 government’s. Falkenhayn under- Schlieffen Plan as a good example by Robert T. Foley estimated the will of his enemies for mobile warfare strategy in the Cambridge, MA: and failed to realize that the 20th century, they often preface Cambridge University Press, 2005 Entente would not accept a peace their discussions about the 301 pp. $75.00 on German terms in 1916; too plan with “If only the German ISBN: 0-5218-4193-3 much had been wagered at that army had. . . .” The strategy was point to agree to the status quo. a failure from any perspective. Reviewed by As a result of the failure of Falken- Furthermore, many critics of JOHN F. O’KANE hayn’s strategy at Verdun, histo- attrition warfare point to the rians, especially German military tactical innovations in mobile historians, have generally ignored warfare that came out of World oley dissects the changes views focused not on the decisive the concepts from which the strat- War I, which arguably were the in German military nature of the initial German egy was derived. Adding insult foundation of the blitzkrieg tactics F thought that began in victory, but on the second phase to injury, Entente leaders with far that were so successful in World 1871 and culminated tragically of the conflict and the challenges greater resources and manpower War II. However true in principle at Verdun in 1916. During this offered by the French volkskrieg. at their disposal embraced the this may be, mobile warfare as period, the General Staff debated Some German military intellectu- strategies of Falkenhayn. And prescribed by Schlieffen and two opposite schools of thought: als saw victory in wars of attrition through attrition warfare, the his supporters was not proving annihilation and attrition. Both rather than in short wars with Entente leaders were able to any more successful in combat strategies would be tested early in decisive battles. Still, most leaders accomplish what the Germans than the attrition-based strategy World War I, but only the latter in a position to make policy clung could not: peace issued to an army of Falkenhayn. If the Germans would lead to what some would to the belief that the short war strat- that had been exhausted. had the resources, manpower, call “the most senseless episode egy was in the best interest of the Using records believed and economy of the Entente, the in a war not distinguished for German military. Enter Erich von destroyed during World War Falkenhayn Plan and volkskrieg sense anywhere” (p. 259). Falkenhayn—a commander who, II (which were returned to might carry the same connota- Most senior German army according to Foley, “appreciated Germany after the collapse of tions today as the Schlieffen Plan officers backed the strategies of and accepted the changed nature of the Soviet Union) and extensive and blitzkrieg. JFQ Helmuth von Moltke and Alfred modern mass warfare” (p. 7). archival research, Foley has von Schlieffen, who advocated The book next focuses painted an alternative picture of quick, mobile wars aimed at on Falkenhayn’s strategies after the development of the Verdun annihilating the enemy in a few his appointment as the chief strategy. He rebuts Falkenhayn’s decisive battles. However, some of the General Staff after the critics by shedding new light on Distribution: JFQ is distributed to officers, Erich von Falkenhayn German failure at the Marne in the German ideas about attri- the field and fleet through Service publications distribution centers. Ac- among them, were convinced 1914. Plagued by the stalemate tion warfare developed before tive, Reserve, National Guard units, of the opposite: that the lessons on the Western Front, pressure and during World War I, citing individuals, and organizations sup- of the Franco-German victory, from the East to help the fledg- in particular the writings of ported by the Services can order JFQ the Anglo-Boer War, and the ling Austro-Hungarians, and German historian and military through the appropriate activity: Army: Russo-Japanese War were not of unsupportive general officers, commentator Hans Delbrück. www.usapa.army.mil (cite Misc. Pub 71-1). the success of annihilation-based Falkenhayn felt compelled to Contrary to the thinking of many Navy: Defense Distribution strategies. Falkenhayn and his few achieve victory quickly. The in the German army, Delbrück Depot Susquehanna, New supporters believed these wars attrition-based strategy in which believed future warfare would not Cumberland, Pennsylvania were the beginnings of modern he so strongly believed focused be decided by strategic battles and 17070; call (717) 770-5872, industrialized warfare that mobi- on rapidly defeating the French great victories, but rather would DSN 771-5827, FAX (717) 770-4360 lized all of a nation’s resources. As on the Western Front. It was in result in a settled peace after Air Force: www.e-Publishing. such, warfare would now require Verdun that he hoped the French tremendous losses on both sides. af.mil or email afpdc-service@ a strategy based on prolonged army would expend the last of Falkenhayn believed that to bring pentagon.af.mil campaigns of attrition to bleed the its reserves, resources, and will one side to the peace table, a Marine Corps: Headquarters U.S. enemy white and force them to to fight, leading to its quick sur- unique strategy would be needed Marine Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (room negotiate peace. render. In turn, England would to force at least one of Germany’s 1302), Navy Annex, Wash- Foley begins with an exami- be isolated and soon forced into a enemies to negotiations. ington, DC 20380; FAX (703) nation of alternative perceptions similar predicament. Foley has breathed new 614-2951, DSN 224-2951 of warfare that arose following the Any strategy based on attri- life into an issue that has been Subscriptions for individuals German victories in 1871. These tion was bound to be at odds with forgotten or overlooked in the and nonmilitary organizations: http://bookstore.gpo.gov/ Captain John F. O’Kane, USAF, is an Active duty Air Force officer attending the Naval Postgraduate School. subscriptions

96 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu e x ecutive su m m ar y Validating the Total Force m Executive Summary ru o f q f j

of an oligarchy. Then, as now, many countries in the world found their interests best served through less than energetic security contributions and diplomatic support, placing a dispro- portionate burden on the United States. And then, as now, those Americans who were asked to shoulder the greatest risks in combat and he way in which the U.S. who performed with exceptional distinction Armed Forces are apportioned and valor were far removed from the elite of between Active duty, Reserve, society. Indeed, just as in Vietnam, those who T and National Guard owes more lead do not bleed. to economic and political calculation than it Since 1971 and the transition to Secre- does to military efficiency. The two primary tary Laird’s Total Force methodology, which factors behind the remarkable transformation made it impossible for any large or lengthy Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. In to a bifurcated, all-volunteer force were Presi- U.S. military operation to be conducted by addition to asserting that the Department of dent Richard Nixon’s commitment to end the the Active Component alone, the individual Defense is “expanding and building” on the draft and the staggering expense of a large Service branches have incrementally inte- Total Force concept, he outlines numerous force structure needed to meet the threats grated the Reserve Component. Arguably, Guard and Reserve transformation issues, of the Cold War. In the intervening years, the inability to distinguish between the from administration to joint training and force the professionalism, esprit de corps, and Active and Reserve Component owes much deployment. He speaks about the rebalanc- unprecedented effectiveness exhibited by the to high operational and personnel tempos ing of high and low demand forces to meet Reserve and National Guard have eroded past that some believe the Total Force concept tomorrow’s needs more efficiently and predicts distinctions between the Active and Reserve was crafted to inhibit. In the interview and that the Reserve Component will remain Components and confirm the efficacy of articles that follow, Joint Force Quarterly seeks about the same size in the years to come with what we call the Total Force. to underline the skilled adaptation of the less legacy equipment. The Assistant Secretary The economic and social pressures Reserve Component to the challenges of the concludes with his assessment of the current on Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird Long War against Islamic radicalism and the crop of Guardsmen and Reservists, as well as (1969–1973) in the face of a global security manner in which the Reserve Component is the employers who support them. threat are similar to the restraints and con- transforming to meet other emerging threats, In the second article, Lieutenant straints present today. Then, as now, America both natural and manmade. General Steven Blum, Chief of the National faced an enemy with global reach intent upon Our first Forum article is an interview Guard Bureau, outlines his vision for the subjugating entire populations to the caprice with the Honorable Thomas Hall, Assistant National Guard as it transforms to “a more

JFQ / issue 43, 4 th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu GurneyAuthor j f q q f o ru m

joint and effective organization.” Notable in this transformation is the creation of a Joint Force Headquarters in every state and territory, capable of 24-hour integrated operations with a common operating picture that one day should be linked to a domestic security network. This article tells the compelling story of how the Guard has moved from the moniker of weekend warriors to a true opera- with the mandate to conduct homeland tional force. defense and provide support to civilian The U.S. Air Force Reserve is the focus authorities. In parallel with the Navy, the of our third Forum feature. Here, Chief of the Marine Corps Reserve has made great strides Air Force Reserve, Lieutenant General John in rebalancing the Total Force to meet the Bradley, states that the mission of the Air challenges of the future while winning the Force Reserve is identical to that of the Active war on terror. Perhaps the most interesting of Component and that the (happy) difficulty in the numerous transformation initiatives that distinguishing between Active and Reserve he outlines is the assignment of civil-military use this resource better. In the final analysis, forces has had the negative effect of making missions to artillery regiments and battalions Colonel Bankus is convinced that we are it harder to validate Reserve contributions to in order to balance mission demand while squandering a time-tested opportunity to the Total Force. He further notes that there is a preserving force capability. improve national security, especially in the natural tension between the desire of regional Our final article in the Forum holds an area of homeland defense. combatant commanders for the continuity of unusual argument: the Total Force concept The following articles share themes longer tour lengths in theater and the ability of should be strengthened further by increased of transformation success and operational part-time Reservists to remain for 120 days or Federal support to volunteer military organi- achievement that are just as compelling as any longer. He concludes with his priorities for the zations at the state and local levels. Colonel discussion dealing with joint interoperability. future of our 76,000 “Unrivaled Wingmen.” Brent Bankus makes the case that state defense The dynamics of technology and transfor- The fourth essay in the Forum comes force organizations are important assets in mation are destined to alter the Total Force from the Commander of the Marine Corps crisis and that small investments in training formula. As revealed in the interview that Reserve, Lieutenant General Jack Bergman. and education would pay great dividends. He follows, however, America can count on one General Bergman is dual-hatted as Com- identifies legal impediments to closer coopera- constant: we find our greatest generation in mander, Marine Forces North, the Marine tion of these state entities with the Department the Reserve and National Guard.

component of the U.S. Northern Command of Defense and makes recommendations to D.H. Gurney (D. Myles Cullen) of the Chairman Joint Chiefs Staff Office ndupress.ndu.edu issueissue 43, 4 th quarter 2006 / JFQ An Interview with Thomas F. Hall m of that transformation of virtually 46 percent of the military. Again, even among our own ranks, we don’t always realize that almost half ru of this corporation called defense is invested in the Guard and Reserve. So how we use o that, and what the return on investment is of f those almost 1.2 million people, is going to be extremely important for our country. I came

q with that framework, that background, and DOD The Honorable Thomas F. Hall is the fourth Assistant Secretary Hall being also a desire to serve. I offered my services, f Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. He is briefed by U.S. trainers and the President appointed me, and we’re j a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (class of of Afghan Army almost 4 years later now. 1963) and retired from uniformed service as a Rear Admiral, USN. JFQ: Secretary Rumsfeld once observed to the press that you go to war with the army Secretary Hall speaking at Employer Support you have. We also go to war with the strategic of the Guard and Reserve we have. If our Reserve forces have Reserve meeting enabled transformation of the Active forces, how has our Reserve transformed to serve as an JFQ: When you first assumed your director of the Naval Reserve Association. operational Reserve? present duties, were you given a specific So when I came to look at this job, I had had mandate, or an open road? about 10 years of experience with the Guard Secretary Hall: Of course, transforma- and Reserve. tion is a word that you hear everywhere, and Secretary Hall: I think we need to go As we went into the 1990s and actu- in fact all of our forces are transforming, and it back even a little bit before that to see how I ally past 9/11, it became my belief that our is essential that the Guard and Reserve trans- got here because I served 34 years as an Active construct for the Guard and Reserve that form along with the Active duty force if we duty officer, and to be associated with the we had all developed in the ’90s had really are going to have one force. We can no longer Guard and Reserve as a former Active duty changed forever. And the idea of the Guard afford not to use the Guard and Reserve in an officer is a little bit different. But while I was and Reserve being a strategic force waiting to operational way. We needed to transform the serving in the Navy, I had the chance to serve mobilize perhaps once in their lifetime to fight way we equipped the Guard and Reserve, and as the deputy director of the Naval Reserve the “Big War” was probably gone forever, and we can talk a bit more about the equipping before I went to my North Atlantic Treaty our Guard and Reserve forces were going to strategy. We needed to transform the way we Organization command in Iceland. So I spent be used more. We had a lot of things about mobilize our Guard and Reserve. We really about a year with the Naval Reserve, and when them that we needed to change, and they were had a mobilization process that was rooted in I finished my tour of duty in Iceland, I came going to become what we call the operational the industrial age rather than the technology back and was actually the last Active duty Reserve. So when I went to the President and age. We knew very well how to flow our time- commander of the Naval Reserve, and I served offered my services, it was because I believed phased deployment plans, we knew how to in that capacity for 4 years. During those 5 that the Guard and Reserve were going to be get big formations into the various theaters of years, I discovered what many Active duty more important than ever, were going to be operation, but we didn’t always know how to officers sometimes don’t admit: that Active used more, and that we fundamentally needed correctly force-package and how to be agile, so duty officers don’t always know a lot about the to change the way we recruit, train, equip, and we needed to transform that entire process. Guard and Reserve, and I didn’t. But I learned utilize our Guard and Reserve forces. When I We also needed to look at the jointness, a lot in those 5 years, and then I went out into came to the job, I came with that orientation. which I hope we’ll talk some about, of our the civilian world and served as the executive I expressed my desire to serve and to be part Guard and Reserve, because they are going to fall in on joint formations. The question of “Do On May 30, 2006, Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.), and Dr. Jeffrey D. we provide joint education, joint training, for Smotherman of Joint Force Quarterly interviewed the Assistant Secretary of our Guard and Reserve?” was critical, and the Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas F. Hall in his office at the Pentagon. answer was, “Probably not as well as we should have.” The regulations and the mobilization

JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Hall Interview authority of the Guard and Reserve are based example. We had a lot of artillery, field artillery, JFQ: In view of the increased operations largely on a strategic Reserve rather than an and air defense artillery. So all the Services tempo and personnel tempo that Reserve forces operational one. So we looked at the bank together said that they were going to rebalance have been shouldering, are there any recruit- of laws, policies, and regulations in this area. about 100,000, creating more Active structure ment or retention challenges on the horizon? If And again—not many people know this, and and more Reserve structure in these very high- so, how are these being addressed? I appreciate your journal helping us put out use areas. Since then, we’ve accelerated, and we some of this information—in the past 2 years, have about 125,000 that we’re going to rebal- Secretary Hall: One of the things I do in j because of the partnership of the Department ance. We’re well along the road: we have 70,000 my job is to visit with the Guard and Reserves, f of Defense [DOD] with our elected officials, who we’ve rebalanced now, and we have 55,000 young men and women who are serving, and q and really because of Congress, we’ve changed who we’re going to rebalance up through the their families. One of the great untold stories 120 provisions of the law that affect the Guard year 2011. When we do that, we will take those of this entire mobilization is the way the young f and Reserve—probably the largest legislative 125,000 people and create more structure in men and women have answered the call to changes in history over a 2-year period. The those areas that we’re stressing. colors, just as the generations before them o laws go all the way from how we compensate, did. This is a wonderful story that Americans ru how we provide benefits, and how we mobilize JFQ: Do any Reserve Component forces need to be told over and over. Many of our our Guard and Reserve. So we needed to over- have formal or informal relationships with state young men and women are volunteering for haul this entire structure and look at it from top militias? If not, should they? And how do you second and third tours of duty in the Guard to bottom and see how we would transform that work with them? and Reserve in Iraq and Afghanistan and other m force to meet the realities of the war on terror. areas of the world, and we are experiencing Secretary Hall: About 25 states have a very high retention rate. In fact, our figures JFQ: In the face of the Long War and the militias. A couple of points to remember are compare well to prior to 9/11. So I have often increasing focus on civil defense, humanitarian that these militias are formed by the states, said that people would not stay in an organiza- assistance, disaster relief, special operations, and controlled by the Governor, funded by the tion that they don’t like and that they don’t stability and security operations, do we have the states, and are a state entity. So many of our believe in. People are staying in the Guard and right mix of Active and Reserve forces? National Guard and Reserve units have infor- Reserve in ever-increasing numbers. Virtually mal-type interactions with the state militias, all of the Guard and Reserve forces, with the Secretary Hall: I’ve often said that some training and other things, but there’s not exception of probably the Naval Reserve by before we determine that we’re out of people, a formal DOD connection to those state mili- just a small amount, will meet their retention and that we need more people, we first have tias because those are controlled by the Gov- goals by the end of the year. to look and see if we’re out of balance. And ernors. But I know in New York, for instance, On the recruiting side is the challenge. the answer was clearly “yes” because I and my that the New York Naval Militia and the Naval Three of the seven components are experienc- colleagues were constructing the Guard and Reserve work very well together. ing recruiting challenges: the Army Reserve, Reserve to meet the Big War, and we were the Naval Reserve, and the Air National putting a lot of our force structuring—combat, JFQ: How have the Reserve Components Guard. They’re all improving—and, by the combat service support, civil affairs, trans- engaged with interagency partners to see after way, the Army Guard, which at the beginning portation, intelligence—into areas that we their slice of the DOD mission? of the year was experiencing some shortfalls, thought we would have ample time to mobi- is doing a magnificent job, and it appears that lize, and plenty of time to train, and get these Secretary Hall: DOD is part of the they’re growing toward the 350,000 that they forces when we needed them. We suddenly interagency process in all that we do, and have projected. But the combination of good discovered after 9/11 that no, we’re going to especially in homeland defense and homeland retention and hard work in recruiting means need them right away. They can’t operate with security. These past 2 years have been unbe- that by the end of the year, we have hopes obsolete equipment. And we discovered that lievable in what we have undergone in the that all the components, with perhaps the we were calling on certain very low-density form of transition alone. Think about it: the exception of the Naval Reserve, might achieve units in a very high usage. first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Home- their end strength rather than continuing to Let me give you some examples: civil land Defense, Paul McHale, has stood up; the have a challenge. affairs, transportation, military intelligence, Department of Homeland Security has stood military police. We have a large amount of up; and U.S. Northern Command has stood JFQ: How is the future Reserve Compo- those structured in the Guard and Reserve, and up. All of these entities are focusing on defense nent going to look vis-à-vis the past? we were using them all the time. So we went of the homeland and security of the homeland. to the individual Services and asked them to DOD, by way of U.S. Northern Command, Secretary Hall: There will be some look at the balance they had. This also includes normally supports the lead Federal agency. So small reductions, but it will be about the same civilians, which we can talk a little bit about. the way I would characterize it is that DOD, size. You will see a force that has more compat- And they came back initially and said, “Well, through the Secretary, as ordered by the Com- ible equipment with the Active Component; there are about 100,000 types of people that we mander in Chief, provides forces to support you’ll have less legacy equipment come to need that we don’t have. And we think there those interagency partners, and I think we the Guard and Reserve, which is important are about 100,000 types of people that we have have seen that in hurricane support and in the because training needs to occur on the same that we don’t need.” Let’s take the Army as an various interactions between the agencies. equipment that is going to be used in combat. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ J F Q F O RU M

You will see a force that has a tremendous no longer endorse it,” and “Is it any longer How should the Total Force, as well as the amount more combat veterans. We will have applicable?” And I say, “Yes, it is, and we’re Guard itself, change to respond to the complex the largest number of combat veterans in the not walking away from it.” What we’re doing network of domestic security tasks? Guard and Reserve than at any time since is merely expanding and building on it. It was World War II. You’ll see an experienced force the right policy at the right time to set the stage Secretary Hall: This would be a good where most of the top sergeants, top chiefs, to launch us toward where we are now. It’s the question for Paul McHale and [National and others will all have combat experience. same way with any other kinds of policies that Guard Bureau Chief] Steve Blum to address You will find a force that is meeting more you modernize, change, and transform. because they work in that area, but from my m predictable rotational patterns. We have a aspect, the President needs to be able to call model that says that you should expect to be JFQ: The Total Force concept also on the Guard and Reserve for the defense of called up once every 6 years. It doesn’t mean required the Reserve Component to meet a basic the homeland in any manner or at any time ru you will be; we hope to be able to predict to standard of training. Now that we’re 20 years he sees fit. It is the duty of the Guard and those forces, their families, and their employ- beyond Goldwater-Nichols and in a period Reserve, the duty of my office, and all of the o ers when we’re going to call them up and how where joint and interagency coordination super- leaders to make sure that we have the training f long we’re going to use them. sede former Active duty and and equipment and that we are prepared to Also, these forces should Reserve Component differences, respond. Our Guard and Reserve forces have

q be mobilized for periods of how do the Armed Forces train demonstrated their readiness during the last 1 year or less. I don’t think and educate senior leaders so year with Katrina and Rita. As I recall, we f we can sustain extended officers of different Services or had a total mobilization of over 100,000 that j call-ups where we’re doing components have similar skill were already mobilized and were meeting 18 to 21 months of mobiliza- sets to command? missions throughout the world. At the same tion. That’s just too much of time, we mobilized about 50,000 people to go a stress on the employers, Secretary Hall: This is to Katrina and Rita from the National Guard, too much of a stress on the why joint training facilities are and they did that without missing a beat, families and individuals. Our so important—the National while meeting overseas commitments, which hope is to get to a goal of 12 Training Center [Fort Irwin, mirrors the view that the National Guard

months or less mobilization. DOD California] and the Joint Readi- must be prepared to do all missions, both You are going to see a Guard and Reserve ness Training Center at Fort Polk, and all of overseas and at home, and must train dually force that is more joint because our joint train- our training institutions, all of our Service for both missions, and they are doing that. ing systems, our joint training sites such as schools. We must train Guard, Reserve, and Of course, our Reserve Components have to Fort Polk [Joint Readiness Training Center, Active duty jointly. We are going to have be available under Title 10 to go to overseas Fort Polk, Louisiana] and schools such as the Guard and Reserve personnel serving on missions or domestic missions. So I just think National Defense University are incorporating joint staffs when they’re mobilized, so they that we need to view this as a Total Force Guard and Reserve in the courses. Our mid- have to have joint training. Also, the training of 2.6 million men and women under arms level courses for senior enlisted and officers concept for Guard and Reserve has changed that the President uses as necessary to meet are both incorporating joint training, so you’re dramatically. When I go to the National Train- both domestic and overseas missions. It is going to see a much greater jointness. Plus, ing Center and see a battalion going through, our job to make sure those forces are trained, you’re going to see people who have served in I can’t tell whether they’re Active, Guard, or equipped, manned, and ready to meet any one a joint way much more than in the past. Let’s Reserve. I have to ask the instructors. And I of those missions when the President calls. take an example. You’re going to see Air Force also ask the instructors if they notice any dif- truck drivers and Navy truck drivers driving in ference in the Guard and Reserve and Active JFQ: A National Defense University faculty Army missions, so you’re going to see people duty units they train, and they say, “When I member wrote, “The Abrams Doctrine is widely much more comfortable with joint solutions. certify them, they’re certified, and I’m not cer- interpreted as an expression of General Creighton tifying anybody who isn’t trained. When they Abrams’ determination to maintain a clear JFQ: In 1971, Secretary of Defense Melvin come out the other end, they’re going to be linkage between the employment of the Army Laird introduced the Total Force concept. The just as good or just as qualified, and we don’t and the engagement of public support for military intent was to hold Reserve and Guard leaders send anybody to the area of responsibility and operations.” Presently, we also understand that accountable for readiness and preparedness. go over the berm unless they’re trained, and I some alterations to that mix are under way. We’re How has the Reserve Component responded in see them there at the point.” interested in understanding if you believe that the last three decades, if you can give us a his- the so-called Abrams Doctrine is at odds with torical perspective? And what do we need to do JFQ: There’s been a lot of discussion about the assessment that a new mix is needed to make differently or better to meet the realities of the the role of the Reserve Component, and the a more agile military with the capability to fight post–Cold War environment? National Guard in particular, for the domestic today while retaining enough strategic depth for homeland security mission set, from planning to the higher-spectrum contingencies. Secretary Hall: A great misunderstand- consequence management. This was even before ing lies in talking about the Total Force policy. the President’s recent proposal to send 6,000 Secretary Hall: General Abrams was a I’ve heard, “We’re walking away from it,” “We Guardsmen to monitor our Southern border. great Soldier and a great American. If he were

10 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Hall Interview alive today, he would be rejoicing in the fact that his principle—that America should never go to war without its Guard and Reserve—is alive and well. Today, we have over 100,000 Guardsmen and Reservists mobilized to virtually every mission around the world. So America has gone to war with its Guard j and Reserve—not as we did in Vietnam. So I f would say that one of the things that we had q walked away from and we are changing now to rejoin is that his doctrine is being shown today f as the exact one we need, and we are at war with the Guard and Reserve—100,000 around o the world—so the change and mix that we’re ru doing is supporting the Abrams Doctrine. Secretary Hall and Secretary of Transportation display Statement of Support JFQ: If the Reserve Component transitions

for Guard and Reserve m to a more agile or lighter force, and the Guard DOD moves into more homeland security missions, how will the Total Force maintain preparedness because I visit men and women at Walter Reed the wrong seat,” and there’s a questioning look for the upper end of the spectrum of conflict? [Army Medical Center] who are wounded, on the part of the young men and women, who have lost legs and arms, who have made a and the attendants say, “You go up in first Secretary Hall: I don’t think those considerable sacrifice. I have never found one class because you’re America’s heroes.” That is are exclusive. By the National Guard being who didn’t say, “What I want to do is get well something we all need to think about and to prepared to meet homeland defense and any and return to my unit and go back into the thank those employers for. further missions they are called to overseas, to fight and help us win this war because we have Once again, the families of our young be trained jointly, to be properly equipped, and to.” These are people who serve voluntarily, men and women around the country are sup- for the Reserve to be the same way, that does particularly the Guard and Reserve. These porting these Servicemembers as they never not mean that you aren’t going to be prepared men and woman did not have to go—they are have before. I was a Vietnam-era veteran, for one or the other; it means you’re going doing it willingly, and they want to protect and when we returned from the conflict to be prepared for both. If you execute those their country. Tom Brokaw’s World War II there, because of the political turmoil in the basic tenets, which is to get regulations correct, generation will always be the greatest genera- country, we were not welcomed. There were get the benefits and compensation correct, get tion, but history will gradually show that this is no parades. We didn’t question the politi- the training correct, get the equipping correct, the next greatest generation. cal aspects; we just went and did our duty. get the mobilization process correct, and get Now, when I travel around the country, I see the usage correct, then you’re going to have JFQ: We would like to give you an oppor- parades and homecomings. We see celebra- a force that is ready to respond at home and tunity to speak directly to our readership on this tions planned and communities turning out. overseas in an integrated way. issue’s focus: the Total Force. So the support of America for the troops is overwhelming. There will always be political JFQ: You are reputed to hold forth on the Secretary Hall: We need to thank the differences about how war is fought, but there’s fact that we’ve uncovered a new “greatest gen- employers of America. One of the untold no difference throughout the country that eration.” If in fact that is your view, how is this stories and unsung heroes of America is our America supports its young men and women. generation to get the credit it deserves in the face employers, and we know for sure that there So I see a different sense in America than I did of a press that tends to report things with an are 300, probably 500 to 1,000, companies that during the Vietnam war. angle that may be more sensational or perhaps are providing extra benefits or just extra help And finally, I think that when we talk political—how are we to give them the credit to the Guardsmen and Reservists who work about our young men and women being better they are due? for them. These employers maintain jobs for trained and the best military we’ve ever had, those serving when they come back, and they I believe that, because I spent a long time in Secretary Hall: I certainly would never support families while these men and women the military. I see very, very bright, articulate criticize the press; they have their job to do, are gone. These employers are patriotic in their young men and women who are willing to and they do that. I returned from Oklahoma own way, just like they were serving, because come and say, “The price of freedom is service this past week, where I go each year to award they say, “It’s important to let my employee for our country.” And they’re meeting that some scholarships and visit with young men go and serve the country, and I’m going to call, and I want to thank them, I want to thank and women, and I met a number of people support him and his family while he’s gone.” I their families, I want to thank the employers of who were joining the military, and I asked get on airplanes where I see flight attendants America for supporting them. them why. They said, “Well, we just want to talk to young men and women in uniform, serve.” I say this is the next greatest generation and the attendants tell them, “You’re going to JFQ: Thank you, sir. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 11 Joint Service Honor Guard displays 11th Communications Squadron (Scott M. Ash) flags from states and territories m ru o f q f j

The National Guard Transforming to an Operational Force

By H . S te v en B lum

hen you call out the The foundation to perform and excel Guard, you call out at these missions is a set of core principles America. Never in the that continues to focus our vision as we Nation’s history has this navigate the operating environments of the W st been more true. From our response to the 21 century: terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to our reaction in the aftermath of Hurricane n securing and defending the homeland in Katrina, one thing stands: America’s National support of the war on terror Guard has transformed from a strategic n transforming as we fight, enhancing Reserve force into a fully operational force readiness and capabilities for rapid action multiplier for the Department of Defense. across the full spectrum of military operations This transformation makes the Guard ideally n remaining the constitutionally based suited for missions to protect our homeland citizen militia that continues to serve our from any threat. nation so well in peace and war

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, ARNG, is Chief, National Guard Bureau. U.S. Air Force (Mike Arellano) U.S. Air Force

Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu 12 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Blum

Texas Air National Guard forces travel to New Orleans during

Hurricane Katrina relief operations j f q q f o ru m

The National Guard Transforming to an Operational Force

n insisting on a relevant, reliable, ready, to integrate with their transformation plans. and combined construct is essential in such an and accessible National Guard. Simultaneously, we are continuing to trans- environment. form the Guard into a more joint and effective The Guard’s homeland defense and These principles guide our Citizen- organization from top to bottom to meet the security roles mandate the ability to operate Soldiers and Citizen-Airmen, ensuring that needs of our elected and uniformed state and seamlessly between state and Federal intergov- they are ready to face any challenge, anywhere, Federal leaders. We must and will do what is ernmental and interagency roles. One need anytime they are called. right for America. only look back to September 11, 2001, and the The operational environment is vastly response to Hurricane Katrina in September 21st-Century Challenges different than just 5 years ago. The level of the 2005, as illustrations of the new operating The National Guard is a critical element Guard’s involvement inside that environment environment. On September 11, the Guard of America’s warfighting capability. While is equally different. The days of large-scale, was there when it was needed. Some 8,500 Sol- the Guard has certainly transformed in sig- single-agency operations are long gone. The diers and Airmen were on the streets of New nificant ways, there are challenges ahead that war on terror, the responses to September 11 York in less than 24 hours. Guard members require unwavering focus and attention. It is and Hurricane Katrina, and the mission to were at the Nation’s airports within 72 hours. imperative to achieve the right force mix and assist U.S. Customs and Border Control with Moreover, the Guard has flown more than types of units. We are developing maximum securing the southern border are windows 30,000 incident-free, fully armed combat air readiness across the full spectrum of national into the future of U.S. military operations at patrol missions over the United States since security requirements—from a full-scale war home and abroad, and are all examples of September 11. fought overseas to myriad homeland security joint, combined, interagency, intergovernmen- Less than 4 hours after Hurricane missions. To that end, we are aggressively tal, and international operations. The ability Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, National Guard working with the Army and the Air Force to think, plan, and operate in a joint, unified, forces were in the water, on the streets, and in

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 13 T ransf o r m ing t o an o P E R A T I o nal F o rce

the air throughout the affected region, rescu- LTG H. Steven Blum, ARNG ing people and saving lives. Also, Guard forces responded in record time with unprecedented numbers, putting more than 50,000 Soldiers and Airmen into the region at the peak of the effort. The fact that units were deployed in Iraq at the time of Katrina did not lessen the Guard’s ability to respond with trained and m ready personnel and equipment. Perhaps more importantly, the summer of 2005 once again demonstrated that the Guard can operate, and ru must continue to be able to operate, across the full spectrum of national security missions. o The Guard successfully accomplished all f of these missions while conducting close quarters combat (including seven infantry brigades

q and Special Operations Forces) in Iraq and Afghanistan, international peacekeeping in f Bosnia and Kosovo, and counterdrug border j support in the United States. Simultaneously, the Guard was responding to Governors’ calls U.S. Air Force (Jim Varhegyi) U.S. Air Force for homeland security operations and mini- mization of suffering in the face of natural and We have developed the Joint Force together closely on the Joint Continental manmade disasters. Headquarters as a sophisticated communica- U.S. Communications Support Environment tions node capable of assuming command (JCCSE). When fully operational, the JCCSE Joint Force Headquarters and control from all Services and components will provide U.S. Northern Command, U.S. One reason the National Guard has been when responding to domestic emergencies. Pacific Command, the National Guard Bureau, able to respond so effectively is the develop- These new headquarters were tested and each state Joint Force Headquarters, and our ment of the Joint Force Headquarters. This proven effective during multiple national intergovernmental partners with the vital has been a critical innovation in every state special security events in 2004–2005: the capabilities and services needed to support and territory and is a significant change from Winter Olympics, the Group of Eight Summit, continuous and accurate situational awareness the days of separate Army and Air Guard state the Democratic and Republican National Con- of operational capabilities. JCCSE will also headquarters geared toward administrative ventions, and the Presidential inauguration. enhance information-sharing and collabora- peacetime operations. The value of these headquarters was further tion capabilities to facilitate mission planning, validated in 2005 by the rapid and success- resourcing, and execution, and fully integrate ful National Guard response to hurricanes trusted information-sharing and the collabora- Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. tion environment to facilitate coordination the Guard’s homeland We are moving forward to link these and unity of effort. defense and security roles headquarters to provide more robust capabili- As the National Guard prepares to mandate the ability to operate ties for sharing secure and nonsecure informa- respond to a potential influenza pandemic, we seamlessly between state and tion within the states or territories, to deployed know that the state Joint Force Headquarters are Federal intergovernmental and incident sites, and to other Department of the only existing organizations with the intrin- interagency roles Defense and intergovernmental partners sic capabilities, knowledge of local conditions, engaged in homeland defense missions and geographic dispersion, resources, and experi- support to civil authorities. To support these ence to coordinate the massive state-Federal needs, the National Guard Bureau has fielded response that would be required in a pandemic Every state now has a joint operations 13 rapid response communications packages, of the predicted magnitude, which experts indi- center with 24-hour, 7-day-a-week, 365-day- called the Interim Satellite Incident Site Com- cate could challenge domestic tranquility like a-year operational coverage. These centers are munications Set. These regionally based pack- no other event since the Civil War. structured and equipped to provide shared ages proved absolutely vital when the entire Aided by the JCCSE communication situational awareness with all interagency, domestic communications infrastructure in backbone, the state Joint Force Headquarters intergovernmental, and Federal military part- the Gulf Coast region collapsed during Hur- can assist civil authorities as they share a ners, particularly U.S. Northern Command. ricane Katrina. common operating picture, request and coor- The result is a National Guard with a common To satisfy the full range of required dinate specialized, regionally based response operating picture of what is going on across command, control, communications, and forces, and receive follow-on forces from the operating spectrum, as well as a better idea computers capabilities, the National Guard other states, Federal Reserve forces, or Active of how to work together as we approach issues. and U.S. Northern Command have worked duty forces.

14 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu jfq forum - - - - 15 - - - Blum

JFQ / quarter 2006 th 43, 4 43, issue In addition to furnishing 44 percent percent 44 furnishing to addition In Ameri the is Guard National the Clearly, business Guard’s National Air The Guard forces already provide efficien provide already forces Guard For example, when the Air National Guard Guard when National the Air example, For cost average its the B–1 bomber, operated to compared $12,322 was per flying hour $14,101 of cost Command’s Combat Air for figures (fiscal 1997–2001). Current years Guard National the Air have the F–16C/Ds compared $3,703 per flying hour averaging $4,185. The Command’s Combat Air to the for cost flying hour Guard National Air percent makes the ARNG the most economi most the ARNG the makes percent capability. required the providing for choice cal a with teams combat brigade Army’s the of aggres ARNG the resources, the of quarter organi its throughout efficiencies seeks sively regard way under is analysis Current zation. already contracts, Guard Army many ing costs. reduced in resulting Army The bargain. defense best taxpayers’ can the of percent 12 only uses Guard National the of percent 32 provides it yet budget, Army 2004–2005, in peak its At capabilities. overall of percent 40 about provided Guard Army the ground, the on overseas deployed Army the Afghanistan. and Iraq in fighting efficiencyits and alsomodel has proven full- of mixture Its repeatedly. effectiveness part-time (65 percent) and time (35 percent) Force the Air provide to it allows personnel a at capability combat a comparable with surge to ability This savings. significant Force the Total allows area a mission within critical skill sets. in managing flexibility ually to the states, Guam, the Virgin Islands, Islands, Virgin the Guam, states, the to ually in Columbia of District the and Rico, Puerto cost-effective most the it makes that way a force. ready and trained fraction a at capabilities maintaining by cies For units. duty Active full-time of cost the of Army an of cost operating annual the example, only is team combat brigade Guard National Army duty Active its of cost the of percent 28 Guard National Army an Similarly, equivalent. an what of percent 28 costs Soldier (ARNG) planned the Given costs. Soldier duty Active Army, duty force—Active each for level usage deploy 1 ARNG, years; 3 every deployment 1 50 than less years—anything 6 every ment - - - - . We We . orce F WMD civil support teams within the National Guard . We have also stood up 12 CBRNE CBRNE 12 up stood also have We . Today, the Guard delivers national national delivers Guard the Today, Quick and Rapid Reaction Forces Reaction Rapid and Quick CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Force Response Enhanced CBRNE beginning in 1999, Congress funded the formation of joint valuable and integral members of the first first the of members integral and valuable

defense capabilities to the Nation and individ and Nation the to capabilities defense Located in every state and territory, as well well as territory, and state every in Located ready a are they Columbia, of District the as the of request the at available force security unit company-sized A President. or Governor of remainder the and hours 4 in respond can key protect can They hours. 24 in battalion a transportation and powerplants as such sites, WMD secure and roadblocks, establish hubs, an to respond also can They sites. incident before well effort, state a of part as incident on. called are assets Federal Cost-Efficient A meets a previously identified U.S. Northern Northern U.S. identified previously a meets request. Command Rapid and Quick Guard National created have dual-missioning through forces Reaction are units These units. existing training and gov Federal and state to available immediately and purposes security homeland for ernments the throughout deployed forward already are warfighting retain will units The States. United also They capabilities. security homeland and Northern U.S. identified previously a meet requirement. forces for request Command Enhanced Response Force Packages, and with with and Packages, Force Response Enhanced we Congress, of direction and assistance the over all arrayed are They more. 5 up stand will uncov left is region no so States United the augment to designed are packages These ered. of case the in capabilities team support civil medical a of consist and event catastrophic a decontamination/treatment with company company engineer enhanced an capability, equipment, rescue and search specialized with sup of capable unit combat task-trained a and fully is package The enforcement. law porting and commanders combatant the to available The timely and effective response of these these of response effective and timely The response emergency the of needs the to teams acceptance their in resulted has community as terrorism. to response military Packages makes these teams decisive contributors to to contributors decisive teams these makes and government, of stability order, public defense. national our in confidence public - - - Civil Civil d . Beginning Beginning .

