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Heg Disad

Heg Disad ...... 1 1NC Shell ...... 3 1NC Shell ...... 4 1NC Shell ...... 5 Ux—Leadership Now ...... 6 Ux—Leadership Now ...... 7 Ux—Economy/Dollar...... 8 Ux—Latin America ...... 9 Ux—Now Key...... 10 Links—Military Presence...... 11 Links—Military Presence...... 12 Links—Military Presence...... 13 Links—Military Presence...... 14 Links—Military Presence...... 15 Links—Military Presence...... 16 Links—Military Presence...... 17 Links—Military Presence...... 18 Links—Military Presence...... 19 Links—Military Presence...... 20 Links—Military Presence...... 21 Links—Afghanistan ...... 22 Links—Afghanistan ...... 23 Links—Afghanistan ...... 24 Links—Afghanistan ...... 25 Links—Afghanistan/Iraq ...... 26 Links—Afghanistan/Iraq ...... 27 Links—Iraq ...... 28 Links—Iraq ...... 29 Links—Iraq ...... 30 Links—Iraq ...... 31 Links—Iraq ...... 32 Links—Japan ...... 33 Links—Japan ...... 34 Links—Japan ...... 35 Links—Japan ...... 36 Links—Japan ...... 37 Links—Japan ...... 38 Links—Japan ...... 39 Links—Japan ...... 40 Links—Japan/Korea...... 41 Links—Japan/Korea...... 42 Links—Korea...... 43 Links—Korea...... 44 Links—Korea...... 45 Links—Korea...... 46 Links—Korea...... 47 Links—Kuwait ...... 48 Links—Turkey ...... 49 Links—Turkey ...... 50 Links—Turkey ...... 51 Links—Turkey ...... 52 Impacts—Democracy...... 53 Impacts—East Asia...... 54 Impacts—East Asia...... 55 Impacts—Economy ...... 56 Impacts—Global Stability ...... 57 Impacts—Great Power War ...... 59 Impacts—Lashout ...... 60 Impacts—Laundry List ...... 61 Impacts—Middle East ...... 62 Impacts—Middle East ...... 63 Impacts—Nuclear War ...... 64 Impacts—Prolif...... 65 Impacts—Stability ...... 66 Impacts—War ...... 67 Impacts—WMD War ...... 68 AT: Non-Ux ...... 69 AT: Other Factors Overwhelm Military Heg ...... 70 AT: Heg Unsustainable ...... 71

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AT: Heg Unsustainable ...... 72 AT: Impact Turns...... 73 AT: Impact Turns...... 74 AT: Multipolarity Inevitable ...... 75 AT: Hegemony is Imperialist ...... 76 AT: Counterbalancing Now ...... 77 AT: Heg Backlash...... 78 Aff—Non-Ux: Afghanistan ...... 79 Aff—Non-Ux: Economy ...... 80 Aff—Non-Ux: Iraq...... 81 Aff—Non-Ux: Multilat Now ...... 82 Aff—Non-Ux: Turkey ...... 83 Aff—Heg Unsustainable...... 84 Aff—Heg Bad: Ux/Ix ...... 85 Aff—Heg Bad: Ux/Ix ...... 86 Aff—Heg Bad: Ux/Ix ...... 87 Aff—Heg Bad: Ux/Ix ...... 88 Aff—Heg Bad: Ux/Ix ...... 89 Aff—Heg Bad: Ux/Ix ...... 90 Aff—Heg Bad: Ux/Ix ...... 91 Aff—Heg Bad: Ux/Ix ...... 92 Aff—Link Turns: Military Presence...... 93 Aff—Link Turn: Withdrawal Key to Burden Sharing ...... 94 Aff—Link Turn: Afghanistan Withdrawal ...... 95 Aff—Link Turn: Afghanistan/Iraq Withdrawal ...... 96 Aff—Link Turn: Afghanistan/Iraq Withdrawal ...... 97 Aff—Link Turn: Iraq Withdrawal ...... 98 Aff—Link Turn: Iraq Withdrawal ...... 99 Aff—Link Turn: Iraq Withdrawal ...... 100 Aff—Link Turn: Japan Withdrawal...... 101 Aff—Link Turn: Japan Withdrawal...... 102 Aff—Link Turn: Japan Withdrawal...... 103 Aff—Link Turn: Turkey Withdrawal ...... 104 Aff—Link Turns: Nuclear Withdrawal ...... 105 Aff—Heg Bad: Middle East ...... 106 Aff—Heg Bad: Middle East ...... 107 Aff—AT: Collapse A-polarity...... 108

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1NC Shell

Uniqueness—Obama is Supporting Military Strength as Critical to Support Other Motives of Influence—Diplomatic and Other Power is Premised on Maintaining Military Dominance and Cooperative Military Relations Associated Press, “Obama's new security goals prize nonmilitary moves," May 26th, 2010 (http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gOHvy03tYuPQNp0ldHC9APDXkyhAD9FUHPF01)

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration's new outline of national security goals says the U.S. must galvanize support abroad to tackle global troubles, a contrast to former President George W. Bush's emphasis on going it alone and striking preemptively if necessary. A summary of the national security document, obtained by The Associated Press, says the United States should maintain its military advantage over the rest of the world while prizing other kinds of power. The National Security Strategy will be the first produced under President Barack Obama, laying out his goals. The document, like those from other presidents, is purposely vague. The AP obtained the summary ahead of document's planned release by the White House this week. The strategy was expected to walk away from a position held by Bush that the United States could or should undertake pre-emptive wars. Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy posited that doctrine, and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq made good on it. The document says the highest priority for national security is the safety of Americans, and that strategies for a more peaceful world begin at home. The strategy points to diplomacy, development and other methods of influence, while making clear the United States intends to maintain its military strength. The U.S. has the world's most powerful military, with unsurpassed reach and resources currently stretched by two wars and other challenges. The new security document describes goals of national renewal and global leadership. U.S. security goals should reflect universal values held by the United States since its founding, the document says. The Obama document reflects his views that U.S. influence should be used in partnership with allies and others, a repudiation of what was often described as Bush's go-it-alone philosophy. Obama touched on that theme during a commencement address Saturday that was a partial preview of the security document. The U.S. must shape a world order as reliant on the force of diplomacy as on the might of its military to lead, Obama said then.

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1NC Shell

Declining Commitment to Military Presence Will Signal The Terminal Decline of US Influence, Leaving a Massive Power Vacuum and Destroying Global Stability for Centuries—Refusing Decline Now is Crucial Michael Austin, Resident Scholar, “Three Strikes against U.S. Global Presence,” American Enterprise Institute, April 2nd, 2010 (http://www.aei.org/article/101869)

The upshot of these three trends will likely be a series of decisions to slowly, but irrevocably reduce America's overseas global military presence and limit our capacity to uphold peace and intervene around the globe. And, as we hollow out our capabilities, China will be fielding ever more accurate anti- ship ballistic missiles, advanced fighter aircraft, and stealthy submarines; Russia will continue to expand its influence over its "near abroad" while modernizing its nuclear arsenal; and Iran will develop nuclear weapons, leading to an arms race or preemptive attacks in the Middle East. Under such conditions, global trade flows will be stressed, the free flow of capital will be constrained, and foreign governments will expand their regulatory and confiscatory powers against their domestic economies in order to fund their own military expansions. For the past six decades, global stability was assured in large part by an expensive US commitment to maintain credible forces abroad, forge tight alliances with key strategic countries, and devote a significant, though not onerous, part of national treasure to sustaining a military second to none. Rarely in history has a country shouldered such burdens for so long, but the succeeding decades of growth and avoidance of systemic war proved the wisdom of the course. Are these three strikes the writing on the wall, the blueprint for how American power will decline in the world, with a whimper and an empty purse? The choice to reverse these trends will grow increasingly difficult in coming years, until we reach a point of no return, as did Great Britain and Rome. The result, unhappily, will not be a replay of the 20th century, when Washington stepped up after London's decline. It will almost certainly be the inauguration of decades, if not centuries, of global instability, increased conflict, and depressed economic growth and innovation. Such is the result of short-sighted policies that reflect political expedience, moral weakness, and a romantic belief in global fraternity. Happily for us, perhaps, is that the lessons of history still hold, and that we can chose to fight the dimming of our age if we but understand the stakes at hand.

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1NC Shell

The Decline of American Hegemony Causes Global Chaos a Nuclear World War—American Security Policy Should Be Directed To Retain Leadership and Avoid Multipolartity Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Analyst and Envoy to Afghanistan, “Losing the Moment,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995 (Lexis)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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Ux—Leadership Now

Obama’s Speech Signals a Recommitment to Global Leadership and Hegemonic Promotion BBC, “Should America lead the world?” May 25th, 2010 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/markmardell/2010/05/should_america_lead_the_world.html)

In a critical but friendly report on the strategy of engagement, the Center for a New American Security argues: "America as a nation appears unsure of its own role and voice in the world and is highly divided internally." It adds: "It is time to renew America's capacity for global leadership by reaffirming the values and interests we share with friends, investing in a better understanding of the world around us, reaching out to a new generation of young people around the world, standing firmly on the side of justice and free dom, and restoring America's moral authority." The president didn't talk about "global leadership" in his West Point speech, but he did suggest that the US should mould the future. "We have to shape an international order that can meet the challenges of our generation. We will be steadfast in strengthening those old alliances that have served us so well, including those who will serve by your side in Afghanistan and around the globe. As influence extends to more countries and capitals, we also have to build new partnerships and shape stronger international standards and institutions." There is no question that some countries, including the UK, look to America for leadership, whether for sentimental or practical reasons. Should it be less ambiguous about giving that lead or a more humble partner in power?

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Ux—Leadership Now

America is Returning to its Role as a Benign Global Hegemon Now—Now is a Crucial Time to Succeed as a Globally Credible Nation Talking Points Memo, “Obama's West Point Speech Shows Signs of Smart "National Security Strategy,” May 24th, 2010 (http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/05/24/obamas_west_point_speech_shows_signs_of_smart_nati/)

President Barack Obama's speech at West Point on Saturday may be among the most important he has yet made during his sixteen month old presidency. The speech intimates a number of the key themes likely to appear in the National Security Strategy report to be issued this next week. As one senior official on his national security team recently said to me, "we are moving past a time when the foreign policy agenda was set by a previous President and into a time when the roster of things to do are chosen and prioritized by this President." In his speech, President Obama said that this is a time for "national renewal" and "global leadership". The entire tone of his speech was confident but humble - seemingly recognizing the vital need for the US to return to its role as a benign, constructive force in global affairs. He seemed to confess that for America to return to a position of global credibility that it needed to work constructively with other powers, not think that power or significant accomplishments can be made independent of other of the world's key stakeholders. Obama said that this time in history was on of those "moments of change", a time of discontinuity in global affairs when America's global social contract needed to be re-forged. He said that while this time of globalization and individual empowerment created opportunities, we also were seeing the emergence of new powers and the rise of "ancient hatreds and new dangers". In other words, the United States no longer has the comfort of a predictable global equilibrium in which what the nation says and does automatically produces the results America wants. America's place in the world - and its power - need to be re-earned, its mystique as a country with dynamic military, economic, moral and institutional characteristics less constrained than other nations recaptured. The President made a compelling call for significant reinvestment in the core strengths of the country - in the sources of American innovation, in education, R&D, next generation energy projects, and the like. He said that there is no way that the US can presume global leadership when its home front is deteriorating and in poor shape. While he did not say so bluntly, Obama is finally leveling with the American public that he inherited national security and domestic portfolios from the G.W. Bush administration that were manifestations of a precipitous collapse in American power. Obama is declaring his intention to turn these negative trends around - and without simply, vapidly asserting that America is powerful and capable of great feats, he is admitting that it will take tough work, prioritization, and creativity.

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Ux—Economy/Dollar

Post the Financial Collapse Everyone is Running Back to the American Dollar—Our Economic Hegemony Remains Intact Professor Geoffrey Garrett, chief executive of the US studies centre at the University of Sydney, “Leadership lends the dazzle to US dollar,” National Times, May 27th, 2010 (http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/leadership-lends-the- dazzle-to-us-dollar-20100526-wdzv.html)

A strange thing has happened in the wake of the Greek-cum-European debt crisis - the second wave of the born-in- America global financial crisis. After two years of talk about the demise of the United States and its economic model, the world's investors are flooding back into dollars. This is not because America has put its own parlous fiscal house in order. Far from it. US public debt is projected to become Greek-like over the course of this decade. Rather, the flight back to the dollar as the preferred port in the latest global storm is recognition that, warts and all, the US is still the world's leading economy and will be so for the foreseeable future. And it is now clear what US leadership will look like as the world starts down the precarious path back to stability and prosperity. America's response to the global financial crisis has less to do with calming global markets or assuaging foreign critics than with political and economic realities at home. The results go only part way to what the world hoped for, but as much as the world could reasonably expect.

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Ux—Latin America

The US is Maintaining Hegemony in Latin America, Important Ties are Strong Laura Carlsen & Tom Barry, Policy Directors, International Relations Center, “US - Hegemony or Global Good Neighbor Policy?” Alterinfos America Latina, February 23rd, 2006 (http://www.alterinfos.org/spip.php?article259)

Over the past five years, the United States had paid relatively little attention to Latin America. Since September 11, policymakers, media, and the U.S. public have kept the focus on the Middle East and Muslim countries. With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, foreign policy, while gaining greater public attention, has become nearly synonymous with the debate over the occupation of that country and the deteriorating conditions for peace in the Middle East. The United States still retains a special sense of hegemony over its “near abroad” or backyard. But in an age of the global war on terror, global economic integration, and global communication, geographical proximity has reduced relevance in prioritizing international relations. As the only remaining superpower since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, Washington has come to regard the entire globe as its natural domain. One result of this global reach is that less importance is attached to relations with Latin America than to nations with more strategic resources, especially oil, more profitable investment locations, geopolitical importance, and those that offer expanding consumer markets. The problem for Latin America is that the lack of coherent policymaking has led to stopgap and piecemeal policies, far more reactive than pro-active. These policies, while generally falling under the erroneous framework of the National Security Doctrine, are not based on a comprehensive and careful analysis of the region; nor do they take into account the needs of the countries themselves. Moreover, between the distinct policy areas-counternarcotics operations, development aid, anti-terrorism, immigration restriction, trade liberalization-they frequently contradict each other and fail to consider broader policy objectives in the region. Historically, the reasons for Latin America ’s relevance to U.S. interests-as defined by the governing elite-have changed. Latin America and the Caribbean were traditionally linked to the United States by geography. In the early 19 th century the U.S. government instituted the Monroe Doctrine to ensure that the Western Hemisphere would remain outside the dominance of colonial powers and mercantilists. In this way it asserted both its interest and its hegemonyover the region. The purpose was not only to pull the new nations of the hemisphere into its sphere of influence but also to keep other countries out. This served both security interests and economic objectives.

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Ux—Now Key

The Wilsonian Moment is Now—Obama Must Maintain American Leadership Towards the Remainder of the World Talking Points Memo, “Bush, Obama, and the Wilsonian Moment,” May 21st, 2009 (http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/21/bush_obama_and_the_wilsonian_moment/?ref=c1)

All of which brings us back to the nature of Wilsonianism. In my thinking, Lind is not "ideologically correct." One may distinguish Wilson from Roosevelt, but by the 1990s in the hands of neoliberals like Ikenberry and Slaughter (and my book A Pact with the Devil names many more, chapters 4-6) liberal internationalism had become more theoretically coherent, thanks in large part to democratic peace theory. Hence it becomes increasingly difficult to pick and choose among the constituent elements of Wilsonianism--its call for an open economic door, its democracy promotion, its multilateralism, and its call for American leadership of such a system. They all fit neatly together but with pride of place going to democracy promotion (without which the other elements are unlikely to operate easily). But this does not disqualify Bush from being a Wilsonian because he spurned multilateralism. His belief (or at least that of the neocons who correctly I believe claim authorship of the Bush Doctrine) was that American leadership could replace multilateralism's "tying down Gulliver by the Lilliputians" but that once successful in reforming not just Iraq but "the Broader Middle East" such leadership would engender a new form of multilateralism minus the genuflections in the direction of the US sacrificing some of its sovereignty. It was Krauthammer, I think, who coined the telling phrase "unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism," or in other words nothing succeeds like success and those in the Old Europe who criticize us will soon be ashamed of themselves. In Wilson's time too, I would maintain, all his talk of multilateralism would in fact have amounted to an American hegemonic order, which might have been a good thing to be sure, but would not have been an egalitarian structure with some kind of majority voting when decisions to use force had to be made. Here is a principal reason the Latin American states turned down Wilson's overtures for a Pan American Union or Treaty in 1915/1916. They saw well enough where it was headed--to a blank check for Washington to intervene when it would in the name of preserving democratic governments. Multilateralism was thus a fig leaf over American hegemony--not a bad thing necessarily, I repeat, but not the kind of multilateralism we see today in the European Union where no hegemon presides (perhaps unfortunately). Bush was therefore not, as Lind puts it, "half Wilsonian" because a) he rightly insisted on the primacy of democracy promotion in invading Iraq; and b) he blew the cover of multilateralism as a combination of equals and stepped forth as a "leader" who expected that with success his followers would be legion-- that is multilateralism would be reinvigorated but now with American hegemony broadly recognized and respected. The point is important for today because with so many of those in the Obama administration the call for multilateralism is being shouted from the rooftops as if it were a basic contradiction of the Bush administration. But is it? For me the test case will be relations with Russia. If and when we start to hear more and more about that country as an autocracy and a threat, combined with calls to bring "democratic" Georgia and Ukraine into NATO then we will know that the Wilsonian moment is far from over.

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Links—Military Presence

American Military Presence is Critical to Deter Chinese Aggression, Prevent them From Challenging Our Unipolar Position José Miguel Alonso Trabanco, “The Great Dragon Awakens: China Challenges American Hegemony,” Global Research, January 6th, 2009 (http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11638)

Needless to say, Washington feels its position might be seriously threatened in the long run. The Project for a New American Century stipulates that the US must prevent any power(s) or coalition thereof (read China and Russia) from effectively challenging American power. Therefore, America’s top policy makers are well aware that China is certainly a serious contender and, for that reason, have been implementing a strategy specifically designed to check Chinese mounting power. Below we will dissect and explore American efforts meant to curb China as well as Chinese countermoves. The US plans toward China comprises the following components: Number one: An updated version of classical containment which was an American strategy conceived by US geoestrategist George Kennan during the early years of the Cold War to limit the Soviet Union’s power projection capabilities. This was clearly reflected in the creation of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), an alliance whose purpose was to keep "the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down". In order to achieve Great Power status, one must ensure regional security in one’s neighboring areas. This can be done by attracting potential allies, establishing a patronage over weak States and by excluding hostile powers from one’s own immediate periphery. The US Monroe Doctrine, formulated at a time when America was an emerging power, is an enlightening example because it expresses American determination to enthrone Washington’s exclusive primacy in the American hemisphere. In the present day, there is not a formal structure akin to an Asian version of NATO. Nevertheless, the US has been continuously seeking to establish military bases close to Chinese borders. Washington has established a meaningful military presence in Mindanao (the Philippines), Okinawa (Japan), the Korean Peninsula, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan (which is in fact NATO-occupied). Moreover, some of China’s neighbors are staunch allies of the West: Japan, Australia, Taiwan and the Philippines. All of them have forged an important degree of military cooperation with Washington and have also purchased a great deal of American-made arms. So far, Washington has not tried to encircle China’s borders as aggressively and in the case of Russia (expansion of NATO, missile defense facilities in Eastern Europe and so on). This is not because America is somehow friendlier towards China but because Beijing’s military capabilities are not as threatening as those of Moscow, whose military power and huge nuclear arsenal possess the ability to challenge the US in the case of war, to say the least.

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Links—Military Presence

American Strategy is Premised on the Ability to Expand from Forward Deployment—Plan Removes a Crucial Arena For the Exercise of Power Paul G. Frost, Schlesinger Working Group on Strategic Surprises, “Unintended Consequences of an Expanded U.S.Military Presence in the Muslim World,” Spring 2003 (http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/military.pdf)

Practically speaking, one participant stressed that the natural tendency of the American military is to expand from the location in which it already maintains a presence. In addition, commanders prefer to be forward based, particularly in the Army and Air Force. When the first Gulf War came to an end, the U.S. had established forwarddeployed forces involving ongoing operations in Oman,Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In 1997 military planners had begun to steps to expand their presence into Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Djibouti and Central Asia. By 2000 the U.S. had concluded formal basing agreements with all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) states except Saudi Arabia. CENTCOM’s force structure prior to the Iraqi Freedom buildup included approximately 11000 troops on land and 5000 to 10000 at sea in the Gulf area for a total of 16000 to 21000. These numbers gave the U.S. the capacity to pursue a policy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran for over a decade, undertake Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001 in order to defeat the Taliban and root out al Qaeda terrorist networks, and to successfully contain (and later defeat) Iraq. In the new environment of postconflict Iraq, military leaders will inevitably seek to keep significant numbers of troops and facilities in this strategically salient and volatile region.

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Links—Military Presence

Military Presence Allows for American Superiority, Confronts Global Threats and Responds Quickly Paul G. Frost, Schlesinger Working Group on Strategic Surprises, “Unintended Consequences of an Expanded U.S.Military Presence in the Muslim World,” Spring 2003 (http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/military.pdf)

The United States has expanded its forward military presence in these regions for several reasons. First, troops back up our ability to confront regimes that pose threats to U.S. and regional security. Second, they give us the opportunity to shape the geopolitical structure of the region. And finally, history suggests that momentum stimulates an expanded presence on top of military bases that already exist. Facing Down Threats It was argued that having a military presence in the region gives us leverage to confront potential threats to U.S. or regional security in three ways. First, our presence conveys an important signal: that there is a high price for attacking or provoking the U.S., and that America can forcefully face down threats to its security. The potential danger of WMD in the hands of terrorists is still very real, with Iran and Syria (not to mention North Korea) at the top of the list of worrisome states. Clearly absolute security does not exist in Afghanistan or Iraq. However, taking a lesson from the fate of Iraq, Syria is taking seriously U.S. warnings not to play host to Saddam’s regime and is responding to concerns about WMD.U.S. interest in influencing developments in Iran represents another factor which inevitably comes into play in deciding about future U.S. power projection capabilities in the Gulf region. Second, military hardware and boots on the ground have enabled the U.S. to strike quickly and attack terrorist targets, often with the help of nations in the region such as Yemen. A third benefit of sustaining a beefed up U.S. military presence in these regions is to ensure U.S. access to affordable oil and to stabilize the regional environment in which the world’s oil reserves are so heavily concentrated.

