CURRICULUM VITAE June 2021
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Nes Delivers Up-To-Date Economics Research And
NES DELIVERS UP-TO-DATE ECONOMICS RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, MAKING A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE RUSSIAN SOCIETY, STATE AND BUSINESS 2021 New Economic School NES MISSION «NES does not rest NES delivers up-to-date Economics research and education, making on its laurels». a valuable contribution to the Russian society, state and business. NES nurtures a community of world-class economists in Russia by: • educating the best professionals in Economics in line with international standards • inviting academic talent from all over the world, including bringing Russian economists back home RUBEN ENIKOLOPOV Rector of the New Economic School • creating and supporting international research groups Full Professor • conducting internationally competitive research NES alumnus, MAE’2002 • boosting quality and prestige of Economics degrees The New Economic School has been a lead- • shaping new approaches to economic challenges er in economic education and research in Russia for many years. NES professors hold • helping the state institutions and businesses make managerial PhD degrees in economics and finance from decisions and shape their economic policies the world’s leading universities and publish their research in the world’s best academic • contribute to the Russian economy by delivering quality education journals. NES graduates are highly valued in in Economics and Finance as well as by carrying out applied and various fields: business, the public sector and academic research projects academia. NES does not rest on its laurels. The develop- ment strategy adopted this year defines our priorities for the next five years: strengthen- ing the School’s unique community, moving NES VALUES to our own campus, transition to a full cycle university by launching a PhD program, fur- ther development of the undergraduate and Professionalism master’s degree programs, and ensuring the financial independence and sustainability of Responsibility the School. -
Challenging Social Hierarchies and Inequalities
Challenging Social Hierarchies and Inequalities BSA Annual Conference 2019 Glasgow Caledonian University Wednesday 24 - Friday 26 April 2019 CONTENTS Welcome ........................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Delegate Information ........................................................................................................................................................ 7 Conference Programme at a Glance ............................................................................................................................... 11 Conference Programme Grid .......................................................................................................................................... 17 Plenary - Satnam Virdee.................................................................................................................................................. 25 Pleanry - Nonna Mayer ................................................................................................................................................... 27 Plenary - Imogen Tyler .................................................................................................................................................... 29 Stream Plenaries ............................................................................................................................................................. 32 Special Activities ............................................................................................................................................................ -
Competition and Efficiency of Coalitions in Cournot Games
1 Competition and Efficiency of Coalitions in Cournot Games with Uncertainty Baosen Zhang, Member, IEEE, Ramesh Johari, Member, IEEE, Ram Rajagopal, Member, IEEE, Abstract—We investigate the impact of coalition formation on Electricity markets serve as one motivating example of the efficiency of Cournot games where producers face uncertain- such an environment. In electricity markets, producers submit ties. In particular, we study a market model where firms must their bids before the targeted time of delivery (e.g., one day determine their output before an uncertain production capacity is realized. In contrast to standard Cournot models, we show that ahead). However, renewable resources such as wind and solar the game is not efficient when there are many small firms. Instead, have significant uncertainty (even on a day-ahead timescale). producers tend to act conservatively to hedge against their risks. As a result, producers face uncertainties about their actual We show that in the presence of uncertainty, the game becomes production capacity at the commitment stage. efficient when firms are allowed to take advantage of diversity Our paper focuses on a fundamental tradeoff revealed in to form groups of certain sizes. We characterize the tradeoff between market power and uncertainty reduction as a function such games. On one hand, in the classical Cournot model, of group size. In particular, we compare the welfare and output efficiency obtains as the number of individual firms approaches obtained with coalitional competition, with the same benchmarks infinity, as this weakens each firm’s market power (ability to when output is controlled by a single system operator. -
