JANUA R Y - JUNE 2000 VOL IV NO 1

Colonial N arne, Colonial Mentality and Ethnocentrism

NATHAN GILBERT QUIMPO Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

.JAY L BATONGBACAL Some Marine Transport Concerns

GLENN D AGUILAR

BOOK REVIEW Edgar Wickberg: The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850- 189 8

MICHAEL L TAN

P 350 in the Philippines 10 elsewhere RlJBLIC YOLICY

EDITORIAL BOARD Francisco Nemenzo Jr, Chairman; Emil Q Javier; Jose Abueva; Edgardo J Angara; Emmanuel V Soriano, Onofre D Corpuz; Raul V Fabella; Maria Carmen C Jimenez; Jose N Endriga

Managing Editor: MARIA CARMEN C JIMENEZ Research Assistant: RAPHAEL 0 CADA Design: ARIEL G MANUEL

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Editor's Note

ESSAYS Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality and Ethnocentrism Nathan Gilbert Quimpo 1 Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines Jay L Batongbacal 51 Some Marine Transport Concerns Glenn D Aguilar 93

BOOK REVIEW

Edgar Wickberg: The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898 Michael L Tan 121 EDITOR'S NOTE

Obviously, changes have happened at the Public Policy, as a look at its cover signals. Now managed by the Center for Integrative and Development Studies {CIDS), the policy-research body of the University of the Philippines, it will appear bi-annually, instead of quarterly and will feature papers focusing on policy issues and concerns, with topics discussed in depth by experts and specialists in these areas. There are three papers in this issue. The first is a rather controversial article by Nathan Gilbert Quimpo on the implications of the name Philippines on the people's self esteem and sense of personal and collective valuation as well as consciousness and identity. And while he does not simplify the continuing conflict in Mindanao by suggesting its resolution hinges on a name change, he does suggest that the inability of Moslems to identify themselves as Filipinos is based on an association of the name Philippines with a colonial past which they do not share. The other two papers focus attention on maritime affairs and the archipelagic character of the Philippines. That by Jay Batongbacal considers the role of the Philippines as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its implications on national territory and the definition of our national boundaries while Glenn Aguilar highlights the problems regarding marine transport. Arguing for a stricter implementation of the many laws and regulations governing marine transport to minimize all-too-frequent disasters at sea, he also presents the case for more support of research and development to aid legislation and a greater consciousness of and pride in our maritime history and environment inculcated through school curricula. All three papers, along with a Book Review by Michael Tan, provide more than just pleasurable reading; they inform, provoke and hopefully, will move us towards action. l?iJBLIC JANUARY-JUNE 2000 1-0LICY VOL IV NO 1 Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality and Ethnocentrism

NATHAN GILBERT QUIMPO

The Philippines is named after the Spanish king, Philip II, under whose or­ ders the country was colonized in 1565. Since the Philippines gained indepen­ dence in 1946, there have been several attempts to have the country's nam~ changed, mainly on the grounds that it is of colonial extraction. Each proposal for a name change has been shot down, and Philippines has prevailed. Defenders of Phillppines have argued that it is the veritable symbol of a saga of nation-building, of the struggle for freedom, and a true emblem of the nation and of national identity. While millions have proudly identified themselves as Filipinos and hundreds of thousands have fought or even died in the name of the Philippines, Phtlippines and Filipino are both tarnished terms. There is more to their being colonial-they repre­ sent what Frantz Fanon referred to as the internalization or "epidermalization" of inferiority among peoples subjected to colonization. Moreover, at different stages of the country's history, Phz1ippines and Fz1ipino have been associated with t'acial, class, ethnic/national and religious discrimination. A significant section of Muslim "Filipi­ nos" have objected to these terms, claiming these to be of colonial origin and insulting to their creed. In this writer's view, Philippines and Ft1ipino are reflecti~e of the ethno­ centric bias of the Christian majority and of the ethnocratic tenden~es of the Philip­ pine state. Quimpo

While the name Philippines is certainly not the matrix of the colonial mentality that persists among many Filipinos, changing it may provide added impetus to the process of cultural decolonization. And while the roots of the long-standing armed conflict in southern Philippines are much more complex than terminological issues, the process of a name change may help in righting historical distortions about Mus­ lims, reconstructing a truly multi-ethnic and multicultural national identity and resolv­ ing the armed conflict.

FILIPINO nationalism is a contradiction in terms. Nationalism, as defined by Anthony D Smith, is an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by at least some of its members to constitute an actual or potential "na­ 1 tion. " Among the peoples of Asia and Africa, the nationalism that emerged and developed in the late nineteenth century and in most of the twentieth was a specifi­ cally anti-colonial form of nationalism, as the experience of colonial rule helped to create a "national consciousness" and a desire for "independence" or "national liberation". To make themselves a free nation, a people had to break the shackles of colonialism. "Nationalism," declared Claro M Recto, possibly the Philippines' fore­ 2 most nationalist statesman, "is the natural antagonist of colonialism. " Filipino comes from the word Filipinas, of which Philt'ppines is the English trans­ lation. Felipinas was the name given by the Spanish explorer Ruy de Villalobos to Tendaya (Leyte or Samar) in 1543 in honor of the Spanish crown prince, Philip (Felipe in Spanish)/ who later became King Philip II (r. 1556-98). Villalobos later applied Felipinas to all the islands of the (Philippine) archipelago. After Miguel Lopez de Legazpi began the colonization of the islands in 1565, Felipinas became Filipinas. The natives literally became subjects of Felipe. From their very origins then, Philippines and Filipino are colonial names, and as such, are contradictory to the term nationalism. Simply on the basis of the colonial roots of Philippines, it can already be argued that the country's name should be changed. Indeed, many former colonies have discarded their colonial appellations and adopted titles that are of more indigenous or un-colonial derivation: Burkina Faso, Namibia, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.

2 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

NAME CHANGE: OLD HAT?

But then, it can be countered, the idea of a name change is old hat. Back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the dictator Ferdinand Marcos attempted to foist upon the Filipino people the name Maharlzka. In pre-colonial Philippines, maharlika de­ noted a warrior-noble who belonged to the lower aristocracy and who rendered 4 military service to his lord. But Maharlzka also happened to be the nom de guerre that Marcos, vaunted to be the most bemedalled Filipino soldier, used as an anti­ Japanese guerrilla soldier in World War II. It was also the name of the guerrilla unit that Marcos claimed to have formed and led in World War II and to have grown 5 into a 9 ,200-strong force in 1945. Marcos' sycophants tried to appeal to the Filipi­ nos' sense of nationalism, arguing that Philippines merely reflected the victories of the country's invaders. They cast aspersions on the competence and character of Philip II, pointing out that he reigned badly and precipitated Spain's decline as a world power, and that he succumbed to venereal disease, a scourge of royalty and nobility then. To drum up support for Maharlzka, the Marcos regime concocted and peddled the "Maharlika culture" which was purportedly based on pre-colonial na­ tive traditions and values. The search for national identity and culture became the 6 search for the "maharlika qualities" of the Filipino. Those who took up the cudgels for Philippines likewise sought to evoke nation­ alist sentiments, but did so perhaps more ardently and convincingly. The name Philippines, according to Remigio Agpalo, was enshrined in the country's poetry, essays, speeches, letters, state documents as well as in patriotic music, and was "a symbol of a saga of nation-building, a struggle for freedom, a history written in the blood and sweat of Rizal, Bonifacio and many other national heroes and in the sweat and tears of ordinary citizens." To replace Philippines with Maharlika, argued Agpalo, is "to cut ourselves from the historical, emotional and ideological roots of our national identity, leaving us without vital sources of purpose, meaning, and life" 7 and "to break faith with our fathers and grandfathers who fell in the night." Up­ holders of Philippines subjected Maharlzka to ridicule, claiming, for instance, that 8 the term, which was of Sanskrit origin, actually meant "big phallus.'' The main reason why Maharlika did not pass, however, .w:as that people saw it as Marcos' ego trip. Some Filipinos recalled with bemusementhow Marcos, in pre-

VOLUME N NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 3 Quimpo martial law days, had attempted to have a film about his war exploits entitled "Maharlika" produced, with Hollywood starlet Dovie Beams playing the part. of Marcos' "leading lady." (The film was never finished. A scandal broke out when Marcos' amorous affair with Ms. Beams was exposed.) It wasn't funny anymore when Marcos decreed Maharlika for exclusive government use and when he had a highway, a government-owned radio-TV company and even the reception area of the presidential residence, among others, all re-christened Maharlika. Some saw something more ulterior and sinister. Reuben R. Canoy warned: "[S]hould the coun­ try and its leader be known by one name and the people conditioned to the idea that the President/Prime Minister not only represents but is the state, there may come a time when to assail Marcos would be construed as an attack against the state itself and, therefore, within the purview of treason or any of the crimes against 9 the public order or the stability and security of the nation." Even among Marcos' own supporters, there were few outspoken advocates for Maharlika. By the last few years of Marcos' rule, Maharlzka was a lost cause. Then, in 1985, the M,lharlika guerrilla unit as well as Marcos' much-ballyhooed war exploits were exposed as . 10 hoaxes or at best, exaggerations. Since the Maharlika episode, there have been several attempts to change the country's name. Among the alternative names submitted to the Constitutional Commission of 1986 and to the Philippine Congress were Rizal, the name of the country's national hero; Bayani, an indigenous Tagalog term which means "hero"; and Luzviminda, short for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, the names- of pre-His­ panic origins - of the three main island groups of the Philippine archipelago. Al­ most each time, the main argument presented for the name change was that Philip­ pines is of colonial origin. The new proposals have all been shot down and Philip­ pines has prevailed. Columnist Ricardo Malay opines that it is only a small but vocal group that "ritually calls for the changing of the country's name after something that is more ethnologically acceptable." While lauding the patriotic intentions behind the initia­ tive to rename the country Rizal, Malay nonetheless maintained that such a move would not make any difference. 'We can't wish away our colonial past by eradicat­ ing the name of King Philip who, despite his venal reign and venereal disease, was

4 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism the sovereign at the time of the conquista ,"he wrote. "There is no real stigma to the name Philippines any more than there is to America, named after the Italian Amerigo ,7:vespucc1. . ,11 Is the name Phzlippines indeed the veritable symbol of a saga of nation-build­ ing, a struggle for freedom, a history written in the blood, sweat and tears of the country's heroes and people? Is it a true emblem of the nation and of national identity? Is there indeed no real stigma to such a name of colonial extract? Or They in fact represent have historians and other social scientists what Frantz Fanon failed to look hard enough or worse, cho­ referred to. as the sen to gloss over the blot? In over a century since Rizal con­ internalization or ceived of the country as an independent "epidermalization" of Philippines, millions have proudly iden­ inferiority among peoples tified themselves as Filipinos and hun­ subjected to colonization dreds of thousands have gone to battle or prolonged oppression. or even died in the name of the Philip­ pines. Nonetheless, Philippines and Fili- pino are both tarnished terms. There is more to their being colonial than historians and other social scientists have perceived or cared to admit. They in fact represent what Frantz Fanon referred to as the internalization or "epidermalization" of inferi­ ority among peoples subjected to colonization or prolonged oppression. Moreover, in different stages of the country's history- and not just during the Spanish period - Phzlippines and Filipino have been associated with racial, class, ethnic/national and religious discrimination. Far more than just "a vocal and small group" have actually been opposed to Philippines and Filipino. For some time now, a significant section of Muslim "Filipi­ nos" have been raising objections to these terms, precisely on the grounds that these are of colonial origin and insulting to their creed. Some objectors have gone even further, rejecting Filipinism, the ideology that "Filipino nationalism" has spawned. Many other Muslims and members of other minority ethnic groups have taken an ambivalent attitude. The Muslim objectors have ndt bothered to cam-

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 5 Quimpo paign for a change in the country's name because they have been busy doing some­ thing else - like fighting a war of secession. In this writer's view, Philippines and Filipino are reflective of the ethnocentric bias of the Christian majority and the ethnocratic tendencies of the Philippine state. While the name Philippines cannot by any means be considered as the matrix of the so-called "colonial men~ality" that persists among many Filipinos, changing it may provide added impetus to the ... the process of replacing process of the country's cultural decolonization. And while the roots of the country's name with a the armed conflict in southern Philip­ new national symbol may pines are much more complex than ter­ help in righting historical minological issues, the process of replac­ distortions about Muslims ing the country's name with a new na­ and other ethnic groups ... tional symbol may help in righting his­ torical distortions about Muslims and other ethnic groups, reconstructing a truly multi-ethnic and multicultural national identity and resolving the long-stand­ ing armed ethnic conflict in the South.

I. Colonial Name

By European standards, Philip II was not as bad a monarch as he has been portrayed to be by some advocates of the renaming of the Philippines. It is true that under his rule, the Spanish empire did suffer certain great failures- the revolt of the Netherlands, the defeat of the Great Armada and, during his latter years, the eco­ nomic impoverishment of Spain. But these failures were offset by such achieve­ ments, among others, as the acquisition of Portugal and its vast colonial empire, the destruction of the hitherto invincible sea power of Turkey at Lepanto and the 12 growth of literature, art and science. Philip II bequeathed to his son Philip III the 13 same legacy of war and bankruptcy that he inherited from his father Charles V. Although Spain's decline did begin in the latter part of Philip II's rule, it was never­ theless under his rule that, as Norman Davies put it, Spain stood at the pinnacle of

6 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

14 its political and cultural power. The claim that Philip II died of venereal disease appears to be without much basis. Like his forebears, Philip II suffered from the gout. As he grew older, attacks of the gout recurred with increasing frequency and were compounded by other ailments. A modern-day diagnosis of Philip's condi­ tion suggests that in his last years, he suffered from both arteriosclerosis and ne- .. 15 p hntis. For Filipinos (outside of the Muslims in southern Philippines whose case will be discussed later), the stigma of the name Philippines has nothing to do with the person of Philip II. In fact, in Spain, Philip II, who was also called Philip the Wise, has generally been regarded as a great king and his reign as the culminating glory of 16 Spanish history. Spaniards could very well argue that he is much more deserving than Amerigo Vespucci of a tract of land being named after him. What Philippines has that America does not have, however, is the colonial stigma. The Philippines, christened after a Spanish monarch, was colonized by Spain; America, named after an Italian navigator-geographer, was colonized by Spain, Portugal, England, France and the Netherlands, but not by Italy nor the small kingdoms, principalities and republics that preceded it. In the analysis ofT J S George, the Philippines' obviously colonial name has emphasized the Filipino's hispanization, which "by definition has meant a degree of de-Asianization, a certain debasement of native nationalism." Each time a Fili­ pino refers to himself as such, he is unconsciously proclaiming his former allegiance to Philip II and his descendants. George continued: Ex-colonies the world over have marked their liberation by casting off the names given to them by colonialists. Only in rare instances was this done out of emotional parochialism: in most cases the colonial names were so patently colonial that they just had to go. The Philippines was an extreme example, being one of the few colonies named after an individual colonial monarch. This made the name, in the post-colonial era, both 17 derogatorv and anachronistic. (Underscoring supplied.)

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 7 Quimpo

From filipino to Filipino The colonial coloring of Philippines has peen deepened by Filipino. When the Spaniards arrived in the sixteenth century, they named the land Philippines but they did not call the natives Filipinos. Originally, the term/ilipino (spelled with a small/) was reserved only for Spaniards born in the Philippines. The natives were called indios (Indians), the very same term that Columbus used for the indigenous population of the New World. The Spanish colonialists pursued a blatantly racialist policy in their colonies. Their treatment of the indios, whom they regarded as belonging to the "primitive" and "inferior races" and as fit to be enslaved or subjugated, is already well known to present-day Filipinos. What is less known is that the Spaniards were so obsessed with the question of race that they were unrelenting in their efforts to track down one's lineage, and that apart from differentiating among Spaniards, indios, negros (blacks) and mestizos, they even made all sorts of distinctions within these catego­ ries. The Spaniards attached such a great deal of importance to one's being "of unblemished birth" that a single drop of indio blood was deemed enough to leave an indelible stain on a person. The blemish associated with indio blood stained even those of pure Spanish descent unfortunate enough to have been born among 18 the indios. A distinction was made between espafioles-peninsulares or simply peninsulares (fdl-blooded Spaniards born in the Iberian peninsula) and the criollos or creoles (fuil-Slooded Spaniards born in the colonies). In the same way that the Spaniards origi 1ally used the term espafioles-americanos or simply americanos to refer to criollos in America, the term espafioles-filipinos or /ilipinos was applied to criollos in the Philippines. Being island-born, the filipinos were also called insulares, as distinguished from the peninsulares. In Spain, the terms r_r,:Jl!o, americana, filipino and insulares soon came to have a pejorative ring to thern, not only because they were associated with the primitive indios but also b._ ·,use ;,.c: colonies were considered the dumping ground for the misfits and dregs oi Sp

8 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism cared to settle in the Philippines and they were, in Philip III's assessment, of "poor 19 quality." Las pobres Filipinas had to content itself with the cast-offs of Mexico. . ' Like the peninsula res, the filipinos did not feel at home in the Philippines, as they shared the same dream of striking it rich in the colony and making it back to Spain, the land of their fathers. The peninsular and insular Spaniard~ stayed in their walled preserves and made no effort to mingle with the indios, as this was viewed as descending to an inferior level. The indios themselves - or at least the indio masses - did not make any distinction between peninsula res and filipinos/ insulares'. As far as the natives were concerned, both were white, both were Span­ iards.20 The racial caste system that the Spaniards perpetuated in the Philippines fostered what Manuel D. Duldulao referred to as "a hierarchy of inferiority": the mestizos bowed to the criollos, the criollos to the peninsula res, while the indios 21 knelt before everyone. The criollos in Spain's colonies (americanos as well asfilipinos) did not enjoy the same political, clerical and economic opportunities as their Spain-born broth­ ers. Often thwarted in their ambitions by the policies of the peninsulares, the criollos grew resentful especially since they increasingly saw themselves as hzjos del pais - the true sons of the country. Thus, in Latin Arp.erica, the criollos developed the early conceptions of nation-ness and led the revolutionary wars that eventUally trans­ 22 formed Spain's colonies into independent nation-states. In the Philippines, how­ ever, it was the native elite - the ilustrados - and not the criollos who came up with the first conceptions of nation-ness. The crzollo community in the Philippines was too small to play a significant role. Unlike in the Spanish colonies in Latin America where the Spaniards and Spanish mestizos had become a sizable part of the popula­ tion and, in some areas, even constituted the majority, their counterparts in the 23 Philippines never amounted to more than one per cent of the population. Constantino explained how the term. filipino evolved to include all inhabitants of the archipelago: From a term with narrow racial and elitist connotation (only for Span­ iards born in the Philippines), Filipino [i.e.,filipino] began to include Chi­ nese mestizos and urbanized natives whose economic ascendancy in the 1 18th and 19 h centuries gave them the opportunity to acquire education

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 9 Quimpo

and Hispanic culture. This made them socially acceptable to the creoles especially since progress had given both groups a common economic base ~o protect. Later, through their propaganda work, the ilustrados, offspring of this rising local elite, wrested the term Filipino from the creoles and infused it with national meaning to finally include the entire people. Thus the term Filipino which had begun as a concept with narrow racial appli­ cation and later developed to delineate an elite group characterized by wealth, education and Spanish culture finally embraced the entire nation 24 and became a means of national identification.

According to Anderson, after 1900 (i.e., after the success of the anti-Spanish revolutionary ~ovement of 1896-98),/ilipino quickly acquired a primarily political meaning, referring to all the "sons and daughters of the country" ... and it went 25 upper case. Floro Quibuyen rightly points out, however, that Rizal and others had already been using Filipino (spelled with a capital/) as a general term for the varied 26 inhabitants of Las Filipinas much earlier. Filipino historians in general have portrayed the change from indio to Filipino as an event for glorification, often even as the turning point in the development of indios' nationalist consciousness, i.e., their realization of being a nation and not just being Tagalogs, Visayans, Ilocanos, etc. Constantino's account does acknowledge that the appropriation offilipino had not been all that commendable. Filipino had been discriminatory in terms of race and class. At first,filipino had distinguished the white, Philippines-born Spaniards from the brown indios. Later,filipino had marked the non-peninsular elite in colonial Philippines- insulares, Spanish and Chinese mestizos and zlustrados- from the indio masses. Nonetheless, there still appears to be a significant element missing. Was it indeed simply a matter of the ilustrados wresting the termfilipino from the criollos? For over three centuries,filipinos (i.e., Spaniards born in the Philippines), together with Spaniards born in Spain, were the oppressors of the natives of the Philippines. Nearly up to the very end of Spanish colonial rule, the filipinos (insula res) saw themselves as superior to themes­ tizos and zlustrados, and behaved accordingly. Even in the community of filipino exiles (i.e., insulares, mestizos and ilustrados) in Spain, the distinction mattered and

10 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism the ilustrados eventually felt compelled to set up their own organization, La Solidarzdad, rivalling Miguel Morayta' s insulares-dominated Asociacion Hispano- Fili­ pino. In spite of the fact that filipino was the name of the indios' oppressor in more ways than one (i.e, Philip II and the insulares), why did the native elite choose to first appropriate it for themselves and then later apply it to the entire population of the archipelago? There is a deeper racial element here that is unaccounted for. Such an element was absent when the criollos of Latin America continued to use americana in refer­ ring to themselves. Latin America's criollos were indeed the original white-skinned americanos. In contrast, the brown-skinned ilustrados of Las Islas Filipinas took on the name of the white-skinned criollos:filtpino.

