Lucian‟ S Paradoxa: Fiction, Aesthetics, and Identity
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i Lucian‟s Paradoxa: Fiction, Aesthetics, and Identity A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Classics of the College of Arts and Sciences by Valentina Popescu BA University of Iasi June 2009 Committee Chair: Kathryn J. Gutzwiller, Professor of Classics Abstract This dissertation represents a novel approach to the Lucianic corpus and studies paradox, with rhetorical, philosophical, and aesthetic implications, as Lucian‟s distinctive discursive mode of constructing cultural identity and literary innovation. While criticizing paradoxography - the literature of wonders - as true discourse, Lucian creates a novel, avowed false, discourse, as a form of contemplation and regeneration of the Greek literary tradition. Paradoxography is Lucian‟s favorite self-referential discourse in prolaliai, rhetorical introductions, where he strives to earn doxa through paradoxa - paradigms of exoticism applied to both author and work. Lucian elevates paradox from exotic to aesthetic, from hybrid novelty to astonishing beauty, expecting his audience to sublimate the experience of ekplexis from bewilderment to aesthetic pleasure. Lucian‟s construction of cultural identity, as an issue of tension between Greek and barbarian and between birthright and paideutic conquest, is predicated on paradoxology, a first- personal discourse based on rhetorical and philosophical paradox. While the biography of the author insinuates itself into the biography of the speaker, Lucian creates tension between macro- text and micro-text. Thus, the text becomes also its opposite and its reading represents almost an aporetic experience. iii iv To my family for their love, sacrifices, and prayers and to the memory of Ion Popescu, Doina Tatiana Mănoiu, and Nicolae Catrina v Table of Contents Introduction 1 1. Paradox 1 2. Sophistry and Paradox 10 3. Lucian‟s Claim to Paradox 14 4. The Paradox of Lucian‟s Reception 21 Chapter 1. Paradoxography and False Discourse 28 1.1. Paradoxography. An Overview 28 1.2. True Stories 50 1.3. Lovers of Lies 87 Chapter 2. Self Presentation and the Aesthetics of Paradox in Lucian’s Prolaliai 123 2.1. Prolaliai 123 2.2. Timid Beginnings: Harmonides and Herodotus or Aëtion 131 2.3. Mastering Paradoxography: The Scythian or the Proxenos 142 2.4. An African Paradoxon: The Dipsades 161 2.5. Enchantment and Disenchantment or the Paradox of Self-Presentation: Amber or Swans 169 2.6. Hippocentaurs and Elephants: Zeuxis or Antiochus 178 2.7. The Spell of an Old Charmer: Heracles 186 2.8. The Old Charmer Revisited: Dionysus 195 Chapter 3. Paradoxology and the Discourse of Identity. An Invitation to Hermeneutics 205 3.1. The Rhetorician 208 3.2. The Ignorant Book Collector 227 vi 3.3. The Dream 239 Post Scriptum 252 Bibliography 255 vii Introduction 1. Paradox A study on Lucian‟s treatment of paradox (τὸ παράδοξον) entails the analysis of two distinct discursive modes: „paradoxography‟, the speech on paradoxa as marvels (θαύματα), and what this study will term „paradoxology‟, the speech in paradoxa as rhetorico-philosophical instruments. Lucian uses paradoxographical discourse to criticize the literature on marvels and its claim to truth, while displaying his own form of paradoxography as avowed false discourse. At the same time, paradoxography becomes Lucian‟s favorite self-referential discourse, using paradoxa as enargetic paradigms of cultural exoticism and aesthetic excellence. Paradoxology, on the other hand, built on rhetorical and philosophical paradoxa, is a constantly startling and deceiving discursive mode of constructing and deconstructing ideas and identities, creating a dense text, particularly resistant to interpretation. What exactly is paradox for Lucian? What does paradox mean in ancient terms? In The Rhetorician the teacher of rhetoric promises a young interlocutor or addressee to show him a short path to becoming a rhetor in no time. The subtle ironical undertones of this piece cannot, however, wipe out entirely the shock a startled reader experiences throughout at least its first few passages, until finally grasping the meaning hidden in this paradox.1 As often Lucian vividly illustrates statements and situations with anecdotes, many of Hellenistic inspiration, in The Rhetorician he uses as exemplum a Sidonian merchant who promised to show Alexander a much 1 Pernot 1993, 533 finds features of a paradoxical encomium in Luc. Rhet.praec. 