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Links—Military Presence

American Military Presence is Critical to International Expansion and Power Projection Manolis Arkolakis, Deputy Chairperson, International League of People’s Struggle, “Imperialist antagonisms, American Military Bases and the Movement Against Them,” June 2008 (http://sudhan.wordpress.com/2009/02/11/imperialist- antagonisms-american-military-bases-and-the-movement-against-them/)

According to above geopolitical situation, the strategic target of US imperialism is the global domination (or just hegemony, as some put it after US failure in Iraq). Therefore the US Army has to reconsider the new priorities for military presence in particular countries all over the world. According to media reports, American military premises are over 580,000 on a land of 120,000 km². There are 823 important military bases outside USA, most of them in Germany (287), Japan (130) and South Korea (106). Military bases have played decisive role in US-NATO expansion, the control and submission of countries and peoples, imposing hegemonic position amongst imperialists. Especially in Europe, during the war which split up Yugoslavia, imperialists used mainly their military bases in Italy and Greece. After the war, the first concern for Americans was the creation of a new base for their own troops. In the borders of Kosovo and Republic of Macedonia 10,000 arcs have been occupied for the creation of the biggest US military base, called Boldsteel. According to various reports, the specific base will control 350 km and 75 bridges. Spread rumours say that Americans call it Little Guadànamo.

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Links—Military Presence

American Military Presence Worldwide is Critical to Deter Potential Rivals and Secure Resources Monthly Review (Editors), “U.S. Military Bases and Empire,” March 2002 (http://www.monthlyreview.org/0302editr.htm)

Military doctrine insists that the strategic significance of a foreign military base goes beyond the war in which it was acquired, and that planning for other potential missions using these new assets must begin almost immediately. For this reason the build-up of bases in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and three of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia is inevitably seen by Russia and China as constituting additional threats to their security. Russia has already indicated its displeasure at the prospect of permanent U.S. military bases in Central Asia. As for China, as the Guardian(London) noted on January 10, 2002, the base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, where U.S. planes are landing daily, “is 250 miles from the western Chinese border. With U.S. bases to the east in Japan, to the south in South Korea, and Washington’s military support for Taiwan, China may feel encircled.” The projection of U.S. military power into new regions through the establishment of U.S. military bases should not of course be seen simply in terms of direct military ends. They are always used to promote the economic and political objectives of U.S. capitalism. For example, U.S. corporations and the U.S. government have been eager for some time to build a secure corridor for U.S.-controlled oil and natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea in Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. The war in Afghanistan and the creation of U.S. bases in Central Asia are viewed as a key opportunity to make such pipelines a reality. The principal exponent of this policy has been the Unocal corporation, as indicated by its testimony to the House Committee on International Relations in February 1998 (reprinted as “A New Silk Road: Proposed Pipeline in Afghanistan” in Monthly Review, December 2001).* On December 31, 2001 President Bush appointed Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad from the National Security Council to be special envoy to Afghanistan. Khalilzad is a former adviser for Unocal in connection with the proposed trans-Afghan pipeline and lobbied the U.S. government for a more sympathetic policy toward the Taliban regime. He changed his position only after the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles at targets in Afghanistan (aimed at Osama bin Laden) in 1998 (Pravda, January 9, 2002).

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Links—Military Presence

Forward Deployment of American Troops in Strategic Regions is Crucial for Overall Goals of Power Projection Major Henry W. Mauer, US Army, “United States Power Projection Capability: A Time For Change,” Global Security.org, 1990 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/MHW.htm)

The United States is heavily dependent on forward basing to confer credibility to its pledge to deter Soviet aggression, both in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The basing of powerful and mobile ground troops, along with tactical aircraft, close to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) have served to overcome the formidable obstacles presented by both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The permanent presence of troops and equipment have not only underscored U.S. commitment to its alliances, but they have also greatly reduced response time in the event of a crisis. While it can be successfully argued, judging from the recent events in eastern Europe, that this strategy has been an overwhelming success, the luxury of forward basing does not come without problems. With nearly half-a-million troops based outside its borders, 8 the United States' capability for strategic military power projection is still limited outside Europe and parts of Southeast Asia. This limited capability is the result of several factors. The first of these involves international agreements allowing the U.S. to base forces in other nations. While the agreements normally allow the use of U.S. military forces in actions to defend and protect the host nation or its alliance partners, they rarely allow for unrestricted use of these same bases and forces for military action outside these parameters. The operations to resupply the Israeli government during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Libyan air strike of 1986 provide excellent examples of how these agreements can hamper U.S. efforts to project military power from forward bases. In both cases, most European governments denied the United States the use of NATO facilities to conduct operations, even though these facilities were manned and maintained by US forces. These denials even extended to aircraft overflight rights. The notable exceptions were Portugal during the 1973 war, allowing the use of the Azores, and Great Britain in 1986, allowing the use of bases there for launching the Libyan raid. Even with these exceptions, US forces had to resort to extraordinary measures to accomplish their mission. Without the cooperation of these two foreign governments, it is likely that neither operation could have succeeded on the scale that they did.

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Links—Military Presence

American Presence Overseas is The Basis for the Totality of American Hegemony Amy Holmes, PhD Candidate at Johns Hopkins, "Contentious Allies: How Social Movements in Turkey Impacted the American Military Presence" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Aug 11, 2006 (http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/5/5/1/p105519_index.html)

American overseas military bases have formed the coercive underpinning upon which US hegemony was built and maintained throughout the course of the 20 th century. World War Two was a watershed in this regard because it marked the turning point from a relatively small basing structure characterized by facilities acquired around the time of the Spanish- American War in scattered locales ranging from the Philippines to Cuba to the beginning of a globe- encompassing basing network with a highly dense web of facilities spread across Western Europe and parts of Asia. Sustaining this historically unprecedented network of bases has required that the US keep a fairly large percentage of its military personnel on foreign territory. From 1950-2000, on average 23% of all active duty troops were stationed overseas. Since 1950, 54 different countries from around the world have hosted 1,000 US troops or more; however, these troops were concentrated primarily in Western Europe, hosting 52% of all deployed personnel, and Asia, with 41%. 1 Deployed military personnel can be divided into combat or non-combat troops and into different branches of the armed services. However, according to a report by the Heritage Foundation published in 2004, “The most important classification is whether the troops are welcome or unwelcome by the host nation.” This is the question which guides my study.

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Links—Military Presence

Military Presence Worldwide is a Pillar of American Hegemony DEXIN TIAN and CHIN-CHUNG CHAO, Bowling Green State University, “The American Hegemonic Responses to the U.S.-China Mid-Air Plane Collision,” International Journal of Communication, 2008 (http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/238/116)

To Cox, “material capabilities” refers to material conditions composed of technological and organizational capabilities and natural resources, which can be productive and destructive potentials. Being the only superpower in the world, the U.S. is in possession of and intends to maintain cultural, economic, and military dominance all over the world. As Monton (2005) stated: The Bush Doctrine follows a period of enormous material expansion . . . . The United States ended the 1990s at the top of a unipolar distribution of power, commanding a greater share of world capabilities than any state in modern international history. U.S. economic dominance is surpassed only by its own position immediately following World War II. U.S. military dominance is even more asymmetrical. (p. 142) Endowed with such a favorable capitalist environment, bountiful natural resources, and sufficient human talents, the U.S. raises the most powerful army and has its military presence all over the world. As Posen (2003) noted, “one pillar of the U.S. hegemony is the vast military power of the United States” (p. 5). The specific plane involved in the collision is an example that can showcase the U.S. material capabilities militarily. The EP-3 spy plane is equipped with a distinctive saucer-shaper antenna on its underbelly and is packed with electronic devices. It is capable of monitoring Chinese military activities by intercepting, tracking, and recording a wide variety of communications such as telephone, radio, radar transmissions, and even electronic mail. Equipped with the electronic surveillance gear, it can also hear and see into Mainland China as a treasure trove of military intelligence.

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Links—Military Presence

American Military Power is Critical to Deter China—Every Part of the World Counts DEXIN TIAN and CHIN-CHUNG CHAO, Bowling Green State University, “The American Hegemonic Responses to the U.S.-China Mid-Air Plane Collision,” International Journal of Communication, 2008 (http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/238/116)

First, as a shared notion, the essence of the Bush Doctrine is to establish American hegemony, primacy, or empire all over the world. To this end, the U.S. has been making use of its power to advance American national interests by means of building and strengthening alliances and by taking a firm stance in dealing with potential enemies. Washington does not allow Beijing to regard the American military presence in East Asia as a threat, yet, at the same time, intends to constrain China due to its huge size, steady economic growth, and military ambitions. Seeing China as a strategic competitor, the U.S. considers it its mission to gather Chinese military and government information via military surveillance planes. Interpreting international laws in line with its hegemonic grand strategy, the Bush administration contends that the U.S. is privileged and obliged to guard against the rise of China in the Asia Pacific in the name of maintaining world peace and regional stability. Second, to maintain cultural, economic, and military dominance all over the world, the United States has both preserved the most resourceful material capabilities and established the necessary human institutions. An example of the material capabilities is its military presence in all parts of the world with an annual expense twice as much as that of the rest of the world combined. The human institutions have been manifested in the Bush administration’s grand strategy, the support of the Senate and other governmental organs, and the average 60% approval and consent of the U.S. notion of primacy in the public opinion poll.

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Links—Military Presence

American Presence Prevents Arms Races and Militarization Dr. Mark Sheetz, Faculty Member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, “US Hegemony and Globalization,” GCSP Policy Brief Series, December 6th, 2006 (se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/92833/.../en/Brief-15.pdf)

American forces protect Europe and Asia from a potentially destructive cycle of security competition and arms races. Without the stability afforded by American hegemony, Germany and other European states might feel the need to develop their own nuclear deterrents. The same is true for Japan and its Asian neighbors.9 The American military presence in the Middle East serves to ensure the free flow of oil to industrial nations at reasonable prices. This commitment began in the wake of the 1973 oil shock and continued in the wake of the Iranian revolution, after President Carter announced that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”10 The US maintains its commitment to the free flow of oil through its protection of Saudi Arabia. This was the motivation for wars against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in both 1991 and 2003.11

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Links—Military Presence

Military Relations are a Crucial Avenue for American Stability and Hegemonic Influence Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Harvard University, “Limits of American Power,” American Hegemony: Preventive War, Iraq, and Imposing Democracy, 2004 (Google Books)

Even in those areas where the direct employment of force falls out of use among countries—for instance, within Western Europe or between the United States and Japan—nonstate actors such as terrorists may use force. Moreover, military force can still play an important political role among advanced nations. For example, most countries in East Asia welcome the presence of American troops as an insurance policy against uncertain neighbors. Moreover, deterring threats or ensuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf increases America's influence with its allies. Sometimes the linkages may be direct; more often they are present in the back of statesmen's minds. As the Defense Department describes it, one of the missions of American troops based overseas is to "shape the environment."

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Links—Afghanistan

Success in Afghanistan is Critical to American Global Strategy, It’s the Only Way to Prevent the Emergence of Eurasian Power Blocks Stratfor Intelligence Report, “Afghan War Threatens U.S. Global Preeminence,” July 17th, 2009 (http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/07/17/widened_war_in_afghanistan_threatens_us_preeminence_worldwi de_96942.html)

Today, the United States is the only country in the world with a preponderance of political, economic and military power astride both the Atlantic and the Pacific. This is no small observation. In the early 1980s, trans-Pacific trade began to equal -- and later exceed -- trans-Atlantic trade for the first time in history. Whoever controls both the North Atlantic and the Pacific will be at the center of global commerce -- and that is exactly the position in which the United States finds itself. Access to and dominance of the world's oceans remains critical to American hegemony. From a geopolitical standpoint, it is imperative for Washington to prevent the emergence of a unified Eurasian power with the resources and coherence to directly challenge U.S. dominance of the world's oceans -- and, as important, space. Such an entity would threaten the very foundations of American power. Thus, the containment and management of former powers like Russia and emerging powers like China is the United States' long-term geopolitical imperative. The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 shook the United States to its core but, by contrast, never threatened any of the underlying foundations of American power or geopolitical security. Both before and after the subsequent U.S. invasion, Afghanistan -- a "graveyard of empires" more than 300 miles from the nearest coastline -- had and has no direct bearing on the pillars of U.S. power. In short, it is a peripheral war, not a strategic or existential one. Very real national objectives -- counterterrorism efforts and the hunting of high-value militant leaders, sanctuary denial and the like -- remain important for the United States. Though the targets of these objectives remain concentrated in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan at the moment, the objectives themselves are, by their very nature, not only transnational but global. It remains to be seen how much and for how long the United States and NATO countries will be willing to continue to invest in Afghanistan, in terms of both money and lives. That investment is not made in a vacuum. It could come at a very real cost, in terms of the neglect of more fundamental U.S. and NATO interests elsewhere in the world.

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Links—Afghanistan

American Military Influence in Afghanistan is Key to Build Coalitions and Support International Order Barnett Rubin, Afghanistan Expert at the American Interest, “Afghan Dilemmas: Defining Commitments,” American Interest, May-June 2008 (http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=423)

Lynch rightly refers to Clausewitz on the relationship of politics to war. He might also recall Sun Tzu’s statement, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of one hundred battles.” Who is the enemy? As I see it, the most serious threat to security in the region derives from al-Qaeda’s transnational campaign against the integration of the Islamic world into the current international order. The way to defeat al-Qaeda is to deprive it of a base by strengthening legitimate governance throughout the territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan, while ending policies (such as the occupation of Iraq) that act as recruiting tools for the enemy. But who are we? The United States is the most powerful state in the world, but its power has limits. We deceive ourselves if we expect others to respond to our exercise of power as a disinterested pursuit of “stability.” We have neither the strength nor the knowledge to shock and awe all opposition in an environment we understand poorly. But we do have the capacity to define and mold common interests, and to build coalitions of the truly willing in defense of those interests.

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Links—Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a Critical Location to Negotiate With China and Russia, Withdrawal Signifies Defeat and Destroys Regional Power Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal , Russian Current Affairs Journal, “Russian expert views prospects for relations with USA, Iran, Afghanistan in 2010,” January 11th, 2010 (http://english.taand.com/index.php?mod=article&cat=News&article=544)

At that time it will become clear whether the Afghanistan model of conciliation announced by Barack Obama in November 2009 is working. If the expansion of the military presence helps the stabilization situation, plans to start withdrawing troops in 2011 may be implemented. If this does not happen, then the American forces and NATO will find themselves in a desperate position - to leave Afghanistan without at least the appearance of success will mean a serious political defeat, which Washington cannot allow.

If Russia and NATO really do seriously want to set up a new type of relations, the dialogue between the sides, which livened up towards the end of 2009, will be concentrated on one question. How to implement the smooth departure of the Western coalition from Afghanistan and simultaneously create in the region a system of political interaction that would guarantee the security of the neighbouring countries and their participation in ensuring the stability of the Afghan regime. Moscow can potentially play quite a constructive role in complicated consultations of this type, since, in the first place, it is the key state in the ODKB [Collective Security Treaty Organization], and in the second place, it plays an important role in the ShOS [Shanghai Cooperation Organization] and, in contrast to Beijing, is interested in giving this structure a more active role in the sphere of security. The question is, what is the real goal that the United States is setting. Is it simply to le! ave Afghanistan and end the unpromising war, to retain its military and political influence in Central and South Asia, to secure its closeness to the strategically important states - Iran and China. It is doubtful that the scenario of using an appeased Afghanistan as a key base, which was probably considered by Obama's predecessors, will remain on the agenda today, in view of the impossibility of ensuring the necessary level of stability there. The prospect of "internationalizing" the conflict, that is, of drawing neighbours, above all Russia and China, into its settlement also depends on the intentions of the United States.

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Links—Afghanistan

American Troops in Afghanistan are Key to Stabilize the Region and Maintain Presence in South Asia Representative Michael McMahon, “McMahon Opposes Afghanistan Withdrawal,” March 10th, 2010 (http://mcmahon.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=570:mcmahon-opposes-afghanistan- withdrawal&catid=93:press-releases-march-2010&Itemid=160)

Setting aside legitimate procedural objections to H. Con. Res 248, this is the wrong time to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan. Secretary Gates just wrapped up a visit to Afghanistan and our troops have successfully lifted the Taliban flag off of Marja, and are preparing to expand security to other Afghan regions.

We are just beginning to implement General McChrystal’s strategy to drive insurgents, terrorists and narco-traffickers out of Afghanistan, where they have comfortably plotted against the US for years. U.S. and International Security Assistance Forces are laying the groundwork for the next push into the Taliban heartland of Kandahar, as we speak. Securing Kandahar will allow us to secure Afghanistan. If we have a peaceful Kandahar, we will have a peaceful Afghanistan.

I support our Commander in Chief in his plan to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan on December 1, 2009. It is time to give this strategy a chance. This Administration has made the elimination of Al-Qaeda and the stability of Afghanistan a top priority. In addition, many of our coalition partners particularly the United Kingdom, and Canada and Muslim allies like Pakistan, have also stepped up their engagement and cooperation. They are committed to the fight and we should be as well. They know that a stable Afghanistan will bring stability and security to Pakistan and all of South Asia.

Our troops now have the leadership and the vision to complete this mission. Their success militarily is working hand in hand with American and international humanitarian assistance and NGOs which are helping to educate to women, clean drinking water and provide healthcare.

Obviously sending Americans to war is our most serious obligation as Members of Congress. But equally serious is our obligation to care for our veterans. In my first year in Congress, working with Members on both sides of the aisle, we have already secured a record amount in mental health funding for our troops and to expand the number of mental health professionals at the DoD. This Administration and Congress is committed to making sure that our Veterans receive the highest quality of care possible both in the field and at home.

Until then, our troops should be proud to help stabilize the region that has fanned the flames of radical hostility and extreme terrorist ideology that led to the horrors of September 11th. Afghanistan should never again be a launching pad for terrorist activities.

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Links—Afghanistan/Iraq

Staying the Course in Afghanistan and Iraq is Crucial to Defend Global Influence and Leadership Michael Young, opinion editor of the Daily Star, “Obama’s timidity threatens US leadership in the region,” The National (UAE), March 17th, 2010 (http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100318/OPINION/703179924/0/FRONTPAGE)

Segue to the Middle East. To what extent has the Obama administration’s actions in the region confirmed, or contradicted, Mr Ferguson’s observations? There has been a disconcerting feeling since President Barack Obama took office that if the American empire were to begin fraying, the process in the region would resemble what we are witnessing today. Time and again, notably in his Cairo speech, Mr Obama has preferred acknowledging Washington’s limitations to warning foes against testing America’s will. The US seems awfully easy to thwart.

It’s difficult for the Obama administration to project a different image when it seems so impatient to withdraw its soldiers from Iraq and Afghanistan, where its military commitment in the past decade has been the greatest. By September the US will have withdrawn all combat forces from Iraq, even though prominent American officials, past and present, believe this is a bad idea at so crucial a moment in Iraq’s stabilisation.

In Afghanistan the situation is different, but not by much. There, Mr Obama has decided to increase the US military presence, but within the framework of a promised withdrawal of American forces starting in July 2011. That the administration may or may not meet the deadline is less significant than the fact that the president felt he needed to set one. Mr Obama knows that voters are less concerned about defending American influence overseas, particularly in the broader Middle East, than they are about ensuring that foreign ventures have a time limit.

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Links—Afghanistan/Iraq

Military Presence Allows American Commitment to the Middle East and Shapes Positive Security Structures Paul G. Frost, Schlesinger Working Group on Strategic Surprises, “Unintended Consequences of an Expanded U.S.Military Presence in the Muslim World,” Spring 2003 (http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/military.pdf)

It was also argued that having forces in these regions may help the U.S. to shape the political geography by enabling democratic institutions to take root in the Middle East by providing necessary security in Iraq and implicit support for democracy-building initiatives elsewhere.However, proponents of this ambitious project acknowledged that bringing democracy to the Middle East would require staying power and political consensus among those who hold power in the United States. The U.S. would need a longterm commitment to make a success of a new government in Iraq if it is to have the necessary standing and authority to promote broader regional strategies.Moreover, America will need the assistance of allies and friends to provide for the humanitarian and security needs of the Iraqi and Afghan people to show that its interest extends beyond the immediate, strategic goal of regime change.

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Links—Iraq

American Success in Iraq is Critical to Overall Hegemony—Failure Sends a Broader Signal to Challenge Unipolarity Dr. Christopher Spearin Canadian Forces College Toronto, “American Hegemony Incorporated: The Importance and Implications of Military Contractors in Iraq,” AllAcademic, March 2004 (http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/6/3/pages73639/p73639-1.php)

Yet, while one can argue that it is doubtful that American predominance will recess anytime soon, it is nevertheless plain that many oppose, wish to constrain, or are skeptical of American influence, intentions, and abilities. This is evident in terms of Iraq. Given the sympathy and support al Qaeda receives from a much wider Muslim population, an anti- American and anti-hegemonic stance, one that rejects the American international presence and American values, is clearly embraced by many. 4 One can contend that the Bush Administration’s policy of preemptive action, first exercised in Iraq, further accents hostility towards the United States in many corners of the world. 5 Many other states, especially traditional European allies, have expressed concern about the content and direction of American policy. For instance, with respect to the political machinations regarding Iraq on the Security Council in 2002-03, James Traub suggests that it was ‘a referendum not on the means of disarming Iraq but on the American use of power’. 6 Moreover, the pre-emptive action against Iraq was a deviation from the traditional expectation of alliance- oriented statecraft upon which the United States has relied in the past for political and military support. Within the United States too, the results of American military activity in Iraq are no small matters. This is because of the divides in public opinion on the American presence overseas and how the effects of this presence might provide further impetus and manpower to those entities wishing to conduct acts of terror against the United States. Finally, the assertion made by the Bush Administration that American military intervention in Iraq would not only bring representative government, but also, domino-style, would lead to the spread of democracy and wider peace in the Middle East, attracts those who wish to compare the policy rhetoric alongside actually achieved ends. 7 Even with American dominance, this is certainly a weighty task. In light of this resistance and doubt, the predominantly American military activity in Iraq is occurring in an international fishbowl; the dynamics of what is occurring within Iraq have implications not only for those within this country, but are also being watched closely by many from without. Therefore, how American military might is exercised, by what means, and how it brings about actual outcomes, intended or not, are important matters for the exercise of American hegemony. They will reveal the utility of pre-emptive action conducted independently of alliance policymaking. They will affect the proclivity of the American populace to support, politically and materially, future military activity. They will influence those peoples whose empathy rests more with anti-hegemonic elements.