The Epidermalization of Inferiority

In the course of studying the writings and personal evolution of the revolution­ ary black psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, psychologist Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan devel­ oped a theory of identity development in situations of oppression, particularly colo­ nialism and racism. Under conditions of prolonged oppression, wrote Bulhan, there are three major modes of psychological defense and identity development among the oppressed: compromise, flight and fight. He further discussed these three modes as stages, tendencies or patterns, to wit: The first stage, based on the defensive mechanism of identification with the aggressor, involves increased assimilation into the dominant cul­ ture while simultaneously rejecting one's own culture. I call this the stage of capitulation. The second stage, exemplified by the literature of negritude, is characterized by a reactive repudiation of the dominant culture and by -an equally defensive romanticism of the indigenous culture. I call this the stage of revitalization. The third phase is a stage of synthesis., and unam- biguous commitment toward radical change. I call this the stage of radicalization . . . . It should be emphasized that one can talk of th~se not only as stages, but also as tendencies or patterns ... But wheth~r considered as ' stages, tendencies, or patterns, it is important to note that none of them

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 11 Quimpo

exists in a "pure state" nor is any one in a way exclusive of the others. All three coexist in each individual and among each generation of the op­ pressed, with one or another being dominant at a given moment, era, or situation ... Frequentlv it happens that ordinarv persons remain in one or another phase that is prevalent in their time and social milieu. Thus, for instance, some individuals and even their generation mav remain fixated in the stage of capitulation. Others mav go bevond this and enter the stage of revital­ ization with all its charged affect, vehement denouncement of the present, and marked romanticism of the past. Still others mav attain the stage of radicalization on their own or find themselves in a revolutionary era with 27 potent influences they cannot resist. (Underscoring Bulhan's.)

According to Bulhan, Fanon traversed all three phases in his development, as did the likes of Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral and Malcolm X. In his 20s, Fanon, a native of Martinique, a French colony in the West Indies, was still in his capitulation stage, personally identifying with the oppressor: "I am a Frenchman. I ... Every colonized people am interested in French culture, French civilization, the French people ... What are a people "in whose 28 have I to do with a black empire ?" He soul an inferiority complex moved on to the revitalization stage when has been created by the he embraced negritude, rejecting assimi­ death and burial of its lation into the French culture and at the local cultural originality." same time asserting his African heritage. As a student in France, Fanon experienced a daily encounter with racism, got drawn into political debates and became radicalized. While working as a psychiatrist in Algeria in the 1950s, Fanon secretly joined the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), the Algerian guerrilla movement that successfully waged a liberation war against 29 French colonialism.

12 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

Reflecting on his own and other blacks' experiences, Fanon stated that everv colonized people are a people "in whose soul an inferiority complex has been cre­ ated by the death and burial of its local cultural originality." Coming face to face with the culture of the mother country, the colonized "is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards" and "becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle." The inferiority complex of the black man is "the outcome of a double process: -primarily, economic; - subsequently, the internalization- or, better, the epidermalization- of this 30 inferiority. "

Capitulation: Filipinas and Filipino

The capitulation pattern in the Philippine colonial experience is excellently caricatured by Rizal in his novel Noli Me Tangere through the character of the heavily curled and made-up Dona Victorina who put on airs after marrying a lame, tooth­ less and hapless Spaniard and who spoke bad Spanish, wore ill-fitting European 31 costumes, used rice powder, but was "more Spanish than Agustin a of Zaragoza. " Through the Propaganda Movement that they spearheaded in the·l880s and early 1890s, the ilustrados campaigned for an end to the abuses of Spanish colonial officials in the Philippines and for the institution of reforms. But the ilustrados, to which Rizal himself belonged, nonetheless largely remained in the capitulation stage or pattern. Their goal was assimilation of Las Islas Filipinas into Madre Espana, i.e., making the Philippines a province of Spain and to achieve this, they asked for Philippine representation in the Spanish Cortes, equality before the law, civil rights, cultural h1spanization, etc. The adoption of the terms Filipinas andfilipino by the tlustrados- which al­ ready occurred way before the launching of the Propaganda Move~ent- was con­ sistent with the capitulation pattern. It was identification with the oppressor, the colonizer, the white man: The ilustrados, like the insulares, were already very much hispanized: they lived like Spaniards, dressed like Spaniards) ate like Spaniards, 32 talked and wrote like Spaniards. But then they wanted mb~~ they wanted to be

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 13 Quimpo treated as Spaniards and to be identified as Spaniards, even if only as Filipino­ Spaniards. The adoption particularly offilipino was indicative of the internalization and epidermalization of the ilustrados' and the indios' inferiority. The first documented use of filipino to refer to indios appears to be in Rizal's prize-winning poem, Ala juventud filipina (To the Filipino Youth), written in 1879, in which Rizal exhorted the indio youth to be the hope of the motherland. Accord­ ing to Rizal himself, he and his classmates in Ateneo thought of themselves as filipinos, even though they were not insulares. In other words, as Ambeth Ocampo 33 aptly put it, Rizal and company saw themselves as "little brown Spaniards." When Rizal and others in the Propaganda Movement later argued that Filipino should mean all people born in the islands, it was astonishing, remarked T.J.S. George, 34 that the profound colonial implications of the term escaped them. In an ironic twist, the propagandists tried to give a somewhat anti-Hispanic or anti-colonial meaning to the term filipino. In 1887, Graciano Lopez J aena berated certain members of the filipino colony in Spain for adopting an accommodationist attitude towards Spain, asserting that only those opposed to Spanish colonial policy 35 could be considered as "genuine Filipinos". After some contestation, the tlustrados eventually "wrested" the term from the criollos. The successful appropriation, how­ ever, does not in any way detract from the colonial roots and connotation of Filipinas and Filipino. For championing the cause offilipino, Rizal has been hailed as "the first Fili· pino" in the prize-winning biography by Leon Ma. Guerrero. Fr. Jose Arcilla, S.J., has contended, however, that the honor should belong to Fr. Jose Burgos whose 36 ideals and work had strongly influenced Rizal. But is it really an honor for an 37 indio like Rizal to be called "the first Filipino"? The firstfilipinos were Spaniards; those who came after them were copycats. (Incidentally, Burgos was more or less an "original" filipino -his father was a Spaniard and his mother was a Spanish mestiza.) Apparently applying Anderson's concept of the nation as an "imagined com­ munity", Ocampo praised Rizal for "almost singlehandedly [having] 'imagined' or 'constructed' the Filipino, and the Filipino nation, when there was none to start 38 with." Unfortunately, this does not gibe with Anderson's own account. Anderson

14 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism noted with some irony, in fact, how the original "imagining" of the Philippines as well as of the Filipino was not done by indigenes of the Philippines themselves: [T]he Philippines ... by the end of Spanish rule had been imagined for already 350 years as- qua terre nourrice- Las Filipinas. But Filipino? Simply the scornful metropolitan name for the tiny stratum of local creoles: in Las Filip\nas, yes, but alongside far more numerous peninsulares, mestizos, chinos and indios. Not the gen­ eral name for the whole people of the patria, until the revolutionaries of the 1890s, who eventually included members of all the above categories, selfwilled themselves 39 into a common Filipino-ness.

Revitalization: Indios Bravos In the Philippine colonial experience, the revitalization pattern, as a mode of psychological defense and identity development, was not as pronounced as the capitulation pattern. Nonetheless, it did manifest itself. For instance, Rizal, while in Europe in 1886-91, clearly manifested through his writings a reactive repudia­ tion of the Spanish colonizers' culture and an equally defensive romanticism of the indigenous culture. Through his novels, Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, Rizal exposed the cruelty and decadence of the Spanish colonial sys.tem in the Philippines. Through his edition of Antonio de Morga's Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (History of the Philippine Islands), on the other hand, Rizal sought to awaken among his compatriots a consciousness of their past. In his copious annotatio~s to Morga's piece, Rizal showed the advanced level achieved by pre-colonial Fili­ pino society and portrayed the destructive effects of colonization on that society, contrasting each point Morga raised regarding the achievements of pre-Hispanic 40 Filipinos with its subsequent decline. Rizal pursued the same theme in some of his essays during the period. In "Filipinas dentro de den afios" (The Philippines a Century Hence), Rizallamented the westernization and degradation of the indios and the loss of their ancient traditions, writings, laws, songs and poems as a result of Spanish colonization. In "Sobre la indolencia del Filipino" (On the Indolence of Filipinos), Rizal defensively explained why indios were "indolent", a racist slur 41 that Spanish colonial authorities often uttered. Accorclin$ to him, the indios had been industrious before the coming of the Spaniards. Evidence of this was

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 15 Quimpo that mining, agriculture and commerce had flourished. During the Spanish colo­ nial period, however, all these were destroyed by Spanish oppression and by the Dutch and Moro wars. Rizal was by no means the first indio to explore the Philippines' pre-Hispanic past. Isabelo de los Reyes, the founder of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (Philip­ pine Independent Church), wrote newspaper articles on this, which were later com­ piled into a book. De los Reyes' writings, however, cannot be regarded as indicative of the revitalization pattern since he made "little overt attempt to glorify the Fili­ 42 pino colonial past", to paint it as some sort of a golden age, as Rizal did. Neither are Pedro Paterno's works denotative of revitalization. In his books on the Philip­ pines' pre-colonial past, Paterno did extol pre-Hispanic civilization but he still ac­ cepted Spanish culture as the norm and held on to the zlustrados' assimilationist goal. Although he rejected the racial superiority of the colonizers, his frame of refer­ ence remained "fundamentally colonial, in which the metropolis provided the stan­ 43 dard to measure the cultural achievement of the colonized." The revitalization pattern was shown not just in Rizal's writings. While still in Europe, Rizal suggested to his compatriots that instead of resenting the derogatory term indio, they ought to take pride in their race. Thus, he organized Indios Bravos to inspire greater self-dedicatio'1 among indios in Europe and to stimulate the edu­ 44 cation of those at home. Rizal's "proud-to-be-indio" phase roughly corresponds to Fanon's "proud-to-be-Negro" phase, the period of the latter's indulging in the romantic nationalism of Martinique negritude.

Radicalization: Katagalugan The Revolution of 1896 denoted, of course, the radicalization pattern. When the Katipuneros under the leadership of the "Great Plebeian", Andres Bonifacio, rose up in revolt, their goal was nothing less than an end to Spanish colonial rule and the establishment of an independent republic. To signify the complete break with Spanish colonialism, the Katipuneros tore up their cedulas, used Tagalog in­ stead of Spanish as their medium of communication, adopted a national flag and even commissioned Julio Nakpil to compose a national anthem, the Marangal na Dalit ng Katagalugan.

16 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

There is one other important indicator of the radicalization pattern which ap­ pears to have been only recently unearthed and authenticated: The fact that Bonifacio discarded the colonial name Filipinas. On the basis of newly-accessed Katipunan documents, historians Milagros C. Guerrero, Emmanuel N. Encarnacion and Ramon N. Villegas have revealed that Bonifacio and the Katipunan actually gave the coun­ try the name Katagalugan in lieu of Filipinas and defined tagalog as the term for all natives of the archipelago. The Katipunan' s Cartilla, written and published in 1896, expressly stated: "The word tagalog means all those born in this archipelago; there­ 45 fore, though visayan, ilocano, pampango, etc., they are all tagalogs." The Philippine Revolution of 1896, therefore, is a misnomer. When the revolu­ tion was launched, it was fought in the name of Katagalugan, not Filipinas. Thus, it actually was - or at least began as - the Katagalugan Revolution. It became the Philippine Revolution only in 1897 when Emilio Aguinaldo, the former gobernadorczllo (mayor) of Kawit, ousted Bonifacio from the helm of the revolutionary movement and had him executed. Aguinaldo, who had continued all along to use Filipinas, dropped Katagalugan. He proclaimed a dictatorial government on 24 May 1898, then the independence of the Philippines on 12 June 1898 (but "under the protec­ tion of the Mighty and Humane North American Nation"). He became president of the Philippine Republic when it was inaugurated on 23 January 1899. Aguinaldo's attachment to the colonial name is reflective of the capitulationist streak in the vacillating, not-thoroughly-revolutionary character of this former member of the privileged local elite, theprincipalia. It should be noted that Aguinaldo capitulated first to the Spaniards when he acceded to self-exile to Hongkong in 1897 (before coming back to the Philippines and installing himself as dictator} and then to the Americans when he swore allegiance to the United States shortly after being cap­ tured in 1901. In the light of Katagalugan, Anderson was not entirely right when he wrote that the revolutionaries of the 1890s "selfwilled themselves into a common Filipino-ness". Even after Bonifacio's death, the dream of Katagalugan lived on for a while. In 1902, guerrillas in the southern Tagalog area organized themse.lves by formally es­ 46 tablishing the "Tagalog Republic" with Makario L. Sakay a~ ;President. Sakay himself had drafted the constitution of this republic in late 1~01. Since the pre-

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 17 Quimpo amble dearly stated "We, the people of the Tagalog Archipelago",'fi Sakay obvi­ ously was not referring merely to the inhabitants of the Tagalog-speaking provinces of Luzon. (Bonifacio, other Katipunan leaders and Sakay were not the only ones among the country's leading revolutionaries who had thought of discarding the name Pht1- ippines. In 1913, General Artemio Ricarte, who stubbornly endeavored to revive the Revolution long after Aguinaldo's capture by the American occupation forces, pro­ posed that the Philippines be renamed "Rizaline Islands" and Filipinos, "Rizalines." Ricarte himself drafted a constitution of the "revolutionary government" of the renamed country in which he called for the overthrow of the "foreign government" 48 and for the establishment of the "Rizaline Republic" ). Even after the unearthing of the Katagalugan documents, most Filipino histori­ ans still consider Filipinas as constituting the peak of the development of national­ ism in the country. Onofre D. Corpuz, for instance, declares: "Bonifacio's and Jacinto's concept of Katagalugan as the nation was analogous to the zlustrados' Madre Espana. Both concepts were intermediate concepts that would ultimately culmi­ 49 nate in Filipinas as the nation. " On the other hand, Ocampo faults Katagalugan for being "obviously so ethnocentric that it will not sit well with Filipinos of today" and thinks that '~uinaldo had a bigger concept of the nation because his Filipinas 5 included the Muslim South and the Cordilleras unconquered by Spain. " ° Corpuz and Ocampo have missed the point or at least the more important point. Bonifacio's adoption of Katagalugan was a big step forward in the development of anticolonial nationalism and in the process of cultural decolonization. Conversely, Aguinaldo's restoration of Ftlipinas was a big step backward. Even the by standards in Bonifacio's time, Katagalugan must have sounded too ethnocentric (i.e., Tagalog-centric), but there is no denying that it was a distinctive effort at decolonizing the country's name. Did Rizal complete the progression from capitulation to revitalization and fi­ nally to radicalization as Fanon did? In the assessment of most nationalist histori­ ans, Rizal and the ilustrados in general remained reformists till the end and never made the radical break. Schumacher, however, contests this view, asserting that at least some zlustrados- Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Jose Alejandrino and Antonio

18 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

Luna- became separatists long before 1896, and that Rizal, as a radical separatist, sought to arouse a united national sentiment of resistance in preparation for even­ 1 tual revolution. 5 Whether or not Rizal did tum radical, Schumacher correctly points out the lineage from the propagandists to the revolutionaries and how the propa­ gandists' historiography supplied the legitimization for the actual protagonists of the revolution. In fact, Bonifacio's very first manifesto to the public in the Katipunan 52 newpaper Kalayaan read like a summary ofRizal's historiography. "Filipino nationalism" is an odd mix, a nationalism with more than just a colo­ nial vestige, a nationalism in which the sense of inferiority of the colonized has been internalized and epidermalized. It is the juxtaposition of the radicalism of the Katipunan revolutionaries with the capitulationism as well as revitalism of the ilustrados or at least of most of them. Filipino is the conflation of the capitulation pattern's Filipino, the revitalization pattern's indio or Indios Bravos and the radicalization pattern's Tagalog. (Historians have not been very helpful in their his­ torical accounts, often freely substituting indio and later also Tagalog with Filipino, and Katagalugan with Philippines.) It is perhaps partly because of this terminologi­ cal muddle that present-day Filipinos now face what Ruby R. Paredes called "the irony of Philippine history", i.e., that the ilustrados who defined the Filipino iden­ tity have been branded "un-Filipino", censured for their putative collaboration and 53 " omttte. d" f rom t h e nation . a1·1st Iegen d .

II. Ethnocentrism

As Constantino put it, the term Filipino (or filipino), which the ilustrados had wrested from the insulares, eventually embraced the entire nation and became a mean.s of national identification. But have Philippines and Filipino truly been em­ braced by the entire nation? Apparently, not by one section of the country's population- die Muslim "Fili­ pinos", or at least a significant part of them. The Muslim "Filipinos", who are mostly in southern Phil!ppines, do not feel much attachment to Philippines and Filipino since, in the fi!s,r place, they did not take part at all in the adoption or appropriation of these namt~. At the time of the

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 19 Quimpo initial stirrings of "Filipino nationalism", the Muslims had remained largely unsubjugated by the Spaniards. Thus, they did not take part in the 1896 Revolu­ tion, the 1898 declaration of Philippine independence nor in the 1899 inauguration of the Philippine Republic. Aguinaldo, in fact, implicitly recognized that the Mus­ lims had their own independent state when he proposed to the Malolos Congress in January 1899 that his government be empowered to negotiate with the Muslims for the purpose of forging a federation. More than just feeling indifferent, in fact, many Muslims abhor the names Philippines and Filipino. Unlike most of today' s Christianized Filipinos who do not seem to be bothered - or bothered anymore - by the genealogy of Philippines and Filipino, many Muslims feel very strongly about these two terms' colonial stigma. Alunan C. Giang asserts that Filipino can only be applied to those who bowed in submission to Philip II and to the might of Spain, that since the Muslim were 54 never the subjects of Spain, they do not fall under the category of Filipino. Ac­ cording to T J S George, Philippines was always anathema to the Muslims, a dis­ tasteful foreign term since generations of them had spilled blood precisely to avoid 5 becoming subjects of Philip II. 5

Philip II: The Anti-Moro Zealot

The indios had certainly fought against Philip II too, but in the Muslims' case, there is an added dimension. Philip II was not a colonial ruler like any other. A Catholic zealot, Philip II tried to suppress not just the upcoming Protestants but also the Muslims, the ancient foe of the Spaniards. It will be recalled that Berbers and Arabs from north Mrica, loosely called moras (Moors) by the Spaniards, in­ vaded the Iberian peninsula in 1711 and subdued most of it. The small Christian kingdoms fought back the Muslim invaders in a long series of wars known as the reconquista that lasted for almost nine centuries. At the time of Philip II's ascension to the throne, the wealthy and prosperous province of Granada was still largely populated by the descendants of the Moors, the Moriscos, who had been forced to become Christians but who remained Moors in religion, dress, language and cus­ toms. When Philip II stringently forbade the 1yloriscos from persisting with their Moorish ways, they rose up in arms. Philip crushed the rebellion, expelled the

20 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Coloni?J/ Mentality & Ethnocentrism

Moriscos from the province or from Spain itself, and then repopulated Granada 6 with "true" Christians. 5 Spain's centuries-old war against the Muslims was brought over from the Medi­ terranean to the Pacific. Philip II was even harsher with the Muslims in southern Philippines, whom the Spaniards called moros, after the Iberians' old conquerors. In a letter of instructions, Philip II expressly gave Legazpi and his men permission to turn moros who carried on commerce and preached Islam into slaves and to 7 seize their propert/ Philip II thus set the stage for the Moro Wars - a long series of wars waged by the Spanish colonizers to subjugate the Mindanao Muslims which spanned over three centuries of Spanish colonial rule hi the Philippines. Spanish military expeditions attacked and destroyed Muslim communities, killing or en­ slaving the inhabitants. In turn, the Muslims raided Spanish coastal settlements and sold off the captured indios as slaves. Through the years, the Spaniards de­ picted the moros as outlaws, bandits, pirates and slave traders. As pointed out by Charles 0. Frake, the title of one 19th century Spanish history of southern Philip­ pines translates as "The Pirate Wars of the Philippines against the Mindanaos and Joloanos" and another, in two volumes, proclaims itself to be 'The History of Malayo­ 58 Mohammedan Piracy in Mindanao,Jolo and Borneo.'' In the Moro Wars, the Spaniards compelled the indios, who had been colo­ nized and converted to Christianity, to fight with them against the moros. The Spanish colonial government and church authorities indoctrinated the Christianized natives with the belief that the Muslims were inveterate enemies of their new religion. Moro­ moro plays, in which the Spaniards were always the heroes and the Muslims the villains, became part of the regular cultural fare in the towns and served as tools of 9 propaganda by promoting a negative image of Muslims.' From the Muslims' per­ spective, meantime, the indios had earned for themselves, for capitulating to the Spaniards and· subsequently accepting Christianity, a status lower than the lowest 60 servile class in Muslim society. In the light of Philip II' s stellar role in the Spanish colonizers' anti-moro cam­ paigns, not a few Muslim "Filipinos" abominate Philippines an«;l Fzlipino. "Why do we name ourselves after the king who ordered our enslavement?" expostulates Alunan C. Giang. "It is only the Indios, who are graduated frodtvassalage, and had

VOLUME N NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 21 Quimpo become Filipinos, who are proud to use the appellation Filipinos. We Muslims are 61 not! " Zainudin Malang is even more derisive: "Why do Muslims resent being called Filipinos? Well, for the same reason that Filipinos would probably refuse to rename the country after the infamous World War II Japanese General Yamashita. Or, to be more illustrative, for the same reason that Jews in Israel in all likelihood 62 would refuse to call themselves Hitlerites instead of Israelis."

