"Northern" EU Enlargement: 47Th Economics Conference 2020 of the Oenb in Cooperation with SUERF

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A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Ed.) Proceedings 25 years of "Northern" EU enlargement: 47th Economics Conference 2020 of the OeNB in cooperation with SUERF SUERF Conference Proceedings, No. 2020/2 Provided in Cooperation with: SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum, Vienna Suggested Citation: Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Ed.) (2020) : 25 years of "Northern" EU enlargement: 47th Economics Conference 2020 of the OeNB in cooperation with SUERF, SUERF Conference Proceedings, No. 2020/2, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, Vienna This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/234534 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu SUERFSUERF THE EUROPEAN MONEYTHE EUROPEAN AND FINANCE MONEY AND FORUM FINANCE FORUM OESTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK EUROSYSTEM 47th ECONOMICS CONFERENCE 2020 of the OeNB in cooperation with SUERF 25 years of “Northern” EU enlargement ECONOMICS CONFERENCE 2020 CONFERENCE ECONOMICS th 47 Contents About SUERF – the European Money and Finance Forum 5 Chapter 1: Introduction and overview: The EU’s “Northern” enlargement 25 years on – stocktaking and some thoughts for the future Ernest Gnan, OeNB and SUERF and Robert Holzmann, OeNB 8 Part 1: Global historical context and EU impact on economic performance Chapter 2: Covalization: Europe on the rack between globalization and COVID Harold James, Princeton University 20 Chapter 3: The benefits of 25 years of EU membership Jetro Anttonen, University of Helsinki, Vesa Vihriälä, Helsinki Graduate School of Economics 30 Chapter 4: 25 Years of Austria’s EU membership Fritz Breuss, Vienna University of Economics and Business, WIFO 40 Chapter 5: The challenges and opportunities in the digitalisation of production Christopher Warhurst, University of Warwick, Stephen Dhondt, KU Leuven 54 Part 2: Monetary and financial integration Chapter 6: After 25 years as faithful members of the EU: public support for the euro and trust in the ECB in Austria, Finland and Sweden Felix Roth, University of Hamburg, Lars Jonung, University of Lund 64 Chapter 7: Finland and monetary policy through three crises Meri Obstbaum and Tuomas Välimäki, Suomen Pankki 80 Chapter 8: Financial integration in the Nordic-Baltic region vis-à-vis the EU: a Swedish perspective David Farelius, Stefan Ingves and Magnus Jonsson, Sveriges Riksbank 90 Chapter 9: T he European banking supervisory framework and its institutional arrangements since Austria’s accession to the European Union Michael Kaden, Michael Boss and Markus Schwaiger, OeNB 104 Part 3: EU membership and economic governance Chapter 10: The development of the EU budget – impact on Austria, Finland and Sweden Walpurga Köhler-Töglhofer and Lukas Reiss, OeNB 126 Chapter 11: Revamping policy governance in Austria Heinz Handler, WIFO 144 47th ECONOMICS CONFERENCE 2020 3 About SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum SUERF stands for “Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Finan- SUERF cières”, the original name under which THE EUROPEAN MONEY AND FINANCE FORUM SUERF was established in 1963 in France. SUERF is an independent and non-partisan member association. SUERF’s strength lies in bringing together three pillars of members: central banks and supervisors, financial industry representa- tives and academic researchers. For more than 50 years, SUERF has been dedi- cated to the analysis, discussion and understanding of European financial markets and institutions, the conduct of financial regulation, financial supervision and monetary policy. SUERF’s main activities are: events, publications and the support of young researchers. SUERF is governed by its Council of Management, which includes senior representatives from central banking, the financial industry and academia. The Oesterreichische Nationalbank has hosted the SUERF Secretariat at its premises in Vienna since April 1, 2000. If your institution is interested in joining SUERF, please contact: [email protected] or +43 1 40420 7206. www.suerf.org – www.suerf.org/policynotes – www.suerf.org/events – www.suerf.org/webinars – www.suerf.org/membership – https://www.suerf.org/fellowships 47th ECONOMICS CONFERENCE 2020 5 Chapter 1 Ernest Gnan Head of Division at the Economic Analysis Division Oesterreichische Nationalbank SUERF Secretary General Robert Holzmann Governor Oesterreichische Nationalbank Introduction and overview: The EU’s “Northern” enlargement 25 years on – stocktaking and some thoughts for the future Synthesizing main findings from this volume, this article identifies how the three EU Northern enlargement countries have been contributing to the EU’s evolution. EU membership has brought substantial economic benefits for all three countries. While these benefits far out- weigh financial costs, this is as such no rationale for net financial contributions, as the EU is a win-win situation for all Member States. While a “multi-speed-Europe” seems a pragmatic way to pursue EU integration, if each country follows an “individual utility approach to EU integra- tion”, then externalities and network effects are neglected. The EU policy process needs more ex ante and ex post scientific evaluation of policies. Policy benchmarking should be adopted explicitly with the aim of mutual learning, improvement and reform. COVID-19 appears to propel EU integration and EMU deepening. The question arises, though, whether crisis-indu- ced “forced” integration is sustainable. It is crucial that the EU and its Member States will effectively turn the crisis recovery into a catalyst for transformation towards a greener and digital economy and to resist the temptation just to cover up the economic fallout from the pandemic, rather than embarking on transformative structural adjustment. JEL codes: E02, E61, E65, F02, F5, H12, H43, H77, N44 Keywords: EU integration, EU membership, Austria, Finland, Sweden, EU budget, NGEU, economic policy evaluation, economic reform, COVID-19, green new deal, digitalization 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of the virtual edition of the event took place EU’s fourth enlargement round – some- on September 21, 2020, giving the authors times referred to as “Northern” enlarge- of this volume the opportunity to pres- ment – which, after several years of ne- ent and discuss their findings. gotiations, made Austria, Finland and Several of the articles in this vol- Sweden EU members on January 1, ume adopt a comparative perspective, 1995. For a European country, there is reviewing various aspects of EU mem- hardly any other foreign or economic bership for the three countries in ques- policy move conceivable in the second tion, while, in some cases also compar- half of the 20th century (and in the 21st) ing these aspects with other countries. that could be more far-reaching and Drawing on these analyses, this intro- important than EU membership. It is duction aims to flesh out a few general thus worth looking back on what EU points, which may also be of relevance membership has entailed for the three for the future development of European countries. integration, and comment on the role To study this question, the OeNB, in of the three countries of the EU’s 1995 cooperation with SUERF – The Euro- Northern enlargement round. pean Money and Finance Forum, has compiled this volume. Originally, this 1 Economic benefits from EU publication would have been the outcome membership have been sub­ of a conference in Vienna planned for stantial for Austria, Finland May 2020 as a collaboration between the and Sweden Bank of Finland, Norges Bank, Sveriges Two studies in this volume (Anttonen Riksbank, SUERF and the OeNB. Un- and Vihriälä, chapter 3; Breuss, chapter 4) fortunately, due to COVID-19, this con- document, based on the authors’ own ference had to be cancelled. A streamlined empirical estimates and the existing 47th ECONOMICS CONFERENCE 2020 9 Ernest Gnan, Robert Holzmann empirical literature, that the economic cannot be easily conceptualized and benefits from EU membership have quantified. For instance, it is an open been substantial for all three countries question how much Austria’ EU and in question, with cumulated increases euro area membership helped the coun- in real GDP or per-capita GDP ranging try in averting a financial crisis from its from 5% to 10% over the past 25 years. bank exposure in Central, Eastern and Most studies find that Austria ben- Southeastern Europe (CESEE) during efited by far the
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