1 shorter route from Persia to Egypt, through the mountains. After confirming the existence of such path (καὶ εἶχεν οὕτω), the teacher of rhetoric continues: “Except that Alexander did not believe it (οὐκ ἐπίστευσεν), but thought that the merchant was a charlatan (γόητα). Thus, the paradoxical character (τὸ παράδοξον) of a promise seems incredible to many (ἄπιστον δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς). However, this should not be the case with you. For you will know, through your own experience (πειρώμενος), that nothing will prevent you from being considered a rhetor (ῥήτορα δοκεῖν) in one single – and not even entire – day, by flying over the mountain from Persia to Egypt” (5-6). A few general aspects of the term „paradox‟ are revealed in this passage. First, paradox is always circumscribed by the general opinion (δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς). It is coupled with lack of credence (οὐκ ἐπίστευσεν, ἄπιστον) and with magic tricks and deceit (γόητα). Yet it does not necessarily mean that something paradoxical, however unbelievable, cannot exist (καὶ εἶχεν οὕτω) or be experienced (πειρώμενος) – although this argument is subject to interpretation, given the paradoxical context of the advice. Paradox is, therefore, fundamentally a matter of opposition to the opinion and the expectation of the many, and thus creates shock and disbelief. In the Suda, παράδοξον is defined, as well as in other lexica, as unexpected (ἀπροσδόκητον) and marvelous (θαυμαστόν),2 while the phrase παρὰ δόξαν means contrary to expectation (παρὰ προσδοκίαν, παρ ̓ ἐλπίδα),3 a sense that is obviously transferred to the substantive adjective as its primary meaning (παρὰ προσδοκίαν – ἀπροσδόκητον). On the other hand, different grammatical forms of παράδοξον are used in the Suda either in definitions of other terms, or – within these definitions – in association with others, as partial or absolute synonyms. „Paradox‟, „paradoxical‟, „paradoxically‟ are therefore associated with terms meaning 2 Hesych. Lex. π 493 (cf. π 514); Phot. Lex. π 383.10, 386.18; Ps.-Zonaras Lex. π 1513.25; Lex. Seg. Bekker 289.2. 3 Hesych. Lex. π 492. 2 new and strange (ξένον, ἄτοπον, νεοχμός, νέος, καινς, ἀτοπιας πλέων),4 magical (μάγγανον, γοητεία, μαγγανεία),5 contrary to the general opinion and therefore unexpected (ἀδοξότατα, παράλογον, ἀνέλπιστον, ἄλογον),6 monstrous (τερατώδη),7 marvelous (θαυμάσιον, δαιμονίως, ὑπερφυς, θαυμαστά, θαῦμα), frightening (φοβερός), rare (σπανίων), different (κατὰ ἄλλον τρόπον),8 unholy and unlawful (ἀνόσιον, παράνομον),9 and thus morally bad (κακόν, μοχθηρόν).10 Paradoxology too is linked with reports of marvels or falsehood (τερατεία, τερατολογίαι, ψευδολογία)11 and, by conjecture, with disbelief: τερατολογεῖν means “to tell things that are incredible and beyond human nature” (τὸ ἀπίθανα διηγεῖσθαι, καὶ λέγειν πράγματα ἔξω τν ἀνθρωπίνων).12 The effect of paradox is recorded as ekplexis, astonishment (ἐκπλαγεῖς, ἐκπλήξεως πλέοι).13 Contrary to the general opinion, paradox does not, however, equal impossibility. The entry for ἀδοξότατα in the Suda is, in fact, an approximate quotation from Alexander of Aphrodisias‟ commentary on Aristotle‟s Topica: ἀδοξότατα are “paradoxical (παράδοξα), impossible things (ἀδύνατα) in Aristotle; paradoxical things are opposed to things approved by the general opinion (τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ἐναντία), yet they are not quite entirely impossible (οὐ 4 Phryn. Praep. soph. 272; Tim. Soph. Lex. Plat. α 979b.4-5; Hesych. Lex. α 8133; Phot. Lex. α 3104; Etym. Gud. 415.1-3; Etym. magn. 503.23-25, 610.41-42; Lex. Seg. Bachmann 160.17-18. 5 Hesych. Lex. τ 509; Phot. Lex. μ 240; Etym. magn. 359.36; Ps.-Zonaras Lex. π 1510; Lex. Seg. Bachmann 294.3. 6 Ael. Dion. π 16; Phryn. Praep. soph. 79; Hesych. Lex. α 1169, π 494 (cf. π 514); Phot. Lex. α 379, π 386.17-20; Ps.-Zonaras Lex. ε 855.8; Lex. Seg. Bachmann 31.15, 229.15, 392.12. 7 Phot. Lex. τ 578.5; Lex. Seg. Bachmann 384.21. 8 Ps.-Zonaras Lex. ε 652, ε 785.11-12. 9 Ps.-Zonaras Lex. θ 1036.7-8. 10 Phryn. Praep. soph. 272; Lex. Seg. Bachmann 160.17-18. 11 Tim. Soph. Lex. Plat. τ 1004a.10-11; Hesych. Lex. π 452 (cf. π 449-450); Ps.-Zonaras Lex. τ 1719.4-5; Lex. Seg. Bachmann 384. 23-24. 12 Phot. Lex. τ 578.1-3; Etym. magn. 752.24-26; Ps.-Zonaras Lex. δ 474.4. 13 It is documented with an approximate quotation from Polybius, 1.76.7: ἐκπλαγεῖς δὲ γενόμενοι οἱ Λίβυες διὰ τὸ παράδοξον. 3 πάντως ἤδη καὶ ἀδύνατα, (α 505; cf. Alex in Top. 159a 18-24).”14 The comment refers to Aristotle‟s definition of a paradoxical thesis as: a paradoxical assumption (ὑπόληψις παράδοξος) of a distinguished philosopher – such as that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said, or that everything is in motion, according to Heraclitus, or that being is one, as Melissus says – for it would be silly to pay attention to a nobody who happens to say things that are opposite to the general opinions (ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις); or, it could be an opinion for which we have a reasoned argument that contradicts the general opinion (λόγον ἔχομεν ἐναντίον ταῖς δόξαις) – such as the sophists‟ tenet that not everything that is has come to be or is eternal […]; even if one does not agree with such theses, he might accept them because of their reasoned argument (εἰ καί τινι μὴ δοκεῖ, δόξειεν ἂν διὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν).15 Paradox, as opposition to ἔνδοξος and δόξα, the general opinion, becomes an established mode of expression for philosophy, and in dialectics it leads to aporia.16 Among the pre- Socratics, especially Heraclitus formulates philosophical theses as paradoxa.