'Filipinizing' the Moros

On the basis of the genealogy of Philippines and Fili'pino alone, the Muslim "Filipinos" have more than enough reason to object to these appellations. But there is still one other significant reason, perhaps an even graver one. To many Muslims, Philippines and Filipino reflect the efforts not just of the Spanish and American colonialists, but also of the indios, i.e. the Christianized majority, to force the Mus­ lims to abandon their "savage" ways and to adopt the ways of Christian, Western "civilization." To many Muslims, Philippines and Filipino encapsulate the attempts of the Christian majority, continuing up to the present time, to turn the Muslims into the majority's image and likeness - Christianized, Westernized and, in the eyes of these Muslims, very colonial-minded. In this writer's view, the appellations are the very reflection of the ethnocentric bias of the Christian majority and of the ethnocratic tendencies of the Philippine state. Unlike the Spanish colonialists, the American imperialists succeeded in van­ quishing and colonizing the Muslims. Nonetheless, like the Spaniards, the Ameri­ cans failed to Christianize and Westernize them. The American imperialists were as racist as the Spanish colonialists. In the early years of American occupation, Filipinos (indios), together with other new ad­ ditions te the American fold- Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians and Guamanians -were conflated with Negroes and Indians (native '1\.mericans") as "savages" in 63 need of American's civilizing influence. The Literary Digest casually referred to 64 them as "Uncle Sam's New-Caught Anthropoids". Dean Worcester, reputed to be the acknowledged authority on the Philippines, vividly described the indios in typical Orientalist fashion as wild and backward, as "half-naked savages". Ameri­ can soldiers called Filipinos "niggers" and "goo-goos". The American media etched

22 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

Filipinos as "little brown fellows" who, as inhabitants of the torrid zone, exhibited such familiar traits as dull-wittedness, enervation and sloth. Filipinos fought con­ stantly among themselves, they were illiterate, they were pagans, headhunters, can­ nibals. Those who resisted the American invaders were labeled bandits. In its cov­ erage of the Philippines, the American media often referred to Orientalist par excel­ lence Rudyard Kipling who had characterized the natives of the Philippines as "half­ devil and half-child" and exhorted America to "take up the White Man's Burden" 65 to bring the half-devils into the civilized world. Aguinaldo, as leader of the Phil­ ippine resistance to American imperialism, was portrayed in a cartoon in Harper's 66 Weekly as a black dancing girl, with a stupefied Uncle Sam as a white old lady. After the capture of Aguinaldo and with the waning of the Filipino-American War, the favored Filipino image in the American media "shifted from bandit to bambino", as coverage was geared more toward showing the cultural and educational deficit 67 from which Americans claimed to be extricating their new wards. When armed hostilities broke out between the American invaders and the Muslims in Mindanao, the latter became the Americans' new savage Other. Re­ nowned for their skill and determination at hand-to-hand fighting, the Moros were portrayed, often with the curved, razor-sharp Muslim kris in hand, as wild-eyed juramentados- suicidal religious fanatics. Apart from being "savage";they were described as "fearsome", "terrible", and often, "fierce and fanaticaL" The Boston Journal remarked that it would be a "service to humanity and progress" to control 68 the "fanatical and warlike Mohammedan Malay." The .45-caliber pistol was in­ vented to stop "fanatical charges of la~less Moro tribesmen." A 1963 U.S. Army poster, entitled "Knocking Out the Moros: The U.S. Army in Action", depicted a 1913 battle in Jolo, in which U.S. soldiers under the command of General Pershing annihilated a defending Tausug force of men, women and children. The poster described the defenders who were falling under the firepower of the .45s, as "out­ 69 laws of great physical endurance and savage fighting ability." After a series of very bloody wars of occupation in which several hundreds of thousands of Christian Filipinos and Moros were killed under the banner of "be­ nevolent assimilation", the Americans "pacified" the natives·, :;tlthough, from time to time, armed resistance flared up in several local areas, espbtially in the South.

VOLUME IV NUMBER l January-June 2000 23 Quimpo

Between the Christian Filipinos and the Moros, the American administrators found it easier to deal with the former, who were already influenced to some extent by Western ideas, thanks to the Spaniards. The Christians cooperated with the Ameri­ cans and thus were given choice positions in the government. In anticipation of the granting of Philippine independence, Filipino political leaders pressed for the rapid Filipinization of the colonial administration. The rising Manuel L. Quezon, who later became the first president of the Philippine Commonwealth government in 1935, dramatically declared that he would prefer "a government run like hell by 70 Filipinos than a government run like heaven by Americans." Meanwhile, the Mus­ lims, save for a few, showed little enthusiasm in participating in the colonial system. Thus, as Majul described it, the Americans' plan to prepare the Muslims for inde­ 71 pendence was "altered and tailored to the Christian Filipinos." The prospects of the Muslims eventually being granted a state of their own began to diminish, as the governance of the Muslim provinces was passed on to the Christians and not to the Muslims themselves. As one of the governing principles of American colonial policy, Filipinization was narrowly defined as the gradual substitution of American with Filipino person­ nel in the government ~ part of the preparation of the Filipinos for self-rule and 72 independence. But to the Filipinos (indios), especially the ilustrados, Filipinization was actually much more than that. It was the continuation of the process of forging a new national identity for the emergent "Filipino nation", a process that had been disrupted by the coming of the Americans. Filipinization could not be anything else than the perpetuation of "Filipino nationalism" and the means for spreading Filipinism, the ideology of "Filipino nationalism". The ilustrados, who had been the very first to capitulate to the Americans and had thus garnered choice posts in the colonial government, had simply retained the appellations which they had earlier adopted: Phtlippines and Filipino. Being among the inhabitants of the "Philippine" archipelago, the Muslims were considered as encompassed by the Filipinization process. But the Muslims did not have the same view of the process as the Christian Filipinos. To them, Filipinization meant being under the governance of "people from the northern part of the country, who were totally ignorant of the indigenous customs and traditions and who for

24 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism generations had harboured an incorrigible bias against the Bangsamoro people." It meant being policed by a Philippine Constabulary, which, though under American 73 guidance, was composed wholly of Christian Filipinos. The Muslims preferred to be under the Americans than under the Filipinos-at least prior to gaining their own independence - as they regarded a government run by Filipinos as "hell" indeed. To the Muslims, Filipinization also denoted the opening or takeover of large tracts of land in Mindanao, including Muslim ancestral lands, to Christian settlers from Luzon and the Visayas, with government assistance. Most of all, Filipinization sig­ nified a process of" assimilation and acculturization [in which] the Moros -like the Filipinos -would be subtly induced to embrace Western habits and values so that they would soon lose their own national and cultural identity and obliterate their ,74 past.

The Dominant Ethnie Model

In an essay on majorities and minorities in Southeast Asia, Anderson stated that Christianity was deployed to create a "supra-ethnic majority" in the Philip­ 75 pines, where the Moros remained "useful bogeymen" to the end of Spanish rule. By the same logic, the Muslims, who belong to thirteen ethnolinguistic gro:ups, can be considered as a supra-ethnic minority. Under Smith's concept of ethnie, on the other hand, Filipinos and Moros, and arguably, Christians and Muslims as well, can be regarded as ethnies or ethnic communities. An ethnie or ethnic community, ac­ cording to Smith, is "a named human population with a [belief or] myth of com­ mon ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements; a link with a historic terri­ 76 tory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity." Ethnolinguistic groups in the Philippines- such as the Christian Tagalogs, Cebuanos and Ilocanos, as well as the Muslim Maguindanaos, Maranaos and Tausugs- can be considered as smaller eth­ nic communities or they could fall under what Smith termed as ethnic categories, which are characterized by outsiders, e.g., scholars, missionaries and travelers, as having a distinct cultural (usually, linguistic) group, but possessing little or no sense 77 of their common ethnicity.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 25 Quimpo

According to Smith, the "territorial nations" that emerged from the former colonies in Africa and Asia were created in two ways: the "dominant ethnie" model, in which the culture of the new state's core ethnic community became the main pillar of the new national political identity and community; and one in which there was no acknowledged dominant ethnie and the new state endeavored to forge a supra-ethnic "political culture" for the new political community. In Smith's analy­ sis, the nation-states of the second model, in particular, experienced great difficulty in welding disparate ethnies and ethnic categories into new nations and in forging new national identities. Paradoxically, it was where the new state was built up around a dominant ethnie that the best chance of creating a "territorial nation" and political community arose. Nonetheless, Smith acknowledged that many dominant-ethnie states did encounter fierce opposition from ethnic minorities within the state. This, he said, revealed "the failure to 'invent' a new political culture and mythology, one that can encompass or transcend the ethnic identities of both dominant and minor- . h . ,78 1ty et me. 79 As Smith himself noted, the Philippines followed the dominant ethnie route. In the main, the culture, identity and social values of the new nation-state were shaped by the dominant Christian ethnie- the Christian ethnolinguistic groups which comprised the majority of the population and had managed to achieve consider­ able integration in the course of struggling against Spanish and American rule. The Philippines certainly cannot qualify as a dominant-ethnt'e success story, if one con­ siders that it has been wracked by an armed ethnic conflict that has lasted for over 80 30 years, claimed 120,000 Hves and turned hundreds of thousands into refugees. Unlike in many of the other postcolonial states, the process of forging a new national culture and identity in the Philippines began long before the attainment of independence from colonial rule. Filipinization, as among others the assimilation and acculturization of the Muslims and other minorities to the Christian Filipinos' Western values, marked the start of the process. Vis-a-vis the relationship between the dominant Christian ethnie and the non-Christianized peoples, Filipinization ini­ tially tended to highlight the "savage"· "civilized" differentiation. The Christian Fili­ pinos had by then imbibed Western ideas and standards of "civilization" and now ethnocentrically looked at the non-Christians through the Western prism.

26 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

In the early years of American rule, the Moros had been placed in a political grouping with other "savages" under the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. "[P]opular books on the Philippines," noted Vaughan, "listed the exotic cultural markers dis­ tinguishing Moros from other Filipinos as part of an ethnographic laundry list that typically began with the nomadic Negritos and climbed a rough pecking order to 81 the 'civilized' Christian lowland metropolitans." Worse, Worcester considered the term Filipino as "properly applicable to the Christian peoples only" and such usage was repeated by him and other writers, including Worcester's assistant James 82 LeRoy and Superintendent of Education Fred Atkinson. When Filipinization was pursued, the "savage"-"civilized" question still con­ tinued to be all-important: to be considered Filipinized, one had to be sufficiently "civilized", i.e., in the Western sense. Thus, far from serving as a symbol of national unity and identity, the term Filipino excluded, and discriminated against, the country's non-Christian peoples. As pointed out by Alejandro R. Roces, pre-World War II dictionaries defined Filipino as "a native of the Philippine Islands belonging to a Christianized Malayan tribe as distinguished from the pagan or wild tribes and the 83 Mohammedan Moros. " As late as 1943, no less than Carlos P. Romulo, General MacArthur's aide-de­ camp, who later became the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the President of the University of the Philippines, in his book, Mother America, racistly denigrated the Igorots as "our wild tribes" and "primitive black people" and disowned them with this appalling remark: "[T]he Igorot is not Filipino and we are not related, and it hurts our feelings to see him pictured in American newspapers under such captions 84 as 'Typical Filipino Tribesman. "' (Romulo could very well have taken the cue from Worcester and from Francis Burton Harrison, the American governor of the Philippines, who, when visiting the Igorots, "had carried with him a cake of car­ bolic soap and had washed himself whenever possible after shaking hands with an 85 Igorot". ) Roces rightly castigated Romulo's attitude as the "GunWt Din Syn- ,86 d rome. Even where the Muslims were no longer regarded as savage or uncivilized, the ethnocentrism of the Christian majority still manifested itself in th.at' the dominant ethnie shaped a national "Filipino" identity and culture that was to

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 27 Quimpo ating to the Muslims. According to Tan, the Muslims found Filipinism and the very idea that they were Filipinos hard to accept, as they equated Filipinism with Christianization. The difficulties with Filipinism as a unifying concept of Christian Filipinos and Muslims persisted even by the time the 1935 Constitution was pro· mulgated, as the ambiguities of ethno-religious origin and expression remained unresolved. Beyond the contexts of geography and law, Christian Filipinos and Muslims held little in common. "The only meaning that could be given to 'Fili­ pino,'" wrote Tan, "was one who was a citizen of the Philippines and to 'Filipinism' 87 that which pertained to the Filipino." During the period of the Philippine Commonwealth, the Muslims still refused to enter the mainstream of Philippine society. They felt offended by the national laws enacted by the Commonwealth government which upheld standards drawn from Christian ethics and Western social history and which were thus alien to the Muslims whose cultural heritage was drawn largely from ancient Malay societies. They also resented the new educational system which emphasized Western "pro­ gressive" ideas and Western values and which taught that the Muslims were pirates and slave traders. "Muslim religious leaders," stated Majul, "came to believe that the new government's legal and educational system constituted an intentional 88 scheme to extinguish Islam in the Philippines."

The Failure of Assimilation When the Philippines gained independence in 1946, most Muslims could not share a sense of national identity with the Christian Filipinos. Apart from perceiving the new republic's laws and public school system as being too Christianized and Westernized, the Muslims deeply resented the steady influx of Christian settlers to Mindanao and the displacement of Muslims from their ancestral lands. Muslim 89 leaders blamed all ills on the "Christian government" in Manila. Instead of righting the wrongs of the colonial era, the postcolonial government aggravated the· problem between the Christian and Muslim communities. Early on, the government came up with a rather one-sided view of the nature of the problem, characterizing it as the "Moro problem". This dearly reflected the ethnocentric bias of the Christian majority. (Understandably, some Muslims fumed about the "Chris-

28 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism tian problem.") A special committee of the Philippine House of Representatives, properly headed by a "Muslim Filipino", defined the Moro problem as "nothing but the problem of integrating into the Philippine body politic the Muslim popula­ tion of the country, and the problem of inculcating into their minds that they are 90 Filipinos and that this Government is their own and that they are part of it." As its response to the "Moro problem" and the "problem" with other "cultural minorities", the Philippines adopted integration as its basic policy: all the minori­ ties would be completely and permanently integrated into the mainstream ofPhil­ ipP.ine national life - culturally, politically, economically and every other way. To implement this integration policy, the government established the Commission on National Integration in 1957. In the analysis of Peter Gordon Gowing, the government's integration program vis-a-vis the Moros revolved around the philoso­ phy that if the Moros were provided with more roads, schools, health facilities and factories, instructed in modern farming methods, given more scholarships for higher education and given more jobs in government, then they would be "integrated", i.e., resemble the Christian Filipinos. This was in reality a philosophy of assimila­ tion, reflecting a basic contempt for the religious, cultural and historical factors upon which the Muslims anchored their psychological and social identity. Gowing explained the Moros' grave misgivings: [M]any Moros think they see a connection between integration and the com­ ing of migrants from the northern provinces into Moroland. The two are but differ­ ent sides of the same coin whose name is assimilation. Integration takes away the Moro religious and cultural identity; migration and resettlement programs take away their land - thus, Moros and Moroland become assimilated into the Philippine • 91 natlon. The Muslims did get some roads, schools, scholarships, government jobs, etc., but they remained as un-integrated as ever. Meanwhile, their area had shrunk to just about a fifth of Mindanao, concentrated in a handful of provinces that counted among the country's poorest and most neglected. By the 1960s, many Muslims felt 92 that only two choices were left to them: integration or secession:. Muslim nation­ alism soon came into full flower with the establishment of the Moro National Lib- 1'1. •t:. eration Front and the launching of the armed struggle for indep~ndence from "Phil-

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 29 Quimpo ippine colonial rule." Just as the ilustrados had appropriated for the indios the pejo­ rative Spanish-given name Filipino, the MNLF adopted the Spanish epithet mora for the Muslim people. But while the ilustrados had taken on Filipino in colonial fawning, the MNLF wrested mora in a show of defiance- to the Muslims' en­ emies, mora had evoked not only contempt, but often also awe, dread or even fear. To emphasize the complete break with "Philippine colonialism", the MNLF as­ serted the nationhood of the Moro people - Bangsamoro (Moro Nation) - and announced as their goal the establishment of a nation-state of their own - the Bangsamoro Republzk. In retrospect, the Philippine government's integration policy was actually only part of a larger scheme. In its efforts to attain rapid development, the government had followed the so-called "modernization paradigm" which was the dominant development paradigm in the immediate postwar decades and which was basically patterned after the Western model of development. Many postcolonial nation-states of Mrica and Asia adopted or were strongly influenced by the modernization model as they strove to catch up with the more advanced capitalist countries. Guided by this paradigm, the new states undertook "nation-building" through "cultural as­ similation" and "social mobilization." Cultural assimilation meant the absorption of smaller, subordinate ethnic communities or nationalities into the larger, domi­ nant "nation." The emergent states were mostly oblivious to the dangers of deadly and protracted inter-ethnic violence, as allegiances towards one's ethnic commu­ nity or group were thought to be mere relics of traditionalism that would fade away or be swept away in the course of modernization and development. In a good num­ ber of postcolonial states of Mrica and Asia, these allegiances, instead of fading or being swept away, gave rise to full-scale wars. Too often, observed Smith, the construction of nations has been equated with state-making. According to him, state-making involves the establishment of an ad­ ministrative apparatus with skilled personnel; a code of law and system of courts; a taxation system and fiscal policy; a unified transport and communications system; effective military institutions; systems for welfare benefit, labor protection, insur­ ance, health and education, etc. Nation-building, on the other hand, includes the following processes:

30 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

the growth, cultivation and transmission of common memories, myths and symbols of the community; the growth, selection and transmission of historical traditions and rituals of commun.ity; the designation, cultivation and transmission of'authentic' elements of shared culture (language, customs, religion, etc.) of the 'people'; the inculcation of 'authentic' values, knowledge and attitudes in the desig­ nated population through standardized methods and institutions; th.e demarcation, cultivation and transmission of symbols and myths of a historic territory or homeland; the selection and husbanding of skills and resources within the demarcated territory; and the definition of common rights and duties for all the members of the designated community.

State-building, though it may foster a strong nationalism, noted Smith, is not to be confused with the forging of a national cultural and political identity .among culturally heterogeneous populations. "The establishment of incorporating state institutions," he wrote, "is no guarantee of a population's cultural identification with the state, or of acceptance of the 'national myth' of the dominant ethnie; in­ deed, the invention of a broader, national mythology by the elites to bolster the state's legitimacy may leave significant segments of the population untouched or . d ,9} altenate .

Ethnocratic Tendencies Due precisely to the ethnocentricism of the Philippines' dominant ethnie, the Philippine state has come to exhibit ethnocratic tendencies. An ethnocratic state, according to David Brown, is one which "acts as the agency of the aominant ethnic community in terms of its ideologies, its policies and its resource distribution." According to Brown, this involves three propositions: .• Recruitment to the state elite positions, in the civil serviqe, armed forces and ;. government, is disproportionately and overwhelmingly from the majority

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 31 Quimpo

ethnic group. Where recruitment of those from other ethnic origins does occur, it is conditional upon their assimilation into the dominant ethnic cul­ ture. The cultural attributes and values of the dominant ethnic segment are em­ ployed as the core elements for the elaboration of the national ideology so that the state's depiction of the nation's history, the state's stance on lan­ guage, religion and moral values and the state's choice of national symbols all derive primarily from the culture of the ethnic majority. Thus, the national identity which is employed to define the multi-ethnic society is neither eth­ nically neutral nor multi-ethnic but rather, it is mono-ethnic. The state's institutions- its constitution, its laws and its political structures­ serve to maintain and reinforce the monopolization of power by the ethnic segment. Thus, the channels which the state provides for participation are such as to either restrict all avenues for politics or to secure the dispropor­ tionate representation of the ethnic segment.

