I'hiiorophy and Archileoiogy history and methodology of Anglo-American , putting the tumultuous debates of Reflections on Thinking: the last thirty years in historical and philosop11- History, Philosophy, and American ical perspective." The back cover also contains, Archaeology not unexpectedly, testimonials as to the book's By Michael J. O'Brien importance-one from philosopher of science Merrilee Salmon and one from archaeologist 7%inlzingfrom Things: Essdys in the Philosophy ofArchnc- George Cowgill. Salmon believes that the book ofo'~~(2002) ALISONWYLIE. University of California is "for anyone who wants to understand con- I'ress, Berkeley xviii + 339 pages. $39.95. lSBN 0-520- temporary archaeological theory; how it came 22360-8. to be as it is, its relationship with other disci- plines, and its prospects for the future." Cowgill Alison Wylie's book Thinking from Things: opines that Wylie "is a reasonable and astute Essays in the Philosophy of Archaeology contains thinker who . . . commands both philosophy the standard kind of promotional blurb that one and archaeology to an unusual degree." expects to find on a book cover or jacket. Edi- Sounds like the standard fare for back covers, tors usually have someone on their staff take the so why even bother to highlight what appears first shot at writing such a piece, then run it by there? I do it because for once, an introduction the author for editing. Promotional introduc- and the testimonials that accompany it accu- tions by force are succinct-there isn't a lot of rately reflect a book's content and significance. space available-but are they necessarily accu- Wylie is an astute thinker; she does put the rate appraisals of a book's importance? They tumultuous debates of the post-1970 period in might be, but a promotional piece is just that- historical and philosophical perspective; and the something written for the express purpose of book is for anyone who wants to understand helping to sell a book. We don't expect to see, contemporary archaeological theory. Impres- for example, an introduction that says, "In this sively, Wylie treats theory in a non-snoozy man- ponderous, overwritten, and poorly researched ner. She can't make the story line quite as lively book, the author begs us to believe that he's as Chinese treasure fleets reaching the New proved that a Chinese fleet made its way to the World, but her writing style helps keep the read- North American continent in 1421." er's interest. Wylie, like Salmon, is one of the No editor, let alone an author, would let few philosophers competent to comment on something like that make its way onto a book both archaeology and philosophy. What places cover or jacket, no matter how much veracity Wylie in even more of a minority is that she the statement might have. Rather, we would actually was trained as both a philosopher and expect to see something like what actually an archaeologist, first at Mount Allison Univer- appears on the jacket: "1421: The Ear China sity in New Brunswick and then at the State Discovered America is the story of a remarkable University of New York at Binghamton. As wit- journey of discovery that rewrites our under- nessed in the early 1970s, many American standing of history." In reality, the book (Men- archaeologists acted as if they were trained as zies 2003) does no such thing, being at best a both, but the ~ublishedrecord strongly suggests work of fiction, but a promotional introduction that for the most part they were better archaeol- is not going to point that out. It's there to help ogists than philosophers. sell the book, as are the select quotations that I use this essay as a springboard from which to come from a glowing review in the London explore a few select aspects of American archae- Evening Standard. ology's forays into philosophical issues. As such, Armed with the proper skepticism, let's see it is not so much a review of Wylie's book as it is what Wylie's book is about. For one thing, it a glimpse at a few points along the ~athof tells us that archaeology is "a deeply philosoph- archaeology's gowth, using several of Wylie's ical discipline" and that Wylie, "one of the field's essays as a rough pide. I bypass discussion of most important theorists," explores "how numerous important topics that Wylie addresses archaeologists know what they know." For in various places, including critical theory, another thing, it tells us that she "examines the archaeology and , argument from analogy, .? 0 The KEVIEIY ofAHCHAEOLOCY Vo!. 25, IVIII'IIII~I,2

and ethics. I refer interested readers to Marcia- Hi3tot.y ufilr~cbneu!~~:so that "we can appreci~te Anne Dobres's (2004) review of Wylie's book in new developments in relation to those that have American Antiquity, in which she highlights gone before; and from this historical perspective some of these topics. In the interest of disclosure we may also sec more clearly the significance of I note that I reviewed Wylie's book for American the new directions in which the field is moving" Ant/~ropologist,although I could accomplish little (Willey and Sabloff 19749). in 750 words other than to state that the book As important as a knowledge of history is in serves a useful purpose as an introduction to the helping us appreciate new directions, the rea- role of philosophy in archaeology. sons why such knowledge is important go deep- The issue that most concerns me here, as the er than this. Paul Bohannan and Mark Glazer cover blurb on Wylie's book phrases it, is "how (1988:~)argued that we should study the his- archaeologists know what they know" about the tory of a discipline to "save [ourselves] a good past. I would add two words to that phrase, deal of unnecessary originality." As humorous as making it read, "how archaeologists think they this might sound, their point is well taken. It know what they know" about the past. There is would be difficult to count the times when a big difference. There also is a big difference archaeologists honestly believe they have between the cover quote, "archaeology is a devised a new concept or method and published deeply philosophical discipline," meaning that a paper on it, only to have someone point out it is philosophical in the abstract, and "archaeol- that someone else said the same thing fifty years ogy us practiced is a deeply philosophical disci- earlier. Worse yet is when someone completely pline." Archaeology most definitely is a deeply misrepresents a fact or argument because he philosophical field of inquiry, although the cited a secondary source in which the author manner in which it often is practiced does not scrambled the original information. These do much to reflect this point. In fact, I might go embarrassing predicaments result from being so far as to further amend the first statement ignorant of a discipline's history. above, making it now read, "how archaeologists On a different note, it often is stated that by think they know what they know. . . when they understanding the history of a discipline, one take the time to think about it." can avoid the mistakes of one's predecessors (e.g., Mayr 1982). This is true, although I don't PHILOSOPHYAND HISTORY particularly like the word "mistakes." Many of Philosophy is the rational investigation of the things we {night count as mistakes in questions about knowledge-how we know archaeology result from honest attempts to use what we think we know. But even if we accept available information to solve intellectual prob- that archaeology is by nature a deeply philo- lems. Hindsight provides a unique perspective, sophical discipline, does this mean that we can't but without clear parameters it can begin to do good archaeology without thinking about border on smugness and