Cleanup of Large Areas Contaminated As a Result of a Nuclear Accident

PW5 ШЩ: ' л - -i I i > , 14 Ч TECHNICAL REPORTS SERIES No. 300 Cleanup of Large Areas Contaminated as a Result of a Nuclear Accident 1819 J INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, VIENNA, 1989 CLEANUP OF LARGE AREAS CONTAMINATED AS A RESULT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency: AFGHANISTAN GUATEMALA PARAGUAY ALBANIA HAITI PERU ALGERIA HOLY SEE PHILIPPINES ARGENTINA HUNGARY POLAND AUSTRALIA ICELAND PORTUGAL AUSTRIA INDIA QATAR BANGLADESH INDONESIA ROMANIA BELGIUM IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF SAUDI ARABIA BOLIVIA IRAQ SENEGAL BRAZIL IRELAND SIERRA LEONE BULGARIA ISRAEL SINGAPORE BURMA ITALY SOUTH AFRICA BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET JAMAICA SPAIN SOCIALIST REPUBLIC JAPAN SRI LANKA CAMEROON JORDAN SUDAN CANADA KENYA SWEDEN CHILE KOREA, REPUBLIC OF SWITZERLAND CHINA KUWAIT SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC COLOMBIA LEBANON THAILAND COSTA RICA LIBERIA TUNISIA COTE D'IVOIRE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TURKEY CUBA LIECHTENSTEIN UGANDA CYPRUS LUXEMBOURG UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA MADAGASCAR REPUBLIC DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA MALAYSIA UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S MALI REPUBLICS REPUBLIC OF KOREA MAURITIUS UNITED ARAB EMIRATES DENMARK MEXICO UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MONACO BRITAIN AND NORTHERN ECUADOR MONGOLIA IRELAND EGYPT MOROCCO UNITED REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR NAMIBIA TANZANIA ETHIOPIA NETHERLANDS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FINLAND NEW ZEALAND URUGUAY FRANCE NICARAGUA VENEZUELA GABON NIGER VIET NAM GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC NIGERIA YUGOSLAVIA GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NORWAY ZAIRE GHANA PAKISTAN ZAMBIA GREECE PANAMA ZIMBABWE The Agency's Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The Head- quarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". © IAEA, 1989 Permission to reproduce or translate the information contained in this publication may be obtained by writing to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. Printed by the IAEA in Austria August 1989 TECHNICAL REPORTS SERIES No. 300 CLEANUP OF LARGE AREAS CONTAMINATED AS A RESULT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, 1989 CLEANUP OF LARGE AREAS CONTAMINATED AS A RESULT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IAEA, VIENNA, 1989 STI/DOC/10/300 ISBN 92-0-125289-7 ISSN 0074-1914 FOREWORD During the last 30 years, the development of commercial nuclear power and its supporting nuclear fuel cycle facilities has in general been associated with an excellent record of nuclear safety. Nuclear facilities are sited, designed, constructed, operated and decommissioned according to strict requirements and regulations to protect the environment and ensure the safety of the workers and the public. In spite of all precautions, the possibility of an accident which would result in the release of unacceptable amounts of radioactive materials or unacceptable exposures cannot be excluded. Therefore, it is desirable to plan in advance for emergency action to protect both the facility personnel and the public. A number of measures are available to protect the public in the event of an accident at a nuclear facility resulting in the release of significant amounts of radioactive material. One of the protective measures which could be implemented in the intermediate phase (days to weeks after the accident) and the late phase (several weeks to years) is decontamination of large areas. Experience at Chernobyl shows that the main long term radiological consequence to the population will probably be external exposure from radioactive fallout deposited on the ground. In the USSR, the contribution of this external exposure from Chernobyl is expected to rise from 53% in the years following the accident to 60% of the total dose commitment. There- fore, it would appear logical that some preliminary planning for the cleanup of contaminated areas should be done. An Advisory Group Meeting on the cleanup of very large areas after a nuclear accident was held in Vienna from 23 to 27 November 1987. The meeting was attended by 17 experts from 9 Member States and one international organization. The participants discussed and revised a preliminary report on the subject written by B.W. Church (USA), M. Pick (UK), C.G. Welty Jr. (USA) and the IAEA Scientific Secretary, M. A. Feraday of the Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle. After the meeting, the report was revised by the IAEA Secretariat and the final report was approved by the members of the Advisory