Brown clarified, however, that ethnocracy constitutes a tendency shown to varying degrees in a large number of states, and not a descriptive category to which 94 any actual state completely conforms. The Philippine state is perhaps far from being as ethnocratic as that of Myanmar 95 (Burma) , but there are still a lot of disturbing signs. To disprove that the Philip­ pine state has ethnocratic tendencies, government representatives would probably point to the regional autonomy granted to the Muslim and Cordillera peoples, now enshrined in the country's 1987 constitution. But it must be borne in mind that such "autonomy" was granted only after armed Muslim and Cordilleran move­ ments had waged bitter wars against the government. And just how satisfactory this "autonomy" is remains questionable. In the case of the Muslims, the MNLF has already signed three peace agreements with three different administrations (Marcos, Aquino and Ramos), each providing for Muslim autonomy. Less than three years after the latest- the 1996 peace pact-was signed, Eric Gutierrez lamented that a mangled version of autonomy was shaping up and that bureaucratic gridlock, legal disputes, political challenges and diminishing popular support were eroding the

32 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism territory, authority, funding and political infrastructure of the new autonomous re­ 96 gion even before it could be set up. It would seem that Muslim autonomy is not really being implemented, just renegotiated. The 1996 pact also provided for "in­ tensive peace and development efforts" to be carried out in the provinces covered 97 by autonomy, but the Muslim areas remain as backward as ever. And although all three government-MNLF accords promised Muslims greater representation and participation in the central government, there has hardly been any marked progress. For long periods, there were no Muslims in the Cabinet, in the Supreme Court and alilDng the top generals of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. And for some time now, there has been no Muslim in the Senate, the upper house of the Philippine Congress. What can perhaps be considered as the only concrete achievements of the 1996 agreement are the end of the armed hostilities between the government 98 and the MNLF and the integration of a significant number of MNLF fighters and sympathizers into the Philippine armed forces and police. Where the ethnocratic tendencies of the Philippine state lie strongest, how­ ever, is in the cultural sphere, or in what Smith has described as the "nation-build­ ing" process. Take the depiction of the Philippines' "national history", for instance. Hardly anything has actually been done to redress the virtual exclusion of the Mus­ lims from, and to connect the distortions about them in, this "national history." Criticizing Philippine scholarship for being "obdurately silent" on the Moros, Aijaz Ahmad wrote in 1982: "From The Philippines: Past and Present, by Dean C Worces­ ter, the seminal work in American historiography of the Philippines, to History of the Philippines, by Rena to Constantino, the most eminent of the contemporary Fili­ pino nationalist historians, serious scholarship of the past seven decades nowhere offers even a dozen consecutive pages on the history, culture, politics and society of 99 the Moros. They are left almost entirely to missionaries and obscurantists." In 1971, when armed clashes were starting to intensify in Mindanao, a group of Mus­ lim leaders and scholars bewailed not just the perennial discrimi'hation against Muslims in many levels of the national life but also "the misrepresentation or dis­ 100 tortion of their true image as a historic people." Since then, a pumber of histori­ ans have produced excellent scholarly works on the Muslims,. but their contents ~ " , have not been incorporated in textbooks on Philippine history being used in el-

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 33 Quimpo ementary and high school. Few Filipino school children have read or heard about such Muslim heroes as Sultan Qudarat, Alimudin I and Amai Pakpak. Since the Philippines gained independence, Filipinism, with all its omissions and distortions 101 of the Muslims, has been the "official nationalism." In the 1960s and 1970s, Agoncillo, Constantino and other nationalist histori­ ans strove to correct the biases and blast the myths implanted by colonial (espe­ cially American) scholarship and to write "a truly Filipino history, the history of the 102 Filipino people." It now appears that the country's "national history" needs to be revised or rewritten to rid it not just of strong survivals of colonial historiography, but also of ethnocentric biases, which in fact bear some extent of colonial influence. On account of their religion and ... the country's "national language, many Muslims have felt excluded from being full Filipino citi­ history" needs to be revised zens. Although the Philippines as a or rewritten to rid it not just secular state adheres to the principle of strong survivals of of the separation of church and state, colonial historiography, but government functions and activities also of ethnocentric biases, are still often marked by Christian customs and rituals. Christian Filipi­ which in fact bear some nos often proudly proclaim that the extent of colonial influence. Philippines is the only Christian (or Catholic) country in Asia, and the government has done nothing to counter such insensitive ethnocentric thinking. As Majul has rightly asserted, "the premise that the Catholic religion is one of, if not the basic element for identification in the Filipino national community ... [is] un­ 103 acceptable on legal and historical grounds. " Filipino, the Tagalog-based national language, still has not been much enriched by the country's non-Tagalog vernacu­ lars and has hardly incorporated any words from the languages and dialects of the Muslim ethnic groups. The 1996 peace agreement does provide for the integration ofislarnic values in the educational curriculum and the propagation of Arabic as an auxiliary medium of instruction, but these can only be truly implemented if and when the new autonomous region has been put in place.

34 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

By commemorating 12 June 1998 as the centennial of "the birth of the na­ tion", the Philippine government transformed the Revolution of 1896-98-in Gre­ 104 gory Bankoff's words, "quintessentially a Christian affair" -into a nationalist origin myth, a myth to which the Muslims cannot identify. Having been absent from "the birth of the nation", the Muslims, despite their valiant struggles against Spanish and American colonialism, have not been reflected in country's national flag and national anthem. The Philippine flag has a sun with eight rays, the rays symbolizit:g the first eight provinces that revolted against Spain in 1896. When the proposal to add a ninth ray to represent the Muslims was presented sometime ago, Christian Filipinos roundly rejected it. This, noted Macario Tiu, stands in contrast to what the United States did- as the number of states in the union grew from the original thirteen to the present fifty, the Americans just kept adding stars on their 105 fl a g. Even as the Muslim struggle against colonialism is unreflected on the flag, the "gratitude" of Filipinos to the imperialist power which later tricked them and be­ came their colonial master is flamboyantly displayed. No less than the Philippine Declaration of Independence explains the symbolism of the colors of the flag: " ... the colors Blue, Red and White commemorating the flag of the United States of North America, as a manifestation of our profound gratitude towards this Great nation for its disinterested protection which it lent us and is continuing to lend ,106 us. The ethnocentric bias of Christian Filipinos and the ethnocratic tendencies of the Philippine state are perhaps best captured in the country's foremost symbol: its name. Philippines and Filipino not only reflect what the Muslims have not wanted to be: Christian, Westernized, even colonial-minded. The terms are an insult to their creed and their very being. The MNLF could very well have been alluding in part to the appellations Philippines and Filipino when it contended: "[T]he Filipino govern­ ment has the birthmarks of its Spanish and American predecessoss. Its most dis­ 107 tinct mark is its colonial character." That Muslims have long objected to Ph£lip­ pines and Filipino and that Christians and the Philippine government have paid no heed to their objections are further indication of the Christian Filipinos' ethnocen­ trism and the state's ethnocratic tendencies.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 35 Quimpo

It is no wonder that, as Kenneth E. Bauzon has pointed out, Muslims view the present government as a foreign government (gobirno a sarwang tao), a government 108 of the Bangsa Pilipino (Filipino nation) of which the Bangsa Moro are not a part. No wonder too that among many Muslims, the old MNLF slogan "Moros- not Filipinos!" still resounds and draws new adherents. Among Muslims who say they are Filipinos, one can never be sure if the Filipino-ness is just on paper. The Sultan of Maguindanao and his associates, in fact, say they are Filipinos only by document - they have no choice but to put down Filipino as their nationality when filling out 11ega papers., e.g., tn. app}' ymg t:·bl09wr JO s.

Ill. Colonial Mentality

Many of the Philippines' nationalist writers and scholars have bewailed the persistence or resurgence of the colonial mentality, "colonial consciousness" or "neo­ 110 colonial identity" among today' s Filipinos. According to Constantino, colonial mentality, as commonly understood, "encompasses our subservient attitudes to­ wards the colonial ruler as well as our predisposition towards aping Western ways" .m Colonial mentality corresponds to what Fanon referred to as the internalization or "epidermalization" of inferiority among peoples subjected to colonization. In Constantino's view, the Philippines is a nation alienated from itself, with no real goals except to emulate alien standards and values imported from the North. Philippine society is an artificial one, as Filipinos pretend to be what they are not. In aping the worst consumerist aspects of the North, they have developed an obses­ sive desire to acquire consumer goods, especially foreign ones. Unlike their Asian neighbors, Filipinos have a weak sense of nationhood and feel little national pride. The young prefer to be citizens of one of the more powerful nations rather than Filipinos;and look forward to foreign placements for work. The sense of national community has been eroded; the crass materialism imbibed from the North has produced a massive rat race where everyone thinks only of self. With the globaliza­ tion of culture, Filipinos are inundated through the transnational media by images full of artificiality, inanity, sexism, violence and racism. The culture being institu­ tionalized is alien in language, direction and content. The educational system con-

36 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism tinues to miseducate Filipinos by glorifying the boons of continuing foreign domi­ 112 nation at the expense of indigenous culture. School children learn very little of their country's history, especially of the heroic resistance of their ancestors to Ameri­ can occupation. "The legions of little brown Americans in our midst," bemoaned Constantmo, . "attest to sue h a tragtc . fl aw. ,113 Poring over children's textbooks and "letters to the editor" in Philippine dai­ lies, Niels Mulder was struck by the great frequency and quantity of the Filipinos' negative evaluations of themselves and of their country, with such references as "this God-forsaken country", "our society has really gone to the dogs", and "our culture of violence". Mulder related this penchant for self-flagellation and Philip­ pines-bashing among contemporary educated Filipinos to "the colonialism-imposed syndrome that makes many Filipinos see themselves in the comparative perspec­ tive of the eternal underdog who feel they have to explain themselves, to apologize vis-a-vis outsiders." He traced how this self-flagellation came about. Thanks to the uncritical depicting in textbooks of the American era, Filipinos of the postcolonial period were effectively indoctrinated with the exemplariness of American civiliza­ tion, and they begun to measure themselves by its idealized standards. Perceiving themselves as culturally part of Western civilization, Filipinos proudly proclaimed themselves to be the world's third largest English -speaking country, the only Chris­ tian nation in Asia, the showcase of democracy, the bridge between East and West. Convinced that their Westernized ways were superior and boasting one of the most robust economies in Asia, Filipinos felt a certain smugness towards their fellow Asians. Through the years, however, the Philippines' growth lagged behind its neigh­ bors. The myth of superiority completely unraveled during the Marcos dictator­ ship, a period of great unrest and crisis. As the country's economy floundered, tens of thousands of Filipinos were forced or opted to work abroad. The ouster of Marcos through the "people power revolution" of 1986 resulted in the widespread visibility of l-am-a-proud-Filipino stickers. But such pride lasted for only d'brief period as political and economic conditions failed to improve significantly and the Philip­ pines became "the sick man of Asia." The self-flagellation, whicp had started in the 1M . . Marcos period, became common practice.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 37 Quimpo

Although "colonial mentality" is an overused term, noted Elmer A. Ordonez, there are still many indications to this "affliction". He cited the pre-eminence in the mass media of American and Western pop culture in song, dance and lifestyles; the preference for "stateside" products to local goods; the continuing dominance of English over Filipino as medium of instruction; and the low visibility of Filipino auth ors compare d to ,vrwestern wnters.. 115 A most telling sign of the Filipinos' "epidermalization" of inferiority has to do with the epidermis itself. According to Randy S. David, one of the more enduring legacies of Spanish colonialism, which has been reinforced by American television, is a lingering colonial concept of beauty pervasive especially among the younger generation, one that is based on the "mestizo standard of beauty": fair skin, large 6 eyes and tall noses.u Modern-day Filipinas, still as heavily made-up as Dona Victorina, have put one over her: they use skin whiteners or resort to face-lifts. Like their predecessors, today's brown Spaniards and brown Americans look down on those who are dark-skinned. Disagreeing with the "conventional wisdom" that Filipinos suffer from "colo­ nial consciousness", "a weak sense of national identity" and a "damaged culture", Eva-Lotta E. Hedman and John T. Sidel contend that the Philippines has experi­ enced "a cultural renaissance and a resurgence of nationalist consciousness and sentiment" in the past two decades. The nationalism is not "official nationalism", but a popular one, resulting in fact from the creative energies of Filipinos working outside - or even against- the Philippine state. According to Hedman and Sidel, the experience of the anti-Marcos struggle in the 1980s, enjoyment of Philippine movies, television and pop music, and the everyday struggles of overseas Filipino workers engendered new modes of representing Filipinos and i~agining a Philip­ pine nation. Instead of referring to and revering mythologized Origins and Great Man History, the new popular nationalism is characterized by "ironic, self-depreca­ tory humour", "mirthful irreverence" and "playfuldiasporic intimacy" and is more inclusively gendered. Hedman and Sidel cite highly varied examples of this popu­ lar nationalism,. among them: a wacky comic strip providing its readers by me­ tonymy an "imagined community" of fellow-Filipinos; newspaper columns of a historian (Ocampo) who brings Philippine historical figures to life with vignettes;

38 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism two prizewinning novels written by a woman writer, both of which feature a female central character involved in a nationalist project; the proliferation of an article "testing" one's Filipino-ness on the basis of a list of everyday Filipino practices; the growing patronage for "ethnic" jewelry and fabrics as well as for a folk music group using "ethnic" instruments; a rock group and a film making sly mockery of the mimicry of foreign songs and films; the emergence of strong solidarities among overseas Filipinos; and the outpouring of nationalist outrage over the execution of a 117 Filipina maid in Singapore and the imprisonment of another in Abu Dhabi. Is there a persistence of colonial consciousness or is there a resurgence of na­ tionalism? Constantino, Mulder and Ordonez, on the one hand, and Hedman and Sidel, on the other, apparently take positions that are polar opposites. Constantino and Hedman/Sidel even differ in the interpretation of a few particular phenomena. While Constantino castigates the giant shopping malls sprouting all over the country's major urban centers as de-nationalizing influences promoting consumerist tenden­ cies fed by foreign brand name advertising, Hedman!Sidel welcome them as re­ flecting and reproducing "an image of limited equality that resonates with the promise of democratic citizenship in the contemporary Philippines". And while Constantino tends to fault Filipino overseas contract workers for looking toward o$er countries to ensure their future, becoming almost exclusively economistic in their outlook and having little concern about what is happening to their country, Hedman/Sidel praise them for promoting what Anderson has described as "long-distance nation- . " 118 atsm.1 But there are areas of reconcilability or at least complementarity. Mulder quali­ fied that the middle classes are the ones indulging in Philippines-bashing and self­ flagellation and that the population at large is not part of all this, except from being exposed to school and media negativism. Hedman/Sidel, on the other hand, see a resurgence of popular nationalism. Thus, it may very well be that while the middle classes remain ensconced in the colonial state of mind, the masses are already reveling in their mirthfully irreverent nationalism. At one stage, Constantino expressed a disinclination to the term colonial men­ tality for it connoted "a resigned acceptance of it as the natt~bl and inescapable

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 39 Quimpo condition of the average Filipino mind" and "disregard[ed] the necessity of look­ ing inward to examine what forces within ourselves reinforce and deepen this intel­ lectual bondage." He advised studying the dynamics of intellectual colonization in all its aspects to find out how the colonial attitude became a generalized condition, as well as to discover and develop the means of overcoming it. "The examination of our colonial consciousness and our eventual liberation from its control," he averred, "must be attended by the evolution and dissemination of a counter-consdous- ,n9 ness. Outside of the few particular variances earlier mentioned as to what manifests a colonial attitude and what does not, the popular nationalism that Hedman/Sidel have discerned could very well fit into Constantino's category. of "counter-con­ sciousness". Viewed through the "consciousness versus counter-consciousness" framework, the main difference between Constantino's and Hedman/Sidel's posi­ tions would be that while the former beheld colonial consciousness as still very much dominant in the Filipino psyche, the latter perceive the nationalist counter­ consciousness as already having risen to predominance. Hedman/Sidel present a refreshingly new- and for nationalists, hopeful- per­ spective on the development of nationalism in the Philippines. However, whether the nationalist counter-consciousness has indeed gained dominance over the colo­ nial mind or still is an upcoming force that promises to be the wave of the future remains debatable. Whichever the case may be, there is no denying that the manifestations of the colonial mind are still very much around and that the process of cultural decolonization still needs to be vigorously pursued. Moreover, Hedman/ Sidel have not presented any evidence that the "resurgent" popular ("Filipino") nationalism encompasses Muslim "Filipinos".

IV. Changing the Name Philippines

Several times over the past decade or so, many Filipinos, especially "Filipino nationalists", have raised a great hue and cry over the derogatory use by Westerners - or what were viewed to be such - of the word Filipino. Filipinos strongly pro­ tested when the words Filipino, Filip ina and Filipineza were defined in several West-

40 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism ern dictionaries as "a domestic helper" or" a maid". Filipinos were again in uproar when a packet of cookies produced in Spain and marketed in Europe carried the brand name Filipinos. Defining Filipino as a domestic helper is indeed an ugly, racist slur. On the other hand, the use of Filipinos as a name for cookies which are not made by Filipinos themselves may be as innocuous as Canton and Dutch in pancit Canton and Alaska milk, which are not products of the Cantonese and the Alaskans themselves. The common Filipino expression lutong Macao and the use of Double Dutch as the name for an ice cream being sold in Filipino supermarkets are perhaps much more politically incorrect. But thinking it over, Filipino has for a long time-or even always- had either a pejorative or a discriminatory connotation to it. For over 300 years, the peninsular Spaniards used it to refer pejoratively to the insular Spaniards. When the mestizos and ilustrados adopted the name, they first made it an exclusive preserve for the insulares and for themselves, and excluded the lower-class indios. During the American colonial period, Filipino tended to be used only for "civilized" Christians and to discriminate against non-Christian "savages". From the very beginning, Philippines and Filipino have always had a colonial ring to them, but most Filipinos have cho­ sen to just gloss over this. The Muslims in southern Philippines have always been conscious of, and protested against, the colonial-ness of Philippines and Filipino, but the dominant ethnie has ignored them and are dragging them into its coloniai­ mindedness. (It seems apt to make a few asides here. First, since the Spaniards invented the term/ilipino and were the firstfilipinos, why shouldn't they put it on their cook­ ies? Second, what an irony that an appellation like filipino (or Filipino) that was once reserved for the elite in the Philippines during the Spanish period is now taken to mean a domestic helper! And third, again what an irony that the Filipinos in Europe today suffer from what the original moros- i.e., the Moors- experienced there centuries ago: In sixteenth-century Spain and Portugal, and,;.n Naples and . uo Venice, the Moors were stereotyped as servants. ) It is time to discard the name Philippines and together with it, the appellation Filipino. They are utterly colonial names, manifesting the internalization and epidermalization of inferiority of the Filipinos. They are, in fac~, doubly colonial in

VOLUME N NUMBER 1 January-}une 2000 41 Quimpo that they identify not just with a foreign monarch who ordered the country's colo­ nization, but also with the white criollos who were among the indios' direct oppres­ sors. According to George, prolonged usage of Philippines and Filipino have no doubt dulled the Filipinos' awareness of their incongruity and colonial character.121 But the colonial stigma remains. Far from diminishing or erasing the colonial stigma, prolonged usage of Philippines and Fzlipino has in fact heightened and accentuated it: the longer the usage, the deeper has been the internalization of inferiority- to the point that one takes these terms for granted and does not think about them any­ more. The colonial names have to go all the more if Filipinos take to heart what Recto himself once declared: "[T]he independence of countries such as ours can­ 122 not be complete until the last traces of colonialism have been eradicated". Apart from being colonial, Philippines and Filipino have for long periods been associated with racial, class, ethnic/national and religious discrimination. As sym­ bols of the ethnocentric prejudices of the country's dominant ethnie and the ethnocratic tendencies of the Philippine state, Philippines and Filipino have not served as true emblems of the nation- or the constellation of nations or ethnic groups that are supposed to comprise the present Philippines- and of national identity. Rather, they have been a factor for continuing dissension and disunity. Christian Filipinos cannot afford to keep ignoring the objections of the Muslims to Phzlippines and Filipino, because, as Alastair Davidson has pointed out, nations simply cannot be made as they were in the past 200 years: it is no longer acceptable for a formally democratic country to forge national unity by mercilessly erasing cultural differ­ 123 ences and making people "forget" their own, different pre-national histories. If given a good start, a new move to change the country's name- on the basis of the arguments cited- could easily spark off a national debate, one that would draw people of all classes and ethnic origins into lively, heated and even impas­ sioned discussion. Certainly a much livelier and more heated disputation than that over a packet of cookies. In the course of the discussion and debate, the country would be transformed into one big public forum or classroom on such questions as nationalism, colonial mentality, ethnicity and ethnocentrism. The process of chang­ ing the name Philippines should help give further impetus to the much broader process of cultural decolonization and to the development of a more thoroughly

42 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism anti-colonial and much more inclusive and popular nationalism. And it should help in rectifying historical injustices done to Muslims and other non-Christian commu­ nities, in rebuilding a truly multi-ethnic and multicultural national identity and in resolving the protracted armed conflict in Mindanao. In other words, the process would be a consciousness-raising and counter-consciousness-making exercise, vis­ a-vis not just colonial but also ethnocentric thinking. The new person that could emerge from the counter-consciousness-making would be one who has learned from, and come to terms with, his colonial past and not one who tries to gloss over it or gets bogged down ruing. In place of the subser­ vience, the fawning and the self-bashing, there would be more of the assertiveness, the pride and perhaps the ironic, self-deprecatory humor.. Apart from being decolonized, the new person would be more sensitive to other ethnic communities and groups, and more cognizant, tolerant and appreciative of ethnic and cultural diversity. Since the roots of the Mindanao conflict are much more complex than termi­ nological issues, changing the names Philippines and Filipino should only be a part of a much broader peace process involving meaningful political, economic, social and cultural changes. If not accompanied by these, name-changing would amount to nothing more than tokenism. Ftlipinism would change in name, but not in substance. The new person that Even if Phtlippines has been the name could emerge from the of the islands for nearly half a millennium, counter -consciousness­ replacing it may not be as difficult as it may first seem. For one, the Philippine Consti­ making would be one tution does specifically provide a mecha­ who has learned from, nism for changing the country's name. Ar­ and come to terms with, ticle XVI, Section 2 states: his colonial past... The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem, or a national seal, which shall be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by 124 the people in a national referendum.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 43 Quimpo

In finding a new name, there should be a lot of choices far better than names or terms that connote an ego-tripping dictator, a fictitious guerrilla unit or a big phal­ lus. Jose B. Abletez has come up with very worthy suggestions on how to pick a new name, based on his study of various countries' names, to wit: To honor heroes, real or mythical, e.g., Bolivia (in honor of South American liberator Simon Bolivar) To convey love for freedom and independence, e.g., Thailand ("land of the free") To denote cultural or racial origins or national pride, e.g., Irat:. To preserve the names of old nations or territories that have been merged, e.g., Tanzania (the merger ofTanganyika and Zanzibar) In memory of old places like villages, e.g., Canada (derived from Kanatta, the name of an ancient Indian village) To do away with old colonial stigma or insult to national pride, e.g., Zimba­ :bwe (formerly Rhodesia, which was named after British colonizer Cecil Rhodes) To indicate popularity of local forestry resources or mineral products, e.g., 125 Ghana ("gold") and Brazil (a special hardwood product).