When requested by civil authorities and and authorities civil by requested When Of the 55 teams authorized by Congress, Congress, by authorized teams 55 the Of WMD Civil Support Teams Support Civil WMD The Guard must continue to transform transform to continue must Guard The ters. This combination of skill and equipment equipment and skill of combination This ters. ndupress.ndu.edu sophisticated communications suite that can can that suite communications sophisticated state, local, other with site incident the link headquar military and agencies Federal and the civilian populace. The teams are equipped equipped are teams The populace. civilian the identifying of capable laboratory mobile a with a with and materials, biological or chemical WMD incident, advise the local authorities authorities local the advise incident, WMD and attack, the of results the managing on additional for requests appropriate with assist on impact the minimize to order in support deploy to an actual or suspected domestic domestic suspected or actual an to deploy agents/ of identification conduct site, incident the of effects potential the assess substances, will be certified by March 2007. March by certified be will rapidly teams the approval, Governor’s a with 2005, completing the congressional mandate to to mandate congressional the completing 2005, territory, state, every in team one least at field teams final These Columbia. of District the and 12 were approved in fiscal year 2004 and are are and 2004 year fiscal in approved were 12 process. certification the of completion nearing year fiscal in authorized were teams Eleven continent—had returned to the forefront at the the at forefront the to returned continent—had the that demanding century, new a of dawning response. in restructure Guard National patrols against further attacks. The homeland homeland The attacks. further against patrols our of task original mission—the defense this on settled first they when forebears militia tions capabilities. Overhead, in New York York New in Overhead, capabilities. tions Air Nation, the across and Washington and armed conducted fighters Guard National September 11, sampling the air to ensure that that ensure to air the sampling 11, September were contaminants chemical or biological no communica critical providing and present fact, the New York National Guard’s 2 Guard’s National York New the fact, organized first the was Team–WMD Support component or Service military any of unit of morning the on Zero Ground at arrive to (CBRNE) attack on the homeland. Few in in Few homeland. the on attack (CBRNE) in infancy operational in still and number In effective. proven have teams these 2001, assistance to civilian emergency respond emergency civilian to assistance biological, chemical, a of event the in ers explosive high-yield and nuclear, radiological, joint weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (WMD) destruction mass of weapons joint Guard. National the within teams support civil direct provide to designed were teams These to a terrorist attack or disaster at home. at disaster or attack terrorist a to of formation the funded Congress 1999, in to maintain its status as a fully operational force force operational fully a as status its maintain to while Force, Air the and Army the of multiplier respond to ability its increasing time same the at Homeland Security Homeland T ransf o r m ing t o an o P E R A T I o nal F o rce

F–15C/D is $8,535 compared to Air Combat culture, rather than serving on Active duty being deployed for up to 1 year of every 6, as Command’s $9,601. status full time. This is especially appealing long as the military requires larger numbers of In its aircraft inventory, the Air National to Servicemembers who have separated from forces for worldwide missions. Guard overall has 1,304 fixed- and rotary-wing the Active duty forces and do not wish to relo- For the Air National Guard, the Air aircraft, which is 29 percent of the total Air cate or be away from home frequently or for Expeditionary Force model forecasts the Force airframes, to include: extended periods. likelihood that a unit may deploy for up to 120 Guard members want a predictable days in a 20-month cycle. The model provides n 764 fighter/attack (A/O–10, F–15, schedule for traditional weekend training the Air National Guard maximum flexibil- m F–16, F–117), or 30 percent of total Air Force once a month and for annual training, which ity in fulfilling its Air Expeditionary Force fighters normally occurs once a year for up to 15 days. requirements. To minimize the impact on the n 229 transports (C–5, C–17, C–130, C– They understand their commitment to be employer and the traditional member, Airmen ru 141), or 31 percent of total Air Force airlifters available in times of national and state emer- typically deploy in 15-, 30-, or 40-day periods. n 252 tankers (HC–130, KC–10, KC–135), gency and are willing and able to make the While family matters have always o or 40 percent of total Air Force refueling sacrifice as long as it is occasional rather than been important for the Guard, they came f capability. constant and predictable rather than random. more to the forefront in the early 1990s

q In fiscal year 2005, of the Air Force budget of $119 billion, the Air National Guard the Army National Guard uses only 12 percent of the Army f portion was $7.3 billion, about 7 percent. The budget, yet it provides 32 percent of the overall capabilities j Air National Guard is truly the “big bang” for the Air Force’s buck. Employers and families need the same when Guardsmen were called up en masse Family and Employer Cooperation predictability so that they, too, can support for operations in Southwest Asia, the first A tenet of the National Guard is its sen- both the Nation and their communities and such call-up of that immensity since the sitivity to the needs of families and employers. keep the civilian workplace and home operat- Berlin Crisis of 1961. Guard leaders quickly Soldiers and Airmen join the National Guard ing as normally as possible. The National realized that with declining Active duty by choice. They want to serve their country, Guard leadership understands these needs installations nearby, the families would state, and community, yet they also want to and works at all levels to ensure that families need more assistance to attain the benefits remain civilians. They wish to live and work and employers are considered. To that end, the that would enable them to carry on in the in the community, supporting schools and Guard has developed a model for deployed prolonged absence of the Soldier or Airman. predictability that enhances recruiting and The National Guard Family Program was retention. The model for the Army National formally established with a full-time support Guard provides the likelihood of a Soldier office in each state, staffed by volunteers and family members. Regardless of whether the Guardsman is deployed or serving at home, Czech soldiers wheel Texas National Guardsman families have a place to get help. during Exercise Clean Valley near Prague as part of state partnership program Recruiting Challenges and Solutions Maintaining our authorized end strength in recent years has been more challenging, in part because we have become an operational force. Citizens who joined the Guard before September 11 were reasonably certain they would perform their military training 2 days each month plus an annual training period of 15 days and were likely to be called up only in an extreme national security situation or for a deployment that would require up to a 9-month Fighter Wing N. Ripps) (Gregory th absence from the workplace and home. Since the attacks of September 11, the world has changed completely with respect to national security threats, which has made the National Guard more necessary than ever and has

Texas Air National Guard 149 Air National Guard Texas required thousands of Guardsmen to mobilize and deploy for an average of 18 months. Nevertheless, by working toward greater predictability in deployments, adding new

16 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu

jfq forum Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu at wallpaper as Download

17 - Blum

JFQ / Q F J after Red River flooding -century Minuteman, Minuteman, -century st quarter 2006 th Minnesota National Guardsmen and residents transport sandbags 43, 4 43, issue with the population America insists on a reliable, ready, rel ready, reliable, a on insists America Today, we are a joint force, and the Army Army the and force, joint a are we Today, its recruiting operations by the Air Guard has changed adding storefront locations to match the recruiting force trained, combat experienced, and doubly doubly and experienced, combat trained, the to skills civilian our bring we as qualified communities local our of aid the to and fight strikes. disaster when Today’s Guard. National accessible and evant, 21 the member, Guard moment’s a at deploy to available be must or home at Nation, the defend to notice are we And less. no expects America abroad. there. always ready, always strategic reserve to an operational force. force. reserve operational an to strategic the fight, way we the way changed have We with work we the way and do business, we National the relevant provide to others—all America needs. that Guard never like united are Guard National Air and volunteers— 444,000 some are We before. - - - . The Air Guard has has Guard Air The . In December 2006, the National December 2006, the National In With the cooperation of the Air Force, Force, Air the of cooperation the With implemented G–RAP, Guard’s Air The ARNG retention continues to be strong strong be to continues retention ARNG Guard National Air $10,000 last year to $15,000 this year. this $15,000 to year last $10,000 are we Indeed, will old. be 370 years Guard to adjusting and evergreen—transforming the new Minutemen. on demands many a from the Guard transformed have We installations. been have liaisons recruiting in-service bases Force Air duty Active 13 at positioned avail more Guard Air the make to worldwide their completed have who Airmen to able serving. continue to want but obligation positive a having already is 2006, April in active 1,800 nearly with recruiting, on impact enlist potential 800 and assistants recruiting service, non–prior service, prior Also, ments. from increased have bonuses affiliation and ARNG along with tuition assistance from the from assistance tuition with along ARNG Bill. G.I. Montgomery commitment. their renew Soldiers ARNG as con Soldiers’ individual bonuses, Retention camaraderie unit and leaders, their in fidence success. this to keys the are operations recruiting traditional its changed to effort an in locations storefront adding by population, the with force recruiting the match made have provisions security post-9/11 as Guard Air to access gain to difficult more it join the Guard. These benefits were further These benefits were theGuard. join fiscal new 2006 as Soldiers for increased year the joining for $20,000 to up willreceive - - - - - . We are espe. We

Between August 2004 and December 2004 and Between August We launchedWe a number of changes in Army National Army Guard National

ndupress.ndu.edu to $15,000 for prior service prior $15,000 for Soldiers who to 5,100. Enlistment and reenlistment bonuses bonuses reenlistment and 5,100. Enlistment $5,000 to fiscal 2005 from grew during year $5,000 from and new recruits $10,000 for 2005, the Army Guard increased the number the increased number Guard 2005, the Army 2,700 to from nationwide recruiters of $2,000 for each referral they provide to a recruiter, provided the prospect meets the enlistment qualifications, is sworn in, and enters basic military training. Launched in December 2005, this con tracted program is currently open to tradi tional Guardsmen, who may receive up to non–prior Service lead that results in an enlistment. G–RAP has been a strong tool in efforts to meet authorized end strength. (G–RAP), where individual Guardsmen who help recruit new members can receive financial incentive for each referral of a fiscal years 2005 and 2006 that account for recent success, including the new Ameri can Soldier advertising campaign and the Guard Recruiting Assistance Program has met 3 consecutive months of recruiting goals since 2003. the first quarter since 1993 that the Guard has exceeded its enlistment objectives for this period of the year and the first time it Guard has exceeded its enlistment goal by signing up 13,466 recruits, achieving 106.8 percent of its goal of 12,605. This marks cially encouraged by our first quarter 2006 recruiting efforts. The Army National the National Guard, we are making consider making are we Guard, National the end authorized our attaining in progress able and Guard Army the for 350,000 of strength Guard. Air the for 106,800 incentives, and changing the ways we market market we ways the changing and incentives,

133 Airlift Wing (John Wiggins) (John Wing Airlift d Reservists conducting tactical training in F–16s m ru o f jfq

An Unrivaled Wingman Air Force Reserve Vision

By J ohn A . B radle y

Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, USAFR, is Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command.

18 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Bradley

Lt Gen John A. Bradley, Commander, Air Force Reserve Command jfq

f o ru

U.S. Air Force (Jim Varhegyi) m

agile and adaptable foes. The Department of Defense is responding by restructuring its forces to defend the homeland and execute the war on terror. In turn, the Air Force will recap- italize, modernize, and transform its organizational structures to become more lean, lethal, and agile—a rebalanced Total Force that will focus on the warfighter. The scope and nature of today’s challenges are shaping our organizational constructs, defining our roles and missions, altering our participation expectations, and affecting the type of people we recruit and retain. Because the Air Force Reserve is often tightly integrated with the Active Component, it can be difficult to distinguish between Reserv- ists and their Active duty counterparts. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General

Combat Camera Squadron (Jacob N. Bailey)

st Richard Myers, USAF, said, “It is almost impos-

1 sible to tell a Reservist from an Active duty servicemember, so many Active duty personnel don’t know how much the force depends on Citizen Soldiers.” This was a great compli- ince its establishment in Decem- Mission ment, but it highlights the problem Reserve An Unrivaled Wingman ber 1948, the Air Force Reserve The Air Force Reserve mission is the Components have when asked to validate their (AFR) has steadily grown from same as that of the U.S. Air Force: to defend contribution to the fight. S a standby force using outdated the United States and its global interests—to It is important that senior leaders aircraft to a highly experienced, fully engaged fly and fight in air, space, and cyberspace. appreciate just what the 76,000 dedicated AFR Air Force Reserve Vision force operating cutting-edge equipment. We Similarly, the AFR purpose, as derived from members have contributed and the capabilities frequently provide unique capabilities for Title 10, U.S. Code, is to provide combat-ready they possess. Not only is the Air Force Reserve significantly less than the cost of a full-time units and individuals for Active duty when- fully engaged in the war on terror, but it has force and have enjoyed tremendous success ever there are not enough trained units and also provided critical responses to natural through modernized equipment and organi- people in the Active Component to perform a disasters, such as the tsunami in East Asia and zational improvements. We will sustain these national security mission. hurricanes in the Gulf states. successes by addressing a growing number The United States no longer faces a As a percentage of the total Air Force of challenges that threaten the ability of our single monolithic threat as it did during the requirement, the AFR in fiscal year 2005 Reservists to contribute efficiently and effec- Cold War. The threats now are multiple and made the contributions shown in the accom- tively to national defense. ambiguous, and they emanate from highly panying table.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 19 AN UNRIVALED WING M A N : A I R F O RCE RESERVE VISI O N

Percentage of U.S. Air Force Freedom, while F–16s from the 482d Fighter another to sustain that level of daily opera- Requirements Performed by the Wing (Homestead AFB, Florida), the 419th tional support over the long haul. The Com- Air Force Reserve Fighter Wing (Hill AFB, Utah), and the 301st mission on the National Guard and Reserve Mission Area Percentage Fighter Wing (Naval Air Station Joint Reserve addressed this issue in its 90-day interim of Requirements Base, Fort Worth, Texas) supported Operation report to Congress, finding that “a balance Weather Reconnaissance 100 Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, Reserve Litening between the use of the Reserve Components Advanced Targeting pods with their precision as an operational and as a strategic Reserve, as Aerial Spray 100 engagement capability, which enabled the necessary to meet national security objectives, m Aeromedical Evacuation 60 strike on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s hideout, are must be achieved, and the Reserve Compo- Strategic Airlift 43 deployed and flown on both Active duty and nents must be tasked, organized, trained, Tanker Support 23 Reserve A–10 and F–16 aircraft. equipped, and funded accordingly.” ru Personnel Recovery 23 Disaster Relief. Reservists, many of Add to this concern the program budget Theater Airlift 21 whom lost their own homes during Hurri- decisions directing a 10 percent reduction in o Intelligence 20 canes Katrina and Rita, provided disaster relief personnel, plus base realignment and closure f Flying Training 14 by moving over 2,700 tons of cargo, as well (BRAC) mandates that directly impact over

Special Operations 10 as evacuating 5,800 storm victims and 2,600 6,000 Reservists, and the solutions become Bomber 8 patients. Reserve recovery teams were credited more complex. Finally, with implementation of with 1,045 rescues. The 920th Rescue Squadron 20 Total Force integration initiatives intended (Patrick AFB, FL), flying HH–60 helicopters, to streamline and integrate the force further, jfq was the first unit in the air and saw 187 people the number of challenges grows exponentially. The Air Force Reserve has fought forest rescued in a single 12-hour mission by 1 crew. Setting a clear direction for the Air Force fires with C–130s equipped with the modular That same wing provided flawless search and Reserve, and identifying critical Reserve Com- airborne firefighting system, flown Noble Eagle rescue support for the space shuttle Discovery ponent attributes to military and civilian lead- combat air patrols with its fighters, tankers, and saved 24 lives, including the high-profile ership, are vital to the future viability and effi- and airborne warning and control system recovery of a Navy SEAL team in Afghanistan. ciency of the force. To address the avalanche crews, and controlled satellites and unmanned After Hurricane Katrina, the 910th Airlift of approaching challenges, we have developed aerial systems all around the globe. Moreover, Wing (Youngstown Air Reserve Base, Ohio) an AFR Vision, a significant undertaking that it was the sole provider of weather reconnais- deployed three specialized spray C–130s, identifies strengths and issues throughout our sance (hurricane hunters) and aerial spraying unique to the Air Force Reserve, to provide Reserve Component and across the Reserve’s capability, which was so vital in preventing the aerial spraying for mosquito control over the major commands. The realization of this spread of disease after Hurricane Katrina. affected areas. They treated over 2.9 million vision will ensure unity of force as we allocate Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) Par- acres—an area almost the size of Connecticut. resources and implement changes. ticipation. AFR fighter packages continue to These were remarkable contributions from the The vision begins by recognizing that flow into the AEF cycle, and expeditionary Air Force Reserve, whose $3.9 billion cost is we are all part of a single team, fighting as a combat support personnel continue to meet only 4 percent of the Air Force budget. unified force. We share the same priorities and a wide range of requirements, from security goals, and this team spirit goes to the heart forces to truck drivers. A–10s from the 926th The Challenge of providing the best possible support to the Fighter Wing (New Orleans) and 442d Fighter It is one thing to employ a force designed Wing from Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), as a strategic Reserve in a surge capacity and Missouri, deployed to Operation Enduring

Medics remove patient transported from Ramstein Air Force Base in Air Force Reserve C–141 U.S. Air Force (Doug Moore) U.S. Air Force

20 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Bradley

Air Force and its joint partners—flying and assured access to AFR personnel. Although Reserve members cannot volunteer, Active fighting as an unrivaled wingman. mobilization has traditionally been the Air Force members are left to manage the Flying and fighting as one Air Force approved mechanism that guarantees the use requirement. If Active duty does not have the means that we function as a more unified of Reserve personnel and equipment, recent personnel to cover the need, they must turn force. We will: policies have restricted the use of the mobiliza- back to the Reserve Component and invoke tion process. the mobilization process to meet the shortfall. n integrate at all levels of war, providing The Services are adjusting to these new There are valid reasons for certain extended jfq flexible, tailored, and adaptive ways to fight policies by looking for ways to further enable tours (such as the need for leadership posi- alongside other air components and encourage Reserve participation through tions), but when possible, it is best to provide n populate Air Force equipment, cockpits, volunteerism. Several of our vision aimpoints Reserve units with basic requirements and and ramps to serve the mission best, focusing are designed specifically to enhance volunteer- allow them to determine the best way to meet f less on who owns the equipment and more on ism and minimize mobilization, and are pre- the tasks. This flexibility is critical to the maximizing warfighter effects mised on the Air Force Reserve remaining as Reserve’s ability to provide voluntary support. o n provide the most motivated, ethical, operationally engaged in the foreseeable future More flexibility almost always equates to ru trained, and experienced Airmen in the world. as it was during the past 3 years. more support being provided by the Reserve. We have settled on six Challenges clearly aimpoints, which are subsets of m indicate that the future force integration is perhaps the most significant reason the basic AFR vision and serve requires lean, flexible orga- we have today’s operational capabilities to guide our decisionmaking nizations, constructed to across a broad array of issues: support and quickly adapt to current and emerging n Operational in Peace and missions. The Air Force Reserve will always A major challenge to the Air Force War: enhancing and enabling the key attri- train to the same standards as the Active Reserve functioning as an operational butes that make the AFR operational in peace Component. It will always strive to maintain Reserve is effective participation in the Air and war parity in equipment with the other Air Force Expeditionary Force. We always encour- n Clear Participation Expectations: elimi- components. It will always remain accessible, age members to participate in the AEF and nating disconnects between what is required flexible, and combat ready. other contingency deployments and urge and what is expected combatant commanders to reverse the trend n Proactive Force Planning: optimizing Operational Reserve of mandating longer stays in-theater before ways to employ our force and advocating pro- As we learn to sustain an operational rotating Reservists. Mandatory tour lengths cesses and improvements that make everyone Reserve, we will need to derive ways to are increasingly hitting 120 days or longer, more combat effective provide that support with minimal mobiliza- making them difficult for Reservists to fill. If tion. Accordingly, one of the fundamental concerns of some policymakers is achieving

Oregon Army National Guardsmen board KC–135 from Illinois Air National Guard to support hurricane relief in Louisiana

Pennsylvania Air Force Reservists pilot a C-130 over Southwest Asia

U.S. Air Force (Ruby Zarzyczny) U.S. Air Force ( Lance Cheung) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 21 AN UNRIVALED WING M A N : A I R F O RCE RESERVE VISI O N

n Leveraged Community F–22A refuels from KC–135R from Connections: connecting to our 916th Air Refueling Wing, Operation communities, not just tying to them, Noble Eagle and leveraging these connections to maximize participation over a lifetime of military and civilian service U.S. Air Force (Shane Dunaway) U.S. Air Force n Flexibility in Participation: organizing participation options to maxi- m mize combat readiness n Combat Ready: preparing not only to come alongside but also to take the lead as our ru needed. people to meet o Operational in Peace and War or exceed f We will organize and operate as a vari- those Recent legislative

able force. We are committed to being an oper- expectations. changes to encourage ational force because the Air Force has more To encourage Total Force integration missions than the Active Component has volunteerism, we and engagement have helped forces to support. While the Air Force Reserve will work to ensure seamless current participation levels to jfq is not a full-time force, Reservists stand shoul- transfer between Service com- continue. These changes include: der to shoulder with the Active force executing ponents, Reserve subcomponents, essential missions every day. and participation statuses. As we n modifying the stated purpose In the future, many of us, as individu- move forward, we fully expect that of the Reserve Components to reflect als and units, will engage in daily operations minimum annual participation require- the operational mission, responsibilities, while others remain in reserve. The mix of ments for many members of the Ready and contributions of the Guard and Reserve Reservists who are engaged and in reserve Reserve may include more than training. more accurately will change rapidly in response to surges and Because we are looking to the Ready n eliminating the restriction on using shortfalls in national defense requirements. Reserve, we will look to our Individual Federal civil service military leave for military Accordingly, we will take organizational, Ready Reserve (IRR) subcomponent for technicians personnel, and other actions needed to increased participation. The IRR is an n lifting the 179-day military personnel ensure that we function smoothly as a vari- integral Ready Reserve asset consisting of appropriation restriction to allow Guard and able force. previously trained individuals we can use Reserve members to serve up to 3 years of Volunteerism is the attribute that enables in either a voluntary or nonvoluntary status duty without counting against Active duty end an operational force and is the hallmark of the whenever there are not enough trained and strength. AFR participation. Our members are already ready members in the selected Reserve. IRR volunteering to support daily operations and volunteers can be matched against current On the heels of these successes, the national emergencies for long periods and requirements and be provided necessary Department of Defense is considering new in high numbers. We will do everything to training and equipment. legislative, policy, and procedural changes enhance and facilitate their ability to serve We recognize retirees as another source aimed at further improving volunteerism. on Active duty, while protecting their civilian to fill the ranks of volunteers in an operational These legislative initiatives are building commitments. Reserve. While this group has never been on the Total Force concept that began in Tomorrow’s Reserve will continue to involuntarily mobilized and can be called up the 1970s. Force integration is perhaps provide significant and sustained voluntary only under full mobilization authority, it can the most significant reason we have operational support to the Air Force on a daily be used on a voluntary basis to support daily today’s operational capabilities. The Air and ongoing basis. Our brand of volunteerism Air Force operations. Force, ahead of the Defense Department, expects Airmen to serve more than required. To enhance service further, we will need embraced the integration of the Reserve to relieve tension between mandating duty and and Air National Guard in all matters of Clear Expectations volunteerism. The future Air Force Reserve planning, programming, equipping, and Each Airman will understand his or will reduce this stress through participation training. The contribution of the Reserve her participation expectations. The sustained practices that allow members to maximize Components has gradually increased to missions of the Air Force require significantly their effectiveness during the time they are where they provide most or all the capabil- more manpower than is available by those in uniform, thus focusing on what makes ity in such mission areas as weather recon- simply performing their minimum duty. Airmen passionate about service. Telecom- naissance (hurricane hunters), aerial spray, Service policy already enables, encourages, muting, alternative training assemblies, and firefighting, and aeromedical evacuation. and supports Reserve volunteerism whenever aligning annual tours with Active Component The challenge is to move beyond current possible, but we are setting the bar even mission needs are examples of practices we Total Force thinking to sustain an operational higher for voluntary participation and expect will expand. Reserve. This process began in earnest when

22 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu

jfq forum

Combat Camera Squadron (Ricky A. Bloom) A. (Ricky Squadron Camera Combat 1 st - - - - - 23 - - con

Bradley JFQ /

onnections C quarter 2006 th ers will remain the primary primary the remain will ers their for providing of means to family and community, community, and family to set to continue will what con their is apart Reservists outside employers to nection most For Force. Air the employ civilian Reservists, 43, 4 43, ommunity ommunity C issue to our communities—we will be communities—we our to . If we are connected to a community, a community, to connected are we . If To achieve our goals, we will not simply simply will we goals, not our achieve To The impact on the relationship between between relationship the on impact The ties shares Component Active the While tied everaged everaged families. Without employer support, many many support, employer Without families. volunteer from discouraged be may members be will it future, the of force Reserve the In ing. employers keep to ways new identify to critical expectations. service on informed be nected ties, and continue to serve in a more predict more a in serve to continue and ties, of change Permanent environment. able cover to Services allow not does policy station personnel, part-time of expenses relocation to decision a with faced are Reservists so cross-train community, new a to commute no case, worst the in or, specialty, new a into Recruiting Reserve The participate. longer readi and recruiting with concerned is Service pro the from result will that challenges ness closures. and realignments, moves, unit posed doubly is communities their and Reservists the leverages Force Air the because important connections. community of value L ------Undertaking new missions will require require will missions new Undertaking challenge planning force immediate An We strive to strike balance between a to strive We left the Active duty lifestyle to provide a more more a provide to lifestyle duty Active the left community establish situation, family stable is dealing with the changes under BRAC, BRAC, under changes the with dealing is person AFR 6,000 to up displace will which understand counterparts duty Active Our nel. expected an is years 3 to 2 every moving that however, Reservists, Many career. their of part ability of personnel within a recruiting area area a recruiting within personnel of ability the mission, to practical support offers that the mission of the compatibility evaluate Reserve with tempo service, operations and man the overall of the affordability consider requirement. power existing use we how about decisions bold alloca resource a develop will We resources. prioritized a as serve will that strategy tion train, organize, to us enables that blueprint equip. and mission and location to address where our our where address to location and mission realistically serve. can con members When pro to best suited are that missions sidering the avail assess we capability, combat ducing - - the Air Force Reserve benefits from the continual

interplay between Reservists’ civilian and military lives

The future demands demands future The Given the nature of the challenges challenges the of nature the Given it must operate in a joint environ joint a in operate must it affordable. be must it the Total Force must be adaptable to to adaptable be must Force Total the Active, the among seamless be must it Rescue Squadron training off Djibouti n n n n th ndupress.ndu.edu Air Force Reserve pararescuemen from 304 process and programmed over 90 percent of of percent 90 over programmed and process initiatives. Force Total II Phase and I Phase the capabilities the Air Force needs. We will tailor tailor will We needs. Force Air the capabilities flex and smart, lean, be to organizations our corporate the engaged already have We ible. Component in operationally important war important operationally in Component we support, this provide To missions. fighting combat the produce to resources our apply will Proactive Force Force Proactive Planning Active the support we that Force ready to fly and fight fight and fly to ready Force effectively. and efficiently that we keep the Air Force Reserve both lean lean both Reserve Force Air the keep we that strengths its enabling edge, leading the on and Air entire the keep help to General Moseley outlined, it is imperative imperative is it outlined, Moseley General ment—not only in what is purchased but also also but purchased is what in only ment—not thinks and speaks, fights, it way the in equally adaptable to unknown applications unknown to adaptable equally Components Reserve and Guard, today’s, as well as tomorrow’s, fight—and fight—and tomorrow’s, as well as today’s, General T. Michael Moseley, Air Force Chief Chief Force Air Moseley, Michael T. General the and ahead way the on commented Staff, of future: Force’s Air the drive will that points four AN UNRIVALED WING M A N : A I R F O RCE RESERVE VISI O N

we can draw from it and positively feed into We will unify and align because it allows experience as more than time spent in the it, while being tied to a community may lead the Air Force to leverage resources better Active Component; it will encompass all duty to being restrained by it. We will never take where it makes sense, whether in an equip- performed, regardless of type. for granted the role families and civilian ment-constrained or a people-constrained If the pool of people leaving the Active employers play in enabling our members to environment. We will continue a human Component shrinks, the Air Force Reserve serve. resource policy that is not based on “up or will stand ready to enlist and train first-term We will improve existing community out,” thus allowing qualified individuals to Airmen from the community. If we cannot links to develop good family-employer- continue performing where their contribu- access experience from people with prior m Reserve connections. This triad will remain tions will be greatest. We will implement a service, we must be prepared to develop our central to our identity. It is an enabler that “lifetime of service” human resource strategy own experience. will allow our people to train, participate, and that gives us the flexibility to task members, In coming years, a number of mission ru volunteer, and it fosters support when mobili- maximize Active duty participation, and allow related factors will require the Air Force zation is necessary. Reserve to increase modestly o We will value how civil- and remix its full-time support f ian and military experience manpower. The future requires

complement each other. The if we cannot access experience a greater operations tempo than Air Force Reserve benefits from people with prior service, we must can realistically be supported from the continual interplay develop our own experience strictly on a part-time basis. An between Reservists’ civilian influx of first-term Airmen will jfq and military lives. One evolves increase the need for full-time with the other. This synergy is critical, making service that is consistent with members’ abili- trainers and management activities. members better employees and Airmen as we ties and passions. Our goal is to maximize Air Force mature and grow. Our resource strategies will allow combat capability by using the appropriate The command will seek maximum members to stay in place longer and build flexible, tailored, and adaptive organizational flexibility in balancing existing versus future experiences. This model creates force manage- constructs. We will never forget that we are a manning requirements. It will pursue legisla- ment challenges for the Air Force Reserve, drill-based force. tive changes to provide relief to Reservists but it also provides seasoned and experienced Maintaining combat readiness for affected by BRAC in the areas of transition assets to the Air Force. Thus, we will optimize an operationally engaged force is a major assistance, relocation allowances, veteran’s the fact that our members are geographic- concern. Program Budget Decision 720 directs benefits, and health care. Reservists will be centric but work to minimize the effect that a reduction of over 7,700 manpower positions, offered new opportunities in emerging mis- has on managing the force. 10 percent of the total AFR force. The recent sions, such as the unmanned aerial systems personnel and budget cuts have forced our and air operations centers, as well as Total Combat Ready programmers and strategic planners to scru- Force Integration opportunities, such as the The Air Force Reserve will train, acti- tinize every mission area and program while Fighter Associate Program and participation vate, and fight—in that order. To enable that, ensuring the force is combat-ready and pre- in Active/Reserve Associate units. the paths to leadership must be open to the pared to fill the requirements of the combatant best and most capable, regardless of status. commander. Flexible Participation We will provide deserving Reservists access We will deliver the best personnel and to developmental opportunities so they can The contributions of the Air Force equipment to the mission, whatever the fight. compete for increased leadership responsibili- Reserve to national defense are monumental. Reserve flexibility adds strength to the Air ties, including command. As the Reserve team strives to sustain this Force and brings trained people to combat. Our developmental paths will involve level of support for the long haul—becoming Because the future Reserve depends on flex- cross-flow between staff and field assignments more adaptable, better trained, and more fully ibility to maximize resources, we will meet Air to broaden the development of future leaders. equipped—we will continue to meet the chal- Force mission requirements with volunteers We will foster high degrees of innovation and lenges of the new environment. We will con- first. For this to succeed, the future Air Force flexibility in structuring the AFR leadership tinue to seek new opportunities that are right Reserve must have stability, flexibility, and development programs. for our members and recognize the delicate individualized control of its programmed The Air Force Reserve will continue as balance between Reservists, their families, and resources. a primary source for retaining people with their employers. Because we share the same Federal Active Component experience. It will persist We want everyone to recognize the mission as the Active Component, our force in offering opportunities that appeal to those vital role our dedicated Airmen and their has the same goals and objectives. Accordingly, leaving full-time service but who want to families play in the defense of the Nation. By we will unify and align our resources with the remain part of the Air Force. remembering that we are One Air Force in the other Air Force components into the most We will leverage and develop the Same Fight, we will draw closer to fulfilling the combat-effective, flexible, adaptive, and tai- strengths of a diverse force and train leaders vision of providing the best possible support lored unified organizations possible—regard- to recognize and employ those strengths to to the Air Force and joint partners—flying and less of who owns the bases or facilities. maximize combat readiness. We will define fighting as an unrivaled wingman. JFQ

24 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Congratulations to f R E E d o m Awar d R ecipie n t s 2006 Freedom Award AgCountry Farm Credit Services Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America Baptist Health Winners BNSF Railway Company Cardi’s Furniture Superstores Commonwealth of Massachussetts Computer Sciences Corporation DuPont Fred Fletemeyer Company MGM Mirage Skyline Membership Corporation South Dakota Game, Fish and Parks Starbucks Corporation State of Vermont he National Defense University Sun Valley General Improvement District Foundation recognizes the 2005 2001 current and past winners of the Secretary of Defense Employer Alticor, Inc. BAE SYSTEMS T Citizens Financial Group Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Support Freedom Award. This honor is Eaton Corporation Southwest Airlines presented by the Department of Defense to Enterprise Rent-A-Car The Boeing Company IDACORP The City of Bedford, Virginia employers who support the Employer Support Los Angeles Police of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) Program. Department 2000 The United States shares nearly half Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections American Express of its men and women in uniform with over selection committee composed of the Assistant Pioneer Financial Services, Inc. Framatome Connectors 115,000 other “bosses,” the civilian employers Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Ryland Homes USA, Inc. Sears, Roebuck and Co. Intel Corporation of National Guardsmen and Reservists. While ESGR National Chairman, and representa- South Dakota State University Midwest Express Airlines Federal law provides very strict protections for tives of the U.S. Department of Labor, the State of Delaware Technology Concepts & Toyota Motor Sales, USA Inc. Design, Inc. civilian employment, the knowledge that their U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National USAA Wachovia Corporation civilian employer supports and appreciates Federation of Independent Business, the 1999 their military service is a major consideration Society for Human Resource Management, 2004 British Nuclear Fuels Limited, in a National Guardsman’s or Reservist’s deci- and the Reserve Components, select as many Inc. Adolph Coors Co. sion to continue to serve. as 15 employers as recipients from over 1,000 General Fire and Safety American Express Co. Equipment Company, Inc. In 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin nominations. Bank One Corp. Hitchiner Manufacturing Colt Safety Fire & Rescue Laird established Employer Support of the Recipients have demonstrated their Company, Inc. General Electric Co. Kaiser Permanente Northwest Guard and Reserve to promote cooperation “above and beyond” support by making up the Harley-Davidson, Inc. The State of Louisiana The Home Depot and understanding between Reserve Compo- difference in income for deployed Guardsmen Los Angeles County Sheriff’s nent members and their civilian employers and Reservists, continuing health insurance Department 1998 The State of Minnesota and to assist in the resolution of conflicts and other benefits, and providing paid military Northrop Grumman Corp. American Airlines arising from an employee’s military commit- leave. Not all above and beyond support has Onesource Building American Family Mutual Technologies, a subsidary Insurance Company ment. To thank employers whose support to an economic pricetag. Recipients have helped of Fisk Corp. CSX Transportation employees serving in the Reserve Components their deployed employees by sending care Saints Memorial Medical Portland Police Bureau Center Wiremold Company went “above and beyond” what was required packages and phone cards, offering to baby- Strategic Solutions, Inc. by Federal law, Secretary of Defense William sit so that the deployed employee’s spouse Sprint Corp. 1997 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Cohen created the Secretary of Defense can take care of family business, recognizing Charles Machine Works Employer Support Freedom Award in 1996. employees’ Guard and Reserve service in the 2003 East Penn Manufacturing The Freedom Award is the Department of workplace, and simply keeping in communica- Co., Inc. Central Atlantic Toyota Entec Services, Inc. Defense’s most prestigious award for employer tion with the employees and their families Distribution Center Fred Meyer, Inc. support. during the deployment. D.H. Griffin Wrecking Co., Inc. Home Depot Southeastern Miller Brewing Company Division ESGR only accepts nominations for the Freedom Award nominations can be PG&E Corporation Freedom Award from National Guardsmen, made online at www.esgr.mil during January Tyson Foods, Inc. 1996 Reservists, and their families. Each year, a and February each year. 2002 McDonnell-Douglas Corporation Autoliv, Inc. National Life of Vermont General Dynamics Land Schneider National, Inc. Systems Tektronix, Inc. Public Service Co. of New United Parcel Service, Central Hampshire Florida District State of Wyoming United Parcel Service Airlines

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 25 M A R I N E F O RCES RESERVE IN TRANSITI O N Marine Forces Reserve in Transition m By J ohn W . B er g man

for years to come. When Hurricanes Katrina ru and Rita battered the Gulf Coast, for instance, As tactics and equipment evolve, our Marine Forces Reserve found itself in the o readiness for future challenges must be main- unusual position of being a part of both the f he last 5 years have demon- tained. Reserve ground combat units, avia- evacuation and the relief efforts. Because of strated that the Marine Corps tion squadrons, and combat service support these storms, Marine Forces Reserve Headquar-

q Reserve is a full partner in the elements are able to integrate with their ters was forced to evacuate the New Orleans Total Force Marine Corps. Active Component comrades in any Marine area and set up temporary command cells in f T Marine Forces Reserve remains commit- air ground task force environment because Texas and Georgia. From these locations we j ted to the rapid and efficient activation of they are held to identical training standards. managed the mobilization and deployment combat-ready ground, air, and logistics Marine Reserve units train to the same of units to the affected areas to support relief units, as well as individuals, to augment uncompromising warfighting standards as our efforts. Some Reservists were serving in their and reinforce the Active Component in the Active Component forces, complementing, own devastated communities. After what war on terror. Marine Corps Reserve units, augmenting, and reinforcing them as needed. amounted to nearly a 3-month deployment, the Individual Ready Reserve Marines, and Indi- This training ensures that these combat headquarters elements returned to New Orleans vidual Mobilization Augmentees fill critical capable units undergo a seamless transition and resumed normal operations. requirements in our nation’s defense and have to the gaining force commander. Moreover, As a rule, the Selected Marine Corps deployed to countries such as Afghanistan, a strong inspector-instructor system and a Reserve, with its force structure comple- Djibouti, the Georgian Republic, Iraq, and demanding mobilization and operational menting the Active operating force in its Kuwait to support all aspects of the war on readiness deployment test program ensure traditional “augment and reinforce” mission,

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ruben D. Maestre) terror. At home, our Reserve Marines are that Reserve units achieve a high level of pre- has served the Nation well. Our Reserve rests prepositioned throughout the country, ready mobilization readiness. on that mission and is keen to do its part in to assist with civil-military missions. We have seen historic and tragic events times of peril. However, we are conscious U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Samantha L. Jones) that have impacted our country and Marine of how changes in key drivers—such as the Forces Reserve in ways that will reverberate Quadrennial Defense Review, the Marine Corps’ own Capabilities Assessment Group, recent operational employment patterns, Background photo: Marine Reservists assigned to II MEF prepare for convoy operation in Iraq and Service expectations of the Reserve—are bound to demand adjustments in Reserve Inset photos top to bottom: 1st Marine missions and roles. Logistics Group providing support to joint Servicemembers in Iraq; LtGen Total Force in Action John Bergman, USMCR, and MajGen Reserve Marines understand the price Douglas O’Dell, USMC, discuss Gulf Coast relief operations; Navy corpsman of protecting our constitutional freedoms. for Marine Corps Reserve scout sniper Even though some have paid the ultimate platoon taking marksmanship training price in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, others continue to step forward and volunteer to serve. The Marine Reserve remains strong and constant due to the committed Marines in its ranks, high recruiting and retention rates, and the ever-increasing benefits that Reserve Marines and their fami-

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Frans E. Labranche) lies enjoy. The Marine Corps adheres to a Total Force construct, which standardizes and U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Randy Bernard) integrates an Active Component of 175,000 Lieutenant General John W. Bergman, USMCR, is Commander, Marine Forces Reserve. and a Reserve Component of 39,600. Today’s

26 JFQ / issue 43, 4thth quarterquarter 20062006 ndupress.ndu.edu Bergman

Reserve is comprised of 32,380 Marines in The capacity of Reserves to augment and from military-to-civilian conversions and the selected drilling units from across America, reinforce the Active force in such operations, disestablishment or reorganization of units over 7,200 augmentees, and nearly 58,000 and to provide unique capabilities such as civil with capabilities in low demand. Ready Reserve Marines, who provide a pool of affairs, reinforces the utility, flexibility, and One recommendation of the review individual capabilities that can be drawn on to strength of the Total Force Marine Corps. group was to assign a secondary civil-military augment the selected or Active Component. operations (CMO) mission to the Corps’ artil- As of May 2006, over 6,700 Reserve Sustainment lery regiments and battalions. This should j Marines have been activated in support of Given that 97 percent of Reserve units serve to provide a CMO focal point within f

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi have been activated since 2001, how can Marine each division, which was previously a mission q Freedom as well as Horn of Africa operations. Forces Reserve ensure continued sourcing of of the Civil Affairs Groups. According to Of these Reservists, 5,100 were serving in units in support of the Long War? Even though General Michael Hagee, Commandant of the f combat-proven ground, aviation, and service we have activated most units, we are constantly Marine Corps, “While we recognize that every support units led by Reserve officers and bringing new Marines into the Reserve at a Marine unit must be able to conduct CMO, o noncommissioned officers. The remain- rate of 20 to 25 percent per year. This, along the Marine Corps requires a designated unit ru ing 1,600+ were serving as augmentees in with dedicated Citizen Marines who continue that is staffed and trained to lead CMO in the support of combatant commanders, the Joint to volunteer, provides continued capability to division’s battlespace.” Staff, and the Marine Corps. Since Septem- augment and reinforce the Active Component. This statement illustrates the Corps’ ber 11, 2001, the Corps has activated over An important source of Reserve Marines overall effort to adapt techniques, tactics, m 39,000 Reserve Marines and 97 percent of all is those who transition from the Active to the and procedures to respond in irregular wars Reserve units. Reserve Component. While we currently do in urban environments against asymmetric Recent examples of the augmenting and not see a downward trend in recruitment of enemies. For Marine Forces Reserve, this new reinforcing capability of the Reserve abound: these Marines, it is important that we keep this CMO mission for artillery units allows even valuable pipeline open. To that end, a recent greater interoperability between force- and n Two Reserve infantry battalions (2d innovation is the Mobilization Deferment division-level units. Two standing Civil Affairs Battalion, 23d Marines of Encino, California, Program, available to both enlisted Marines Groups will each be responsible for supporting and 2d Battalion, 25th Marines from Garden and officers. Under this program, Marines two artillery regiments. When this program City, New York) were promptly mobilized to transitioning to the Reserve Component are reaches operational capability, we will have support defense of the homeland in the imme- eligible for an involuntary mobilization defer- exponentially increased our ability to conduct diate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. ment upon their affiliation with a selected CMO across the battlefield and given the n In 2003, these same Marines, plus two unit. To be eligible, Marines must have com- ground commander a ready pool of in-house additional units (3d Battalion, 23d Marines pleted a deployment in support of Enduring CMO warriors to accomplish his mission. of New Orleans, Louisiana, and 1st Battalion, Freedom or Iraqi Freedom in the 12 months As new warfighting requirements have 24th Marines of Detroit, Michigan), shifted to prior to their end of Active service. The emerged, we have adapted our capabilities major combat operations and participated in deferment is good for 24 months from their with an eye toward reinforcing these high- the drive to Baghdad. service end. This program should alleviate the demand, low-density units in the Marine n The 25th Marine Regiment further sup- apprehension those Marines might have about Corps Reserve. Examples include the former ported Marine Corps global requirements involuntary mobilization, providing a power- 8th Tank Battalion in Rochester, New York, when their First Battalion (out of Worcester, ful incentive to “stay Marine.” transitioning to become the core of a new Massachusetts) deployed to Okinawa, Japan. Anti-Terrorism Battalion, and an Intelligence n Marines of Detachment A of the 4th Transformation Support Battalion in Mobile, Alabama, being Assault Amphibian Battalion fought in Iraq in Since the war on terror began, it has transformed to consolidate Reserve intel- 2003, then used their unique amphibious lift become necessary for the Marine Corps ligence assets. capabilities to rescue fellow citizens in Gulf- Reserve to increase support for operations Most recently, changes under the Marine port, Mississippi, hours after Katrina made against the backdrop of a rapidly changing Aviation Transition Strategy have identi- landfall in 2005. world environment accented by asymmetrical fied realignments within 4th Marine Aircraft n Members of Marine Light Attack Heli- warfare and continuing hostilities. Wing. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 134 copter Squadron 773 from Marietta, Georgia, In 2004, the Corps conducted an exten- in Miramar, California, will be deactivated, conducted immediate rescue, relief, and sive Total Force Structure Review (conducted with that unit’s structure going to establish reconnaissance in New Orleans after Katrina by the Force Structure Review Group) recom- two Tactical Air Command Center detach- ravaged that city. mending approximately 15,000 structural ments (one for each coast). These detachments n Civil affairs teams from 3d (Camp Pend- changes to improve the Marine Corps Total will enhance the capabilities of the 2d and 3d leton, California) and 4th (Washington, DC) Force ability to meet the long-term needs of Marine Aircraft Wings. Civil Affairs Groups, along with 5th (Baltimore, the war on terror and the emerging require- In a further nod toward transformation Maryland) and 6th (drawn from 30 states) pro- ments of the 21st century. This effort consisted and realignment, we recently deactivated both visional Civil Affairs Groups, have deployed of end strength and structure-neutral offsets the I and II Marine Augmentation Command to Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003 and have to rebalance the Total Force with increases in Elements. Their structure was realigned to served with distinction and valor. capabilities for high-demand needs coming augmentation detachments that better support ndupress.ndu.edu issueissue 43, 4 th quarter 2006 / JFQ 27 M A R I N E F O RCES RESERVE IN TRANSITI O N

both I and II Marine Expeditionary Force our Reservists to their communities provide each year. The program was conceived by (MEF). This arrangement better serves the an invaluable perspective and sensitivity to former Commandant of the Marine Corps customer (the MEF) by giving him ownership the concerns of officials at the state and local General James L. Jones and is manned by of his individual augmentees. That differs from level and pay great dividends in times of crisis Reserve Marines. For the more than 100 the previous construct in that the MEF was response at home, as we saw during the hur- Hometown Link Reserve Marines in 80 forced to mobilize an entire unit (the Marine ricane response along the Gulf Coast in 2005. cities, “Once a Marine, always a Marine” Augmentation Command Element or parts By combining the duties of Marine Forces is more than a slogan—it is a way of life. thereof) to obtain staffing for surge operations. Reserve and Marine Forces North in one com- These hometown links provide sponsor- m The new system gives the MEF commander mander and staff, we have achieved a reason- ship for transitioning Marines that includes more flexibility in determining his needs, then able balance in the efficient and effective use assistance with employment, education, mobilizing individuals to meet those needs. of headquarters personnel, while dramatically housing, childcare, veteran’s benefits, and ru In another example of transformation, increasing the Corps’ ability to support U.S. other support services, all with an eye toward the 4th Marine Logistics Group has led the Northern Command. ensuring a smooth adjustment to civilian o way within the Total Force Marine Corps in life. To provide this support, the Marine for f developing the Marine Logistics Command Quality of Life Life program taps into a network of former concept. The group is a tactical-level logistic Marine Forces Reserve recognizes the Marines and Marine-friendly businesses,

q capability organized along functional combat strategic role families play in mission readi- organizations, and individuals willing to service support lines. At times, due to the ness, particularly in mobilization prepared- lend a hand to a Marine who has served f expeditionary nature and quick deployment ness. We help families to prepare for day-to- honorably. Career retention specialists and j of forces into a theater, there may be an day military life and the deployment cycle by transitional recruiters help Marines by getting absence of operational logistic support at the providing educational opportunities at unit the word out about the program. Currently, theater level. When that occurs, the logistics family days, predeployment briefs, returns and 8,000 individuals log onto the Web-based command can provide an initial operational or reunions, postdeployment briefs, and through electronic network for assistance each month theater level of logistics. Operational logistics programs such as the Key Volunteer Network (www.m4l.usmc.mil). The program currently links tactical requirements with strategic capa- (KVN) and Lifestyle Insights, Networking, enjoys participation by some 6,100 registered bilities to accomplish operational objectives. Knowledge, and Skills (LINKS). employers and 1,600 registered mentors. A noteworthy addition to the role of At each Reserve training center, the More recently, the program has Reserve forces is the designation of the Com- KVN program ties together the command expanded to provide information, advocacy, mander of Marine Forces Reserve as Com- and family members, providing the family and support for injured Marines and their mander, Marine Forces North, which is the with official communication, information, families. Assistance is available to help these Corps component responsible for supporting and referrals. The Key Volunteers, many the individuals navigate the process from time U.S. Northern Command. Among the duties of parents of young, unmarried Marines, educate of injury through either return to duty or this commander and his staff are antiterrorism families on the military lifestyle and benefits transition to the Veteran’s Administration. programs and force protection responsibilities and enhance the sense of community within Currently, some 330 Marines with disability for Marine Corps installations. Marine Forces the unit. The LINKS program is a spouse- ratings greater than 10 percent are using the North also commands, supports, coordinates, to-spouse orientation service that acquaints program to research disability benefits, chari- and provides advice on the employment of family members with the military lifestyle and table organizations, and adaptive technologies the Corps, including the challenges applicable to their injuries. resulting from deployments. Online the Marine for Life program taps into a and CD–ROM versions of LINKS The Marine Corps Reserve continues to network of former Marines and Marine- make this tool accessible to fami- be a vital part of the Marine Corps Total Force friendly businesses willing to lend a hand to lies of Reservists not located near concept. Reserve Marines are fully dedicated Marine Corps installations. to serving and protecting the Nation now and a Marine who has served honorably Military One Source is another in the future. They have been engaged in the tool that provides Marines and their Long War far longer than many expected and families with around-the-clock have performed admirably. Their continuing Marine Corps forces when attached to U.S. information and referral service for subjects courage, commitment, and dedication to war Northern Command within the latter’s area of such as parenting, childcare, education, fighting excellence, while maintaining close responsibility in order to conduct homeland finances, elder care, health, wellness, deploy- ties to their communities, truly set them apart defense operations and support civilian authori- ment, crisis support, and relocation via toll-free as Citizen Soldiers. They recognize a crucial ties. Hurricane Katrina highlighted the efforts telephone and Internet access. mission and realize that the American people of Marine Forces North to integrate both Active The Corps’ commitment to take care of will continue to expect the most from them and Reserve forces in relief operations. its own includes not only families but also a while continuing to support them. Marine Dual-hatting the commander and staff Marine’s transition from honorable service Forces Reserve will remain a viable part of the also leverages one of the great strengths of the back to civilian life. Initiated in 2002, the well-equipped, well-led, and well-trained Total Reserve: its close contact with communities Marine for Life program supports the 27,000 Force of professionals and warriors that the all across the United States. The ties that bind troops transitioning out of Active service Nation has come to rely on. JFQ

