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' ' ' I ‘ *flfsmf WHO [00K GREAT H .‘ Ä l“: \ I I ‘ \ l k ,.._ E ¥ \ FASSBENDER TEES OFF! ‘ CLOAK & HACKER How nusslks DIGITAL sms ARE PLANNING To INVAIJE AMERICA PENN STATE wnv Is FOOTBALL THESPoRToF sex PREDATORS? nun .' ' ' i ‘ *flfsmf WHO [00K GREAT. .ALLTHE RULES "SHOW IE I I STIIIGHTFOIHAID 54,99 "III III llFE. IT CAN BE VERY SIMPLE, BIIT IT CAI SET VERY COMPLICATED.‘ —Ii|:lael Installer UH“) HE TABLE OF NTENTS Ta INTO THE COUNTRY Joe Alwyn, the breakout smr nfb‘i'lly Lynn's Long Halfr‘ime Walk. tries on the seron's most stylish outdoor clothes, pg. 122 The Spark Michael Fassbender has a gift that makes great directors want to line up for him. But what happens to the life Ufa private man when he always has m reveal himself? Best of Times. BY AMANDA Worst of Times. I’ETRUSICH Some days. \I'nu \\ oke up p g . 10 6 feelim.r like yuu \\ ere “\ng in the spring See No Evil, Hear No of hope: other days. the Evil, Speak No Evil \\ inter nfdespuiiz Have He u b the head {mitlmll we reached utnpia 0r much zit .in elite prep Armageddon? \,k'l1|)l)l. HL‘ “1h. JIM) .1 CONTRIBUTION.'S HY \eriul pudnphih’ TED HELLER AND HY hlx’H' LE“ IS DANIEL SCHOFIELI) p g . 114 p g. ‘l 3 8 The Plot Against That '805 Show America Just like the mnmter I he mxhle «um ul hmv nn Stranger Things. HIHHJH xpiwhuckcd their hit slut“. the Ihx- l .N, elm'tiun buffer hmthen wenn-d “Y III()\I \\. II”) \'\II m come out ufnmvhere \ [(‘l\\ \\ \l'xll BY S'I‘EVI‘ZN I.I'.'k‘l\v\l>\”l' pg. 130 p g . 144 ON THE COVER: MICHAEL FASSBENDER PHOTOGRAPHED EXCLUSIVELY FOR ESOUIRE BY CEDRIC BUCHET. SUIT, SHIRT, AND TIE BY BURv BERRY; WATCH BY PATEK PHILIPPE PRODUCED BY LAURA OUGHTON FOR ROSCO PRODUCTION. STYLING BY NICK SULLIVAN. STYLING (UK) BY CHRIS BENNS ASSISTANT STYLING (UK) BY NATASHA CHANG LEWIS GROOMING BY CARLOS FERRAZ FOR CAROL HAYES MANAGEMENT SET DESIGN BY ALEXANDRA LEAVEY FOR THE MAGNET AGENCY. THIS PAGE: PHOTOGRAPH BY DUSAN RELJIN. SHIRT BY BILLY REID; T-SHIRT BY SAVE KHAKI UNITED; JEANS BY DSQUAREDZ. 19 confidential files from the eratit DNL‘ THE HACKERS USED THE LANGUAGE 0F ins would still m n'kjustfine. found their way to the public. On July 3.“. three days before AMERICANS FRUSTRATED Throughout the campaign. Guc- the Democratic National (.‘unven- "ASYOU SEE cifer maintained that he was the WITH WASHINGTON. tion in Philadelphia, Wikilcaks only person behind the hacking THE U. S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS published the largest troveol‘iilcs and leaking. “This is my personal ARE BECOMING A FARCE.” to date, which included nearly project and I‘m proud ofit," he— twenty thousand hacked emails. or they—wrote in late June. But Press coverage of the release several sloppy mistakes soon re— quickly centered on emails that vealedwhowas reallybehind the operation. designed to trick their victims into clicking suggested a bias among some DNC staff- The unraveling happened more quicklythan a link that would install malware or send ers in favor oinllar\_' Clinton. The leaked anybody could have anticipated. them to a fake but familiar-looking login site emails lentcredence to a suspicion held by to harvest their passwords. The malicious some Democrats that the party establish- AS SOON AS Guccifer's files hit the linkswere hiddenbehind short URLs ofthe ment had never intended to give Bernie open Internet. an armyofinvestigators—in- sort often used on Twitter. Sanders, Clinton‘s opponent in the prima— cludingold—school hackers, former spooks. T0 manage so many short URLs, Fan- ries, a fairshake. Protesters in Philadelphia security consultants, and journalists—de- cy Bear had created an automated system held up signs that read ELECTION FRAUD scended on the hastily leaked data. Infor- that used a popular link—shortening ser— and DNC LEAKS SHAME. One day before the mal, self—organized orgoups of sleuths dis— vicecalled Bitly. Thespear-phishing emails convention, the Russian kompromat cam— cussed their discoveries over encrypted worked well—one in seven victims revealed paign took its first trophy: Debbie Wasser- messaging apps such as Signal. Many of their passwords—but the hackers forgotto man Schultz, the DN C chair, resigned from the self-appointed analysts had never met set two oftheirBitly accounts to “private.” the organization. in person, and sometimes they didn't know As a result, acybersecurity company called The episode shocked the Democratic es- one another's real names, b SecureWorks was able to glean information tablishment, not least because of what it about Fancy Bear’s targets. Between Octo- augured for the future. As Clinton’s lead ber 2015 and May 2016, the hackinggroup in the polls widened after the convention, used nine thousand links to attack about commentators began to speculate that a intelligen four thousand Gmail accounts, including damaging leak late in the campaign might ' and o