Working Paper No. 12
The Real Wage And The Marginal Product of Labor Tracy Mott* Working Paper No. 12 November 1988 * Research Associate, Program on Political and Economic Change, Institute of Behavioral Science, and Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Colorado, Boulder. Part of this work was done while on research fellowship at the Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Annandale-On-Hudson, NY. 1 The opening section of the Sumner 1987 issue of the Journal of Post Kevnesian Economics contained a symposium on the question of the significance of the concept of the marginal productivity of labor to Post Keynesian economics. This took the form of a discussion surrounding John Maynard Keynes's statement that his theory of employment in Chapter Two of the General Theorv did not reject "the first classical postulate" of equality between the real wage and the marginal product of labor. Though there were a number of interesting points raised and insights made, the discussion was hardly conclusive. I would like to add another intervention on the subject. I begin by noting Paul Wells's (1987) discussion, which I think very clearly points out the first and perhaps most important divergence of Keynes's theory from the neoclassical theory of employment. That is, Keynes's acceptance of the proposition that the real wage is equal to the marginal product of labor should not be taken as Keynes's saying that the level of employment is determined by the real wage, at that level where the real wage equals the marginal product of labor. Rather, Wells notes, for Keynes the level of employment is determined by the level of effective demand. -
Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: a Partition Function Approach
games Article Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach Takaaki Abe School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1, Nishi-waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan; [email protected] Abstract: In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is “moderate”, then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting. Keywords: cartel formation; Cournot competition; partition function form game; stability JEL Classification: C71; L13 1. Introduction Many approaches have been proposed to analyze cartel formation. Ref. [1] first intro- duced a simple noncooperative game to study cartel formation among firms. As shown by the title of his paper, “A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and Citation: Abe, T. Cartel Formation in 6 are many”, this result suggests that cartel formation depends deeply on the number of Cournot Competition with firms in a market. Ref. [2] distinguished the issue of cartel stability from that of cartel Asymmetric Costs: A Partition formation. -
Lessons from the History of UK Science Policy
Lessons from the History of UK Science Policy August 2019 2 Science Policy History Foreword The British Academy is the UK’s national body for the humanities and social sciences. Our purpose is to deepen understanding of people, societies and cultures, enabling everyone to learn, progress and prosper. The Academy inspires, supports and promotes outstanding achievement and global advances in the humanities and social sciences. We are a fellowship of over 1000 of the most outstanding academics, an international community of leading experts focused on people, culture and societies, and are the voice for the humanities and social sciences.1 The British Academy aims to use insights from the past and the present to help shape the future, by influencing policy and affecting change in the UK and overseas. Given this, the Academy is well-placed to bring humanities and social science insight from the past into policymaking for the present and the future. One way to do this is in using historical insights to inform policymaking – ‘looking back to look forward’. To support these efforts, the Academy’s public policy team in collaboration with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, has undertaken a new programme of work on policy histories. The policy histories series develop historical analyses for individual policy areas. These analyses are used to provide: • a structured, rigorous and objective account of the history of a given policy area and the significance of key milestones in context, • an informed basis for analysis and insights from the timelines as well as dialogue and discussion about what history can tell us about the future. -
Kieler Studien