In the light of the multi-ethnic character of the Philippines, the case of Burkina Faso, whose citizens are called Burkinabe, may be particularly instructive. Burkina Faso has many ethnolinguistic communities, the largest of which are the Mossi, the Peul and the Bobo. Burkina comes from the Mossis' word for "justice" or "upright­ ness". Paso is the Bobos' term for "land". And the be in Burkinabe comes from the Peuls' word for "people". Burkina Paso thus translates as "land of the upright " 126 peop1 e . To foster greater unity among Christians, Muslims and non-Christian ethnic communities, Tiu has advocated "reimagining" the Philippines as a national com­ 127 munity , while Arnold Azurin has proposed "reinventing the Filipino" (or more 128 precisely, "reinventing the Filipino sense of being and becoming") . Perhaps the first step in reimagining the Philippines is to change Philippines into an un-colonial

44 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism and much more inclusively representative name. And perhaps the first step in rein­ venting the Filipino is to change Filipino. Constantino once declared that "the only true Filipino is the decolonized Fili­ pino."129 But producing a decolonized Filipino is perhaps an impossible task. Even more than "Filipino nationalism", "decolonized Filipino" is a contradiction in terms.

Notes

The author wishes to thank Patricio N. Abinales, Arnold M. Azurin, Benedict J. Kerkvliet, Armando Malay, Jr., Paul Matthews, Otto van den Muijzenberg, Renato Perdon, Raul Pertierra, Floro C. Quibuyen, Mina Roces and an anonymous reader for their comments on an earlier draft. At least two of them disagreed very strongly with the author's view.

Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, London: Penguin, 1991, p. 73; and Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, pp.l49-50. 2 Renato Constantino (ed.), Recto Reader, Manila: Recto Memorial Foundation, 1965, p. 6. Despite the apparent incongruity of Ftlipino and nationalism, Recto, like other "Filipino nationalists", nonetheless espoused "Filipino nationalism". 3 Eufronio M. Alip, Political and Cultural History ofthe Philippines, Manila: Alip & Sons Inc., 1954, p. 127. 4 William Henry Scott, Cracks in the Parchment and Other Essays in Philippine History, Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1982, pp.105-6, 118. 5 Hartzell Spence, Marcos ofthe Philippines, copyright Ferdinand E. Marcos, 1979, p. 184. (The book was earlier published as For Every Tear a Victory: The Story ofFerdinand E. Marcos, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.) 6 Teresita G. Maceda, "Creative Intervention: Towards a People's Alternative Culture.( 1986)",cited in Jose V. Abueva (ed.), Filipino Nationalism: iflnous Meanings, Constant and Changing Goals, Continuing Relevance, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1999, p.682. 7 Remigio Agpalo, "Fzlipinos: Dolor de Mis Dolores, A Position Paper on Parliamentary Bill No. 195", Philippine Political Science Journal, No. 12 (December 1980), pp. 5-6. 8 Reuben R. Canoy; The Counterfeit Revolutton: Martial Law in the Philippines, Manila: Philippine Editions Publishing, 1980, p.233. 9 Canoy, pp. 233-234. 10 See Charles C. McDougald, The Marcos Ftle, San Francisco: San Francisco Publishers, 1987. 11 Ricardo Malay, ''What's in a Country's N arne?", Manila Chronicle, 10 May 1996, p. 4; cited in Abueva, The Making ofthe Filipino Nation and Republic: From Barangays, Tribes, Sultanates, and Colony, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1998, pp. 651-652. 12 R. Trevor Davies, The Golden Century ofSpain 1501-1621, London: MacMillan and Co., 1937, pp. 225-6 13 Peter Pierson, Philip II ofSpain, London: Thames and Hudson, 1975, p. 194. 14 Norman Davies, Europe: A History, London: Pimlico, 1997, p. 531. 15 Pierson, p. 38. Pierson cites Maria Teresa Oliveros de Castro and Eliseo Subiza Martin, Felipe II, estudio medico-histon·co, Madrid: 1956; and C. D. O'Malley, Don Carlos ofSpain, a Medical Portrait, Berkeley and LosAngeles: 1969. · 16 R.T. Davies, p. 225.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 45 Quimpo

17 T.J.S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Riseofl.slamin Phtlippine Politics, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, 1980, pp. 269-270. 18 Domingo Abella, From Indio to Filipino and Some Historical Works, Manila: Milagros Romualdez-Abella, 1978, pp. 4-5. 19 Abella, pp. 5-6, 12-1.3. 20 Abella,pp.21-22. 21 Manuel. D. Duldulao, The Ftlipinos: Portrait ofa People, Philippines: Oro Books Inc., 1987, p. 29. 22 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism, London: Verso, 1983, pp. 51-52. 23 Abella, p. 12. 24 Renato Constantino, Neocolonial Identity and Counter-Consciousness, White Plains, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1978, pp. 51-52. 25 Anderson, The Spectre ofComparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asza and the World, London and New York 1998,pp. 246-247. 26 Floro C. Quibuyen, A Nation Aborted; Rizal, American Hegemony and Philippine Nationalism, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999, pp. 77-80. 27 Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, Frantz Fanon and the Psychology ofOppression, New York: Plenum Press, 1985, pp. 193-195. 28 Frantz Fa non, Black Skin, White Masks, New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967, p. 203. 29 Bulhan, pp. 15-35. 30 Fanon, pp. 18, 11. 31 Jose Rizal, Noli Me Tangere, translated by M. Soledad Lacqson-Locsin, Makati: Bookmark, Inc., 1996, pp. 14-15,373-385. 32 Jose S. Arcilla, S.]., "What Broughton the Philippine Revolutionof1&96 (1992)", inAbueva {1998), p. 97. 33 Ambeth R. Ocampo, "From 'Indio' to Filipino", Looking Back (column), Philippine Dazly Inquirer, 9 June 1996, p. 9; cited inAbueva {1998), p. 648. 34 George, p. 269. 35 Quibuyen, pp. 89-92. 36 Arcilla, "Fr. Jose A Burgos: The First Filipino, [1837-1872] (1992)", inAbueva (1998), p. 462. 37 Rizal was actually of mixed racial origin. His father, Francisco Mercado, was a Chinese mestizo; his mother, Teodora Alonso, a Chinese mestiza. 38 Ocampo (1996), p. 9; citedinAl::Jeva (1998), p. 648. 39 Anderson (1998), p. 65. 40 John N. Schumacher, S.]., The Making ofa Nation: Essays in Nineteenth-Century Filipino Nationalism, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991, p.llO. 41 While not denying that Filipinos were indolent, Rizal did state that the colonialists were even more indolent. 42 Schumacher(199l),p.106. 43 Schumacher (1991), pp.l07-8. 44 Schumacher, The Propaganda Movement: 1880-1895, Manila: Solidaridad Publishing, 1973, pp. 213-214. 45 Translated from the original Tagalog by Milagros C. Guerrero, Emmanuel N. Encarnacion and Ramon N. Villegas, in their essay ''lilldres Bonifacio and the 1896 Revolution", Sulyap Kultura, 2nd Quarter, Manila: National Commission for Culture and the Arts, 1996, pp. 3-12; cited in Abueva (1998), pp. 87-96. 46 Constantino, A History ofthe Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World ~r, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975, pp. 255-6. 47 Gregorio F. Zaide, Phzlippine Constitutional History and Constitutions of Modern Nations, Manila: The Modern Book Company, 1970, pp. 238-40. 48 Ricarte, Arternio, Memoirs ofGeneral Artemio Ricarte, Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1963, pp. 137-141; Zaide, pp. 275-292. Ricarte's credentials as a revolutionary nationalist were greatly damaged by his collaboration with the Japanese in World War II. Returning to the Philippines in late 1941 under Japanese auspices, Ricarte called on his countrymen to cooperate with the Japanese who he saip had come to "liberate" them.

46 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

49 Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots ofthe Filipino Nation (Volume II), Quezon City: AKIAHI Foundation, Inc., 1989, p. 220. 50 Ambeth R. Ocampo, The Centennial Countdown, Pasig;Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1998, p. 16. 51 Schumacher, "Re-reading Philippine History: Constantino' sA Past Revisited", Phzlippine Studies 23 (Fourth Quarter, 1975), p. 473. 52 Schurriacher(199l),p.114. 53 Ruby R. Paredes, "Introduction: The Paradox of Philippine Colonial Democracy", in Paredes (ed.), Phzlip- pine Colonial Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988, p. 5. 54 Alunan C. Giang, Muslim Secession or Integration?, Manila: R.P Garcia, 1969, p. 21. 55 T.J .S. George, p. 270. 56 R. Trevor Davies, pp.164-17L 57 Emma Blair and James Robertson (eds.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, VoL VI, Cleveland: The A. H. Clark Company, 1903-1909, pp. 57-58. 58 Charles 0. Frake, "Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities among Philippine Muslims",AmericanAnthropologist, Vol. 100, No.1 (March 1998), pp. 48-49. 59 Majul, p. 18. 60 Kenneth E. Bauzon, Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Identity in the Philippines, Durham, North Carolina:TheAcornPress, 1991,p. 78. 61 Alunan C. Giang, "The Centennial That Was Never", Mora Kurier, VoL XII, Nos. 1 & 2, p. 26. 62 Zainudin Malang, in a message posted to the e-mail news-group [email protected] on 11 January 2001. 63 Christopher Alan Vaughan, "Obfuscating a New Other, Defining a New Self: Popular Discourses on the Colonization of the Philippines" (PhD dissertation), University of California, Berkeley, 1997, p. 158. 64 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular Culture, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992, p. 217. 65 Vaughan,pp.92-147. 66 Pieterse, p. 216. 67 Vaughan,pp.l41-147. 68 Ibid.,pp.148-173. 69 Frake, p. 49. 70 Corpuz, pp. 566-567. 71 Majul, p. 22 72 Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Milagros C. Guerrero, History ofthe Fziipino People, Quezon City: R. P Garcia Publishing Co., 1970, p. 303. 7 3 Abdurassad Asani, "Moros- not Filipinos", Diliman Review, VoL 29, No.2, March-April1981, pp. 32-3 3. 74 Ibid., p, 33. 75 Anderson (1998), p. 321. 76 See Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Secunty, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 4-5; and Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism", in M. E. Brown, pp. 28-29. 77 Smith (1993 ), p. 30. 78 Smith (1991), pp.ll0-116. 79 Smith(199l),p.l14. 80 Macapado A. Muslim and Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao: Land of Promise",Acco_,, Issue 6/1999, p. 16. 81 Vaughan, p. 150. 82 Benito M. Vergara, Jr., Displaying Filipinos: Photography and Colonialism in Early 20th Century Phzlippines, Quezon City: Universityofthe Philippines Press, 1995, p. 51. 83 Alejandro R. Roces,Fzesta, Philippines: Vera-Reyes, Inc., 1980, p. 27. 84 CarlosP. Romulo,MotherAmerica, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Dotan& Co., 1943, p. 59. 85 Pieterse, p. 196. 86 Roces, p. 25.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 47 Quimpo

87 Samuel K Tan, "Islam and Christianity in the Philippines", Mindanao Studies Reports, No. 3, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1995, pp. 6-7. 88 Majul, p. 25. 89 Ibid., pp. 29·32. 90 Peter Gordon Gowing, Muslim Filipinos- Heritage and Horizon, Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1979, p.208. 91 Ibid., p. 210. 92 See Giang, Muslim Secession or Integration?, 1969. 93 Smith (1995), pp. 38, 89-90. 94 David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, London & New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 36-37. 95 On Myanmar as an ethnocratic state, see David Brown, pp. 33-65. 96 Eric Gutierrez, "The Politics of Transition", Accord, Issue ~1999, p. 70. 97 In this, of course, MNLF chairman Nur Misuari and other Muslim leaders also have a lQt to answer for. See Jacques Bertrand, "Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement is Fragile," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, (Spring 2000), pp . .37·54. 98 This has to be qualified. Two Moro rebel groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf are still at war with the government. 99 Aijaz Ahmad, "Who is the Moro?", Southeast Asia Chronicle, Berkeley: Southeast Asia Resource Center, Issue No. 82, February 1982, p. 2. 100 Muslim Leaders in the Philippines, "Muslim Leaders' Consensus of Unity", Manila Times, 21 July 197 L 101 Anderson describes official nationalism as follows: "This is the form of nationalism which surfaces as an emanation and armature of the state. It manifests itself, not merely in official ceremonies of commemora­ tion, but in a systematic program, directed primarily. if not exclusively, through the state's school system, to create and disseminate an official national history. an official nationalist pantheon of heroes, and an official nationalist culture, through the ranks of its younger, incipient citizens- naturally. in the state's own interests. These interests are first and foremost in instilling faith in, reverence for, and obedience to its very self." (Anderson 1998, p. 253.) 102 Constantino, Renato The Philippines: A Past Revisited, Quezon City: Rena to Constantino, 1975, pp. 3·5. 103 Peter Gowing (ed.), Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines, Quezon City: New Day Publish­ ers, 1988, p. 122. 104 Gregory Bankoff, "History at the Service of the Nation-State", Public Policy, VoL II, No.4, October­ December 1998, p. 29. 105 Macario D. Tiu, "Diversity and the National Community" [Lecture delivered at the 25th National Confer· ence of the Pambansang Samahan sa Sikolohiyang Pt1ipino (National Association of Philippine Psychology), Davao City. 24 November 2000)]. 106 Ocampo(1998),p.2. 107 Moro National Liberation Front Manifesto (mimeographed), addressed to the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers,Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, July 12-1.5,1975, p. 8. 108 Bauzon,p. 149. 109 Wahab Ibrahim Guialal, "Perceptions of Democracy and Citizenship in Muslim Mindanao", in Maria Serena Diokno (ed.), Democracy & Citizenship in Filipino Political Culture, Quezon City: Third World Studies Center,1997,p.l64. 110 See, for instance, Constantino (1978); and Joan Orendain (ed.), The Invisible Enemy- Globalization & Maldevelopment, Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1997, p. 5, 107. 111 Constantino(1978),p.277. 112 Orendain, pp. 4, 107-108, 134-135, 139; Constantino, "Sanitizing History", Manila Bulletin, 20 Septem· her 1995,p. 11; and "CollectiveAmnesia",29 December 1996,p.ll;citedinAbueva (1998), pp.220-221, 246-247. In his later writings, Constantino referred to the advanced capitalist countries as "the North" instead of as "the West".

48 PUBLIC POLICY Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality & Ethnocentrism

113 Constantino, Fetters on Tomorrow, Quezon City: Karrel, Inc., 1996, pp.l03, 111-112. 114 Niels Mulder, ''Filipino Images of the Nation", Phzlippine Studies, Vol. 45, First Quarter, 1997, pp. 50-7 ·t 115 Elmer A. Ordonez, 'The Alternative Hegemony in Culture", The Other View, Manila: Kalikasan Press, 1989, pp. 91-92; cited in Abueva (1999), p. 573. 116 Randy S. David, Public Liws.· Essays on Selfhood and Social Solidarity, Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1998, pp.62-6.3. 117 Eva· Lotta E. Hedman and John T. Side!, Phzlippine Polt!ics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-colonial Trajectories, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 140-165. 118 Orendain, pp. 107-108, 134; Constantino, "Sanitizing History", Manila Bulletin, 20 September 1995, p. 11, cited in Abueva (1998), pp. 220-221; Hedman and Sidel, pp. 1.35, 160. 119 Constantino (1978), pp. 277-278. 120 Pieterse, pp. 124-125. 121 George, p. 269. 122 Constantino (1965}, p. 6. 12.3 Alastair Davidson, From Subject to Citizen: Australian Citizenship in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 18-19; cited in Kathleen Weekley; "Nation and Identity at the Centennial of Philippine Independence", Asian Studies Review, VoL 23, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 343- 4. 124 The 198 7 Constitution ofthe Republic ofthe Philippines (booklet), Philippines: N a tiona! Book Store, 1987, p.56. 125 Jose P. Abletez, "Why Not a New Name for this Ex-Colony", Phzlippine Graphic, 17 June 1996, p. 40; cited inAbueva (1998), pp. 658-660. 126 Wun Ettema and Gerrie Gielen, Burkina Faso, Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen and Novib, 1992, p. 14. 127 See Tiu, "Diversity and the National Community". 128 See Arnold M. Azurin, Reinventing the Ftlipino Sense of Being and Becoming: Critical Analyses of the Orthodox Views in Anthropology, History, Folklore and Letters, Quezon City: CSSP Publications, 199.3. 129 Letizia R. Constantino and Lourdes B. Constantino (eds.),A Constantino Sampler, Quezon City: Karrel, 1989, p. 79; Orendain, p. 146.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000

Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

JAY L BATONGBACAL

INTRODUCTION

The entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in November 16, 1994 created an internationally-recognized legal framework for management of the planet's oceans with the support of a great majority of nation states. The Philippines is a mid-ocean archipelago with definite maritime interests, straddling the Pacific Ocean, South China Sea and Celebes Sea, as well as enclos­ ing the Sulu Sea is at the crossroads of international shipping and within a unique nexus of maritime interests of foreign nations. Yet since it signed the Convention in 1982, no concrete action for implementation has been taken in response to its even­ tual entry into force. The main issue preventing the implementation of the Convention is its impact on the national territory. This paper intends to delve into this is?ue by providing an overview of the development of our national territory laws and the historical con­ text for the introduction of the Convention. Thereafter, the !rrip'act of the Conven­ tion in the light of the current state of the law is briefly discussed and recommenda- Batongbacal tions made on what needs to be done. It is hoped that as a result, serious discus­ sion may be provoked as to what steps the Government should take to see its way clear out of what will be shown to be an intricate legal and historical problem.

The Pre-Spanish Period

In the Pre-Spanish Period, the country was largely made up of villages scat­ tered among the islands. Chronicles of the Spanish expeditions show that the is­ lands were already inhabited and teeming with activity, with the people organized 1 into village governments. But it is not clear how such governments conceptual­ ized their territories, which apparently extended a short distance from their shores as far as their boats could reach. When Miguel Lopez de Legazpi and his lieuten­ ants arrived in Cebu and Manila, for example, his ships anchored offshore and requested permission to land, indicating an awareness of and respect for the degree 2 of control exercised by the inhabitants over those waters. However, this may also have been merely in accordance with accepted maritime practices at that time with respect to landing in unknown inhabited territories.