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Links—Iraq

American Troops in Iraq Destroy Our Ability To Lead Worldwide International Socialism, “Dented hegemony and Georgia’s nasty little war,” October 2nd, 2008 (http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=478&issue=120)

That strategy has backfired completely. The US’s ability to achieve what it wants elsewhere in the world has been damaged by the way its troops have been tied down in Iraq, with the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff worrying whether “the military could provide the 10,000 extra troops” requested by commanders in Afghanistan. The military “surge” in Iraq over the past 18 months may have achieved more than some of us expected but not much more. It has brought some limited stability but not clear victory. General Petraeus, who was sent in to oversee the surge, could still warn before the summer, “We haven’t turned any corners. We haven’t seen any lights at the end of a tunnel. The progress, while real, is fragile and is reversible”.2 And he repeated the warning, in a more subdued tone, at the beginning of September: “innumerable challenges are out there still. Make no bones about it”.3 The real “challenge” is that any stabilisation has depended on the attitude of Iraqi groups that do not accept long-term occupation or control of the oil by US firms. They are also deeply antagonistic to one another. The “Awakening Councils” of Sunni former resistance groups took American arms and money in order to eliminate the threat to their own position from Al Qaida in Iraq. But they are deeply hostile to the US’s firmest allies, the Kurdish Peshmerga. The Mahdi Army of radical Shia cleric Muqtata al-Sadr may be avoiding military confrontation with US troops, but that is because its leader, currently in Iran, ordered it to do so to avoid dissipating its strength.4

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Links—Iraq

American Withdrawal in Iraq Emboldens Terrorism and Insurgent Forces to Threaten American Power Worldwide Frontiers of Freedom, “Democrats and Some Republicans Ignore Reality in Iraq”, July 9th, 2007 (http://www.opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/jbell_20070709.html)

It not only seems contradictory, it is contradictory - indeed, it is delusional - to believe that a reliance on international cooperation and foreign aid will soothe the ire of Iran, al Qaeda in Iraq and their ideological supporters and pave the way for political and social progress. Absent active and engaged U.S. leadership Iraq will become a long-term failed state and a terrorist sanctuary. With respect to Iraq, the Democrats have always preferred to plow the easy field of political expediency instead of laboring in the difficult field of policy. Now the party of the donkey is being joined by some Republicans who are prepared to ignore reality in favor of mythical rhetoric. On July 5, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid wrote, “As evidence mounts that the ‘surge’ is failing to make Iraq more secure, we cannot wait until the Administration’s September report before we change course. President Bush and the Iraqis must move now to finally accept a measure of accountability for this war … transition the mission for our combat troops and start bringing them home from an intractable civil war.” First, Reid and his political brethren have spent far too much time trying to make the case that what is transpiring in Iraq is a civil war. However one defines the conflict it is a key battleground and the aftermath of the fighting will dictate what forces sink their roots deep into the Middle East’s future. Second, despite Reid’s hyperventilating, there is no “evidence” that the surge is failing. In fact, U.S. commanders on the ground report the opposite. On July 6, the day after Reid’s misguided missive, Army Major General Rick Lynch, commander of Multinational Division Center and the 3rd Army Division said U.S. and Iraqi forces are making “significant progress” in destroying insurgent sanctuaries. General Lynch said the “surge forces are giving us the capability we have now to take the fight to the enemy. The enemy only responds to force and we now have that force.” Lynch explained, “We can conduct detailed kinetic strikes, we can do cordon and searches, and we can deny the enemy sanctuaries. If those surge forces go away that capability goes away and the Iraqi security forces aren’t ready yet to do that (mission).” The general said if U.S. forces begin an untimely departure, “You’d find the enemy regaining ground, reestablishing sanctuaries, building more IEDs (and) carrying those IEDs to Baghdad, and the violence would escalate.”

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Links—Iraq

Failures in Iraq Allow Russia and China to Secure Energy Supplies and Gain in Power International Socialism, “Dented hegemony and Georgia’s nasty little war,” October 2nd, 2008 (http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=478&issue=120)

Things have begun to change since the late 1990s. Putin was able to marshal enough military brutality to finally crush resistance in Chechnya, and reassert fighting discipline within what is still one of the world’s most powerful militaries. He was able to exile some of the oligarchs and draw others into his camp. The global rises in oil and gas prices enabled the economy to escape from slump and become one of the fastest growing in the world. They also enabled Russia to exert pressure on, as well as be pressurised by, the states of the European Union. Now dents to US power in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided Russia with the chance to respond to US challenges close to its borders, just as they have made it easier for China to pursue its own imperial projects in Africa, for Iran to defy the US, and for Venezuela to challenge US power in Latin America. No wonder the US political establishment and their hangers on this side of the Atlantic are so upset.

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Links—Iraq

Military Presence in Iraq is Crucial to Maintain Stabiltiy, Prevent Terrorism and Assure Cooperation in the Muslim World DR. SAMI G. HAJJAR, Prof of Middle East Studies at the US Army War College, “U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GULF: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS,” Strategic Studies, March 2002 (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub185.pdf)

Following a survey of security challenges and U.S. policies to manage them, the author presents a regional appraisal of U.S. military posture. He elaborates on the Gulf states. attitudes toward U.S. military presence on their soil and notes that each state views its engagement with the United States differently. This analysis provides a glimpse of Gulf regional politics and security concerns. The last section deals with the war on terrorism whose consequences are regarded by Islamic radicals as a .clash of civilizations.. However, others in the region are calling for a .dialogue of civilizations. to contain the phenomenon of terrorism. The discussion reveals that the Bush administration, in prosecuting the war on terrorism, has discovered a link to the festering Middle East conflict just as the former Bush administration was exposed during the Gulf War to the same conflict. The author concludes that until September 11, the size, posture, and mission of U.S. military presence in the Gulf were appropriate for the assumed threat perception. The on-going war on terrorism and future regional security realignments that could emerge may impact the nature of U.S. military presence. This presence, however, must continue to be low-key for cultural and political reasons. Given the negative popular attitudes stemming from U.S. regional policies, force protection measures become a priority. The author offers a number of policy recommendations which include a comprehensive public diplomacy program that engages, among others, the American chaplains and Muslim clerics serving with Gulf forces. A slightly different approach to the peace process that gives hope for a breakthrough and a more neutral U.S. stance as peace broker is recommended. Finally, the author alludes to Iraq and the war on terrorism, concluding that U.S. military presence is indispensable, with the land power component being essential for the security of the world.s most important real estate.

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Links—Japan

Losing Japanese Military Presence Would End American Power Projection and Regional Security Michael Austin, Resident Scholar, “Three Strikes against U.S. Global Presence,” American Enterprise Institute, April 2nd, 2010 (http://www.aei.org/article/101869)

Decisions by the governments of Japan and Great Britain and the passage of the bankrupting health care bill in the US spell the coming end of America's overseas basing and ability to project power. Should these trends continue, the US military will lose its European and Asian strategic anchors, hastening America's eventual withdrawal from its global commitments and leaving the world a far more uncertain and unstable place. The first strike comes from Asia. For the past six months, the new government of Japan has sought to revise a 2006 agreement to relocate a Marine Corps Air Station from one part of Okinawa to a less populated area. The upshot of these three trends will likely be a series of decisions to slowly, but irrevocably reduce America's overseas global military presence and limit our capacity to uphold peace and intervene around the globe. Though the agreement was reached only after a decade of intense negotiations and with Democratic and Republican Administrations alike, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's government has instead suggested numerous alternative sites for the base, most of which were rejected during the previous negotiations and none of which would allow the same type of training and operations necessary for the Marine Corps' air wing. Now, American officials are privately wondering whether the ruling Democratic Party of Japan wants to allow the US the same level of access to bases in Japan, without which America would be incapable of providing regional security guarantees and serving as a force for stability in Asia amidst the growth of China's military capacity and North Korea's continuing nuclear developments. Indeed, the former head of the Democratic Party of Japan has publicly mused whether the US 7th Fleet is sufficient for alliance purposes, thus raising the specter of the withdrawal of US Marines and Air Force from Japan.

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Links—Japan

Japan is the Only Way for America to Sustain Asian Hegemony—Maintaining the Military Alliance is Crucial to Global Order Robert Dujarric, Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs, “The future of US hegemony in East Asia,” World Security Newtork, October 17th, 2002 (http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=8724)

Asia, even if we limit ourselves to Northeast Asia, is too large, too populated, too rich, for American primacy to be possible without a local partner. That partner has to be Japan because it accounts for a majority of the region’s wealth. South Korea and Taiwan play an important role but Japan is irreplaceable in America’s security architecture in the region.

Therefore, when thinking about the future of American hegemony in Asia we must ask ourselves where Japan is going.

For a reader of the Financial Times, The Economist, or for that matter Japanese publications, it is difficult to be optimistic. Every day seems to carry with it stories of huge non-performing loans, wasteful government spending, and of an absence of alternative to the moribund LDP. In addition, Japan’s dire demographic situation adds more worries about the nation’s future.

There are indeed many reasons to be pessimistic about Japan. Nevertheless, and this may surprise you, it is easier to be optimistic about Japan than about China. Why? Japan, unlike China, has functioning liberal institutions. Japanese enjoy the rule of law, the bureaucracy is effective, the state apparatus has the capacity to enforce the law, and there is a general agreement on the constitutional order (proposed amendments to the constitution do not put into question its basic framework). Therefore, though Japan needs major reforms, the country does not require, as China does, an entirely new political and economic order.

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Links—Japan

American Presence in Japan is Crucial to Regional Stabilization and East Asian Order G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “American hegemony and East Asian order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, September 2004 (http://www.ou.edu/uschina/SASD/SASD2005/2005readings/Ikenberry2004%20AmHegEA.pdf)

The alliance system—and the US-Japan security pact in particular—has also played a wider stabilising role in the region. The American alliance with Japan has solved Japan’s security problems, allowing it to forgo building up its military capability, thereby making it less threatening to its neighbours. This has served to solve or reduce the security dilemmas that would surface within the region if Japan were to rearm and become a more autonomous and unrestrained military power than it currently is. At the same time, the alliance makes American power more predicable than it would be if it were a free-standing superpower. This too reduces the instabilities and risk premiums that countries in the region would need to incur if they were to operate in a more traditional balance of power order. Even China has seen the virtues of the US-Japan alliance. During the Cold War the alliance was at least partially welcome as a tool to balance Soviet power—an objective that China shared with the United States. Even today, however, as long as the alliance does not impinge on China’s other regional goals—most importantly, the reunification with Taiwan—it reduces the threat of a resurgent Japan. The political bargain behind the East Asian regional hegemonic order was also aimed at making American power more predictable and user-friendly. If the United States worried about finding partners to help wage the Cold War and build an American-centred world order, these partners worried about American power—both its domination and its abandonment. Thus the East Asian regional bargain was also about the restraint and commitment of American power (Ikenberry 2001). The United States agreed to operate within bilateral and multilateral frameworks and the junior partners agreed to operate within and support the American order. American hegemony became more open, predictable, reciprocal, and institutionalised— and therefore more benign and tolerable. But the United States was able to lock other countries into operating within a legitimate and US-centred order.

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Links—Japan

American Military Presence in Japan is Crucial to Project Power in East Asia Korean News, “KCNA on U.S.-Japan military nexus,” September 11th, 2001 (http://www.hartford- hwp.com/archives/27c/518.html)

Pyongyang, September 11 (KCNA)—U.S. State Secretary Powell at a meeting held on Sept. 8 to mark the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. security pact said that powerful U.S.-Japan military alliance is essential for pursuance of the U.S. East Asia policy concerning China and North Korea. Earlier, high-ranking officers of the U.S. military flew Japan and underscored the importance of military tie-up between the U.S. and Japan and the Japanese authorities hailed it. Why are the U.S. and the Japanese authorities clamouring for the strengthening of military alliance all of a sudden? Celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the security pact turned out to be a serious point at issue. The U.S. attempt to convert Japan, its junior, into a military power and use it in establishing its military domination over the East Asian region fell in line with Japan's intention to become a leader of the region with the backing of the U.S. The U.S. strategy for world domination is, in general, to blockade and collapse those independent countries disobedient to its domination and militarize its satellite countries to use them as a means of domination and interference. Typical of it is the U.S.-Japan relations, their military nexus in particular. Japan, a war criminal state, was not allowed internationally to rearm itself after its defeat in the war. But it has been rapidly rearmed under the Japan-U.S. security pact and U.S. care. and it has played the role of a shock brigade in implementing the U.S. strategy for domination over East Asia. The Japanese authorities are now so actively welcoming the U.S. attempt in a bid to use the U.S. patronage and support as an opportunity for its second rearming to become a perfect military giant.

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Links—Japan

Washington Needs Military Facilities in Japan to Deter China and North Korea, Critical to Overall Power Huffington Post, “US Military Base Row Could Bring Down Japan Prime Minister,” May 13th, 2010 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/us-military-base-row-coul_n_575003.html)

TOKYO — It is possibly the most controversial U.S. military facility in the world after the prison at Guantanamo Bay. Local residents like to call it the world's most dangerous base. An impasse over its future could bring down the government of a key U.S. ally. But this hotspot isn't in Kyrgyzstan, or Afghanistan. It's an airstrip on the sleepy, semitropical tourist haven of Okinawa that hasn't directly been involved in a conflict since the Japanese surrender in 1945 ended World War II. For decades, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has instead been a political quagmire – and now D-Day appears to be looming. Haunted by a campaign pledge to relocate the base, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has vowed to settle the issue – or at least form a coherent set of proposals – by the end of this month. Polls suggest he will be under heavy pressure to resign, after barely nine months in office, if he fails to do so. The debate has grown so convoluted and the pressure to find a compromise so intense that Hatoyama is suggesting a replacement airstrip be built on raised pilings so as not to destroy marine life below – an expensive, high-tech option that experts doubt would work and which has so far failed to appease many Okinawans. "It is a terrible idea," said Masaaki Gabe, a professor of international relations at the University of the Ryukyus, Okinawa's most prestigious college. "It's no better than the previous plan. It won't persuade Okinawans, and I don't think it will be welcomed by Washington, either." So far, it hasn't been – working-level talks in Washington this week ended in discord. The base, home to about 2,000 U.S. Marines, has long symbolized Okinawan concerns over safety, crime and economic development. But efforts to remove it have shaken support for America's most important alliance in Asia, a region where – with China ascending and North Korea unstable – Washington badly needs reliable partners.

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Links—Japan

Forward Projected American Defenses in Japan are the Only Way to Maintain Stabiltiy in Asia and Check Chinese Rise Project for the New American Century, “Rebuilding America's Defenses,” May 6th, 2003 (http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3249.htm)

"Raising U.S. military strength in East Asia is the key to coping with the rise of China to great-power status. For this to proceed peacefully, U.S. armed forces must retain their military preeminence and thereby reassure our regional allies. In Northeast Asia, the United States must maintain and tighten its ties with the Republic of Korea and Japan. In Southeast Asia, only the United States can reach out to regional powers like Australia, Indonesia and Malaysia and others. This will be a difficult task requiring sensitivity to diverse national sentiments, but it is made all the more compelling by the emergence of new democratic governments in the region. By guaranteeing the security of our current allies and newly democratic nations in East Asia, the United States can help ensure that the rise of China is a peaceful one. Indeed, in time, American and allied power in the region may provide a spur to the process of democratization inside China itself….A heightened U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia would be a strong spur to regional security cooperation, providing the core around which a de facto coalition could jell" (pp. 18-19). "The prospect is that East Asia will become an increasingly important region, marked by the rise of Chinese power….A similar rationale argues in favor of retaining substantial forces in Japan. In recent years, the stationing of large forces in Okinawa has become increasingly controversial in Japanese domestic politics, and while efforts to accommodate local sensibilities are warranted, it is essential to retain the capabilities U.S. forces in Okinawa represent. If the United States is to remain the guarantor of security in Northeast Asia, and to hold together a de facto alliance whose other main pillars are Korea and Japan maintaining forward-based U.S. forces is essential" (p. 18).

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Links—Japan

American Presence in Japan Remains Precisely To Check North Korea and China Christian Science Monitory, “North Korea, China give Japan a couple reasons to keep US Marines on Okinawa,” May 24th, 2010 (http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Editorial-Board-Blog/2010/0524/North-Korea-China-give-Japan-a- couple-reasons-to-keep-US-Marines-on-Okinawa)

Officially a pacifist nation, Japan struggles with living in a tough neighborhood. In just the last two months, North Korea has sunk a South Korean naval ship while China's warships conducted naval exercises near Japan without informing Tokyo. One Chinese military helicopter even buzzed a Japanese ship.Such aggressive actions by these two authoritarian regimes in the Far East were a strong reminder for a democratic Japan that it still needs the deterrence of US forces on its soil, even 65 years after the end of World War II. So on Sunday, its prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, backed down from a campaign promise to drastically cut the American military presence in Japan. He cited "political uncertainties" in East Asia. US Marines will now remain in the southern island of Okinawa. President Obama had to play diplomatic hardball with Mr. Hatoyama to win this concession, a sign of how much Japan is struggling with remaining under the American wing for its defense even as it faces a China that insists on Japan paying due deference to its rising power.

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Links—Japan

China Will Use Breaks in the US-Japan Alliance to Insert Itself and Destabilize American Security Structures in Asia Christian Caryl, contributing editor to Foreign Policy, “Naval Gazing in Asia,” May 18th, 2010 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/18/naval_gazing_in_asia)

There is one more layer to the maneuvering, though, and that has to do with Japan's role as America's closest and most powerful ally in the Western Pacific. China's present leadership seems to have made a strategic decision that the Middle Kingdom no longer has to hide its light under a bushel-- and that projecting military power is a legitimate way of defending its expanding interests. John Tkacik, who headed China intelligence analysis at the U.S. State Department during the Clinton administration, says, "China is now asserting that it, not Japan, is the preeminent Asian power and that both the Chinese people and the masses of Asia must acknowledge China's new preeminence." He notes that many of the recent Chinese maneuverings have taken place in waters near those islands that are claimed by both China and Japan. The Chinese, he says, are testing to see how far the Americans are really prepared to stand up for Japan's side of the argument. "China is probing the U.S.-Japan alliance for fissures." Of late the Chinese military has become more assertive in Southeast Asia, unnerving some countries there by using naval forces to assert its claims to the contested Spratly Islands, for example. Beijing has also demonstrated that it's prepared to stake out strategic strong points in the Indian Ocean region, even when that aggravates its biggest regional rival, India. And, of course, ensuring Taiwan's eventual accession to mainland rule remains a paramount goal of Chinese state policy -- so the PLA has been busily working to acquire the technology (like long-range anti-ship missiles) to ensure that it can push back against the U.S. Seventh Fleet if it needs to. (Chinese leaders have a painfully clear memory of how the Clinton administration forced them into a humiliating climbdown over Taiwan back in the mid-1990s, when the United States deployed its then-unassailable fleet to the Taiwan Strait. That was then.) Sumihiko Kawamura, another Japanese ex-admiral, says that the U.S., Japan, and their regional allies should respond by conducting more joint naval maneuvers, coordinating efforts to monitor Chinese naval movements, and pushing the Chinese "to observe the international standard of modus operandi at the high sea." Kawamura also points out that the Chinese have been mysteriously reluctant to conclude an "incidents at sea" agreement with the Japanese and the Americans. The first such agreement, concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, succeeded in dramatically reducing the sorts of in-your-face naval maneuvers that could have easily led to accidental escalation with potentially disastrous consequences. Establishing some sort of hotline between naval headquarters on both sides of the East China Sea might not be a bad idea, either. Pretty much all of the experts agree that war remains unlikely. One thing is reasonably certain, though: As China rises, a certain degree of tension with its neighbors is probably unavoidable. The trick will be keeping such tensions at a manageable level. And that is precisely the reason why it's probably a bit early to be worrying about the end of the U.S.-Japan alliance. For better or for worse, Tokyo and Washington still have clear reasons for making common cause in the realm of security.

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Links—Japan/Korea

Absent a Withdrawal, There Will Not be a Rise in Chinese Influence in East Asia—They are Willing to Support and Accept American Hegemony G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “American hegemony and East Asian order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, September 2004 (http://www.ou.edu/uschina/SASD/SASD2005/2005readings/Ikenberry2004%20AmHegEA.pdf)

In this scenario, the region will experience—and willingly accept—a gradual replacement of American with Chinese hegemony. There are some doubts that this will happen. It is not at all clear that China will be able to establish sufficient restraints on its power to make its leadership palatable to its neighbours. Can an illiberal China fashion a liberal hegemonic order in East Asia? This vision of future regional order also depends on China remaining political stable and open as it continues the modernise. Chinese growth could flatten out and political turmoil within China could thwart the construction of a Sino-centred order. Also the United States itself would need to gradually remove itself from the region, which is not likely. American global strategic interests are likely to remain global—and a military presence in the region will be essential for decades to come. Other countries, such as Japan and India, are also likely to want an American security presence in East Asia if for no other reason than simply to provide a hedge against Chinese dominance. What is interesting today is that China has seemingly chosen to accommodate itself to American hegemony, at least for the moment. The rhetoric of anti-American ‘hegemonism’ has ended. There are some indications that Beijing finds the hub-and-spoke security system in East Asia to be a useful vehicle for its own diplomacy. After all, the touchstone of this system is the array of bilateral ‘special relationships’ that the United States has with its partners in the region. Beijing, in effect, seems to be seeking to establish its own special bilateral relationship with Washington. If East Asia had a multilateral security order such as exists in Europe, its geopolitical integration American hegemony and East Asian order 363 into the region would be much more difficult, fraught with formal institutional obstacles. But it is relatively easy to establish an informal Chinese ‘spoke’ in the East Asian system. China itself is pursuing bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the region to reassure its neighbours (Goldstein 2003). These developments suggest that the future will entail more of an incremental adaptation of the existing order than its wholesale replacement with something new.

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Links—Japan/Korea

American Decision to Withdraw From East Asia Would Radically Reshuffle the Security Environment G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “American hegemony and East Asian order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, September 2004 (http://www.ou.edu/uschina/SASD/SASD2005/2005readings/Ikenberry2004%20AmHegEA.pdf)

The other possibility is a sudden retraction in America’s commitment to the region. The United States might simply decide that it did not want to underwrite security in East Asia and this decision to ‘abandon’ its old allies would lead to a dramatic and far-reaching reshuffling of relations and the character of order. A massive terrorist attack on the US could radicalise domestic politics and trigger a wave of isolationism. Alternatively, it might happen in the wake of an economic crisis and fall in the American economy. Or the burdens of fighting wars in the Middle East—‘imperial overstretch’— could trigger strategic rethinking in Washington about its military presence in East Asia. Out of economic weakness and political exhaustion in the wake of World War II, Britain withdrew its security support of Greece and Turkey, and this fundamentally altered postwar world order—leading to the transfer of security leadership to the US. In any of the possible scenarios, the US would be forced to fundamentally reassess the political bargain it has offered the region since the 1950s.

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Links—Korea

Withdrawal of Troops From Korea Threatens American Security Commitments Worldwide and Encourages Chinese Adventurism to Challenge Unipolarity The New York Times, “Why Keep US Troops?” January 5th, 2003 (p. l lexis)

Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's presumptive supercop. Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia. "In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese might respond." In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea makes Japan more confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about the United States' commitment to the 40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, he argues. "If we did it, we would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said. Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American power, no matter how much the United States asserts its commitment to the region. China might take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms. "Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term." "Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in the region."