targets in Ukraine, the Baltics, the United be the only chance for Donald Trump to a“ States, China, and Iran. Fancy Bear tried win the election. Fears of a Russia-spon- to gain access to defense ministries, em- sored October surprise grew as it became bassies, and military attaches. The largest clearer thatthe subversion effort was im- _ group oftargets, some 40percent, were cur- proving. When files appeared, they were >tlent and former military personnel. Among now scrubbed of the sort of distinguish— e group’s recent breaches were the Ger- ing metadata that had allowed analysts to parliament, the Italian military, the trace the leak back to Russian intelligence. l u ' foreign ministry, the email accounts The operators behind Guccifer and DC ‘p Breedlove, Colin Powell, and John Leaks also appear to have recognized that ~—Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair— American journalists were desperate for . d, ofcourse, the DNC. scoops, no matter their source. The Rus- sians began to act like a PR agency, provid- ' ID P U B L I C reconstruc- ing access to reporters at Politico, The Inter~ metadata settings, which, he sugge I NC break-in appears to have cept, and BuzzFeed. Journalists were eager q vealed a failure ofoperational security. ckers offguard. Researchers to help. On August 27, when part ofthe DC A second mistake had to do with the com- ‘ Russianspies had not ex— Leaks website was down for some reason, puterthat had been usedto control the hack- pected to "I ntified so quickly, a theory Twittersuspended the @DCLeaks account. ing operation. Researchers found that the that would explain, among other things, the The DailyCaller, a conservative news web- malicious software, or malware, used to peculiaranimus Guccifer seemed to havefor site, posted a story about the events, draw- break into the DNC was controlled bya ma- CrowdStrike. Accordingto this hypothesis, ing an outcry from Trump supporters. Lou chine that had been involved in a2015 hack the tradecraft blunders that Tait and others Dobbs, the Fox Business anchor, sneered ofthe German parliament. German intelli- had identified were the result ofa hasty ef- that “leftist fascism” was throttling the last gence later traced the Bundestag breach to fortby the GRU to cover its tracks. best hope for aTrump victory. Twittersoon the Russian GRU, aka Fancy Bear. As ifto regroup after the initial rushof ac- reinstated @DCLeaks. There were othererrors, too, includinga tivity, Guccifer and DC Leaks went quiet at The most effective outletby far, however, Russian smile emoji—“)))"—and emails to the end of June. But the 2016 presidential was WikiLeaks. Russian intelligence like— journalists that explicitly associated Guc- campaign, already the most bizarre in liv- ly began feedinghacked documents to Ju— cifer 2.0 with DC Leaks, as the cybersecu- ingmemory, had a further surprise in store, lian Assange’s “whistleblower” site in June rity firm ThreatConnect pointed out. But one thatworked in favorofthe Russians. At 2015, after breaching Saudi Arabia's foreign the hackers’ gravest mistake involved the a time when only 32 percent ofAmericans ministry. A group called WikiSaudiLeaks. emails they'd used to initiate their attack. say that they trust the media to report the probably a Guccifer-like front for Fancy AS part of a so—called spear-phishing cam- news fairlyand accurately, the hackers were Bear, claimed that “WikiLeaks have been Pai’ng, Fancy Bear hademailedthousands of about to learn that gettingcalled out public- given access to some part of these docu— targets around the world. The emails were lydidn't really matter: Theirkompromatop- ments.“ The so-called Saudi Cables showed 133 princes buying influence and monitoring dissidents. They became a major news sto- ry. Proving that the old methods \\ orked PART 2 even better in the t\\'ent\_‘—h‘rst century. A leak released at theendofthis past sum— mer showed how frictimilesslythe kompro— THE RUSSIAN E'MIGRE' mat campaingi was able to operate in the fact—free atmosphere of the 2016 Ameri- can presidential campaign. In late Septem- LEADING ber, DC Leaks publishedhundreds ofemails. from the account of a twenty—two—year—old freelancer for the Clinton campaign. Lach— THE lan Markay, a reporter for The Ha’shingron FreeBeacon, found an audio clip buried deep in the cache. In the recording, which was FIGHT made at a fundraiser in Virginia, Hillary Clinton could be heard describing Sanders TO PROTECT AMERICA supporters as “children ofthe Great Reces- sion” who “are living in their parents' base— BY VICKY WARD ment.” The comments were clumsybut. in context, hardly damning; Clinton was de— scribing the appeal of Sanders‘s “political O'CLOCK on the morning of revolution" for young voters. (“We want " ay 6, Dmitri Alperovitch woke up in a people to be idealistic." she said.) Never- .
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