The Spanish Period

It was during the consolidation of Spanish sovereignty over the country that the concept of the Philippines as a single territorial entity emerged, called the Islas Filipinas or Philippine Islands. The appellation itself bears significance, for it indi­ cates that the Spanish sovereigns treated the islands as territories, giving little or no importance to the waters around and between them. This is consistent with the Western concept of territory which referred only to the land and not the sea. The extension of a state's territory from the shoreline to a certain distance seawards had gained acceptance in international law at the time, under what was known as the "cannon-shot rule." According to this, the distance to which a state may lawfully extend its exclusive dominion over the sea adjoining its territories, and beyond those portions of the sea embraced by its harbors, extended as far as its

52 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines cannons could reach. Up until the late 1800s, this distance was accepted by a large number of states to be one marine league (about 3 miles) from the low water mark.3 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 became effective in the Philippines in 4 1871. Included in this law was a provision which stated that: '1\rt. I. The following are part of the national domain open to public use: XXX 2. The coast sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coast, to the full width recognized bv international law. The State provides for and regulates the police supervision and uses of this zone, as well as the right of refuge and 5 immunity therein, in accordance with law and international treaties. "

It would appear, therefore, that during its reign, the Spanish Crown regarded the Philippine territory to extend about 3 miles from the low water line around each of the islands of the archipelago. But it permitted the breadth of the country's maritime territory to change with the times, depending on the degree of consensus reached by the international community.

The American Colonial Period

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the Philippines was ceded to 6 the United States in the Treaty ofParis of 1898. In Article III of the treaty, Spain ceded to the United States "the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within" a line which described an irregular rect­ 7 angle surrounding the country's main islands. In the subsequent Treaty of Wash­ ington of 1900 supplementing the Treaty of Paris, a singular article stated that "Spain relinquishes to the United St.ates all title and claim of title, which she may have had at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside of the lines described in Article III of that Treaty and particularly to the islands of Cagayan, Sulu, and Sibutu and their dependencies, and agrees that all su,ch islands shall be comprehended in the cession of the Archipelago as fully as if they had been ex­ 8 pressly included within those lines." (underscoring supplied)l l

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 53 Batongbacal

The wording of the treaties clearly refers only to the islands and did not spe­ cifically refer to the waters within. This was consistent with the previous Spanish practice which did not consider the waters 3 miles from the island shoreline part of the territorv. The inclusion of islands outside of the lines of the Treatv of Paris in ' ' the cession to the United States would also indicate that the lines described by Article III were not regarded as territorial boundaries. If they were, it would be inconsistent for places outside of such lines to be deemed included in "territorial" limits. Apparently, the Americans considered the national territory to extend only to 3 miles from the low water mark. In an early commentary on the relevant provision of the Spanish Law of Waters, future Supreme Court Justices Ramon Aquino and Carolina Grifio wrote: "(1) Meaning of maritime zone.- The jurisdictional limits of the Phil­ ippines generally include all of the land and water within its geographical boundaries including all rivers, lakes, bays, gulfs, straits, coves, inlets, creeks, roadsteads, and ports lying wholly within the 3-mile limit (Taylor, International Public Law, pp. 263, 293; Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to Mr. Jordan, Jan. 23, quoted in I. Op. Atty. Gen. 542; Gallatin's Writ­ ings, II, 186). It further extends three geographical miles from the shore of the Islands of the Philippines, starting at low water mark. (Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, to Mr. Welles, Secretary of Navy, Aug. 1862; I Moore International Law Digest, 703, et.seq.; I Oppenheim International Law, p. 241). "It further includes those bays, gulfs, adjacent parts of the sea or re­ cesses of the coast line whose width at their entrance is not more than twelve miles measured in a straight line from headland to headland. (Tay­ lor, International Public Law, p. 278; I Oppenheim International Law, p. 246; Opinion of Attorney-General Randolph, May 14, 1793, I Op. Atty. Gen. U.S. 32; Second Court of Commissioners ofAlabama Claims, Stetson v. United States, No. 3993, class I; I Moore International Law Digest, pp. 699, 7 41). It further includes all straits only or less than six miles wide as wholly within the territory of the Philippines, while for those having more

54 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

than that width, the space in the center outside of the marine league limits is considered as open sea. (Taylor, International Public Law, pp. 279; I Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 249). "It further extends for customs purposes at least four leagues from the coast. (Customs Administrative Act, sec. 79). It further can be said that the Philippine Islands exercises in matters of trade for the protection of her marine revenue and in matters of health for the protection of the lives of her people a permissive jurisdiction, the extent of which does not appear to be limited within any certain mixed boundaries further than that it cannot be exercised within the jurisdictional waters of any other State, and that it can only be exercised over her own vessels and over such for­ eign vessels bound to one of the ports of the Philippines as are approach­ ing but not yet within the territorial maritime belt. (Op. Atty. Gen., Jan. 9 18, 1912)."

10 In the case of United States vs. Bull, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that

"No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters ,of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within ter­ ritorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable."

11 This was reiterated in the case of People vs. WOng Cheng. Clearly, the con­ cept of territorial waters was in accord with the 3-mile rule. But the Americans also introduced elements which have been interpreted as extending the national territory beyond the normal 3 mile band and which would later become the basis of the Archipelagic Doctrine espoused by the"Philippines. In 12 the Jones Law of 1916, the lines described by the Treaty of Paris were referred to as "boundaries." In 1930, the US and UK delimited the territpries of the Philip­ 13 pines Islands and North Borneo, the preambular paragraph,rJferred to the desir­ ability of delimiting the boundary between the US and UK teA-itories. In the Fish-

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 } anuary-June 2000 55 Batongbacal

1~ eries Act, the law referred to the existence of insular fisheries which were within territorial waters of the Philippines but not included within municipal waters de­ 15 scribed to extend 3 nautical miles from the low water mark. The treaty lines were 16 also referred to as boundaries in the Hare Hawes CuttingAct of 1933, and in the 17 J:vdings-McDuffie Act of 1934, Unfortunately, however, the American practice was ambiguous, as in other 18 documents , it consistently maintained the wording that referred to the national territory as comprised of islands within limits described in the Treaty of Paris and outside of the lines but encompassed by the Treaty of Washington. Although the word "boundaries" was 1,1sed, the context in which the term was used did not indi- .. . in negotiating the cate that it was intended to have the same agreements, the parties meaning to be territorial boundaries. only had the islands, not Moreover, an inconsistency emerges in the waters, in mind as that if the Treaty ofParis lines are consid­ actual territories. It would ered as territorial boundaries, then the is­ certainly be odd to have lands mentioned in the Treaty of Wash­ ington of 1900 are separate territorial en­ indefinite and "mobile" tities since they are precisely outside of territorial boundaries. the Treaty of Paris lines. And while the treaty between the US and UK delimit­ ing the respective territories referred to the delimitation of "boundaries," the actual wording of the pertinent article is: "It is hereby agreed that the line separating the islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago on the one hand and the islands belonging to the State of North Borneo which is under British protection on the other 19 hand shall be and is hereby established ... " (underscoring supplied)

The treaty also provided for the contingencies that if the lines described were subsequently proven by more accurate surveys to pass between certain islands and 20 reefs, the line would automatically be adjusted to pass between them; and that if the line were found to pass through certain islands and rocks, the whole of such

56 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

21 islands and rocks would still pertain to the Philippines. These provisions for contingencies not only acknowledged the uncertainty of the location of the lines but tended to prove that in negotiating the agreements, the parties only had the islands, not the waters, in mind as actual territories. It would certainly be odd to have indefinite and "mobile" territorial boundaries. The year 1928 saw the loss of one island within the treaty lines in favor of the Netherlands. The US and Netherlands had entered into arbitration proceedings regarding a dispute of sovereignty over the Island of Palmas, also known as Miangas, near the southern tip of Mindanao Island, well within the Treaty ofParis lines. In his 22 '" award, the arbitrator referred to the treaty lines as a "geographical frontierline," and found that, based on a letter signed by the US Secretary of State, the American view towards the use of the lines in relation to Spain was: "The metes and bounds defined in the treaty were not understood by either party to limit or extend Spain's right of cession. Were any island within those described bounds ascertained to belong in fact to Iapan, China, Great Britain, or Holland, the United States could derive no valid title from its ostensible inclusion in the Spanish cession. The compact upon which the United States negotiations insisted was that all Spanish title to the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands should pa~s to the United States- no less or more than Spain's actual holdings therein, but all. This Government must consequently hold that the only competent and equitable test of fact by which the title to a disputed cession in that quarter may be determined is simply this: "Was it Spain's to give? If valid title belonged to Spain, it passed; if Spain had no valid title, she could 23 convey none. " ( und erscormg . supp1. te d)

Such a view tends to reinforce the argument that when the Treaty of Paris was negotiated, the intention of the US and Spain was to use the lines oaly as a means to identify the Spanish-held territories within them, as they acknowledged a possi­ bility that other states could hold title to specific islands with~ the lines. They were not territorial boundaries in the same way that land boundaries were since

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 57 Batongbacal they were intended to allow "pockets" of non-Philippine territories within them, and did not accord the same status to the waters.

The Era of the 1935 Constitution

The Article on the National Territory

The 1935 Constitution focused attention on the concept of national territory. Although the debates in the Constitutional Convention dwelt more on the propri­ ety of including a new and specific provision describing the national territory, what was important was that the delegation sought a legally-acceptable formula for con­ sidering the archipelago as a single legal and political unit to which the Fundamen­ tal Law would be applied. The Chairman of the Committee on Territorial Delimi­ tation filed a report which pointed out an anomaly in the Treaty of Paris lines where the description of the location of the northern line (running west to east) was inconsistent with the specific latitude, and proposed correction thereof in the Con­ stitution being written "to avoid all possibility of confusion in the future regarding the real boundaries of our territory towards the north." This indicated an under­ standing that the national territory extended to the waters within the treaty lines, since what was involved in the adjustment of the lines was not the inclusion of islands but rather the Bashi Channel. The report recommended an article on the national territory which described its boundaries in metes and bounds similar to Article III of the Treaty ofParis, incorporating the correction of the anomaly as well as the adjustments necessary to accommodate other treaties. However, the impact of regarding all the waters within the treaty lines as part of the national territory, equivalent to the land, is not so easily discernible. The 25 debates reveal an attitude of the delegates to consider only land as territory. Dis· cussions among other things, on the propriety of including an article on the national territory, acquisition of other islands as additional territories by virtue of the new article, and the implications of the article on treaty-making. But they did not touch on the legal status of the waters around, between, and connecting them. There was 26 only one reference to the importance of the seas, and that, only incidentally. Sub-

58 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines sequently, the Committee Chair submitted an amended draft article on the na­ tional territory which stated that the national territory included "its jurisdictional water and air." In the end, the Convention reached consensus on the following phraseology: "The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain oh the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington, between the United States and Spain on the seventh day of November, nineteen hun­ dred, and in the treaty concluded between the United States and Great Britain on the second day ofJanuary, nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory over which the present Government of the Philippine Islands 27 exercises jurisdiction." (underscoring supplied)

Again, the above section refers to and reiterates the formulation of the national territory as islands. The use of the treaties as the reference points implies that "ter­ ritory" referred only to land territory, considering that: ( 1) Prior to the cession of the Philippines, Spain claimed only a m~ritime zone around the islands "to the full width recognized in international law", and therefore could not have intended to transfer to the US any waters beyond that distance; (2) The official American viewpoint was that in negotiating the Treaty of Paris, they likewise referred only to the islands within the limits and did not make any claim as to the waters; (3) It is inconsistent to consider the islands outside of the Treaty of Paris lines, referred to in the treaty of 1900, as part of the Philippine territory, if such territory was precisely defined by the treaty lines; in addition, it opens to question the status of the waters around the islands, and between them and the treaty lines; , ( 4) The exact phraseology of the treaty between the US an~ UK, referring to ;, \ the line it described as merely separating one group ·of 'islands from an-

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 59 Batongbacal

other, and the provision for adjustment if future survey and mapping re­ vealed the more precise location of the islands and reefs near the line.

When President Truman issued the Proclamation declaring Philippine Inde- 28 pendence in 1946, the US again referred to the delimitation between the US and UK as a boundary. But this did not amount to a recognition of the entire Treaty of Paris lines as territorial limits, and at most referred only to the line between the 29 Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo. Subsequently, an exchange of notes took place between the Philippines and the UK, in which certain other groups of islands on the edge of North Borneo and 0 the Sulu Sea were transferred to the Philippine/ in accordance with the 1930 treaty between the US and UK.

The First Continental Shelf Claim

In 1949, the Philippines attempted to adopt and adapt the continental shelf doctrine as contained in the Truman Proclamation of 1945. This was through the promulgation of Republic Act No. 387 which claimed petroleum resources in the continental shelf or its analogue in the archipelago: '~t. 3. State ownership.- All natural deposits or occurrences of petro­ leum or natural gas in public and/or private lands in the Philippines, whether found in, on or under the surface of dry lands, creeks, rivers, lakes, or other submerged lands within the territorial waters or on the continental shelf, or its analogue in an archipelago, seaward from the shores of the Philippines which are not within the territories of other countries, belong to the State, inalienably and imprescriptibly."

This manifested the increasing official interest in the resources in the waters around the islands, as it was the first major legal development on marine resources other than navigation and fisheries. It would remain the status quo for the next few years, until the United Nations initiated what would eventually result in the. first conference on the Law of the Sea.

60 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

The Archipelagic Doctrine

In the early 1950s, the international community still had not come to a con­ sensus regarding the precise width of the territorial seas to which coastal states may validly lay claim. In response to a communication from the UN Secretary-General seeking comments on the work of the International Law Commission for a pro­ posed convention for all nations of the world to agree on the limits of the territorial sea, the Philippines made its first formal declaration of the "archipelagic doctrine" 31 in a Note Verbale in 1956, wherein it stated: 'i\11 waters around, between and connecting the different islands be­ longing to the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of their width or di­ mension, are necessary appurtenances of its land territory, forming an in­ tegral part of the national or inland waters, subject to the exclusive sover­ eignty of the Philippines. All other water areas embraced within the lines described in the Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898, the Treaty con­ cluded at Washington, D.C., between the United States and Spain on 7 November 1900, the Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of 2 January 1930, and the Convention of 6 July 1932 between the United States and Great Britain, as reproduced in Section 6 of Com­ monwealth Act No. 4003 and article 1 (this was inadvertentiy given as article 2 in the note verbale of 7 March 1955) of the Philippine Constitu­ tion, are considered as maritime territorial waters of the Philippines for purposes of protection of its fishing rights, conservation of its fishery re­ sources, enforcement of its revenue and anti-smuggling laws, defence and security, and protection of such other interests as the Philippines may deem vital to its national welfare and security, without prejudice to the exercise by friendly foreign vessels of the right of innocent passage over those wa­ ters. All natural deposits or occurences of petroleum or natural gas in public and!or private lands within the territorial waters or on th~ continen­ tal shelf, or its analogue in an archipelago, seaward from the shore of the Philippines which are not within the territories of other cottntries, belong

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 61 Batongbacal

inalienably and imprescriptibly to the Philippines, subject to the right of innocent passage of ships of friendlv foreign States over those waters. "In view of the foregoing considerations, and in line with this article, the Philippine Government assumes that high seas cannot exist within the waters comprised by the territorial limits of the Philippines as set down in the international treaties referred to above. In case of archipelagoes or territories composed of many islands like the Philippines, which has many bodies of waters enclosed within the group of islands, the State would find the continuity of jurisdiction within its own territory .disrupted, if certain bodies of water located between the islands composing its terri­ tory were declared or considered as high seas." (underscoring supplied)

This was the first official declaration seeking to define the status of the waters within the Treaty of Paris lines as both "national or internal" waters and "maritime territorial" waters. However, the ambiguity with which the internal waters are dis­ tinguished from the territorial waters, particularly the lack of a clear rule for deter­ mining which portions are internal and which are territorial waters, practically meant a fusion of the two regimes within the treaty lines. As far as the international com­ munity was concerned, internal waters had to be clearly distinguished from territo­ 32 rial waters because the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels was recognized as applicable only in the latter. It is important to note that in its statement, the Philippines apparently identi­ fied a functional basis for claiming the territorial sea, i.e. it claimed territorial wa­ ters for specific purposes (protection of fishing rights, conservation of fishery re­ sources, enforcement of revenue and anti-smuggling laws, defense, and security). This is an important point since territorial waters are normally conceptualized as extensions of the land territory without a functional justification. The Philippines further sought exemption from the proposed rule limiting the extent of the territorial sea to a fixed distance measured from the coast, as follows: "The Philippine Government considers the limitation of its territorial sea as referring to those waters within the recognized treaty limits, and for

62 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

this reason, it takes the view that the breadth of the territorial sea may extend beyond twelve miles. It may therefore be necessary to make ex­ ception, upon historical grounds, bv means of treaties or conventions be­ tween States. It would seem also that the rule prescribing the limits of the territorial sea has been based largely on the continental nature of a coastal State. The Philippine Government is of the opinion that certain provi­ sions should be made taking into account the archipelagic nature of cer­ tain States like the Philippines."

In claiming rights to its resources in the "continental shelf, or its analogue in an archipelago," the Philippines broke new ground in the first Law of the Sea Confer­ ence in 1958. During the conference, it was able to persuade the international community that the "continental shelf" doctrine applied equally to islands as to 33 coastal states. Soon after, the US challenged the Philippine claim to sovereignty over all the waters within the Treaty of Paris lines. In a telegram, the US Department of State declared: "The United States' attitude with reference to the position of the Philippine Government quoted supra was that the lines referred to in the bilateral treaties between the United States and the United Kingdom and Spain merely delimited the area within which the land areas belong to the Philippines and that they were not intended as boundary lines. The United States, in 1958, stated that it recognized only a 3-mile territorial sea for each island."

This began a long battle for the Philippine Archipelagic Doctrine to bind the international community into legally recognizing the archipelago as a single social, geographic and political unit. In the 1958 and 1960 sessions of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the international community rejected the archi­ pelagic principles proposed by the Philippine delegation.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 63 Batongbacal

The Philippine Baselines Law

Seeing the unmistakable trend in the international community to come to agree­ ment on the breadth of the territorial seas, a clearer definition of the maritime zones around the country to negotiate with others, Senator Arturo Tolentino intro­ duced a bill that defined straight baselines around the country. This was based on his observation that in the previous UNCLOS sessions, the international commu­ nity accepted two major points, namely, that (1) baselines are the basis for deter­ mining the territorial seas, and that (2) the territorial sea shall have a fixed width measured from the baselines. Although the 1958 and 1960 sessions did not pro­ duce a consensus, it nevertheless revealed that there was a need to consolidate the Philippine position by clarifying which were internal waters under the complete sovereignty of the State and which were territorial waters through which the right of 34 innocent passage applied. Thus was born Republic Act No. 3046. Republic Act No. 3046 enclosed the outermost points of the archipelago within straight baselines and declared all waters between the island shorelines up to and within the baselines to be internal waters, and all waters between the baselines and the Treaty of Paris limits to be territorial waters. It would subsequently be clarified 35 that the baseline system was without prejudice to the Philippine claim to Sabah. The legislative debates on both laws were lengthy, but focused on only a few major concerns, namely, the impact of the bill on the fishing rights of Filipinos within and outside the national territory, the entry of foreign vessels into the territo­ 36 rial and internal waters, and its impact on the claims to Sabah and Freedomland. In the debates on the amendatory bill,n there was awareness of the need for the law to stave off the imminent fragmentation of the archipelago if the international community limited itself to consideration of territorial seas based on a fixed, short 38 distance from the baselines. However, the attention of the legislators was soon largely absorbed by the Sabah issue. Nonetheless, the importance of Rep. Act No. 3046 cannot be overemphasized. More than the 1956 Note Verbale, the Philippine Baselines Law represents the first unequivocal Philippine legal claim to maritime spaces beyond that recognized by international law. Despite the discussions of the delegates to the Constitutional

64 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

Convention regarding the article on the national territory in the 19 35 Constitution, the resulting phraseology did not reflect a clear claim to both the land and water within the treaty limits. The 1956 Note Verbale clarified this intent, but while revolutionary in itself, it could be regarded as a mere executive declaration or state­ ment of administrative policy. Rep. Act No. 3046 gave the Archipelagic Concept of the Philippines the status of law, and later on would become the basis for elevating the same into a constitutional edict.

The Revised Continental Shelf Claim

In 1968, the Philippines issued a proclamation formally stating its claim to the continental shelf, as follows: "WHEREAS, it is established international practice sanctioned by the law of nations that a coastal state is vested with jurisdiction and con­ trol over the mineral and other natural resources in its seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf adjacent to its coasts but outside the area of the territorial sea to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of such resources; "NO~ THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim that all the mineral and other natu­ ral resources in the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf adjacent to the Philippines, but outside the area of its territorial sea to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of such resources, including living organisms belonging to sedentary species, appertain to the Philippines and are subject to its exclusive jurisdiction and control for the purposes of exploration and exploitation. In any case where the continen­ tal shelf is shared with an adjacent state, the boundary shall be deter­ mined by the Philippines and that state in accordance with legal and equi­ table principles. The character of the waters above these submarine areas as high seas and that of the airspace above those waters. is not affected by . 1 . ,39 t h1s proc amatton.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 65 Batongbaca!