condescension. At best, philosophical issues-or "thinking from we become historical revisionists. Take, for things," as Wylie phrased it in the title of her exampie, the term epistemology, the branch of book? Maybe we L-dn do "good" archaeology philosophy that deals with the origin and nature without explicitly thinking too much about of knowledge. The odds are small that we will such issues, but there is every reason to suspect find more than an occasional use of the term in that we can do better archaeology by adopting a archaeology before the 1970s, when the philos- philosophical point of view. Wylie's book, espe- ophy of science (or onc brand of it) became the cially Chapter 6, "Between Philosophy and centerpiece of a new Arnericanist movement. Archaeology," is a good companion guide. (Gordon Lowther used it in his 1962 article There's something else that all archaeologists "Epistemology and Archaeological Theory" could profit from, namely, having a basic knowl- [Lowther 19621, but there probably are a few edge of the history of the discipline, especially earlier examples.) At that point, "epistemology," where philosophical issues are concerned. There along with "hypothetico-deductive," "nomolog- are a number of reasons why someone might ical," and other borrowed terms became de benefit from an awareness of disciplinary history, rigeur in American archaeology. including what and Jeremy Maybe archaeologists working in the pre- Sabloff singled out as the reason they wrote A processualist days were not focused on episte- mology, but were they thinking in any philo- in considerable depth (e.g., Lyman et al. 1997), sophical terms? As Wylie points out, one early especially those relating to four archaeologists foray into philosophy was by Clyde Kluckhohn who figure prominently in Wylie's story-James (1939), who was technically an ethnographer,- - Ford (O'Brien and Lyman 1998, 1999), W C. but one with considerable archaeological train- McKern (Lyman and O'Brien 2003), and Gor- ing. Kluckhohn's efforts were directed explicitly don Willey and Philip Phillips (Lyman and toward philosophy, and in this he was unique. O'Brien 2001). I mention this to add credence to Most archaeological ventures into philosophy my claim that there may be no better synopsis of were implicit or consisted of at best a brief quote the intellectual history of the -history prri- and citation. For example, one of Kluckhohn's od than what Wylie provides in her first two students, Walter Taylor, cited Frederick Teggart chapters, "How New Is the New Archaeology?" (e.g., 1925) and Maurice Mandelbaum (1938) and "The Typology Debate." In the pages that in A Stztdy ofArcheology (Taylor 1948). Similar- follow, I examine a few of the philosophical issues ly, Betty Meggers (1955) cited Hans Reichen- that Wylie discusses in those chapters and try to bach (1 942); Raymond Thompson (1 956) cited add to her perspective. John Dewey (1938); and Albert Spaulding (1962) cited Gustav Bergman (1957) and John Kemeny (1959). Suffice it to say, however, that Just how "new" was the new archaeology? philosophy was not on many radar screens in the Received wisdom has long been split over the pre-processualist days. Does this mean that question of whether what Lewis Binford pro- archaeologists working before then were not posed in the 1960s as a way of approaching the confronting philosophical issues? No, they were archaeological record represented a paradigm confronting them on a continual basis. It simply shik in the sense that Thomas Kuhn (1962) means that they weren't thinking philosophical- used the term or whether it was a continuation, ly in concrete terms. Should they have been albeit at a heightened level, of what came before thinking in concrete philosophical terms? it (e.g.,- Custer 1981; Meltzer 1979). No doubt Maybe, but to answer that question affirmative- the new archaeology ushered in an era of aware- ly- -gets us nowhere; the fact of the matter is, they ness of certain principles that had not previous- weren't. It is, however, legitimate to point out ly moved to the forefront of archaeological that had they had some training in philosophy, inquiry, but the same can be said of any period. American archaeology would have had a far dif- The question is, was there a structural change in ferent trajectory than the one it took. the way archaeology went about its business Wylie's book is an excellent place to start if one after 1960? Wylie downplays this question, wants a brief history of how American archaeol- focusing instead on the cyclic nature of "new ogists have dealt with (and sometimes been con- archaeologies," which seem to roll around about sumed by) various epistemological issues. Specif- every two decades or so. Clark Wissler (1917) ically, the first five chapters, which were written used the term "new archaeology" early in the expressly for the volume as opposed to being revi- twentieth-century to herald the stratigraphic sions of previously published papers, cover Amer- work undertaken by Nels Nelson and others in ican archaeology from the opening decades of the the prehistoric pueblos of eastern New Mexico, twentieth century up through the post-processu- and Joseph Caldwell (1959:304) used it four alist movement of the 1980s. I happened to pick decades later to refer to an archaeology that was up Wylie's book as Lee Lyman, Mike Schiffer, "tending to be-more concerned with culture and I were finishing our history of American process and less concerned with the descriptive

archaeology from about 1960 on, Archaeology as content of 1 reh historic ." a Process: Processualisrn and Its Progeny (0%rlen ' et For a structural change to have occurred, the al. 2005). In perusing the opening chapters of her new archaeology of the 1960s, which became book, I was struck by some of the parallels in how universally kn&n as proce~sualisrn,would have Wylie and we had approached the issues raised by had to break not only methodologically but also processualism and its intellectual offspring I also metaphysically with its predecessor, and it is was impressed with her treatment of the pre- unclear that this happened. To be sure, major 1960 "culture historical" period-a subject changes took place in terms of how archaeology whose various angles Lyman and I have explored was practiced, but in my opinion (not ~~~liversallv RCHAEOLOGY Vol. 25, nlii~i~bei.2

shared) there was no coi7ceptzlnl break. The con- ble to his having around him a cadre of smart, cepts were, for the most part, already there. What ambitious students such as Bill Longacre, Kent Binford advocated so eloquently (e.g., Binford Flannery, Leslie Freeman, Stuart Struever, Robert 1962, 1965) had been put forth, if sometimes Whallon, and Sally Schanfield (later Binford). only in incipient form, by, among others, Taylor They, together with older (e.g., Patty Jo Watson (1948), Meggers (1 955), Phillips (1955), and and Frank Hole) and younger (e.g., John Fritz Caldwell (1959) during the preceding two and Fred Plog) Chicago students, would form decades. Their calls, however, had produced little the core of the new archaeology (Longacre 2000). change in how the discipline at large both con- The goal of these like-minded individuals was ceptualized and approached the past. Binford had to study cultural processes and to contribute to the proper mix of words, ambition, and charisma anthropological theory. Like their predecessors, to effect large-scale change in how more than just whom they often derided, the processualists a few archaeologists viewed what they were doing. understood that those processes, which are Binford's first major article, published in Amer- dynamic phenomena, are represented by a stat- ican Antiquity in 1962, typically