Group. EDITORIAL NOTE The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA. CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. PURPOSES OF THE REPORT 4 3. SCOPE 4 4. PLANNING THE CLEANUP 6 4.1. Introduction 6 4.2. Preliminary planning 7 4.3. Final planning 13 4.4. Planning the implementation 14 5. MANAGING THE CLEANUP 15 5.1. Introduction 15 5.2. Management structure for cleanup 16 5.3. Managing the planning and implementation 19 6. CHARACTERIZING THE AFFECTED AREA 24 7. DEPOSITION OF CONTAMINATION ON SURFACES 26 8. CHARACTERIZING THE CONTAMINATION 29 8.1. Introduction 29 8.2. Monitoring equipment and techniques 30 8.3. Data management 37 9. STABILIZATION OF CONTAMINATION 38 10. DECONTAMINATION TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT 39 10.1. Introduction 39 10.2. Decontamination of buildings, equipment and paved surfaces .... 41 10.3. Decontamination of large land areas 60 10.4. Decontamination of forest areas 78 10.5. Decontamination of aquatic ecosystems 81 11. INTERDICTION OF AN AREA 84 12. APPLICATION OF CLEANUP TECHNOLOGY TO SITUATIONS INVOLVING HIGH RADIATION FIELDS 84 13. LOADING AND TRANSPORTING LARGE VOLUMES OF WASTES 86 14. DISPOSAL OF LARGE VOLUMES OF WASTES 88 14.1. Introduction 88 14.2. Methods for storing/disposing of large volumes of wastes 90 14.3. Site selection 93 15. RADIATION PROTECTION AND SAFETY 96 15.1. Introduction 96 15.2. Radiation protection and safety plan 97 15.3. Implementation 98 16. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99 ANNEX A: THE CLEANUP AFTER THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 101 A.l. Introduction 101 A.2. Radiological evaluation 104 A.3. Cleanup of the site 109 A.4. Cleanup of the 30 km zone 113 A.5. Equipment used for the cleanup 117 A.6. Transportation and disposal of contaminated wastes 123 A.7. Conclusions 124 REFERENCES 125 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 133 1. INTRODUCTION National governments establish strict requirements and regulations to ensure that nuclear facilities are sited, designed, constructed, operated and decommissioned so as to protect the health and safety of the plant personnel and the public. In spite of all precautions, the possibility of an accident which results in the release of significant amounts of radioactive material cannot be excluded. Since the released radioac- tivity may adversely affect persons and property outside a nuclear plant, it is prudent to plan in advance emergency actions required both on and off site to limit and mitigate the impacts resulting from such accidents. The IAEA has published general guidance and recommendations on emergency planning and preparedness for situations where an accident at a nuclear power plant may involve the need for off-site remedial actions and the implementation of protective measures [1-3]. Protective measures that could be implemented to protect the public in the event of an accident at a nuclear facility which results in the release of significant amounts of radioactive material are shown in Table I and range from sheltering of people to the decontamination of lands and buildings. The selection of protective measures which are appropriate for particular hazards during and following an accident must take into account factors such as the type of facility and accident, the source term, data on the affected area, particularly population density and distribution, attendant risks and in particular the time-scale associated with the accident. The time-scale can be classified as follows [3]: (a) The early phase which extends for some hours from the start of the accident. The immediate risk ftom an airborne release may be inhalation of radioactive material and/or external irradiation from the radioactive plume. (b) The intermediate phase which may extend from days to weeks after the early phase. In this phase the risks may be due to external radiation from ground depositions, internal radiation from the inhalation of resuspended radioactive particles or internal radiation from the ingestion of contaminated food or water. (c) The late phase which may extend from several weeks to several years. The risk here may be due to consumption of contaminated food or water and contamination of the environment. Table I gives some general guidance on the application of the protective measures to the different time scales associated with an accident. The implementation of these protective measures involves cost, inconvenience and risk to the public so the hazard or social cost associated with a remedial measure must be justified by the resulting reduction in risk [4, 5]. Any intervention will be appropriate only if its resulting detriment to health and social life will be less than that resulting from fur- ther radiation

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