28 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Volunteer Military Organizations An Overlooked Asset j

Photos left to right: Connecticut Militia Governor’s Guard; f Members of the Virginia Defense Force communications unit complete field training exercise at Fort Pickett, Virginia; q Cavalry Troop A of the Maryland Defense Force performs mounted drills at Antietam National Battlefield f o

and then all were activated for World War ru I. However, the prior legislation was a curse Maryland Defense Force and a blessing. With the entire National Guard deployed, states were ill prepared for Therefore, a serious study of expanding the either self-defense or response to natural or m use of legitimate volunteer military organi- manmade contingencies. zations is long overdue. But the mobilization of the National These groups are not new in America and Guard for World War I was not an insur- Virginia Defense Force are divided into state and Federally sponsored mountable problem because 34 states orga- organizations. State-sponsored organizations nized Home Guard or State Guard units as By B rent C . B an k us include State Defense Forces (SDFs) and Naval replacements, allowed under Section 61 of the Militias, while elements such as the U.S. Air National Defense Act of 1916. These volunteer Force Civil Air Patrol and the Coast Guard units used prior service personnel (Spanish- ith the current opera- Auxiliary are sponsored by the Armed Forces. American War and Civil War veterans) as tions tempo for Federal training cadre, performing duties mostly in forces, the availability History a nonpay status. For example, well-trained of manpower for home- From the colonial period through the Home Guard units from Connecticut and W th land security is a major concern. Today’s early 20 century, militia or volunteer units Massachusetts provided valuable manpower, missions are full spectrum: traditional shouldered much of the responsibility for transportation, and medical assets during the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, peace- national defense since the regular, or full-time, Spanish influenza outbreak in 1918.5 Texas keeping in the Balkans and the Sinai, and U.S. military was comparatively small. Militia also organized State Guard cavalry and infan- defense support to civil authorities in hur- units augmenting Active forces sufficed until try regiments to patrol the Mexican border. In ricanes Katrina and Rita. the Spanish-American War in 1898.3 As the all, State Guard units provided an additional President George W. Bush’s National 20th century dawned and the United States 79,000 troops for state duty; however, they Security Strategy makes it clear that “defend- became increasingly involved in overseas were never called up for combat operations in ing our Nation against its enemies is the first operations, decisionmakers began to reassess World War I and were quickly disbanded after and fundamental commitment of the Federal the capabilities of such units. the Armistice.6 Government.”1 With the gradual reduction in Several pieces of landmark legisla- Volunteer military organizations were force and increased deployments, however, tion were passed to enhance the militia especially important early in World War II. commanders are asked to do more with less. (for example, the Dick Act of 1903 and the As with our British colleagues, every available As troops engage in overseas operations, National Defense Act of 1916). Through this resource was used due to the huge mobiliza- for example, they are tasked with additional legislation, the organized militia was renamed tion effort, including Home or State Guard short-notice contingencies that further exac- the National Guard, given the official role of units and the fledgling Coast Guard Auxiliary erbate the problem. America’s second line of defense, and provided and Army Air Force Civil Air Patrol. These Given the needs of the Department Federal funds for training and equipment. latter two elements represented a phenomenon of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Consequently, the Federal Government had a not seen before: volunteer military organiza- Command, the increased use of National better-trained and more capable militia at the tions sponsored by Federal branches of the Guard and Reserve units, and the many and beginning of the 20th century than ever before.4 U.S. military. Nonetheless, World War II varied asymmetrical threats confronting Federal service was quickly tested as represented a high-water mark for the use of the Nation since 9/11, it is questionable most National Guard units were mobilized voluntary military bodies, particularly the whether sufficient forces will be available.2 for the Mexican border campaign in 1916, Home or State Guard. By the fall of 1940, all National Guard Lieutenant Colonel Brent C. Bankus, USA (Ret.), is Senior National Guard Advisor in the Strategic Studies units were again called to Federal service. Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Recognizing the impending dilemma, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 29 V o lunteer m ilitar y o rgani z ati o ns

Photos left to right: Georgia State Defense Force soldiers participate in WMD training; Members of the Washington State Guard attend civil protection training; Members of the 492d Coastal Command conduct patrol training.

rescue, medical, religious, legal, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) naval and air capabilities. SDF search and rescue capabilities

Washington State Guard vary from state to state but routinely include emergency medical technicians and enhanced m search capabilities such as horses and fixed- wing aircraft. The Tennessee SDF, for example, with former Special Forces and Ranger

ru Alaska Defense Force members, has a robust search and rescue orga- serving order, guarding critical industrial sites, nization somewhat modeled after a Special o Georgia State Defense Force preventing or suppressing subversive activities, Forces “A” team. Its members include licensed f and cooperating with Federal authorities. paramedics, civilian structural engineers, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the For example, when National Guard units communications specialists, all both airborne 7 q State Guard Act on October 21, 1940. Con- are mobilized, SDFs often assume control of and scuba qualified, as well as a canine section. sequently, Home Guard units, composed of their armories and assist with their mobiliza- Several SDFs have privately owned f retired or prior service personnel, were again tion.8 The Alaskan SDF also routinely provides fixed-wing aircraft detachments in their force j mobilized in all but four states. They were security for the Alaskan pipeline and the structure. Virginia uses its aircraft extensively charged with protecting critical infrastructure harbors of Anchorage and Whittier, using four as drones for WMD scenarios and assists the sites under the direction of each state adjutant armed patrol craft. With an instructor cadre Virginia Fish and Game Commission by flying general. of current or former state troopers, graduates reconnaissance missions over the Shenandoah Additionally, the Coast Guard Auxiliary of the Alaskan SDF Military Police Academy Valley. While predominantly a ceremonial and the Army Air Corps Civil Air Patrol have the same credentials as Alaskan state organization, the Connecticut SDF has occa- provided value-added assets in the event of troopers. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, sionally used its cavalry detachment for cross- either prolonged air or amphibious attacks Albany utilized the New York Guard Army country search and rescue missions. by submarine. As recently released archives Division’s Military Police Brigade as perimeter The Georgia SDF shares robust chemi- prove, the Axis powers considered both and infrastructure security at Camp Smith cal, biological, radiological, and nuclear and concepts. Regardless, both state and Federal and within New York City. Similarly, Air explosives capabilities with the Centers for volunteer military organizations were valuable Force SDFs in Texas and New York routinely Disease Control and several hospitals in the assets. In fact, the Civil Air Patrol was credited augment base security forces along with Atlanta area. The force has acquired the skills with sinking several German U-boats, and the assisting in administrative duties. In addition of chemists, medical doctors, and other profes- Coast Guard Auxiliary rescued hundreds of to the Coast Guard Auxiliary, Naval Militias sionals to fashion an organization to advise, stranded sailors. add another dimension to state-sponsored assist, and train with the specialized Georgia While there are differences between volunteer military organizations, providing National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction present operations and those in World War waterborne patrol assets for security missions. Civil Support Team.9 II, there are also similarities. During the 2005 With many retired or former National flood season, a substantial portion of the Loui- Guard personnel in their ranks, SDF assets Alternatives to Service siana Army National Guard was unavailable, represent an experienced force knowledgeable The expanded use of volunteer military so state and Federal assets from neighboring in local and state emergency operations poli- organizations provides an opportunity for states were used in disaster recovery. In addi- cies and procedures. The Louisiana SDF, for increasing numbers of citizens to serve in a tion, the Coast Guard Auxiliary, Civil Air instance, provides a team of Soldiers as desk less demanding military environment than the Patrol, and at least five states contributed their officers for each county emergency operations Federal Active or Reserve military. Of those State Defense Forces to the relief effort, and center, consisting of subject matter experts in who enter the Active military, 14 percent leave all indications are that the volunteers were operations and logistics. Being an integral part during the first 6 months and over 30 percent effective. Thus, to prepare for future contin- of the Georgia Department of Defense, the before their first term is complete. Reasons for gencies, regardless of location, the increased Georgia SDF was also active during hurricanes this attrition include inadequate medical and use of volunteer military organizations seems a Katrina and Rita and provided desk officers preentry drug screening. Moreover, recruits common sense approach to provide additional for the National Guard Joint Emergency fail to perform adequately because they are capable assets. Operations Center at Dobbins Air Force Base in poor physical condition for basic training near Atlanta. Local volunteer organizations or lack motivation.10 Routinely, State Guard Civilian Authority Support are indigenous to the area and therefore more units during World War II took advantage of Since homeland security is the major effective than contract forces. National Guard discharges from Active service focus of volunteer military organizations, Today’s volunteer military organizations due to stringent physical standards associated missions may include meeting domestic also provide manpower and specialized exper- with overseas deployments. Approximately emergencies, assisting civil authorities in pre- tise as several SDFs have robust search and 3,400 National Guardsmen were discharged

30 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Bankus prior to deployment, providing trained During 2002, for example, the Georgia exist at all, SDFs and Naval Militias function resources capable of State Guard service.11 SDF contributed more than 1,797 days of at the behest of each Governor and often are Professionals in the legal and medical operational service, saving the state $1.5 million. stifled by being at the mercy of the state adju- fields who desire continued service are finding In 2001, their service saved over $754,000.13 tant general, a political appointee. SDF organizations particularly attractive. As During the 9/11 crisis, the 244th Medical As demonstrated by the 2002 anthrax doctors and lawyers often have their own Detachment of the New York Guard provided attacks against domestic targets, the ease of practices or are part of small consortiums, the medical services not available from other orga- WMD acquisition causes constant question- j prospect of an extended deployment as part of nizations and saved the state $400,000.14 These ing of whether sufficient manpower exists to f a Federal force represents a significant loss of are a few examples that prove that expanding defend against attacks. Information technology q income, if not bankruptcy. Participation in an the use of volunteer military organizations is tampering is also a concern and is increas- SDF represents a viable alternative, as units are economically attractive. Since SDFs possess little ingly difficult to locate and eradicate. The f designed strictly for state service and are not equipment, overhead costs are relatively small. importance of information technology cannot subject to deployments.12 Table 1 provides a comprehensive list of SDFs be overstated, as threats to computer security o and their funding levels. are a great concern. Again, questions regarding ru Border Security Issues sufficient numbers of trained personnel are The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the U.S. Challenges voiced at every level. Customs and Border Protection Service, is While attractive, expanding the use of The lack of codified missions and unit responsible for detecting, interdicting, and SDFs requires resolving several issues, such types impacts SDF doctrine and training. m apprehending those who attempt to enter as the lack of Federal recognition of state- It is essential to have a clearly established the United States illegally or smuggle people sponsored volunteer military organizations. universal task list, approved mission-essen- or contraband, including weapons of mass Although SDFs were designed for state service, tial task list, and associated doctrine. To destruction, across U.S. borders. These the lack of Federal recognition has other effects. date, all 23 SDF organizations offer military boundaries include official ports of entry in 20 First, current laws prohibit SDFs from purchas- training courses but are without established sectors of the United States, both on the north- ing excess Federal field equipment of all types, standards. For example, the Tennessee SDF’s ern border with Canada (4,000–5,000 miles such as uniforms, affecting unit morale. Second, basic noncommissioned officer and basic long) and the southern border with Mexico SDFs lack an active authoritative command officer courses are approved through the U.S. (over 2,000 miles long). Illegal immigration and control headquarters to provide strategic Army Training and Doctrine Command at has received increased attention. Customs direction on unit types, table of distribution Fort Monroe, Virginia. Courses offered by and Border Protection Commissioner Robert and allowances, readiness reporting, missions, the New York Guard Army Division are also Bonner stated that some 10,800 agents cur- training, and personnel policies. Standardizing well organized and designed by former non- rently are in the field, and the U.S. Customs policies and procedures is essential to ensure resident Army Reserve instructors. However, and Border Patrol is exploring the use of vol- interoperability with other state or Federal agen- SDFs are prohibited from participating in unteer organizations as augmentation. cies. Although the National Guard Bureau is some nonresident training (for example, In April 2005, a volunteer civic organiza- the DOD executive agent for SDFs, and though the U.S. Army Command and General Staff tion, the “Minutemen,” conducted a month- National Guard Regulation 10–4 long surveillance along the Arizona-Mexico provides guidelines, the regulation Table 1. State Defense Forces—Army border. These volunteers from various parts lacks authoritative language to State Active budget type Prior Age of the United States provided an “extra set of ensure compliance.15 Strength in $ Unit service range eyes” to the Customs and Border Patrol. Com- Most World War II State Alabama 600 30K Support HQs 75% 22–69 Alaska 274 26.5K–1 Mil Military Police 75% 20–72 missioner Bonner reported that the Minute- Guard units, for instance, were California 500 225K Support HQs 80+% 18–62 men facilitated the apprehension of over 300 modeled after either a light Connecticut 275 0 Infantry/Cavalry 40% 20–60 illegal immigrants with no incidents or threats infantry or military police Georgia 500 0 Infantry 40% 18–64 of vigilantism. The Minutemen were observ- organization. Today, some SDFs Indiana 315 40K Support HQs 70% 21–75 ers only and reported illegal crossings to the mirror that traditional structure, Louisiana 108 0 Admin HQs 96% 50–65 Maryland 194 0 Support HQs 75% 17–70 Border Patrol for action. yet there is substantial derivation Massachusetts 60 0 Admin Det. 60–75% 18–65 of unit types that demonstrates Michigan 130 0 Support HQs 80% 20–70+ Cost Effectiveness a strategic lack of interest. Mississippi 185 0 Infantry 85% 18–78 Since all land SDFs are strictly state orga- Conversely, the Coast Guard New Mexico 200 7K Military Police 75% 18–65 nizations, their operating budgets are compar- Auxiliary and Air Force Civil Air New York 1,200 75K Support HQs 75% 18–65 Ohio 650 14K Military Police 50+% 17–67 atively minimal. Moreover, today’s volunteers Patrol are well established and Oklahoma 28 0 Support HQs 75% 21–75+ receive no pay or allowances for training and seemingly enjoy a better working Oregon 184 0 Infantry 50% 18–65 drill attendance, and, unless called to state relationship with their parent Puerto Rico 1,630 300K Support Det. 30% 16–65 Active duty, mission support is also conducted Federal service. They do not South Carolina 1,500 100K Infantry 45–50% 17–75 in a nonpay status. Even when called to state appear to suffer from the same Tennessee 990 53K Light Infantry 80% 18–70 Texas 1,518 103K Infantry 60% 17–79 Active duty, SDF personnel are paid a rate that fickleness of state politics that Vermont 326 0 Infantry 90% 17–70 is often not commensurate with normal pay affects SDFs and Naval Militias. Virginia 774 0 Light Infantry 70% 18–70 for a Federal force, depending on rank. As state entities, and if allowed to Washington 95 0 Infantry 90% 18–64 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 31 V o lunteer m ilitar y o rgani z ati o ns

College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas).16 To Since SDFs and several Naval Militias are Currently, SDF units operate in 22 educate their officers, then, states such as strictly state supported, partial Federal funding states and Puerto Rico, with another handful California and Georgia enroll their person- should be initiated through the National maintaining a volunteer Naval Militia in nel in the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Guard Bureau and the planning, program- addition to Coast Guard Auxiliary and Air General Staff College. ming, and budgeting system. Some civilian Force Civil Air Patrol units nationwide. A Due to the homeland security focus of organizations (for example, the Citizen Corps volunteer force costs much less to maintain SDFs, another training venue is the Federal and the USA Freedom Corps) already have than a Federal force and provides trained Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) access to Federal funding, and all legitimate personnel for state contingencies. m Web site. In fact, several states require FEMA volunteer military organizations should enjoy In the case of SDFs, their organization courses as a prerequisite for promotion. the same privilege. Trained volunteer organi- and use have too often been an afterthought. Again, however, no standards exist to ensure zations provide manpower and professional From the Mexican border expedition through ru a base level of education in military support services that permit Federal forces to concen- the Korean War, and from the bombing of to civilian authority subjects. Table 2 provides trate on other critical areas. Pearl Harbor to the 9/11 attacks, State and o a comprehensive list of military courses that As the DOD agent for SDFs, the Home Guard use has been a last-minute f SDFs offer. National Guard should be more proactive in reaction to unexpected circumstances. With providing guidance in conjunction with the today’s increase in asymmetric warfare, explor-

q Recommendations Department of the Army and each adjutant ing the use of all existing force structures and Volunteer military organizations are general. Standardization would add further expanding volunteer military organizations f older than the United States itself and have legitimacy to these organizations. Moreover, and SDFs are steps in the right direction. JFQ j proven themselves time and again. Their the National Guard Bureau should have an infrastructure already exists, and the process office staff to handle SDF matters that cannot N o t es works despite political pressures. With the be accomplished as an additional duty. 1 growing concern for securing the homeland, The National Security Strategy of the United common sense should be applied to use these While volunteer military organizations States of America September 2002 (Washington, DC: The White House, Executive Summary). assets to their fullest extent. To do so, several present challenges, evidence suggests that their 2 For more details, see Citizen Corps, available actions are recommended. expanded use makes sense for several reasons. at . Current laws must be changed to grant First, with the current high operations tempo, 3 Edmund Zysk, “Stay Behind Forces for the Federal recognition to state-sponsored SDFs. trained Federal forces are at a premium. By National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?” unpub- Denying volunteer access to basic equipment actively supporting volunteer military organi- lished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Bar- and necessities makes little sense. Also, the lack zations, especially State Defense Forces, Gov- racks, PA, May 1, 1988, 3. of Federal recognition impacts the ability to ernors have an alternative to provide a trained 4 Ibid., 13. tap into existing nonresident military courses. force at least in cadre strength. 5 “U.S. Home Defense Forces Study,” Depart- ment of Defense, Historical Research and Evaluation Table 2. State Defense Forces—Schools Organization, Washington DC, April 27, 1981, 22. 6 Barry M. Stentiford, The American Home Guard: State basic PLDc bNCOC ANcoc sergeant officer officer cGsc ocs Warrant Training Major basic Advanced Officer The State Militia in the Twentieth Century (College Alabama X Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 51. Alaska X X 7 Zysk, 7. California X X X X X X X 8 Department of the Army, National Guard Connecticut X Bureau Regulation 10–4, Washington, DC, Septem- Georgia X ber 21, 1987, 3. Indiana X X X X X X 9 Kathi Heaton, National Guard Bureau, Louisiana X “National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Maryland X Support Teams Overview and Update,” Information Massachusetts X Michigan X Paper, September 24, 2002. 10 Mississippi X “Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions New Mexico X X X X X X X by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel,” GAO/ New York X X X X X X X X NSIAD-97-39, January 6, 1997, available at Ohio X X X X X X , 1. Oklahoma X 11 Stentiford, 94. Oregon 12 David W. Fairbanks, Virginia State Defense Puerto Rico X X X X X X Force, interview by author, October 20, 2003. South Carolina X X X X X X X X X 13 Ibid., 3. Tennessee X X X X X X X 14 After Action Review, Headquarters, Army Divi- Texas X X X X X X X X th Vermont X X X X X X X sion, 244 Clinic, New York Guard, January 9, 2003. 15 Virginia X X X X X X X X Department of the Army. Washington 16 Michael Turner, Chief, Non-Resident Key: PLDC = Primary Leadership Development Course; Bncoc = Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course; ANCOC = Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaven- Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course; CGSC = Command and General Staff College;O CS = Officer Candidate School worth, KS, interview by author, June 29, 2003.

32 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Retooling the Nationbuilding Strategy in Afghanistan

By V INCENT M. DRE Y ER

decisive and enduring result. To achieve this more ambitious endstate, “we must plan for . . . extended stability operations involving substantial combat and requiring the rapid and sustained application of national and international capabilities spanning the elements of to ensure that it would state power.”4 Likewise, one National Military never again lapse into a Strategy goal directs us to “prevail against feature terrorist breeding ground or adversaries.” Stability operations are specified sanctuary. Even President George as one way to accomplish this end: W. Bush, who campaigned against military involvement in “peripheral” Winning decisively will require synchronizing operations and reiterated his opposition to and integrating major combat operations, nationbuilding2 prior to launching Opera- stability operations, and significant postconflict tion Enduring Freedom, changed his opinion interagency operations to establish conditions he United States began the soon after major fighting ended. Thus, the of stability and security. . . . The Joint Force war on terror October 7, 2001, United States embarked on a concerted must be able to transition from major combat by attacking Taliban and al nationbuilding effort. operations to stability operations and to Qaeda targets throughout The importance of nationbuilding is conduct those operations simultaneously.5 special T Afghanistan. Special Operations Forces codified in various high-level U.S. policy embedded with indigenous Northern Alli- documents. The President’s National Security The lack of planning for and erratic ance fighters and followed by a small con- Strategy specifically mentions Afghanistan: execution of postconflict operations in recent ventional force of coalition units defeated “As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, American endeavors (particularly in Iraq) the enemy in 2 months and forced its retreat we will continue to work with international likely prompted the publication of National along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Once organizations . . . as well as nongovernmental Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)–44 major combat operations ended, however, organizations, and other countries to provide and Department of Defense (DOD) Direc- we faced a crucial question: What next? the humanitarian, political, economic, and tive 3000.05 mandating unprecedented While intricate preparation had ensured the security assistance necessary to rebuild government attention to this significant destruction of the enemy, the short timeline Afghanistan so that it will never again . . . issue. NSPD–44 empowers the Secretary between 9/11 and 10/7 precluded adequate provide a haven for terrorists.”3 Secretary of of State to lead and coordinate the Nation’s postconflict planning, often referred to as Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s National Defense efforts to plan and execute reconstruction stability and support operations.1 It quickly Strategy calls for the capability to defeat and stabilization assistance. In particular, became apparent, however, that a major adversaries in two separate theaters and to the State Department will “identify states at effort to rebuild Afghanistan was necessary turn one of these operations into a more risk of instability . . . and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated . . . recon- Lieutenant Colonel Vincent M. Dryer, USA, wrote this essay as a student of the U.S. Army War College. struction and stabilization efforts . . . which This paper won the Strategic Research Paper category of the 2006 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are integrated with military contingency Strategic Essay Contest. plans, where appropriate.”6 The directive also

34 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu CJCS Strategic Essay ContestDreyer Winners

mandates all other executive departments Photos Top to Bottom: and agencies to identify skilled personnel 20-watt broadcast tower built by Iranian government for Afghan who can be deployed for postconflict mis- Television; Afghan poppy farmer sions and establishes a Policy Coordination in Tora Bora region; International Committee for Reconstruction and Stabiliza- Security Assistance Force prepares tion Operations.7 DOD Directive 3000.05 for mission; Afghans building school places emphasis on stability operations, with resources provided by Parwan Provincial Reconstruction Team stating that they are “a core U.S. military and coalition forces; Special Forces mission” and should “be given priority Soldier in front of bomb site comparable to combat operations.”8 These in Kabul, now used as Signal Company (Kevin P. Bell) Signal Company (Kevin P. Afghan training site th documents either directly or indirectly 55 underscore the importance of Afghanistan’s future to America’s security. The translation of emerging doctrine to actual strategy, however, has been ad hoc and inconsistent.

Current Strategy The strategic objective for Afghanistan special special is to rebuild the country in such a way Combat Camera Squadron (Jeremy T. Lock) T. (Jeremy Combat Camera Squadron st that it will never again become a terrorist 1 sanctuary. Complicating this goal is the latent Taliban/al Qaeda–led insurgency that threatens all participants in the reconstruction effort. Given this circumstance, the U.S. Government is pursuing several ways, in cooperation with the

international community, to solidify

Afghanistan’s future as a stable, peaceful, feature feature and self-sufficient nation. Most of the DOD (Al Lowry) Signal Company (Thomas Bray) th 55 Signal Company (Kevin P. Bell) Signal Company (Kevin P. th 55

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 35 RET o o LING THE NATI O NBUILDING STRATEG Y

ways predictably employ the military element (it has provided only $10 million annually). issue is the paradoxical reliance of coalition of national power; however, American leaders In addition, the international community’s commanders on warlords and their fighters are also utilizing diplomatic tools to build inability to address the problem in a holistic to prosecute the counterinsurgency. consensus and economic measures to jump- fashion and the Afghan Interior Ministry’s Another overarching challenge asso- start a broken economy. Analysis of the three failure to integrate its own internal and police ciated with security sector reform is the primary ways being used to reconstitute the reforms with judicial restructuring impede interdependent nature of the five tasks, “failed state” of Afghanistan—security sector what is arguably the most important of the which combine to form a complex system of reform, extension of government influence five sectors.10 systems where progress is constrained when via provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), Although Great Britain is tackling the task execution does not proceed evenly. For and economic assistance—reveals example, a credible police force serious disconnects in the strategy, is essential for opium eradica- particularly with regard to the current U.S. strategy fails to tion, but it is useless without resources (or means) being applied a functioning judicial system. to accomplish the designated ways. adequately address many of the obstacles This reality makes coordinated, Security sector reform to an enduring peace concerted effort on behalf of refers to concerted efforts by the all five lead nations essential. international community to share Furthermore, economic recon- the burden of rebuilding Afghanistan’s basic opium issue in close coordination with the struction is inherently linked with the success security institutions. At a Geneva conference Afghan Interior Ministry, the United States, of security sector reform. Barnett Rubin, an in 2002, various nations agreed to assume the and the United Nations (UN) Office on architect of the Bonn Agreement, notes that role of “lead donor” in the five most critical Drugs and Crime, the drug trade continues if people cannot make an honest living, they tasks at hand: the United States is respon- to be not only destabilizing but also one of will gravitate toward criminal activity (for sible for creating an Afghan National Army; the most profitable income sources for the example, the heroin industry). Lawbreakers Germany is working to build a national common farmer, accounting for more than will seek protection from the historic power police force; Italy is charged with judicial half of the economy. Eradication policies brokers—the warlords—thereby diminish- reform; Great Britain is leading efforts to that do not provide options for alternative ing the rule of law. This environment fosters combat opium cultivation; and Japan is livelihoods run the risk of alienating a large an economy based on illegal transactions, feature responsible for the disarmament, demili- percentage of the population. This problem significantly reducing the tax base essential tarization, and reintegration of the militias is compounded by the active involvement of for the development and maintenance of an operating throughout the country. Each effort many senior government officials in the drug army and police force.12 The bottom line is has experienced its share of setbacks. Even trade, including cabinet officials and provin- that insufficient means (planning, people, the American program, the most successful cial governors. President Hamid Karzai has and money) have been provided for secu- of the five, suffers from major ends/ways denounced Afghanistan’s opium cultivation rity sector reform. Although the strategy is mismatches. (he declared a “holy war” against drugs last prudent, inadequate resources, as well as Germany’s efforts at police reform have year), but little progress has been made to insufficient coordination among the lead been plagued by poor planning and lack of reduce it. Until a viable program takes effect, donors, jeopardize success. commitment. Although officials offered a the warlords who process and smuggle drugs Extension of authority to the outlying strategy paper to address the situation, they will continue to hinder government efforts. provinces is another linchpin in America’s special failed to distribute and coordinate it with The disarmament, demilitarization, strategy to rebuild Afghanistan’s central other donors, particularly the United States, and reintegration program led by Japan, in government. Provincial reconstruction the largest financial contributor. Germany close cooperation with the UN Assistance teams—“joint civilian-military organizations also was slow in prompting the United States Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and whose mission is to promote governance, to begin a training program for patrolmen the UN Development Programme, has security, and reconstruction throughout the while Berlin concentrated on the officer enjoyed considerable success, accounting country”13—are the coalition’s primary means corps. Until a credible, competent, and for the disarmament, demobilization, and for addressing this critical goal. Comprised of honest police force is operational throughout reintegration of over 60,000 former Afghan a robust military contingent and interagency the country, it will be impossible for the military forces and more than 11,000 heavy representatives from the sponsoring country, central government to extend its influence weapons. Numerous militias (some estimates as well as an Afghan government official, and enforce its policies. report as many as 850 groups totaling over these teams are designed to “export” the Italy has fallen short in reforming the 65,000 members), however, are not part of stable environment currently provided by Afghan judicial system, currently “character- the program. These groups are controlled the United Nations–mandated International ized by a conflicting mix of civil, religious, and supplied by local warlords, drug bosses, Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. and customary laws, with few trained judges, and, in some cases, government officials.11 These teams generally have been prosecutors, or other justice personnel.”9 This Until the Karzai administration takes a firm praised for their ability to extend central reform program seriously lags behind the stand on eliminating these “undocumented” governmental influence outside the capital, other sectors due to Italy’s failure to allocate militias, they will remain a latent source of but numerous problems limit their effective- adequate personnel and financial resources instability and rebellion. Complicating this ness. First, the goals of the PRTs are not clear

36 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Dreyer and vary depending on their sponsoring before it suffered through 23 years of conflict. and 50 times more troops per capita into countries. For example, Americans focus The cost of creating government institutions postconflict Kosovo than into postconflict on quick-impact reconstruction projects and a functioning infrastructure is stagger- Afghanistan.”22 Substantial increases in and internal force protection; British teams ing, so several donor conferences have been money and manpower would undoubtedly concentrate on security sector reform and held to solicit funds. The Afghan government contribute to the success of security sector are willing to intervene in warlord confronta- projects the reconstruction bill to be as high reform and facilitate the formation of many tions; German teams are much larger (up as $27.5 billion for 2002–2010.17 The United more PRTs, but there are risks associated with to 300 personnel) with a substantial civilian States is the largest contributor to this effort, this approach. contingent. A British study notes that the lack providing over a third of the $3.6 billion Other critics agree with the endstate of of common operating protocols and objec- pledged by the international community Afghan nationbuilding but advocate changes tives weakens unity of effort and “leads to for 2004.18 Unfortunately, many countries to the ways this strategy is pursued. Kathy confusion among national and international have failed to deliver their pledges, causing a Gannon argues that U.S. and North Atlantic actors who cannot predict from one PRT to significant shortage of funds for designated Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation the next what to expect in terms of exper- projects. Despite the best of intentions, many with the warlords and their militias presents tise, level or sustainability of engagement, designated projects have not met the stated the most ominous obstacle to Afghanistan’s or focus.”14 For example, the unwillingness goals. For example, only 85 schools of the 286 transition.23 She recommends that we cut all of American PRTs to provide security for planned were built or refurbished in 2004.19 ties to the warlords as quickly as possible. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has The United States is seeking other While eliminating their influence would con- special arguably limited the ability of more qualified funding sources for reconstruction. The Trea- tribute to national unification and perhaps agencies to provide reconstruction assistance. sury Department unblocked $145 million weaken the opium trade, the difficulty of Maintaining a clear distinction between in Afghan assets that were frozen in 1999; such an undertaking must be acknowledged. NGOs and PRTs has been another source of likewise, nearly all of the sanctions imposed These warlords are the same individuals who friction. James Bishop, Director of InterAc- during Taliban rule have been lifted. The fought side by side with Operation Endur- tion, notes that soldiers carrying weapons Bush administration is also working on a ing Freedom forces to defeat the Taliban and and wearing civilian clothes while engaging Trade and Investment Framework Agree- who continue to support coalition forces in in humanitarian missions have “blurred the ment designed to “create a bilateral forum to their counterinsurgency/counterterrorist

necessary distinction between members deepen trade and investment relations” with campaign. Gannon contends, however, that of the military and humanitarian workers, Afghanistan and is supporting the country’s continued reliance on the militias and our feature potentially putting the latter at risk.”15 membership in the World Trade Organiza- ongoing provision of weapons and money to Although a PRT Steering Committee headed tion.20 While many of these programs will them have increased the warlords’ prestige by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior is in provide more money for nationbuilding in and influence and eroded Karzai’s authority. place, it has yet to synchronize and standard- Afghanistan, the efficiency with which the Yet her proposal to sever relations involves ize PRT operations throughout the country. funds are spent is the ultimate determinant of significant risk as well. If the warlords Despite problems, the overwhelming success. Thus far, the record is disappointing. become disenfranchised, they could easily consensus is that the PRT program has had a muster sufficient forces to challenge the positive impact on stability and reconstruc- Alternate Strategies government in Kabul and return the country tion in Afghanistan, a reality that highlights a Most critics of the current strategy to chaos. ISAF is neither large enough nor final deficiency: there are not enough teams contend that it is woefully under-resourced equipped to counter such retaliation. The to engage the major population centers, let or that the ways employed do not adequately United States could quickly find itself in a alone the more rural areas. quagmire comparable to the Michael McNerney notes Soviet experience, compounded that “establishing 22 PRTs a larger military presence might incite the largely by a probable resurgence of the in the 3 years after the Islamic population and feed claims that “imperial” Taliban and al Qaeda. Although collapse of the Taliban America is occupying Afghanistan seeing former Taliban leaders government is a snail’s and current warlords (some pace when dealing with an accused of war crimes) assume insurgency.”16 Future plans seats in the recently elected par- call for the establishment of only four addi- address the fundamental requirements of liament is disturbing to many Afghans and tional PRTs by the end of 2007. This would nationbuilding. A few pundits even argue outside observers, integration of these indi- leave at least 8 of the 34 provinces without a that the endstate itself is flawed. James viduals into the political process is the only team. Absent significantly more PRTs in the Dobbins’ RAND study of past postconflict realistic way to bolster their collaboration in hinterland, local militias will remain unsta- efforts shows a direct correlation between building a democratic, institution-based state. ble, police will be ineffective, and widespread resources and the capacity to provide secu- Another group of experts advocates poppy production will continue. rity, build democratic institutions, and foster more sweeping modifications to current Economic assistance is the third major economic development.21 Citing Kosovo as strategy, claiming that the endstate itself focus of U.S. strategy. Afghanistan was a success, he notes that the “United States is flawed. Subodh Atal argues that the already one of the world’s poorest nations and its allies have put 25 times more money United States should eschew the goal of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 37 RET o o L I N G the N A T I O NBUILDING STRATEG Y

nationbuilding in Afghanistan for four larly in training police and providing local the Afghan government. For projects con- reasons.24 First, external aid has proven to security during reform activities. UNAMA trolled by outsiders, concrete measures must be only marginally effective in reconstitut- has the mandate to promote national recon- be taken to overcome bureaucratic obstacles ing failed states. Second, entanglement in ciliation, fulfill the tasks outlined in the Bonn and focus on the maximum employment of Afghan internal affairs diverts American Agreement, and manage all UN humanitar- indigenous workers. This initiative provides attention from the primary mission of defeat- ian relief and reconstruction efforts in- an exceptional opportunity to merge security ing the Taliban and their terrorist guests. country. While it has done an admirable job, and economic objectives; contracting war- Third, coalition and Afghan forces have been particularly with organizing and monitoring lords and their militias to execute construc- unable to provide the security necessary for the national elections, its expertise has not tion projects “would give both leaders and reconstruction. Fourth, the Afghan people been fully tapped. their foot soldiers a stake in the rebuilding.”26 may begin to resent the presence of foreign Increase the number of PRTs operating James Phillips advocates this approach, soldiers. Atal recommends that the United in the country and expand their mandate to arguing that dependence on foreign contrac- States dedicate all efforts toward defeating include a more active security function. The tors should be reduced as quickly as pos- the insurgency along the Afghan-Pakistan forces for this expansion should come from sible. The United States should place greater border and then exit immediately to prevent ISAF and the new Afghan National Army. effort on “building the Afghan government’s America from becoming entangled in the NATO has declared that Afghanistan is its capacity to help its own people by improving “great game” that has plagued other world highest priority, stressing that the country is public administration and training govern- powers (Britain and Russia) for centuries. the Alliance’s “first mission outside the Euro- ment officials and Afghan NGOs to train While this proposal would limit the duration Atlantic area.”25 Yet NATO members are cur- other Afghans.”27 While U.S. officials will of American involvement in Afghanistan, the rently contributing only 25 percent of their have to encourage the international com- short-term savings would pale in comparison available forces to ISAF. Although NATO munity to contribute significant amounts to the dangers generated. has conducted initial planning to expand its to this effort, the more difficult task will be operations into the more dangerous eastern applying those assets effectively. In particular, Retooling Strategy projects that provide There is no lack of immediate improvement proposed “fixes” to improve the National Security Council is probably the only in the lives of war-weary, the current policy. Most organization capable of orchestrating development of a impoverished people are feature seem constructive, yet many most likely to produce

comprehensive design of assistance involve excessive risk. Pro- long-lasting results. ceeding on the assumption Develop and execute that a reformed Afghani- a public diplomacy stan is a vital U.S. interest, the following and southern portions of the country, a sig- campaign to capitalize on the “informa- recommendations would retool the current nificant increase in the number of PRTs is not tion” element of national power. Ray Millen approach rather than discard it wholesale. currently planned. proposes the construction of a network of In addition to dedicating adequate funding Including the Afghan army in PRTs studios and transmission towers that would for reconstruction, the Bush administration will not only alleviate the demand for target the entire country.28 He recommends should immediately implement the following foreign forces but also add to the legitimacy implementing a public awareness campaign courses of action. of the PRT mission and refine the training designed to educate the population regarding special Continue the current security sector of Afghan soldiers as they are mentored by government programs and to foster “buy-in” reform program, but apply diplomatic pressure their ISAF counterparts. Increased numbers to the reform process. An initiative such as (and perhaps economic incentives) to persuade of teams will strengthen the government’s this will be particularly important in the the lead donor countries to redouble their authority beyond Kabul and enable judiciary government’s effort to combat narcotics traf- commitment and efforts in terms of personnel reform, disarmament, demilitarization, and ficking. Not only will Karzai’s exhortations assigned and money spent. To align the prog- reintegration, as well as opium eradication. against opium production reach a wider audi- ress of the five most critical tasks, the United While there is risk that a larger foreign ence, but also information regarding alternate States should volunteer to act as security sector footprint will incite nationalistic backlash employment programs will be easier to dis- reform coordinator and devise a system of and provide more targets for insurgents, seminate. Given the low literacy rate of the accountability and regular synchronization the RAND study noted earlier suggests that country, the information architecture should meetings to provide a forum for cooperation. more soldiers will enhance the probability focus initially on oral and visual media to Rather than lamenting the problems caused of eventual success. As the PRTs facilitate transmit desired messages. by the interdependence of the tasks, we should improvements of basic living conditions, Develop a comprehensive plan that coor- capitalize on this interdependence and use it as indigenous support will increase, which will dinates the plethora of activities. Currently, no a catalyst to drive collaboration. generate beneficial second- and third-order single party is in charge of the overarching To relieve some of the burden on the effects, such as improved intelligence regard- reconstruction effort: “ostensibly, the United lead countries, the United Nations should be ing criminal or insurgent activity. Nations is, but that is as good as saying that lobbied aggressively to assume a more promi- Develop mechanisms to channel a much no one is.”29 The U.S. Embassy in Kabul is nent role in security sector reform, particu- greater percentage of foreign aid funds through striving to guide the rebuilding process, but

38 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Dreyer its limited resources and modest span of publications. Close examination of key 11 Amin Tarzi, “Disarmament in Afghani- control of the contributing countries impede aspects reveals a major imbalance in the stan—Which Militias and What Weapons?”April effectiveness. Although there is an Afghani- strategic ends/ways/means construct. In 5, 2005, available at . stan Security and Reconstruction Steering particular, we are not applying sufficient 12 Barnett R. Rubin, “(Re) Building Afghanistan: Group co-chaired by the United States, the resources to ensure strategy success. The Folly of Stateless Democracy,” Current History European Union, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, it Furthermore, we are not employing the 103 (April 2004), 165. has thus far been unsuccessful in establish- complete range of our national elements and 13 Robert M. Perito, The U.S. Experience with ing a comprehensive blueprint to establish instruments of power to effect the outcome. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan goals and track results. The Afghanistan A good portion of the international com- (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, October Research and Evaluation Unit recommends munity is engaged in assisting this war-torn 2005), 1. mechanisms to align priorities and reduce nation; thus, the challenge is not in convinc- 14 Dylan Hendrickson et al., A Review of DFID overlap among the numerous lower-level ing others that something must be done, but Involvement in Provincial Reconstruction Teams coordinating bodies. In particular, the plan rather in encouraging the willing to share (PRTs) in Afghanistan, report commissioned by the should address: the burden more equitably and to synchro- U.K. Department for International Development (London: King’s College, July 8, 2005), 7. nize the efforts of key actors. JFQ 15 James K. Bishop, “Combat Role Strains Rela- n specific roles and responsibilities of the tions between America’s Military and its NGOs,” various security organizations Humanitarian Review (Summer 2003). n n o t ES special measures to fill security vacuums 16 Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and created by implementation of the disarma- 1 Stability and support operations include peace Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model ment, demilitarization, and reintegration operations, foreign internal defense, humanitarian or a Muddle?” Parameters 4 (Winter 2005/2006), 44. 17 program and civic assistance, support to counterdrug opera- Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War n fielding a professional police force tions, and combating terrorism. See U.S. Depart- Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (Washington, n the need to synchronize information ment of the Army, Stability Operations and Support DC: Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2005), operations.30 Operations, Field Manuel 3–07 (Washington, DC: 43. 18 U.S. Department of the Army, February 20, 2003), U.S. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Report to the Committee Planning per se is not normally consid- 1–4. 2 The term nationbuilding has various mean- on International Relations, House of Representatives ered a component of strategy, but in the case ings depending on the context. For the purpose of (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability of Afghanistan, events have moved so quickly feature this paper, it refers to activities aimed at securing Office, July 2005), 3. that the strategy has become disjointed at 19 long-term stability in a country after war or conflict, Ibid, 4. best and incoherent at worst. Fundamental 20 including establishment or reestablishment of demo- U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, “New Initia- strategic adaptations are necessary, includ- cratic government and national institutions (police, tives for a Peaceful, Prosperous, and Democratic ing new planning. Leaders of this process military, and so forth), revitalization of the economy, Afghanistan,” June 15, 2004, available at . 21 that aligns their efforts to realize the vision 3 George W. Bush, The National Security Strat- James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation- of a transformed Afghanistan. The National egy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: Security Council (NSC) is probably the only The White House, September 17, 2002), 7. RAND Corporation, 2003), 146. 22 4 Ibid., 161. Larry Goodson of the Army War organization capable of orchestrating the Donald H. Rumsfeld, The National Defense College has also been critical of the “small footprint” development of a comprehensive design that Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, approach, noting that “by 2003, the disorder had addresses all aspects of assistance: military, DC: The Pentagon, March 2005), 17. 5 Richard B. Myers, National Military Strategy of gotten so bad that in certain locales people had nongovernmental, and economic. Therefore, the United States of America (Washington, DC: The even begun to miss the Taliban’s ability to enforce President Bush should immediately task the Pentagon, 2004), 13. at least a rough kind of justice and suppress some NSC to work with key allies to accomplish 6 National Security Presidential Directive/ of the grosser crimes.” See Larry Goodson, “Bullets, this critical task. Once a plan is in place, a NSPD–44, December 7, 2005, available at . Democracy 16 (January 2005), 25. 23 of guiding it to a successful outcome. 7 Ibid. Kathy Gannon, “Afghanistan Unbound,” 8 Department of Defense Directive Number Foreign Affairs 83 (May/June 2004), 35. 24 The reconstruction of Afghanistan is a 3000.05, November 28, 2005, available at . 9 ing? (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, September 24, nearly total destruction of the infrastructure U.S. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Security: Report to the Committee on 2003), 1. and an ongoing insurgency. Helping Afghani- 25 International Relations, House of Representatives Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: NATO Looks to stan become a stable, representative democ- (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Expand Mission After September Elections,” Sep- racy that enforces the rule of law and respects Office, June 2005), 29–32. tember 5, 2005, available at . 26 difficult to find an all-encompassing docu- Wilkinson, “Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: Goodson, 29. 27 ment outlining a single integrated approach, The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan,” Phillips, 2. the principal elements of the strategy are Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 1, 2004, described in various government agency 18, available at . ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 39 special feature

Marine fire team training 28 Raymond A. Millen, Afghanistan: Reconstitut- in Combat Town, Central Traininging a Collapsed Area, Okinawa State (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005), 5–8. 29 Goodson, 28. 30 Bhatia et al., 20.