is regarded as the ic archaeological record. They argued that two birth announcement of processualism, although requirements had to be met before one could there was nothing particularly revolutionary get at those processes. First, the notion of cul- about it at the time. It is clear that Binford him- ture had to be changed from a normative, idea- self did not see the article as a revolutionary piece based concept to one that was behavioral, sys- but as more of an attempt to herd archaeology temic, and materialist. Second, archaeology had back into 's pen. The title of that to be conducted scientifically, which to most paper was "Archaeology as Anthropology," and processualists meant working deductively rather its opening sentence read, "It has been aptly stat- than inductively and using analogy, often ed that 'American archaeology is anthropology or ethnographic analogy, in a rigorous manner. it is nothing' (Willey and Phillips 1958, p. 2)" The inductive approach came to be equated, (Binford 1962:217). That phrase had been wrongly, with an archaeology that began and reworded from an earlier statement by Phillips ended with rote descriptions of artifacts and (1 95 5:246-247), "New World archaeology is assemblages. This is what Caldwell in his "New anthropology or it is nothing." The corralling of American Archaeology" paper in Science archaeology obviously had been on the agenda of (1959:304) had labeled "dull and uninterest- the Phillips-and-Willey generation; Binford was ing." Inductive archaeology was seen as slow just the latest hand to take a try at it. and tedious because, according to the processu- Binford followed that seminal contribution alists (e.g., Binford 1968b; Longacre 1970), tra- with several articles during the 1960s (e.g., Bin- ditionalists had to await the accumulation of ford 1963, 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968a) that set sufficient data, which would enable the facts to both the agenda and the tone for the new speak for themselves. But according to the archaeology. Nothing, however, matched the processualists, no accumulation of facts could book that he co-edited with his then-wife, ;peak unless the archaeologist asked processual Sally-New Perspectives in Archeology (Bin ford questions and designed deductively oriented and Binford 1968)-which grew out of a sym- research programs to answer them. posium that the Binfords had put together for Wylie provides excellent coverage of the the American Anthropological Association processual movement, both in her introduction meeting in Denver in November 1965. Charles to the book and in Chapter 1. Not unexpected- Redman, a second-generation processualist, ly, her emphasis is on the interest that processu- later referred to the publication of New Perspec- alists had in the philosophy of science. Received tives in Archeology as marking "the crossing of a wisdom holds that Binford was the person most threshold" (Redman 1991:296). responsible for infusing philosophy into proces- A number of contributors to the volume were sualism, but this is incorrect. Binford certainly graduate students at the University of Chicago cited a few philosophers on occasion, but he was when Binford taught there in the early '60s. not the archaeologist whose arguments had the Undeniably, part of Binford's success in foment- biggest impact on the discipline. I would give ing change in American archaeology is attributa- thac honor to Albert Spaulding. F,F.;~//2004 7'l~eREVIEW of ARCHAEOLOGY 9 7

When the Binfords organized their 1965 AAA with the latest developn~entsin the history and symposium, they selected as chairmen Spauld- philosophy of science, which at the time includ- ing, who was on the faculty at the University of ed the work of Carl Hempel, a logical positivist Oregon, and Paul Martin, who was on the who in the 1970s would become the philoso- research staff of the Field Museum of Natural pher of choice of the processualists. History in Chicago. A specialist in ceramic Spaulding was clear in his paper for the Bin- typology, Martin spent his entire career working fords' volume, as he had been over a decade ear- in the Southwest (Nash 2003), and over the lier (Spaulding 1954a), that archaeology is (or years he generously provided resources that were should be) scientific, meaning that research used by generations of graduate students to designs and analytical protocols are geared apply their new ideas in his NSF-supported toward producing explanations. He asked if projects (Longacre 2000). By the time of the there were not two kinds of explanations for the AAA symposium, a number of Chicago gradu- way the world works, one historical and the ate students, including Longacre and Hill, had other scientific. The scientific was the "nomolog- begun to produce processualist products based ical or covering-law explanation [of Hempel]. on work conducted with Martin's encourage- All serious explanations relate the circumstance ment and financial support. Summaries of some to be explained to relevant general laws or at of that work appeared in New Perspectives in least to empirical generalizations. Explanations Archeology (e.g., Hill 1968; Longacre 1968). may be deductive, in which case the covering law Spaulding was a person with whom Binford admits of no exceptions, or they may be proba- had taken courses at Michigan, and by his own bilistic-statistical (or inductive, if you prefer), in account (Binford 1972) was someone Binford which case the covering law has the form of a admired. Martin provided no paper for New Per- frequency distribution" (Spaulding 196834). By spectives in Archeology, but Spaulding did-one he "covering law" Spaulding, following Hempel, had presented at the annual meeting of the Arner- meant a generalized law that "covers" (explains) ican Association for the Advancement of Science specific empirical phenomena. in 1965. In part because of his well-publicized Spaulding took his discussion directly from "debate" with fames Ford in the early 1950s (see Hempel's (1962) paper "Deductive-Nomological below), Spaulding had developed a reputation in vs. Statistical Explanation," in which Hempel, archaeology as an advocate of using for although he emphasized the physical sciences, pattern discovery But it wasn't statistics that he accommodated biological phenomena under his took up in his paper (Spaulding 1968). Rather, it explanatory umbrella. Spaulding argued that was the philosophy of science. There were only even though anthropology, and by extension three references in Spaulding's paper, and they all archaeology, could never match "the deductive were to works by philosophers. elegance of physics" (Spaulding 1968:34), they As Lyman, Schiffer, and I were writing Archae- nonetheless were sciences because they sought to ology as a Process, we wondered where Spaulding discover relationships in their data that could be had been hiding his philosophical interests all accountsd for by covering-law explanations. Fur- the time he was battling Ford over pottery types ther, "anthropological explanations are character- and the like in the 1950s. He never cited any istically probabilistic-statistical rather than philosophers in his articles on typology, nor did deductive, and they are partial rather than com- he frame his arguments in philosophical terms. plete. . . . Anthropologists are not forbidden, We concluded that he must have acquired those however, to struggle toward covering generaliza- interests later, during his stint as program officer tions with greater powers of re diction and retro- at the National Science Foundation. We based diction. They can strive to sharpen statements of this conclusion on the fact that for the first few the frequency distributions underlying proba- years at the agency, Spaulding served as the bilistic explanations, to make explanations more director of the History and Philosophy of Sci- complete" (Spaulding 1968:36). ence Program before assuming the helm of the Spaulding's comments paved the way for one Anthropology Program. In our opinion Spauld- of the all-important questions of processual ing would not simply have served as a titular archaeology: Where do laws come from, and head. Rather, he would have become familiar what role do they play in explanation? Different archaeologists would come up with different arrisans had in mind when they made a projec- answers, and some, like Kent Flannery (1973), tile point or decorated a pot.. This stance led would bypass the matter entirely. %'here Spauld- Spaulding into a series of exchanges with Ford ing saw anthropology as a statistical science, Bin- that brought into sharp contrast two opposing ford saw a deductive-nornological science built epistemological views that had lollg been around the discovery of laws of cause and effect. embedded in American archaeology.