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Links—Korea

Military Presence in Asia Serves to Deter Chinese Rise—Signals that they Have to Accept American Military hegemony Doug Bandow, CATO Institute, “China's Military Rise Means End of US Hegemony?,” Korea Times, May 5th, 2009 (http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10175)

U.S. military spending continues to increase even though conventional threats against the United States are de minimis. China is the leading contender for Enemy Number 1. But if Beijing poses a threat, it is to U.S. domination of East Asia, not the country itself. Only the latter is worth fighting for. Commonly expressed is fear of growing Chinese military outlays. The Pentagon highlighted its concern with the latest annual report on the Chinese defense budget. Yet Beijing's armed forces remain dwarfed by America's military, which starts at a vastly higher base and spends several times as much. The Pentagon report states that the United States "encourages China to participate responsibly in the international system." True enough, but how does Washington define "responsibly"? One suspects it means accepting American military hegemony in East Asia — something with which Beijing isn't likely to agree. The Chinese military buildup so far has been significant but measured. "The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its periphery against high-tech adversaries," explains the Pentagon.

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Links—Korea

American Troops in Korea are the Only Way to Secure East Asia—The Lack of Regional Security Infastructure Means Only American Presence Deters War Kuo-cheng Chang, "The future of the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, April 15th, 2004 (http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p82331_index.html)

During the Cold War, the United States deployed a large amount of armed forces in Europe and Asia. In the past, the United States military involvement and intervention were important dynamics for security movement in Asia. These policies and actions also played indispensable roles in the U.S diplomatic and defense policies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States decreased the size of its troops deployed in Europe, but there was no change in Asia. Obviously, the United States is convinced that it is suitable political choice to keep current military presence for guaranteeing the American national interest in Asia and dealing with the happening and future political and security development of this region. The question is: What is the future of the U.S. military presence? (e.g. military strategy, units, structure, personal, bases, cooperation with local countries) in Northeast Asia? Is it likely to remain the same, increase or decrease? Theoretical Construction The U.S military presence is depended on its grand strategy. What is the suitable theory to explain U.S. grand strategy toward this region? In 2002, President George W. Bush said America’s international strategies, and we can find the “Bush Doctrine” in this report; the United States will use a variety of measures, including forces, to actively, preemptively deal with the international affairs. The U.S. seeks not just to deter traditional great powers, but to eliminate the threats of “rogue states” and non-state actors capable of exercising disproportionate influence terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Scholars have attempted to define the U.S grand strategy, for example, Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross said that the United States had to reconsider its national security policy after the Cold War. There are four possible grand strategies; they may be termed neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. According to Robert J. Art, The United States should maintain military presence abroad to prevent five adverse situations, three ones of those situations relate to Northeast Asia; an acceleration of nuclear weapons spread, great power war, and the conquest or destruction of U.S allies, such as South Korea. John Mearsheimer’s theory of “offensive realism” is a structural theory of international politics. He defines that U.S is an offshore balancer; he means that U.S tried to “pass the buck” to other great powers to balance against the potential hegemony. If the approach failed, the United States will use its own military forces to eliminate the threat and ensure that it remains a sole regional hegemony. By historical experience, I think this theory that is helpful to describe the main reason for U.S to maintain its military presence in this region is past, now and future.

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Links—Korea

No Other Force Can Assure East Asian Stabiltiy—American Military Presence is Crucial to Sustain Hegemonic Influence in the Region New Straits Times, “End looks near for American hegemony,” November 10th, 2009 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_8016/is_20091110/ai_n44459660/)

THE role the United States should play in a future East Asia Community was apparently one of the unresolved issues at the recent 16-nation East Asia Summit (EAS) in Hua Hin, Thailand. The truth is, the US is already a significant player in the region. This is not just the result of the deep economic and political ties that the US enjoys with most of the 10 Asean states, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Huge American military bases with tens of thousands of soldiers and some of the most sophisticated weaponry on earth are spread throughout Asia and the Pacific. The US has over the years forged security alliances with some of the governments in the region and continues to sell arms to many of them. Neither the EAS, Asean 3 (China, Japan and South Korea) nor Asean itself - the driving force behind the other two formations - has, at the collective level, questioned the overwhelming US military presence. The US quest for global hegemony - military power is a critical pillar of this - has never been on the formal agenda of any of the meetings of these groupings. And yet, East Asia has also been a victim of the push for global dominance and control. It was because of a tussle precipitated by the desire for hegemony that the Korean Peninsula was partitioned in 1953. More than four million people were killed mainly in Vietnam, but also in Cambodia and Laos in the 1960s and 1970s largely because of the politics of hegemony.

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Links—Korea

Military Presence in Korea is the Cornerstone of American Power Projection Major Henry W. Mauer, US Army, “United States Power Projection Capability: A Time For Change,” Global Security.org, 1990 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/MHW.htm)

Though not of the same magnitude, the ongoing problem on the Korean peninsula has occupied United States' military attention almost as long as the Warsaw Pact. As a result, a sizable US military force is also permanently stationed in South Korea with the mission of defending that country in the event of a North Korean invasion. While Europe and Korea are not the only two places in the world that US military forces maintain a presence, they are the best examples of the cornerstone of United States power projection strategy - forward basing against the threat.

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Links—Kuwait

Presence in Kuwait is Key to American Interests in the Middle East Christopher Bollyn, Independent Investigative Reporter, “America 'Pearl Harbored,” No Date (At least April 2003) (http://library.flawlesslogic.com/iraq.htm)

The 90-page PNAC document from September 2000 says: "The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein." "Even should Saddam pass from the scene," the plan says U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will remain, despite domestic opposition in the Gulf states to the permanent stationing of U.S. troops. Iran, it says, "may well prove as large a threat to U.S. interests as Iraq has." A "core mission" for the transformed U.S. military is to "fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars," according to the PNAC.

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Links—Turkey

American Military Engagement With Turkey is Key to Regional and Energy Security—Only Likely to Increase Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world, “U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA,” June 2000 (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub113.pdf)

Indeed, as the oil producing states are now members of the PfP, and Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, and Georgia overtly seek NATO’s direct participation in the area, the U.S. or Western contest with Russia and Iran has assumed a more openly military aspect.25 And that was true even before the war in Chechnya. Turkey wants to play as an organizer and inspirer of a regional peacekeeping force, and provider of military assistance to Baku and Tbilisi, and U.S. forces are increasingly involved in training and exercises. Georgia and Azerbaijan want NATO to guard pipeline routes. This stimulates an equal and opposing reaction. Armenian officials proclaim the vital importance of joint exercises with Russia to defend Armenia’s security and talk of an “axis” with Russia and Iran.26 Consequently and due to the spiraling strategic stakes in the Transcaspian, NATO’s collective engagement, as well as the specifically U.S. engagement, with the region is likely to grow.

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Links—Turkey

American Presence in Turkey is Critical to Secure Supplies and Dominance in the Middle East and Transcaspian Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world, “U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA,” June 2000 (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub113.pdf)

These contrasting views highlight the strategic quality of the Russo-American competition for leverage and influence over regional energy. Adding to that competition is the fact that as the region’s states depend on energy for capital and any future development, whoever controls their lifeline controls their destiny, a regional strategic consideration of utmost importance. Therefore Washington attaches ever more importance to this region as the struggle for energy heats up and parallels the U.S. efforts to construct a world order in Europe and the Middle East. U.S. policies are also closely tied to NATO’s enlargement and the dual containment of Iran and Iraq. U.S. analysts increasingly call this area, and the “greater Middle East” which it is deemed to be part of, the “strategic fulcrum of the future” or the “strategic high ground,” due to its energy resources.35 Prominent Western analysts and former officials in America and Germany, Robert Blackwill and Michael Stuermer, claim that “no Western power has been safe without some measure of influence or control over the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.” 36 This geographical area now includes the Transcaspian, since the Southeastern Mediterranean is precisely where Washington and Turkey want the terminus of Transcaspian oil and gas to be. Ultimately the purpose of military engagement then becomes helping these states defend themselves to the point that they can control their borders and resist attacks or pressure connected with oil and gas flows. U.S. officials are not shy about spelling out their grander vistas of the future. Ambassador Matthew Nimetz postulates the entire Mediterranean region’s rising importance. To maintain regional security, NATO must not only integrate the whole region into the Western economy and foster the development of “pluralistic institutions,” it must also grasp the military nettle.

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Links—Turkey

Turkey is a Critical Partner in Securing Energy Futures and Expansion of Global Security— American Presence is Crucial Muharrem Eksi, Caucasia & Central Asia Specialist, Global Strategy Institute, “NATO’s Global Transformation and Quest for Absolute Hegemony: Missile Defence and Energy Security,” Eurasia Critic, June 2008 (http://www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/nato’s-global-transformation-and-quest-absolute-hegemony-missile-defence-and- energy)

In conclusion, the most important parameter in NATO's energy security approach is sustaining energy security. In other words, as an international security organisation, NATO is also expected to include energy security, which is seen as an integral part of global security, as a priority item in its concept at the 2009 Summit. NATO, by taking the energy security issue into its agenda, widens its strategic concept. NATO's attempt to include energy security in a strategic concept is affected by the fact that European allies have significant security problems in energy (dependency) and Russia's willingness to use energy as a tool for foreign policy. However, it would not be hard to imagine that NATO could find itself facing Russia on energy security issues. Despite this, the US, which played a key role in the inclusion of energy security in NATO's strategic concept, is pursuing an escalation strategy in relations with Russia. For the first time, cyber defence is also included in NATO's action plan with a request from Estonia (because of attacks, which is seen as the first cyber war, by Russian hackers who were reacting to the removal of a Red Army Memorial in April 2007). NATO's inclusion of energy security into its area of interest also shows its goal in transformation and enlargement (this enlargement has a geographical, the inclusion of three sea basins - Mediterranean, Black Sea and Caspian - and a security aspect). NATO's approach is a reflection of US foreign policy and this situation is a breaking point in relations with OPEC and Russia by creating a security dilemma, paving the way for either polarisation or cooperation. From this perspective, NATO's energy security approach is at the initial stage and still debated, as, apparently, there is no defined energy security policy. At this stage, Turkey, which is at a critical point on the Eurasian energy corridor, will play a significant role and contribute in defining NATO's security concept. We assert that NATO needs Turkey as much as Turkey needs NATO in energy security and this can increase the strategic significance of Turkey as in the Cold War. Finally, NATO's missile defence and global energy security expansion is part of the quest for global hegemony.

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Links—Turkey

American Military Presence in Turkey is Crucial to Expand American Influence and Serve as a Base for Power Projection Saffet Akkaya, Phd Candidate at the International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara/Turkey, “US Military Bases in Romania and Bulgaria and their possible Implications on Regional Security,” January 25th, 2009 (http://www.ccun.org/Opinion%20Editorials/2009/January/25%20o/US%20Military%20Bases%20in%20Romania%20a nd%20Bulgaria%20and%20their%20possible%20Implications%20on%20Regional%20Security%20By%20Saffet%20A kkaya.htm)

Balkans have been the most volatile and troublesome part of Europe particularly after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire starting in 19th century. And afterwards, Balkans has been a non-coherent region in economic, political and cultural senses and parallel to the demise of Soviet Union, Russian influence has decreased whilst the western influence has increased gradually. In the first couple years of the new millennia, US and EU proved reasonable efforts to integrate Eastern Europe and Balkan countries with NATO and EU. In year 2004 together with other 5 countries, Romania and Bulgaria joined the NATO which was the largest growth in NATO history. Actually these two countries were spending huge efforts to join both NATO and EU since the end of cold war, and as a solid indication of their intention, from the very beginning they supported the US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with no reservations contrary to some of other states in Europe. As we clearly see in the official statements of the leaders of both countries they foresee the future of their countries in integration with political, economic, societal, cultural and military aspects with the West. In addition, the two countries' elites perceive U.S. assistance as crucial to enhance their economic transition into market capitalism and they hope that stronger strategic ties with Washington will pave the way to further economic and financial cooperation and to an increase in U.S. investment.

From a military point of view, it is easy to justify the requirements of these bases. According to US military authorities the 20th century military philosophy that mass equals commitment is not true in the 21st century and the important thing is not the size of the force you have, but what you can do with it and the aim is to make the forces strategically more effective and agile. The American forces in Europe will be in three types of bases. The first type is main operating bases, installations like Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and U.S. Naval Station Rota, Spain. These bases will remain hubs and have American forces assigned to them. The second are called forward-operating sites that are called "light-switch operations" meaning all troops arriving have to do is turn the lights on and operations can proceed. Examples of these bases are Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, Camp Eagle in Bosnia, and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The bases established in Bulgaria and Romania are also the same type. The third type of bases is called a cooperative security site that could be as small as a fueling agreement or as complicated as a few American contractors ensuring facilities ready for US troops to operate. Within this context, the security challenges for Europe no longer lie to the east but to the south and southeast. The orientation of NATO towards the Middle East and Africa requires forces that can deploy quickly using a combination of inter-theater aircraft, sealift, and rail movement. Given the volatility of these outlying regions, deployment times must be measured in days, not weeks. Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria appear best sited for power projection posture to the Middle East, whereas Italy, France, and Spain provide superb access to the Mediterranean Basin and Africa.

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Impacts—Democracy

American Leadership is Critical to Promoting and Creating Sustainable Democracies Worldwide Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, “Building a framework for American leadership in the 21st Century - U.S. Secretary of State” Statement before the House International Relations Committee, June 1997 (http://findarticles.co m/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_n2_v8/ai_19538680/pg_9)

Mr. Chairman, more than seven years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall and five years since the demise of the Soviet Union. Today, America is secure, our economy vibrant, and our ideals ascendant. Across the globe, the movement towards open societies and open markets is wider and deeper than ever before. Democracy's triumph is neither accidental nor irreversible; it is the result of sustained American leadership. It would not have been possible without the power of our example, the strength of our military, or the constancy and creativity of our diplomacy. That is the central lesson of the twentieth century -- and this lesson must continue to guide us if we are to safeguard our interests as we enter the twenty-first. Make no mistake: the interests served by American foreign policy are not the abstract inventions of State Department planners; they are the concrete real, ties of our daily lives. Think about it. Would the American people be as secure if weapons of mass destruction, instead of being controlled, fell into the wrong hands? That is precisely what would have happened if the Administration and Congress had not acted to ensure the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, the freezing of North Korea's, and the securing of Russia's.

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Impacts—East Asia

American Hegemony is Key to Preventing Chinese Destabilization and War Throughout Taiwan and East Asia Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Analyst and Envoy to Afghanistan, “Losing the Moment,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995 (Lexis)

Third, the United States should seek to strengthen its own relative capabilities and those of its friends in East Asia to deter possible Chinese aggression and deal effectively with a more powerful, potentially hostile China. China's military leaders are considering the possibility of a conflict with the United States. They recognize the overall superiority of the U.S. military but believe there are weaknesses that could be exploited while preventing the United States from bringing its full power to bear in case of a conflict over Taiwan. According to the Chinese, U.S. weaknesses include vulnerability of U.S. bases to missile attacks, heavy U.S. reliance on space, America's need to rapidly reinforce the region in times of conflict, susceptibility of U.S. cities to being held hostage, and America's sensitivity to casualties. According to the emerging Chinese doctrine, the local balance of power in the region will be decisive because in this new era wars are short and intense. In a possible Taiwan conflict China would seek to create a fait accompli, forcing the United States to risk major escalation and high levels of violence to reinstate the status quo ante. China might gamble that these risks would constrain the U.S. response. Such an approach by China would be extremely risky and could lead to a major war. Dealing with such possible challenges from China both in the near and long term requires many steps. Burden-sharing and enhanced ties with states in East and Southeast Asia will be important. New formal alliance relationships--which would be the central element of a containment strategy--are neither necessary nor practical at this time, but it would be prudent to take some preparatory steps to facilitate the formation of a new alliance or the establishment of new military bases should that become necessary. They would signal to China that any attempt on their part to seek regional hegemony would be costly. The steps we should take now in the region must include enhancing military-to-military relations between Japan and South Korea, encouraging increased political- military cooperation among the ASEAN states and resolving overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea; fostering a Japanese-Russian rapprochement, including a settlement of the dispute over the "northern territories;" and enhancing military-to-military cooperation between the United States and the ASEAN states. These steps are important in themselves for deterrence and regional stability but they can also assist in shifting to a much tougher policy toward China should that become necessary. Because of the potential for conflict between the United States and China over issues such as Taiwan, the U.S. military posture in general should take this possibility into account. Measures should be taken to correct the Chinese belief that they can confront the world with a fait accompli in Taiwan. The United States needs expanded joint exercises with states in the region. Ensuring access to key facilities in countries such as the Philippines, pre-positioning stocks in the region, and increasing Taiwan's ability to defend itself would also be prudent. The large distances of the East Asian region also suggest that a future U.S. force- mix must emphasize longer-range systems and stand-off weapons. The United States must develop increased capabilities to protect friendly countries and U.S. forces in the region against possible missile attacks.

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Impacts—East Asia

Multilateralism Fails in East Asia, Only American Hegemony Can Secure the Region and Prevent Outbreaks of Significant Violence G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “American hegemony and East Asian order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, September 2004 (http://www.ou.edu/uschina/SASD/SASD2005/2005readings/Ikenberry2004%20AmHegEA.pdf)

Finally, the specific way in which American security relations were established in East Asia reflects the specific postwar power realities and array of countries in the region. The United States was less determined or successful in establishing a multilateral order in East Asia. Proposals were made for an East Asian version of NATO but security relations quickly took the shape of bilateral military pacts. Conditions did not favour Atlantic-style multilateralism: Europe had a set of roughly equal-sized states that could be brought together in a multilateral pact tied to the United States, while Japan largely stood alone.2 But another factor mattered as well: the United States was both more dominant in East Asia and wanted less out of the region. This meant that the United States found it less necessary to give up policy autonomy in exchange for institutional cooperation in Asia. In Europe, the United States had an elaborate agenda of uniting European states, creating an institutional bulwark against communism, and supporting centrist democratic governments. These ambitious goals could not be realised simply by exercising brute power. To get what it wanted it had to bargain with the Europeans and this meant agreeing to institutionally restrain and commit its power. In East Asia, the building of order around bilateral pacts with Japan, Korea and other states was a more desirable strategy because multilateralism would have entailed more restraints on policy autonomy. As Peter Katzenstein argues: [i]t was neither in the interest of the United States to create institutions that would have constrained independent decision making in Washington nor in the interest of subordinate states to enter into institutions in which they would have minimal control while forgoing opportunities for free-riding and dependence reduction. Extreme hegemony thus led to a system of bilateral relations between states rather than a multilateral system than emerged in the North Atlantic area around the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Community (Katzenstein 1997). The logic of the hub-and-spoke security order is clear. A multilateral security system in East Asia—if it had been possible despite unfavourable circumstances within the region—would have entailed a more far-reaching reduction in America’s freedom of action. In choosing to abide by the rules and commitments of a multilateral security order, the US would need to accept a reduction in its policy autonomy. But in exchange it expects other states to do the same. A multilateral bargain is attractive to a state if it concludes that the benefits that flow to it through the coordination of policies are greater than the costs of lost policy autonomy. In effect, the United States did not want as much from East Asia countries as it did from Western European countries. In Europe, the US wanted a unified Europe and a close partner in the Cold War. It needed to give more to European countries in the form of multilateral commitments than it needed to in East Asia. In the Pacific if was far more hegemonic and wanted less of other states. The bilateral option was an attractive tool around which to build political bargains and regional order.

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Impacts—Economy

Absence of American Hegemony Dooms Globalization, The Economy and Global Stabiltiy Dr. Mark Sheetz, Faculty Member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, “US Hegemony and Globalization,” GCSP Policy Brief Series, December 6th, 2006 (se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/92833/.../en/Brief-15.pdf)

Many believe that globalization is synonymous with Americanization. Pressure for liberalization and political reform in Middle Eastern countries is blamed on the United States. The cultural imperialism of the American film industry is decried in Europe. And the threat to French cuisine by the invasion of McDonald’s has become a cause celèbre in France. Likewise, many believe that the advance of globalization is inexorable, that the growing openness of markets for goods and services and the rising level of international capital mobility cannot be reversed. But the forces of protectionism and economic nationalism, like certain resistant strains of virus, are surprisingly resilient. Mercantilist impulses are never very far from the surface. And historical precedents exist for such a reversal. During the interwar period, the seemingly irresistible momentum for ever-greater economic interdependence was stopped in its tracks. “Time and again,” as Benjamin Cohen observes, “governments have demonstrated their willingness to limit market openness, sacrificing the benefits of globalization, when deemed necessary for the sake of national security, cultural preservation, or environmental protection.”18 Pressure for limitations on trade and capital flows is again growing in the American Congress. If the United States either withdraws voluntarily from its dominant role in the world or is forced to scale back through a combination of military and economic overextension, it is hard to see how globalization will be sustained. Future Trajectories/Scenarios With its willingness to absorb unimaginably high deficits in its balance of trade, the United States acts as the global market of last resort. With its willingness to provide exceptional financial backing to the International Monetary Fund, the United States acts as the global lender of last resort. And with its willingness to intervene militarily and to provide disaster relief in international crises, the United States acts as the underwriter of a global insurance policy against catastrophes. Without an American hegemon to sustain a liberal economic system, one might expect an increase in barriers to unfettered economic penetration of national borders. Difficulties in the current round of WTO talks are characteristic of the constant struggle waged by free traders against protectionist impulses. Without a global American military presence, one might expect increasing resistance to the unfettered spread of liberal political reforms, like democracy and the rights of women and minorities. One might also anticipate less pressure for standardization. English may not necessarily remain the lingua franca of business, air-traffic control, and diplomacy, and globally recognized standards in the areas of communication, transportation, and technology may be harder to come by.