Soldiers searching for improvised explosive devices in Baghdad Camp Victory Combat Digital (Jorge A. Rodriguez) U.S. Marine Corps (C. Warren Peace) U.S. Marine Corps (C. Warren

Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu feature feature

Marine trains for night operation Space Communications Squadron (Barry A. Loo) Space Communications Squadron

in urban area th 30 Where the Streets Have No Names special special Looking Past Operation Iraqi Freedom to Future Urban Operations

By S tephen R . D alzell

n the ongoing debate over the U.S. it is an aberration in terms of military because such operations will become invasion of Iraq in 2003, some operations. In fact, it is much more the rule, not the exception, in the assume that if it had been done likely that the opposite is true. If foreseeable future. I differently (more troops, different we had avoided prolonged urban For years, U.S. doctrine and plans), then current conditions would be stability operations, it would have training (for example, military different (no insurgency, better economy). been because Iraq was excep- operations in urban terrain) have Others defend the invasion as executed but tional. We need to learn the right been based on the assumption agree things have not gone according to lessons from current operations that the setting for urban operations plan. Although seemingly incompatible, both positions assume that the situation we Lieutenant Colonel Stephen R. Dazell, USA, wrote this essay while serving as Senior are facing in the fourth year of Operation Service College Fellow at Tufts University. A recent graduate of the U.S. Army War College, his essay won the Iraqi Freedom was not inevitable and that Strategy Article category of the 2006 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest.

40 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu CJCS Strategic Essay ContestDalzell Winners would look like European cities—where some citizens against them. “We are dying for help humanitarian and reconstruction activities” of the biggest obstacles would be to overcome from the NGOs [nongovernmental organiza- actually commenced during Phase III, combat removable rubble and service interruptions. tions], and we get zero from OCPA [Office of operations.7 Even after our experience in Somalia, we the Coalition Provisional Authority],” said one. If Iraq challenged our military thinking, expected cities to have big buildings, extensive “You can feel it out on the streets; people are future operations in the least stable parts of road networks, and existing infrastructure. frustrated, and we’re getting rocks thrown at us the world may break it altogether unless we That is not what we encountered in Iraq, in neighborhoods where we never did before,” earnestly embrace the lessons to be learned. however. How different was Iraq? Ask the said another.3 In other cases, the stick was The United Nations estimates that the popula- Marines sent to rescue captured U.S. Soldiers needed. U.S. forces found it necessary to make tions of less developed regions will grow at an in “House 13” on a certain street in Samarra: it clear to civilians that they were the center annual rate of 1.3 percent between 2000 and “As they made their way through a dusty of gravity and could either prolong the insur- 2020, with the percentage of residents living in warren of two-story mud-colored hutches . gency or help coalition forces defeat it.4 urban areas increasing from 40 to 51 percent.8 . . they found House 11. They found House The new urban environments reflect These areas will continue expanding until they 12. But no House 13. What they did see were global changes, and those changes directly merge into huge bands of urban terrain. It more and more Iraqis swarming around.”1 impact how the profession of arms does will no longer be possible to think of cities as Now the United States is building better business. Industrial-age conflict saw cities obstacles to be bypassed or key terrain to be urban training areas, modeled on realities as centers of industry and commerce—the seized in a single move. In the course of a con- encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 Iraq’s joints and tendons of society. Cities were flict, a series of three-block wars will extend special special oil wealth and stable regime set it apart from important primarily with respect to how they incrementally over the region, with low-level the environment that would be found in most supported the clash between organized armies. conflict flaring up repeatedly in areas behind of the world’s “at-risk” cities. Unlike Iraq—in But fourth-generation conflict is turning the the “front line” on our tactical maps.9 which most urban areas were developed before focus to winning the cities, as that is where the Current trends also give potential sanctions and war led to decay—almost a combatants live and operate from. The best opponents the ability to escalate conflicts quarter of the population in both sub-Saharan national strategies for combating terrorism rapidly. No longer can U.S. forces deploy to Africa and the Latin America/Caribbean integrate programs of urban development conduct humanitarian missions without being region live in slums, which are defined by and political reforms with improved law prepared for unexpected escalations entail- 5 substandard physical conditions and/or the enforcement. All focus on “winning hearts ing security operations or even combat. We fact they were illegally built, and are therefore and minds” as much as changing the physical need to recognize the strategic importance of feature feature not integrated into conventional political and shape of the urban landscape. civilians and to create a new model for urban economic structures. There, U.S. Soldiers will To prepare strategically for these chal- operations that fully integrates a wide range not just be groping for “House 13”; they will lenges, the United States needs the resolve of potential activities. Anecdotal evidence be searching for a particular alleyway hidden to maintain hard-to-manage skills like civil suggests that in those Iraqi cities where the among acres of plywood shacks. affairs, psychological operations, and linguist/ U.S. military was responsible for both recon- Shantytowns and slums are the urban regional expertise in peacetime and rapidly struction and security, with a focus on short- battlespaces of the future. The U.S. military integrate them with other units in time for turnaround, high-impact projects, there was must prepare for that environment by develop- effective operations. Urban operations doc- a more rapid increase in stability than where ing appropriate doctrine, organization, train- trine needs to be rewritten to focus planners more complicated interagency and/or inter- ing, material, leadership, education, personnel, on cities as the positive objective of warfare. national efforts were attempted. Among other and facilities and giving the warfighter ways Hostiles need to be located, cities need to be virtues, this multitasking type of military-led to process information and coordinate actions controlled, citizens need to be provided for, effort makes it clear that Soldiers on patrol are where all existing ground references are unin- and institutions must be created before victory also providing the material benefits of peace telligible to the outsider. can be declared. and, potentially, the seeds of cooperation.10 U.S. urban operations doctrine relegates General Charles Krulak, USMC, crys- U.S. strategists and planners need to civil-military operations to secondary chap- tallized the reality of modern combat in his develop means for monitoring actions and ters that could almost be subtitled, “How “three–block war”6 vision of Marines and Sol- controlling forces in ways that recognize the to keep the rabble out of your way.” Why, diers conducting combat, stability, and secu- independence of small units, thus breaking then, worry about cities at all? Cities matter rity operations simultaneously and in close away from the sequential, progressive model of because that is where the people are; a state proximity to each other. His insight, however, “phased activity” and our geographic under- does not win a war, stabilize a country, or has failed to reshape either doctrine or plan- standing of coherent forward lines of troops secure the future until it succeeds with the ning. American leaders still discuss operations and forward edges of the battle area. While urban population. Instead of wishing civilians as comprising distinct phases, even when they many transformational initiatives seek to re- away, we need to figure out how to win them know better. General John Sattler, USMC, who think the nonlinear battlefield, they still see over and help them. commanded the joint force in the battle for the battlefield as the spatial array of military Within weeks of seizing Baghdad, U.S. Fallujah in late 2004, reflected the standard forces and miss the ways in which large groups Soldiers recognized that their inability to mindset when he referred to his Phase IV of civilians, changing location, direction, address basic human needs and meet fun- as “the civil affairs phase.” At the same time, behavior, and attitudes, will impact multidi- damental living requirements was turning however, he recognized that “Phase IV–type mensional military mobility. This confluence ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 41 specialspecial featurefeature 42 global trends are discussed in Richard P. Cincotta, percent. The security implications of this and other 47 percent, from 25.6 percent of population to 37.6 growth rate will push urbanization levels up nearly for the least developed countries, where a 2.4 overall Publications, 2003), 246. The figures are even higher on Human Settlements 2003 gramme, Marine Corps Gazette tion awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm>. zine Leadership in the Three Block War,” Hurlburt Field, FL. lication by the Joint Special Operations University, and Counterterrorism in Morocco,” upcoming pub “Beyond ‘Draining the Swamp’: Urban Development cated,” An Exception, Not a Model That Is Easily Repli 31, 2005; Ann Scott Tyson, “Ten Days in Tall Afar: around Story,” Service, June 26, 2003. Slums Becoming Tinderboxes,” Newhouse News 2005. Associated Press via Hannah, “Mock Villages Provide Taste of Realism,” Baghdad’ ” , building and was rescued. managed to get the Marines’ attention from inside a ington Post Off: Team of Marines Feared Ambush,” prepare for that future is at hand. point seems relatively certain, and the time to streets in other developing countries at some That Americans will be tasked with patrolling opportunity for future urban operations. is unique, but in others it provides a honing some ways, the struggle to secure Iraq’s cities fail to learn or to learn the wrong lessons. In only thing more painful would be for us to challenging learning experience in Iraq. The lesson. The U.S. military is going through a teacher, but first it gives the test, then the development. relief, and both lay the foundation for future of operations such that security efforts support of activity will require us to see the continuity E R E H W

, January 1999, available at

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- - - n o The Los Angeles Times (Autumn 2003), 97–106. “Feral Cities,” image of the trajectory of urban development in his Action International, 2003). after the Cold War Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict Robert Engelman, and Danielle Anastasion, A N 10 9 m Richard J. Norton offers an even more dire T. Christian Miller, “Sadr City Success Story,” S E Naval War College Review (Washington, DC: Population , September 7, 2005, 1. 56, no. 4 The ndupress.ndu.edu How We Might Build Better Coalitions It’s as Simple as “A,A,A” By N adja Y . W est

hen answering the ques- is truly the desired outcome and not merely Acknowledge that other prospective tion “How might we better a hollow act to provide cover. Acting for the members of a coalition may not enjoy build coalitions?” some latter reason severely damages our cred- hyperpower status, but they still have pride, observations and recom- ibility, especially since U.S. security strategy history, intelligence, and the potential to W special mendations appear so fundamental that, has closely linked our values to our interests, contribute, and they deserve to be treated given the intended audience, it seems almost and coop- with dignity insolent to discuss them. However, when it is erative action and respect. apparent that these basic tenets are forgotten is a prominent the mark of a benevolent hyperpower Appreciate or for some reason not exercised, a review is pillar. Parity on is to be neither apologetic nor haughty that possible not entirely unreasonable. some level is about its ascendancy participants A vital but somewhat neglected point is implicit among may have laws, that building a coalition actually starts long the entities that conflicting inter- before one is needed. Fellow world leaders can form coalitions ests, or differing

detect disingenuous gestures as well as our to achieve common goals. One premise is opinions that may not allow them to become leaders in the United States can. Colin Gray that in the unique role as a hyperpower, affiliated with the gathering coalition. They feature commented that “strategic behavior we do not really need anyone. If this may have other agreements or relationships that offends the sense of justice of key is what we truly believe, we must on which they depend that would be com- constituencies will meet with more indicate that position explicitly promised if they committed to the suggested resistance than will behavior that is and act in a unilateral way. If not, partnership. not ethically so challenged.”1 Though then we must act in a manner Most importantly, graciously accept that this insight was offered in the context that indicates a genuine desire the offer to align with the forming coalition of strategy, it can apply just as well to for multilateral participation. The may be declined—a choice that democracy coalitions. Last-minute courting of pre- mark of a benevolent hyperpower may require. The “play my way or I will take viously neglected nation-states can breed is to be neither apologetic nor haughty my marbles and go home” mentality is irritat- suspicion, resentment, and, ultimately, refusal about its ascendancy. Military hierarchy ing on the playground; when demonstrated by of support if intended partners perceive that offers an example of this. Commanders do a great power, it is unbecoming indeed. they are being treated disrespectfully. In the not have the luxury of being “one of the Fellow world leaders should not be same vein, a senior official recently suggested troops.” Such a position of authority and subject to consequences if they do not appear that “if you take the time to be inclusive day responsibility requires that every word and “willing” to support our interests when they to day, then when you act unilaterally, allies deed be carefully measured to ensure the legitimately conflict with their own. An eye understand.” Analogously, if you treat other proper message and example are sent to injury caused by a well-placed thumb is recognized sovereign entities with dignity those entrusted to the commander’s care, painful, may cause permanent injury, and is and respect day to day, they will feel more like and to ensure that credibility as a leader is not soon forgotten. A similar effect may be bona fide stakeholders in a common cause and maintained. As a hyperpower, the United seen between allies. We might better build thus be more amenable to cooperating when States is in a similar position. If we say we coalitions by adopting the same principles we their collaboration is needed. In this setting, want to build coalitions, then we must sin- apply in being good citizens: treating others the alliance will truly be a coalition of the cerely want it and do it. with dignity and respect. The Golden Rule willing, not a coalition of the compelled. In summary, we might better build remains relevant. JFQ A second obvious but important point coalitions by remembering the three “A”s is to determine whether building a coalition of acknowledge, appreciate, and accept. N o t e Colonel Nadja Y. West, USA, is Deputy Commander of Clinical Services at Bethesda Naval Hospital. This essay 1 was written while she was a student at the National War College and won the Brief Essay category of the Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: 2006 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest. Oxford University Press, 1999), 11. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 43 commentary of The Problem 44 to need Some valid. still are centuries even and decades over many used terms Most age. information the in obsolete is practice and theory military in not everything example, For meanings. changing in shown be should However, care ones. great existing modify or terms new create to aneed always is there dogmatically; defined be should meanings or their terms that not mean does erly. This prop understood and used be should terms the say, would some because as of semantics, It not aquestion is no exception. are Forces T E H T Milan N.

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have, a decisive impact on the outcome of a Effects-based operations (EBO) advo- Henri de Jomini (1779–1869) insisted that campaign or an entire war. Hence, this term cates compound the problem of using proper line of operations became outdated because of alone should not be used for situations of tacti- terms by mixing goals, aims, and objectives. changes in material conditions. Hence, he also cal importance. For instance, it is an exaggera- They claim that objectives and tasks are stated changed the meaning of the term as pertain- tion to consider a bridge, garrison, or air/naval in terms of “friendly goals and actions, while ing to an imaginary line along which a force base strategic, as often happens. The phrase effects are stated in the form of behavior and moves from its base of operation toward an strategic corporal, used frequently by even capabilities of systems within the operational assigned physical objective. He used the term high-ranking information warfare advocates, environments—friendly, neutral, or adversary strategic line for those “important lines which is also inappropriate. While the decisions behavior.”2 EBO proponents are currently connect the decisive points of the theater of and actions of tactical commanders or single trying to redefine the term objective by making operations either with each other or with the soldiers can have great effects, it is a stretch to it broader and more abstract (in essence, by front of operations.”4 The Jominian term line of suggest that they can have a major impact on making it indistiguishable from an aim, goal, operations was widely accepted in all militaries. the course and outcome of an overall conflict. or effect) in order to make effects, not objec- JP 3–0, Doctrine for Joint Operations The terms aims, goals, and objectives are tives, the central part of the military decision- (September 2001), states that a line of opera- often used interchangeably. However, there making and planning process. The 2006 Joint tions defines the directional orientation of are significant differences in their proper Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense the force in time and space relative to the meanings. Aim means to direct or intend Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, enemy. It connects the force with its base of something toward a given purpose. It also defines a task as an action or activity (derived operations and its objective. The U.S. Army refers to a statement of intent or direction from the mission and concept of operations) Field Manual (FM) 3–0, Operations (2001), adds that in geographic terms, lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that because of their inherently open-ended nature, aims or goals lead to control of the objective or defeat of cannot be used as the basis for military planning the enemy force. However, the same doctrinal document confuses the issue by introducing a new but synonymous term, logical line of The Problem for an action. A goal is the result or achieve- assigned to an individual or organization to operation (thereby also implying that there ment toward which an effort is directed. It is provide a capability. In contrast, the U.S. Joint are illogical lines of operations), for use also a statement of one’s intent, but it is more Forces Command (USJFCOM) defines a largely in stability and support operations c specific than an aim. Both aims and goals are task as a directive statement used to assign a when positional reference to the enemy has of Common usually expressed broadly. Both are normally discrete action or set of actions to an organiza- little relevance. This is not necessarily true omm used when referring to national interests. tion that enables accomplishment of a mission because posthostilities operations might They are, in their essence, the expressions or function. A single task may incorporate include counterinsurgency, as the post–major Terminology used by strategists and policymakers. Hence, multiple individual actions. Neither of these combat phase in Afghanistan and Iraq an aim or goal must be converted into some- definitions implies that a task is integral to the illustrates. The 2001 FM 3–0 explains that thing more specific: the objective, defined specific military objective or is derived from the logical line of operation helps the com- as something that one’s efforts are intended the objective rather than the mission. mander visualize the use of both military and entar to accomplish or to serve as the basis for nonmilitary sources of power as means of military or nonmilitary action. The objective New Meanings support. Confusingly, decisive point is used can also be described as the purpose of one’s Another problem in the joint com- for a collection of tasks aimed to achieve a actions, carried out within a specific space munity is the lack of understanding of the “military condition.” In the new construct, and time. A military objective is that which, true meanings of key operational and tactical the commander “links multiple objectives if controlled, captured, destroyed, neutral- terms. For instance, line of operation is increas- and actions with logic of purpose.” Multiple

ized, or annihilated, would result in a drastic ingly misused in the U.S. military, although it and complementary lines of operations work y change in the military situation. Tactical, is well defined in current joint doctrinal publi- through a series of objectives. The command- operational, and strategic objectives are dif- cations. The term was introduced into military ers synchronize activities along multiple lines ferentiated by their scale and importance. theory in 1781 by the British general and theo- of operations to achieve the desired endstate The larger the objective, the more diffi- rist Henry Lloyd, one of the chief proponents (see figure on next page). This definition of cult it is to accomplish by a single act. In prac- of the so-called geometrical school. Originally, what constitutes a logical line of operations tical terms, then, an objective must be divided a line of operation was understood as a line is contradictory. Among other things, the into component parts (tasks) that, when linking an army in the field with its supply well-known and commonly understood term carried out, would accomplish it. In generic depots.3 The Prussian theorist Adam Heinrich decisive point is given entirely new meaning. terms, a task is defined as a definite piece of Dietrich von Buelow (1757–1807) used the Series of tasks comprising each logical line of work assigned to or expected of a person; a same term and contended that all modern operation are in fact component tasks, and duty; or a matter of considerable labor or dif- warfare was based on lines of operations. Both what is defined as a military condition is actu- ficulty. The task answers the question of what Lloyd and Buelow understood this term to ally the main task. And the so-called endstate needs to be done, while the objective answers mean what today is commonly called a line actually equals part of the strategic objective Marine Division Combat Camera (Adaecus G. Brooks) st 1 the question of why. of communications or line of supply. Antoine in the posthostilities phase.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 45 the pr o ble m O F c o m m o n ter m in o l o g y

The final coordination draft of JP 3–0, objectives.” This definition represents a radical the term underwent numerous changes in Joint Operations (2005), and JP 5–0, Joint Oper- break with the traditional view of what consti- Service and joint doctrinal documents. Joint ation Planning (2006), added a new meaning tutes a strategy. It is in fact a huge step back- Publications 3–0 (2001), 1–02 (2006), and 5–0 to line of operation: “a logical line that connects ward. Among other things, it is too simplistic (2006) define operational art as the employ- actions on nodes and decisive points related in to call strategy a “prudent idea.” In contrast ment of military forces to attain strategic time and purpose with an objective(s).” As a to JP 3–0 (2001), the new definition does and/or operational objectives through the secondary meaning, the term was also defined not refer to strategy as being both an art and design, organization, integration, and conduct as “a physical line that defines the interior or science of matching ends, means, and ways. of strategies, campaigns, major operations, exterior orientation of the force in relation to JP 5–0 (2006) does not have an entry and battles. Operational art translates the joint the enemy or that connects actions on nodes for strategy. However, it provides a definition force commander’s strategy into operational and decisive points related in time and space of national security strategy as “the art and design and ultimately tactical actions by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. Logical Lines of Operations A major problem with this definition is that operational art is not considered as both an art and science. Moreover, it does not emphasize Endstate: Secure, Stable Republic of . . . that it is an intermediate field of study and practice between strategy and tactics that deals Establish Clear Distribute Provide with synchronizing military and nonmilitary ➡ Displaced Person ➡ Unexploded ➡ Food and ➡ Emergency ➡ Military Condition: Camps Ordnance Water Medical Care Restore Basic Services sources of power to accomplish strategic or operational objectives in a theater. Decisive Points Existing Terms Conduct Conduct Military Condition: Recruit Issue New Train the Individual Create a Professional ➡➡ ➡➡ Equipment ➡➡ Trainers ➡➡ ➡➡ Unit ➡➡ Some military terms are misunderstood Soldiers Army for . . . Training Training partly because they are not well defined in the various Service or joint doctrinal publications. One of the most egregious cases is the Control Military Condition: Project Destroy Seize and Capture and Overland Destroy or Disarm interchangeable use of endstate. Properly ÿÿÿ Decisive ÿÿÿ Main ÿÿÿ Hold ÿÿÿ Disarm ÿÿÿ ÿÿÿ Arms Supply Existing Paramilitary Force Forces Capital City Remnants understood, this term should be used solely Routes Forces in describing the desired endstate (or perhaps y more accurately, desired strategic endstate). The desired endstate is part of the strategic to an objective(s).” Apparently, the authors science of developing, applying, and coordi- guidance. The commander’s intent, however, confuse nodes and decisive points as two dif- nating instruments of national power (diplo- is often understood as being synonymous ferent things. In fact, nodes in a given system matic, economic, military, law enforcement, with the endstate. This is incorrect because the are also decisive points that should be attacked and international) to achieve objectives that commander’s intent is exclusively focused on or protected. Obviously, these changes were contribute to national security. The secondary the military aspects of the situation (or “mili- made for no good reason except to make a meaning of the same term refers to the docu- tary landscape”) that the commander wants to entar space for the currently fashionable “system of ment prepared by the President and National see after the mission is accomplished. systems” approach to the analysis of the mili- Security Council that outlines national secu- The true meaning and purpose of tary situation. rity strategy.” Joint Publication 1–02 (2006) deployment and maneuver seem not well Another major problem in the U.S. mili- provides essentially the same generic defini- understood by some leading network-centric tary today is the radical attempt to redefine tion of national security strategy as JP 5–0 warfare advocates, which is puzzling because what constitutes strategy and operational art. (2006). In contrast, JP 3–0 (2005) refers only each term is well defined in Service and joint omm Although considerable differences existed to the national security strategy document but doctrinal documents. It is well known that c in the past, strategy was generally properly does not explain its meaning. Only JP 1–02 force, movement, and mobility are common defined. For example, JP 3–0 (2001) defines (2006) defines national military strategy as “the to both deployment and maneuver. However, strategy as “the art and science of developing art and science of distributing and applying they differ in their purpose, timing, location, and employing instruments of national power power to attain national objectives in peace and need for combat support and combat in a synchronized and integrated fashion to and war.” service support. Deployment is intended to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational Perhaps the biggest problem was move forces from bases or operating areas to objectives.” Yet the current JP 1–02 (2006) properly defining operational art. In an early where maneuvers will be conducted. Hence, it does not provide any definition of what definition, the U.S. Army FM 100–5, Opera- normally precedes the maneuver. In contrast constitutes a strategy. JP 3–0 (2005) defines tions (1986), described it as “the employment to maneuver, which is usually conducted in the term as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for of military forces to attain strategic goals in a an area either controlled or disputed by the employing the instruments of national power theater of war or theater of operations through enemy, deployment is generally carried out in a synchronized and integrated fashion to the design, organization, and conduct of in the area of one’s own or friendly control. achieve theater, national, and/or multinational campaigns and major operations.” Afterward, Forces conducting a maneuver move along

46 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego

Iraqi soldiers display flag after transfer of operations base from U.S. to Iraqi control

55th Signal Company (Kevin L. Moses, Sr.) lines of operations, while those carrying feature of the concept is that what represents a instance, define a campaign as “a series of out deployment move along lines of com- decisive point for operational planners usually related military operations aimed at accom- munications. Another significant difference becomes a task for subordinate tactical com- plishing a strategic or operational objective is that forces are supported by fires during manders. However, this should not be carried within a given time and space.” This definition maneuver (usually not during deployment). too far into the operational or strategic level. is imprecise because any definition of a mili- Also, one’s forces conducting maneuver must For example, obtaining and maintaining sea tary term pertaining to the method of combat be logistically supported and sustained, while control or air superiority cannot be viewed as force employment should state in simple terms those conducting deployment are usually a decisive point, as is often claimed, but rather only the ultimate objective of a given military self-sustainable. as an operational or strategic objective to be action. Hence, operational not only is redun- dant in the above definition but also obscures c the meaning of campaign. some military terms are misunderstood partly because In generic terms, a campaign in a war omm they are not well defined in the various Service consists of a series of related major operations or joint doctrinal publications sequenced and synchronized in time and place to accomplish a military or theater- strategic objective. It is conducted according New Meanings for Old Terms accomplished. Also, any decisive point has less to a common plan and controlled by a joint or An increasing trend with Service and military significance than the nearby physical combined forces commander. Land and mari- entar joint doctrinal documents is adding new objective or center of gravity. For example, time campaigns are differentiated according to meaning to well-defined and established decisive points near the operational objective the predominant characteristics of the physi- terms. Decisive point was introduced by or operational center of gravity are usually cal environment. Because of the primarily Jomini in The Art of War in 1838. Since then, tactical in their importance. nonmilitary nature of the strategic objective, the Jominian concept of what constitutes a There is a shortage of common terms a campaign in a low-intensity conflict, such decisive point has undergone changes, yet its referring to methods of combat force employ- as insurgency or counterinsurgency, consists

essence has remained remarkably stable. In ment. At the tactical level, the terms attack, largely of a series of tactical actions; major y generic terms, a decisive point can be described strike, battle, engagement, and raid mean dif- operations are rare. as a geographic location or source of physical ferent things for each Service. JP 1–02 (2006) A campaign today is inherently multiser- military power whose destruction or capture, does not have an entry for attack and provides vice and often multinational. Hence, no single control, defense, or continuous surveillance highly inadequate definitions for strike and Service, including the Air Force, can plan and and monitoring would give an immediate raid. Another problem is that Service doc- conduct a campaign. Yet that does not imply and marked advantage over the opponent trines generally do not precisely define the that a single Service cannot contribute far in accomplishing one’s military objective. terms for tactical employment of their respec- more to the outcome than other Services. Today, geographic-, force-, and cyber-ori- tive combat forces. ented decisive points or their combinations In the U.S. military, campaign is one Foreign Terms are differentiated; they exist at each level of of the most often used and abused terms. Translating a foreign military term is war. The most important decisive points are Doctrinal documents either do not explain often full of pitfalls. This is a problem not just those located in physical proximity to, or that what constitutes a campaign or they define it of linguistics but of different military cultures. allow access to, the enemy or friendly center improperly. Joint publications 1–02 (2006), The accuracy of the original term is often in of gravity or some critical enemy capability. A 3–0 (2001), 3–0 (2005), and 5–0 (2006), for question. In other cases, the entire meaning ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 47 the pr o ble m O F c o m m o n ter m in o l o g y

Iraqi soldiers receive live fire The use of business terms is inappropri- training from U.S. Soldiers ate when referring to any aspect of military theory and practice. Among other things, it creates the impression that the main job of the military is not killing but resolving conflict by using business practices. It also confuses and eliminates distinctions among various levels of war. The Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation (OFT) apparently does not share the widely known and commonly accepted definitions of what constitutes strategy, operational art (or as OFT calls it, operations), and tactics. It clearly considers each component of military art to be not much different from a business activity. Specifically, OFT asserted in 2003 that strategy selects a Combat Camera Squadron (Ken Bergmann) Combat Camera Squadron st 1 competitive space and determines the scope, of the original term can be lost or drastically erpunktverlegung).8 To complicate the matter, pace, and intensity of competition; operations changed. Perhaps the classic case of mistrans- Schwerpunkt is widely used for a variety of determines key competitive attributes and lation of a critical term is the rendering of military situations, such as in designating the applies or masters them; and tactics executes Clausewitz’s Schwerpunkt as “center of gravity.” theater of main effort versus the theater of in the battlespace.10 The authors are either This term is widely used in the German mili- secondary effort and in force planning (for oblivious to or completely ignorant of the fact tary. Its meaning has changed considerably example, focusing on one category of forces or that these terms are the result of both the prac- since Clausewitz’s day and is now used for platforms versus another). The many purposes.5 Clausewitz wrote: same term is also often used in politics, diplomacy, and other One must keep the dominant characteristics nonmilitary areas of activity. of both states in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain Schwerpunkt develops, the Business Terms y hub of all power and movement, on which Network-centric warfare everything depends. That is the point against enthusiasts are principally which all our energies should be directed. responsible for the steady influx It represents concentration of the enemy of business expressions into the U.S. Marine explaining to Moldovan strength most vital to him in the accomplish- military vocabulary.9 This trend army officer C2 computer used in ment of his aim. If you could knock it out is exemplified by, for example, Exercise Combined Endeavor 2006, directly, it would be the most valuable target the terms: a communications and information 6 systems exercise involving 41 nations

for your blows. (Chris Willis)U.S. Air Force entar n transaction strategy Properly translated, Schwerpunkt refers n competitive edge tice and theory of centuries of warfare. They to the “weight of effort” (or literally the “point n competitive space cannot be simply abandoned without throwing of main emphasis”), not “center of gravity.”7 n leveraging out the thinking of masters of war. In German military theory and practice, the n human capital strategy Another business term, exit strategy, is Schwerpunkt has a much broader meaning n Vice Chief of Naval Operations Corpo- also extensively used by both the U.S. military omm than what the U.S. military understands as rate Board and politicians, instead of desired (strategic) c center of gravity. In the military meaning, n empowered self-synchronization. endstate. Among other things, exit strategy Schwerpunkt designates a theater, area, or place is associated with the benchmarks in a good in which combat forces are massed to seek a The word enemy is being replaced with business plan that serve for deciding when to decision or in which the commander expects threat, adversary, or opponent. The term lock call it quits. It was coined by the chief executive a decision. The main factors in selecting a in our success was adopted from the business officer of Docutel Corporation (inventor of the Schwerpunkt include the situation, terrain, term product lock-in. Likewise, battlespace automatic teller machine) in a story published and commander’s intent. Each commander is awareness was adapted from the business term in The New York Times in 1980. Not until responsible for concentrating his forces in the competitive space awareness. In fact, the three 1993 was the term used in a military context. sector of the weight of effort (Schwerpunktbil- pillars of network-centric warfare (informa- Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher dung). When appropriate, a commander des- tion, sensor, and shooter grid) correspond to used exit strategy in reference to Bosnia in his ignates a weight of effort for his subordinate the business (Wal-Mart) model of informa- testimony before the Senate Appropriations commanders. A change in the situation would tion, sensor, and transaction grid. Committee on April 27, 1993.11 In fact, the require a shift in the weight of effort (Schw- purpose of a posthostilities or stabilization

48 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego phase is not to call it quits, but to consolidate narrow tactical perspective among information training in the correct use of military terms. and exploit strategic success. Hence, the term warfare advocates. The use of proper terms accurately conveys desired (strategic) endstate, is not only more Currently, situational awareness is tactical or operational perspective and accurate, but also more positive in its meaning applied to all levels of command and war, so compels the participants in the discussion than the much misused exit strategy. no real distinction is made to indicate that the to use terms right. The lack of agreement on requirements for successful command at the the meaning of military terms considerably Misapplied Tactical Terms operational and strategic levels are substan- complicates communications within a Service Network-centric warfare proponents tially different from those at the tactical level. and among Services, as well as with allies and have been largely successful in introducing Operational commanders must think opera- prospective coalition partners. JFQ new terms and imposing tactical perspective in tionally, not tactically, to succeed in operation discussing actions at all levels of war, including planning and execution. Likewise, the term strategy and policy. This is perhaps one of the theater seems to be almost abandoned in the N o t es most corrupt influences these enthusiasts have U.S. military; the focus instead is on the bat- 1 D. Holger Mueller, The Character of Manoevre at the Operational Level (Toronto: Canadian Forces situational awareness was originally used to describe a College, 1999), 3. pilot’s perception of reality 2 Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations (Norfolk, VA: Standing Joint Force Head- U.S. Navy explosive ordnance quarters, USJFCOM, February 24, 2006), I–4. personnel removing rocket that 3 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From landed in Camp Victory, Iraq the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 77. 4 Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (Precis de l’Art de Guerre), with an introduction by Charles Messenger (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 101. 5 Timothy J. Keppler, The Center of Gravity Concept: A Knowledge Engineering Approach to

Improved Understanding and Application (Fort Leav- c enworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General omm Staff College, June 1995), 15. 6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595–596. 7 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 16th edition, with comments by Werner Hallweg (Bonn: Ferdi- Combat Camera Squadron (Denise A. Rayder) Combat Camera Squadron st 1 nand Duemmlers Verlag, 1952), 874. entar 8 on the current debate on various doctrinal tlespace. This is more proof of how the narrow “Schwerpunkt,” HDv 100/900 VS-NfD, Fueh- rungsbegriffe (TF/B) (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, issues in U.S. military terms. For instance, situ- tactical perspective predominates among February 1990), Sch–SEA; related terms include ational awareness is exclusively used in discuss- information warfare advocates. “area of the point of main decision” (Schwerpunk- ing the need for higher commanders to know traum), “point of main decision in an attack” and understand all aspects of the situation In general, precise language is essential (Schwerpunkt des Angriffs), etc. Huerth, US-NfD, within their areas of responsibility. U.S. Joint for the accurate transmission of ideas. Perhaps Militaerisches Studienglossary Englisch, vol. 2/3

Forces Command defines situational awareness this is more critical in the national security (Bonn: Bundessprachenamt, January 1993), 1060; y as “knowledge and understanding of the opera- field than in any other area of human activity. “Schwerpunkt,” Hermann Franke, ed., Handbuch der tional environment, factors, and conditions, Clausewitz wrote that until terms and concepts neuzeitlichen Wehrwisenschaften, vol. 1: Wehrpolitik to include the status of friendly and adversary are defined, one cannot hope to make progress und Kriegfuehrung (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag von forces, neutrals and noncombatants, weather in examining a question clearly and simply Walter de Grunter and Co., 1936), 649. 9 and terrain, that enable timely, relevant, com- and expect the reader to share his views.13 Ironically, U.S. business is going in the opposite direction, increasingly adopting purely military prehensive, and accurate assessments, in order In particular, the successful application of terms in referring to their competitors. to successfully apply combat power, protect mission command is predicated on having not 10 Office of Force Transformation, Network- 12 the force, and/or complete the mission.” This only common operational or tactical outlook, Centric Warfare: Creating a Decisive Warfighting term was originally used to describe a pilot’s sound doctrine, common education and train- Advantage (Washington, DC: Office of Force Trans- perception of reality. Situational awareness is ing, and healthy relationships between the formation, Winter 2003), 3. purely a tactical term, not operational or strate- commanders and their subordinates, but also a 11 Timothy Kane, “‘Exit Strategy’: A Mere Phrase, gic. Its extensive use in doctrinal publications is common vocabulary. Not a Strategy,” USA Today, June 20, 2005, 15. one of the best proofs of the predominance of a Indeed, doctrinal documents are the 12 Joint Warfighting Center, 112. most important means of educating and 13 Clausewitz, On War, 132. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 49 Future Approaches to the

Secretary Rumsfeld waves to Economic tourists while meeting with civilian

and defense officials in Beijing (James Bowman) Combat Camera Squadron st 1

Instrument Defense academics and thinkers have turned a closer eye to social and cultural knowledge since the threat of terrorism took of center stage post-9/11. Research conferences PowerBy P hilip Y . k A O sponsored by think tanks and blossoming journal publications have attempted to extract military and security insight from such fields We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are perpetual and as cultural anthropology and sociology. Along eternal and those interests it is our duty to follow. with this renewed focus on “social factors,” —Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary, 1848 research and development pouring into complex systems modeling has given planners guidance and probability tools for analyzing y he U.S. military should capital- efforts conducted jointly by military and eco- and conducting counterterrorist and counter- ize on a greater understanding nomic subject matter experts should discover insurgency operations. of economics. Indeed, identify- local expressions of politics and economic One discipline, economics, which has T ing supporting relationships relationships. Delineating these structural been (in)famously called “the dismal science” and how the military and key economic relationships will help situate and ground for its cold-hearted and scientific analysis, and financial figures interact may prove later cultural observations into a meaning- has been slowly withdrawing behind the to be a daunting task, but it will enhance ful context. Moreover, a robust preconflict curtain. Once the darling child of the post– the strength and cohesiveness of national economic analysis needs to determine the risk Cold War era, economics is now coming entar security. Whether it is gathering intelligence, preferences of a given country’s government. close to the limits of market fundamentalism providing security, shoring up market To carry this out, analysts can scrutinize gov- and exhausting its own ideological circumlo- confidence, or supporting the execution of ernment investments and purchases and look cution. Contrary to public opinion, there was economic policies abroad, the military clearly for patterns of trade and regional economic a postconflict plan in Iraq, and it echoed the has an economic function. By reinforcing behaviors. During conflict, economic assess- millennial slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid!” geographic boundaries, the Armed Forces ment can not only draw on the prior knowl- Naomi Klein offers the poignant observa- omm play an inevitable role in shaping local and edge base but also expand the horizon toward tion that injecting greed and free-market c regional labor markets. Additionally, the finding economic and resource leverage points economic shock therapy into Iraq was indeed military is an enforcer of contracts, providing and military financing mechanisms. Lastly, in a failure and contributed to the escalation of traction and realism to burgeoning rule of the postconflict phase, economic reconstruc- Iraqi insurgency.1 law and economic reforms, especially in the tion and development should seek to leverage Economists often ostracize their readers immediate postconflict environment. the ongoing and cumulative dialogue between by presenting a deterministic conception of the The greater Department of Defense military and economic planners. Probing for world. This article, however, steers economics (DOD) community should incorporate real economic capacity on the ground is vital back into our military knowledge base and economic analysis more prevalently into its and can thwart a premature and headlong suggests that failure to do so could be highly planning consciousness and the various phases dive into yet another gargantuan institution- detrimental, given the nature of future threats. of operations. Prior to conflict, intelligence building campaign. Analyses of a Working Partnership Philip Y. Kao is the 2005 Presidential Management Fellow in the Joint Warfighting Center at U.S. Joint DOD frequently treats economics as Forces Command. a shorthand for macromovements of cash

50 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Kao

flows. This approach is highly superficial and Ultimately, economic actions may prove and attributable to our (sometimes) polarized more in line with accounting than the actual more palatable in the international arena political theories that hedge outspoken liberal- science of economics and its various applica- than unilateral military interventions. Japan ism with Kissinger-style realism. tions. Additionally, the media tend to focus is an example. In light of Article IX of its Policy articulations of economics are on economics when hand-wringing over the constitution, Japan engages in political realism bifurcated along two strands of political financial and opportunity costs associated through the pursuit of economic power. As thought. On the one hand, policies drawing with war. For the future, however, we need to Samuel Huntington asserts, “In the realm from the doctrine of economic liberalism deepen our awareness of economics beyond of military competition, the instruments of are called on to quell erupting civil wars and these wave-top representations. The need to power are missiles, planes, [etc.]. In the realm nascent insurgencies abroad, especially in share information across U.S. agencies will of economic competition, the instruments of areas that have been referred to as the noninte- be paramount in the years to come. Achiev- power are productivity, market control, trade grating gap.4 Liberalism stems from the ratio- ing a harmonized, government-wide effort surplus, strong currency, foreign exchange nale that economic well-being and exchange will become the dominant business practice. reserves, ownership of foreign companies, and promote complacency, mutual understanding, Unified action is one such concept gaining technology.”2 By raising our consciousness and risk-averse behavior. On the other hand, a second life in this milieu, which harnesses and appreciation of economics, we can create an honest engagement with economics must multiple Federal departments and agencies better national security options and results. face up to the (realist) question: How do we go to carry out national strategy directives more to war and dominate someone who is becom- efficiently and effectively. Policy Schizophrenia ing more economically intertwined with us? Under this framework, the growing In the past, economics and national Paul Collier, the former director of need for economic experts and planners to security shared traditional and overlapping research at the World Bank, started a wave of weigh in critically on the consequences of concerns. Robust growth and economic investigations into the economic relationships military action will only intensify. Economics welfare were keys to securing a Maslowian- arising out of the world’s messy conflicts after can inform policy instrument options (for inflected hierarchy of needs. According to World War II.5 Working with a large dataset, example, incentives and sanctions) to prevent Aharon Barth, the economy is an integral part he ascertained some statistically significant kinetic wars or even to terminate conflict of military capabilities, such as maintaining relationships, including the observation that midstream without sacrificing our strategic a healthy industrial-military complex.3 Also, economic greed, corruption, and a dispro- goals. Flexible deterrent options are not new to Barth maintains that in the interconnected portionate ratio of natural resource export the military community, and surely they make global economy, a nation-state’s position income to gross domestic product are all cor- c up certain courses of action in strategic theater within the interdependent network presents related with conflict. His thesis jumpstarted cooperation planning, albeit rather anemically. itself as a double-edged sword—that is, as a an academic reaction within the development omm simultaneous instance of power and vulner- community because it suggested that greed, ability. These concerns are still extremely valid, rather than political grievance, motivates but other economic strands of thinking and and sustains civil wars and conflicts. Collier relating must be showcased as well. also concluded that peacetime corruption U.S. foreign policy orientation to eco- probably has a strong link to economically nomics has always been rather schizophrenic. motivated conflict and that the longer a war entar During the Cold War, policymakers wanted lasts, the more likely violence will become failing and weak states to grow economically economically motivated. in the hopes of spreading liberal democracy. These claims beg for an understanding Military and “social systems” analysts paid of how our actions, either by the military or a U.S. Army engineer reviews plans extraordinary attention to the causes of civil civilian-military coalition, reproduce the con-