-- Spaulding ignored the distinction berween Ford and Spaulding took center stage, but their empirical generalizations and hypotheses because polarized views made them less representative of to him only empirical (statistical) generalizations ;he discipline than they might haie been other- were possible in anthropology. Conversely, Bin- wise. The majority of archaeologists, if the litera- ford underscored the difference between an ture is any guide, would have seen themselves as empirical generalization and a hypothesis (a ten- crosses between Ford and Spaulding. Everyone tative law) and discussed how one went about would have agreed that types are constructs that testing a hypothesis: "The accuracy of our knowl- hopefully are usehl for bringing chronological edge of the past can be measured; it is this asser- control to archaeological- deposits. Most would tion which 'most sharply differentiates the new have agreed that if the types serve an additional perspective from more traditional approaches. purpose-for example, if traits ~isedto sort pot- The yardstick of measurement is the degree to tery into types "correspond to characters that which propositions about the past can be con- might have served to distinguish one sort of pot- firmed or refuted through hypothesis testing- tery fi-om another in the minds of the people who not by passing personal judgment on the person- made and used it" (Phillips et al. 1951:63)-so al qualifications of the person putting forth the much the better. But with rare exception, left propositions" (Binford 1968b:17). unanswered was whether a type could actually The latter was a passing reference to a notion perform both duties, or whether separate types- that had long been implGit in archaeology and one for chronological purposes, the other for which Raymond Thompson (1958:8) had for- sociological purposes-were required. Also left malized: The "final judgement of an archaeolo- unanswered was any discussion of how archaeol- , - gist's cultural reconstructions . . . must therefore ogists would know when they had selected the be based on an appraisal of his professional com- requisite characters that would allow them to petence, and parii'cularly the Gality of the sub- overlay their categories on those of prehistoric jective contribution to that competence." That's artisans. Spaulding was determined to show that an interesting point: The validity of an archaeol- methodological rigor could solve that problem, ogist's work should be based on how his or her but he was not the first archaeologist so inclined. peers view the person's competence. To that state- That honor belongs to George Brainerd. ment perhaps should be added, "or on how per- Wylie doesn't mention Brainerd, but as suasively one argues the case." The outcome of Lyman and I were examining Ford's work one of the most interesting epistemological argu- (O'Brien and L,yman 1998, 1999), it became ments ever to take place in American archaeolo- increasingly apparent the influence that Brain- gy-the so-called Ford-Spaulding "debaten-- erd must have had on Spaulding Both men hinged in part on persuasion (or lack thereof). were present at a conference on archaeological T; work our way into a brief look at that method sponsored by the Viking Fund and lheld debate, we can start with Wylie's categorization at Spaulding's home institution, the University of three mid-twentieth-cen;ury archaeologists: of Michigan, in 1951 (Griffin 1951). As Brain- Thompson, Ford, and J.O. Brew. Wylie labels erd (1951a:117) put it in his conference them '$onstructivists," by which she means that paper,"The Use of Mathematical Formulations " . they viewed their analytical units (types, periods, in Archaeological Analysis," typology is In and the like) as "constructions"-units built by itself a generalizing procedure which ~lltimatel~ the archaeologist for a specific purpose-as depends for its validity upon the archaeologist's opposed to "things" that could be elicited direct- success in isolating the effects of culturally con- ly from the phenomena being investigated. The ditioned behavior from the examination of latter was Spaulding's view of artifact types- human products." Brainerd's procedure for iso- that by using the proper statistical method, the lating those effects involved selecting attributes archaeologist could approach what the original that occur most often in combination in single artifacts and then subjecting them to statistical the makers of the artifacts, not an arbitrary pro- manipulation in order to produce the types. In cedure of the classifier" (Spaulding 1953a:305). this way, "the archaeologist can objectively Following Brainerd (195 1a), Spaulding was describe the cultural specifications followed by interested in discovering which attributes more the artisans" (Brainerd 195la: 1 18). often than random chance would co-occur on Brainerd (195 la: 123) argued that his suggest- specimens from a single locale. The majority of ed techniques would eliminate the problem of artifact types in common use in American existing typologies falling "far short of full uti- archaeology at the time were based on ceramic lization of archaeological materials for the samples from multiple locarions, perhaps num- recovery of information on culture." Further, "it bering in the dozens or even hundreds (e.g., is conceivable that a bridge may be found unit- Ford 1936). Spaulding's types, however, were ing the objectivity of the taxonomist to the cul- derived from single assemblages. tural sensitivity of rhe humanist. Cultural intan- To Spaulding, types created by intuition and gibles can, if they exist, be made tangible. Better employing artifacts from multiple sites were too rechnique is the solution" (Brainerd messy to be of much use archaeologically. No 1951 a: 124). This statement echoed the point matter how carefully the analyst worked to cre- made by A. L. Kroeber (1940) a decade earlier ate the types, they were conflarions of characters in his paper "Statistical Classification." (rraits). At best, a type was an across-sample Brainerd has been afforded lirtle place in the average, which, because it was an average, annals of American archaeology, other than as masked variation-the very feature that Spauld- someone who worked with statistician W.S. ing saw as being so important from a sociologi- Robinson (195 1) to develop a mathematical cal (behavioral) standpoint. He pointed out that technique for measuring the similarity of pairs "the presence of an adequate method for inves- of assemblages (Brainerd 1951 b). What Brain- tigating consistency and range of variation with- erd had to say about