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Impacts—Global Stability

Hegemony promotes economic and democratic norms – solving global stability Bradley A. Thayer 07 Associate Professor of Political Science @ Missouri State University (American Empire: A Debate, p. 42-6)

Stability Peace, like good health, is not often noticed, but certainly is missed when absent. Throughout history, peace and stability have been a major benefit of empires. In fact, pax Romana in Latin means the Roman peace, or the stability brought about by the Roman Empire. Rome's power was so overwhelming that no one could challenge it successfully for hundreds of years. The result was stability within the Roman Empire. Where Rome conquered, peace, law, order, education, a common language, and much else followed. That was true of the British Empire (pax Britannica) too. So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its "normal" condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest. Spreading Our Form of Government The American Empire gives the United States the ability to spread its form of government, democracy, and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Using American power to spread democracy can be a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as for the United States. This is because democracies are more likely to align themselves with the United States and be sympathetic to its worldview. In addition, there is a chance—small as it may be—that once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of conflict will be reduced further. Natan Sharansky makes the argument that once Arabs are governed democratically, they will not wish to continue the conflict against Israel." This idea has had a big effect on President George W. Bush. He has said that Sharansky's worldview "is part of my presidential DNA."" Whether democracy in the Middle East would have this impact is debatable. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in October 2004, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. Elections were held in Iraq in January 2005, the first free elections in that country's history. The military power of the United States put Iraq on the path to democracy. Democracy has spread to Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Caucasus, and now even the Middle East is becoming increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt. The march of democracy has been impressive. Although democracies have their flaws, simply put, democracy is the best form of government. Winston Churchill recognized this over half a century ago: "Democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." The United States should do what it can to foster the spread of democracy throughout the world. Economic Prosperity Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIED)—a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets—to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that "economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability"; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and "we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity...business follows the flag."6° Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the American Empire comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat, researcher at the World Bank, prolific author, and now a professor who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India that strongly condemned empire. He has abandoned the position of his youth and is now one of the strongest proponents of the American Empire. Lal has traveled the world and, in the course of his journeys, has witnessed great poverty and misery due to a lack of economic development. He realized that free markets were necessary for the development of poor countries, and this led him to recognize that his faith in socialism was wrong. Just as a conservative famously is said to be a liberal who has been mugged by reality, the hard "evidence and experience" that stemmed from "working and traveling in most parts of the Third World during my professional career" caused this profound change.' Lal submits that the only way to bring relief to the desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the American Empire. Empires provide order, and this order "has been essential for the working of the benign processes of globalization, which promote prosperity."62 Globalization is the process of creating a common economic space, which leads to a growing integration of the world economy through the increasingly free movement of goods, capital, and labor. It is the responsibility of the United States, Lal argues, to use the LIEU to promote the well-being of all economies, but particularly those in the Third World, so that they too may enjoy economic prosperity. Humanitarian Missions If someone were to ask "How many humanitarian missions has the United States undertaken since the end of the Cold War?", most Americans probably have to think for a moment and then answer "three or four." In fact, the number is much larger. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War, and while wars like the invasion of Panama or Iraq received considerable attention from the world's media, most of the fifty actions were humanitarian in nature and received almost no media attention in the United States. The U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"—it serves as the world's police; it is the global paramedic, and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, typhoon, or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. In 1991, when flooding caused by cyclone Marian killed almost 140,000 people and left

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5 million homeless in Bangladesh, the United States launched Operation Sea Angel to save stranded and starving people by supplying food, potable water, and medical assistance. U.S. forces are credited with saving over 200,000 lives in that operation. In 1999, torrential rains and flash flooding in Venezuela killed 30,000 people and left 140,000 homeless. The United States responded with Operation Fundamental Response, which brought water purification and hygiene equipment saving thousands. Also in 1999, Operation Strong Support aided Central Americans affected by Hurricane Mitch. That hurricane was the fourth-strongest ever recorded in the Atlantic and the worst natural disaster to strike Central America in the twentieth century. The magnitude of the devastation was tremendous, with about 10,000 people killed, 13,000 missing, and 2 million left homeless. It is estimated that 60 percent of the infrastructure in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala was destroyed. Again, the U.S. military came to the aid of the people affected. It is believed to have rescued about 700 people who otherwise would have died, while saving more from disease due to the timely arrival of medical supplies, food, water, blankets, and mobile shelters. In the next phase of Strong Support, military engineers rebuilt much of the infrastructure of those countries, including bridges, hospitals, roads, and schools. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra and killed 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. More importantly, Washington not only contributed a large amount of aid, $350 million, plus another $350 million provided by American citizens and corporations, but also—only days after the tsunami struck—used its military to help those in need. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention, as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort, and it is important to keep in mind that its costs were separate from the $350 million provided by the U.S. government and other money given by American citizens and corporations to relief organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent. The generosity of the United States has done more to help the country fight the war on terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving 3 million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the war on terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States provided about $156 million in aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the generosity of the United States, it left a lasting impression about the United States. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the war on terror. There is no other state or international organization that can provide these benefits. The United Nations certainly cannot because it lacks the military and economic power of the United States. It is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on small matters as well as great ones. Thus, it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on important issues and to act as a unified force once a decision has been reached. Moreover, it does not possess the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. Simply put, there is no alternative to the leadership of the United States.

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Impacts—Great Power War

American Unipolarity Prevents Great Power Conflicts and Avoids Dangerous Miscalculation Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls." Naval War College Review, Spring 2002 (Proquest)

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.8 The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

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Impacts—Lashout

A World Without American Dominance is Increasingly Dangerous—Leads to Rogue States Lashing Out, Challenges to Global Interests, Terrorism and Proliferation Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations., “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2008 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)

The increasingly nonpolar world will have mostly negative consequences for the United States -- and for much of the rest of the world as well. It will make it more difficult for Washington to lead on those occasions when it seeks to promote collective responses to regional and global challenges. One reason has to do with simple arithmetic. With so many more actors possessing meaningful power and trying to assert influence, it will be more difficult to build collective responses and make institutions work. Herding dozens is harder than herding a few. The inability to reach agreement in the Doha Round of global trade talks is a telling example. Nonpolarity will also increase the number of threats and vulnerabilities facing a country such as the United States. These threats can take the form of rogue states, terrorist groups, energy producers that choose to reduce their output, or central banks whose action or inaction can create conditions that affect the role and strength of the U.S. dollar. The Federal Reserve might want to think twice before continuing to lower interest rates, lest it precipitate a further move away from the dollar. There can be worse things than a recession. Iran is a case in point. Its effort to become a nuclear power is a result of nonpolarity. Thanks more than anything to the surge in oil prices, it has become another meaningful concentration of power, one able to exert influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and beyond, as well as within OPEC. It has many sources of technology and finance and numerous markets for its energy exports. And due to nonpolarity, the United States cannot manage Iran alone. Rather, Washington is dependent on others to support political and economic sanctions or block Tehran's access to nuclear technology and materials. Nonpolarity begets nonpolarity.

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Impacts—Laundry List

Loss of American Primacy Would Destabilize the World, Create Massive International Conflict, Embolden Threatening States and Enable Terrorism Bradley Thayer, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest, November –December 2006 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_86/ai_n27065796/pg_5/?tag=content;col1)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power- -the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment. (1) Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future, With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.

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Impacts—Middle East

Military Projection is Key to the Middle East and Provides for Positive Security Structures J.E. Peterson, Independent historian and political analyst, “Foreign Military Presence in the Gulf and its Role in Reinforcing Regional Security,” Arabian Gulf Security, 2003 (http://www.jepeterson.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Foreign_Military_Presence_in_the_Gulf.pdf)

Apart from Iraq, US views of regional actors and the need for a FMP in the region have remained markedly steady over the past several decades. In the run up to the Iraq War, of course, the US government had perceived a strong need for action against Iraq. This gradually came to include a perceived requirement for an expeditionary force to topple Saddam. Following the war, the United States has been preoccupied with a need to combat the "insurgency," broadly defined, and the search for an exit strategy. However, the US presence in Iraq also raises the possibility and desirability of permanent US bases in Iraq. Some have alleged that construction on such bases began shortly after the war ended and much has been made of the fact that the US embassy in Iraq is the largest (and certainly one of the most fortified) embassies in the world.30 At the moment. Iraq is at the heart of American FMP in the Gulf. The country can be regarded a principal platform of forward power projection. It can be seen as required for expeditionary forces. In terms of the Department of Defense's three-iiercd strategy, as outlined above, Iraq's potential utility is far more than simply hosting main operating bases. However, myriad security and political problems countervail the military advantages stemming from Iraq. A majority of Iraqis oppose a continued US presence in the country, which so far has served as a lightning rod for guerrilla and suicide attacks and has not been able to provide a secure basis for reconstruction of the country. Politically, the present Iraqi government faces the prospect of being perceived as a US puppet regime, while much of the Iraqi public holds the same negative view of US foreign policy as the rest of the region and much of the world.

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Impacts—Middle East

The Decline of American Hegemony Will Destabilize the Middle East and Create Nuclear Conflict Anthony Bubalo, director of the West Asia program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, “Ambivalence on the Middle East does not work,” The Australian, May 3rd, 2010 (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/ambivalence- on-the-middle-east-does-not-work/story-e6frg6ux-1225861248469)

Some may celebrate the end of US hegemony, but it will leave even greater uncertainty in the region. It will see regional and extra-regional states jockey even more to protect their interests and project their power. In coming years, the region may witness a nuclear-armed Iran, an Israeli military strike on Iran, a regional nuclear arms race, or perhaps all three. This has real implications for Australia. The Middle East's strategic reconnection with Asia will make its stability more important to Australia at a time when US ability to preserve that stability will be reduced. America will need more help from allies and not just token commitments.

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Impacts—Nuclear War

Hegemony is key to maintain stability and prevent nuclear war – the alternative is apolarity Niall Ferguson 04 Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History @ Harvard University, Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution (When Empires Wane, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244)

Yet universal claims were an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was political fragmentation. And that remains true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. If free flows of information and factors of production have empowered multinational corporations and NGOs (to say nothing of evangelistic cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology has empowered criminal organizations and terrorist cells, the Viking raiders of our time. These can operate wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Sarajevo. Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the one of the ninth century. For the world is roughly 25 times more populous, so that friction between the world's "tribes" is bound to be greater. Technology has transformed production; now societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of mineral oil that are known to be finite. Technology has changed destruction, too: Now it is possible not just to sack a city, but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization has been raising living standards, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. Deglobalization--which is what a new Dark Age would amount to--would lead to economic depression. As the U.S. sought to protect itself after a second 9/11 devastated Houston, say, it would inevitably become a less open society. And as Europe's Muslim enclaves g`1row, infiltration of the EU by Islamist extremists could become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to breaking point. Meanwhile, an economic crisis in China could plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that have undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out, and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the Dark Age would be felt on the margins of the waning great powers. With ease, the terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers and cruise liners while we concentrate our efforts on making airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in Korea and Kashmir; perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. The prospect of an apolar world should frighten us a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the U.S. is to retreat from the role of global hegemon--its fragile self-belief dented by minor reversals- -its critics must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony. The alternative to unpolarity may not be multipolarity at all. It may be a global vacuum of power. Be careful what you wish for.

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Impacts—Prolif

American Military Authority Presences Proliferation, Arms Races and Military Conflict MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy program at the Johns Hopkins University, “David’s Friend Goliath,” Foreign Policy, January 4th, 2006 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids_friend_goliath)

The United States makes other positive contributions, albeit often unseen and even unknown, to the well-being of people around the world. In fact, America performs for the community of sovereign states many, though not all, of the tasks that national governments carry out within them.

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which protects Japan, simultaneously reassures Japan's neighbors that it will remain peaceful. This reassurance is vital yet invisible, and it is all but taken for granted.

The United States has also assumed responsibility for coping with the foremost threat to contemporary international security, the spread of nuclear weapons to "rogue" states and terrorist organizations. The U.S.-sponsored Cooperative Threat Reduction program is designed to secure nuclear materials and weapons in the former Soviet Union. A significant part of the technical and human assets of the American intelligence community is devoted to the surveillance of nuclear weapons-related activities around the world. Although other countries may not always agree with how the United States seeks to prevent proliferation, they all endorse the goal, and none of them makes as significant a contribution to achieving that goal as does the United States.

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Impacts—Stability

American Primacy is Crucial to Sustain Stability and Achieve All Global Goals Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls." Naval War College Review, Spring 2002 (Proquest)

Thus, anyone who thinks that the United States should try to discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction, promote human rights, advance the cause of democracy, or pursue any other positive political goal should recognize that the nation's ability to do so rests primarily upon its power. The United States would accomplish far less if it were weaker, and it would discover that other states were setting the agenda of world politics if its own power were to decline. As Harry Truman put it over fifty years ago, "Peace must be built upon power, as well as upon good will and good deeds."17 The bottom line is clear. Even in a world with nuclear weapons, extensive economic ties, rapid communications, an increasingly vocal chorus of nongovernmental organizations, and other such novel features, power still matters, and primacy is still preferable. People running for president do not declare that their main goal as commander in chief would be to move the United States into the number-two position. They understand, as do most Americans, that being number one is a luxury they should try very hard to keep.

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Impacts—War

Lack of American Power Projection Will Destroy Global Order and Create Instabiltiy and Conflict Michael Auslin, Blogger for the American Enterprise Institute, “Free Riders, Age Dimming, and America’s Global Role,” The American, May 4th, 2010 (http://blog.american.com/?page_id=13486)

Thus, I would disagree with M.S. at the Economist’s Democracy in America blog, who focuses on the free-rider issue, writing that Asian and European countries are spending healthy amounts of national treasure (>2 percent) on their militaries. Since I had initially not thought about the free-rider issue, I agree with M.S. that global military spending is increasing, which is the just the scenario I find disturbing. However, no one is spending, or is able to spend, enough to become the new hegemon (as if it were a position one could apply for, as opposed to being the particular combination of capability, position, and historical moment). Thus, we encounter the likelihood of increased instability and potential conflict absent an actual public goods-providing hegemon, which would undoubtedly lead to the stressed free trade flows I mentioned in my article. M.S. is absolutely right, however, that America’s confiscatory regime at home to pay for its military is no different from other countries’. There are at least two resulting conditions, however: the drain on the United States to project power globally (as opposed to locally or regionally), makes such expense all the more unsustainable in an environment when our domestic spending demands are rising exponentially and, secondly, it will be easier for the United States to choose to reduce its global presence and reach—thereby leading to exactly the uncertainties around the globe that would not occur if, say, Malaysia or Italy chose to reduce their military spending. The responses to my article were thoughtful and passionate, which is all a writer wants. An op-ed length piece is necessarily constraining, and I’m sure I could have made my points better. At base, I think the connection between economics, domestic politics, foreign relations, and security are so complex that there is no way to understand how today’s system, which evolved over decades, if not centuries, would be affected by taking away an important constituent in its mix. While we presume that maintaining the global order is an inherent good, there’s no assurance others, even those who benefit from it, do, as well.

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Impacts—WMD War

The Alternative to American Hegemony is Not Peaceful Multipolarity or a Replacement Hegemon—It Will be Regional Conflicts Escalating to WMD Wars Zbigniew Brezinski, Former Sect. Of State, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, 2004 (Google Books p.2-4)

In any case, the eventual end of American hegemony will not involve a restoration of multipolarity among the familiar major powers that dominated world affairs for the last two centuries. Nor will it yield to another dominant hegemon that would displace the United States by assuming a similar political, military, economic, technological, and sociocultural worldwide preeminence. The familiar powers of the last century are too fatigued or too weak to assume the role the United States now plays. It is noteworthy that since 1880, in a comparative ranking of world powers (cumulatively based on their economic strength, military budgets and assets, populations, etc.), the top five slots at sequential twenty-year intervals have been shared by just seven states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and China. Only the United States, however, unambiguously earned inclusion among the top five in every one of the twenty- year intervals, and the gap in the year 2000 between the top-ranked United States and the rest was vastly wider than ever before, The former major European powers—Great Britain, Germany, and France—are too weak to step into the breach. In the next two decades, it is quite unlikely that the European Union will become sufficiently united politically to muster the popular will to compete with the United States in the politico-military arena, Russia is no longer an imperial power, and its central challenge is to recover socioeconomically lest it lose its far eastern territories to China. Japan’s population is aging and its economy has slowed; the conventional wisdom of the 1980s that Japan is destined to be the next “superstate” now has the ring of historical irony. China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal political stability both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still constrained by an impoverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide. The same is true of India, which additionally faces uncertainties regarding its long-term national unity. Even a coalition among the above—a most unlikely prospect, given their historical conflicts and clashing territorial claims—would lack the cohesion, muscle, and energy needed to both push America off its pedestal and sustain global stability. Some leading states, in any case, would side with America if push came to shove, Indeed, any evident American decline might precipitate efforts to reinforce America’sleadership. Most important, the shared resentment of American hegemony would not dampen the clashes of interest among states. The more intense collisions—in the event of America’s decline—could spark a wildfire of regional violence, rendered all the more dangerous by the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction.

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AT: Non-Ux

Your Understanding of American Power is Distorted By Domestic Distrust for Obama— Internationally the Perception of Global Leadership Remains Unchanged Judah Grunstein, World Politics Review's managing editor, “Obama: Transitional or Transformational?” May 25th, 2010 (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/5594/obama-transitional-or-transformational)

Nevertheless, one thing that struck me, and it's not the first time, is the difference in how Obama is perceived Stateside compared to an offshore perspective. The rest of the world is too busy blaming their own leaders for domestic economic meltdowns -- whether real, averted, or anticipated -- to be overly critical of Obama. And the rest of the world probably has more realistic expectations of what American power and influence can accomplish than many American observers. So there's much less disappointment with Obama and the direction he's taken America's global leadership abroad than there seems to be in the U.S. these days.

Specifically, from afar, Obama does not come across as weak and ineffective, either domestically or in the international arena. And that holds true on both an absolute and relative scale. When it comes to global affairs, the only countries that really stand out these days are Turkey, in terms of its diplomatic shine, and Russia, in terms of its savvy power politics. For all its frenetic energy, China looks pretty jittery. Fair or not, Europe looks like a trainwreck. Brazil has yet to really deliver. And the new Japanese leadership looks pathetic.

As for the question of whether Obama will be a transitional figure, like Jimmy Carter, or a transformational one, like Ronald Reagan, it bears noting that at this point in his presidency, Reagan wasn't yet transformational either. For all his insistence that America's days of global leadership were not over, in May 1982, Americans were far from convinced. And in fact, Reagan's truly transformational mandate for a "Morning in America" came with his landslide electoral victory in 1984.

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AT: Other Factors Overwhelm Military Heg

Military Strategy is the Most Important Factor For American Hegemony, It’s the Key to Future Power Projection China People’s Daily, “US Hegemony Shows New Features,” February 22nd, 2001 (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200102/22/eng20010222_63095.html)

Enhancing military strength and grabbing strategical superiority have become top choices for the United States when it maps out its global strategies for the new century.

Since the Cold War, the United States has increased military spending by a big margin to solidify the material foundation for its military hegemony. Its military expenditure growth is the fastest in the Western world.

In 1999, the US defence budget reached US$270.6 billion, 1.6 times the total military spending of Russia, Britain, France,Germany, Japan and China. Last year, it recorded an increase of US$10.2 billion over the year before.

The Clinton administration approved a total increase of US$112 billion for military expenditure from 2000-05. In 2005, US military spending will reach at least US$320 billion, making up 35 per cent of the world's total.

The world's first country to develop and use nuclear weapons, the United States owns the world largest nuclear arsenal. To further enhance its nuclear superiority, it plans to upgrade its strategic nuclear weapons and concentrate on developing and deploying a National Missile Defence (NMD) system. If realized, NMD will be a big blow to international efforts in arms control and disarmament.

Washington has also stepped up its efforts to cultivate a global security system led by the US by pushing ahead NATO's eastward expansion and buttressing US-Japan defence ties.

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AT: Heg Unsustainable

Hegemony is Sustainable—It Cannot Be Replaced or Balanced By Others Phillip Cohen, Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, History and the Hyperpower, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004 (Lexis)

In the end, however, the applicability of a particular term (debates about empire tend to degenerate into semantic squabbles) does not matter. The fact of the overwhelming power of the United States does. No potential adversary comes close to it, and, for the moment, there is no question of a countervailing coalition to block, let alone replace, it. Its roots lie in a growing and extraordinarily productive population, a stable political system, and a military that is unsurpassable in the foreseeable future. And the United States will not, as some hope and others fear, bind itself to an international institutional and legal order that will domesticate and restrain it. If nothing else, domestic politics would prohibit it. No U.S. leader in the next decade or two will call for a dramatic reduction in defense spending or deny that this country must be the strongest in the world, ready to exert its power globally and act unilaterally if necessary. The "Age of Empire" may indeed have ended, then, but an age of American hegemony has begun. And regardless of what one calls it or how long it will last, U.S. statesmen today cannot ignore the lessons and analogies of imperial history.

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AT: Heg Unsustainable

Irrelevant of Its Permanent Sustenance—The United States Must Maintain Its Leadership To Engineer a Soft Landing, A Crash Will be Catastrophe Zbigniew Brezinski, Former Sect. Of State, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, 2004 (Google Books)

History is a record of change, a reminder that nothing endures indefinitely. It can also remind us, however, that some things endure for a long time, and when they disappear, the status quo ante does not reappear. So it will be with the current American global preponderance. It, too, will fade at some point, probably later than some wish and earlier than many Americans take for granted. The key question is: What will replace it? An abrupt termination of American hegemony would without doubt precipitate global chaos, in which international anarchy would be punctuated by eruptions of truly massive destructiveness. An unguided progressive decline would have a similar effect, spread out over a longer time. But a gradual and controlled devolution of power could lead to an increasingly formalized global community of shared interest, with supranational arrangements increasingly assuming some of the special security roles of traditional nation-states. [P. 2]

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AT: Impact Turns

On Balance, Hegemony Remains the Best Choice—Even if There is Violence in the Status Quo, Its Nothing Compared to the World Post Decline—The Worst off Now Would Take it The Hardest Bradley Thayer, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest, November –December 2006 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_86/ai_n27065796/pg_5/?tag=content;col1)

Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview. (3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.

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AT: Impact Turns

Your Impacts are Impossible—Even if Hegemony is Not Perfect, the World After the Decline Would Be More Chaotic and Necessitate Massive Security Compeition Michael Auslin, Blogger for the American Enterprise Institute, “Free Riders, Age Dimming, and America’s Global Role,” The American, May 4th, 2010 (http://blog.american.com/?page_id=13486)

The point I was trying to make, constrained in an op-ed length piece, is that once the American role diminishes, we really have no way of knowing what replaces it or how other actors react. Yet, if we take as a general good the spread of free trade and market liberalization that American power and ideology have both promoted and enabled, any regression in which national governments find themselves hard-pressed to increase their military capabilities without interfering with their economic structures would be a double blow to the post-World War II liberal economic and political program: greater potential for military conflict, less economic freedom. This claim is what Reihan Salam takes up as the threat to the Second Globalization Era. Given the inability of European and Asian countries to continue to free-ride on American military power, Salam posits two alternative outcomes (leaning towards the former): Military budgets would swell slightly, but new collective security arrangements would emerge to keep the peace at reasonable costs. Or perhaps the security competition would spark dangerous spirals of aggression and counter- aggression. I think history shows the likelihood that both would occur at the same time, with alternating cycles of cooperation and competition among and between local, regional, and global rivals (the 1920s seem a good example). On this scenario there are two great risks: the first being that of miscalculation, which can lead to overreaction and the collapse of mediating mechanisms designed to prevent war; the second being that we can never fully be sure what existential issue any national leadership would be willing to go to war over, but only that they would be more “free” to do so in a world without a hegemon. As Larison points out, America’s global presence over the past 60 years has not prevented conflicts (and, I would assume, miscalculation) from occurring. Nor would I make such a claim. Yet the increasing degree of instability, tension, and conflict that is normal in international affairs can only be exacerbated under conditions where both the existing hegemony and the accepted rules of the game (global trade, for example) are weakening or increasingly seen as ineffective.