Combat Camera Squadron (Jason Bailey) Combat Camera Squadron for clinic with Iraqi contractors wars. Indeed, this fixation on failing states ditions and terms of violence and cause con- st 1

and underperforming economies continued flicts to relapse. Development academics argue y through the fall of the Soviet Union. Under that the law of diminishing returns applies What is new, however, is the need to the aegis of the post–Washington Consensus, to foreign direct investment and aid. Perhaps reach beyond DOD and tap outside subject transparency, accountability, privatization, and there are military actions with diminishing matter experts in various other departments liberal democracy were packaged into a sacred returns and elasticities that we need to identify and agencies as working partners. Military bundle and parachuted into “unclean” devel- and put on the table. planners need to learn more about how oping countries. Simultaneously, however, they can tailor their interventions, teeing policymakers have remained threatened by The Liberalism/Realism Debate up for a sustainable phase of economic competitive economies, despite their market Economic reconstruction is too often reconstruction. Battle damage assessments of leanings. In other words, we have a publicly caught up in postconflict planning and should diplomatic channels of strategic communica- contradictory policy that extends the olive be embedded more thoroughly in military tion, economic drivers of growth, trade, and branch of trade and liberalism while simulta- planning. Keeping a blind eye to corruption commodity chain networks are just a few neously refusing to sell certain assets to foreign and informal markets may be politically expe- examples of the kinds of analyses a working countries in the name of national security. dient, especially during the drafting of a peace partnership could conduct. This economic dilemma is certainly rhetorical agreement. Common sense, however, suggests

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 51 the E c o n o m ic instru m ent o f p o wer

otherwise. Informal economies are not only realism debate. Friedman suggests that there For example, China has recently traded in dangerous breeding grounds for illicit trade is a modest role for economics, and he tests its political relationship with North Korea but, more importantly, are also incapable of three hypotheses that state, in summary, that for future investment and trade opportuni- mobilizing resources (raising taxes) for invest- mutually beneficial transnational exchange ties with the United States. Innovating and ing in the public good. Failure to generate and (between Israel and Palestine) reduces the creating new market niches should ensure spread prosperity will lead to future conflicts utility of warfare, enriches the nations, and our continued economic dominance, dimin- and instability. This brings us to the point that thereby engenders a preference for the status ishing the impact of outsourcing. Without economics and conflict are not so distinct. quo, promoting a positive effect. He concludes transgressing international dumping laws, David Keen, for example, writes that war that for those who view economic improve- new cost-effective ways of pushing out should not be perceived as an outgrowth of ment as the most important factor, there is a exports and raising tariffs on select imports chaos theory, where violence signals a massive strong correlation between economic integra- will be useful yet limited tools. Furthermore, societal meltdown. “Rather,” he states, “con- tion and support for peaceful diplomacy. On research should explore the feasibility of flict and war is simply a break of a particular the other hand, respondents who did not view creating market panics and financial crises. system in the hopes of creating an alternative economic improvement as the most important How could we overinvest deliberately in system of profit, power, and even protection.”6 issue tended to support attacks against Israel a region in order to induce capital flight, Unlike liberalism, realism postulates even when they believed it damaged the distort regional markets, and create future that nation-states are rational actors looking economy. Perhaps the greatest conclusion, and levers of power? The economics of the infor- to maximize security gains. Realists argue a rather subtle one, is what Friedman describes mation subdiscipline also offers promising that economic growth enables nation-states to as Hypothesis 4: insight. Are we hurting our future prospects develop stronger military capabilities and that by ceding away too much in the way of tech- actors are more willing to engage in war today The salience of economic concerns relative to nological and knowledge capital transfers? to secure a higher position tomorrow. Realism other concerns modifies the strength of the In other words, is there an unfair arbitrage also posits that nation-states will leverage their relationship between economic motives and that is leaving us short-changed? The devil economic powers to influence and threaten views on war and peace. One way forward is in the details, and there needs to be an those who are weaker. With the epigraph could be to conduct similar research but into examination of the timing and sequencing from Lord Palmerston in mind, determining different areas and relationships. of such economic actions alongside other clear-cut friends and foes will be increasingly national government strategies. difficult, especially in economic interdepen- A Shift in Thinking Interdependence entails a certain shift dence. One has to be clear, nonetheless, that There are some tangible economic policy in thinking about foreign investments. Going y economic growth and market-led reforms do instruments and overall directions to take in along with the conventional wisdom that it is not always coincide with Western democratic boosting our national security and strategic always better to wage war on someone else’s reforms; they are not hand-in-glove issues. capabilities. First, policymakers should avoid turf, we need to consider the types of invest- Growing economies may exhibit increased meddling with monetary policy. Our currency ment and capital we risk losing in foreign nationalism and clamor for conspicuous cul- and economic strengths trade off of growth countries during conflict. One hedging tural politics that, in the best-case scenario, act and return-on-investment opportunities. strategy is to tilt foreign investments toward as an alternative to “our” models and at worst Synchronizing interest rates and money supply mobile assets such as knowledge and human as an antagonistic competitor. capital; these would be recover- entar There is a dire need to find economic role playing should be elevated at military able sunken costs during times ways of dissuading growing exercises and given life outside of the closeted of war. As a corollary, we need economies from investing in world of wargaming to make sure that foreign invest- defense. (Over)investment in ments in the United States can a military may give regional be replaced relatively cheaply or neighbors the wrong security signals, prompt- with national defense strategy would signal substituted away. omm ing a regional arms race. More importantly, a moral hazard and weaken our position in Under the liberalist framework, eco- c if these countries experience significant eco- the global economy. With that said, sanctions nomic policy instruments look rather differ- nomic downturns, they will be left with stock- provide a feasible solution, albeit imperfect ent. For one thing, information operations piles of weapons as their only international in many situations. Critics of these policies (IO) present a commonsensical opportunity bargaining chips. argue that sanctions fail because they create for military planners and economists to Research of economic interdependence subterranean informal markets. Examples of collaborate. Promoting economic growth can take some cues from models arising out of relatively successful sanctions such as the Kim- and spreading awareness of economic the Palestinian-Israeli case study. Gil Friedman berley (diamond) Process demand a closer empowerment functions as an effective coun- conducted a brilliant analysis that explored study. Alternatively, creating a two-tier market terinsurgency tactic. In addition to buying the impact of economic incentives on views system that makes the cost of business unsus- away spoilers, IO campaigns that draw from of peace and violence.7 His study, a regression tainable for informal market entrepreneurs is economics can plant the seeds of self-empow- model of Palestinian views on diplomacy one way to deal with informal markets. erment, democratic participation, and civil and attacks using 2001 public opinion data, Staying economically competitive society. The increasing debt of the developing is couched broadly around the liberalism/ allows us to manufacture favorable tradeoffs. world may be a source of violent tension, but

52 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Kao

coordinated national security strategy that differentiates when and where the Nation is promoting economic cooperation/growth versus protecting itself from the vulnerabilities inherent in interdependence. Allowing U.S. civil affairs Soldiers assess slippery language to infect policy will lead Baghdad power transfer station to to disastrous confusion. Being explicit about help restore infrastructure our strategy and economic instruments will help us remain flexible and shuffle between liberal and realist positions with lower transition costs. An economist at U.S. Joint Forces Command claims that in times of peace, we need to harness the U.S. Government to persuade, influence, assist, reward, and socialize. In times of conflict and crisis, he suggests looking for “unified economic actions” to Signal Company (Charles Gill)

th dissuade, deter, isolate, defeat, and dominate. 55 These economic carrots and sticks should be indexed more explicitly to strategy and politi- there are opportunities as well. Tied aid and of being just a convenient mnemonic for cal goals, regardless of whether there is peace debt forgiveness are implicated in a system of getting planners to think holistically, there is or outright war. JFQ rewards and political reform. a growing danger that DIME is ossifying our To facilitate a working dialogue between thinking with respect to social analysis. Too N o t es economics and national security, we must be many people eschew various models because 1 willing to transform. Military planners and the models force them to identify an action Naomi Klein, “Baghdad Year Zero,” Harper’s strategists must appreciate the sensitivities or effect solely in terms of DIME-generated 309, no. 1852 (September 2004), 43–53. 2 Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International surrounding the reluctance on the part of categories. One of the powerful conclusions Primacy Matters,” International Security 17, no. 4 many professional economists to participate coming out of Collier’s research is that conflict (Spring 1993), 73. c in discussions spanning economics and is triggered by the interaction of economic 3 Aharon Barth, “Econo-Realism: Putting Eco- omm national strategy. For one thing, “applied” motives and other factors such as social and nomics at Center Stage. How Does, and Should, IR policy economics is entrenched in normative cultural politics. Economic relationships, just Research React to Expanding Economic Interdepen- struggles to solve the woes of underdeveloped as any other cultural or political observations, dence?” paper presented to the International Studies countries. Development economics proceeds are really enablers among social variables. Association 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, from understanding economics as a science The way they play out is always contingent March 14–18, 2000, available at .

4 entar efficient solutions to situations where the lack economics rigidly within the framework of Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New of resources threatens to undermine rational DIME would amount to a certain degree of Map (New York: Putnam, 2004). 5 Paul Collier, “Development and Conflict,” behavior and distribution. In a nutshell, negative training. Centre for the Study of African Economies, Depart- normative economics in practice concerns To deepen our understanding and move ment of Economics, Oxford University, October itself with maximizing the greatest good for away from a superficial DIME analysis of eco- 1, 2004, available at . See also Paul economists fear that treating their discipline as such topic areas as new institutional econom- Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in

a weapon vitiates the unfettered nature of the ics, different markets’ ontologies, behaviors, Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 2004 56, no. 4, y market system and generates distorting price and the forces and types of capital that regulate 563–595. and information noise. For these academics, preferences and clear imperfect contracts.8 6 David Keen, The Economic Functions of war is an exogenous shock and signifies points Complementary to all this, economic role Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 320 (New along a historical time-series. Keeping aware playing should be elevated at military exercises York: Oxford University Press for the International of these normative and institutional tendencies and given life outside of the closeted world Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), 11. 7 Gil Friedman, “Commercial Pacifism and Pro- will help pave the road toward effective com- of wargaming. Having various economists tracted Conflict: Models from the Palestinian-Israeli munication techniques that will bolster the (representing the Department of the Treasury Case,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (June overall national security dialogue. and the Federal Reserve, for example) train 2005), 360–382. and adjudicate options under pressurized situ- 8 See Samuel Bowles, “Endogenous Prefer- Economic Relationships as Enablers ations within a command post exercise would ences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and The military planning and research be highly valuable. Other Economic Institutions,” Journal of Economic community should wean itself away from People often refer to the economic Literature 36 (1998), 11; and Samuel Bowles, conventional diplomatic, information, mili- instruments of power as the carrots and Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions and Evolution tary, and economic (DIME) analysis. Instead sticks. But we need a sophisticated and (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 53 The Case for Alliances By E lizabeth S herwood -R andall

oes America need allies? The United States is the strongest nation on earth, the only stand- D ing superpower, and its natural impulse is to assume that it can act unencum- bered. Paradoxically, America needs allies because of its overwhelming strengths and the vulnerabilities that lurk in the shadow of such unprecedented national power. In this era of American predominance, alliances are more compelling than ever, yet U.S. citizens are largely unaware of or unin- formed about who their allies are. For example, in the recent uproar over the potential acquisi- y tion by a Dubai company of contracts for management of U.S. ports, many were ignorant of Dubai’s status as a long-standing partner providing critical support to American policies in the Persian Gulf. The lack of clarity underscores the fact that policymakers and analysts have failed to think strategically or systemati- cally about the role alliances should play in entar American national security in the 21st century. As a consequence, they have also failed to build the public support necessary for sustained global engagements. What does an alliance offer that the United States cannot obtain otherwise? omm Alliances are binding, durable security com- c mitments between two or more nations. The critical ingredients of a meaningful alliance are Royal Saudi Land Forces and other coalition the shared recognition of common threats and members roll through channel cleared of mines, Operation Desert Storm a pledge to take action to counter them. To forge agreement, an alliance requires ongoing policy consultations that continually set expectations for allied behavior. In light of the amorphous nature of new security challenges, such consultations will be essential instru- Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall is Adjunct Senior Fellow for Alliance Relations at the Council on Foreign ments of American leadership, especially with Relations, Senior Research Scholar at the Stanford University Center for International Security and regard to building and maintaining consensus Cooperation, and Senior Advisor to the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project. She was a Deputy on ends and means. To generate the capac-

Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1996. DOD (Dean M. Fox) ity to operate together, an alliance requires

54 JFQ / issue 43, 4 th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu commentary - 55 -

JFQ / Sherwood-Randall quarter 2006 th 43, 4 43, Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu at Jebel Ali, United at Jebel Ali, issue To act preventively rather than react only only react than rather preventively act To The opening phase of the Iraq War is is War Iraq the of phase opening The Tarawa century. While preparing for large-scale large-scale for preparing While century. st ailor stands watch aboard Sailor stands watch aboard USS Arab Emirates

after catastrophe, America needs an expanded expanded an needs America catastrophe, after of capabilities the engages fully that toolkit Because own. its as well as countries other its seal hermetically cannot States United the there them, within itself cocoon and borders respond can it which in scenarios few are sus the without challenges these to effectively partners. and allies of support tained phase of the effort. the of phase for paradigm dominant the be to likely not also the in power military U.S. of engagement the 21 warfighting unconventional and conventional as deterrence enhance to necessary remain will many face will America force, deploy to as well such to themselves lend not will that threats unilateral less much responses, military robust that threats significant of list short The ones. nor prevent neither can States United the terrorists by attacks includes alone to respond weapons; biological and/or nuclear with armed mass of weapons of proliferation widespread delivery long-range and (WMD) destruction growing a in operations stability vehicles; petri perfect are that states failed of number of rise the and groups; extremist for dishes such challenges, security transnational “new” threats these of Each disease. pandemic as growth the to relation in danger in grow may of proliferation the example, for another; of weapons nuclear current the beyond WMD terrorists that likely more much it makes states them. obtain to able be will doctrinal development, planning, equipping, equipping, planning, development, doctrinal members. NATO by undertaken training and Alli Atlantic the that fact the Furthermore, war to go to decision the over split was ance and France as such allies NATO key that and military the in join to unwilling were Germany multinational the reduced severely campaign during States United the to available assistance postconflict costly more and longer much the (Marvin Harris) (Marvin Tarawa USS - - -

century, the view view the century, st oes America Get from Alliances? from Get America oes D . The initial phase of the Iraq War, with with War, Iraq the of phase initial The . Generate Capabilities That Amplify U.S. U.S. Amplify That Capabilities Generate In the intensely interconnected security security interconnected intensely the In generate capabilities that amplify U.S. U.S. amplify that capabilities generate exer the for legitimacy of basis a create counterbalance to impulse the avert strategic from away partners steer n n n n (though not decisive) military support and and support military decisive) not (though of years the on dependent entirely almost was Power opera maneuver high-intensity and rapid the capable are today allies U.S. few that tions example an as cited often is undertaking, of are relationships alliance traditional why of is claim This useful. or required longer no and itself Iraq to respect with both wrong assumption underlying the to regard with future of model likely most the is Iraq that North some of involvement The conflict. allies (NATO) Organization Treaty Atlantic important provided basis national a on alliances. Going forward, the purpose of alli of purpose the forward, Going alliances. fourfold: be must ances power power American of cise power U.S. self-reliance. excessive or apathy that the United States should retain the right right the retain should States United the that must institutions old that itself, defend to formal less that and times, changing to adapt security meaningful a make can arrangements interests national America’s contribution, in ever than investment greater a require now from investments made in long-standing alli long-standing in made investments from debt. their acknowledging without ances What 21 the of environment administration Bush senior some by espoused that term, first the during especially officials, is benefits, their outweigh allies of costs the antithesis the are Alliances flawed. strategically self- highly a are they passivity: or altruism of American advancing for instrument interested self-evident is it While security. national national policies and prepared participants to to participants prepared and policies national battlefield. the on together effectively operate borrowed have willing the of coalitions Recent ------to go without or around an ally the first impulse of allies should be to

It is instructive to contrast an alliance alliance an contrast to instructive is It Alliances also create incentives for for incentives create also Alliances Alliances can range in their obligations obligations their in range can Alliances turn to one another for support; the last impulse should be mitments that over decades have coordinated coordinated have decades over that mitments ndupress.ndu.edu nize one fundamental fact: the capabilities that that capabilities the fact: fundamental one nize based are groupings these by fielded been have com alliance underlying upon entirely almost military definitions. Indeed, the argument that that argument the Indeed, definitions. military impromptu such with replaced be can alliances recog to failure a from derives arrangements entirely different organisms with respect to the the to respect with organisms different entirely breadth the and commitment the of durability which in era an in particularly cooperation, of traditional beyond far go must cooperation priority initiatives. priority are two The willing.” the of “coalition the with stantly stimulated to consider how their inter their how consider to stimulated stantly partners their of interests the with dovetail ests own their for support maximize to order in broader context of prior shared experience, experience, shared prior of context broader and agenda, current the on items concomitant con are allies Therefore, goals. longer-term tures consultations and enables horse trading. trading. horse enables and consultations tures nar issue policy each consider not do Allies the within rather but merits own its on rowly reaching multinational consensus. In the most most the In consensus. multinational reaching a from benefit participants alliances, effective struc that mechanism coordinating central seek to thwart an ally’s policy goals. policy ally’s an thwart to seek and defense policy choices. The first impulse impulse first The choices. policy defense and another one to turn to be should allies of go to be should impulse last the support; for and oppose to or ally, an around or without parts. At a minimum, allies are expected to to expected are allies minimum, a At parts. and perspectives the consideration into take foreign make they as partners their of interests sum of cooperation between or among the the among or between cooperation of sum the than greater be will states participating constituent the of addition arithmetic sheer an attack on all”—to guarantees that are more more are that guarantees all”—to on attack an the alliances, all Across ambition. in limited the which in entity an of creation the is ideal understood as vital to national security. national to vital as understood is one on attack expansive—“an most the from the past, such action has resided largely in the the in largely resided has action such past, the future, the in cooperation; military of domain collaborative of set broader a to extend will it be to come have recently only that activities sustained preparations for combined action. In In action. combined for preparations sustained andall -R herwood S lizabeth E

By Alliances the case f o r alliances

An alliance can be distinguished from Occasionally, the United States chose to use Avert the Impulse to Counterbalance U.S. other kinds of cooperative relationships its power in ways that strained relations with Power. As America’s power has become ever between or among nations by the existence allies, such as at Suez in 1956 or during the more dominant, there is a growing inclination of interoperable military capabilities that Vietnam War, but never to the breaking point; to seek to constrain U.S. unilateralism—to enhance prevention, provide deterrence, what held its alliances together was so much bind the American Gulliver.2 The current and contribute to effective defense. A fully more compelling than whatever centrifugal effort to generate European Union foreign and evolved alliance is notable for its capability forces might be at work. defense policy competencies partially reflects to undertake combined strategic planning, With traditional approaches to preven- the impulse to establish a counterweight to in which two or more nations’ security tion, deterrence, and defense under siege, alli- U.S. power. In Asia, U.S. dominance is also establishments conduct threat assessments, ances offer the single most effective mechanism questioned by those who resent American anticipate future security needs, and commit to the development and implementation of a common program to meet the requirements generated by this process. Rather than scrambling to coordinate their capabilities in a crisis, allies can count on preparing to operate alongside one another. Preparedness in the face of new security threats will require the expansion of strategic planning and coordination of effort across allied governments, involving agencies that previously did not consider themselves essential to national security. The day-to-day business of a meaningful future alliance will necessitate the collaboration of national security establishments, not just defense and mili- Participants boarding Russian KA–27 while U.S. Sailors secure

tary establishments. This will involve broader N. Vasquez) U.S. Navy (Edward area during joint humanitarian exercise Passex ’06 and deeper combined planning, training, and equipping of personnel—including those that for ensuring that American actions are per- influence and yearn to chart their own course, y do not belong to departments or ministries of ceived to be legitimate. Planning for and using potentially in association with others seeking defense—than has previously been achieved. American power in a multinational context greater global stature, such as China. Wash- To be fully effective, the United States will enables the United States to build an updated ington’s ability to preempt or mitigate such need to lead an effort to link agencies of gov- consensus on when and how to use force. balancing behavior is considerably enhanced ernment that have not engaged in sustained Acting without such international “cover” by transmitting its power through binational multinational collaborative activities and that is increasingly problematic, both because it or multinational structures. have traditionally resisted “foreign” access. foments resistance to U.S. policies and because Steer Partners Away from Strategic This is most notable in the need for sharing the United States needs the help of others to Apathy or Excessive Self-Reliance. Another entar intelligence and fusing data in real time. achieve its goals, especially in the arduous and challenge facing the United States is the real In the defense and intelligence domains, extended aftermath of most military operations. danger that key allies will cease to believe America’s extraordinary technological prowess There is another way in which the that international security requires their presents an additional challenge to the full inte- legitimacy conferred by alliance relationships active engagement. The end of the Cold War gration of allied capabilities. It is hard for most can either strengthen the U.S. hand or reduce exacerbated latent tendencies in this direction, militaries to fight alongside American forces.1 its effectiveness. If America uses its power in and the construction of a unified Europe has omm Yet it is not in American interest for its allies ways that are perceived to respect international provided an internally oriented focal point for c to lack capabilities, to use such a deficit as an norms, it can bolster the global stature and many over the past decade. Such a divergence excuse not to join us in military action, or to be influence of its allies. This creates a favorable of attention has begun to create a divergence such a burden on the U.S. military that it resists climate for the pursuit of its national security of interests that undermines solidarity in taking allies along (as was the case in Afghani- goals. Conversely, if it chooses to act outside the Atlantic Alliance. Across the globe and stan in 2001). The United States therefore needs of its alliances, it undermines its allies’ inter- under different circumstances, long-standing to lead a continuing effort to improve interoper- national standing, making it harder for them American ties in the Republic of Korea are ability and information connectivity with allies. to support American policies. This makes it facing challenges, especially from a younger Create a Basis of Legitimacy for the Exer- harder to achieve American objectives. Ulti- generation that feels no debt to the United cise of American Power. For the United States, mately, the United States also risks diminish- States, with the potential to alter the security the issue of legitimacy was largely dormant ing the stature of leaders who are most closely landscape in that region and beyond. throughout the Cold War. America held the identified with its policies, which can lead to On the other end of the spectrum, moral high ground; the enemy was repres- their ouster and the election of governments countries whose security is not embedded in a sive domestically and imperialistic abroad. less committed to cooperation. network of steady relationships may be inclined

56 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu commentary - - - - 57 - - - -

JFQ

/ here here T Sherwood-Randall quarter 2006 th 43, 4 43, Even though polling data show show data polling though Even issue oes America Get Get America oes build upon existing bilateral and mul and bilateral existing upon build stronger of establishment the promote coopera security peacetime pursue coopera of spectrum full the utilize D An American alliance strategy would would strategy alliance American An n n n n Multi and Bilateral Existing Upon Build policies and doubts about America’s role in role America’s about doubts policies and to goodwill—and a preference the world, prev together—remains constructively work invested have that elites older among alent For States. in ties the United with much in behavior American generations, younger influence will profoundly years few the next as leadership whether they see Washington’s benign malign. or How How Here? from of view long-range comprehensive, a take be would and requirements security national It multiyear. and multilayered, multifaceted, four- a to States United the commit would policy: pronged and relationships, institutions, alliance tilateral capabilities alliances enduring become might that ties necessarily not will that countries with tion allies formal become comple that arrangements international tive alliances. ment and Relationships, Institutions, Alliance lateral Capabilities. American for support in public drop a huge the American Government, between the United States and key allies, and among alli ances that span the globe. Alliances provide the political framework, the fundamental underpinning, to broad engagement across agencies that affect national security. It will be necessary to build up over time, both bilaterally and in multinational alliances, a dense network of interactions. This will be crucial in dealing with threats such as WMD proliferation and nonstate terrorism, which are less susceptible to traditional military tools and which require intimate cooperation across previously “domestic” structures such as departments of justice, treasury, health, and law enforcement. Old notions of protection of national intel ligence assets are also severely challenged by the imperatives of addressing new threats, where the sharing of information on a timely basis may make the difference between life and death for millions. ------

century, other regions regions other century, st century, Europe consumed consumed Europe century, th -century threats are global rather rather global are threats -century st -century security challenges. Third, Third, challenges. security -century Effective security cooperation now Further challenging existing maps and and maps existing challenging Further In the 20 the In st necessitates a much wider embrace of gov ernmental functions. This is true within tion is an economic one, globalization has sig has globalization one, economic an is tion domain, security the in implications nificant as well as threats for consequences with compels it alliances, to respect With responses. In fundamentals. the of some of rethinking will alliances dangers, transnational of face the the than terms broader in defined be to need Transre model. based geographically classical will alliances and allies among linkages gional that fact the to response in forged be to need 21 many nature. in regional than the tables are slowly turning: In the future, the the future, the In turning: slowly are tables the dimension one in powerful States—all United might—might very its by hamstrung often but in allies its on less than rather more depend goals. global its achieve to Asia and Europe with faced now is States United the mindsets, its all in globalization of phenomenon the defini precise most the Though dimensions. of the attention and resources that it absorbed absorbed it that resources and attention the of of support in offered it that partnership the and 21 the In policies. U.S. and interest American command world the of America reunified, Europe With engagement. Europe too, So, fate. its on riveted longer no is depend to need longer no they that believe ans they as security their for States United the on may same The War. Cold the throughout did Overall, Asia. in alliances American of said be between the regional rootedness of its partner its of rootedness regional the between nature globalized increasingly the and ships 21 of alliance its expand to work should America gov of set wider a encompass to relationships capabilities nongovernmental and ernmental range full the to respond to tools provide that threats. likely of ener international America’s of share lion’s the the of regions other in conflicts Although gies. time from States United the preoccupied world terms in dominant remained Europe time, to as they once were on the American security security American the on were once they as a spearhead to needs it Second, guarantee. tension the reconcile to initiative sustained - - - - eeds? N eet eet M one cluster in Europe, and one in Asia

two major sets of alliance relationships are discernable: While the array of relationships that that relationships of array the While Looking at the globe, two major sets the globe, major two Looking at In 2006, the landscape of American American of landscape the 2006, In o America’s Alliances Alliances America’s o fact that its allies are no longer as dependent dependent as longer no are allies its that fact ndupress.ndu.edu to evolve in several critical dimensions in in dimensions critical several in evolve to First, needs. future and present meet to order the account into take must States United the exists today provides a strong foundation for for foundation strong a provides today exists needs it influence, American of exercise the analysts used to worry about a “strategy- used worry to analysts about least be they at should Now mismatch.” force the “power-influ about equally concerned mismatch.” ence unparalleled U.S. power does not necessarily necessarily does not power U.S. unparalleled American achieve to the ability into translate security security the Cold War, In goals. and the Middle East. What is most striking most is the East. Middle What and framework overarching no is there that is that and abroad relationships America’s for In addition, the United States maintains maintains States the United addition, In close security in other ties countries with Latin America, Africa, including regions, of alliance relationships are discernable: one one discernable: are alliance relationships of They are in Asia. one and in Europe, cluster in content. and in structure different vastly still retains some influence over the policy policy the over influence some retains still countries. allied many in process may be under way but is as yet not entirely entirely not yet as is but way under be may generation the because especially perceptible, institutions War Cold in much so invested that Union; the U.S.-led effort to redefine the mis the redefine to effort U.S.-led the Union; the in partnerships and alliances key of sions years 15 that fact the and inertia; sheer 1990s; change that so history, human in blip mere a is be explained by several factors: the pent-up pent-up the factors: several by explained be was that West the with association for longing Soviet the of collapse the after requited finally the Cold War alliance system. These arrange These system. alliance War Cold the comprehen nor systematic neither are ments can structures old the of durability The sive. commitments around the world—and the the world—and the around commitments the to made have others that commitments of features the of many States—retains United D feeling threatened and insecure may fan the the fan may insecure and threatened feeling to some leading nationalism, fanatical of flames commitments their reverse possibly and revisit Treaty. Non-Proliferation Nuclear the to to pursue autarkic paths. For example, leaders leaders example, For paths. autarkic pursue to the case f o r alliances

The Bush administration needs to the U.S. presence be drastically reduced or the establishment of more formal alliance ties undertake a major effort to renew America’s terminated in one, pressures would likely include Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, most important bilateral relationships. Span- mount in the other to follow suit. As China and South Africa. ning the globe, from Turkey to the Republic of plays an increasingly shrewd game in the In the multilateral domain, the absence Korea, from Brazil to Poland, a systematic and region, cultivating opportunities to enhance of a security cooperation mechanism is most sustained commitment to listening to allies is its power in ways that may diminish the U.S. striking in Asia. The United States has played urgently required. Consultation must be more role, America’s Asian alliances become all the a major stabilizing role in the region since the than just informing counterparts of predeter- more significant.4 They are also necessary end of World War II and has relied heavily on mined American positions; it must take their building blocks for collective responses to bilateral relationships to achieve its security perspectives into consideration while policies global security challenges. goals. Historic and current rivalries among are being formulated. Genuine give and take is Looking to the longer term, the United regional powers have been a major obstacle to crucial to achieving consensus on threats and States should seek to establish a worldwide the establishment of institutionalized multina- responses. Furthermore, these bilateral ties are network of key allies, with the objective of tional cooperation. Yet the need is greater than also the essential building blocks of multina- creating an alliance of alliances. This would ever for a mechanism that provides a regular tional alliances. permit bridge-building between and among forum for consultation, policy coordination, Given the pace of globalization, it makes existing institutional arrangements and would crisis management, and response. sense to ask whether the existing regionally facilitate linkages with organizations such Pursue Peacetime Security Cooperation based alliance structures are outdated. To as the Group of Eight, the Organization for with Countries That Will Not Necessarily a certain extent, geography is still destiny, Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Become Formal Allies. A much undervalued and the neighborhood in which a state exists United Nations, marrying competencies in U.S. policy instrument involves the pursuit of will play a great part in shaping its security diplomacy, economics, and defense. peacetime security cooperation with countries perspective and in determining its participa- Promote the Establishment of Stronger whose orientation and future may be uncer- tion in alliances. But to be relevant to the full Ties That Might Become Enduring Alliances. tain. Correctly conceived and executed, such range of real and potential security challenges, A U.S. alliance strategy that maximizes the efforts can reduce suspicion, build confidence, alliances must increasingly be functionally benefits of enduring relationships would not and encourage reform; they can also lay the oriented. NATO has already taken note of this only seek to strengthen existing bilateral and foundations for prospective partnership and important trend and has transformed itself, multilateral arrangements but also attempt potential alliance relationships. These kinds moving from a strict definition of its theater to advance the development of relationships of investments require U.S. policymakers to of operations to common acceptance that its that currently fall short of alliance status. look beyond the immediate requirements y only meaningful missions will most likely be For a variety of reasons, it will most likely of national security. Also, they necessitate “out of area.” not be realistic to offer or ask for guarantees sustained engagement and taking a genuine Extending this concept further, NATO similar to NATO’s Article V, but the United interest in the perspectives and concerns of should pursue a greater degree of interface States can and should pursue the institu- other countries. and potential formal coordination with other tionalization of security cooperation with a Such initiatives are usually low in cost countries, groups, and organizations. Already, number of countries. but offer the possibility of big payoffs if they some of this is taking place, with mechanisms In identifying potential allies, the are conceptually sound and pursued with sen- such as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, United States should consider factors includ- sitivity and discretion. A leading example took entar Mediterranean Dialogue, and Southeast ing governance, geography, regional stature, place a decade ago in Central Asia. Looking at Europe Initiative, in discussions of expanded and potential for meaningful security coop- maps of the world, senior Pentagon officials linkages with Australia, Israel, and Japan, and eration. Based on these standards, America noted that what had been considered the in structured partnerships with Russia and should continue the development of fuller underbelly of the Soviet Union was now acces- Ukraine. However, there is no overarching security ties with India. With a capable sible and without firm geopolitical orientation. conceptual framework for these arrangements. professional military under firm civilian A subsequent, relatively modest program to omm The evolution of mechanisms for marrying control—setting it apart from many of its establish bilateral and multilateral security c NATO’s competencies with the European neighbors—and major modernization pro- ties with these countries literally redefined Union’s potential will also be critical.3 grams under way, India has the potential to the borders of Europe so that newly indepen- In Asia, U.S. interests dictate the main- be a highly competent military partner. Much dent states adjacent to Afghanistan and Iran tenance of a robust diplomatic, economic, progress has been made in this direction in became members of NATO’s Partnership for and military presence. In the cases of Japan the past 5 years, but much more is possible. Peace and offered basing rights to the United and the Republic of Korea, it is preferable Inevitably, the pursuit of enhanced ties with States after 9/11. to wrestle with disagreements within the India will complicate the relationship with Today, there are a variety of countries context of an alliance relationship than to Pakistan, and while this dynamic must be in the world with whom discreet, substantive succumb to pressures that would cast either well managed, it should not stand in the security cooperation—such as in preventing one of them strategically adrift. Furthermore, way of the fruition of an important alliance proliferation or interdicting terrorist activity— the presence of U.S. forces in both countries relationship. Other countries that present can contribute to shaping positive perceptions. helps prevent either from feeling isolated in opportunities for the advancement of bilat- In some cases, these initiatives will establish playing its role as an American ally. Should eral security cooperation with a view toward patterns of behavior that might ultimately take

58 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu commentary - 59 (New (New What What

Gulliver’s Gulliver’s JFQ Keeping the the Keeping , ed. Ashton B. B. Ashton ed. , / Q F J (Washington, (Washington, Centre for European European for Centre Allies in Crisis: Crisis: in Allies Sherwood-Randall es o t quarter 2006 th N Mind the Gap the Mind 43, 4 43, issue Day in and day out, the default mode Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Sherwood, D. Elizabeth For an insightful and enduring treatment of of treatment enduring and insightful an For the linking for ideas useful of number A Asia, in emerged have structures new Several David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and and Kugler, L. Richard Gompert, C. David 5 5 2 2 3 4 1 1 Uzbekistan (and which recently extended observer observer extended recently which (and Uzbekistan accord not do Pakistan), and Iran, India, to status table. the at place a Americans Security Western to Challenges Global Meeting 184–187. 1990), Press, University Yale Haven: 2000), 235–264. 2000), poses power unrivaled America’s that challenge the Hoffmann, Stanley see policy, foreign its to Policy Foreign American of Setting the or Troubles, 1968). Hill, McGraw York: (New are Union European the and NATO, States, United Leonard, Mark and Grant Charles by offered Institutions? Transatlantic New at available 2005), (April/May 41 Bulletin Reform . of some but States United the involve which of some participate do Americans not. do pointedly which which Cooperation, Economic Asia-Pacific the in ASEAN the and economics, with principally deals security Asia-Pacific for vehicle a Forum, Regional Talks, Party Six the is entrant newest The dialogue. nuclear Korea’s North address to 2003 in established China, States, United the involving ambitions, Korea. South and North both and Russia, Japan, process a Three, Plus ASEAN contrast, stark In China, with along nations Asian Southeast involving Shanghai the and Korea, of Republic the and Japan, China, involves which Organization, Cooperation and Tajikistan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, must be to work with allies to get things done. In the short run it may be easier to goforeign it alone. and defense However, policies are measured not only by how they respond to present requirements but also by whether they create the conditions for a safer future. A strategic approach to Ameri can alliances will enable the States United to translate its unique power into effective global influence that genuinely enhances American national security. Libicki, C. Martin 1999); Press, University Defense National DC: the “Managing Sherwood-Randall, Elizabeth and in Relations,” International Pentagon’s Future the for Defense Managing Edge: Press, MIT (Cambridge: White P. John and Carter ------The United States must rebuild its alli its rebuild must States United The To achieve an enduring sense of of sense enduring an achieve To Less formal structures, dohowever, not In the diplomatic realm, informal coali informal realm, diplomatic the In

with international institutions and nongov and institutions international with organizations. ernmental in the illusory hope that less formal arrange formal less that hope illusory the in sus and flexibility both provide will ments support. tained connectiv a new kind of innovate and ances regions and institutions, countries, across ity alliance system in a broad-based results that disparate its of the sum than greater far is that also remain must States parts. United The foreign for possible it making to committed American alongside capably operate to forces that mechanisms establishing to and troops effective security cooperation permit more tum and incentives for supporting American initiatives that are being pursued through more informal processes. be not will it purpose, and interest common expect and power American flex to sufficient must States United The line. in fall to others mag a into power its transform to ways find to nations and peoples draws that force netic national American serve not will It goals. its multilateralism disparage to interests security ties enduring of pursuit the abandon to or possibilities available to an American admin American an to available possibilities for opportunities exploit to seeks that istration support. international supplant more formal arrangements. Indeed, the success of informal undertakings will depend in large part on the vitality and durability of the bilateral and multilateral ties the United States maintains and culti vates. Decisions about participation in such ad hoc groupings will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis in national capitals. Multilateral alliances can generate momen been created for ongoing conflict resolution resolution conflict ongoing for created been process peace East Middle the as such efforts Further Nagorno-Karabakh. of status the and Talks Party Six the as such processes more, engagement facilitated have Korea North on vital of issue an on parties interested with States. United the to concern security national Initiative Security Proliferation the Finally, for cooperation of model new a created has challenge: security international specific a deliv and materials of transit the interdicting destruction. mass of weapons for systems ery additional of range the suggest examples These tions have been devised to address specific specific address to devised been have tions have groups” “contact and challenges, policy U.S. Navy (Darrell Crandall) (Darrell Navy U.S. - - - - A leading A leading 5 U.S. national security national U.S. all

. An effective American alliance alliance effective. An American Utilize the Full Spectrum of Cooperative Cooperative of Spectrum Full the Utilize structures and less formal arrangements. formal less and structures ndupress.ndu.edu with the will and capability to take action to the will capability with and of example an is theater the European beyond alliance between synergies existing available NATO nations. The Combined Joint Task Task Joint Combined The nations. NATO in the model developed mid-1990s to Force members those NATO for a vehicle create the first Gulf War, for which the United States States which the United for War, the Gulf first that coalition a multinational organized the formal assets outside NATO upon drew non- also involved and framework Alliance allies with reaching agreement to or partici or to agreement allies reaching with all members. in action by pation was cooperation such case of contemporary arrangements that drew upon the political upon drew that arrangements the of military and preparedness foundation the burden did not but structure Alliance allies found that out-of-area challenges, challenges, out-of-area that allies found allied of commit domain the formal beyond ad hoc best through met often were ment, The informal approach to multilateralism multilateralism to approach informal The for During the Cold War, roots: sound has NATO its and States the United example, strengthened by the recognition that alli that the recognition by strengthened fulfill willances not be may arrangements other that needs and in specific circumstances. appropriate more International Arrangements That Complement Complement That Arrangements International Alliances indeed and be complemented would strategy derailments in bilateral relations, or looming looming or relations, bilateral in derailments conflict. of sources In less felicitous cases, they provide American American provide they cases, felicitous less In warning early valuable with policymakers conditions, domestic deteriorating about nevertheless anchor participants in activities activities in participants anchor nevertheless well as interests security own their serve that demonstrat goals, American to contribute as sides. both to partnership of rewards the ing on the characteristics of an alliance. In others, others, In alliance. an of characteristics the on will but ties close such to lead not may they ush commends coalition Bush commends coalition President George W. presidential palace former forces at Saddam’s theater civil affairs s o ldiers : a f o rce at ris k