improvement in method, in the site obviates a comparative study so far as however, would be championed by Spaulding, the questions of the existence and definitive although if he felt an intellectual debt to Brain- characteristics of a type are concerned" (Spauld- erd, he never said so in print. Spaulding several ing 1953a:305). He continued, "Historical rele- years earlier, in a brief consideration of whether vance in this view is essentially derived from the the Midwestern Taxonomic Method (McKern typological analysis; a properly established type 1939) was of analytical use on the Plains, had is the result of sound inferences concerning the lamented that archaeology needed a classifica- customary behavior of the makers of the arti- tion technique that "expressed at one stroke the facts and cannot fail to have historical meaning" classifier's opinion of the cultural relationship (Spaulding 1953a:305). and the chronological position of an assem- In his response to Spaulding's article, Ford blage"; such a technique would allow "a com- (1 '954x391) called Spaulding's approach "amaz- bined presentation of [the] independent units of ingly naive," pointing out rhat although it would chronological position and cultural affinity" "reveal thh relative degree to which the people (Spaulding 1949:5; emphasis added). Spaulding conformed to rheir set of ceramic styles at one was not denying the need to understand the time and place," thar was all the approach would chronological ordering of assemblages; rather, do. Spaulding (1 954b) replied rhat Ford still did he was advocating the development of artifact not understand what a type was, although he types that did more than simply tell time. At was "quite willing to let FG~have his types if he thar point, however, he had not figured out how will let me have mine" (Spaulding- 1954b:393). to create such types. Brainerd showed him how. While Ford was preparing his response to Spaulding published his version of the Spaulding (Ford 1954a), he was also preparing a method in a paper titled "Statistical Techniques more programmatic statement on typology for the Discovery of Artifact Types" (Spaulding (Ford 1954b). The heart of Ford's discussion 1953a). He defined a type as "a group of artifacts focused on the houses constructed by the ficti- exhibiting a consistent assemblage of attributes tious Gamma-gamma people, who occupied the whose combined properties give a characteristic Island of Gamma. Cultural, or emic, house types pattern," and classzjcation as "a process of dis- certainly existed, Ford said, as the houses on the covery of combinations of attributes favored by Island of Gamma and nearby islands indicated. 36 The REVIEW of',

But, like with prehistoric artisans, how would types. were both historical and sociological. If archaeologists know when they had "discovered" nothing else, the debate between ~oydand those emic types? They wouldn't. But for Ford it Spaulding was a catalyst for the new archaeolo- didn't matter; he wanted type groupings that the gy, as Wylie appreciates. archaeologist consciously selected in order to Spaulding's view-clearly having precedent in produce a workable typology "designed for the Rrainerd's work-represented a new approach* * to reconstruction of culture history in time and the archaeological record, one in which appropri- space" (Ford 1954b:52). Ford never specified ate methods would allow one to detect emically how such groupings were to be extracted from significant properties of that record-properties the flow of culture or how one knew one had that revealed human behaviors (e.g., Binford such a type (Dunnell 1986; O'Brien and Lyman 1968b:23). What the new archaeologists- wanted 1998). He was not alone, as Wylie makes clear. was to study culture and cultures, not to measure Despite his lack of specificity, Ford showed the time-space continuum by detailed classifica- keen insight into the typology issue. For exam- tion of artifacts. Spaulding and other "noncon- ple, he pointed out that types are accidents of structivists" provided the warrant through refer- the samples available for analysis: "[TIhe partic- ence to cultures and ethnicities, however defined, ular locality where an archeological collection as being ethnographically visible. If so, then per- chances to be made will be one of the factors haps they were archaeologically visible as well. that determines the mean and the range of vari- This caught the attention of the anthropological- ation that are demonstrated in any particular ly oriented processualists and contributed to tradition in the culture that is being studied" what became known as "ceramic sociology" (Rin- (Ford 1954b:49). This was a reiteration of a ford 1983; Longacre 2000), the early results of point he had made in his response to Spaulding which appeared in the Rinfords' (1968) New Per- (Ford 1954a). Further, "permitting sampling spectives in Archeology (e.g., Deetz 1968; Hill chance to determine typology operates very well 1968; Longacre 1968; Whallon 1968). so long as the archeologist has only a spotty We could leave the issue there, but from a sampling of the culture history" (Ford philosophical standpoint we would be skipping 1954b:52). A larger sample would result in over the most delicious concern of all-one that typological "creep," where types begin to blend transcends epistemology and gets directly at the together (Phillips et al. 1951). Here Ford was core of philosophy. That core is ontology. Where- taking a shot at Spaulding's method. As long as as epistemology is about knowledge and know- Spaulding had limited samples, Ford was argu- ing, ontology is about existence; specifically, it is ing, he could get consistent co-occurrences of a systematic account of existence. To this point attributes. Once the sample grew larger, typo- one could argue that the difference between logical creep would set in, and the types would Spaulding and Ford with respect to types was be much less useful as historical units. Spauld- epistemological-a disagreement about knowl- ing never addressed this criticism. edge and knowing. That is, are we better off get- Hindsight tells us that Ford's strategy for ting ourknowledge from types created by statis- refuting Spaulding's position didn't work very tical methods and using samples from a single well for several reasons, not the least of which location, or are we better off with types created was that Ford was both a poor writer and a by inspection and using samples from multiple stubborn person. The interplay of these two locations? Undeniably, this is an epistemological character traits sometimes overrode clarity and question (O'Brien and Lyman 2002), but its logic, especially critical when the topic was con- riots go much deeper than that. They get at ceptually difficult to begin with. In his respons- whether types are real, as Spaulding argued, or es to Spaulding, Ford's vague allusions to "cul- completely arbitrary, as Ford argued. Reality ver- tural customs" and his use of a fictitious sus nonreality: That is an ontological issue. ethnographic example (the Gamma-gamma How one views something like archaeological people) didn't win him many converts. Arneri- types is one part of a much larger concern, can archaeologists typically agreed with Ford in namely, how one views the reality of the natural how types were to be created, but they emulat- world: There are two ontologiks, ed Spaulding in assuming that the resulting and , and although they contrast FaII 2004 The REVIEW of ARCHAEOLOGY 37