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AT: Multipolarity Inevitable

Predictions About the Rise of Multipolarity are Empirically Denied—There is No Sign of an Immanent Rise, Meaning Unipolarity is the Only Alternative to Apolarity Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations., “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2008 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)

Charles Krauthammer was more correct than he realized when he wrote in these pages nearly two decades ago about what he termed "the unipolar moment." At the time, U.S. dominance was real. But it lasted for only 15 or 20 years. In historical terms, it was a moment. Traditional realist theory would have predicted the end of unipolarity and the dawn of a multipolar world. According to this line of reasoning, great powers, when they act as great powers are wont to do, stimulate competition from others that fear or resent them. Krauthammer, subscribing to just this theory, wrote, "No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era." But this has not happened. Although anti-Americanism is widespread, no great-power rival or set of rivals has emerged to challenge the United States. In part, this is because the disparity between the power of the United States and that of any potential rivals is too great. Over time, countries such as China may come to possess GDPs comparable to that of the United States. But in the case of China, much of that wealth will necessarily be absorbed by providing for the country's enormous population (much of which remains poor) and will not be available to fund military development or external undertakings. Maintaining political stability during a period of such dynamic but uneven growth will be no easy feat. India faces many of the same demographic challenges and is further hampered by too much bureaucracy and too little infrastructure. The EU's GDP is now greater than that of the United States, but the EU does not act in the unified fashion of a nation-state, nor is it able or inclined to act in the assertive fashion of historic great powers. Japan, for its part, has a shrinking and aging population and lacks the political culture to play the role of a great power. Russia may be more inclined, but it still has a largely cash-crop economy and is saddled by a declining population and internal challenges to its cohesion.

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AT: Hegemony is Imperialist

Hegemony Isn’t Imperialist—Unipolarity Simply Means We Have Influence and Deterrent, Not Dominance Joseph Nye, Prof of Internatioanl Relations at Harvard, “Soft power and American foreign policy,” Political Science Quarterly, June 22nd, 2004 (http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-2364796/Soft-power-and-American-foreign.html)

In many ways, the metaphor of empire is seductive. The American military has a global reach, with bases around the world, and its regional commanders sometimes act like proconsuls. English is a lingua franca, like Latin. The Ameri- can economy is the largest in the world, and American culture serves as a mag- net. But it is a mistake to confuse the politics of primacy with the politics of empire. Although unequal relationships certainly exist between the United States and weaker powers and can be conducive to exploitation, absent formal political control, the term "imperial" can be misleading. Its acceptance would be a disastrous guide for American foreign policy because it fails to take into account how the world has changed. The United States is certainly not an em- pire in the way we think of the European overseas empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because the core feature of such imperialism was direct political control.^"* The United States has more power resources, compared to other countries, than Britain had at its imperial peak. On the other hand, the United States has less power, in the sense of control over the behavior that occurs inside other countries, than Britain did when it ruled a quarter of the globe. For example, Kenya's schools, taxes, laws, and elections—not to men- tion external relations—were controlled by British officials. Even where Brit- ain used indirect rule through local potentates, as in Uganda, it exercised far more control than the United States does today. Others try to rescue the meta- phor by referring to "informal empire" or the "imperialism of free trade," but this simply obscures important differences in degrees of control suggested by comparisons with real historical empires. Yes, the Americans have widespread influence, but in 2003, the United States could not even get Mexico and Chile to vote for a second resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council. The British empire did not have that kind of problem with Kenya or India.

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AT: Counterbalancing Now

Even the Most Powerful International Competitors are Years From Successful Counterbalancing Associated Free Press, “Emerging big four economies flaunt power at summit,” June 13th, 2009 (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ie-Cbti6FYBb4IznPXZ0qCVDCN5w)

MOSCOW (AFP) — Brazil, Russia, India and China flaunt their unity against more established powers this week as the four emerging economic giants hold the first summit of their grouping, known as BRIC. But while they will express determination to act together during the current economic crisis and beyond, they are years away from being a counterbalance to established global institutions, analysts say.

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AT: Heg Backlash

Denunciations are Just Talk—There is No Real Resistance to American Power Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations., “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2008 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)

The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior, which has not stimulated such a response. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. Bush has not alienated other nations; it surely has. But it has not, for the most part, acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy are pervasive, but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance.

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Aff—Non-Ux: Afghanistan

Failures in Afghanistan Demonstrate that American Global Hegemony is a Pipe Dream Graham E. Fuller, former vice-chair of the CIA's National Intelligence Council, “Obama speech: kicking the can down the road in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, December 2nd, 2009 (http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1202/p09s04-coop.html)

Whatever mixed feelings Pashtuns have toward the Taliban, they know the Taliban remain the single most important element of Pashtun political life; the Taliban will be among them long after Washington tires of this mission. The strategy of the Bush era envisioned Afghanistan as a vital imperial outpost in a post-Soviet dream world where hundreds of overseas US bases would cement US global hegemony, keeping Russia and China in check and the US on top. That world vision is gone – except to a few Washington diehards who haven't grasped the new emerging global architectures of power, economics, prestige, and influence. The Taliban will inevitably figure significantly in the governance of almost any future Afghanistan, like it or not. Future Taliban leaders, once rid of foreign occupation, will have little incentive to support global jihadi schemes – they never really have by choice. The Taliban inherited bin Laden as a poison pill from the past when they came to power in 1996 and have learned a bitter lesson about what it means to lend state support to a prominent terrorist group. The Taliban with a voice in power will have every incentive to welcome foreign money and expertise into the country, including the Pashtun regions – as long as it is not part of a Western strategic package. An austere Islamic regime is not the ideal outcome for Afghanistan, but it is by far the most realistic. To reverse ground realities and achieve a markedly different outcome is not in the cards and will pose the same dilemma to Obama next year.

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Aff—Non-Ux: Economy

American Financial Hegemony Has Already Collapsed Its Going Down For Good Eric Roseman, President of Montreal-based E.N.R. Asset Management, Inc., The Fed Is Still Cornered by Deflation, Roseman Eruptions, December 7th, 2009 (http://rosemanblog.sovereignsociety.com/2009/12/the-fed-is-still-cornered- by-deflation.html)

The gobs of money the Fed and other governments are printing, including China, demands a position in gold by all investors because the endgame will result in much higher inflation down the road accompanied by another round of currency debasement. At some point over the next 5-10 years, or sooner, a full-blown debt or currency crises will emerge, which might correspond with the Chinese currency becoming fully convertible. That event will mark the official end of the post-WW II U.S. dollar reserve role. I would argue the events of 2008 and early 2009 marked the beginning of the end of American financial hegemony and the emergence of China as reluctant leader of global finance. It's true the Chinese are reluctant to assume a leadership role in global finance. China loves a weak currency partially tied to the dollar because of the enormous advantage it gains from export competitiveness; but after the Great Crash of 2008, the Chinese are being drawn into this role because the world starves for exchange-rate stability and financial order. The American model no longer affords stability.

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Aff—Non-Ux: Iraq

Iraq and Afghanistan Prove American Hegemony is Screwed—The World is Looking to Other Powers for Balance International Socialism, “Dented hegemony and Georgia’s nasty little war,” October 2nd, 2008 (http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=478&issue=120)

A lot of things could upset this arrangement, which would leave an Iraqi government asserting its independence by balancing between US and Iranian pressures. But the very fact that it is under consideration represents a blow to the dream of US hegemony. That hegemony is also under pressure elsewhere. Jonathan Neale’s account of Afghanistan’s 30 years of wars in this issue shows how close the US and its allies are to facing the same fate that beset the USSR’s occupation. The Ethiopian government is threatening to withdraw its troops from Somalia because of the degree of resistance to its US-backed invasion. Iran is refusing to make a humiliating climbdown in the face of US sanctions and threats. Central Asian republics that used to court the US are now courting Russia again. Such blows to US hegemony explain its determination to turn a small war into a major international crisis. They also explain the Russian government’s response.

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Aff—Non-Ux: Multilat Now

Obama’s Foreign Policy Has Doomed American Hegemony—Turkey, Brazil and Iran Prove Multilateral Challenges Will Succeed Now Charles Krauthammer, Political Analyst, “The Fruits of Weakness,” RealClearPolitics, May 21st, 2010 (http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/05/21/the_fruits_of_weakness_105676.html)

That picture -- a defiant, triumphant take-that-Uncle-Sam -- is a crushing verdict on the Obama foreign policy. It demonstrates how rising powers, traditional American allies, having watched this administration in action, have decided that there's no cost in lining up with America's enemies and no profit in lining up with a U.S. president given to apologies and appeasement. They've watched President Obama's humiliating attempts to appease Iran, as every rejected overture is met with abjectly renewed U.S. negotiating offers. American acquiescence reached such a point that the president was late, hesitant and flaccid in expressing even rhetorical support for democracy demonstrators who were being brutally suppressed and whose call for regime change offered the potential for the most significant U.S. strategic advance in the region in 30 years. They've watched America acquiesce to Russia's re-exerting sway over Eastern Europe, overUkraine (pressured by Russia last month into extending for 25 years its lease of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol) and over Georgia (Russia's de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is no longer an issue under the Obama "reset" policy). They've watched our appeasement of Syria, Iran's agent in the Arab Levant -- sending our ambassador back to Syria even as it tightens its grip on Lebanon, supplies Hezbollah with Scuds, and intensifies its role as the pivot of the Iran- Hezbollah-Hamas alliance. The price for this ostentatious flouting of the U.S. and its interests? Ever more eager U.S. "engagement." They've observed the administration's gratuitous slap at Britain over the Falklands, its contemptuous treatment of Israel, its undercutting of the Czech Republic and Poland, and its indifference to Lebanon and Georgia. And in Latin America, they see not just U.S. passivity asVenezuela's Hugo Chavez organizes his anti-American "Bolivarian" coalition while deepening military and commercial ties with Iran and Russia. They saw active U.S. support in Hondurasfor a pro-Chavez would-be dictator seeking unconstitutional powers in defiance of the democratic institutions of that country. This is not just an America in decline. This is an America in retreat -- accepting, ratifying and declaring its decline, and inviting rising powers to fill the vacuum. Nor is this retreat by inadvertence. This is retreat by design and, indeed, on principle. It's the perfect fulfillment of Obama's adopted Third World narrative of American misdeeds, disrespect and domination from which he has come to redeem us and the world. Hence his foundational declaration at the U.N. General Assembly last September that "No one nation can or should try to dominate another nation" (guess who's been the dominant nation for the last two decades?) and his dismissal of any "world order that elevates one nation or group of people over another." (NATO? The West?) Given Obama's policies and principles, Turkey and Brazil are acting rationally. Why not give cover to Ahmadinejad and his nuclear ambitions? As the U.S. retreats in the face of Iran, China, Russia and Venezuela, why not hedge your bets? There's nothing to fear from Obama, and everything to gain by ingratiating yourself with America's rising adversaries. After all, they actually believe in helping one's friends and punishing one's enemies.

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Aff—Non-Ux: Turkey

Turkish Actions Now Prove it is Not Subservient to American Political Hegemony Flynn and Hillary Mann Leverett, Middle East Policy Specialists, “Hegemony Challenged: Turkey and Brazil Take on The United States and the UN Security Council Over Iran,” Huffington Post, May 19th, 2010 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/hegemony-challenged-turke_b_582528.html)

The unfolding drama of the Brazil-Turkey nuclear deal and the Obama Administration's reactive push to move a draft sanctions resolution in the United Nations Security Council will have profound effects on the character of international relations for years to come. At least two such effects warrant particular attention. First, for those in official Washington or anywhere else who still doubt that the "post-American world" is here, the deal to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) brokered by Brazil and Turkey should serve as a blaring wake-up call. Two rising economic powers from what we used to call the "Third World" have now asserted decisive political influence on a high-profile international security issue. And, in doing so, they have signaled that Washington can no longer unilaterally define terms for managing such issues. As a consequence, President Obama's most serious foreign policy challenge--repairing America's image as a global leader--just got more daunting. Second, by answering Brazil and Turkey's extraordinary diplomatic effort with an arrogant assertion of the P-5's power to demand the rapid imposition of new sanctions on Iran and reinstating a demand that Iran must suspend enrichment to avoid new sanctions, the Obama Administration is following a course that could inflict serious damage not only on America's global standing, but also on the legitimacy of the Security Council itself.

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Aff—Heg Unsustainable

The Financial and Imperial Crisis Proves that Hegemony is Not Sustainable—China’s Rise Will Either Produce Conflict or Multipolar Dialogue Wang Wanzheng is a post-doctoral scholar with the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, and chief editor of the magazine 'Current Affairs.', America's Hegemony on Truth is a Fallacy,” China Daily, February 4th, 2010 (http://worldmeets.us/chinadaily000023.shtml)

Consequently, what worries me the most is that soft conflicts between the U.S. and China will eventually explode. The question is, can the revival of U.S. soft power and China's new soft power strategy be reconciled? The answer is, absolutely not.

The West has long ruled the world through three major hegemonies: wealth, power and truth. The first two belong in the category of hard power, while the third is soft. Struggle for wealth and power is like "dividing a cake," while competition for truth is like "making a cake." Whether or not a country is from West or East, strong or weak, it has the right to pursue, transmit and share truths with other nations - and only by these means can humanity reach the summit of civilization.

The United States has taken the lead in stirring up a soft conflict with China, attempting to defend the hegemony of Western truth. But the global financial crisis has already proven that once civilization has been dominated by a single state or group, that state or group will become a scourge.

For the U.S. , the only choice, the correct choice, is to emancipate the mind, give up on its perceived monopoly on truth and sincerely promote dialogue between civilizations and create good fortune, not only for our two nations, but for the world.

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American Pre-Eminence is Conclusively Coming to an End—The United States Must Avoid Attempting to Retain Unipolarity to Avoid Conflict With China and Another Global War Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State, “Rebalancing Relations With China,” Washington Post, August 19th, 2009 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/18/AR2009081802850.html?hpid=opinionsbox1)

For several decades, the global economic system was sustained by acceptance of American predominance. A vast tide of liquidity coupled with America's appetite for consumer goods had sent enormous amounts of dollars to China, which, in turn, China lent back to us for still more buying. Before the crisis, China sent scores of experts to the United States and invested in major American financial institutions to learn the secrets of the system that seemed to produce permanent global growth at little risk. The economic crisis has shaken that confidence. Chinese economic leaders have seen the American financial system subject a decade of their savings to potentially catastrophic fluctuations. To protect the value of its Treasury investment and to sustain its own export-driven economy, China finds itself obliged to largely retain its Treasury holdings of nearly $1 trillion. Ambivalence in both China and the United States is the inevitable consequence. On the one hand, the two economies have grown increasingly dependent on each other. China has a major interest in a stable -- and preferably growing -- U.S. economy. But China also has a growing interest in reducing its dependence on American decisions. Since American inflation as well as deflation have become for China nightmares as grave as they are for America, the two countries face the imperative of coordinating their economic policies. As America's largest creditor, China has a degree of economic leverage unprecedented in the U.S. experience. At the same time, the quest for widening the scope of independent decision exists in ambivalent combination on both sides. A number of Chinese moves reflect this tendency. Chinese officials feel freer than they did previously to offer public and private advice to the United States. China has begun to trade with India, Russia and Brazil in their own currencies. The proposal of the governor of China's central bank to gradually create an alternate reserve currency is another case in point. Many American economists make light of this idea. But it surfaces in so many forums, and China has such a consistent record of pursuing its projects with great patience, that it should be taken seriously. To avoid a gradual drift into adversarial policies, Chinese influence in global economic decision-making needs to be enhanced. According to conventional wisdom, the world economy will regain its vitality once China consumes more and America consumes less. But as both countries apply that prescription, it will inevitably alter the political framework. As Chinese exports to America decline and China shifts the emphasis of its economy to greater consumption and to increased infrastructure spending, a different economic order will emerge. China will be less dependent on the American market, while the growing dependence of neighboring countries on Chinese markets will increase China's political influence. Political cooperation, in shaping a new world order, must increasingly compensate for the shift in trade patterns. A cooperative definition of a long-range future will not be easy. Historically, China and America have been hegemonic powers able to set their own agendas essentially unilaterally. They are not accustomed to close alliances or consultative procedures restricting their freedom of action on the basis of equality. When they have been in alliances, they have tended to take for granted that the mantle of leadership belongs to them and exhibited a degree of dominance not conceivable in the emerging Sino-American partnership. To make this effort work, American leaders must resist the siren call of a containment policy drawn from the Cold War playbook. China must guard against a policy aimed at reducing alleged American hegemonic designs and the temptation to create an Asian bloc to that end. America and China should not repeat the process that, a century ago, moved Britain and Germany from friendship to a confrontation that drained both societies in a global war. The ultimate victims of such an evolution would be global issues, such as energy, the environment, nuclear proliferation and climate change, which will require a common vision of the future. At the other extreme, some argue that the United States and China should constitute themselves into a G-2. A tacit Sino-American global governing body, however, is not in the interest of either country or the world. Countries that feel excluded might drift into rigid nationalism at the precise moment that requires a universal perspective. America's great contribution in the 1950s was to take the lead in developing a set of institutions by which the Atlantic region could deal with unprecedented upheavals. A region hitherto riven by national rivalries found mechanisms to institutionalize a common destiny. Even though not all of these measures worked equally well, the end result was a far more benign world order. The 21st century requires an institutional structure appropriate for its time. The nations bordering the Pacific have a stronger sense of national identity than did the European countries emerging from the Second World War. They must not slide into a 21st-century version of classic balance-of-power politics. It would be especially pernicious if opposing blocs were to form on each side of the Pacific. While the center of gravity of international affairs shifts to Asia, and America finds a new role distinct from hegemony yet compatible with leadership, we need a vision of a Pacific structure based on close cooperation between America and China but also broad enough to enable other countries bordering the Pacific to fulfill their aspirations.

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American Hegemony is in Terminal Decline—The Collapse of the Economy and Military Pre- Eminence Will End Unipolarity Now—Empirically Attempts to Preserve Have Been Disastrous Asia Times, “US hegemony slips into history,” September 12th, 2009 (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KI12Ak01.html)

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new period of unipolar American power. In this country, liberals and conservatives alike celebrated the triumph of market democracies under the leadership of the United States. The Bill Clinton administration attempted to consolidate America's geoeconomic power. The George W Bush administration attempted to consolidate America's military and geopolitical power.

And today, the Barack Obama administration surveys the wreckage of these efforts to preserve a unipolar world. The global economy is in deep recession and the United States is drowning under the costs of maintaining its post-Cold War empire. Thechaos in Iraq and Afghanistan stands testament to the failures of our military pretensions.

Terence Edward Paupp, in his new book The Future of Global Relations, traces the downward trajectory of US power and forecasts a very different future for the international community. In the first half of his book, which tackles international relationstheory as well as real-world examples, Paupp describes the decline of US hegemony.

The US has persuaded other countries to do its bidding not so much through naked imperial force as through the indirect application of economic, political and military force. Our friends and allies, in other words, believe that they are acting in their own interests when they support the US. Moreover, by setting the terms of the global economy and by maintaining the largest military in the world, the US can exert control over countries with which it has only the barest of relations.

The American hegemon, Paupp argues, has been losing its legitimacy - and thus its power - for some time. The crisis in casino capitalism, the inability of the US military to subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan and insurgents in Iraq and the declining legitimacy of the institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization) through which the US has exerted hegemonic power have all contributed to a hollowing out of unipolarism (in much the same way that outsourcing has eroded US manufacturing).

Rising regions are Paupp's key to the future. Regional economic organizations (such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN), regional security organizations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), hybrid regional formations (such as the European Union), and regional powers such as China, India, and Brazil have all challenged Washington's preeminence. "As American hegemony declines," he writes, "there shall be a corresponding rise in South-South regional alliances that will constitute, de facto, a new counter-hegemonic alliance against the US Global Empire."

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American Hegemony is Declining Now and TerminallyInevitable—Adopting a Non- Confrontational Attitude is Key to a Peaceful Rise and Multipolar Stabiltiy Daniel Larison, Blogger at the American Conservative, “A Bright Post-Hegemonic Future,” The American Conservative April 5th, 2010 (http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/04/05/a-bright-post-hegemonic-future/)

In other words, unsustainable U.S. hegemony will not be as great as it was, and that will mean that other major and rising powers will be able to exert something more like the normal influence in their regions that such powers have exerted throughout most of modern history. Will there be conflicts in such a world? Of course, there will be, but we already have a number of conflicts in the world that have either been deemed irrelevant to the maintenance of Pax Americana or they are the products of policies designed to perpetuate Pax Americana. In practice, securing this “peace” has involved starting several wars, the largest and most destructive of which has been the war in Iraq, as well as supporting proxies and allies as they escalated conflicts with their neighbors. China will build up its military, as it is already doing, and Russia will continue to extend its influence into its “near- abroad,” and Iran will develop nuclear weapons. What is important to stress here is that all of these things already are or soon will be happening anyway. These things are happening despite, and perhaps in some cases because of, American military presence in their respective regions. The reality of multipolarity makes these first two more or less unavoidable, and as we have been seeing over the last few years there is nothing short of full-scale war with Iran that could realistically interrupt the development of its nuclear program. If Iran definitely decides to acquire nuclear weapons, there is remarkably little that any outside government can do to prevent this from happening. One sure way to guarantee that Iran pursues this route is to continue to act punitively towards Iran. If Western powers actively resist Russian efforts to exercise influence along its own borders as the U.S. and some European states have been doing, all that will result is the use of Russia’s smaller neighbors as Western proxies. This will have very unfortunate consequences for the proxies, which the Russians will intimidate and/or attack and which Western powers will not aid in direct conflicts with Russia. Too many American policymakers and policy analysts remain devoted to restoring a degree of American preeminence that existed in 1991-92 and will probably never come again. The reality is that we may not even see American preeminence c. 2008, much less the way it was twenty years ago. Our policies and our military deployments around the world have not adjusted to this reality. Now some of our closest allies are forcing us to come to terms with the way the world has changed.

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American Hegemony is No Longer Possible—The Attempt to Sustain Hardline Unilateralism is Dangerous—Changing Our Stance is Crucial to Maintain Global Peace Shanghai Eastday (English Edition), “Robert S.McNamara admit: U.S. hegemony will not work,” August 17th, 2009 (http://english.eastday.com/e/eastalk/u1a4586821.html)

Cheerio, McNamara in the end knows the truth:"the United States is not almighty, not omniscience." "The U.S. has no right to reform other countries with his will." In a word, that the U.S. military hegemony dominates the world is no longer possible. The United States is a super power nation on earth. He is incomparable in economy, military, science, etc. But as a super power nation, America usually opposed by many people, such as Iraq, Afghan, Islam particularly. It is because the reign of America believes in "almighty" and has rights to reform other countries that put him in dilemma situation. Who dare say "no" to this unilateralism country? Someone still believes in almighty America nowadays. They turn deaf ears to the lesson of McNamara, like George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld. To mold Iraq as they will, they dispatch aircraft carriers, airplanes, tanks and missiles to Islam countries. In the end, Iraq becomes the second Vietnam, being attacked day and night. Once as proud as a peacock Donald Rumsfeld forced from office and Republican Party lost the campaign at last. Barrack Obama took the office by his new policy. What's new? Correct the historical mistakes. He began to think that America is no longer always right while other countries have their merits. To get better cooperation with others, the United States make concessions on many aspects. If America radically changes his usual"principles and traditions", we can count down the harmonious days of whole states.