(USPACOM) from December 26, 2004, to February 21, 2005. During this relief effort, Theater Civil the 96th could muster only 18 Soldiers for the operation out of an authorized strength Affairs Soldiers of 48. The shortage was due to recurrent deployments and augmentation of civil affairs companies attached to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) for operations in Iraq. This A lack of rapid reaction CA capability forced Force to request Reserve Component forces, which were already stretched to the breaking point. at Risk If the entire 96th had been available, a strong capability could have been established in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Requested By W illiam R . F lori g Reserve forces were not used because the Sec- retary of Defense decided not to leave any U.S. forces in the affected countries after the initial he future of the joint civil affairs and mobilization constraints, Active duty CA relief effort was complete. (CA) force looks bleak. If drastic battalions should be created and allocated to Furthermore, the 96th Civil Affairs Bat- measures are not taken, this support geographic combatant commanders. talion can rarely field more than 2 civil affairs T unique capability will soon be a These battalions must be larger than current teams per quarter to assist with the entire shadow of its former self. To make it relevant proposals call for and assigned directly to the USPACOM area of responsibility, which for the nationbuilding operations of the combatant commanders. The Reserve CA consists of 43 countries, 20 territories and pos- future, the Active force needs to be greatly force must also be redesigned and downsized sessions, and 10 American territories. When expanded while the Reserve Component to reflect recruiting and retention realities. those teams are in-theater, they are focused must be right-sized and realigned to reflect Four years of sustained combat opera- exclusively on the USPACOM commander’s recruiting and membership realities that are tions have had a telling effect on both the Army priority in regard to the war on terror, leaving part of Reserve life. Establishing a habitual Active and Reserve Component civil affairs no capability for additional theater engagement. featurefeature relationship with a combatant command is units. The Army’s only Active duty CA unit, Instead, these teams should have the focus of the way ahead for this expanded CA force, the recently expanded 96th Civil Affairs Bat- an entire battalion, with 4 companies and 20 without all the bureaucratic layers of head- talion, has seen a heavy operating tempo. This civil affairs teams for regular use and rotation quarters that get in the way. battalion consists of six companies that are in-theater in support of the commander. Addi- The best proposal to fix the civil affairs regionally oriented and focused on a combatant tionally, included in the USPACOM theater are force is an Active Component expansion to commander’s theater of operations. The force is Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries five larger battalions assigned to the combatant adequate for short duration contingency opera- that receive scant civil affairs support to shape commands, and the creation of a smaller, more tions and has served its purpose well. But for the environment and build host-nation capacity capable Reserve CA force aligned with these long conflicts such as the war on terror, these to combat terrorism. battalions. Without steps to alleviate the stress companies are overtaxed and too often must be on the Reserve Component civil affairs force, reallocated to cover shortfalls in other theaters. Civil Affairs Realities it will cease to be relevant or effective. Stated an executive officer of one of the compa- But why build more Active Component nies concerning the constant deployment of the capability at greater cost when we have such a The Problem 96th, “You’re either there, you just got home, or large Reserve Component force to draw from? Since September 11, 2001, Army and you’re getting ready to go.”1 Unfortunately, operations in Afghanistan and Marine Corps civil affairs forces have under- The secondary effect of replacing other Iraq have left the Reserve civil affairs force in gone tremendous stress because of operational regionally focused companies in-theater is a broken state that will take years to repair. deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. The that they eventually lose their regional spe- Writing in Army, Mark Kimmey argues for Army Reserve provides a large percentage of cialization due to focus on one theater only. Active Component expansion and analyzes CA Soldiers today, with the Marine Corps This robs other combatant commanders of why the Reserve Component is not the solu- adding a small force from the Marine Reserve. the CA experts required to execute their own tion to continued joint CA support for lengthy Because of Presidential call-up to execute the operations and to support the Theater Security conflicts or peacetime theater support.2 war on terror, mobilizing future civil affairs Cooperation Plan. Kimmey believes the Army Reserve civil forces for regional contingencies and support- A striking example occurred during affairs force has done a tremendous job in ing combatant commanders’ theater strategies Operation Unified Assistance, the tsunami Afghanistan and Iraq despite personnel and are jeopardized. To overcome operating tempo relief effort led by U.S. Pacific Command resource constraints, but the current force is past the breaking point. During the last 3 years Lieutenant Colonel William R. Florig, USA, is Plans and Operations Chief, Civil-Military Operations Division, of mobilizations, for instance, nearly every Marine Division Combat Camera (Andrew D. Young) Marine Division Combat Camera (Andrew st J–32, U.S. Pacific Command. 1 available CA Soldier was mobilized and spent

60 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Florig a year or more in Iraq or Afghanistan. These Equipment has been another problem Marines, make up the all-Reserve Marine CA Reservists have civilian jobs and cannot mobi- for mobilizing Army Reserve CA battalions force. They have been deployed continuously lize for successive years. Deployment stresses for Iraqi Freedom. While the only Active Com- since the war on terror began in 2001. The are just beginning to be seen, and many skilled ponent CA battalion (the 96th) had the latest Marines decided to expand the force just for civil affairs Soldiers will likely leave the force weapons, communications, and vehicles, the the Iraq conflict by creating the 5th and 6th and take their irreplaceable skills with them Reserve battalions initially did not have the CAGs of nearly 200 personnel, who arrived due to the high operating tempo. A Reservist state-of-the-art communications equipment or in Iraq to support the I Marine Expedition- cannot participate in successive mobilizations command and control systems used by regular ary Force. Sandra Erwin writes, “The Marine without risking both career and family.3 units. Personnel did not even see these systems Corps created the 5th CAG for this deployment Currently, Reserve CA specialties are too until they drew them in-theater, and few to ease the deployment cycles of the 3d and frequently filled with Soldiers who have little operators were trained before arrival. Also, the 4th CAGs and to create additional civil affairs if any experience in the necessary skill sets. battalions did not have the shorter M4 carbine assets. The unit was established in late 2004 Education and language abilities, for example, so essential for firing from confined spaces in and shipped down to Camp Lejeune, are lacking. For years, U.S. Army Civil Affairs vehicular and urban operations. The bottom North Carolina, for training from and Psychological Operations Command has line is that the Reserve battalions could not January until February 2005.”5 claimed that CA skills are so specialized that communicate with their regular Army coun- The creation of a composite 5th they can only be found in the Reserve force. terparts and had inadequate weaponry for all CAG demonstrates how worn This idea has been oversold to the Army and but the smallest, short-duration firefights. out the Marine civil affairs feature the Department of Defense as a whole. Very More generally, there is a wide gap Reservists are. Of note, these rarely are the specialized teams filled with in military education between Reserve CA CAGs will be disbanded once officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs) leaders and their Active counterparts. This is their mission in Iraq is complete. who can do the job. also the case with training. Reservists receive In the end, if the Army were serious The Reserve force is composed of civil only 24 training days yearly, much of it admin- about supporting all of DOD with affairs generalists, not specialists. Too often istratively oriented and poorly resourced, and CA forces, the Marines would units are happy just to have bodies of the 2 weeks of unit annual training. That cannot not need CAGs. correct rank to fill slots, regardless of the civil- compare with the time, quality, and resources ian skills brought to the table. According to dedicated to Active Component training. The The Way Ahead Kimmey, “CA officers and NCOs are currently education and training issues are hardly the Current proposals by the pressed into jobs they might know something fault of the Reserve Component. Reservists do U.S. Army Civil Affairs and about, but too often we expect a Reservist their best, given time and resource constraints, Psychological Operations who works for a bank to know how to set up a but their effort is still inadequate to provide Command reflect a simple banking system. It should be obvious that this the quality of support required by modern expansion of the Active does not work very well.”4 warfare and nationbuilding. duty CA force to four bat- With the current focus on USCENTCOM, By spring 2005, after the fourth civil talions with the creation the language skills of our civil affairs forces, affairs command was mobilized, it was appar- of a brigade headquarters, both Active and Reserve, are also eroding. ent that the CA force was in trouble. For 2 a mere doubling of the During Operation Unified Assistance, the 96th years, units were sent into theater as composite current Active Compo- Civil Affairs Battalion, anticipating operations organizations filled ad hoc with Soldiers from nent force. While a step in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, could up to 10 other CA units. The practice of “in- in the right direction, provide only one linguist in the Bahasa lan- lieu-of sourcing” became commonplace and this proposal contains guage for Indonesia, and no Sinhalese or Tamil called for the creation of civil affairs Soldiers no innovative attempts speakers for Sri Lanka. The rest of the teams from other Army branches and other Service to transform civil had no useful language skills except Thai, in components, sending them to a 2-week course affairs or its command which the need was minimal. CA forces are with limited additional specialized training. and control. It is much less useful downrange without language Due to a lack of qualified personnel, some also predicated on skills. Soldiers have already performed multiyear budget constraints In Iraq, moreover, the United States rotations, but this is not an option for most and personnel caps. often relies on host-nation or contract person- Reservists. To fill a fifth rotation of wartime To provide a capable, nel instead of civil affairs Soldiers to provide CA units, the Secretary of Defense’s last option expanded CA force language support. These interpreters are often is either to remobilize involuntarily most of for the future, DOD of questionable value, wasting time and losing the personnel who served during the first year and the Army need things in translation. The Reserve forces of the war or throw together more marginally to discover where simply have too few linguists trained and even competent composite units. This is politically excess legacy capabil- U.S. Marine Corps 3d Civil Affairs Group patrols fewer ready to commit to the year or more untenable and is not in touch with the reality ity is located in Harwan, Iraq, during away from career and family to learn a lan- of the exhaustion of the civil affairs force. the Active and humanitarian mission guage of use to DOD only—a deficiency that The Marine Corps’ 3d and 4th Civil Reserve Compo- must be corrected. Affairs Groups (CAGs), approximately 400 nents to build this more

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conflicts, its effectiveness there as part of the organic staff and partici- is limited. The role of the pate in deliberate and crisis action planning brigade headquarters is habitually in theater (see figure). This design to provide command, would pay tremendous dividends, as these control, communica- Soldiers would be familiar with the theater, its tions, computers, and major plans, and all the civil-military opera- information management tions staff. capability and to plan, Interagency players such as the U.S. coordinate, and enable Agency for International Development operational/strategic level (USAID) should have permanent positions stabilization and recon- at the regional combatant commands under struction, focused on the the auspices of a joint interagency coordi- national (civil) center nation group to magnify the effectiveness Soldiers from 478th Civil Affairs of gravity. In addition, of the civil affairs staff and command and Battalion unload furniture donated it must provide rapidly control element. Once in-theater for war or a to school in Dominican Republic, deployable, plug-and- contingency, the regionally aligned CA bat- Exercise New Horizons 2006

U.S. Army South (Miguel A. Negron) play, civil affairs planning talion would be attached to the combatant capable force. The stressed Reserve force needs teams and have the ability to receive and fuse command and under operational control of to be downsized while this Active Component civil information from units into a tactical/ the commander of the Army Special Opera- model is expanded to meet future nationbuild- strategic-level common operational picture.6 tions Command as directed by the combatant ing challenges. In fact, this Army proposal could be used in- command. For administration and service Creation of the civil-military operations theater for a year at most. support, the unit would be garrisoned by the center capability at the company level needs Army theater component. This institutional- to remain in the battalion structure; however, Transforming Civil Affairs ized relationship would be priceless. each of the CA teams should be expanded to Instead, a simpler design is one that will The role of the Active Component CA 8 personnel—an additional 512 Soldiers. This place the more than 15 civil-military opera- brigade should be limited to that of force will ensure that the teams can operate in places tions planners and staff in a more robust cell. provider and trainer only. It is difficult to such as Iraq, where force protection conditions Rather than the brigade headquarters arriv- fathom how this brigade, as proposed by the feature demand eight or more Soldiers to embark on ing in-theater, unfamiliar with the culture U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological an operation. It will not require conventional and strategy of a combatant command, the Operations Command, could seriously stay commanders or Special Forces teams to geographic combatant command or the Army in meaningful contact with five combatant commit their valuable assets to protect the Special Operations Command cells would be commands while training and maintaining the team. The current four-man structure is insufficient to operate autonomously. Active Component Civil Affairs Redesign In addition, a fifth battalion should be created, adding 197 more Soldiers attached to U.S. Special Operations Command Civil Affairs (Airborne) Civil Affairs (USSOCOM). This battalion would be the Planning Team initial surge capability for any of the four geographic combatant commands in a con- Civil / tingency or war. The USSOCOM battalion Military USSOCOM Operations should have a company servicing each Special Center Forces team that is regionally aligned with the theater Special Operations Command, and the focus of the company should be specific USSOUTHCOM USPACOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM to Special Operations Forces and complement the regional battalion, allowing it to focus on CAPT CAPT CAPT CAPT the war on terror and Theater Security Coop- eration Plan events for the geographic combat- CA CMOC CA CMOC CA CMOC CA CMOC ant commander’s theater strategy. The creation of a brigade headquarters, CA CA CA CA the 95th CA Brigade, is also a problematic part

of the current proposal. In a major regional CA CA CA CA contingency, it is unlikely that the command 20 CATs 20 CATs 20 CATs 20 CATs 5 CMOC 5 CMOC 5 CMOC 5 CMOC and control structure of 96 Soldiers will be CA CA CA CA deployed or needed by a geographic combatant command, and in the event of multiple

62 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Florig

Active Component battalions, which should Civil affairs Soldier be their primary focus. speaks with Iraqi civilians Basing in-theater is not discussed in through interpreter current plans for transformation. Habitual, mutually supportive relationships simply cannot be maintained from North Carolina. The idea of stationing all five battalions at Fort Bragg is senseless if their purpose is to support the geographic combatant commands; each battalion should be garrisoned near its respective command. The USPACOM battalion, for instance, should be in Hawaii. Getting the battalions away from Fort Bragg would allow them to maintain an unparalleled relationship with the commands. The first step now should be to move the 96th and 97th Battalions’ companies in the next 24 to 36 months to bases close to their geographic combatant command and feature start building from there.

The stationing and assignment of an Pacific (Bart A. Bauer) Fleet Combat Camera Group, Active Component civil affairs battalion with Reserve had problems filling the units it had worked and is the direct contributor to the each command would have great benefits before the war on terror began. Rarely was a fraying of this fine force. Current U.S. Army for the theater commander. With 20 civil CA battalion filled to more than 70 percent Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations affairs teams and 5 civil-military operations strength, and of that, only 50 to 75 percent was Command expansion plans for the Active centers per company, the regional combatant qualified to deploy. The expanded force of 28 Component units take us into the middle of command could place 5 or more civil affairs battalions should be cut back to 20 or fewer, the next decade. That is far too slow to meet teams downrange quarterly in target coun- and the remaining battalions should reflect the current and emerging needs that might arise if tries. These teams could monitor and execute units that have had high unit strengths and no the United States continues nationbuilding. An humanitarian assistance projects with the host problems filling positions. interim solution should call for basing the 95th nation and ensure that host-nation forces are Civil affairs battalions in remote rural Civil Affairs Brigade’s respective companies trained and monies are properly spent. This areas should be disbanded and moved to with their combatant commands now and synchronized joint and combined effort maxi- population centers to recruit the diverse assigning the Reserve Component civil affairs mizes resources and contributes to changing peoples who speak the languages that are command with all subordinate units who, in population attitudes in ongoing insurgencies. so needed in the field. Units that have failed turn, report directly to the theater army to Over time it should prove to targeted popula- should fold their colors to free up slots for support the combatant command. If current tions that the United States is not only friendly other units and the Active Component. To trends continue, the Reserve civil affairs force but also genuinely interested in their welfare. assist in filling out the new Active battalions’ will shatter and the Active Component expan- Long-term repetitive involvement of quality Reserve Component, NCOs and junior sion will proceed too slowly to be effective in the same companies and Soldiers with the officers should be drawn into Active duty with the midterm. JFQ host nation will build lasting relationships incentives. The 20 Reserve battalions should and trust that we currently do not have the be apportioned to provide surge capability and luxury to cultivate. This is also true of the continual reinforcement capability to the com- n o t ES interagency process. The U.S. Agency for batant commander. In addition, the U.S. Army 1 International Development, for instance, is Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Donna Miles, “Civil Affairs Mission Continues the biggest player the non-DOD U.S. Govern- Command should be eliminated and turned to Grow in Iraq, Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Press Service, April 29, 2004, 1–3. ment has in counterinsurgency. Its spending into a training center and school for all things 2 Mark Kimmey, “Transforming Civil Affairs,” dwarfs any of the humanitarian assistance related to civil affairs and civil-military opera- Army 55, no. 3 (March 2005). programs of the geographic combatant tions. This should eliminate another bureau- 3 Ibid., 19. commands. Too often, however, military cratic level in the chain of command and 4 Ibid. humanitarian assistance projects are not facilitate the relationship between civil affairs 5 Sandra I. Erwin, “Civil Affairs: As Demands synchronized or linked with anything that battalions and their combatant commands. for Nation-Building Troops Soar, Leaders Ponder USAID and host-nation agencies are doing. Reserve civil affairs units should be Reorganization,” National Defense 39 (May 2005). Theater civil affairs Soldiers could and would assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve Command, 6 Ritchie Moore and Mike Warmack, “Civil make this synchronization a reality. where they could be manned, trained, and Affairs (CA) Transformation,” presentation to the To be effective, the Reserve civil affairs equipped like all other Army Reserve units. Joint Special Operations University’s Joint Civil- force structure needs reengineering. It is unre- The assignment of CA Reserve forces under Military Operations Course, March 24, 2005. alistic to expand this force when the Army U.S. Special Operations Command never truly ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 63 NATO Stability Teams The Next Stage of Capability Development

By A nne M . M oisan and J ennifer D . P . M orone y

he North Atlantic Treaty drama, where transformation faces critical Organization (NATO) has new challenges. From the strain of supporting achieved important strides in out-of-area deployments in the Balkans and T capabilities since the Prague Afghanistan, and with the growth of stabiliza- and Istanbul Summits: the first functional tion and reconstruction missions, counterter- NATO command, Allied Command Trans- rorism operations, and prospective support formation, was stood up; the NATO Response to civil authorities in homeland security, the Force is on track for full operational capabil- demand for combat support and combat ity in fall 2006; deployable headquarters service support type capabilities highlights a realignment is complete; new missions out severe capabilities gap. The need for a new and of area have been taken on; completion of broader approach to addressing expedition- Stabilization Force, Bosnia, and turnover ary and homeland defense missions, as well of the mission to the European Union (EU) as more inventive ways of dealing with new feature have occurred; and training help has been partners and Allies, is clear as we approach provided for Iraqis. In addition, current the next stage in this evolution of Alliance operations in or in support of Afghanistan transformation. To meet these challenges, this and Iraq, preparations for United Nations article proposes the development of NATO (UN) negotiations on the final status of Stability Teams. Kosovo, and the search for a peaceful resolution to the Iran nuclear standoff are forcing Strategic and Capabilities Gaps the Allies to redefine NATO’s core missions The Atlantic Alliance continues to face a NATO personnel prepare to unload relief supplies in Pakistan and to find ways to reenergize the transatlan- gap between its strategic vision of a full range tic link. Likewise, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, of missions, promoting stability, and the abili- the Madrid train bombing, and the transit ties and willingness of member governments Space Communications Squadron (Barry Loo) Space Communications Squadron th blasts in London have led to new types of to follow through with shared risks, burdens, 30 missions, brought new meaning to Article V and responsibilities. In order to maintain in combating terrorism, and raised questions Alliance cohesion and effectiveness, it is gen- about the NATO role in Transatlantic Home- erally preferable to have the widest possible land Security. With the dramatic shift in participation of Allies and partners in major operational requirements to stabilization and missions. As a result, it is imperative to address reconstruction missions, the need to counter capability requirements broadly enough to terrorism, and the prospect of expanded be comprehensive, while still allowing the missions in homeland defense and support fullest participation by individual Allies and to civil authorities in homeland security, partners. To this end, this article suggests a the demand for combat support and combat new approach for the Alliance to maximize service support (CS/CSS)-type capabilities constructive participation—focusing on the has increased exponentially. area where global partnering, expeditionary Despite all it has accomplished, NATO capabilities, and transatlantic homeland secu- is now approaching Act II of this 21st-century rity intersect. U.S. Marines set to train with NATO allies and Guinean Colonel Anne M. Moisan, USAF, is a Senior Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Rangers in West Africa Defense University. Jennifer D.P. Moroney is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. U.S. Marine Corps (Joseph N. Lomangino)

64 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Moisan and Moroney

Over the last 10 years, NATO has the comparative advantages of host countries counterinsurgency, peacemaking, and nation- devised numerous initiatives and programs to address humanitarian/civilian/military building are all people- and skill-intensive to address partnering. In response to the capabilities requirements. These teams could areas where new members and European immediate post–Cold War demand for respond to crisis management scenarios and partners can continue to make significant Central and Eastern European membership, it natural and humanitarian disasters, as well contributions and a wider circle of partners crafted the Partnership for Peace (PFP). The as act as enablers for transatlantic homeland could provide selected skills. Counterter- PFP program allowed the Alliance to deal security missions. The development of NSTs rorism and information technology security with fear of a resurgent Russia and to promote would provide a unique venue for NATO to experts, along with critical infrastructure internal reform and democratization among constructively address all three integrating protection specialists, specialized medical the states of the former Soviet Union. The elements of transformation. Simply put, NSTs facilities, and emergency responders, are establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue would allow the Alliance to operationalize fields where European resources generally in 19941 provided the Alliance a mechanism partnering, expeditionary efforts, and capabili- match or exceed U.S. capabilities.2 for political and security consultations and for ties, as well as focus on capabilities critical to CS/CSS-type capabilities support limited practical cooperation with northern homeland security operational requirements. peacekeeping, humanitarian and assistance African and eastern Mediterranean states. The teams would provide a real opportunity (to include search and rescue operations), and NATO efforts mirrored the European Union’s for all members, including small Allies, stability and reconstruction missions, and are Barcelona Process and the new European new members, and PFP and Mediterranean critical to NATO transformation. Overall, new Neighborhood programs to effectively Dialogue partners, to make an operational mixes of Active military, paramilitary, and feature incorporate allies and friends under a new contribution to the Alliance if they choose. civilian response forces are required to ensure structural relationship. Unfortunately, these NSTs would tailor partnering to emphasize that transformation can address current and programs have met with mixed reviews. Tell- the existing comparative advantages of these future threats. But in addition to high-technol- ingly, partners have remarked that they see members and increase opportunities for their ogy systems, CS/CSS-type capabilities such as no measurable improvement in participation, participation in operations, diversifying and military police, combat and civil engineers, prospects for integration, and especially addi- enlarging the player base, and eliminating service support units, and transportation tional capabilities. “free riders.” In addition, NSTs would utilize units are just a few examples of transforma- Since the 2002 Prague Summit, the light, more easily deployable civilian, humani- tional capabilities that are currently gapped. failure of European Allies to improve expe- tarian, and military-type units in the overall Highly motivated Allies and partners could ditionary capabilities is especially evident in mix of capabilities at little to no cost to partici- provide these critical capabilities that directly the areas of strategic airlift; air-to-air refuel- pating countries, while filling critical security support growing NATO, EU, and UN mission ing; precision weapons; command, control, and capability gaps for NATO requirements. requirements. communications, computers, intelligence, After the less-than-satisfactory result The Alliance should assist its members surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); of the Defense Capabilities Initiative, the and friends in the development of CS/CSS- and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Prague Capabilities Commitment encouraged type capabilities that serve a dual use—that defenses. The United States and the few Euro- members to pursue niche capabilities and a are useful domestically for homeland security pean Allies with significant force moderniza- shorter, more focused list of multinational and that at the same time complement NATO’s tion programs have focused on capabilities efforts to fill gaps in strategic airlift, air-to- high-end expeditionary capabilities. Most if which are “high-end technology,” expensive, air refueling, precision weapons, C4ISR, and not all CS/CSS capabilities can serve a dual and have acquisition lead times of 10 to 15 WMD defenses. Up to now, the emphasis has purpose and may be attractive for potential years. Identified but often overlooked are the been on high technology, long acquisition partners to nationally develop and showcase. more basic, less expensive, and even more crit- lead-time capabilities, and, by extension, NSTs can be developed among the less-capable ical combat support/combat service support- Allies with a higher level of capability and Allies and partners in the following transfor- type capabilities such as engineering, medical, defense resourcing. However, in addition to mation priority areas: transportation/trucking, civil affairs, explosive the well-known requirements for enhanced ordnance, and military police. The ensuing capabilities in these high-end areas, many n chemical corps security and capabilities gap and the need for CS/CSS-type capabilities are also critically n military police/constabulary corps a new and broader approach to addressing needed but have received little emphasis. n engineering (construction, etc.) expeditionary and homeland defense capabili- This article considers how less-capable or n medical ties are key points for the Allies to consider at resource-constrained Allies and partners can n transportation corps the Riga Summit in 2006. This article proposes contribute to NATO transformation and win n ordnance corps (demining). that Act II, the next stage in capability evolu- public support for their efforts. In short, what tion, should be the development of NATO factors might motivate these partners to take The benefit of developing functional Stability Teams. a lead in developing CS/CSS-type capabilities NSTs is based on overall assumptions about for specific missions? NATO and what motivates individual Enlarging the Player Base Expeditionary operations in Afghani- partners. First, the target audience we seek NATO Stability Teams (NSTs) would stan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq have shown to motivate is new members and partners, be flexible and mobile teams ranging from the importance of support capabilities to a including the Partnership for Peace, Medi- 20 to 100 personnel organized to leverage variety of missions. Combating terrorism, terranean Dialogue, and Adriatic Charter ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 65 nat o stabilit y tea m s

countries. These countries already have The above benefits of developing NSTs The Alliance has expended much politi- CS/CSS-type capabilities to varying degrees, lead to a framework for leaders and poli- cal capital either bringing in new countries or have indicated a willingness to develop cymakers to analyze the importance of the or developing partner relations and regional them in support of NATO operations. As a specific capabilities to both the Alliance and capacity. However, NATO needs to consider result, NATO will not have to motivate some to individual new Allies and partners. After carefully the kinds of capabilities it intends to partners to develop altogether new capabili- consulting subject matter experts from RAND, ask its newest Allies and partners to provide. ties, meaning these countries will require no the National Defense University, and the Joint The key is to ensure that the partners have large-scale investment. Third, new Allies can Staff on each CS/CSS capability, we first rated an opportunity to positively and actively be motivated to participate in peacekeeping, each capability from 1 to 5 (with 5 being the contribute to ongoing and future missions in humanitarian assistance, and search and highest) according to its criticality to specific a meaningful way, while also filling gapped rescue operations under a NATO, EU, or UN missions, which we considered as peacekeep- capabilities and contributing to all three key umbrella for a variety of compelling reasons. ing, humanitarian assistance (to include search areas of transformation. This approach has Motivation can be a promised or enhanced and rescue), and enablers for search and many potential benefits, not least paving the capability or the prospect of international rescue operations. Using the same scale, we way for contributions at a higher level in the prestige through showcasing a capability. Of then considered how the capability supports future. course, showcasing an NST capability can overall transformation goals. We then aver- To be fair, there may be drawbacks to have varying motivational effects based on aged the criticality factor with the goals under the approach advocated here. For example, whether having the capability enhances the the heading “Importance to NATO.” Second, members and prospective members will more country’s international or Alliance prestige we rated motivational factors for partners likely be motivated by contributing to trans- or provides it a more weighted input on according to the 1 to 5 scheme (with 5 being formation goals than will Jordan or Morocco coalition operational decisions. Finally, the highest motivation): dual use, international in the Mediterranean or some PFP partners developing and enhancing NST capabilities utility and prestige, and support to military in the Caucasus or Central Asia who are not constructively support NATO transforma- transformation at a national level. We averaged in the military assistance program. Moreover, tion goals, which can be a motivator for these factors under the heading “Importance there is the question of reliability and commit- Allies as well as for candidates for member- to Partner”. ment of partners to sustain and deploy their ship or closer association. Comparing the importance of develop- contributions to the NSTs, whose capability These assumptions suggest several ing CS/CSS-type capabilities to the Alliance sustainment and deployment are related to benefits a country gains by developing NSTs and the individual Allies and partners, the cost and political will, both of which can be feature within the Alliance: capabilities almost always ranked as vital inhibitors. However, we believe the benefits from both perspectives. Only for transporta- outweigh the drawbacks. n Having a particular CS/CSS-type capa- tion corps, which scored slightly lower in As Secretary General George Robertson bility would allow less-capable or resource- importance to the partner, was there some stated in 2003: constrained partners with NATO equities to divergence. In this exercise, medical ranked improve their prestige in an area where they the highest of CS/CSS capabilities analyzed, While none of the invitees possesses spec- have expertise. closely followed by engineers/military police, tacular military capabilities, each of them n Developing NSTs would enable partners then ordnance corps and chemical corps. has niche capabilities that will be valuable to to modernize their force structures a piece at It is important to NATO to focus on the NATO. Moreover, they bring an enthusiasm, a time, since resource or political constraints intersection of interests; that is, the long-term willingness, if necessary, to take on risks and preclude substantial modernization in the impact of initial successes and perceived an appreciation of the value of a permanent short term. mutual benefits on enduring and maturing transatlantic alliance.3 n NSTs capabilities have strong domestic relations between old and new Allies and part- utility. ners. For example, among the CS/CSS capabil- Encouraging less-capable Allies and ities identified, Romania is strong in military partners to take the lead in areas where they From the Alliance perspective, the ben- police and engineers. Estonia, Latvia, and have the expertise improves their confidence efits of developing NSTs are: Lithuania have a strong engineering tradition. and prestige, making them more committed. Likewise, Ukraine as a PFP partner is probably In addition, the development of deployable n Teams could reinforce the concept of strongest in chemical corps and transportation CS/CSS-type capabilities can spur defense equal partnership. corps. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and and military reform by setting the example n Less-capable or more resource- Tunisia could provide medical, engineering, for the remainder of the force structure. Small constrained Allies and partners can make a civil affairs, and ordnance corps units. In successes and confidence-building can set the real contribution and even take a leadership addition, even members such as Turkey could stage for more significant changes and deepen role in a gapped capability for transformation, benefit from providing engineering and civil countries’ relationships with NATO. helping preserve NATO’s military relevance. affairs teams to the mix. The Alliance should The CS/CSS capability shortfalls identi- n NSTs can support all three themes of also encourage these partners to combine their fied by NATO mirror U.S. shortfalls. For Alliance transformation, including partnering, CS/CSS capabilities where they want to take example, the NST concept aligns with the expeditionary capabilities development, and the lead in regional NSTs. Building Partner Capacity Roadmap that transatlantic homeland security enhancement. stems from the Quadrennial Defense Review

66 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Moisan and Moroney

(QDR) implementation plan and DOD Direc- That would allow the results/lessons learned expeditionary capabilities, and transatlantic tive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, from the pilot program and way ahead for homeland security. Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operationalizing other teams to be reported at The 2006 summit should focus on a (SSTR) Operations. Improving partner SSTR the 2008 NATO Summit. few initiatives that are logical extensions of capabilities is a key component. The QDR has n Other NSTs are tested and readied for the Prague-Istanbul efforts and grow out of endorsed establishing a NATO headquarters deployment in an ongoing NATO operation additional cumulative experience in both for SSTR operations, developing standards (possibly in Afghanistan, Africa, or Kosovo) operations and capacity-building. The NATO by Allied Command Transformation (ACT), by 2010. Stability Team concept does this and matches integrating planning into the NATO force n ACT is tasked to capture lessons learned Allies and partners who are willing to planning process, and developing metrics to and make recommendations to the NAC, commit to operations with the specific opera- evaluate progress.4 The U.S. Government, par- NATO Allies, and participants on how best to tional tasks (to include combat as well as ticularly DOD, would be well advised to focus focus appropriate Alliance resources to supple- stabilization and reconstruction) that need to bilateral and multilateral security cooperation ment bilateral contributions. be done to meet the Istanbul strategic vision: on developing NSTs, since they fill a security “a full range of missions, promoting stability and capabilities gap and can be relatively quick The timeline to deploy the first NST where it is needed to defend our security and “turn key” operations. Offering partner capa- should coincide with the followup NATO our values.” JFQ bilities gives the United States an opportunity Summit of 2008. Like the development and to focus its security cooperation efforts to deployment of the NATO Response Force n o t ES feature maximize operational relevance. (NRF), interested Allies and friends should be 1 held to a tight 2-year timeline and encouraged The Mediterrranean Dialogue countries are NST Implementation to volunteer forces that could complement Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Recognizing that NSTs fill critical core NRF, but could also be used independently. 2 Anthony Cordesman, “Rethinking NATO’s capabilities, it is important to consider what Force Transformation,” NATO Review (Spring 2005). additional transformation requirements The North Atlantic Alliance faces a 3 Secretary General George Robertson’s forward should be applied to the teams before they can historic moment at the Riga Summit in 2006 in NATO Review (Spring 2003). integrate into NATO operational missions. as it evaluates its progress on transformation. 4 Excerpt from Quadrennial Defense Review The list is relatively short and can be enhanced Despite the capabilities initiatives resulting Execution Roadmaps: Building Partnership Capacity, by exercises, military-to-military training, from the 1999 Washington Summit and the February 23, 2006, unclassified draft. and inclusion of units in ongoing operations. 2002 Prague Summit, little capability has actu- 5 As the outgoing Secretary General, George NSTs will need to adopt Alliance doctrine and ally been delivered.5 Most military budgets Robertson stated in an interview on January 2, procedures, work under existing command are still flatlined or decreasing, and hard 2004, “Improving the military capabilities of the and control/deployable headquarters, and be capabilities have a lead time of at least 10 to 15 NATO member countries has to remain the key priority of any Secretary General, because the equipped with compatible communications/ years in the most optimistic view. Add to this credibility of the Alliance depends on it having the radios and procedures to share information the unrealized expectations of new Allies and capability to take actions.” and operational orders. Countries providing friends, the heightened operational out-of-area teams will need to develop options for their requirements, and increased terrorism, and the own lift, from commercial support to more need is clear for a more broad and innovative sophisticated development of the Civil Reserve approach to the transformation issues chal- Air Fleet and/or pooling of requirements and lenging NATO—global partnering, developing assets. While some partners might initially find these challenges daunting, the costs fade compared to the benefits derived from NST participation. The development and implementation of the NST concept requires a five-step process:

n NATO approves the concept of NSTs at a signing conference, hosted by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in the 2d quarter of 2007, and all participants agree to timelines and to clearly establish the way ahead. n Working groups are established to develop plans for each type of NST. Lead/ U.S. Air Force maintenance crew partner countries are identified at this time. member reviews schedule for F–15 n A pilot program is created for one with Bulgarian officer as part of Fighter Wing (Jennifer Shirar) d Joint Contact Team Program

functional NST. The team is tested in a 173 well-publicized exercise overseen by ACT. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4 th quarter 2006 / JFQ 67 ref o r m ing pentag o n decisi o n m a k ing

Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, addresses members of the Joint Staff

U.S. Air Force (D. Myles Cullen) U.S. Air Force Reforming Pentagon Decisionmaking

By C hristopher J . L amb and I r v in g L achow This article is a synopsis of INSS Strategic Forum 221, which can be downloaded at ndupress.ndu.edu feature major surprise in the Depart- concluded that people using mental shortcuts delays to “reason through” a formal decision- ment of Defense 2006 Quadren- can produce good decisions in difficult cir- making process can result in disaster nial Defense Review (QDR) cumstances. One of the most popular nonra- n conditions are dynamic or goals are A Report to Congress is the tional theories of decisionmaking, which can ambiguous; it makes sense in such circum- prominence it gives to decisionmaking reform. be dubbed the intuitive model, proposes that stances to focus on a quick “good enough” Pentagon leaders thought that improvements people make decisions by recognizing situa- solution that can be reevaluated later to the decisionmaking process prior to the tions, matching them to previous situations n they have a great deal of relevant experi- QDR would facilitate hard choices on new they have experienced, simulating various ence; the more relevant experience a person military capabilities.1 Yet by the end of the solutions in their heads, and then picking the has, the more likely he is to use intuition and QDR, they concluded that additional decision- first solution that is good enough to satisfy the use it well making reforms were one of two fundamental problem at hand.3 In this model, popularized n the problem can be modeled in strategic imperatives for the Department.2 In in Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink, biases are not mental simulations to determine what this article, we recommend a Decision Support deviations from an ideal approach but rather would happen if a given option were chosen Cell to improve Pentagon decisionmaking. helpful mental adaptations that enable quick, (for example, one study found that Navy Before explaining how the cell would work, we accurate decisions. commanders serving on Aegis cruisers use identify prerequisites for good decisionmaking Blink stimulated a defense of rationality intuitive decisionmaking for 95 percent of and the problems and conditions that cur- and a resultant “blink vs. think” controversy their decisions).6 rently diminish the quality of that undertak- that captured popular imagination.4 However, ing at the Pentagon. the clear consensus among experts is that In contrast, people generally use a ratio- people use both intuitive and rational tech- nal process when:7 Reason and Intuition niques to make good decisions. People gener- It is commonly assumed that people ally rely on their intuition when:5 n they are not under heavy time pressure should make decisions as rationally as possible that requires mental shortcuts; with more and that deviations from the rational ideal are n they face time-urgent situations such as time, people are more likely to follow the undesirable. Recently, however, scientists have firefights or battlefield triage, where even short rational approach, if only to verify an initial gut feeling Christopher J. Lamb is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National n conditions are relatively stable and goals Defense University. Irving Lachow is a Senior Research Professor in the Information Resources Management are clear, permitting a rational approach to College at the National Defense University. find an optimal solution

68 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Lamb and Lachow

n they do not have the relevant experi- must accommodate rational, nonrational, tify and weigh all possible risks. Second, the ence to provide a basis for pattern matching; and intuitive decisionmaking, depending on infrequency of war means there is not a large then they should (and usually do) resort to a which is likely to generate better outcomes.9 experiential basis for making intuitive deci- more rational model to guide them through To determine when these different approaches sions about what investments will produce problem formulation, option identification, are appropriate, we must understand the cir- the best mix of capabilities for warfighting; analysis, and selection of a solution cumstances in the Pentagon that affect senior therefore, a rational as opposed to an intuitive n the problem is so computationally leader decisionmaking. system makes sense for investment decisions. complex that it overwhelms Third, many Pentagon the ability to grasp a given planning problems (for situation, at which point the consensus among experts is that people use both intuitive example, logistics or quality of decisions erodes strategic lift) are com- along with the ability to and rational techniques to make good decisions putationally so complex recognize situations or run that they defy intuitive mental simulations. judgment alone. Fourth, Challenges there usually is sufficient time to allow a Despite different models, human Pentagon decisionmaking reforms since rational process to unfold. decisionmaking actually represents a con- World War II are largely a history of efforts to The resource planning and allocation tinuum. In most cases, people decide through curtail the power of the Services to veto joint systems designed to support senior Pentagon feature a combination of reason and nonrational solutions that serve the entire military better. leaders, therefore, are ostensibly methodical mental shortcuts. For example, people can use Service cultures are beneficial for warfighting, and engineered to minimize risk: objec- Reforming intuitive rules of thumb to bound the range but they can be counterproductive at higher tives are defined, conditions that inform the Pentagon Decisionmaking of possible solutions for a problem analyzed decisionmaking levels where integrated effort objectives are identified, alternative ways and rationally. Similarly, they can use a rational is required. means to achieve the objectives are explored, thought process to augment or verify initial Secretary of Defense Robert McNama- expected and unintended consequences are intuitive judgments.8 ra’s planning, programming, and budgeting considered, and decisions are made, generally How do these observations about the system was installed in 1961 to rationalize to eliminate as much risk in as many categories way people decide relate to decisionmaking in Pentagon decisionmaking with broader, as possible. The same holds true for contin- the Pentagon? First, reforming strategic deci- more transparent, and more objective deci- gency planning systems that were designed to sionmaking must account for the way senior sion criteria. It survives to this day, albeit in rationalize campaign planning and war plans leaders actually make strategic-level decisions modified form, because its rational design is review. (for example, by acknowledging the power beneficial for several reasons. First, the high Bureaucratic Contributions and Limita- of personal and bureaucratic biases). Second, stakes involved in deterrence and war argue tions to Rational Decision Support. To execute prescriptions for improving decisionmaking for adoption of rational processes that iden- its ostensibly rational planning processes,

Decision Support Cell Structure Decision Support Cell (Director, Deputy Director, and Administrative Assistant) Secretary of Strategic Agenda Group Analytic Decision Support Group Exercises and Simulations Group Defense (Leader Core Functions) (18–25 personnel) (7–10 personnel) (7–10 personnel)

Standing Teams Led by Standing Teams Led by Ad Hoc Teams Led by Decision Support Cell Staff Decision Support Cell Staff Decision Support Cell Staff Roles and Joint Strategic Direction Responsibilities Joint Operating Contingency Concepts Joint Data Exercises 1 Exercises 2 Exercises 3 Internal and External Scenarios Relations Macro Investments Joint Methods Joint Institutional Operational Exercises 4 Exercises 5 Exercises N Contingency Oversight Performance Review of Analysis Metrics Knowledge

Multi- Defense Service Force Joint Data Global Force Defense Technical Lessons Deployments Support Management Modeling and Information Learned Conferences Board Simulation Centers Organizations Examples of Institutions Receiving Guidance From Decision Support Cell–Led Teams

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 69 ref o r m ing pentag o n decisi o n m a k ing

the Pentagon is divided into hierarchical much information away from me as possible, the net effect of their decisions across multiple organizational structures that represent rela- [thinking] let’s just give him what we want objectives, but they ought to take advantage of tively narrow bodies of expertise: policy, intel- him to have, not what he needs.”11 decision support that can better inform their ligence, program analysis, acquisition, or bud- Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made it clear intuition. In practice, this means two elements geting. Recently, Pentagon wits have taken to early on that he would challenge these bureau- are required for strategic decisionmaking in calling these stovepipe organizations “cylinders cratic tendencies. In a speech on September the Pentagon: clear, transparent, and well- of excellence,” which they in fact are. Their 10, 2001, he called the Pentagon bureaucracy coordinated rational analyses of alternatives purpose is to build and nurture deep expertise the enemy, arguing that it “disrupts the defense from the decision support system, and well- in narrow bodies of knowledge. These experts of the United States and places the lives of men honed personal intuition and judgment. These identify issues, devise options and recom- and women in uniform at risk.”12 The next day, elements can best be harmonized through the mendations, and forward them up the chain to however, he had to go to war with the bureau- creation of a Decision Support Cell. senior officials. In this regard, Pentagon deci- cracy he had, not the one he wanted. There- sion support is essentially “bottom-up” as well fore, like his predecessors, Secretary Rumsfeld Reform’s Critical Element as “stovepiped.” uses workarounds to tame the bureaucracy. The Decision Support Cell would be a These bottom-up rational decision pro- For example, he relies heavily on a few trusted dedicated staff located within the Secretary’s cesses are limited by multiple bureaucratic and aides who are able to offer alternatives to office with a mission to enforce a degree of human factors. Senior leaders need integrated the bland or contradictory decision support discipline and collaboration in strategic deci- problem assessments and solution options, provided by the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, sion support for the Secretary and his closest but there are few incentives for their subordi- that practice helps convince subordinates that advisors. It should do three things. First, it nates to collaborate to provide them. Instead, having access to senior leaders and control- should help the Secretary focus the decision subordinates are rewarded for developing and ling information to them is the key to success, support process on his own strategic agenda, protecting their own organizational equities. which further discourages information-sharing making sure that he receives integrated Absent any incentive to sacrifice organiza- and collaboration. The lack of senior leader products in support of this agenda and that tional equities for the common good, the feedback to subordinates compounds the the process provides necessary feedback and natural outcome of formal direction. Second, it should coordination in the Penta- the Decision Support Cell would be a dedicated staff improve the quality of the gon is consensus products located within the Secretary’s office with a mission to decision support routinely pro- that avoid and obscure the vided by the contingency plan- feature need for tough tradeoffs. As enforce discipline and collaboration ning and resource allocation a result, many talented and systems, making sure underly- motivated officials get their positions directly problem. If subordinates do not understand ing assumptions are clear and that all viable to senior decisionmakers by circumventing the senior leaders’ decisions, they may conclude alternatives are rigorously examined. Third, it formal coordination process. Proposals pre- that the wrong choice was made for the wrong should help senior leaders refine their intuitive sented this way often are clear and creative but reasons, further deepening cynicism. decisionmaking with exercises that enlarge reflect a perspective that does not benefit from Decision Support: Balancing Rationality their experience base. access to all relevant information. and Intuition. Even if the rational planning Strategic Decisionmaking Focus. The What Senior Leaders Need. Secretar- and resource allocation processes of the QDR Report underscored the importance ies and Deputy Secretaries of Defense need Pentagon worked better, they would be insuf- of senior leader focus on a set of core func- integrated decision support from the 30 or ficient for producing good strategic decisions. tions that only they can perform effectively,13 more subordinate bureaucracies that report Senior leaders must account for a broader but the lack of integrated, quality decision directly to them, but they do not receive range of factors than those found in analyses support for strategic issues makes that dif- this support, and they do not have time to conducted by lower level officials. Sometimes ficult. The Decision Support Cell should produce it themselves. These leaders are the the significance of these factors is so great be charged with ensuring the collaboration first real point of integration in the Depart- that they dwarf the marginal utility of rational among Pentagon bureaucracies necessary ment of Defense, and they do not like it. analyses. Even when the results of the rational to put core senior leader issues in a strategic Former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries analyses offer valuable insights, senior leaders choice framework. In doing so, the cell are virtually unanimous in their belief that ultimately must contrast choices across diverse would not usurp the functions of other staff the Pentagon bureaucracy could be cut from value sets (operational, political, economic, elements but rather undertake integrating 25 to 75 percent without any degradation and so forth). It is difficult to compare ratio- activities that currently are either left to the in the quality of decision support.10 The nally the value of better relations with a key Secretary or are not done at all. Office of the Secretary of Defense is often ally, less friction with a powerful Senator, With a Decision Support Cell to singled out as bloated and ineffective, but and more economical shipbuilding. Doing so coordinate decisionmaking in senior leader the Joint Staff also hoards information and requires reliance on intuition, judgment, and core functions, the Secretary’s personal staff defaults toward least common denomina- other nonrational factors. would be free to support his daily schedule tor products. Colin Powell remarked that This is not to say that there is no role for and personal needs. Similarly, subordinates while he was Chairman, the “sole purpose” rational decision support. Senior leaders must could concentrate on their areas of exper- of his 1,500-member staff “was to keep as rely in part on their intuitive understanding of tise, knowing that the cell would ensure