sharply, they are not mutually exclusive. By this his treatment of types. From the beginning of I mean that a person can hold to both views, his career, he held to the notion that culture was corlsciously calling on one or the other depend- a constantly flowing stream, but one that could ing on circumstances. The key issue is knowing be carved up into units of varying scale depend- which one to call on under which circumstance. ing on the analyst's needs. His cultural periods The interplay of essentialism and materialism and the like, as with his pottery types, were the- has seen considerable attention in biology and oretical (nonempirical) units constructed to the philosophy of biology (e.g., Ereshefsky perform some piece of analytical work. Because 2001; Mayr 1982, 1987; Sober 1984) as well as his views were not widely shared, Ford had to in archaeology (e.g, Dunnell 1982; Lyman et constantly trumpet the nonempirical nature of al. 1997; O'Brien and Lyman 1998, 2000). cultural units. His classic collaboration with Under essentialism, the essential properties of Philip Phillips and James Griffin on survey and a set of things define an ideal (archetype), "to excavation in the Lower Mississippi Alluvial which actual objects [are] imperfect approxima- Valley (LMV) was a case in point (Phillips et al. tions" (Lewontin 1974:5). Variation between 1951). Although the three men agreed on some objects placed in the set, because it contributes things, they parted company on others. It is nothing- to the "essentialness" of the objects, is clear that in general Phillips and Griffin were viewed as "annoying distraction" (Lewontin essentialists, whereas Ford was a materialist. 1974:5). Under this perspective, only variation This difference in ontology makes their mono- between types, not between the individual gaph an interesting read, as numerous review- objects placed in types, is of explanatory signif- ers have ~ointedout (e.g, Dunnell 1985; Haag icance. Single sets, or kinds, of entities are pre- 1953). It is equally clear, however, that neither sumed to ge real; thus relations between units Ford nor Phillips and Griffin maintained a con- can be formulated without reference to time or sistent ontological outlook across the board space. They are redundant, universally true (O'Brien and Lyman 1998), which gives the statements (true for all times and all places). monograph a schizophrenic feel. For example, Spaulding's types were essentialist construc- in the pottery section the authors stated that tions, created on the basis of their possessing with respect to types, "essential" properties-specific attribute combi- . . . we have in mind the concept of a con- nations. They were also "empirical" units, tinuously evolving regional pottery tradi- meaning they were viewed as being real. tion, showing a more or less ~aralleldevel- In contrast, materialism does not assume that opment in and around a number of centers, reality is a unified system. Phenomena are con- each of which employs a number of distinct stantly in a state of flux, meaning that they are but related styles, each style in turn being in continually in the process of becorning some- process of change both areally and tempo- thing else. Relations between phenomena are not rally. With this remarkably unstable materi- timeless, nor can universal statements be made al, we set out to fashion a key to the prehis- about the relations because no static set of phe- tory of the region. Faced with this nomena exists. Time and space are kept separate, three-dimensional flow, which seldom if and relations between phenomena are time- and ever exhibits "natural" segregation, and spacebound. Kinds, or types, are nonempirical being obliged to reduce it to some sort of configurations-theoretical units-that are manageable form, we arbitrarily cut it into changing constantly, although at any given units. Such created units of the ceramic con- moment in time and space we can create kinds tinuum are called pottery types. (Phillips et based on observations. Ford's types were materi- al. 1951 :62-63) alist constructions, created on the basis of a more This is a decidedly materialist view. But notice or less informed version of "throw it up and see that on the previous page of the monograph what sticks." They were built for specific purpos- they had indicated that types serve as "expres- es, such as chronological ordering. If the types sions of the ideas and behavior of the people didn't work too well, throw them out and start who made and used them" (Phillips et al. over, refining the process until they did work. 1951 :6 1). This is a decidedly essentialist view. Ford's materialist views extended far beyond Part of the reason for the schizophrenia nlay have been that the three authors were bending on Natural disjunctions have long been an impor- some points just to get the report completed. tant component of the archaeological meta- Ford, for example, never accepted that types physic, especially when stratigraphy is involved could serve a sociological purpose because he saw (Lyman and O'Brien 1999). Phillips, Ford, and no method to test the correspondence between Griffin confronted the issue in the LMV analysis type and social norm. But he apparently went in terms of what to do with "mixed" assem- along with Phillips and Griffin. Another reason blages, meaning assemblages that represented for the schizophrenia undoubtedly rested on the multiple archaeological "complexes" (O'Brien fact that it's difficult to maintain consistency in and Dunnell 1998). For Phillips and Griffin, ontology if you are not constantly reflecting on multiple complexes meant multiple peoples; for why you think things are the way they are- Ford, multiple complexes represented nothing Wyliels "thinking from things." This lack of con- more than "a single brief span of time on the sistency is evident in Ford's work (O'Brien and continuum, an 'instant' for all practical purpos- Lyman 1998), although he was more consistent es, when both elements of the mixture were than some of his colleagues. One topic on which being made and used side by side" (Phillips et al. he seldom veered from a consistent course was 195 1:427). Griffin and Phillips, "while not the flow of culture. The only time he saw that rejecting the general theory of continuity . . . flow being interrupted to such a degree that it have tended to see indications of at least one sig- would be visible ethnographically, let alone nificant break in the otherwise placid stream of ar~haeolo~ically,was as a result of some cataclysm pottery continuity at the point where the tem- such as invasion. Otherwise, culture was a quiet- pering material shifts from clay to shell, in other ly flowing stream, albeit a braided one, filled with words between the Baytown and Mississippi intersections and splits that resulted from diffu- periods" (Phillips et al. 195 1:427). For Phillips sion and other "normal" cultural processes. Given and Griffin, those two "periods" meant two dif- this steadiness, any attempt to divide the flow of ferent peoples-an earlier, clay-temper-using culture into analytical units-culture periods, for "Baytown" people and a later, shell-temper-using example-was bound to be arbitrary. "Mississippian" people. Ford saw no equivalence Some of Ford's ideas on culture and its flow as between temper and people; to him, periods reflected in pottery designs irritated Phillips and were nothing but analytical units carved out of Griffin to the point that when they were prepar- the temporal (hence cultural) continuum. ing the LMV report, they wouldn't let him Nothing in American archaeology better include them. Ford published them the next year exemplifies the difference in metaphysic between in Measurements ofSome Prehistoric Design Devel- essentialism and materialism than what Ford and opments in the Southeastern States (Ford 1952). later Phillips had to say about the cultural The monograph was a wide-ranging discussion sequence for the LMV. The sequence was entire- of Ford's views on culture and diffusion as reflect- ly of Ford's making and was based on a series of ed in pottery designs across an area that stretched surface collections and test excavations he made from East Texas to the Florida Panhandle and in the 1930s (Ford 1935, 1936) and on later covered 1,500 or more years. It was Spaulding's excavations that he directed as part of the (1953b) review of that monograph that initiated Louisiana Works Progress Administration pro- the "Ford-Spaulding debate." Spaulding could gram (Ford 195 1; Ford and Quimby 1945; Ford not understand the basis for Ford's chronological and Willey 1940). Based on his early work (Ford arrangement of assemblages from the Southeast. 