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Krauthammer’s Article Proves Precisely Why American Hegemony Must Decline—The Alternative is an Alienating Imperialist Violence that Fails To Bring Peace—We Must Choose Multipolarity Instead Joe Klein, Time Political Columnist, “Decline is a Choice...That Hasn't Been Chosen,” October 12th, 2009 (http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/10/12/decline-is-a-choice-that-hasnt-been-chosen/)

Charles Krauthammer has disgorged a magnum opussy sort of rant on the cover of the week's Weekly Standard, based on a lecture he gave to the Manhattan Institute, a neoconservative think tank that has actually done some creative thinking about urban issues over the years. Nothing creative about Krauthammer's thinking, though, which stands as an anti-Nobel exegesis, blaming Barack Obama for choosing a foreign policy that will lead, inexorably, to American decline. It's actually the same old 'hammer hegemonizing--unipolar, unilateral, unidimensional, uninflected and unsubtle. There are one or two sort of true sentences in it. The most important is this one: [T]he ultimate purpose of [the New Liberalism's] foreign policy is to make America less hegemonic, less arrogant, less dominant. Well, two out of three ain't bad. Barack Obama would probably argue--as would most foreign policy centrists--that the goal of his foreign policy would be to make the United States dominant in a more effective way: at the center of multilateral efforts to bring international miscreants under control. This can happen militarily, as it is being done on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. It can also happen through a US-led international sanctions regime, as has been very effective in sending a tough message to North Korea (with the strong support from China and Russia)--which may well bear fruit before long. Or it can happen through US-led efforts to bring peace to the Middle East and a strong multilateral deterrence posture, including many regional players, to counteract Iran's possible nuclear ambitions. You don't achieve this sort of dominance by marching into Baghdad in three weeks. It takes patience, a pattern of good faith behavior, the acknowledgment that the U.S. hasn't always acted in good faith in the past. Indeed, part of the reason why Obama's Nobel Peace Prize seems so foolish is that diplomatic success can't be judged in nine months--those of us who believe that Obama is trying to do the right things overseas have no idea if he's any good at it yet (as Nixon and Kissinger were in their long-gestating opening to China). Krauthammer's take--and that's all it is, a journalistic take puffed into doctrinal pretense--is based on several demonstrably wrong premises: The first is that George W. Bush's foreign policy was a success. (It was, in some ways--like fighting AIDs in Africa--but Krauthammer doesn't care so much about that sort of stuff.) The second is that by going around the world, acknowledging that the U.S. has not always behaved well in the past--while always, always, taking our friends and enemies to task for their failures in the same paragraphs--Obama is somehow damaging America's moral standing or "exceptionalism," as Krauthammer would have it: In Strasbourg, President Obama was asked about American exceptionalism. His answer? "I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism." Interesting response. Because if everyone is exceptional, no one is. Well, that's one limited, literal way of looking at it. Another way is this: Great countries don't have to go around proclaiming their greatness. An American President who pronounced America's "exceptionalism" would be obnoxious. An American President who admits our imperfections--while proclaiming our enormous strengths as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-racial bastion of freedom and equality--is demonstrating our "exceptionalism" in a far more sophisticated and effective way. We are a country willing to admit mistakes. That's pretty exceptional. Krauthammer loves inflammatory, We're-Number-One!!! sort of locutions. He loves the word "hegemon," mostly because moderates and liberals find it muscle-bound. But his sentiment here in his most prescriptive paragraph is, I believe, unimpeachable: First, accept our role as hegemon. And reject those who deny its essential benignity. There is a reason that we are the only hegemon in modern history to have not immediately catalyzed the creation of a massive counter-hegemonic alliance--as occurred, for example, against Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany. There is a reason so many countries of the Pacific Rim and the Middle East and Eastern Europe and Latin America welcome our presence as balancer of power and guarantor of their freedom. And that reason is simple: We are as benign a hegemon as the world has ever seen. That is true mostly because three of the four Presidents since we achieved our undeniable pre-eminence with the collapse of the Soviet Union--George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama--thoroughly rejected the sort of bullying that Krauthammer advocates. The disastrous exception was George W. Bush. Our reputation in the world, now being regained after the Bush debacle, is a result of the fact that we've always been half-hearted imperialists, pathetic in our occasional attempts at oppression--and, more often, from the Bosnian accord to the Indonesian p0st-Tsunami airlift, willing to act selflessly to benefit humanity. All you need to do is compare the Russians' utter brutality in Afghanistan with our real, if ineffective so far, attempts to bring education and economic development to the people so that we can leave a more stable country. (General McChrystal's refusal to continue offensive aerial strikes, which caused some terrible civilian casualties, is an example of our continuing efforts to do as little damage as possible.) In the end, the real problem with Krauthammer's rant is this: he really doesn't want us to be exceptional. He wants us to be more brutal, more like other historically powerful countries, more like the Russians in Afghanistan or the British in Mesopotamia. His position on Iraq tips his hand, as he excoriates Obama for having ...almost no interest in garnering the fruits of a very costly and very bloody success--namely, using our Strategic Framework Agreement to turn the new Iraq into a strategic partner and anchor for U.S. influence in the most volatile area of the world. Iraq is a prize--we can debate endlessly whether it was worth the cost--of great strategic significance that the administration seems to have no intention of exploiting in its determination to execute a full and final exit. A prize! Sounds sort of like Churchill in his most demented colonial moments: India, the jewel in the crown! (The fact that a duly elected Iraqi government wants us to leave is ignored.) Krauthammer's sort of imperialism--a brutal and patronizing neo-colonialism--has never sat well with the American people. And it doesn't work in the world. It was, in fact, the cause of the marked decline in American moral authority and power over the past eight years--including the near-destruction of our Army--that people like Krauthammer refuse to acknowledge. That disaster is being rectified now, from Robert Gates's various decisions to scuttle unnecessary weapons systems and use those resources to bolster our troops in the field, to Hillary Clinton's efforts to transform our hidebound and ineffective foreign aid disbursements, to Barack Obama's more judicious decision-making about when to use force, when to sanction, when to negotiate. Those decisions may not prove wise in every instance, but they are being made with an intelligence and consideration that never attended the sledgehammer fecklessness of the last President, whose policies Krauthammer so admired.

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The Ability to Preserve Unipolarity Simply Does Not Exist, It’s a Naïve Misunderstanding of International Relations—We Must Choose Multipolarity to Prevent Massive Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Yglesias, Political Commentator, “Decline: It’s Not Really a Choice,” October 13th, 2009 (http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/10/decline-its-not-really-a-choice.php)

Charles Krauthammer has a fantastically silly Weekly Standard article headlined “Decline Is a Choice: The New Liberalism and the end of American ascendancy.” Robert Farley makes some good observations about the piece but I think he lets Krauthammer’s central conceit off too easy, offering only a parenthetical remark about “a curious inability to admit that basic shifts in the international economy are occurring, and that these shifts make change in the political structure of international politics inevitable.” This, however, totally undermines Krauthammer’s central point. Nobody has proposed a halfway plausible mechanism by which the United States can alter the fact that India and China have a larger population than ours, or the fact that India and China and Brazil have economies that are growing faster than ours. Nor does there seem to be a plausibly method by which we can prevent the slow-but-steady progress of European political and economic integration. These trends are, however, steadily eroding the basis of American global dominance. They don’t make the end of American global dominance inevitable—I find it very plausible that China will enter a period of political meltdown and chaos long before it achieves economic parity with the United States, and it’s at least somewhat plausible that the same could happen to India. But this kind of thing is largely out of our control. For now, the trends are what they are and the question is how to respond to them. Krauthammer’s central conceit ever since the end of the Cold War has been that bold acts of will can prolong the “unipolar moment” indefinitely. And he’s just wrong. He’s always been wrong, he continues to be wrong, and this interpretation of world affairs will always be wrong. It’s a remarkably elementary mistake that seems to evince no understanding of how the United States came to be the dominant global player in the first place. As if he thinks we’re top dog and nobody cares about Australia or Finland is because we just have more of a bad-ass attitude. Those are, however, actually some pretty bad-ass countries. They’re just, you know, small so nobody cares. If China and India were richer, we’d look small to them! The main practical consequence of Krauthammer-style policies for international relations is to speed the spread of nuclear weapons. Having us behave in an alarming manner increases the desire of regional powers to acquire nuclear weapons and decreases the extent to which other great powers are inclined to collaborate with us on preventing nuclear proliferation.

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A Lack of American Unipolarity Can Still Solve All Your Heg Good Warrants and Avoids Conflict—Decline is Only Problematic if We View it That Way Ezra Klein, Washington Post Political Blogger, “The End of Unipolarity,” October 13th, 2009 (http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/10/the_end_of_unipolarity.html)

You can think of the transition away from a world in which America is the sole superpower in one of two ways: American decline, which is the label my colleague Charles Krauthammer attaches to it. Or global betterment, which is how my colleague Fareed Zakaria thinks of it. I'm with Zakaria on this one, but in fact, I think Krauthammer should be, too. Central to the nationalist's lament is that having a huge, rich, stable country like America has been very good for the world. It's led to technological progress and economic improvement and relative peace and all the rest of it. The reasons for that are no secret: America's riches allowed it to invest in innovation. Its wealth allowed it to trade. Its economic ties gave it a strong interest in global stability. All this was good for America, yes, but also good for other countries that benefited from our rise. All this, however, also applies to a strong, rich, stable China, or India, or integrated European union. If China begins churning out doctors and one of them cures cancer, we'll be able to buy the drug. If India emerges as a massive new market with the disposable income to purchase increasingly high-end goods, that will mean profits for our companies. If Brazil has an incentive to keep a lid on Latin American instability because they don't want to see their region written off as a trading partner, that's good for American interests. But all this requires America itself to view these entities as cooperative, rather than competitive, players on the world scene. If we're fearful of China and India and try to slow their rise, and they mature with the recognition that America is more adversary than enemy, the end result is that we simply have much more powerful competitors. In that case, the end of unipolarity is bad, but it's bad because we made it into a bad thing, not because it had to be one.

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Failures in Iraq and Afghanistan Prove that Hegemony is in Decline—New Forums For Multipolarity and Resistance Extend the Economic and Military Crisis and Destroy the Immanence of Imperialist Power Middle East Media Research Institute, “Resistance Conference in Beirut Declares Resistance's Victory, U.S. Policy's Defeat in Region,” February 10th, 2010 (http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3964.htm)

One of the conference's central messages was that the resistance challenges the imperialist Western policy that is trying to impose its hegemony on the region. The concluding statement said that "resistance is a necessary condition for establishing a just world order that prohibits wars, aggression and occupation… and inculcates the values of cooperation, brotherhood and peace." In his speech at the opening ceremony, Nasrallah harshly attacked the U.S. and its policy: "As for the confrontation with the U.S. hegemony in the region, I can also say that we have overcome the most dangerous phase in the history of our region and nation. The military, security, economic and political power of the U.S. reached its peak in the last two decades. Encouraged by being the only [superpower] in the world, the U.S. pushed its project and its offensive against our region, our countries and our peoples to the limit. "Seeing this as a historic opportunity to resolve its conflict with our nation, the U.S. went on to occupy Afghanistan and Iraq, constantly made threats against the Islamic Republic of Iran and against Assad's Syria, and attempted to take over Lebanon, while fully supporting and sponsoring 'Israel's' wars on Lebanon and Gaza. "The aim was to crush the resistance movements in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, dry up all their sources of support in the world, and topple regimes that defy [the U.S.] hegemony and support the resistance – especially Iran, Syria and Sudan... "[But] once again, the project and the people of resistance and resilience – yourselves among them – managed to make great historic achievements. The resistance movements stood fast in all the arenas, confronting the wars and the attempts to crush them physically and morally. The governments [supporting] the resistance stood fast in the face of the pressures, isolation and sanctions, and our peoples upheld the culture of honor, liberty and jihad... "Even if we cannot talk today of the complete collapse of the U.S. project in our region, we can at the very least talk of America's failure, retreat, sense of helplessness, and lack of options. God willing, all of these are but a prelude to the final collapse of this project and war against our nation..."[19] Syrian columnist Hassan Hirdan wrote in the Syrian daily Al-Watan that the very holding of the conference reflected a shift in the power-balance in favor of the resistance, as well as the weakness of the U.S., which is exhausted from its struggle with the resistance forces: "The forum was held in an Arab and Lebanese climate that reflects the sanctification of the victory of the resistance and opposition forces in their struggle against the American-Zionist- Western imperialism, which aims to defeat the peoples of the region and break the will of the resistance in order to redraw the map of the region according to America's interests… "The number and quality of the participants – Arabs and foreigners from five continents – reflects the extent to which the power balance has shifted in favor of the enterprise of resistance and opposition in the region, as well as the ongoing decline of America's imperialist enterprise, which the resistance forces have managed to weaken. The forum convened at a time when America is in the midst of a deep crisis in Afghanistan and Iraq [thanks to] the activity of the resistance against its occupation forces – [activity] that is depleting its funds and manpower and exacerbating the economic and financial crisis from which it is suffering. [America's] prestige has plummeted, along with its influence and exclusive control over the international decision-making. It has been supplanted by a new world order based on multiple powers and regional [forces]. This has strengthened the enterprise of liberation and resistance against hegemony, occupation and imperialism throughout the world, giving it a chance to make further achievements and gains…"[20]

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Aff—Link Turns: Military Presence

Withdrawing Troops and Refusing to Focus on Coercive Military Force is Crucial to Building Succesful Hegemonic Coalitions—The Status Quo Can’t Achieve the Benefits of Unipolarity Mark Beeson, Professor of Political Science & International Studies, The University of Birmingham, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, January 10, 2009 (http://www.old.japanfocus.org/_Mark_Beeson- East_Asian_Regionalism_and_the_End_of_the_Asia_Pacific__After_American_Hegemony)

There are a number of different ways of conceptualising hegemony. While all agree hegemony is about dominance in the international system, there are very different views about what this means and how it is achieved.[3] For realists, hegemony is about material resources, principally military. In the endless quest for power that realists believe characterises the international system, hegemonic competition is cyclical and inevitable, as rising powers supplant enfeebled ones in a Darwinian struggle for survival. [4] If this was all there was to hegemony, the US ought to be in an unassailable position for the foreseeable future given its military and technological superiority. And yet, not only can the US not impose its will in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there is plainly more to contemporary dominance than sheer brute force. This is an especially important consideration given the bloody recent history of the East Asian region and the US’s direct military involvement in it: if any region ought to be acutely attuned to a predominantly strategic calculus it is East Asia. While much of East Asia does remain preoccupied with ‘traditional’ notions of security, even here America’s strategic presence is, as we shall see, no longer as decisive as it once was. Hegemony has an important ideational or ideological component that is realised discursively, and which can be a crucial determinant of a hegemony’s power to achieve its goals peacefully.[5] Despite their very different views about the impact of hegemony, there is a surprising amount of agreement between liberal theorists and those ‘neo- Gramscians’ who draw their inspiration from a radical, Marxist tradition about the importance of ideas and institutions in entrenching hegemonic rule. Both stress the normative and ideational component of hegemonic rule, although they differ markedly on it overall impact. For liberals like John Ikenberry, American dominance has been effective and – until recently, at least – largely unchallenged, because it offered real advantages to subordinate powers which benefited from key collective goods like a relatively stable, liberal economic system and access to lucrative US markets.[6] Critical scholars like Robert Cox, have also emphasised the importance of pay-offs for subordinates, although these have been largely confined to members of the local ruling classes, rather than nations as a whole.[7] Both the liberal and critical perspectives highlight the potential strengthsand weaknesses of American power: the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions under US auspices in the aftermath of World War II plainly did entrench American power and offer potential advantages to allies as Ikenberry suggests. However, it is precisely this aspect of American power that is being undermined by its recent shift to more unilateral and/or bilateral policies, and encouraging a greater interest in regional mechanisms and strategies that could exclude the US as a consequence. This leads to an important insight developed by critical theorists: the operation and impact of hegemony is something that transcends national boundaries, and is not solely a consequence of state behaviour. Although nation-states generally and the US in particular remain the most important actors in the international system, particular sets of ideas, practices and power relations have taken on a distinctly trans-national form.[8]

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Aff—Link Turn: Withdrawal Key to Burden Sharing

Withdrawal Allows Others to Take the Burden Off American Hegemony, Makes it Sustainable Judah Grunstein, Managing Editor, “Haiti and the Constraints of American Hegemony,” World Politics Review, January 22nd, 2010 (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/blog/4986/haiti-and-the-constraints-of-american-hegemony)

What I find more revealing about the Haiti response is the degree to which U.S. policymakers felt they had no choice in the matter. For any number of reasons, they were right -- certainly with regards to the humanitarian intervention, and most likely with regards to the subsequent reconstruction efforts. That reflects, in part, the responsibilities inherent in the role of global hegemon, and it underscores a paradox we'd do well to consider. Iraq and Afghanistan have already demonstrated the limits of military force, in particular, and American power more generally. And Haiti itself is a testament to the limits of nation-building. And yet, despite the near-certainty that results will be disappointing, we have no choice but to act.

To paraphrase Madeleine Albright, What good is global hegemony if we have no choice but to use it?

That underscores what is perhaps the most significant long-term strategic objective of the Obama administration's foreign policy shift -- namely, the need to redistribute global responsibilities in order to lighten the burden borne by U.S. power. There's still a lot to be accomplished in terms of buy-in, both domestically, in terms of those who continue to advocate for American primacy, and abroad, among "freeloaders," happy to enjoy the benefits of global stability but reluctant to share the costs.

But as Haiti also illustrates, "the Rising Rest" -- and in particular Brazil and China -- now find themselves bound by the same constraints, albeit on a lesser scale. Due to global expectations, failure to act, for both, would cost more in terms of soft power than actual failure.

The comparison remains a limited one, because neither Brazil nor China will "own" the Haitian reconstruction effort to the same degree that the U.S. will (and currently does in any number of hot spots around the world). But the precedent is significant. The fact that Brazil is already on the ground in its peacekeeping role makes sending more troops that much more likely. And just five years after the Indonesian tsunami, China's ability and willingness to respond to a humanitarian disaster halfway around the world will only increase expectations for participation in subsequent reconstruction efforts and future stability operations.

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Aff—Link Turn: Afghanistan Withdrawal

American Attempts to Coerce the Middle East Prove that Coercive Heg Fails in the Status Quo, Plan Can Only be a Link Turn Michael Young, opinion editor of the Daily Star, “Obama’s timidity threatens US leadership in the region,” The National (UAE), March 17th, 2010 (http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100318/OPINION/703179924/0/FRONTPAGE)

The Obama administration has also publicly taken off the table a military operation to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Not only has the US reassured the Iranians on this count, it has not concealed its refusal to approve an Israeli attack on Iran. Regardless of whether Washington’s judgment is sound, brinkmanship is an essential part of successful negotiations. If Mr Obama’s allies see the president as passive, as accepting Iran’s fait accompli, they will not be motivated to act themselves; or worse, they will react in disparate ways, probably to Tehran’s advantage.

American leadership means just that: leading by co-ordinating the actions of allies in defence of common interests. Yet American allies, both in the Arab world and Israel, have shown a disconcerting willingness of late to flout Mr Obama. The so-called moderate Arabs rejected the president’s request to normalise relations with Israel, while only last week Israel sought to torpedo US-mediated proximity talks with the Palestinians by announcing new construction in East Jerusalem on the day the American vice president, Joe Biden, arrived in the country. The administration expressed anger, but now what? A Washington ineffective in dealing with Iran and Syria, but that also backed down in an earlier dispute with Israel over settlements, will need to exert much effort to impose some respect.

America still possesses tremendous power, and it may be premature to declare it on the ropes just yet. But the Obama administration appears deeply reluctant to employ that power, and has no discernible ethos giving higher meaning to its actions. If America’s decline is sudden, nothing in its present Middle Eastern behaviour will delay the onset.

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Aff—Link Turn: Afghanistan/Iraq Withdrawal

American Military Imperialism in the Middle East Creates Overstretch, Decimating Hegemony Francis Shor , Professor in History at Wayne State University, “War in the Era of Declining U.S. Global Hegemony,” Journal of Critical Globalization Studies, 2010 (http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/65_81_DECLINING_US_HEGEMONY_JCGS2.pdf)

Another very real dilemma for U.S. military imperialism and their global strategies, particularly as a consequence of the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan, is imperial overstretch. Both in terms of the eventual costs, estimated in the trillions of dollars just in the case of the war on Iraq, and the continuing drain on military personnel, these wars have further underscored the inherent contradictions of U.S. military imperialism and its war strategies. Even with active troops, counting the National Guard and Reserves, numbering over 2 million, the U.S. military has so depleted its human resources that it has resorted to extending tours in ways that have lowered morale and created even more internal dissent about deployment. Attempts to offset these problems by higher pay inducements, expansion of the numbers, and use of private contractors have only exacerbated the overall contradictions endemic in maintaining the kind of global garrison embodied by U.S. military imperialism. According to world-systems scholar Giovanni Arrighi, besides having “jeopardized the credibility of U.S. military might,” the war and occupation of Iraq may be one of the key components underlying the “terminal crisis of U.S. hegemony,” albeit without diminishing the U.S. role as “the world’s pre-eminent military power” (2005, p. 80). Nonetheless, as pointed out by other scholars (Johnson, 2004; Mann, 2003; Wallerstein, 2003), imperial overstretch was central to the demise of previous empires and now threatens the death of a U.S. empire also bent on fighting debilitating and self destructive wars.