70 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Lamb and Lachow

collaboration when the Secretary needed it. experience in each these areas before taking level with a Decision Support Cell that bal- Since the cell would have a holistic view of office, it is not realistic. ances objective analysis and intuitive wisdom. the senior leader core functions, it would be Senior leaders can gain experience Those who fight the Nation’s battles deserve in a position to advise the Secretary on the on the job, but that is time-consuming and nothing less. JFQ importance of keeping abreast of these areas. inefficient and sometimes means learning by It would also be in a position to identify spe- making mistakes. In fact, mistakes offer one cific problems that require him to set priori- of the best ways to learn, but given the stakes N o t es ties among competing interests. associated with strategic decisionmaking 1 Improving Rational Decisionmaking in the Pentagon, it is too costly a method to Ryan Henry, “Defense Transformation and Support. Comparing and evaluating alterna- accept readily. A better approach would be to the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review,” Parameters (Winter 2005–2006), 5–15. tives is impossible without a transparent set develop the senior leaders’ experience base 2 Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial of baseline assumptions, operating concepts, with a tailored program that helps them to:15 Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Depart- methods, metrics, and data. Without these ment of Defense, February 6, 2006), 65–66. n common, essential precursors to good analy- identify and understand the decision 3 The term intuitive model refers to a class of sis, with results that are comparable and repli- requirements of their job “naturalistic” models exemplified by Gary Klein’s cable, senior leaders cannot usefully evaluate n practice difficult decisions in context Recognition-Primed Model. See Klein, Sources of alternatives and their consequences. Currently, n review decisionmaking experiences to Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge: no single organization has the interest, author- learn what works and what does not. MIT Press, 1998). feature ity, and resources to produce such timely, 4 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Think- quality products. As a result, the foundational The best way to accomplish this goal ing without Thinking (New York: Little, Brown, products for good decision support are pro- is with decisionmaking exercises or thought 2005); and Michel Legault, Think! Why Crucial Decisions Can’t Be Made in the Blink of an Eye (New vided too slowly and with insufficient quality experiments that are built on well-defined York: Threshold Editions, 2006). and quantity to support a common analytical scenarios and capture the essence of specific 5 Klein, 95–96. 14 framework across the Department. decisions. These exercises could be conducted 6 Ibid., 97. The Secretary would need to empower as tabletop or virtual games or both. Decision- 7 Ibid. the Decision Support Cell to set standards making exercises should not be confused with 8 David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin and timelines for these analytic precursors large-scale games or field simulations; each Perkins, Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information and to enforce a degree of transparency, col- experiment would be a focused event targeted Superiority in Networked Warfare (Washington, DC: laboration, and information-sharing among at the characteristics of a unique decision.16 National Defense University Press, 2006). all the Pentagon headquarters elements that The Decision Support Cell should also 9 The Services clearly understand this point. conduct analysis in support of senior deci- help record the results of real-world intui- Rational and intuitive decisionmaking processes, sionmakers. Exercising this kind of authority tive decisionmaking. Even though intuitive and the situations in which each should be used, are discussed explicitly in Navy and Marine Corps doc- underscores why the cell must be indepen- decisionmaking is somewhat idiosyncratic and trine. For example, see Naval Doctrine Publication dent of any Pentagon component and report often politically sensitive, the cell must capture 6: Command and Control. directly to the Secretary. If it reported to senior leader concerns and desires solidly 10 Exit interviews with departing Secretaries of someone lower, it might be unable to enforce enough to help middle management under- Defense by the Pentagon Office of the Historian and the necessary collaboration and competition stand the factors that informed a particular informal comments from participants in defense of ideas needed to support senior leader deci- decision, which will increase trust in the system reform studies who interviewed former senior sionmaking. If the cell belonged to an orga- and improve the quality of decision support. leaders. nization charged with conducting analysis Creating the Decision Support Cell is 11 “Follow the Leader,” Context Magazine, on specific problems or conducted analysis consistent with the 2006 QDR recommenda- interview with Colin S. Powell, available at . 12 “DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence as an honest broker. the tactical military already achieved a com- Week Kickoff—Bureaucracy to Battlefield,” remarks Improving Intuitive Decisionmaking parable transformation in decision support. as delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Support. The Decision Support Cell must also Following the Vietnam War, the Services Rumsfeld, the Pentagon, September 10, 2001. be able to support senior intuitive decision- introduced objective, empirical feedback into 13 2006 QDR Report, 65–66. making by providing leaders with the breadth training exercises with the aid of new simula- 14 Christopher J. Lamb, Transforming Defense and depth of experience needed in their jobs. tion technologies and after-action reports (Washington, DC: National Defense University The list of diverse areas where meaning- to improve learning and decisionmaking. Press, September 2005), 4–17. ful experience would be desirable includes The training revolution of the 1970s was not 15 Gary Klein, The Power of Intuition: How to military operations, executive management, an easy transformation, but it was highly Use Your Gut Feelings to Make Better Decisions at bureaucratic processes, political savvy, govern- effective because it combined the value of Work (New York: Currency Books, 2004), 36–63. 16 ment budgeting, media relations, intelligence objective analysis of courses of action with Ibid., 45. products and operations, and emerging the ultimate need for commanders to make technologies. While it would be ideal for all intuitive assessments and decisions. The Pen- senior leaders to possess a depth of real-life tagon could do the same thing at the strategic ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 71 U.S. Marines and Soldiers demonstrate use of nonlethal weapons and tactics in Boeblingen, Germany

and the murder of Dutch film- maker Theo van Gogh. But far more frequently, these threats lurk in the shadows. The al Qaeda network inspires operatives to dis- guise themselves among thousands of peaceful immigrants in largely unassimilated Muslim enclaves throughout Europe. The complex New Thinking at USEUCOM European legal system provides a safe haven for those who would provide terrorists with logistic and financial support, while the vast The undergoverned spaces of North Phase Africa serve as fertile recruiting grounds, training areas, and transit routes for a wide range of loosely

U.S. Marine Corps (Donald E. Preston) associated groups that are trying to replace their nations’ governments with their own peculiar and intolerant featurefeature version of an Islamic state. Many of them pledge allegiance to, or at least claim common cause with, the al Qaeda network. Some funnel Zero money, arms, and volunteer fighters from Europe into Iraq. In growing numbers, foreign fighters Campaign appear to be finding their way back to share their combat experiences with a new genera- By C harles F . W ald tion of potential recruits in Europe’s mosques and madrassas and the tribal regions of Africa. he U.S. European Command a new approach, focusing on terrorism’s long- With their strongholds in Afghanistan, Iraq, (USEUCOM), headquartered in term, underlying conditions. This deliberate and the rest of the Middle East growing Stuttgart, Germany, is fighting strategy of engagement is called Phase Zero, smaller every day, these groups are trying to T a new kind of campaign in the but in truth it is much more than just a new build on safe havens in North Africa while global war on terror. With an area of respon- phase of systematic campaign planning; it is a simultaneously bringing the fight to the back sibility that includes all of Europe, Russia, new form of campaign in and of itself. yard of our European allies. To confront this Israel, and most of Africa, USEUCOM is This article examines a number of growing threat, USEUCOM’s Phase Zero home to a growing variety of threats. These issues associated with this evolving concept, campaign places a new emphasis on TSC and dangers require new thinking and a new including the threats in the command’s area of capacity-building with our allies throughout understanding of the differences between responsibility, origins of Phase Zero strategy, the region. theater security cooperation (TSC) and tradi- and initiatives that make up the campaign. tional warfighting. What Is Phase Zero? From Norway to South Africa, from New Threats The traditional four phases of a military Azerbaijan to Senegal, USEUCOM is engaged The security environment is changing campaign identified in joint publications are in a wide variety of operations and TSC rapidly. New threats manifest themselves in deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive opera- activities. It is through these efforts that the high-profile events, such as the bombings in tions, and transition. Phase Zero encompasses command is fighting the war on terror using Madrid, Casablanca, Istanbul, and London, all activities prior to the beginning of Phase I—that is, everything that can be done to General Charles F. Wald, USAF, is Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command. prevent conflicts from developing in the first

72 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Wald place. Executed properly, Phase Zero consists They understood that defeating terrorism broad-based contact programs that can range of shaping operations that are continuous would be a long-term fight and that, in some from combined military training and exer- and adaptive. Its ultimate goal is to promote cases, success would be measured more by cises to humanitarian assistance and civilian stability and peace by building cultural exchanges. This capacity in partner nations that superb Total Force collab- enables them to be cooperative, Phase Zero encompasses everything that can be done oration allows USEUCOM trained, and prepared to help to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place to execute a robust col- prevent or limit conflicts. For lection of TSC activities, the United States, this approach despite the fact that major is typically nonkinetic and places heavy the avoidance of costly kinetic events than portions of its assigned forces have been emphasis on interagency support and coordi- by the execution of direct action. The non- committed to the U.S. Central Command nation. In many instances, Phase Zero involves kinetic emphasis is the heart of Phase Zero, area of responsibility in support of Opera- execution of a broad national strategy where the driving force behind a major new strategy tions Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. the Department of Defense (DOD) is not the at the command. To achieve strategic objec- lead agency and its programs are only one part tives, the command has coordinated a variety Execution of the larger U.S. Government effort. of previously disparate TSC activities with U.S. European Command executes The exact origin of the Phase Zero information operations (IO) and other more Phase Zero by conducting operationalized reference is unclear, making it difficult to give traditional military operations into a seamless, TSC throughout its area of responsibility. Mis- feature credit for its coining. While it may not have effects-based program of operationalized TSC. sions range from train-and-equip programs originated with USEUCOM, the command for building capacity in partner nations to has long applied the Phase Zero concept as Operationalizing TSC regional security initiatives, humanitarian a central element of its theater strategy and Theater security cooperation is not assistance actions, and similar “hearts and continues to follow this approach in dealing a new concept. Although it may have been minds” engagements. This active TSC strategy with a complex and growing threat environ- known by other names, such as peacetime is aimed at protecting U.S. interests, promot- ment across its 91-country area of responsibil- engagement, it has always fallen into the ing stability, and defeating terrorism and its ity. In the early stages of the war on terror, category of other-than-war activity. That view underlying causes. While it would be impos- senior leaders at the command recognized is changing, thanks to the maturation of the sible to examine every TSC activity in detail, the importance of thinking long term and of Phase Zero concept. USEUCOM currently two are worth a closer look: Operation Endur- collaborating with interagency partners to plans and executes various TSC activities as an ing Freedom–Trans Sahara and the Caspian develop effective security relationships with active and integral part of the war on terror. Guard Initiative. key partner nations. Leaders at USEUCOM The primary objectives are eliminating condi- Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans also realized that the preventive focus of Phase tions favorable to terrorists and preventing Sahara is an example of operationalized Zero is less costly (in both blood and treasure) broader conflict. With operationalized TSC, TSC. It is the first time a series of TSC events than a reactive approach to crisis. At the very U.S. European Command has improved on has been grouped under the umbrella of a least, Phase Zero helps set conditions for an peacetime engagement by bringing together named operation directed by the Joint Staff. easier transition to a more comprehensive U.S. planners and operators from its joint staff, the It is the American military component of the intervention in a crisis. interagency community, and the component Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, a The primary goal of Phase Zero, staffs (U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Air Forces long-term U.S. Government program designed however, is to invest fewer resources in a pre- Europe, Naval Forces Europe, Marine Forces to help the countries of Trans-Sahara Africa crisis situation to avoid an exponentially larger Europe, and Special Operations Command cooperate to control the undergoverned spaces expenditure later. The 2003 intervention by Europe) to plan engagement activities in a of their interiors. the United Nations (UN) and United States in synchronized manner. All Phase Zero efforts The Trans-Sahara region stretches from Liberia provides a case study supporting this are coordinated and executed in accordance Senegal and Mauritania on Africa’s west coast, rationale. According to UN figures, the overall with theater strategic plans. The continuous across Mali, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, and operational costs were over $680 million, involvement of the component commands is Chad. The area is sparsely populated, largely mostly for UN peacekeeping and emergency essential to draw on their individual strengths barren, and difficult for local governments assistance. Prior to that, the United States had and avoid duplication of effort, particularly to control. Lately, a variety of transnational committed a mere $67 million to programs important in the prudent use of finite defense terrorist groups such as the Algerian-based to promote stability in the troubled nation. resources. “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat” Doubling or even tripling spending on our While USEUCOM uses assigned, in- (commonly known by the French acronym preventive programs would still have been far theater forces to conduct Phase Zero TSC GSPC) have sought sanctuary there. The entire cheaper than the cost of reacting to the crisis activities as much as possible, it also gets region is crisscrossed with ancient smug- and the violence that eventually unfolded. significant help from Reserve Component gling routes for moving people, weapons, and By taking a preventive approach to secu- forces. These assets are often National Guard other contraband. Under Operation Endur- rity throughout their area of responsibility, units operating under the auspices of the ing Freedom–Trans Sahara, USEUCOM is USEUCOM leaders accepted the fact that the State Partnership Program. This program working with the militaries of nine countries payoff would not necessarily be immediate. pairs U.S. states with target countries in to improve intelligence, command and control, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 73 the phase z er o ca m paign

logistics, border control, and execution of through the region. Caspian Guard includes and countering extremist ideology through combined operations against terrorist groups. a wide variety of programs, including train- public diplomacy, DOD plays a significant The mission is a successor to an earlier U.S. ing for Kazakh and Azeri naval units and role. USEUCOM’s IO efforts consist of a wide Government program known as the Pan-Sahel maritime border guards, upgrading maritime variety of actions across many discrete lines of Initiative. In 2003–2004, planners and train- detection systems, and teaching North Atlantic operation, being executed across the theater ers taught a variety of basic infantry skills to Treaty Organization standard procedures for under the umbrella of Operation Assured soldiers from Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and maritime surveillance operations. Voice, which is designed to harness and orient Niger. The initiative also included the provi- Success in these and similar endeavors a range of theater information and influence sion of basic uniforms and field equipment. is supported by robust information sharing activities to reinforce regional security and During training in Chad and Niger, a “hearts between USEUCOM and partner nations, establish an environment unfavorable to and minds” dimension was added by U.S. Air particularly on terrorist activity (for example, extremist ideas, recruiting, and support. Force Reserve medical specialists conducting movement and threat warnings). U.S. Euro- The primary intent of the operation medical civil action programs that involved pean Command also cooperates with partner is to establish a long-term capability to examinations of thousands of local patients, nations to develop and field information shape the information environment and providing many with the only medical, dental, systems capable of protecting classified infor- counter the negative underlying conditions and optometry care they had received in years. mation while making it available to the per- that impact vulnerable audiences in volatile In the summer of 2005, Exercise Flint- sonnel who need it for mission effectiveness. regions. The value and overall effectiveness of lock ‘05 rolled out as the first major Operation Through major programs such as Operation Operation Assured Voice is determined by its Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara activity. It Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara and Caspian relationship with other regional TSC activi- involved a broad spectrum of ties, so USEUCOM places forces training with several significant emphasis on countries across the region. synchronizing information In addition to providing operations closely with all small unit tactical training in other TSC activities. Orches- marksmanship, land naviga- tration of what we say with tion, and basic infantry skills, what we do is vital; words the exercise also included air- fade, but actions endure. borne operations and Special The local populations of our feature Operations aviation units. new partner nations must The overarching goal was see concrete benefits from to ensure that participating their cooperation with the nations improved on growing United States or they will be security partnerships to halt vulnerable to extremist influ- the flow of illicit weapons, ences. The operation consists goods, and human traffick- of a collection of specific ing and to deny terrorists programs, including military sanctuary in the region. The USS Mount Whitney underway in information support teams, hope is that engagements support of Joint Forces Maritime Web-based initiatives, and such as Flintlock will facilitate Component Commander Europe collaboration with private cooperation and develop- U.S. Navy (Sarah Bir) industry throughout the area ment of capabilities among of responsibility. bordering countries that will while USEUCOM uses assigned, in-theater forces Military information result in the apprehension of to conduct Phase Zero theater security cooperation support teams are a great terrorists—much like the suc- activities, it gets significant help from Reserve forces example of interagency cesses achieved against GSPC cooperation to conduct targets in the recent past in this same focus Guard, with myriad supporting actions, the information operations. Provided to Embas- area of Africa. United States and allied nations are working sies to support their public diplomacy efforts, The Caspian Guard Initiative is perhaps together to defeat terrorist networks. Support- these teams are normally made up of four to the best example of an interagency Phase ing all these efforts is a carefully planned and six uniformed military psychological opera- Zero program. It represents a combined effort executed IO campaign. tions specialists who deploy and work side of DOD, the Department of State, and the by side with the country team. Skilled in Department of Energy. Caspian Guard is an Attacking the Center of Gravity mass communications and marketing, they initiative designed to help Azerbaijan and The National Military Strategic Plan for perform assorted information activities, from Kazakhstan develop capabilities to monitor the War on Terrorism identifies extremist ide- setting up community outreach programs and traffic in the Caspian Sea and ensure that ter- ology as the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. youth sports leagues to training host-nation rorists are not able to transport weapons of While the Department of State is the lead military personnel in the conduct of informa- mass destruction, supplies, funds, or people Federal agency for strategic communications tion operations. All their work is directed at

74 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu

feature Fleet Combat Camera Group, Atlantic (Roger S. Duncan) S. (Roger Atlantic Group, Camera Combat Fleet - 75 - Wald - .

JFQ / National Military Military National as described in Joint Joint in described as quarter 2006 th U.S. European Command Command European U.S. Doctrine for Joint Opera Joint for Doctrine 43, 4 43, deter/engage weapons of mass destruction, destruction, mass of weapons nations’ partner building while same. the do to capacity and counter the proliferation of of proliferation the counter and terrorists resources and sanctuary sanctuary and resources terrorists is striking at the enemy’s most most the enemy’s strikingis at nonkinetic offensive that will deny deny will that offensive nonkinetic significant center of gravity—the gravity—the of center significant issue forces. USEUCOM has launched a launched has USEUCOM forces. ideological base and popular ideological popular base and JFQ of major actions by conventional conventional by actions major of support—by encouraging European European encouraging support—by its roots, while avoiding the high cost cost high the avoiding while roots, its Phase Zero (or “the time prior to the the to prior time “the (or Zero Phase and African audiences to abandon abandon to African audiences and part of of part ; thus, it could be argued that Phase Zero Zero Phase that argued be could it thus, ; war on terror by destroying terrorism at at terrorism destroying by terror on war . Air Force pararescue jumper glides in jumper pararescue Air Force U.S. Djibouti amp Lemonier, near C and in cooperation with allies and partner allies with and in cooperation and nations. radical causes. All of these actions are aimed aimed these are Allradical actions of causes. the six mili of four accomplishing at directly tary in the listed objectives Terrorism on War the for Plan Strategic successfully, if executed importantly, Most Phases the need for Zero eliminates Phase Phase sustain to goal is The IV. I through to transition no with Zero engagements open- conflict. long-term, This subsequent appropriate more it makes ended endeavor in and describeto a campaign Zero as Phase must that campaign new kind of itself—a of forces joint U.S. by continuously be fought community the interagency with in concert the senior staff to the the to staff senior the of product key the components, that order tasking a is SECC bimonthly the with components and command the provides informa all for priorities and guidance clear activities. tion the to strongly relates crisis”) a of beginning deter 3–0, Publication tions current under I Phase of subset a simply is more much is Zero Phase But doctrine. joint mere beyond goes and deterrence than the win to effort active an is It engagement. - - - - guidance from from guidance

The SECC also provides a forum forum a provides also SECC The To ensure success in Phase Zero, U.S. U.S. Zero, Phase in success ensure To senior of forum a is SECC The Brian Kilgallen; and Robert T. Hunt. T. Robert and Kilgallen; Brian Contributors to this article include Col N. Whitford Taylor, USAF; Col Mark Mark Col USAF; Taylor, Whitford N. Col include article this to Contributors Austin LTC USA; Kenner, Kris LTC USN; Hoeing, Joseph CAPT USAF; Wells, K. USAF; Holinger, T. Christopher Maj USAF; Haber, Matthew Col Lt USA; Branch, Buglewicz; James USAF; Ameigeiras, Miguel Maj USA; Kripowicz, Scott MAJ large and diverse area. One of the goals of the the of goals the of One area. diverse and large conflicts these eliminate or reduce to is SECC to together stakeholders the all bringing by them analyze activities, respective their discuss theater overall command’s the of context the in to actions future synchronize and strategy, of review the to addition In effects. desired the and assessments strategic strategic effects and furnish the staff staff the furnish and effects strategic a commander the give to data the with prog command’s the on update regular objectives. strategic its toward ress the synchronize to leaders USEUCOM for actions. TSC its with messages command’s command’s the in forces U.S. by action Any perceptions impact can responsibility of area about populations and governments local of possibil real a is There States. United the when messages conflicting conveying of ity a in activities of variety a such conducting USEUCOM and component staff members members staff component and USEUCOM set guidance, provide to bimonthly meets that communica and TSC orient and priorities, Each theater. the throughout efforts tions region particular a on focuses meeting responsibility of area command’s the of strategic the of review a includes and J–8 the by produced assessments (comprised Cell Assessment Effects system-of- contracted of primarily assessments These analysts). systems command’s the of snapshot a provide desired achieving in failure or success Assessing Phase Zero Phase Assessing truly a instituted has Command European the assessing for concept ground-breaking their and activities TSC all of effectiveness The initiatives. information supporting Communications and Effectiveness Strategic for forum primary the is (SECC) Council orchestrate to leaders senior USEUCOM It activities. influence and information theater in doing is command the how evaluates also objectives. strategic achieving the stigma that might come from surveys con surveys from come might that stigma the personnel. military U.S. uniformed by ducted - - - - - South , despite its its despite , Southeast Euro Southeast in three. According According three. in is published in nine nine in published is Magharebia (addressing audiences audiences (addressing

Magharebia (for audiences in the Maghreb Maghreb the in audiences (for is now a major source of regional regional of source major a now is on terrorist activity success is supported by All of these efforts are enhanced enhanced are efforts these of All In contrast to extremist ideology ideology extremist to contrast In The Web site initiatives consist of of consist initiatives site Web The between USEUCOM and robust information sharing partner nations, particularly behavior of host-nation populations without without populations host-nation of behavior ndupress.ndu.edu expertise regarding their own societies, and by by and societies, own their regarding expertise groups focus and research market conducting and attitudes assess command the help they USEUCOM partners with local and regional regional and local with partners USEUCOM to firms marketing and relations public provide firms These audiences. target research are being realized for for realized being are 2004. late in launch recent relatively industry. private with collaboration through information. It averages over 5 million hits hits million 5 over averages It information. average with area, the within from month a numbers Similar minutes. 20 exceeding visits languages and and languages sources, industry Internet to Times pean analysis, interviews, and commentary from from commentary and interviews, analysis, issues. regional key on correspondents local Times European Southeast ness. Six days a week, the Web sites feature feature sites Web the week, a days Six ness. inter and local in reported as news regional in-depth include also They media. national institutions in both government and busi and government both in institutions military, and creation of strong, accountable accountable strong, of creation and military, media, these sites present positive themes. The The themes. positive present sites these media, open law, of rule the include topics principal the of control civilian media, unbiased and balanced coverage about key players, events, events, players, key about coverage balanced issues. and other and Internet the throughout propagated USEUCOM commander to communicate to to communicate to commander USEUCOM information and news using audiences foreign accurate, providing and regions their about countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia). Tunisia). and Morocco, Algeria, of countries Department State the with partnership in Run the allow sites two these Embassies, U.S. and in the former Yugoslavia, as well as Albania, Albania, as well as Yugoslavia, former the in and Turkey) and Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Magharebia Embassy public diplomacy. public Embassy Times European east host nation and reducing support to extrem to support reducing and nation host from last typically Deployments elements. ist country the by valued are and days 120 to 90 ongoing supporting for tool a as teams improving the security environment in the the in environment security the improving Fingerprints and the War on Terror An FBI Perspective gue o dial y

Fingerprint card of Saddam Hussein Paul J. Shannon

By P aul J . S hannon interagenc

n late 2001, with the Tora Bora Under the rule of the Taliban, this war-torn identities: at the time of the invasion, the bombing campaign in Afghanistan country had become a haven for terrorists American military was not routinely finger- in full swing, a team from the Federal and enemies of the United States, even har- printing detainees or sharing detainee infor- I Bureau of Investigation (FBI) entered boring Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda training mation with U.S. law enforcement. the combat theater on an unprecedented camps. Islamic extremists had flocked to The urgency paid off quickly. A foreign mission: to fingerprint, photograph, and the camps by the thousands, over long- fighter captured during the Tora Bora bomb- interview captured terrorists as if they were established clandestine routes from Europe, ings claimed he was in Afghanistan to learn bank robbers. the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Moreover, the ancient art of falconry. A fingerprint iden- The idea of this mission was to freeze there was potential for the terrorists to use tification was made against his immigration the identities of terrorists through a traditional these same routes to scatter back to their record, showing that he was denied entry to law enforcement booking procedure used for home countries, where they would become the United States in August 2001 at Orlando decades by police officers in the United States undetectable as potential threats. International Airport by a suspicious immigra- to track dangerous criminals so the terrorists There was another factor creating tion official. The individual was Mohamed could always be identified as such. urgency in this mission to freeze terrorists’ al Kahtani, who would later be named by the There was urgency to this FBI mission. Afghanistan in 2001 was clearly the launch- Supervisory Special Agent Paul J. Shannon, Federal Bureau of Investigation, is the Director for Law ing pad for the attacks of September 11. Enforcement Policy on the Homeland Security Council at the White House.

76 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu interagency dialogue

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claimed he was in ancient art of falconry The Bureau’s equipment on this first first this on equipment Bureau’s The Afghanistan to learn the a foreign fighter captured

and used as a fingerprint platform. fingerprint a as used and ndupress.ndu.edu 35-mm camera. Oral swabs like oversized Q- oversized like swabs Oral camera. 35-mm The samples. DNA collect to used were tips opened be could that briefcase a in fit gear ten on these fingerprint cards. Detainees Detainees cards. fingerprint these on ten and names their with boards erasable held a with taken shots, mug for numbers assigned rollers, and paper cards were used to gather gather to used were cards paper and rollers, height, as such data Descriptive fingerprints. birth, of date color, hair color, eye weight, handwrit were nationality and birth, of place Background hand ink, Printer’s primitive. was mission 9/11 Commission as the likely 20 likely the as Commission 9/11 custody. U.S. in remained person This during the Tora Bora bombings Paul J. Shannon J. Paul fingerprints and the war o n terr o r

them. Authority was sought from the U.S. Attorney General to place the terrorists in these databases, which traditionally were comprised exclusively of domestic criminal information. The conventional databases could tell a user who had been arrested for robbing a bank in Dallas, committing a bur- glary in Newark, or forging a check in Seattle. They could not tell who learned to make an improvised explosive device in a terrorist training camp. This inability was what the FBI proposal to the Attorney General would change. A strong component of this proposal was the recognition that if a police officer gue had stopped one of the 19 hijackers from the

o September 11 attacks on the streets or in the airports, nothing in the databases would have alerted the officer to a threat. In March 2002, the Attorney General approved the FBI proposal, not only endorsing the idea but also issuing a formal direc- FBI FBI dial FBI Ten Most Wanted poster FBI Ten Most Wanted poster tive compelling the Bureau to gather terrorist of Osama bin Laden of Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi fingerprints and descriptive data internation- y ally and place this information in databases. The team handed out these portable Once the booking packages were col- Using this new authority, the FBI began booking stations in Kandahar and Kabul. The lected, terrorists’ identities were permanently adding fingerprints gathered in Afghanistan agents fingerprinted detainees in U.S. custody recorded. The FBI team then hand-carried to IAFIS and almost immediately was con- there and in Northern Alliance custody in the packages from Afghanistan to Clarks- fronted with a wholly unexpected finding. Mazar-e-Sharif. The FBI team, supported by burg, West Virginia, where the Bureau acts When the first batches of terrorist prints were U.S. troops and by deployed U.S. intelligence as steward to the national criminal databases added to IAFIS, identifications occurred at officers in theater, also worked for months used by U.S. law enforcement nationwide. The the rate of about 1 per 100 terrorists. That along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, finger- two databases—the National Criminal Infor- meant that not only had those terrorists been printing foreign fighters who to our country, but they had were captured trying to flee also engaged in conduct that led coalition forces. not only had those terrorists been to arrest. By exposing terrorists The fighters were young, to our country, but they had also engaged in and networks that otherwise radicalized, and committed to conduct that led to arrest might not have been revealed, jihad. A full quarter of them these identifications provided interagenc freely admitted to interview- immediate security and intel- ers that they had surrendered ligence gains for the country. in order to fight another day—a day of their mation Center (NCIC), a text-based system An example shows the power of finger- choosing. They expected to be well treated, as that officers can query with information such printing. A foreign fighter captured near the al Qaeda trainers had explained U.S. policies as name and date of birth, and the Integrated Afghanistan-Pakistan border claimed he was toward prisoners. The message to the fighters Automated Fingerprint Identification System an itinerant preacher of Islam and not part of was wait, and eventually you will be freed. (IAFIS), which positively identifies criminals the fighting. He was one of many captured in These self-declarations were by them- by comparing submitted prints against known the area with similar stories. The fingerprint selves reason to justify the FBI mission in prints—can be called the backbone of U.S. identification was made against a misde- Afghanistan and were of no surprise to the law enforcement. On a typical day, NCIC is meanor marijuana arrest in an American city. agents; the best predictor of future behavior queried more than 3 million times and IAFIS When agents examined the arrest records, they is past behavior. A person who steals, lies, compares over 70,000 submitted prints. determined that he was a flight student. This and commits acts of violence in his twenties The team’s idea was to post the terror- person remained in U.S. custody. is likely to do the same or worse later in life. ists’ photographs and information in NCIC Such identifications were not aber- Criminals also rarely give up when confronted and place their fingerprints in IAFIS, with rations. The Bureau team started what by law enforcement. Instead, they try to the result being ready identification when the would become a worldwide effort to gather remain anonymous and undetected. They lie terrorists attempt to enter the United States thousands of prints of known terrorists about their identities to avoid punishment. or American law enforcement encounters and search and post them through law

78 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Shannon

Detainee being released protection of U.S. troops in combat zones, and from Abu Ghraib Prison identifying previously unknown terrorists. The Department of Defense (DOD) will help in this effort in two major ways: taking full sets of 10 fingerprints for all detainees from overseas operations, and collecting and keeping latent fingerprints and additional forensic identification from the sites of terrorist activities. At the Homeland Security Council, policy work is in large part directed by Presi-

dential directives. The underlying directive for interagenc this policy statement about the U.S. military is Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 11, signed and issued in August 2004. This directive calls for improving terrorist screenings of people, cargo, and conveyances at opportunities outside, at, and within national borders. The military’s role in the

U.S. Marine Corps (Ben Flores) effort has been substantial, but the consider- enforcement databases. In known terrorist n Anonymity is the greatest weapon, and able advances in the overall enterprise are due populations sampled to date, and in Iraq today, the challenge for a Soldier or police officer is to it being interagency and Government-wide. the hit rate has remained close to 1 percent. to pick the terrorist out of the crowd. Screening relies not only on those agencies Hits have been recorded at a similar rate n Terrorism is closely associated with conducting the screenings but also on those on pockets of detainees captured and then criminality. In fact, under the U.S. system, serving as collectors, who add to the database fingerprinted in the combat theater of Iraq, terrorists who make it to America must be as they encounter terrorists abroad and wher- which was unexpected because under Saddam, prosecuted in a court of law. Terrorist data- ever combat takes place. This procedure dove- y Iraq was a country with closed borders. An bases cannot be maintained separately from tails with the screening process for visitors to

interesting event occurred when an FBI team criminal databases. the United States, where names are compared dial traveled to a remote desert camp on the Iraq/ n Fingerprints, correctly collected in law with the date-of-birth watch lists being com- Iran border, the main base of the Mujahedin-e enforcement fashion and placed in databases, piled for the National Center for Counter Khalq (MEK), a terrorist group dedicated to are the best way to track and identify terrorists. Terrorism’s Terrorist Screening Database. the overthrow of the Iranian government. The Name and birthdate databases are of limited Until recently, the Federal Government MEK members led a sparse, almost cult-like value against an enemy who hides his identity. had three major agencies—the Departments o lifestyle where men could not have contact n The battlefield is global. Terrorists bide of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, and

with women, material goods were renounced, their time and wait out the immediate conflict Defense—that were building terrorist screen- gue and a group mentality held sway. Yet even to attack later. ing databases and biometric systems that in this austere environment, when the team fingerprinted about 3,800 MEK fighters, more Federal Framework than 40 hits were recorded against IAFIS. It is critical to homeland security that the overarching directive is To the agents on that original FBI team, the military develop what have traditionally to improve terrorist screening and on the teams that deployed in 2003, 2004, been considered law enforcement equities, through consolidation of and 2005 to detainee camps in Baghdad, identify terrorists and enemies of the United screening activities throughout Mosel, Erbil, and Basra, the consistent rate of States, and share the gathered fingerprints, identifications against the domestic criminal photographs, DNA, descriptive data, and trace government fingerprint database provided stark conclu- evidence, such as latent fingerprints (finger- sions about the nature of the enemy and the prints not readily visible to the naked eye), battlefield. As the team leader for forensic with U.S. law enforcement. Five years of work could not efficiently share information. DHS collection in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the by FBI teams gathering terrorist prints led to and DOD had 2-print screening systems that agent who negotiated the terrorist fingerprint this conclusion. At the White House, working could not interface with Justice or with the exchanges with certain allied countries, I through the Homeland Security Council and FBI national criminal database, which was would phrase the conclusions as follows: the National Security Council, this conclusion based on the traditional law enforcement has been the foundation of a policy statement standard of 10 fingerprints. Through HSPD n Terrorists are internationally mobile, on the role of the American military in the 11, these agencies have adopted the 10-print criminally sophisticated, adept at crossing forensic identification of terrorists. According standard and are building systems that will be borders undetected, and adroit at obtaining to the statement, comprehensive biometric interoperable, connecting law enforcement, multiple forms of false identifications. screening for terrorists, especially using fin- border security, and military detainee systems gerprints, will be basic to homeland security, to detect terrorists better before they attack.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 79 fingerprints and the war o n terr o r

Vehicle destroyed by car bomb Paul J. Shannon gue

o Significant force protection gains in Iraq and other theaters have already been realized, and Latent fingerprints identifications have been made against IAFIS discovered on car of prints gathered by the military. bomb vehicle

The overarching directive from HSPD 11 Paul J. Shannon is to improve terrorist screening through con- dial solidation and coordination of disparate screen- be a managed effort by multiple agencies, as be processed to U.S. law enforcement stan- ing activities throughout government, and the collection is most effective at first point of dards. Detainees are specifically to be finger- y Homeland Security Council has sought to assist contact with known or unknown terrorists. printed with 10 rolled and 10 flat prints, which through the interagency process, promoting The Department of Defense (in combat the- are then shared with law enforcement because information-sharing, and Federal standards. aters primarily), Central Intelligence Agency, of the transnational nature and mobility of Examples of progress include: and National Security Agency are most often the terrorist fighter. Fingerprint-based back- the first responders overseas who will have ground checks, also on the 10-print standard, n the adoption of a 10-print standard for that initial contact. were similarly ordered for foreign nationals the biometric screening of all foreign visitors Other countries, some allies in the war applying to work on U.S. military bases and to the United States, including applicants for on terror and some not, have significant exist- in some Iraqi agencies, such as military and visas at U.S. Embassies worldwide ing databases of terrorists that would greatly police forces. n DOD adoption of the 10-print standard enhance our own. Some countries are safe These commitments have led to immedi- in processing military detainees, in particular havens and could provide access to terrorist ate short-term benefits for the military in the for insurgent and foreign fighters encountered populations. Collection of screening informa- Iraqi theater, such as better control of detainee in combat theaters, and the immediate sharing tion can occur through four channels: overt, populations, improved force protection for of this information with U.S. law enforcement through diplomatic agreements which would American bases in theater, and identifications n the Department of State series of overt be managed by the State Department and against fingerprint databases, which allow interagenc diplomatic contacts with allies in the war on would likely be a long-term process; informal, military intelligence officers to focus interro- terror to negotiate agreements to share terror- through established law enforcement chan- gations on the worst terrorists. ist screening information, including forensic nels, which would be managed by the Bureau; As laudable as the gains have been, the identifiers such as fingerprints covert, when a host country is uncooperative U.S. military’s status quo on forensic identifica- n Homeland Security Council meetings or hostile, which would be managed by the tion in theater, and specifically on fingerprints, with law enforcement and intelligence agencies Intelligence Community; and direct, through remains half a program. with the goal of fully involving them in col- encounter with terrorists and their implements The terrorist crime scenes in such lecting terrorist fingerprints and latent prints in combat theaters, which would be managed theaters as Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, and internationally. by the military. the Philippines are not being fully exploited for forensic identification in the way U.S. law Through HSPD 11, the Homeland Soldiers Meet Agents enforcement would process a murder, rape, Security Council seeks to begin robust In early 2005, the U.S. military com- or robbery crime scene for trace evidence international collection of terrorist screen- mitted to adopting a booking procedure for that would then be preserved to identify the ing information such as fingerprints. This detainees in Iraq and other theaters that meets offender. Thus, there are missed opportuni- process must be systematic, sustained, and law enforcement standards with respect to ties in the short term to wage battle better by worldwide, as our screening systems will be fingerprints, photographs, and mandatory identifying and neutralizing insurgents on the only as good as the database against which descriptive data. By memorandum and general ground in theater, and missed opportunities suspects are checked. This process must also order, it was mandated that all DOD detainees in the long term to secure the homeland, as

80 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Shannon latent prints can be placed permanently in law databases can take a relatively short period FBI’s basic instruction for evidence collec- enforcement and border security fingerprint of time but can identify previously unknown tion can be given in a 40-hour week. A more databases for future identifications. terrorists. Hits made against the in-theater advanced course requires 2 weeks. While Forensic identifiers, such as latent database could lead to operations to neutralize certain lab techniques for developing and fingerprints, have no shelf life limit. They are terrorists. Moreover, hits reflecting that the comparing latent prints and other trace evi- permanent identifiers made against correctly terrorists had been in the United States would dence are complex and require considerable gathered latent prints 40 and 50 years after lead to investigations in the homeland. training and expertise, collecting trace evi- a crime. Latent prints can also be placed in The long-term value of latent prints, dence is basically simple. One team member automated systems such as IAFIS for identifi- if searches do not yield immediate hits, is photographs and documents evidence while cations of unknown terrorists who might try considerable: the other two collect and preserve, a process to enter the country during or after the war in known as “bagging and tagging.” interagenc Iraq, be it 5, 10, or 50 years from today. Latent n Unidentified latent prints can be placed This procedure also lends itself to the prints gathered in Iraq would thus have lasting in U.S. fingerprint databases for future need in the combat theater to get off the value to homeland security and contribute identifications. exploited site quickly. If the team knows what significantly to the war on terror. n Latent prints are retained for comparison constitutes good evidence, it can collect and against detainees or fighters in other theaters, preserve a great deal in a short time. Recommendations such as Afghanistan and the Philippines. Such a process, including photograph- To institute a full forensic identification n Latent prints can be shared with allies ing and documenting, could be accomplished program in theater and within DOD, the mili- the same way as intelligence for search against in minutes with equipment that could fit in tary must: their automated systems and postings for a backpack. The gains include a permanent future identifications. record of the terrorist act and forensic identi- n deploy crime scene teams within the n Latent prints, once identifications are fiers to discover the perpetrator and prosecute combat theater to use simple, well-established made, are admissible as evidence in U.S., Iraqi, the act as a terrorist crime. techniques to collect and preserve evidence and international courts. The law enforcement commitment in n establish procedures based on best prac- n As part of the rebuilding effort in Iraq, the short term, primarily from the FBI, would tices of U.S. law enforcement to track the col- Iraqi security forces are being taught to fin- be to train these teams, provide expert advice y lection of evidence for later use in U.S., Iraqi, gerprint criminals and insurgents, and a com- on the types and amounts of equipment or international courts mitment has been made that the United States necessary, and provide samples of standard dial n formalize a manner for transferring will build an automated fingerprint system for administrative procedures and the documents evidence collected in theater to the U.S. law these forces. used to track evidence for purposes of proving enforcement laboratories for full exploitation. criminal acts in a court of law. Based on Evidence Collection. The cost of gath- basic equipment for FBI Evidence Response Crime Scene Teams. Events recently ering latent prints is minimal. There is no Teams, a 3-man team could be outfitted for o unfolding in some locations demonstrate that expensive logistic apparatus to establish, several weeks for about $2,500. The Bureau

there is urgency for implementing these pro- but simply a formalization of the existing would also have to commit to taking in larger gue posals. Sites discovered in Fallujah included pathway to transfer evidence collected from volumes of evidence from Iraq, which at the apparent scene where hostages held by the field to the laboratory and the creation present amounts to only a fraction of work the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi organization were of as complete an evidence chain (that is, received by the FBI laboratory. beheaded, as well as an apparent headquarters documentary support of where and by whom Evidence Transfer. The framework for of al-Zarqawi, including letters written by him. evidence was gathered) as the ebb and flow getting evidence from field to laboratory Neither location appears already exists in a process to have been forensically that balances immediate exploited. Other significant, high-value sites not forensically exploited are the hiding in-theater requirements high-value sites not forensi- hole where Saddam was captured and the shed from with the need to develop cally exploited are the hiding which he directed insurgent activity trace evidence in a labora- hole where Saddam was tory setting. In September captured and the shed from 2003, the military with which he directed insurgent the FBI set up the Com- activity. Minimal effort, supplies, and training of combat allows. The key to success is bined Explosive Exploitation Cell to analyze could have yielded significant trace evidence seizing all opportunities, and then gathering improvised explosive devices that coalition from such sites, such as latent fingerprints, evidence properly. Facilitating the search in forces collected in Iraq. The mandate for the hair, fiber, and DNA that could lead to posi- the short term would require designating cell was to conduct a quick forensic triage tive, court-accepted identification of victims, three-man mobile teams that would deploy of devices and report back to the theater perpetrators, and conspirators. to high-value sites and operations in theater, regarding design, appearance, triggering Latent prints in particular would have much as crime scene teams in major cities mechanism, and anything else that could help immediate value to the U.S. military in Iraq. respond to crime scenes discovered by patrol a Soldier in the field recognize, avoid, or neu- Searches of these prints against automated officers and then process those scenes. The tralize an explosive apparatus. In this process, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 81 fingerprints and the war o n terr o r