1935, 1936), Ford created three periods-(from Nor could he tolerate what he saw as the arbi- early to late) Marksville, Coles Creek, and trariness of Ford's periods, meaning that the peri- Natchez (Figure 1). Based on later excavations od boundaries did not correspond with any "nat- (Ford 195 1; Ford and Quimby 1945; Ford and ural" cultural disjunctions. Ford (1 954c: 109) Willey 1940), he added the Tchefuncte period retorted that Spaulding was "amazingly naive" below Marksville, the Troyville period between (there was that phrase again) and that he (Ford) Marksville and Coles Creek, and the Plaquemine was "somewhat more uncertain than Spaulding period between Coles Creek and Natchez (later that nature has provided us with packaged facts renamed Natchez-Bayogoula) . and truths that may be discovered and digested Almost no one was happy with Ford's han- like Easter eggs hidden on a lawn." dling of the chronological sequence. A large part Fa11 2004 The REVIEW ofARCHAEOLOGY 3 9

however, is the fact that the stratigraphic Periods as Named Periods as Named data have a picture of quantitative in 1936 at Present change of ceramic styles. The sequence of Natchez-Bayogoula period names "Marksville," "Coles Creek," Natchez Plaquemine and "Natchez" presented in 1936 was actu- Coles Creek ally the limit of our control over ceramic , Coles Creek 'Troyville chronology in this region at that time. While i: Marksville we were aware that these were probably gross Marksville 'Tchefuncte divisions of a changing cultural continuum, this could not be demonstrated and had no Fig. 1. Cultural sequences, LMV. more validity than a reasonable assumption deduced from experience with culture histo- of the irritation arose as a result of how archae- ry in other areas where details were better ologists chose to view cultural periods--that is, known. Some of the ignorance that makes as "real" units, bounded on either side by visible such a neat and "air-tightn classification pos- cultural disjunctions. When Ford and Willey sible has now been dispelled, and the (1940) proposed the first additions to the expanded list of period names can be pre- sequence, the Tchefuncte and Troyville periods, sented as nothing more than convenient archaeologists used to the old sequence- labels for short segments- of a continually Marksville, Coles Creek, and Natchez-were changing culture history. . . . angered. Maybe they could understand adding a This readjustment of the named divisions sub-basement (Tchefuncte) beneath the older for the time scale in this area seems to have basement (Marksville), but why in the world puzzled a few of the archaeologists working would Ford add a new floor-Troyville- in the Mississippi Valley, even some of those between Marksville and Coles Creek, or, later, who have been best informed as to the field- make matters worse by adding another floor- work which led to this rearrangement. Plaquemine-between Coles Creek and the his- Complaints have been made that pottery torical period (Natchez)? As Jon Gibson types that were formerly classified as Coles (1982:271) put it, both Troyville and Plaquem- Creek in age are now assigned to the ine were "transitional units. . . . carved out of Troyville Period. Discussion develops the ceramic complexes that had formerly been clas- opinion that if this latest chronoiogical sified as something else. This confounded oppo- arrangement is correct then the former nents who simply could not see how some cul- must-have been in error. The adoption of tural types could be Marksville or Coles Creek new names for all the periods in the more one day and Troyville or Plaquemine the next. recent arrangement may have avoided These individuals apparently did not share some, but not all, of this confusion. These Ford's view of culture as a gradually changing serious and earnest seekers after truth really flow of ideas, with any one archaeological site believ~that we have discovered these peri- encapsulating those elements which comprised ods and that this is a more or less successful a limited span of an unbroken continuum." attempt to picture the natural divisions in In his report on the excavations at the Green- this span of history This is obviously an house site in Avoyelles Parish, which were com- incorrect interpretation. This is an arbitrary pleted in the 1930s but not published until set of culture chronology units, the limits df 1951, Ford finally answered his critics, and he each of which are determined by historical didn't pull any punches: accident, and which are named to facilitate The [WA] excavation program has made reference to them. (Ford 195 1 :12-13) possible the expected subdivision of the Here Ford was adamant about what in his rough time scale that I presented in 1936. mind was the illogicalness of seeking "real" cul- New classificatory terms have been inter- tural units. One of those to whom his com- posed between each of the time-period ments were directed was Phillips, who never names previously set up, thus giving a more backed away from his disdain for Ford's "arbi- accurate measure of the chronology in verbal trary" periods. In 1970 I'hillips published a terms. Of considerably more importance, large two-volume update of the LMV, and in it 40 The REVIEW of ARCHAEOLOGY VbL. 25, NLL~Hbri. 2

he took a swipe at Ford's periods: Plaquemine periods. He even thought Tche- ?'he concept of a Troyville "period" in functt. was one of those "intelligible culture-his- Lower Mississippi archaeology has been a torical units in the usual sense" (I'hillips target of criticism since it was first launched 1970:908). If, I'hillips later lamented, Ford hadn't by Ford and Willey (1940). Many students toyed with the hlarksville-Coles Creek boundaly have felt uneasy about it. Others have flatly and had simply split the Coles Creek period into stated that they could not use it in their par- three pieces-Troyville (early Coles Creek), Coles ticular area of interest. . . . The reasons for Creek (middle Coles Creek), and Plaquemine this almost universal discomfort lie, I (late Coles Creek)--everything would have been believe, in the peculiar nature of lloyville as fine. But he had to go and stick the Troyville peri- an archaeological form1;lation. . . . od between the two periods with which everyone Troyville [appears] to have been sliced out was comfortable-Marksville and Coles Creelc- of Coles Creek [and] Marksville (Ford, in the process compressing them into shorter 195 1). But this could only work if there is a periods by squeezing them against either the solid clear case of continuity between Marksville basement period, Tchefuncte in the case of and Coles Creek. If there is discontinuity Marksville, or the equally solid ceiling period, (and who can doubt it in this particular Plaquemine in the case of Coles Creek. Neither of case?), that discontinuity would 'be auto- those two anchor periods was going to budge, so matically incorporated in the new Troyville