There are two problems with the phraseology of this proclamation. First, it makes the extent of the continental shelf dependent on a technology-driven crite­ rion, i.e. "to where the depth of the superjacent waters admit of exploitation," which is not a fixed measure as its changes with the development of technologies to ex­ ploit offshore resources. When the Truman Proclamation first declared the conti­ nental shelf doctrine, the maximum depth of exploitation was only about 30 feet; at present, such depth can be measured in the thousands. Thus, the criteria leaves the extent of the continental shelf indeterminate. Secondly, the proclamation refers to submarine areas outside of the area of the territorial sea, and states further that it does not affect the status of high seas and airspace above the waters. If the term "territorial seas" refers to the area defined by Rep. Act No. 3046, extending to the Treaty of Paris limits, it is not clear what other areas would be covered by the proclamation. On the other hand, if it were to follow international law, then the continental shelf areas would indeed be extensive.

The Era of the 1973 Constitution

The 1971 Constitutional Convention presented an opportunity for the Philip­ pines to revise its constitutional formulation of the concept of national territory and accommodate the legal developments that had taken place since 1935. The new article in the 1973 Constitution stated: "The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all the other territories be­ longing to the Philippines by historic right and legal title including the territorial sea, the air space, the subsoil, the seabed, the insular shelves, and the other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part 40 of the internal waters of the Philippines. " (underscoring supplied)

The above provision formally elevated the Archipelagic Doctrine to the status of a Fundamental Law. Aside from re-igniting the debate on the implications of the

66 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines provision on national territory to Philippine claims to Sabah, Freedomland, and even the Marianas Islands, the record reveals that a vigorous discussion ensued on the importance of incorporating the archipelagic principles in the Constitution as a means of legally protecting the inland waters from intrusion by foreigners. Of pri­ mary concern were "considerations of national defense and internal security" which demanded absolute control and dominion over all the inter-island waters which 41 were the main links of communication and transportation. In a public hearing held for the Convention, Senator Tolentino, who participated in the UNCLOS conferences, pointed to the need for such a provision to support the Philippine position at the Law of the Sea conferences where the country was fighting a losing 42 battle with the maritime powers over the archipelagic principles. Indeed, such a provision was required to legally demonstrate the archipelagic elements in the Phil­ ippine concept of the national territory because the provisions of the 1935 Consti­ tution clearly referred to the country as a single political unit of geographically frag­ mented groups of islands without regard for the intervening waters. 43 The constitutional provision was subsequently incorporated in Philippine laws.

The Kalayaan Island Group Claim

The Philippine claim to the Kalayaan Island Group was the next major legal development in our national territory laws after the promulgation of the 1973 Con­ stitution. Prior to 1971, there was very little indication of any official inclination to include the islands west of Palawan in the national territory. The earliest official and recorded statement could be that of a delegate to the 19 35 Constitution, made during deliberations on the national territory provision, where it was stated that the islands were clearly outside of the territorial limits contemplated, but nevertheless 44 could be subject to a Philippine daim. At that time, Japan had only begun to occupy the islands. Japan eventually placed the islands under the Shinnan Gunto or New South Islands administrative region under the jurisdiction ofJapanese-occupied Taiwan. When World War Two ensued, Japan launched attacks from the; islands, such that in the post-war period, Filipino policymakers saw the need_t9~;place the islands within its national defense perimeters. The first official statemeht to this effect was

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 67 Batongbacal made in 1946 by the Foreign Mfairs Secretary but this was not pursued at the San Francisco Treaty negotiations; then President Quirino merely said that possession o fh t e 1s'ld"b an s y an enemy , was a t h reat to nattona . 1 secur1ty. ' 45 In 1956, Tomas Cloma laid claim to the islands west of Palawan, calling them Freedomland, but could not get government support for his claim. The Philippine Government did was to issue a declaration which did not make a formal claim to the island group, but allowed that it was subject to legitimate exploitation and 46 exploration by Filipino citizens. It was only in 1972 that the Philippines took definite ~ction to establish a claim; President Marcos officially announced that it had occupied several islands 47 as a measure of ensuring national security. In 1978, President Marcos promul­ gated Presidential Decree No. 1596, proclaiming Philippine sovereignty over the area encompassed in a modified parallelogram extending from the Palawan side of the Treaty of Paris limits, officially calling it the Kalayaan Island Group and consti­ tuting a municipality of Palawan province. The decree asserted absolute soyer­ eignty over the islands, waters, seabed and subsoil of the area within the described . 48 boun d anes.

The Philippine EEZ Declaration 49 Presidential Decree No. 1599 was issued on the same day as Pres. Decree No. 1596. It declared an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in conformity with the EEZ provisions of the negotiating text of the ongoing Third United Nations Con­ ference on the Law of the Sea. Within a 200 nautical mile zone measured from the baselines of the territorial sea, set down in Republic Act No. 3046, the Philippines asserted that "Sec. 2. Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the Philip­ pines over its territorial sea and continental shelf, it shall have and exercise in the exclusive economic zone established herein the following: a. Sov~reign rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources, whether living or non-living, both renewable and non-renewable, of the seabed, including the subsoil and the superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities

68 PU13LIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

for the economic exploitation and exploration of the resources of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents, and winds; b. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and structures, the preservation of the marine environment, including the pre­ vention and control of pollution, and scientific research; c. Such other rights as are recognized by international law or state practice."

Resource-related activities, construction of artificial islands and installations and other activities falling within the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coun­ try were limited to Filipino citizens, and any other person would be allowed to do so only under the terms of a prior agreement with the Philippines or a license granted by it. It also stated, in a separate provision, that "Sec. 4. Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone free­ doms with respect to navigation and overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea relat­ ing to navigation and communications."

This provision, however, presents a potentially anomalous situation in relation to the territorial seas under Rep. Act No. 3046 as amended. One nuance undetec­ ted by the incorporation of the negotiating text into the decree was that the EEZ was defined in the negotiating text to be a zone beyond the territorial sea. This 50 distinction is not made in the text of the decree. Sec. 2 makes a reservation that the Philippine sovereign rights within the EEZ are without prejudice to its rights over the territorial sea and continental shelf, implying that despite the apparently limited scope of EEZ enumerated, the rights arising out of full exercise of sover­ eignty are not affected in areas falling with the territorial sea as defip.ed by Rep. Act No. 3046. However, this reservation is not made with respect to Sec. 4, which refers to the recognition in the EEZ of full freedom of navigation and overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other intematiobally lawful uses of the EEZ relating to navigation and communication. Since th6 EEZ overlaps with

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 69 Batongbacal much of the territorial sea area delineated by Rep. Act No. 3046 as amended, the anomalous interpretation may be made, that the Philippines recognizes freedom of navigation and communication in its territorial sea! The EEZ Declaration likewise converted about 2/3 of the Kalayaan Island Group claim area, beyond the territorial sea defined in Rep. Act No. 3046 and declared to be under complete sovereignty, into EEZ waters subject to the abovementioned freedoms, apparently reducing the extent of sovereignty over much of the waters of the KIG to only sovereign EEZ rights. No reservation was made to provide for the KIG claim area.

The Montego Bay Conference

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Montego Bay, Jamaica ( 1982) ended with the signing by the Philippine delegation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at the final session. Though the confer· ence would come into force only on November 16, 1994, the impact of the Con­ vention on the national territory of the Philippines would be significant. The Law of the Sea created a system of maritime zones based on the funda­ mental stage of establishing baselines from which the zones would be measured. These could be normal baselines using the low-water mark; straight baselines pur­ suant to the rules in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case which permitted the use of straight lines connecting the outermost points of deeply-indented coasts or fring­ ing islands along the coastline; or archipelagic straight baselines connecting the out­ ermost points of the outermost islands of a mid-ocean archipelagic state, subject to certain conditions. These baselines generated the following maritime zones in favor of the coastal state: 1. Internal Waters, referring to those waters lying within the landward side of the baseline forming an integral part of the State territory that was no differ­ ent from the land. It included bays, estuaries and ports, mouths of rivers, navigable rivers and canals, subject to specific rules in the Convention.

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2. Territorial Sea, referring to the waters from the baseline and seaward to a distance of 12 nautical miles. It was deemed to be included in the territory of a State and under its sovereignty but subject to the Right of Innocent Passage of foreign ships. This right was further defined by the Convention. 3. Archipelagic Waters, referring to the waters enclosed within straight archipe­ lagic baselines, if such were .validly used. Such waters are also deemed to be under the sovereignty of an archipelagic state but subject to recognition of the Right of Innocent Passage, designation of Archipelagic Sea Lanes and recognition of traditional fishing rights under international agreements. 4. Contiguous Zone, or the area contiguous to and beyond the Territorial Sea to a distance of another 12 nautical miles, in which the Coastal State exercises limited powers to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations or to punish infringements of those regulations commit­ ted within the state's territory or territorial sea. 5. Exclusive Economic Zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines wherein the Coastal State has extensive rights and jurisdictions essentially with respect to natural resources, structures, marine scientific re­ search and marine environmental protection. All other States enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines within theEEZ.

The Convention also codified the international law on the Continental Shelf which referred to the natural prolongation of the land territory of the state beneath the sea but contiguous to the coast, and as an "inherent right" of the coastal state that exists ipso facto and ab initio, to explore the seabed and exploit its natural resources. The Convention contained various rules of delimiting the outer limits of the Continental Shelf of states. Outside all the maritime zones were the High Seas, or all patts of the sea not included in internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ or archipelagic waters. They were deemed to be beyond the sovereignty of any state, wherein traditional High Seas Freedoms could be exercised. States could only exercise speballimited jurisdic­ tions within the High Seas.

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Beneath the waters lay the International Seabed Area, referring to the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Regarded as the "common heritage of mankind", these were not subject to private appropriation, nor to the sovereignty of any state. The Convention laid down the rules for any exploitation of this Area. The Convention also provided for special regimes not previously existent in international law. These special regimes included: 1. The Right of Transit Passage in straits used for international navigation. This meant the exercise of freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one area of the EEZ or High Seas and another, or to enter or leave a state bordering the strait. The Convention greatly limits the jurisdiction of the coastal state 1 in matters which may affect passage. 5 2. The Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage through archipelagic waters. This is the right of navigation and overflight in "normal mode" making for continuous, expeditious and unobstructed passage from one part of the High Seas or EEZ to another part thereof. The right is exercised in sea lanes and air routes designated by the archipelagic state in consultation with IMO. In theory, the sea lanes and air routes can extend to 50 nautical miles in width; but the rules also provide that ships and aircraft cannot come closer to the coast than 1/10 of the distance between bordering islands. If sea lanes and air routes are not designated, the right may be exercised through routes nor­ mally used for international navigation. 3. Provisions for management and conservation of fishing in the High Seas; 4. Provisions to encourage control of marine pollution; 5. Provisions to regulate marine scientific research.

The first two bear special relevance to the Philippines. Without the archipe­ lagic state provisions, the international community would likely claim the Right of Transit Passage through the Philippines. So long as the Philippines does not imple­ ment the archipelagic state provisions, the international community can plausibly claim that only a 12 nautical mile territorial sea around each island can be recog-

72 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines nized, implying that all straits within the Philippines are subject to Transit Passage and that pockets of High Seas exist within the islands. This can be obviated by application of the archipelagic state principles and the passage of ships moderated by the designation of archipelagic sea lanes under the management of the Philip­ pines. The Philippines is likewise allowed to suspend innocent passage in portions of archipelagic waters thereby regulating inter-island passage activities of foreign vessels which it could not do if such waters were regarded as pockets of High Seas.

Main Philippine Concerns

In sum, the main Philippine concerns in the negotiation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea were: 1. Recognition of sovereignty over waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago regardless of breadth and dimension, which were in danger of disregard by the territorial sea concepts then proposed; 2. Exercise of the degree of control over passage of vessels through the same waters necessary to protect national security; 3. Recognition of the rights to the marine wealth embraced within the areas described by the Treaty of Paris lines.

Looking over the Convention's regime of maritime zones, the Philippines was able to protect its interests in Nos. 1 and 3 above to a much more significant degree than what it would have had not the archipelagic state provisions in the Convention not been included. Without the archipelagic principles, the country would have been subject to the ordinary regimes and the archipelago fragmented because of pockets of High Seas between the islands, and the application of the Transit Pas­ sage in the various straits. A corresponding increase would be noted in the area where resource and management rights could be legitimately exercised under the 52 Convention were to be compared to the areas claimed within the Treaty of Paris. There were also compromises, as there was a corresponding responsibility to acknowledge innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage, ~d traditional fish­ ing rights. The impact of the latter issue was moderated by the requirements of l

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bilateral agreements prior to implemen­ The Philippine delegation tation. The Philippine delegation be­ believed that the lieved that the accommodation of the maritime powers was not too high a price accommodation of the to pay for recognition of the remaining maritime powers was not essence of archipelagic principles; they too high a price to pay for also believed that in time, technological recognition of the developments would allow the country remaining essence of to compensate for weaknesses it would archipelagic principles ... be exposed to by allowing such passage ng. h ts. '3

Philippine Declarations Upon Signing of the Convention The decision to sign the Convention was not made easily. After nearly 30 years of negotiations, the Philippines gained some headway in the recognition of the archipelagic principles, but also had to make compromises. In signing the Conven­ tion, the Head of the Philippine delegation declared: '~ong the new concepts in the Convention is that of the archipelago. The Philippines advanced the archipelago principle as early as 1956 and we have established it in our national legislation. We are therefore happy that the archipelago principle has finally been recognized and accepted as part of public international law. Although we would have been much hap­ pier lf our proposed amendments in this area had gained general accep­ tance, we are satisfied, principally because of the inclusion of two basic considerations in the text of the Convention. "The first of these is the recognition of the concept that an archi­ pelago is an integrated unit in which the "islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic, and political entity." No longer will the various islands of the archipelago be regarded as sepa­ rate units, each with its own individual maritime areas, and the waters between them as distinct from the land territory. This archipelago con-

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cept carries far-reaching implications which can influence the interpreta­ tions of the provisions of the convention. "The second welcome basic consideration that gives us satisfaction is the recognition of the sovereignty of the archipelagic state over the archi­ pelagic waters, the air space above them, the seabed and subsoil below them, and the resources contained therein. The text states explicitly in clear terms the only qualification of this sovereignty, by providing that this sovereignty is to be exercised "subject to the part," referring to Part IV on archipelagic states. "No qualification or limitation, therefore, outside of Part rv, on the exercise of sovereignty by the archipelagic states over the archipelagic wa­ ters would be valid. To make provisions outside of Part IV applicable to archipelagic states, the Convention expressly so provides. (Art. 52 and 54) "One consequence of this is that the archipelagic waters are subject only to two kinds of passage by foreign ships provided in Part IV of the Convention: (1) innocent passage, and (2) archipelagic sealanes passage. This refers to all archipelagic waters, or waters inside the archipelagic baselines, wherever located, whether around or between the islands and whatever their breadth or dimension. Transit passage, therefore, available to foreign ships in straits used for international navigation under Part III of the Convention, would not be available to them on national or domes­ tic straits entirely within the archipelagic sealanes. "Such national straits could be subject to sea lanes passage if th~ archipelagic state so decides. Of course, the elements of sea lanes passage are practically the same as those of transit passage; but while transit pas­ sage is imposed by the Convention on the waters of the coastal states concerned, sea lanes passage can be exercised by foreign ships only in such sea lanes as the archipelagic state may designate and establish. "Sea lanes passage does not impair the sovereignty of the archipelagic state over the waters of the sea lanes. It is thus expressly provided in article 49, paragraph 4, that: "The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the

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archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipe­ lagic state of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, seabed and subsoils, and the resources contained therein." XXX "You can readily see, Mr. President, that we have some problem with the 12-mile breadth of the territorial sea provided in the Convention. My government has studied the problem; it is a very difficult one for us. But this notwithstanding, my government nevertheless decided that it shall sign the Convention. The determining factor in arriving at this decision, as we have repeatedly stated, was the sovereignty of the archipelagic state over the archipelagic waters, their air space, seabed, and subsoil and their resources. This sovereignty will bind together, in the eyes of International Law, the islands, waters, and other natural features of the Philippines as an "intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity." XXX "Our satisfaction with the EEZ may be better appreciated when we consider that the Philippine EEZ is more than 132,000 square nautical miles bigger than our historic territorial sea and therefore has a compen- • fi: ,54 satmg e 1ect.

Despite the non-acceptance of the Treaty of Paris lines which defined the ex­ tent of Philippine territory, the head of the delegation considered that sufficient protection was accorded Philippine interests in the recognition of the archipelagic principle insofar as they allowed for a concept of the archipelagic state as a single unified political entity and for sovereignty over archipelagic waters. Archipelagic sea lanes passage was accepted as an alternative to the more onerous transit passage regime provided straits used for international navigation. The recognition of the EEZ regime was also seen to compensate for the non-recognition of the Treaty of Paris limits as the maximum extent of Philippine national territory. These statements, however, were cast in some ambiguity when the Philippines submitted a formal declaration upon signing the Convention, which pertinently stated:

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"2. Such signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Philippine as successor to the United States ofAmerica, under and arising out of the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States of America of December 19, 1898, and the Treaty of Washington between the United States of America and Great Britain of January 2, 1930; XXX 4. Such signing shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sover­ eignty of the Republic of the Philippines over any territory over which it exercises sovereign authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters appurtenant thereto; 5. The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent laws and Presidential Decrees or Proclamations of the Re­ public'Of the Philippines; the Government of the Republic of the Philip­ pines maintains and reserves the right and authority to make any amend­ ments to such laws, decrees, or proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Constitution; 6. The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic state over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence, and security; 7. The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of in­ ternal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these waters with the economic zone or high sea from the rights 55 of foreign vessels to transit passage for international navigation;"

A number of nations soon filed protests against the above declaration, aver­ ring, among others, that the matters referred to in the first paragraphs were in the nature of reservations prohibited by the Convention. The Convention was ratified 56 two years later by the Batasang Pambansa after legislative qeliberations which focused largely on the implications of the Convention to natiohal security, fishing 57 activities and passage of foreign vessels.

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Under the 1987 Constitution

The Article on National Territory Revised

When a new Constitution was promulgated under the Aquino Administration, it also contained a provision on the national territory which was not too different from that in the 1973 formulation: "The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philip­ pines." (underscoring supplied)

New provisions were also added indicating acceptance of certain concepts in the Law of the Sea such as that on the protection of the marine wealth: "The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use 58 and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. "

Debates in the Constitutional Commission, however, reveal that the intention in adopting the article on the national territory was simply to use the 1973 formula­ tion, though the Commissioners decided to emphasize on the fact that the Philip­ pines is an archipelago. But discussions focused on the impact of the new provision on the Sabah claim, rather than on the maritime territorial areas. There were also disturbing indications that the Constitutional Commissioners were not properly 9 informed of the meaning of the maritime zones, rights and jurisdictions involved. 5

Commitment to Abide by the law of the Sea

Since 1985, the Philippines had received a number of protests against the Dec­ laration it filed when it signed the Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982.

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Countries such as the Byellorussian Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, the Ukrainian Socialist Republic, the United States and Vietnam filed their protests with the Secretary General of the United Nations. In 1988, Australia filed its own protest. These countries mostly argued that the Philippine Declaration was 60 in the nature of reservations which were not allowed under the Convention. Re­ sponding to the Australian protest, the Philippines issued a statement directed to all State Parties to the Convention saying: "The Philippine Declaration was made in conformity with article 310 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The declara­ tion consists of interpretative statements concerning certain provisions of the Convention. "The Philippine Government intends to harmonize its domestic leg­ islation with the provisions of the Convention. "The necessary steps are being undertaken to enact legislation deal­ ingwith archipelagic sea lanes passage and the exercise of Philippine sov­ ereign rights over archipelagic waters, in accordance with the Convention. ((The Philippine Government, therefore, wishes to assure the Austra­ lian Government and the States Parties to the Convention that the Philip­ pines will abide by the provisions of the Convention."

The meaning of the Philippine Response is dear and unequivocal- the Phil­ ippines intends to abide by the Convention. But since 1988, no concrete legislative or executive action has definitely resolved the issues of implementation of the Con­ vention on the Law of the Sea.