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Aff—Link Turn: Afghanistan/Iraq Withdrawal

Attempts at American Military Presence in Afghansitan and Iraq is a Failed Strategy, It Cannot Create Stability, Only Engender Increased Conflict and Resentment, Doom All Aspects of Hegemony Francis Shor , Professor in History at Wayne State University, “War in the Era of Declining U.S. Global Hegemony,” Journal of Critical Globalization Studies, 2010 (http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/65_81_DECLINING_US_HEGEMONY_JCGS2.pdf)

Clearly, the pursuit of such wars also engenders resistance abroad and potential dissent at home, the latter, however, contingent on some fundamental understanding of the whys and wherefores of prosecuting war. Certainly, resistance to a militarized U.S. foreign policy is evident in various guises, from local insurgencies to global protests. Irrespective of the form such resistance may take, including insurgencies that engage in terror, the U.S. will encounter resistance as long as it insists on imposing its sense of order in the world. In effect, a “system of global domination resting largely on military force, or even the threat of force, cannot in the greater scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs on values” (Boggs, 2005, p. 178). On the other hand, U.S. perception of that resistance, whether by the ruling elite, corporate media, or the public at large, is filtered through an ideological smokescreen that either labels that resistance as “terrorism” or some primitive from of know-nothing anti-Americanism. Part of the inability to recognize the reality of what shapes the lives of others is the persistence of a self-image of U.S. benevolence or innocence, even in the face of the realities spawned by U.S. intervention and occupation.20 Also, what remains both contentious and difficult to face is the degree to which the United States, especially in its pursuit of global dominance through military imperialism, has become, to quote Walter Hixson, a “warfare state, a nation with a propensity for initiating and institutionalizing warfare” (2008, p. 14). For Hixson the perpetuation of that warfare state requires reaffirming a national identity whose cultural hegemony at home can provide ideological cover for “nation building, succoring vicious regimes, bombing shelling, contaminating, torturing and killing hundreds of thousands of innocents, and destroying enemy others” (2008, p. 304). As the bodies pile up, however, the ability to maintain hegemony abroad and even at home is eroded. Yet, war, as a political strategy, remains a compulsive choice by those elite forces in the United States waging a losing struggle to retain global hegemony. As argued by one fierce critic of U.S. military imperialism: “All presidents, whether Democrats or Republicans, have sought to shape the contours of politics worldwide. This global mission and fascination with military power has entangled [U.S.] priorities and stretched its resources over and over again” (Kolko, 2006, p. 95). Although imperial overstretch is even more pronounced in the aftermath of the recent world-wide economic crisis and the proliferation of conflicts in new regions, the fundamental bi-partisan commitment by the political elite to exercising, in the words of President Barack Obama, “global leadership” will continue (quoted in Bacevich, 2008, pp. 79-80).

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Aff—Link Turn: Iraq Withdrawal

Withdrawal From Iraq Won’t Kill Hegemony, It Will Strengthen Image and Prevent Crippling Quagmires—Only the Aff Can Recover Fareed Zakaria, Executive International Editor at Newsweek, “The Post-Imperial Presidency,” Newsweek, December 5th, 2009 (http://www.newsweek.com/id/225824)

Ultimately, however, one hopes that President Obama will keep another lesson of Vietnam firmly in mind. Withdrawing from a messy situation did not permanently damage America's national security. The United States suffered the most humiliating exit imaginable from South Vietnam in 1975, followed by reversals in Africa, Central America, and Iran. Yet within a decade, America had regained a commanding position internationally, and within 15 years its principal adversary, the Soviet Union, had collapsed. The key element in this resurgence was nothing that happened abroad— it was America's ability to revive its economic strength at home, the engine of its superpower status. The history of great powers suggests that maintaining their position requires, most crucially, tending to the sources of their power: economic growth and technological innovation. It also means concentrating on the centers of global power, not the periphery. Throughout history great nations have lost their way by getting bogged down in imperial missions far from home that crippled their will, strength, and focus. (Even when they won: Britain prevailed in the Boer War, but it broke the back of the empire.) It's important to remember that in the coming century it will be America's dominant position in Asia—its role as the balancer in the Pacific—that will be pivotal to its role as a global superpower, not whatever happens in the mountains of Afghanistan.

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Aff—Link Turn: Iraq Withdrawal

Withdrawal From Iraq is Our Only Chance to Save Hegemony—Continued Occupation Will End it Lt General WILLIAM E. ODOM, US Army, Prof of Political Science at Yale, “American Hegemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, December 2007 (http://www.amphilsoc.org/sites/default/files/1510403.pdf)

As a spectacular example of how to squander American hegemony— fiscally, militarily, politically, and morally—the war in Iraq will probably turn out to be the greatest strategic mistake in American history. Can we still save the American empire? Or is it too late? We can, but we must act soon. The first step must be withdrawal from Iraq. That invasion was never in American interests. Rather, it advanced the interests of Iran by avenging Saddam’s invasion of that country. And it advanced al Qaeda’s interests by making Iraq open for its cadres. They are killing both Americans and Iraqis there in growing numbers, and taking their newly gained skills to other countries. Many reports suggest that al Qaeda was in desperate condition by spring 2002 and that only after the U.S. invasion of Iraq did its recruiting powers recover and its funding sources replenish its coffers. Apparently, President Bush came to Osama bin Laden’s rescue in his nadir. The irony would be comical if it were not so tragic. All the debate today over the tactical mistakes we have made in Iraq is beside the point. All of the unhappy consequences were destined to occur once the invasion started. Most worrisome, the war has paralyzed the United States strategically. The precondition for regaining diplomatic and military mobility is withdrawal, no matter what kind of mess is left behind. The United States bears the blame for it, but it cannot avoid the consequences by “staying the course.” Every day we remain on that course increases the costs and makes the eventual defeat larger. Only after the United States withdraws can it possibly rally sufficient international support to prevent the spread of the damage beyond the region, and it might bring some order to the region as well.

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Aff—Link Turn: Iraq Withdrawal

Ending War in Iraq is the Only Chance to Restore Leadership Barrack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs, July-August, 2007 (http://pierretristam.com/Bobst/07/wf070607a.htm)

To renew American leadership in the world, we must first bring the Iraq war to a responsible end and refocus our attention on the broader Middle East. Iraq was a diversion from the fight against the terrorists who struck us on 9/11, and incompetent prosecution of the war by America's civilian leaders compounded the strategic blunder of choosing to wage it in the first place. We have now lost over 3,300 American lives, and thousands more suffer wounds both seen and unseen. Our servicemen and servicewomen have performed admirably while sacrificing immeasurably. But it is time for our civilian leaders to acknowledge a painful truth: we cannot impose a military solution on a civil war between Sunni and Shiite factions. The best chance we have to leave Iraq a better place is to pressure these warring parties to find a lasting political solution. And the only effective way to apply this pressure is to begin a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces, with the goal of removing all combat brigades from Iraq by March 31, 2008 -- a date consistent with the goal set by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group. This redeployment could be temporarily suspended if the Iraqi government meets the security, political, and economic benchmarks to which it has committed. But we must recognize that, in the end, only Iraqi leaders can bring real peace and stability to their country.

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Aff—Link Turn: Japan Withdrawal

Engagement With China is the Only Way to Avoid Future Devestating Conflicts—Demilitarizing Japan is Crucial to Facilitate Succesful Cooperation to Address Global Challenges Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Engaging China to maintain peace in East Asia,” Daily Caller, May 25th, 2010 (http://dailycaller.com/2010/05/25/engaging-china-to-maintain-peace-in-east-asia/3/)

While the U.S. remains involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, East Asia contains the seeds of potentially bigger conflicts. China holds the key to maintaining regional peace. For instance, the Republic of Korea is imposing economic sanctions on North Korea after the latter sank a South Korean naval vessel. A military response could set off a retaliatory spiral leading to war. With 27,000 troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, Washington could not easily stay out of any conflict. Less obvious but potentially more serious is the future status of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China insists that the island, separated from the mainland by Japanese occupation and civil war, return to Beijing’s authority. The Taiwanese people are never likely to support control by the PRC. Although China-Taiwan relations have improved with a new government in Taipei, Beijing may grow impatient as its power increases and be tempted to substitute coercion for negotiation. However, Washington has implicitly guaranteed Taipei’s security, which could lead to a serious military confrontation between the U.S. and China. How to maintain the peace in East Asia? Washington must engage the PRC on both issues. America’s relationship with Beijing will have a critical impact on the development of the 21st century. Disagreements are inevitable; conflict is not. China is determined to take an increasingly important international role. It is entitled to do so. However, it should equally commit to acting responsibly. As the PRC grows economically, expands its military, and gains diplomatic influence, it will be able to greatly influence international events, especially in East Asia. If it does so for good rather than ill, its neighbors will be less likely to fear the emerging superpower. Most important, responsible Chinese policy will diminish the potential for military confrontation between Beijing and Asian states as well as the U.S. In return, Washington should welcome China into the global leadership circle if its rise remains peaceful and responsible. American analysts have expressed concern about a Chinese military build-up intended to prevent U.S. intervention along the PRC’s border. But the U.S. cannot expect other states to accept American dominance forever. Any American attempt to contain Beijing is likely to spark—predictably—a hostile response from China. Instead, Washington policymakers should prepare for a world in which reciprocity replaces diktat. The U.S. could encourage Chinese responsibility by adopting policies that highlight the importance of the PRC’s role in promoting regional peace and stability. Such an approach is most needed to deal with the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. For instance, Beijing could play a critical role in restraining and ultimately transforming the North. So far the PRC has declined to apply significant pressure on its long-time ally. In fact, North Korea’s Kim Jong-il recently visited China, presumably in pursuit of additional economic aid and investment. His quid pro quo might have been a professed willingness to return to the Six-Party nuclear talks. But few analysts believe there is much chance of a nuclear deal whether or not these negotiations proceed—and almost certainly no chance unless the PRC is prepared to get tough with the North, including threatening to cut off generous food and energy shipments. To encourage Beijing, Washington should suggest that China would share the nightmare if an unstable North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal. The North’s nuclear program would yield concern even in the best of cases. But the so- called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is no best case. The regime started a war in 1950 and engaged in terrorism into the 1980s. Pyongyang has cheerfully sold weapons to all comers. Worse, today it appears to be in the midst of an uncertain leadership transition. If North Korean forces sank the South Korean vessel, then either Kim Jong-il is ready to risk war or has lost control of the military, which is ready to risk war. The Obama administration should indicate to the PRC that Washington will face sustained pressure to take military action against the North—which obviously would not be in Beijing’s interest. Should the DPRK amass a nuclear arsenal, the U.S. would have no more desire than China to be in the middle of a messy geopolitical confrontation, especially one that could go nuclear. Thus, Washington would not be inclined to block decisions by the ROK and Japan to create countervailing nuclear arsenals. Just as the prospect of a North Korean bomb worries the U.S., the possibility of a Japanese nuclear capacity would unsettle the PRC. Should China take the tough, even risky (from its standpoint) steps necessary to moderate or transform Pyongyang, Washington should promise to reciprocate. The DPRK poses the greatest threat to regional peace and security. Eliminate it, and eliminate the principal justification for a U.S. military presence in East Asia. Most obvious would be a promise not to maintain American bases or troops in the Korean peninsula, whether united or divided. Pulling back units from Japan would also be warranted.

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Aff—Link Turn: Japan Withdrawal

Failure to Account for Japanese Interests and Desires Crushes American Hegemony in Asia Robert Dujarric, Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs, “The future of US hegemony in East Asia,” World Security Newtork, October 17th, 2002 (http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=8724)

The third element of American hegemony is the partnership nature of America’s alliances. America’s allies in Northeast Asia – and Europe – are rich and autonomous. They are not like the colonies of traditional empires nor are they like the small impoverished Caribbean islands where the US can exercise its influence almost unilaterally.

The US is more powerful than Japan, having an economy about twice the size and a military vastly greater than Japan’s. Nevertheless, the US cannot successfully manage its Japan relationship, and therefore its hegemony in Asia, if it does not take into account Japanese interests.

The behavior of the Bush administration, where it seems to relish in ignoring the interests and wishes of its allies (Kyoto Protocol, International Criminal Court, arms control agreements, Israel-Palestine, Iraq) raises serious questions about America’s ability to maintain strong relations with its allies. So far, this has been more of a problem in Europe, which is more directly affected by the Iraq issue and other international treaties, than with Japan, though the Japanese relationship is not unaffected by the behavior of the Bush administration.

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Aff—Link Turn: Japan Withdrawal

Attempts to Force Japan Can Only Drive it Towards China Leon Hadar, Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Old U.S. allies are hedging their strategic bets,” World Bulletin, December 24th, 2009 (http://www.worldbulletin.net/author_article_detail.php?id=2104)

Similarly, there is clearly no support in Japan for becoming part of a Sinic-dominated regional system or for ejecting America from East Asia. Like Turkey, Japan does not want to put all its strategic and economic eggs in an American basket that seems to be full of so many holes. It has no interest in being perceived as an American proxy intent on containing China. And it wants to benefit in terms of trade and investment from the economic rise of China and the integration of the region. Hence, Washington should welcome these steps towards strategic adjustment being pursued by its allies and refrain from any attempt to force them to re-embrace to the old subservient approach towards the United States. The United States lacks the power to impose its agenda on these allies. And if it insists on doing that, it could turn them from partners into rivals.

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Aff—Link Turn: Turkey Withdrawal

Turkey is Already Tilting Towards China—American Presence Can Only Infuriate Anti- American Sentiment More Gideon Rachman, Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent, “America is losing the free world,” Financial Times, January 11th, 2010 (http://kasamaproject.org/2010/01/11/u-s-losing-grab-for-world-hegemony/)

If climate change were an isolated example, it might be dismissed as an important but anomalous issue that is almost designed to split countries along rich-poor lines. But, in fact, if you look at Brazil, South Africa, India and Turkey – the four most important democracies in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the greater Middle East – it is clear that none of them can be counted as a reliable ally of the US, or of a broader “community of democracies”. In the past year, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil has cut a lucrative oil deal with China, spoken warmly of Hugo Chávez, president of Venezuela, and congratulated Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad on his “victory” in the Iranian presidential election, while welcoming him on a state visit to Brazil. During a two-year stint on the United Nations Security Council from 2006, the South Africans routinely joined China and Russia in blocking resolutions on human rights and protecting authoritarian regimes such as Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan and Iran. Turkey, once regarded as a crucial American ally in the cold war and then trumpeted as the only example of a secular, pro-western, Muslim democracy, is also no longer a reliable partner for the west. Ever since the US-led invasion of Iraq, opinion polls there have shown very high levels of anti-Americanism. The mildly Islamist AKP government has engaged with America’s regional enemies – including Hamas, Hizbollah and Iran – and alarmed the Americans by taking an increasingly hostile attitude to Israel. India’s leaders do seem to cherish the idea that they have a “special relationship” with the US. But even the Indians regularly line up against the Americans on a range of international issues, from climate change to the Doha round of trade negotiations and the pursuit of sanctions against Iran or Burma. So what is going on? The answer is that Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and India are all countries whose identities as democracies are now being balanced – or even trumped – by their identities as developing nations that are not part of the white, rich, western world. All four countries have ruling parties that see themselves as champions of social justice at home and a more equitable global order overseas. Brazil’s Workers’ party, India’s Congress party, Turkey’s AKP and South Africa’s African National Congress have all adapted to globalisation – but they all retain traces of the old suspicions of global capitalism and of the US. Mr Obama is seen as a huge improvement on George W. Bush – but he is still an American president. As emerging global powers and developing nations, Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey may often feel they have more in common with a rising China than with the democratic US.

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Aff—Link Turns: Nuclear Withdrawal

Removing Nuclear Weapons Enhances American Hegemony and Prevents Total Armageddon Jerome Grossman, Chairman Emeritus of Council for a Livable World, “Accepting American Hegemony,” Atlantic Community, January 22nd, 2010 (http://www.atlantic- community.org/index/articles/view/Accepting_American_Hegemony)

President Barack Obama has called for a major change in world policy on nuclear weapons, leading to eventual elimination. His initiative is supported by a powerful group of conservative and military allies led by former Republican Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz and Democrats former Secretary of Defense William Perry and Sam Nunn, longtime Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee. These leaders recognize that nuclear weapons are the most inhumane and dangerous ever conceived, that kill and maim without discrimination, the only weapons ever invented that could destroy all life on planet Earth. That must not happen. Disarmament is the only answer: If any country has nuclear weapons, others will want them. Then, some day they will be used by accident, mistake, or design - the ultimate catastrophe. These conservative leaders agree with the Democrats in the US Senate. Both argue for dramatic reforms in the US and world nuclear policy. The problem is political, how to persuade the Republican Senators to adopt these reforms. It won’t happen unless Kissinger et al do some serious lobbying. Obama can not do it alone and GOP support is essential. While the public argument will advocate the ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons, immediate reduction of all nuclear arsenals, guarding nukes and nuclear materials, enhanced verification and enforcement procedures, their private argument will point out that complete and verifiable elimination of all nukes will enhance world-wide US military hegemony. During President Clinton’s administration, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was sent to the US Senate for approval. It failed to reach the 67 votes necessary for ratification, but did attain a majority, 51- 49. In 2010, there will be another attempt to reach 67, hopefully by persuading seven Republicans to join 60 Democrats. Some conservatives and military leaders believe that a worldwide policy of no nukes would be the most advantageous policy for the US, enhancing and protecting its status as the only military superpower with the capability to deploy overwhelming non-nuclear forces anywhere on earth in a matter of hours. It would legitimize US action against alleged rogue states and tighten control over the nuclear black market. It would support the present US hegemony by eliminating the so-called suicide defense prepared by North Korea and Iran. Giving up nuclear weapons and accepting US hegemony may be the price that humanity must pay to avert the threat of total annihilation.

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Aff—Heg Bad: Middle East

Collapsing American Hegemony in the Middle East is Crucial to Create New Security Arrangments and Development Leon Hadar, Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Old U.S. allies are hedging their strategic bets,” World Bulletin, December 24th, 2009 (http://www.worldbulletin.net/author_article_detail.php?id=2104)

Indeed, the collapse of the U.S. hegemonic project in the Middle East and the rise of Iran as the new regional power, has created incentives Turkey to fill the strategic vacuum by strengthening its political and economic ties with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and other Arab governments as well as with Iran (Erdogan has defended that country's nuclear program) and even with old-time foes like the Armenians and the Kurds, while distancing itself from Israel. In a way, not unlike Japan, Turkey seems to be in the process of reorienting its relationship from the United States as it attempts to re-establish itself as a regional power. But the new foreign policy direction that seems to be embraced by Turkey and Japan is not an indication that these two governments are pursuing an anti-American agenda or are embarking on a civilizational confrontation with a U.S.- led. Turkey is not about to join Iran or anti-American governments and groups to force the U.S. out of the Middle East. Instead, it is responding the erosion in the power of the U.S. there by creating new partnerships that could help stabilize the region: helping other Sunni governments to counter-balance the rising power of Shiite Iran's; trying to serve as a peace mediator (between Syria and Israel, for example); preventing the disintegration of Iraq by strengthening ties with the Kurds; and facilitating trade and investment.

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Aff—Heg Bad: Middle East

American Hegemony Can’t Succeed in the Middle East—It Has Already Collapsed, Attempting to Reassert it Can Only Create Conflict Anthony Bubalo, director of the West Asia program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, “Ambivalence on the Middle East does not work,” The Australian, May 3rd, 2010 (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/ambivalence- on-the-middle-east-does-not-work/story-e6frg6ux-1225861248469)

It is often forgotten that American hegemony in the Middle East - in the sense of an overwhelmingly dominant position - dates only to 1991. During the Cold War, the competing power of the Soviet Union and the US limited what each could do. The American defeat of Iraq in 1991, and the Soviet Union's meek acquiescence in the war, signalled a change. After 1991, Washington could contemplate ways to transform the Middle East, something that was unthinkable in the Cold War era. Under Bill Clinton, it sought transformation via Israeli-Arab peace; under George W. Bush it sought change via democratic revolution. Yet the next two decades only demonstrated the limits of US power. Israeli-Arab peace proved elusive, despite the microscopic attention of Clinton. Bush's democratic revolution never escaped the tar pit of its birth, Iraq. Iran, meanwhile, moved steadily towards a nuclear capability. The end of America's hegemony does not mean the end of US power in the Middle East, but it does mean a change in perceptions of that power. As former French foreign minister Herbert Vedrine once observed of US hegemony globally, it was not oppressive, but existed "in people's heads" - and so it has been in the Middle East. Had the US been more successful, or less ambitious, in its designs for regional transformation over the past two decades, it might still be in people's heads. Instead, diplomatic and military failures have confirmed in the minds of foes and friends that American hegemony has proven to be something less than was initially promised or feared. Which brings us to the second major change under way in the Middle East: the region's reconnection with Asia. Today, the rise of China and India and an expanding web of economic and strategic links across the Asian continent are reviving the old idea of "the Orient" as one region stretching horizontally from the Middle East to East Asia. The Middle East's reintegration into Asia is not just economic. West Asia has become East Asia's energy lifeline, a fact already feeding into Asian rivalries. For example, Japan's decision in 2006 to increase to 40 per cent the amount of its oil secured by Japanese-owned companies followed the success of Chinese companies in getting access to Middle East (and African) oil resources. This reconnection with Asia is also helping to erode American hegemony. China cannot challenge US military power in the region, but regional states are being drawn to China's economic power. Iran is already leveraging that power, but even US allies in the Gulf, still reliant on American brute force for their external security, are increasingly dependent on China for their economic security.

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Aff—AT: Collapse A-polarity

Status Quo Proves the Decline of Hegemony Doesn’t Result in Collapse—Coalitions and Rising Powers Will Create New Security Structures to More Effectively Address World Problems Daniel Larson, Political Blogger, “U.S. Failing To Adjust To A Multipolar World,” The American Conservative, May 21st, 2010 (http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/05/21/u-s-failing-to-adjust-to-a-multipolar-world/)

Iran has many trading partners that are interested in improving their relations with Iran’s government, and much of the rest of the world does not believe Iran’s nuclear program is a major threat, so it was a matter of time before our obsession with this issue would generate dissatisfaction and action from other states. Had Obama continued every Bush policy and conducted himself in the same way, he would not have delayed this from happening, and instead might have made sure that it happened almost immediately after he took office. Hegemonists believe that an assertive, aggressive U.S. abroad helps to guarantee global stability and peace. Even though I think this is mistaken in important ways, there is an even greater flaw in hegemonists’ thinking, which is the assumption that U.S. allies and non-aligned states must see these things in more or less the same way that the hegemonists do. If Turkey and Brazil try to prevent Iran from being sanctioned, the only way hegemonists can see this is as an expression of anti-American rebellion. It does not seem to occur to them that Turkey and Brazil want to preserve peace and stability in the region and simply have no confidence in going the sanctions route, which they and everyone else have seen fail time after time in numerous cases. Turkey has been building strong ties with Iran for several years, and this rapprochement predates Obama’s time in office. Turkey has important energy interests in Iran, and wants to find a way to resolve the nuclear issue without sanctions. The Turkish government was fiercely opposed to the Iraq war, and they are likewise opposed to any confrontational policy towards Iran that could lead to another conflict. They obviously have a vested interest in stability on their borders. The Iraq war was responsible for alienating a lot of Turks from the United States and allowing Erdogan to pursue a more assertive and independent course. Brazil has been becoming a regional power with its own foreign policy agenda for some time, and Brazil is becoming more active internationally now that Lula is nearing the end of his term. Riding high at home, Lula has been taking steps in recent years to raise Brazils’ profile internationally, and this nuclear deal with Iran is just one of those efforts. Turkey and Brazil are emerging as significant powers in their own right, which would have happened regardless of what any administration following Bush did or didn’t do. Washington needs to learn how to cope with this without slapping them down and trying to humiliate them.