Taking digital identification photo of detainee Paul J. Shannon Comparing latent print to print in database Combat Camera Squadron (Suzanne M. Day) Combat Camera Squadron st 1 gue o dial y

while creating a product that definitely saved lives, it was recognized that the devices Fingerprinting detainee in Tikrit Combat Camera Squadron (Suzanne M. Day) Combat Camera Squadron st

should also be exploited in a law enforce- 1 ment manner for trace evidence—DNA, hair, unique tool marks, explosive analysis, or Several devices have been linked through and passed back to U.S. law enforcement and latent prints. latent comparison showing that the same border security because of the international In October 2003, the cell began forward- bomb maker worked on them, while others mobility of the terrorist fighter. ing devices to the FBI laboratory through the have been linked through DNA comparison. According Department of State statistics, Bureau’s command post in Baghdad. More Crime scene work and evidence col- 87 percent of terrorist attacks against Ameri- than 800 devices have since been sent to the lection must become part of the institutional cans or their interests worldwide have involved interagenc laboratory, processed through the new Ter- goals of the military and an integrated part of improvised explosive devices. This trend will rorist Explosive Device Analytical Center. combat operations. Crime scene teams must continue as Iraqi-trained terrorists bleed out Technicians process the items for latent prints be present at high-value sites in the aftermath of Iraq into surrounding countries and Europe and other trace evidence. The prints are then of suicide car bombings and attacks, and on and as al Qaeda’s preference for large car bombs that inflict maximum casualties shows the mandate for the cell was to report anything no abatement. The terrorist’s and the insurgent fighter’s greatest weapon is anonymity, that could help a soldier in the field recognize, avoid, or and the most difficult task for a Soldier or a neutralize an explosive apparatus law enforcement officer in the war on terror is to pick that individual out of the crowd. searched and posted permanently in IAFIS for the battlefield during campaigns such as the Forensic identifiers such as latent prints and future identifications. Analysts also produce taking of Fallujah. Soldiers must behave as DNA give the United States the potential to reports on devices that are distributed to U.S. first responders—in the same manner as U.S. identify the most dangerous subset of terror- law enforcement bomb squads and explosive police officers, firefighters, and paramedics— ists, unknown bombmakers. JFQ technicians nationwide, to disseminate domes- in recognizing a high-value scene, understand- tically the same intelligence on explosive ing that evidence there must be preserved, and devices that has been passed back to soldiers knowing they must call in crime scene teams. in the combat theater. The evidence collected must then be exploited

82 JFQ / issue 43, 4 th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu No Leader Is Ever Off Stage Behavioral Analysis of

Leadership interagenc By B renda L . C onnors y y dial Combat Camera Squadron (D. Myles Cullen) Combat Camera Squadron st 1

The many faces of Saddam Hussein from his 2004 hearing in Baghdad o gue ith a better understanding United Nations (UN) Security Council delib- a variety of analytical methods, such as social of the behavior of foreign erations before we know what personally moti- network and semantic content analysis of tran- leaders, we can strengthen vates Iran’s current leader? Not necessarily. scripts. Since 9/11, the imperative to do more and W our ability to influence Until 1986, the Central Intelligence better in understanding leaders of interest has them and their decisions. Assessing these Agency (CIA) had a vibrant Center for the resulted in a self-examination of what and how figures accurately—indeed, analyzing human Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, such assessments are done, how they could be motivation rationally—is a tough business. led by Jerrold Post, a psychiatrist whose inter- improved, and how best to share these improve- But predicting the behavior of often reclu- disciplinary team included experts in social, ments. Filling our knowledge gaps in these ways, sive and complex individuals who possess clinical, and political psychology, as well as analysts today are getting better at understanding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is an cultural anthropology. The team’s studies and predicting leaders’ actions. essential task of modern government. on Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, Reliable assessments of nuclear capabili- for instance, provided critical guidance to Movement Analysis ties and human intention in North Korea and President Jimmy Carter during the successful A promising new approach has evolved Iran top today’s list of priorities. U.S. policy, Camp David negotiations with and between that may complement traditional ways of strategy, and operational planning hinge on those opposing leaders. assessing leaders and their intentions. This understanding remote adversarial regimes and Today, several agencies, including the method, called movement analysis, has impli- our best guess at what their leaders will do CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Federal cations for policy, strategy, and operations. next. Will North Korea’s leader use his WMD? Bureau of Investigation are building models of It involves adding a different perceptual and When? And how far will he go? Need we wait individuals relevant to agency mission. To enrich analytic lens through which to assess leaders another year and witness more rounds of these biographical and political models, they use not well known to us to provide insights about how they might behave. This new kind of Brenda L. Connors is a Senior Fellow in the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College. investigation can illuminate many issues, as it

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 83 behavi o ral anal y sis o f leadership

did in Iraq when it empowered us to distin- alone determines a leader’s actions, a leader’s ment demands that we consider a new point guish the real Saddam Hussein from a possible overall behavior (and its relation to policy) ulti- of view that focuses on people’s behaviors and double. Moreover, movement analysis can help mately arises from a body/mind patterning that experiences. gauge the general potential of an emerging recurs and manifests on several levels to influ- head of state, such as Iran’s president. It can ence his decisions.4 A national leader considers Bomb Damage Assessment also reveal evidence of psychological disorga- a wide range of strategic choices, but he filters In March 2003, at the beginning of nization, substance dependency, or medical these choices through a personal information Operation Iraqi Freedom, the world hoped problems and provide insight into cognitive base: his body’s temperamental hardwiring. for a quick and clean extraction of Saddam and decisionmaking styles. Such analysis Decoding an individual’s intrinsic pat- Hussein from power. The night the United offers a glimpse into a person’s style at both terning can penetrate the body’s functional States precisely bombed his headquarters, the unconscious and conscious level, helping and expressive level. Vladimir Putin’s labored there was great anticipation that Saddam distinguish between a pro-forma expression walking when he appeared on the world stage would be gone shortly. Only hours later, and a convicted response indicating feeling or New Year’s Day 2000, for instance, signaled to the network television anchors suddenly belief from a deeper source. a behavioral movement analyst that as he rose announced that the Iraqi leader would make Extensive movement analysis had been ever higher politically, he had to overcome a statement. Then a man much resembling gue undertaken on Saddam Hussein since the great life-long obstacles within himself. Such Saddam read a defiant speech to the world.

o 1990s, which afforded baseline evidence hurdles reflected in movement signature influ- Had the Iraqi leader survived the attack? Or about his decisionmaking style, including ence how he perceives himself and his role as was it one of his doubles? explanation for his “less rational” decisions. Russia’s leader.5 The fog of war can wreak havoc with As far back as 1990, for example, observers perceptions, as well as increase the stress levels questioned why he did not partially withdraw The Leader Beneath the Performance of targeted adversaries like the former Iraqi his troops from Kuwait while retaining the Careful study of a leader’s behavior dictator, who that evening appeared swollen dial northern oil fields, which would have under- involves observing movement below the level in the face and wearing what was for him mined the U.S. and multilateral position. of political performance. We have entered an an unusual pair of spectacles. Background y Psycho-diagnostic measures of his movement age in which neuroscience discoveries and commentary and best guess estimates about reveal intermittent disorganization visible in computerized event recorders can reliably whether this was the president of Iraq or one his gestures.1 These measurements can offer capture quantitative and qualitative measures of his doubles kept the world glued to the hypotheses about when and why Saddam of human expression in .03 seconds if neces- television but actually distorted the general remained attached to certain positions and sary.6 Observing a leader’s demeanor beneath perception of what was happening. Careful missed other strategically wise opportuni- the greasepaint penetrates beyond the coaching analysis of the man wearing the beret and large ties.2 Movement disorganization emerges as that image makers offer politicians performing eyeglasses on that March 2003 evening offered Saddam speaks about relinquishment of his on the stump or in interviews. Charisma, in the the expert movement analyst evidence that he WMD, and this disorganization offers insight end, cannot be easily taught, and performance was Saddam Hussein. into his psychological framework related to cannot so easily be improved or masked. When the weapons, and thus the poor prognosis of confronted by probing questions, even the Proof of Identity any policy to cut him off from them. Also, the most highly trained performers and politicians Signature movement style is unique and body can offer hints of why exile or suicide reveal in movements large and small their so detailed that it can offer incontrovertible was highly unlikely given his personal psycho- stresses, emotions, and movement contradic- proof of who someone is in the flesh. Even if logical framework.3 tion. We can detect these signs if we are attuned an imposter has had surgery to alter his facial interagenc Analysis of Saddam’s responses in 2003 to such sensing. appearance, he cannot exactly replicate the orig- to questions regarding whether he possessed Until recently, WMD or had links to al Qaeda offers evidence the behavior of foreign Framegrab from on several levels both for policymakers, who leaders has been consid- Al Jazeera television must make decisions on war or peace, and for ered marginally relevant of an unconfirmed image of Hussein military planners and battlefield commanders, in the development urging Iraqis to who must devise and enact strategic and opera- of U.S. foreign policy resist the U.S.-led tional plans. Today, because of the consistency and military planning. occupation and recurrence of behavioral patterns in the Domains such as politi- wake of Saddam’s capture, there is an opportu- cal science, political psy- nity to validate certain hypotheses posed long chology, public diplo- before his capture. Such patterns are detectable macy, and psychological even before a leader is elected, making analysis operations discuss the and planning even more reliable. behavioral dimension The human body is an almost untapped but as yet do not directly unorthodox instrument of power; it is the observe or analyze ultimate source and container of much strategic people or context. But

information. While it may appear that policy today’s security environ- AP/Wide Photo–Al Jazeera TV World

84 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Connors inal. Contrastive analysis of a subject against the ably what Saddam would do. Even with the baseline movement style is one of passive self offers micro-evidence in myriad categories, fires of war burning around him, the patterns detachment, symptomatic of how psycho- such as head and gaze behavior, handedness, drove his actions, and he could not fail to take physically he became organized to survive body posture, rhythm, and archetypes of advantage of that kind of opportunity to seek early in his difficult childhood. personality that can be compared against a so- attention and assert control. Saddam’s defiance This disconnection from the present called imposter. In addition to tracking what is during his ongoing trial is another manifesta- also provides him with a patterned sense of moving, we can also assess the quality of how tion of the pattern. “timelessness,” which offers another explana- someone moves.7 Understanding the body’s patterns helps tion for his tendency to ignore ultimatums In April 2003, a month into the second us appreciate that Saddam actually seems and deadlines or even to recognize that he is Gulf War, the networks announced, “Saddam to come alive when he can defy the world on trial. Even after all that has happened to is walking the streets of Um Quasr, Baghdad,” and gather global attention. When he is not him, detached in part from the body, he is still interagenc and CNN commentators again asked, “Is this engaged in defiance, we see his body’s true comfortable telling himself that he is here to a double?” Even with the poorest of footage baseline, that of an uncomfortable, impassive stay and that he remains powerful. shot from 40 feet away, behavioral movement leader. Ironically, challenging the prosecution evidence revealed that the man was Saddam. during his trial in Baghdad is recuperation for Dissimulation Pattern The fact that he was surrounded by several of Sadam and what floats his boat. Placing him in In January 1991, CNN’s Peter Arnett his closest aides was one cue, but his signature view of the international media in the court- asked Saddam what had happened to the Iraqi passive body attitude, style of interaction with room is the kind of sparring he thrives on, air force planes that landed in Iran to avoid those surrounding and touching him, and because it allows temporary freedom from the destruction. Saddam’s movement went well micro-facial expressions offered other sound straitjacket of his controlled body attitude. beyond his baseline evasive mode, and his evidence. One particular display of stress,8 body organized into active deception. Saddam barely visible to even a trained observer, constrained all of his movement, brought his strengthened the evidence: Saddam displayed Saddam’s movement arms tight to his sides, stopped his head move- his stress sign of rubbing his left eyelid with went well beyond his baseline ment and gestures, and displayed no grins his left hand. He did that at a moment when (though they often accompany his evasive

evasive mode, and his body y people milling around him came well inside mode) while he constructed an implausible the space he prefers to maintain between organized into explanation of what happened. himself and others. active deception The historical record shows that the dial Scratching his left eyelid may seem planes did land in Iran and that he lied about insignificant in day-to-day behavior, but such that. Thus, we have a snapshot of what he looks a subtle recurrence of signature evidence can Veracity of Saddam’s Statements like when he dissimulates (what he does when help identify the man. First, it is observable Analysis of the behavioral response of he is actively constructing a lie).9 Moreover, evidence of an idiosyncratic expression that is the adversary’s unconscious expression on several of the movement measures he employed o a verifiable element of his repertoire. Second, specific topics, such as Saddam’s statements in this response were behaviors related to

its emergence in context is an indicator of his about WMD or links to al Qaeda, offers addi- constraint of arms and head and a decrease in gue patterned interaction style and the extreme tional critical evidence for consideration at the gesture, which some deception research has also discomfort he consistently displays when he is policy, strategy, and operational levels. Sad- associated with active dissimulation.10 in close contact with people. dam’s defiance of the UN Special Commission Now that we know what Saddam does The war on terror increasingly demands program to verify the destruction of his WMD when he believes himself and what he has been reliable measures in the area of identity confir- and links to al Qaeda were the foundations known to do when he lies, we can examine mation. Amidst the chaos of insurgency and of our public premise to go to war in Iraq. two of his more recent responses for evidence war, when America’s most wanted remain on Since our ability to verify the existence of such about the veracity of his statements. the run, the remote capacity to identify elusive weapons had been cut off since 1997—and On February 5, 2003, Saddam gave an and lethal figures can save time and lives. since U.S. intelligence had scant knowledge interview in Iraq to former British Parliamen- about whether Osama bin Laden and Saddam tarian Tony Benn for the Canadian Broadcast- Patterns of Expression were linked—another means of answering ing Company. As soon as the interview began, Saddam granted CNN’s Peter Arnett these questions was necessary. Benn asked Saddam, “Do you have weapons of an interview in January 1991, 2 weeks into Beneath the well-crafted image, resplen- mass destruction?” the first Iraq war while bombs were dropping dent military uniforms, and displays of himself At first, Saddam responded with his around his offices. Maintaining control at at rallies and on posters as Iraq’s leader, baseline evasive style but then rolled into his all costs and featuring himself as the center Saddam was a man whose communicative nit-picking mode where his gestures become of attention are the mainstays of Saddam’s repertoire is strikingly limited. His speeches segmented,11 so tightly controlled that the patterned movement style. The same pattern were mostly bland and monotonous. Flat- speech and motion correspondence goes emerged 12 years later when he appeared on tering images cannot replace the elements of off track, signaling a profound separation of television to show that he was still alive and charisma or energetic intensity so lacking in thought, movement, and voice revealing a in control. This bold appearance revealed the his presentations. In fact, examples of Saddam temporary disconnect from his body’s unity consistency of his behavior and was predict- displaying personal conviction are rare. His of expression.12 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 85 behavi o ral anal y sis o f leadership

Umm al-Maarek (Mother of All Battles) mosque selective reality emerged when he told an near Baghdad has four inner minarets shaped incredulous Dan Rather twice that he won the like Scud missiles and four outer minarets 1991 Gulf War. resembling the barrels of Kalashnikov rifles While Saddam’s response probably was an attempt to garner Arab support and reflected a calculated defiance against the United States, his statement was accompanied by segmentation, a visible movement disorganization that broke his unity of expression and was measurable evidence of the sort of compartmentalized cognition that suggests that while he believed what he was saying, he was at that moment not fully present in his body or in touch with reality. (Tyler Hicks) (Tyler gue No Rational Actor

o Many political experts considered Saddam a shrewd strategic planner who

The New York Times The New York misled the international community for over a decade, giving him the false title of “rational Context analysis of the verbal asser- people. Saddam then got right on track with actor.” The movement patterning Saddam dis- tions that accompany Saddam’s heightened low-level conviction as he said, “We have never plays in real time is a direct and more reliable dial segmentation shows that he reduced complex had any relationship with Mr. Osama bin indicator and may help us to refine our views ideas into simple notions, another manifesta- Laden, and Iraq has never had any relationship of when Saddam was rational. The degree to y tion of control. This extreme compartmen- with al Qaeda.” As he denied the links, there which this former dictator is fully in reality talization served to disqualify important was no contradictory movement. In body, he can be reliably measured through psycho- elements of reality, creating for him a was telling us again that he was speaking clearly diagnostic indicators of the body’s movement selective perception. This visible movement about not having a connection to bin Laden. according to topic and context, and this mea- disorganization broke any momentary unity To these explicit questions, Saddam surement becomes a critical aspect of strategic of expression and is a measurable reflection begins answering from his baseline evasive style planning for policymakers. of the sort of compartmentalized cognition and leaves everyone wondering as to the truth. Jerrold Post and Amatzia Baram, in that comes and goes and that suggests that, Evasion is most basically Saddam; it serves him Saddam Is Iraq, Iraq Is Saddam, argue that while Saddam believes what he was saying, he well in many ways. It is a communicative mode Saddam’s psychological grandiosity convinces is not fully in touch with reality. The leader that keeps everyone unsure all the time and is the former dictator that he and Iraq are indis- recovered with a low level of conviction and one of the mainstays of the former dictator. It tinguishable. They argue that, in his mind, concluded, “Iraq has no he and his weapons are one weapons of mass destruc- and the same. These authors tion.” There are no signs Saddam’s psychological grandiosity convinces the link Saddam’s psychological of active dissimulation in architecture directly to the

interagenc former dictator that he and Iraq are indistinguishable Saddam’s response. Mother of All Battles Mosque, Benn, without which has four minarets shaped missing a beat, followed up with, “Does Iraq buys him time to defend himself and recover like Scud missiles and four shaped like assault have links to al Qaeda?” Saddam first flashed from tough questions. But behavioral move- rifles. Looking directly at his body offers a grin, signaling that he was going into one of ment analysis asks that we stay with the stream additional concrete evidence strengthening the his evasive responses. He quickly recovered of communication a bit longer. If we remain authors’ hypothesis derived both from remote and became clear. In an unfettered way, reveal- focused through the phases and watch what else behavioral movement analysis and traditional ing again the unusual spark of conviction and occurs in movement during such responses, we political history and psychological theory. dynamism in his posture and gesture, he said, can learn more. Saddam was known for his quintes- “Iraq has no links to al Qaeda.” Saddam’s evasive beginning on the sential displays of the right arm waving to the In a CBS interview 19 days later, Dan WMD question bought him time, but if we crowds, emphasizing his status and power. A Rather also pointedly asked Saddam, “Do look at the body level, the nit-picking gesture closer look reveals a profound disconnection you have, or have you had, any connection and segmentation emerge. This additional between the arm movement and his torso. to al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden?” Again, evidence in his hand movements cues us that The arm is so controlled that it is detached Saddam grinned and launched into an evasive he is in his hyper-vigilant, highly controlled, energetically from the torso. So, in a sense, strategy, throwing back the question, asking cognitively isolated selective reality. During as a form of compensation, Saddam’s arms Rather whether the root of the anxiety was in this last international CBS interview in 2003 (his weapons) are his power—unconsciously the minds of U.S. officials or of the American prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam’s an extension of what Post and Baram call the

86 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Connors

“wounded self and what the body reveals are Still, failure to embrace this soft dimension of 5 See Paul Starobin, “The Accidental Autocrat,” missing from the whole.” Saddam and his power may lead to serious mistakes. Atlantic Monthly (February-March 2005), 82–92. 6 weapons are one and the same, virtual append- Some kinds of movement patterns can We constantly interact with what movement analysis theory calls the four motion factors, mea- ages of the fractured man. be read easily with modern teaching tools. sures familiar to the political military community: Thus, the emergence of segmentation Research has demonstrated that the facial power (weight), time and space (environment), in his arm movement is not surprising in a expression of human emotion is the same the and energy. Analytic appreciation of how a leader 2003 response about WMD. Presumably, even world over (although what triggers and ulti- interacts with these forces is a primary aspect of raising the topic made his selective percep- mately shapes the display of those expressions understanding a behavioral movement signature. tion go into high gear as the mere mention is culturally influenced). Appreciating that 7 Charlie Chaplin and Alec Guinness, actors of separating Saddam from these extensions critical behavioral knowledge represents just of Hitler’s day, portrayed the Third Reich’s dictator of self evoked in him a sense of detachment the tip of the iceberg for American officials. in motion pictures. While certain parts of their interagenc (and unconsciously triggered a deep fear and a The willful failure to uncover the cogni- performance captured aspects of Hitler’s oratorical sense of further dismemberment) seen in the tive decisionmaking style and psychological style, such as crossing his arms, the careful pausing highly controlled, segmented arm gestures. state of mind of the opponent across the table to keep the crowd waiting, and his smugness, Hitler’s deepest hardwired movement signature, includ- In responding to Benn’s question about during negotiating or planning for war denies ing the movement disorganization manifest in the WMD, Saddam was evasive and segmented, us a tremendous advantage. If the opponent uncontrollable twitch in his right hand, which he but he did not contradict what he was saying uses it against us, the advantage will be his. tried to hide during speeches by tucking it beneath in movement. Though denying verbally that In the end, our opponents are never off stage. his left upper arm, could not be replicated by even he had WMD is what we expected under any Neither are we. JFQ the generation’s best actors. circumstance, he could not, in reality, accept 8 A movement repertoire will include a person’s the idea of not having them or, for that matter, N o t es stress signs. Studies of footage for over two decades of not remaining in power. However, that his included analysis of one particular unconscious 1 movement did not contradict what he was Brenda L. Connors and Martha Davis, “Non- micro-expression of stress that a master movement saying is interesting additional information. verbal Communication Demonstration Project, expert with over 30 years of experience had actually Micro-analytic Profiling of Foreign Leaders,” unpub- What would have been compelling is if, analyzed for cues to inner motivation and the phras-

lished U.S. Government report, 1999. ing of his actions. y while Saddam denied in words that he had 2 Other evidence continues to emerge about 9 The same posture is seen in images taken with WMD, his body movement had contradicted Saddam’s state of mind. See Kevin Woods, James former U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie during her his claim. There was no such evidence in his Lacey, Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: last meeting with Saddam. dial display. While underneath he might have The View from the Inside,” Foreign Affairs (May/ 10 B.M. De Paulo et al., “Cues to Deception,” been telling himself his own story about the June 2006), 2–26. Psychological Bulletin 129 (2003), 74–118. weapons, and hoping to restart his program in 3 Brenda L. Connors, “See a Reflection of 11 See M. Davis and D. Hadiks, “Demeanor and the future, his statement that he did not have Saddam’s Biography,” Naval War College Review 57, Credibility,” Semiotica 106 (1995), 5–54. them was supported by his body movement. no. 1 (Winter 2004), 113–116. 12 Saddam at such moments, when his think- 4 o And when Benn and Rather asked about links Brenda L. Connors, “Body Leads: A Non-Tra- ing is in overdrive, often corrects his competent ditional Approach to Understanding Leadership and interpreters. to al Qaeda, Saddam did not display his dis- gue Performance Style,” unpublished U.S. Government simulation mode. This analysis of his very per- primer, 2004. sonal relationship to WMD and what it means to him becomes one more piece of evidence to be used by policymakers and planners.

In a world seeking to understand how to communicate with friend and foe alike to avert conflict, using one more leadership assessment tool can help us predict the behavior of political leaders and remote adversaries to whom we have little access. Each person has a basic hardwired skill to apprehend movement. Perhaps our greatest interagency challenge will be to attend more consciously to behavior. That involves confronting our resistance to embodying such a perspective. It can be hard to accept that we are so patterned and predictable. Moreover, learning something both new and outside our comfort zone, such as decoding movement Classic pose of Saddam Hussein during one of his patterns, can trigger resistance; thus, we find rare public appearances ways to remain unconscious about them. AP/Wide Photo World ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 87 Russian soldier captures enemy German soldiers dash away after setting fire to barn outside Stalingrad

The Enduring Relevance of the Battle for Stalingrad By B rian H anle y

ore than six decades after be touched on specifically is an appraisal of a plan to attack the Soviet Union (though he the surrender of the Sixth the Stalingrad campaign that speaks directly had made up his mind that war with Russia was Army and Fourth Panzer to warfighters who value interservice comity inevitable nearly a year earlier). In the autumn of M Army, some 50 years after and know-how above all else. To this end, this 1940, Hitler’s intuition told him that the defeat the last German prisoner of war was allowed article argues that the Germans could have of Great Britain could be accomplished only by to return to what had once been his home- succeeded at Stalingrad if they had some of conquering Russia. The German army, and to a land, and a couple of generations after the our ideas of joint operations and, of equal lesser extent the Luftwaffe, was as close to what place was renamed Volgograd, the mention importance, our high standards in regard to we would understand as combat readiness as it of Stalingrad brings distinct images, even to professional integrity. ever would be. Morale was at a peak, and there minds untaught in history and geography. was a core of combat-tested leaders at all levels, In the months preceding the 2003 Iraq A Flawed Strategy although the German equipment was wanting campaign, we were warned that the battle for Stalingrad was fought and lost by the finest in major respects. In both numbers and quality Baghdad would become “another Stalingrad.” collection of divisions in an army that had not of weapons, the Russians had the upper hand. There was no shortage of editorials that argued known strategic defeat for a quarter of a century. The Wehrmacht possessed no tank that could that the earlier battle might forecast the nature Where did this collection go wrong? How could go head-to-head with the Russian T–34 and of the impending struggle for the Iraqi capital. talented leaders blunder on such a massive KV–1, and more than half of the 3,200 Panzers Analogies of this kind express just how cata- scale? We study the battle for Stalingrad from assembled at the eastern frontier in June 1941

recall strophic the battle for Stalingrad was. the German point of view so that 50 years hence, were thinly armored machines. The Mark I had In military circles, Stalingrad occupies a students of military campaigns will not be 7.62-mm machineguns, the Mark II had 20-mm suitable place in officer development courses asking similar questions about U.S. performance guns, and the Czech tanks were armed with 37- that focus on important battles. A campaign in whatever major clash of arms awaits us. mm guns. The infantry was without a suitable of Stalingrad’s proportions offers a multitude The battle for Stalingrad really began in assault weapon; the standard-issue K98 rifle, an of lessons for the military. But what has yet to the summer of 1940, when Adolf Hitler initiated old design but hardly obsolete, was of limited value given the scale, intensity, and conditions of Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hanley, USAF, is an Associate Professor of English at the U.S. Air Force Academy. combat that would prevail on the eastern front.

88 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Hanley

Even so, the operational and tactical excellence the Germans were unprepared, which reflects be kept running without a proper inventory of of the soldiers who would employ that equip- not only a failure in planning but also a robust spare parts. Too late, German industry created ment was without equal. and invincible self-deception. As good as it semitracked trucks, but they were never Irrespective of the valor and resourceful- was, the German army that charged across produced in sufficient numbers and, even ness of the combat troops, the military strategy the River Bug in June 1941 in Operation if they had been, none were without major that governed Germany’s war on Russia and Barbarossa was essentially an expeditionary design shortcomings. culminated in the Stalingrad disaster was force working to annihilate an enemy that The German planning system failed from the start to coordinate ways, ends, and means—a circumstance that had not been corrected when the summer offensive kicked off the military strategy that governed Germany’s war on Russia in June 1942. The decision to persist in execut- and culminated in the Stalingrad disaster was terribly flawed ing a bad strategic plan thrust the Germans toward a defeat at Stalingrad that led to Soviet Russia’s triumph 2 years later. From February 1943 onward, after the last German soldier terribly flawed—a circumstance aggravated could be defeated only by a military establish- surrendered at Stalingrad, Germany could not by the moral feebleness of the operational ment that was structured, provisioned, trained, expect to regain the strategic initiative. Its only The commanders on the scene. Military planners and experienced in wars of attrition. realistic hope was to fight a defensive war that today would find the Wehrmacht’s original would prove so costly to the Soviet armies as objectives of capturing major centers of gravity to drive Stalin to the negotiating table. Enduring unexceptionable: the Ukraine (Soviet Russia’s The great loss of men and materiel at industrial and agricultural heartland); Moscow Stalingrad meant that the most important Relevance of the Battle (the seat of Russia’s dictatorship and its indus- strategic objective, the capture of Moscow, fell trial and communications nerve center); and forever out of reach. And so crippling was the Leningrad (a major port on the Baltic Sea and Stalingrad debacle that it removed the need for cradle of Bolshevism). for a northern front, even though the armies Achieving these objectives would give investing Leningrad in the spring of 1943 Germany mastery over Russia from Archangel could have mitigated, if not prevented, the Stalingrad to the banks of the Volga, isolating Stalin massive defeats in the central and southern and the communist system that Hitler feared sectors in 1944. and detested on the Asian steppe. But Hitler also insisted that his armies destroy Russian Practical Difficulties forces in the field—a goal that could not be Operation Blue, Hitler’s summer squared with the other objectives. The great offensive, largely duplicated the strategy of encirclement battles of 1941 have never been Barbarossa. The difference between the opera- matched: 9 major pockets and more than a Germans find safety behind a wall tions was one of scale. Directive 41 (April 5, dozen smaller ones yielded 3 million Russian 1942) ordered the Wehrmacht to “destroy prisoners, 14,000 tanks, and 25,000 guns, as Forever Out of Reach the active fighting strength remaining to the well as heaps of other equipment. But these vic- To begin with, the German economy was Soviets and to take away as far as possible tories, spectacular though they were, enfeebled not geared to support an effort of this kind. their most important resources of war.” Hitler the Wehrmacht in such a way as to make its Moreover, the army was deliberately deprived no longer had the forces to do this along the massive defeat before the gates of Moscow in of all supplies that would help the troops entire line, so Operation Blue focused on the recall December 1941 inevitable. In locking down fight or withstand the Russian winter on the southern sector of the eastern front. In four Russian forces in positions called kessels (kettles grounds that such items would demoralize phases, the German army would destroy or cauldrons), rather than bypassing them, the the soldiery who, it was assumed, would fight Soviet forces in the Don River Bend, capture German armored columns racked up miles on better if they believed the war would be won in the oil fields in the Caucasus, and shore up the their tracks and engines they could ill spare. a few weeks. front elsewhere until offensive power could be The infantry divisions tasked to liquidate the In fact, the entire logistic system was concentrated for further operations. pockets suffered enormous losses in men and a mess. Supplies were expected to move These ends were not beyond reason material. Time was spent inefficiently in these across great distances, without a proper road given what Hitler assumed to be the thread- encirclement battles rather than in storming and rail network, to a front line constantly bare forces opposing him. But even if the Moscow before the autumn rains would hold in flux. Also, the Germans had far too few intelligence estimates had been accurate rather up the mechanized spearheads, or at least trucks. The Opel Blitzes and Mercedes L3000 than terribly wrong regarding Soviet strength before the unimaginably brutal winter would vehicles soon broke down under the strain of and fighting spirit, Berlin’s armies would have paralyze and debilitate them. bad roads, excessive cargo, and questionable struggled to execute even this pared-down But even if the original objectives had maintenance. The miscellany of captured strategy. Hitler turned a precarious situation been doggedly pursued, in one decisive respect vehicles the Germans had to rely on could not into a hopeless one by expanding the aims

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 89 the battle F O R stalingrad

another. Armored columns require massive quantities of supplies when the objectives are as expansive as Hitler’s, so it makes good sense for them to advance at the head, or as part, of a broad offensive front. That allows these formations to remain within reach of supply dumps and field repair shops. Hitler took no account of these practical difficulties, nor did he take notice of the additional psychological and physical strain his revised objectives would place on his troops. The Wehrmacht was already weakened by fighting the previous winter. German factory production could not keep up with demand for critical weapons systems—tanks and armored personnel carriers, for instance—and the Soviets were growing stronger and, as strategists and tacticians, wiser by the day. The Russians had every good reason to trade space for time, the objective being to lure Hitler’s armies—his most capable formations in particular—into a trap from which they could not Clockwise from left: Germans aim heavy artillery escape. Unintentionally, Hitler collaborated at Stalingrad; Germans view with the Russian High Command on its plan battlefield; Map of German of strategic retreat, to be followed by a series of campaign for seizure of massive counterstrokes. Stalingrad; Soldiers run for cover behind damaged Panzer tank. Running Out of Options The Sixth Army began to engage Russian forces outside Stalingrad in late July 1942. By August 23, advance elements had secured the west bank of the Volga immediately north of Stalingrad. At that moment, it appeared that Hitler’s plan, reckless though it was, just might work. From a strategic standpoint, the mission of his plan. On July 23, about a month after was more than 200 miles east of the German of the Sixth Army and the Fourth Panzer Operation Blue got under way, he issued a front line in June 1942. According to Directive Army was successful. Soviet river traffic fell major revision: his armies were to destroy 42, the Sixth Army and the Fourth Panzer Army under German artillery fire, the rail line Soviet forces in the Rostov area immediately were “to attack Stalingrad, smash the enemy con- running north from Stalingrad was in German to the east of where the German forward line centration there, take the town, and cut off the hands, and the Luftwaffe had free play of the was held, push on to occupy the entire eastern isthmus between the Don and the Volga.” skies, allowing it to pummel the industrial and coast of the Black Sea, and dispatch mobile These expanded strategic ends were transportation systems, as well as the civilian forces to seize the main oil-producing areas, all beyond the means of the German army—and population within the city. As a hub of arms in preparation for an offensive that would ter- given the indeterminate character of his production and the movement of raw materi- minate at the north shore of the Persian Gulf. revised plan, Hitler’s strategy in the south als, Stalingrad was knocked out of the war. Maikop was the nearest objective at 200 miles was perhaps not attainable without great Operationally, however, the situation southeast of the German front line. Astrakhan risk by any army any time. First, expecting was much murkier for the Germans by late lay some 350 miles distant, Grozny 500 miles, armored spearheads to plunge hundreds of September. Unlike the preceding weeks and Baku a further 300 miles to the southeast miles further into enemy territory from a start when the fighting took place on the steppes

recall of Grozny. point hundreds of miles from the German and in the suburbs, the Russians began to In addition, Hitler expected the Sixth homeland to seize towns and encircle and put up a stiff resistance within Stalingrad Army—at 17 divisions, the largest and best annihilate enemy forces is contrary to sound proper—though German tactics made it easier equipped formation of its kind on the eastern operational and strategic judgment. Even for the outnumbered and outgunned Soviets front—to deny Russian forces the great volume if the enemy puts up only feeble resistance, to stall the German advance. Instead of seizing of munitions, weapons, food, and oil produced in flanks are well guarded, and all attacks on the the western bank of the Volga, which would southern Russia by cutting the supply line at the flanks fail immediately, embarking on such a have isolated Russian forces in the city and cut Volga, immediately north of Stalingrad, which course would provoke one logistic crisis after off the ferrying of troops and supplies across

90 JFQ / issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Hanley the river each night, the Germans attacked the city on a broad front: from the northwest, the west, and the southwest. Advances, always costly in troops, quickly petered out because of pockets of resistance behind the front line, or because the Germans absorbed a critical mass of casualties in exchange for short and often evanescent gains. Scarcely less important, the Germans had no choice but to use their primary offensive weapon, the Panzer force, entirely in a support role as assault groups. Within Stalingrad, the Panzers were usually employed

Russians celebrate victory Hitler turned a precarious situation into a hopeless one by after 200 days of fighting expanding the aims of his plan

in small groups (three and four per engage- Prestige versus Lives Stalingrad would humiliate Stalin. The ment) and under conditions that favored the The operational and tactical aspects world would take note of communism being defender. Fighting in the dust, darkness, and of the battle are what most readily come smashed under the boot of national socialism clutter of a bombed-out city gives prominence to mind when one thinks of Stalingrad. By and marvel at Hitler’s strategic genius and the to a tank’s weakness—a large, noisy, smoking October 1942, after nearly 2 months of a invincibility of his armies. target that does not offer its crew the agility on contest marked by unprecedented brutality, Russian armies, which had been assem- which its survival depends—while minimizing the Germans were in charge of almost the bling on the periphery of the Stalingrad its strength. entire city but without the strength to hold out combat zone since late summer, attacked the What made the Panzer arm effec- should something go wrong. By early Novem- thinly held flanks of Friedrich von Paulus’ tive was not its firepower, which was ber, after the final attempt to take the city had army with overwhelming force on Novem- always second-rate compared with Russian run its course, the Sixth Army was exhausted. ber 19. By November 23, the encirclement machines, but its maneuverability and mutual Most formations were reduced to a fraction of of the Sixth Army and parts of the Fourth support in formation. The three Panzer divi- their original complement of men and equip- Panzer Army was complete. The Hungarian, sions (14th, 16th, 24th) and the three motorized ment. At both the operational and tactical Italian, and Romanian armies guarding the divisions (3d, 29th, 60th) committed to Stalin- levels, the battle for Stalingrad was effectively flanks and rear areas had been torn to pieces. grad thus would have been more effectively lost. The Germans had taken a mass of casual- Despite what was by any sensible reckoning employed as a mobile reserve, ready to ties and lost hundreds of tanks, vehicles, and a serious defeat that could only ripen into a annihilate any kind of flanking offensive or weapons with nothing to show for it but gath- strategic calamity if the trapped forces did counter a deep puncture in the front line. ering catastrophe. not break out immediately, Hitler ordered his German intelligence told the High Command At the strategic level, chaos had begun to generals in the pocket to stand fast; he would that the Russians had no strategic reserves assert itself many weeks earlier. In late Septem- send forces under General Erich von Man- left, but military prudence and a knowledge ber, Hitler quarreled with and then dismissed stein to break in. A supply corridor would be recall of military history should have kept the his chief of staff, General Franz Halder, whose maintained until spring, when the offensive Germans from risking all on mere reports. well-grounded misgivings about the Stalingrad was expected to resume. One knows for certain that the enemy has campaign affronted Hilter’s understanding of By Christmas Eve, however, the quixotic no reserves only when that enemy has been what was at stake. Halder argued for a strategic attempt by General von Manstein to relieve the completely, irrevocably subdued. As John withdrawal from the city not only because of Sixth Army had failed 2 weeks after it began. Keegan argues, “Intelligence in war, however the casualties and the attendant weaknesses In the meantime, Russian armies pushed good, does not point out unerringly the path of the extended flanks, but also because the the German line some 200 miles west. The to victory. Victory is an elusive prize, bought original strategic objective had since been Russians assaulted the kessel on January 10, with blood rather than brains. Intelligence attained—a fact Hitler would concede in a 1943. German troops fought valiantly but in a is the handmaiden, not the mistress, of the situation briefing 12 days after firing Halder. hopeless cause. On January 31, von Paulus sur- warrior.”1 Hitler was certain that no intelli- As Hitler looked at the matter, however, rendered, though remnants of the 11th Corps, gence service could be expected to deliver. seizing the city became above all else a matter isolated in the northern part of the city, did of prestige—a word always fraught with not capitulate until February 2. meaninglessness when a head of state balances For the Germans, it was a disaster it against the lives of his soldiers. Capturing beyond imagination. Two German armies ndupress.ndu.edu issue 43, 4th quarter 2006 / JFQ 91 the battle F O R stalingrad

National were removed from the order of battle. Some down, as he later would to Manstein and 100,000 troops, including 2,000 officers and Heinz Guderian. At the least, the command- Defense 22 generals, marched into captivity. Perhaps ers might have surrendered when there was 1 in 20 survived the ordeal that followed. nothing to be gained by continuing the fight. University Antony Beevor estimates that, all told, the Axis No matter how well a campaign is planned, no armies—including the satellite forces—lost matter how finely equipped and trained and Foundation more than half a million troops between battle-hardened an army is for a campaign, the August and the final surrender at Stalingrad.2 moral qualities of the leadership remain of the Building a Stronger The loss of equipment was on an equally cata- highest importance. strophic scale. The Stalingrad campaign took for and Safer America granted that German forces would always The Moral Factor prevail, no matter what the specific details of Congratulations to the authors Hitler is to blame for the Stalingrad a given engagement. The German soldier at of the winning essays in the 2006 Chair- debacle. He did not have the means to achieve all levels was superior to his Russian counter- his vast and at times incompatible objectives, part—his morale was higher as well—and in man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic and when his military chief of staff told him any case, the High Command was convinced Essay Contest and to all the entrants as much he was removed from his position. in the summer of 1942 that the Russians th and judges who participated in the 25 As J.F.C. Fuller has argued, the German army had no strategic reserves left. According to a anniversary of this annual event. Look would have achieved its strategic objec- capabilities-based approach to warfighting, the for the winning essays in this issue of tive—denying the Russian war machine vital Germans were right to proceed as they did and Joint Force Quarterly. raw materials produced in the south—by would probably have defeated the Russians “Schwerpunkt at ,” taking both banks of the Volga many miles Stalingrad—just as the Russians would have north of Stalingrad.3 Such a plan would have crushed the Germans in the opening weeks of Keep informed about squared ways, ends, and means, though the Operation Barbarossa. our activities with the NDUF prestige Hitler attached to taking the city out- E-newsletter at right might never have been realized. Scarcely If the German experiences in Russia www.nduf.org/publications.html less significant was that Hitler’s manner of teach us anything, it is that capabilities proceeding was wasteful. When Hitler realized wargaming can foster an atmosphere of over- that Stalingrad could not be seized without confidence that is rooted in a narrow concern bleeding his armies as they had never been for material circumstances. Wargame directors bled before, the Nazi leader rejected advice should always throw in an implausible episode from his commanders about aligning his stra- or detail, if only to encourage us to expect tegic objectives with his operational plan and surprise and to help us cultivate prudence and forces available. resourcefulness. While Hitler is due the largest share of Military leadership, irrespective of time the blame, his generals bear responsibility and place, is at heart a moral activity. It is as well. For starters, they did not push for quality of character, not technical virtuosity or freedom of action until after the Germans had even managerial ability, that ultimately wins been effectively defeated in early November; or loses the day. Wisdom, humility, compas- what the Russians did after November 19 sion, and intelligent perseverance are the was basically a harvesting operation. The wellsprings of outstanding officership in peace Visit the NDU Foundation German generals on the scene only conceded but most especially in war. This is every bit as online at the obvious after the hour for action was long true for von Paulus at Stalingrad as it was for past, when there was nothing to do but strike Agamemnon before Troy—and it is true for www.nduf.org an indignant pose. It would have been far the joint warfighter today. JFQ Thank you for your support better for the Sixth Army leadership to resign en masse when General Halder was sacked in September than to continue endorsing a N o t es strategy they had to know was destructive. 1 John Keegan, Intelligence in War (New York:

recall The generals rightly feared Hitler, for he might have imprisoned them for defying him or Knopf, 2003), 6. 2 Antony Beevor, Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: sent them before a firing squad. But the lives 1942–1943 (New York: Penguin, 1999), 398. of one’s troops always come first—and in 3 J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western any case, why should the generals persist in World (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1956). National Defense University Foundation being careless with their soldiers while being 251 Third Avenue, Building 20 overly scrupulous about their careers? Indeed, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 20319 there was a possibility that Hitler would back (202) 685-3726 FAX: (202) 685-3582

92 JFQ / issue 43, 4thth quarterquarter 20062006 ndupress.ndu.edu