Institut für Weltwirtschaft The Kiel Institute for World Economics Annual Report 2003 Contents I. The Institute in 2003: An Overview 3 II. Research and Advisory Activities 6 1. Main Areas of Research 6 2. President’s Department 7 3. Growth, Structural Change, and the International Division of Labor (Research Department I) 10 4. Environmental and Resource Economics (Research Department II) 21 5. Regional Economics (Research Department III) 27 6. Development Economics and Global Integration (Research Department IV) 35 7. Business Cycles (Research Department V) 43 8. Interdepartmental Research 53 9. Cooperation with Researchers and Research Organizations 53 10. Advisory Activities and Participation in Organizations 61 11. Commissioned Expert Reports and Research Projects 64 III. Documentation Services 72 1. The Library 72 2. The Economic Archives 75 IV. Teaching and Lecturing 77 1. Universities and Colleges 77 2. Advanced Studies Program 77 3. Guest Lectures and Seminars at Universities 79 V. Conferences 80 1. Conferences Organized by the Institute 80 2. External Conferences 84 VI. Publications 96 1. In-House Publications 96 2. Out-of-House Publications 103 VII. Appendix 114 1. Recipients of the Bernhard Harms Prize, the Bernhard Harms Medal, and the Bernhard Harms Prize for Young Economists 114 2. Staff (as of January 1, 2004) 116 3. Organization Chart 121 I. The Institute in 2003: An Overview The Kiel Institute for World Economics at the University of Kiel (IfW) is one of the world’s major centers for international economic policy research and documentation. The Institute’s main activities are economic research, economic policy consulting, and the documentation and provision of information about international economic relations. -
Appendix List of JSPS’S Overseas Counterpart Institutions (86 Institutions in 44 Countries and 2 International Organizations)
JSPS 2009-2010 Appendix List of JSPS’s Overseas Counterpart Institutions (86 institutions in 44 countries and 2 international organizations) Fellowships Bilateral Programs Multilateral Research Country Counterpart Institution Invitation Postdoctoral Researcher and Other Projects/ Region Fellowship Fellowship Exchanges Programs Seminars Bangladesh University Grants Commission (UGC) ○ ○ Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) ○ ○ ○ Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) ○ ○ Ministry of Education P.R.C. (MOE) ○ ○ ○ China China Scholarship Council (CSC) ○ Chinese Academy of Medical Science (CAMS) ○ National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) ○ ○ Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) ○ ○ Indian National Science Academy (INSA) ○ ○ India Department of Science and Technology (DST) ○ ○ ○ Asia Directorate General of Higher Education, Department of National Education (DGHE) ○ ○ Indonesia Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) ○ ○ Korea, Rep. National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) ○ ○ ○ ○ Malaysia Vice-Chancellors’ Council of National Universities in Malaysia (VCC) ○ Mongolia Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (MECS) ○ Philippines Department of Science and Technology (DOST) ○ ○ Singapore National University of Singapore (NUS) ○ ○ Thailand National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT) ○ ○ Vietnam Vietnamese Academy of Science and Technology (VAST) ○ ○ Australian Academy of Science (AAS) ○ ○ ○ Australia Australian Research Council (ARC) ○ ○ ○ Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MoRST) ○ ○ ○ ○ Oceania New Zealand Foundation -
Symposium Proceedings, 1998: Income Inequality: Issues And
The Contributors A.B. Atkinson, Warden, Nuffield College, Oxford University Mr. Atkinson is currently serving as warden of Nuffield College, Oxford University. Previously, he was professor of political econ- omy at the University of Cambridge, and chairman of the Suntory Toyota International Centre at the London School of Economics. A fellow of the British Academy, he is a past president of the Royal Economic Society, the Econometric Society, the European Eco- nomic Association, and the International Economic Association. He has served on the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, the Pension Law Review Committee, and the Commis- sion on Social Justice. He is also the author or co-author of a number of books dealing with public economic issues and income distribution. Alan S. Blinder, Professor, Princeton University Mr. Blinder is the Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics and co-director and founder of the Center for Economic Policy Studies at Princeton University where he has been a member of the faculty since 1971. He is also vice chairman of the G-7 Group. Between June 1994 and January 1996, he was vice chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Before joining the Board, he was a member of President Clinton’s Council of Eco- nomic Advisers where he was in charge of macroeconomic forecast- ing and also worked on budget, international trade, and health care issues. Mr. Blinder is the author or co-author of 12 books and scores ix x Contributors of articles on such topics as fiscal policy, monetary policy, and the distribution of income. -
Oligopolistic Competition