Marksville and Coles Creek took the brunt of the phase. In my opinion it is, but the fact is force (O'Brien and Lyman 1998). not brought out in Ford's (1951) descrip- This apparent "rearrangement" threw things tion of the Troyville complex. It seems to be out of whack because everyone but Ford was nothing more than a mixture of two sepa- looking for discontinuities in the archaeological rate and distinct complexes. . . . record. Certainly he might use an apparent dis- To conclude this digression into methodol- continuity as a means of establishing a period ogy, in setting up Marksville and Coles Creek boundary, as he did when he used the disappear- in 1936, Ford was following the classic ance of fancy pottery decoration to end the method of starting new periods with the Marksville period, but he didn't rely on them. It appearance of new forms. Later it became just so happened that in almost every case he necessary to subdivide these periods. If had used highly visible artifacts or designs to Troyville had continued to be simply a divi- mark period boundaries, but this was simply sion corresponding to early Coles Creek (as coincidental to his real purpose-to cut up the Plaquemine to late Coles Creek), which is continuum into a sufficient number of short- about what it was as originally defined by term periods so as to allow the measurement of Ford and Willey in 1940, there would have the passage of time and the writing of culture been no difficulty. The "natural" (a word history. That was the method Ford had nlwtys which Ford would not allow me to use) line used; he hadn't made a break with classical of separation between the old Marksville and methoddat least as he defined it. Others Coles Creek would have remained in place. defined "classical method" differently, a differ- But Ford's description of 1951, in failing to ence born of ontologies in conflict. accent the new forms that belong specifically to Troyville, makes it appear to straddle this CONCLUSION line. Actually, he is using a new criterion in It is tempting to speculate that if Ford had marking off chronological divisions. Instead only read some philosophy, he would have of coinciding with the appearance of new sharpened his ontological stance and been able features and the disappearance of old, lines of to beat his opponents at their own game. Or at separation are determined by their maximum least he would have been able to express his occurrence. (Phillips 1970:908-909) views on culture and cultural units in a logical It is interesting that Phillips referred to Ford's and consistent fashion. Maybe the same could break with "classic" archaeological method, be said about Spaulding, though he clearly was because in reality he hadn't broken with anything. much more consistent, not to mention clearer, Phillips liked the Marksville-Coles Creek bound- in his thinking and writing than Ford was. ary & well as that between the Coles Creek and Would a healthy dose of philosophy have Fd1/ 2004 The REVIEIV nf'ARCHAEOLOGY 41

changed the outcome of the Ford-Spaulding more of that kind of awareness as we find our- debate or caused Phillips to change his opinion selves thinking from things. i7 of Ford's arbitrary temporal divisions? Probably not, but I'm guessing the arguments for or REFERENCES CITED: against a particular kind of unit, as well as the Bergman, G. (1957) Philosophy of Science. University of accompanying discussion of the uses that a unit Wisconsin Press, Madison. serves, would have been considerably tighter. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance Binford, L. R. (1962) Archaeology as Anthropology. Arnerican Antiquity 28:217-225. of philosophy to any endeavor that involves thinking rationally and logically, and archaeology (1963) Red Ochre Caches from the Michigan certainly falls in that category. And yet at the Area: A Possible Case of Cultural Drift. Southwestern Jour- same time, I am hesitant to suggest that philoso- nal ofAnthropology 19:89-107. phy is some cure-all for what I or someone else (1 964) A Consideration of Archaeological might see as archaeology's ills. I say this because Research Design. Arnerican Antiquity 29:425-44 1. of what history has taught us about philosophy (1965) Archaeological Systematics and the and archaeology. The interest that the processual- Study of Cultural Process. Arnerican Antiquity ists showed in the philosophy of science during 3 1:203-2 10. the 1970s, specifically Carl Hempel's brand, was (1967) Smudge Pits and Hide Smoking: The more than casual, but there were as many false Use of Analogy in Archaeological Reasoning. Arnerican starts and dead ends as there were successes. Antiquity 32:l-12. Archaeologists were led to believe-primarily by (1968a) Some Comments on Historical versus other archaeologists, not by philosophers-that . Southwestern Jozrrnal of Anthro- the future lay in the direction of Hempel's deduc- pology 24:267-275. tive-nomological model of scientific explanation. Why did the processualists choose Hernpel as (1968b) Archeological Perspectives. In, New Perspectives in Archeology, edited by S. R. Binford and L. the model for archaeology? Part of the reason, R. Binford, pp. 5-32. Aldine, Chicago. Lyman, Schiffer, and I suggest (O'Brien et al. 2005), had to do with the fact that when Albert (1972) Introduction. In, An Archaeological Per- spective, by L. R. Binford, pp. 1-14. Seminar Press, New Spaulding introduced archaeologists to the sci- York. entific approach in his comments in New Per- (1983) Working at Archaeology: The Late spectives in Archeology (Spaulding 1968), ~t' was 1960s and the Early 1970s. In, W~rkin~atArchaeology,by to Hempel's brand, not someone else's. Binford L. R. Binford, pp. 3-20. Academic Press, New York. was simply following Spaulding's lead when he adopted Hempel as a guide. Regardless, the Binford, S. R. and L. R. Binford, eds. (1968) New Per- processualists' devotion to strict Hempelian spectives in Archeology. Aldine, Chicago. deduction began to fade as they came to realize Bohannan, P and M. Glazer, eds. (1988) High Points in that research% rarely if ever entirely inductive Anthropology, 2nd ed. McGraw-Hill, New York. or deductive. Rather, it combines both. This Brainera, G. W. (1951a) The Use of Mathematical For- realization was helped along by another philoso- mulations in Archaeological Analysis. In, Essays on Archae- pher of science, Merrilee Salmon, whose ological Methodc Proceedings of a Conference Held under engagement with archaeology and archaeolo- Auspices of the Viking Fund, edited by J. B. Griffin, pp. 117-127. Anthropological I'apers, no. 8, Museum of gists at the University of Arizona in the 1970s Anthropology, , Ann Arbor. aemonstrated that philosophers could make positive contributions to the discipline not only (1951b) The Place of Chronological Ordering in Archaeological Analysis. American Antiquity by clearing up misunderstandings but also by 16:301-313. introducing ar~haeolo~icallyappropriate mod- els. Alison Wylie continues that tradition. I'm Caldwell, J. R. (1959) The New American Archeology. Science 129:303-307. not sure what Ford and Spaulding would have thought about Wylie's book, but it might have Custer, J. F. (1981) Comments on David Meltzer's "Para- made them a little more aware of just how diffi- digms and the Nature of Change in American Archaeolo- cult it is to think about epistemological and gy." American Antiqzriiy 46:660-661. onrological issues in a consistent, logical fash- Deetz, 1. (1968) The Inference of Residence and Descellr ion. As archaeologists, we all could use a little Rules from Archeological Daca. In, New Ptr.pecti~/e~'n 42 The REVIEW of ARCHAEOLOGY Voi. 25, ivzriizbri. 2

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