Lecture 3: Oligopolistic competition EC 105. Industrial Organization Mattt Shum HSS, California Institute of Technology EC 105. Industrial Organization (Mattt Shum HSS,Lecture California 3: Oligopolistic Institute of competition Technology) 1 / 38 Oligopoly Models Oligopoly: interaction among small number of firms Conflict of interest: Each firm maximizes its own profits, but... Firm j's actions affect firm i's profits PC: firms are small, so no single firm’s actions affect other firms’ profits Monopoly: only one firm EC 105. Industrial Organization (Mattt Shum HSS,Lecture California 3: Oligopolistic Institute of competition Technology) 2 / 38 Oligopoly Models Oligopoly: interaction among small number of firms Conflict of interest: Each firm maximizes its own profits, but... Firm j's actions affect firm i's profits PC: firms are small, so no single firm’s actions affect other firms’ profits Monopoly: only one firm EC 105. Industrial Organization (Mattt Shum HSS,Lecture California 3: Oligopolistic Institute of competition Technology) 2 / 38 Oligopoly Models Oligopoly: interaction among small number of firms Conflict of interest: Each firm maximizes its own profits, but... Firm j's actions affect firm i's profits PC: firms are small, so no single firm’s actions affect other firms’ profits Monopoly: only one firm EC 105. Industrial Organization (Mattt Shum HSS,Lecture California 3: Oligopolistic Institute of competition Technology) 2 / 38 Oligopoly Models Oligopoly: interaction among small number of firms Conflict of interest: Each firm maximizes its own profits, but... Firm j's actions affect firm i's profits PC: firms are small, so no single firm’s actions affect other firms’ profits Monopoly: only one firm EC 105. -
Cambridge Economics: a Place, a People, an Academic Community and Its Palgrave Companion
Cambridge Economics: A place, a people, an academic community and its Palgrave Companion Cord, Robert A. (editor), 2017, The Palgrave Companion to Cambridge Economics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2 Vol., pp. XVII, 1225. £ 165 (Hardcover) ISBN 978-1-137-41233-1 The Palgrave Companion’s two volume set on Cambridge Economics is part of an ongoing project by Robert Cord to bring together contributions that capture Economics, as it was, and is, practised in historically important universities for the subject. This publication project follows Cord’s Ph.D. work that discussed research centres in economics in the 1930s, with special reference to Cambridge, Oxford and the LSE (Cord, 2012). In that book Cord analysed the relative success of these research centres by utilising a framework that identified sociological, technical, intellectual and financial factors to explain why some centres where more successful than others. In contradistinction, this edited set starts with a collection of surveys ‘from within’, with academics reviewing fields of research through narratives that capture specific traditions and/or the interface of economics with related fields/faculties in Cambridge. These form Part I, titled “Themes in Cambridge Economics”. Part II, titled “Some Cambridge Economists”, has an extensive set of intellectual biographies of the major economists associated with Cambridge, who also figure in the narratives constructed in Part I. All of this yields more than a thousand pages of text, from fifty one academics contributing the various pieces. This is a herculean task, and the very scope of the project and its execution awes the reader. It is commendable that Cord not only completed this task but also amassed contributions from celebrated academics that know intimately Cambridge and its many traditions. -
Equilmrium and DYNAMICS David Gale, 1991 Equilibrium and Dynamics
EQUILmRIUM AND DYNAMICS David Gale, 1991 Equilibrium and Dynamics Essays in Honour of David Gale Edited by Mukul Majumdar H. T. Warshow and Robert Irving Warshow Professor ofEconomics Cornell University Palgrave Macmillan ISBN 978-1-349-11698-0 ISBN 978-1-349-11696-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-11696-6 © Mukul Majumdar 1992 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1992 All rights reserved. For information, write: Scholarly and Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 First published in the United States of America in 1992 ISBN 978-0-312-06810-3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Equilibrium and dynamics: essays in honour of David Gale I edited by Mukul Majumdar. p. em. Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 978-0-312-06810-3 1. Equilibrium (Economics) 2. Statics and dynamics (Social sciences) I. Gale, David. II. Majumdar, Mukul, 1944- . HB145.E675 1992 339.5-dc20 91-25354 CIP Contents Preface vii Notes on the Contributors ix 1 Equilibrium in a Matching Market with General Preferences Ahmet Alkan 1 2 General Equilibrium with Infinitely Many Goods: The Case of Separable Utilities Aloisio Araujo and Paulo Klinger Monteiro 17 3 Regular Demand with Several, General Budget Constraints Yves Balasko and David Cass 29 4 Arbitrage Opportunities in Financial Markets are not Inconsistent with Competitive Equilibrium Lawrence M. Benveniste and Juan Ketterer 45 5 Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a General Equilibrium Model Truman Bewley 55 6 Equilibrium in Preemption Games with Complete Information Kenneth Hendricks and Charles Wilson 123 7 Allocation of Aggregate and Individual Risks through Financial Markets Michael J.