Major Problem Areas and Issues

The Limitation of Choices At the outset, it must be stated that the Philippine ratification of the Law of the Sea, together with subsequent official declarations reiterating the commitment to abide by its provisions, has charted the country's course irrevocably into compli­ ance with the Convention. Not only does the rule of pacta sunt servanda demand

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61 it, not even the ultimate and extreme option of denunciation of the Convention will result in any advantage to the Philippines, as it is expressly provided that in the event of denundation, "2. A State shall not be discharged by reason of the denunciation from the financial and contractual obligations which accrued while it was a Party to this Convention, nor shall the denunciation affect any right, obligation, or legal situation of the State created through the execution of this Convention prior to its termination for that State. 3. The denunciation shall not in any way affect the duty of the State Party to fulfill any obligation embodied in this Convention to which it would be subject under international law independently of the Conven­ tion.';62 (underscoring supplied)

Even if the Philippines were to attempt to withdraw from the Convention, it would still be legally bound, as far as the international community is concerned, to comply with its provisions. The second part of the first paragraph could be inter­ preted to mean that rights, obligations, or duties created by the express provisions of the Convention upon ratification and entry into force will remain enforceable, while the third paragraph could mean that portions of the Convention deemed to have become customary international law, as far as the international community is concerned, would be enforceable as well. But the problem remains that if the Convention is denounced and the country does not implement its provisions, other countries could still demand that the more onerous obligations of the Convention be complied with by the Philippines (e.g. transit passage through straits within the archipelago) while the latter would not be able to exercise the relevant rights that would enable it to mitigate the impact of such obligations on the country.

Treaties and Philippine Constitutional law While the Constitution provided for the incorporation of the general principles 63 of international law as part of the law of the land, it also placed treaties on the

80 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines same level as statutes and therefore subject to challenge before Supreme Court.64 But though a treaty may be declared invalid or unconstitutional, it is also accepted that a party to a treaty may not invoke provisions from its own internal law as justification for failure to perform its obligations under the treaty. Considering these rules, the Supreme Court concluded that when a treaty is thus repealed or abrogated or amended as part of the law of the land, it continues to be as an obliga­ tion of the Philippines to the other State Party or Parties, l'llthough it may not be 65 enforceable internally by the courts. The practical impact would be that even if the Convention were successfully challenged before the Supreme Court, then there would be no duty on the part of agencies of the Government to implement it. The practical implication, perhaps, is that no appropriations will be devoted towards any activity that implements the Convention. In that case, then it would be as if the Government were to com­ pletely abdicate management of ocean activities insofar as it is covered by the Con­ vention (which is quite a lot), because the Philippines would still be bound to comply with its obligations to the international community.

The Existing Straight Baseline System

Republic Act No. 3046 establishes straight baselines in accordance with the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case. Among the options proposed is the maintenance of this baseline system, or at least the use of modified straight baselines instead of archipelagic baselines to enclose the islands of the archipelago, so that the waters within the baselines would retain their "internal" character. Such an option, how­ ever, is actually far less attractive than the archipelagic baseline system. First of all, the "new" internal character of the waters does not affect the right 66 of innocent passage previously exercised by foreign ships through those waters. Second, the establishment of straight baselines brings all the straits in the archi­ 7 pelago within the ambit of the regime of Transit Passage/' which is even more 68 onerous than Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage. In giving the nomenclature of "internal waters" to the waters within the straight baselines, .thf! country would in effect be giving up even more control over foreign ships' pJ1Ss.age through those • waters.

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Striking A Middle Ground

It thus appears that the Philippines has no choice but to implement the Con­ vention; non-implementation places it in a far less favorable position because of the non-recognition by foreign nations of any action inconsistent with the Convention's rules. In truth however, this is not as negative a situation as it would seem.

Constitutional Flexibility

The ultimate impact of the Convention on the Constitution will no doubt fo­ cus upon the article concerning the National Territory. However, the phraseology of the article is flexible enough to permit the incorporation of the system of maritime zones under the Convention into the Philippine legal system. This is so if one were to momentarily disregard the historical antecedents of the Treaty of Paris and re­ lated agreements and consider the article in light of the Convention. Since the article on national territory does not specify the location or breadth of the territorial sea or internal waters, there is no apparent inconsistency between it and the system of maritime zones described in the Convention. The only major inconsistency would be the article's declaration that the waters "around, between and connecting" the islands of the archipelago are deemed "in­ ternal waters," whereas the Convention defines "internal waters" as waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial ;ea or waters within closing lines drawn across mouths of rivers, bays, and harbor works in the case of archipelagic waters. It is possible to adopt a new national legal definition of "internal waters" to encompass the "archipelagic waters" as defined in the Convention. To date, no piece of Philippine legislation precisely defines "internal waters." The Constitution refers to the waters around, between, and connecting the islands as "part of the internal waters," implying that other Philippine waters (inland waters, for example) are also internal waters. Such a national legal definition would bring the Conven­ tion within the ambit of the provision of the national territory. In any case, "archi­ pelagic waters", which are not expressly defined in statutory law are recognized by 69 the Constitution in a separate provision.

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Ultimately, it is not whether the bodies of water around, between and connect­ ing the islands are called "internal" or not which determines the effectiveness of State control over foreign vessels. It is international law which will be the basis for ~he legitimacy or illegitimacy of State actions vis-a-vis foreign vessels within the waters of the archipelago. But to exercise the rights and jurisdiction already recog­ nized by international law, it is necessary to make use of the concepts provided by The dimensions of the the Convention and adapt them to the territorial sea no longer Philippine legal system. figure heavily in national The character and extent of the terri- torial sea has also been at the center of defense planning the debate on the impact of the Conven­ because of the nature of tion. Diminution of the territorial sea, it modern weaponry. is contended, is a diminution of our re- source base and defense. But at its core, the need for a territorial sea arose from the need to ( 1) secure fisheries and other resources within the extension of the land territory, and (2) protect the State from threats posed by naval ships. With respect to the first, the concern for resources is adequately addressed by the EEZ and continental shelf concepts which extends the State's exclusive jurisdiction and protects its sole access to the resource~ seaward to at least 200 nautical miles. In fact, the area covered by the EEZ is far greater than that con­ tained in the original treaty limits. As for the second, it should be noted that the idea of a definite breadth for the territorial sea sprang from the cannon-shot rule. As such, the security value of the territorial sea was tied to the range of naval artillery. In an era of guided missiles reaching far beyond 500 miles, the impor­ tance of the security consideration for determining the breadth of the territorial sea obviously needs re-examination. The dimensions of the territorial sea no longer figure heavily in national defense planning because of the t'Iature of mod­ ern weaponry. It thus, would be more practical and useful to focus on the benefits of access to resources rather than on the (now admittedly low) military value of the territorial sea.

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Advantageous Rights and Duties

The objection to the Convention's focus on the impact on the national territory provision and the issue of passage of foreign vessels has unfortunately obscured the greater advantages of the majority of the Convention's new recognition of State rights and jurisdiction in extended maritime areas. The Convention does not deal with territory, after all, but rather with the management of the oceans and covers such activities as marine pollution, scientific research and use of marine resources. Because of the debate over some provisions of the Convention, the Philippines failed to take advantage of the rights, jurisdictions and obligations in all the other parts of the Convention in managing its oceans, some areas of which extend far beyond the original limits of the national territory. Using the Convention as basis or reference, other countries have gone far ahead in managing marine activities in their EEZs, territorial waters, or archipelagic waters, and have successfully entered into cooperative agreements with other states regarding the exploitation of living and . . 70 non-11vmg resources. It must be noted that the Philippines cannot afford to be left out of the con­ tinuing developments in the Law of the Sea. It has great maritime interests which have not been properly articulated because of the deadlock created by the debate on its impact on the national territory. In the meantime, other countries have pushed forward, continuously building a regime for management of the ocean and its re­ sources.

Mitigation of Impacts of Onerous Obligations

The main concerns of the Philippines about the Convention have been on the grant of archipelagic sea lanes passage and its impact on national security and terri­ torial integrity and the recognition of traditional fishing rights within archipelagic waters. While there is a duty to recognize traditional fishing rights, the modalities will still be subject to bilateral agreements between the archipelagic state and the state to which the fishers belong. This moderates to a great extent the impact of mere recognition and allows the Philippines a degree of flexibility as well as a mandate to

84 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines manage the traditional fishing activities of foreigners. To date, no work has been done on how this provision may be implemented by the Philippines, in contrast to other countries like Indonesia which has come up with a working definition of 71 72 "traditional fishing," and Australia which forged agreements on it. Yet many traditional Malaysian and Indonesian fishers traverse our waters in the southern fringes of the archipelago. As for the first concern, what needs to be considered is that without imple­ mentation of the Convention, the Philippines cannot exercise any regulation of in­ ternational passage through its waters, either because the regime of Transit Passage can be invoked or because the Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage may be exercised by foreign ships in all normal routes of navigation for as long as no desig­ nation is made. Part N of the Convention provides the basis for at least limiting the passage of ships to designated Archipelagic Sea Lanes, which can be substi­ tuted under conditions that the archipelagic state may define. In archipelagic wa­ ters outside of those designated for Archipelagic Sea Lane Passage, the exercise of the right of innocent passage may likewise be moderated by the designation of sea 73 lanes and can even be suspended for reasons of security. What is important is that Part N allows the Philippines a greater degree of control over passage than what would ensue if Transit Passage rights were to be invoked by the international community in Philippine waters, as they have grounds to do so under existing legal conditions. Moreover, having a system of internatiomilly recognized sea lanes al­ lows the Philippines to rationalize its monitoring of foreign vessels use of the waters of the archipelago, and to more efficiently allocate its meager resources for man­ agement of Philippine waters.

Redefining Our Maritime Zones The system of maritime zones created by our laws and under the Convention, are very different and will undoubtedly cause conflicts with other nanons. Even if recognized by international law, the maritime zones created by Rep. Act No. 3046 as amended, Pres. Decree No. 1596, and Pres. Decree No. 15?9. demand an enor­ mous and complicated legal and logistical support structure SQ that the country's

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 85 Batongbacal rights and jurisdictions can be exercised effectively to protect and pursue the na­ tional interest in those areas. In view of the Law of the Sea, undoubtedly the law as far as the international community is concerned, this task is made even more diffi. cult, perhaps even impossible, to accomplish. At this point, it may be useful to discuss whether the Treaty of Paris lines have any more relevance in the management of the ocean. This author believes that in truth, the Treaty of Paris (and associated treaties) no longer serve a practical pur­ pose for ocean management, have been reduced to a historical artifact. This is because in the management of the oceans, the interactivity of the marine environ· ment and the mobility of the marine resources are such that boundary lines drawn on a map have little meaning. Activities on one side of the border can impact upon the environment on the other side, perhaps to an even worse degree. Ocean man· agement issues are transboundary in nature, and whether we advocate the Treaty of Paris lines or the Convention lines, the effectiveness of our actions will ultimately be based on the extent that we can address the issues on multiple levels that are not geographically-defined, not on lines on a map. Internationally, the Law of the Sea has led to the rapid and progressive de- velopment of international law on prac­ What matters is human tically every aspect of ocean use except activity, and how to the military; these developments render manage or influence such the Treaty of Paris lines all the more ir­ activity so that they do relevant as the existence of such lines do not diminish our interests not pose an obstacle to the development in the areas where they and implementation of international. law. The Philippines' location at the occur, and that Philippine nexus of Southeast Asia, the South interests... are protected China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean ren- ders it most prone to multiple overlaps of maritime jurisdiction. To date, there is no dear policy on how the problems and issues created by these overlaps can be dealt with, because of the rigid territorial structure presumed to have been created by existing laws on the national territory. But these problems and issues exist, continue to exist and are getting worse. For

86 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines example, there are Malaysian and Philippine settlements in the various islands along the Philippine-Malaysian border, in effect, rendering the border irrelevant to the people in those fringes of the territory. The competition for occupation of the fea­ tures of the Spratly Island Group, of which the Kalayaan Island Group is a part, continually threatens to throw the littoral claimant states into conflict. In the north, Taiwanese fishers continually encroach upon fishing grounds in the Batanes and in northern portions of Luzon, to the detriment of the disadvantaged Filipino fishing communities in those areas. These are but some of the slowly escalating conflicts that are brewing; yet the Philippines has not laid any groundwork for managing the existing problems.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the Philippines is bound to implement the United Na­ tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, as it has publicly declared to the interna­ tional community for about 10 years now. But the real questions should not be whether or not the Convention increases or diminishes the extent of the national territory as drawn on a map, as the debates have been about, but on how the Philippines can exercise its rights under the Convention to more effectively pursue its maritime interests in the areas to be covered by the expanse of such territory. Ultimately, the lines of a map, whether they are those of the Treaty of Paris or the Convention's maritime zones, are meaningless out at sea. Those lines do not impede the movement of resources, nor do they act as barriers to the impacts of the many uses of the ocean. What matters is human activity, and how to manage or influence such activity so that they do not diminish our interests in the areas where they occur, and that Philippine interests in the resources and activities in those ocean areas are protected. The provision on the national territory becomes irrel­ evant where foreign vessels and the interests of the international cllmmunity are concerned; what will matter will be the provisions of international agreements. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides the accept­ able framework for engendering the cooperatign of the internatiohal community in the management of shared resources and ocean spaces. It is 1\igh time that the

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 87 Batongbacal

Philippines commits itself to a program implementing the Convention, and thus to exercise its rights, as well as to require compliance by other states of their duties and obligations.

NOTES

Pacis, V. A., et. Al., Founders ofFreedom, Capitol Publishing House, Manila 1971, p. 10-17 2 Id.,atpp.9-10 3 However, this was not really universally accepted. Up until the 1950's, countries claimed varying distances for different reasons. Many claimed 3 miles, others 4, some 12, and in the case of South American countries, 200 miles. It was only after the First Law of the Sea Conference in 1958 that the a consensus developed towards either 3 or 12 nautical miles. 4 Kok Wmgvs. Philippine National Railways, 54 Phil438 (1930) 5 Villongco vs Moreno, G.R L-17240, January 31, 1962; The full text of the provision may be found in Aquino, R. and C. Grifto, Law of Natural Resources, E.F. David & Sons, 789 Washington Ave., Manila, 1957,atp.425. 6 Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain signed in Paris, 10 December 1898. In Lotilla, RP. (Ed.), The Philippine National Territory, UP Institute ofinternational Legal Studies and Foreign Service Institute, Manila 1995. (Hereafter referred to as PNT) Document 10, pp. 32- 37 7 Ibid. 8 Treaty Between the of Kingdom Spain and the United States of America for Cession of Outlying Islands of the Philippines (1900). In PNTDoc. No. 11, pp. 38·39 9 Aquino, Rand C. Grifto, Law of Natural Resources, E.F. David & Sons, 789 Washington Ave., Manila, 1957, at pp. 425-426. 10 15 Phil? (1910). Also in PNTDoc. No.13, pp. 61-75, at 11 46 Phil729 (1922}. In PNT, Doc. No. 17, pp. 90-93 12 Public Law No. 240, Chapter416.AnAct to Declare the PurposeofthePeopleofthe United States as to the Future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous Government for thos Islands. In PNT Document 14, pp. 7 6-87 13 Convention Between the United States of America and Great Britain Delimiting the Boundary Between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo, 1930. In PNT Document 19, pp. 134-136 14 Act No. 4003, An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relating to Fish and Other Aquatic Resources of the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes (1932). In PNTDocument No.20:1, pp. 146-147 15 Little comfort is to be drawn from this piece of legislation, however, as nowhere in the Act is it expressly mentioned that the waters between the seaward boundary of municipal waters to the Treaty limits are of the character of territorial waters. Designation of areas as fishing grounds are not in themselves indicative of a territorial character, as it is possible to have designated fishing grounds in the high seas. 16 Sec 1, Public Law Act No, 311. An Act to Enable the People of the Philippine Islands to Adopt a Constitution and Form a Government for the Philippine Islands, To Provide for the Independence of the Same, and for Other Purposes (1933). In PNT, DocumentNo.21, pp. 148-156 17 Sec. 1, Public Law No. 127. An Act to Provide for the Complete Independence of the Philippine Islands, to Provide for the Adoption of a Constitution and A Form of Government for the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes (1934). In PNT, Document No. 22, pp. 157-166

88 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

18 Art. IV; Sec. 14, Act No. 2657 (Administrative Code of 1916). In PNT, Document No. 15, p. 88; Art. IV; Sec. 16,Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code of 1917). In PNT,Document No. 16, p. 89 19 Art. I, Convention Between the United States of America and Great Britain Delimiting the Boundary Between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo ( 1930 ). In PNT, Document No. 19, pp. 134·136, at p. 134 20 Art. II, Id. 21 Art. III, Id. 22 Arbitral Award Rendered in Conformity with the Special Agreement Concluded on January 23, 1925 Between the United States of America and the Netherlands Relating to the Arbitration of Differences Respecting Sovereignty Over the Island ofPalmas (Miangas ), 1928. In PNT, Doc. No. 18, pp. 94-133 23 Id., at p. 105, citing a LetterdatedApril7, 1900ofthe Secretary of State of the United States to the Spanish Minister at Washington. 24 Committee Report No.7, dated August 31, 1934. In PNT, Doc. No. 23A, pp. 168-171 25 Proceedings on the National Territory of the 1934-193 5 Constitutional Convention. Record of the Consti­ tutional Convention, Vol. ll,Journal Nos. 21-40. In PNT, Doc. No. 23B, pp. 172-258 26 Interventions of Delegates Bautista Razona, Id., pp. 247-248. Explaining the reason for including the proposed provision on the national territory, he stated: "El objeto es cortar el paso de extraiias potencias, que, movidas por la avaricia, quiseran algun dia valerse de nuestros propios compatriotas para aduefiarse de una parte de nuestro territorio; y al mismo tiempo ahuyehtar la posibilidad de que, por ciertas dtidivas, el President/?' de la Republica y la Asemblea Nacional dispongan de un municipio, de una provincia o de una isla de este Archipielago a favor de uno de los vanos paises que, por saber sue en el seno de nuestras montaiias se guardia oro de altisima ley, en el coraz6n de nuestros bosque se encierra un tesoro de inmenso valor y en el fondo de nt:.testros mares se esconden riquezas inagotables, codician tanto esta tierra de nuestros amores. » 27 Sec. l,Art. I, 1935 Constitution 28 Proclamation of Independence of the Philippines by the President of the United States of America ( 1946}, 60 US Stat 1352. In PNT, Doc. No. 24, pp. 261-262 29 Ibid. The pertinent paragraph of the Proclamation r<}ads: "WHEREAS the United States of America by the Treaty of Peace with Spain of December 10, 1898, commonly known as the Treaty of Paris, and by the Treaty with Spain of November 7, 1900, did acquire sovereignty over the Philippines, and by the Convent:ion ofJanuary 2, 19 30, with Great Britain did delimit the boundary between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo; x x x" 30 Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and the Philippine Republic Regarding the Transfer of Administration of the Turtle and Mangsee Islands to the Philippine Republic. In PNT, Doc. No. 26, pp. 265- 269 31 Note Verbale dated 20 January 1956 from the Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the United Nations. In PNT, Doc. No. 28, pp. 272-273 32 The right of innocent passage refers to the right accorded to foreign vessels to traverse the territorial waters of a foreign state without having to seek permission to do so, as long as the vessel did not act in a manner that was prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the said state. 33 Sanger, C. Ordenng the Oceans: The Making ofthe Law ofthe Sea. Zed Books Ltd., 1986. Pp. 71, 73-74. 34 Rep. Act No. 3046 ( 1961). An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines. In PNT, Doc. No. 29, pp. 276-280 35 Rep. Act No. 5446 (1968). An Act to Amend Section One of Republic Act No. 3046, Entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines". In PNT, Doc. No. 30, pp.365-.370 36 See Proceedings of the Philippine Senate on Senate Bill No. 541: Baselines of the Philippine Territorial Sea (1960). In PNT, Doc. No. 29Aand29B,pp. 281-364 37 Rep. Act No. 5446 (1968)

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 200 0 89 Batongbacal

38 See Proceedings of the Philippine House of Representatives on Senate Bill No. 954: An Act Amending Section One of Republic Act No. 3046, Entitled ''An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines" (1968). In PNT, Doc. No. 30B, pp. 375-409 39 Presidential Proclamation No. 370. Declaring as Subject to the Jurisdiction and Control ofthe Republic of the Philippines All Mineral and Other Natural Resources in the Continental Shelf of the Philippines ( 1968). In PNT, Doc. No. 31, pp. 410-411. 40 Art. I, Sec. 1, 1973 Constitution 41 Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Cabal, Record of the Constitutional Convention, Session of February 14, 1972, No 106 42 Stenographic Notes on the Public Hearing of the Committee on National Territory held on September 29, 1971 (unpublished), pp. 8-10 43 For example, Sec. 5 and 6,PresidentialDecree No. 1587, The Revised Administrative Code of1978 (1978). In PNT, Doc. No. 41, p. 467 44 See Intervention of Delegate Buendia, Proceedings on the National Territory of the 1934-193 5 Constitu­ tional Convention. Record of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. ll,]ournal Nos. 21-40. In PNT, Doc. No. 23B, pp. 172-258, at pp. 203-204. He stated: "Tambien quisiera hacer constar, como una mera informacion, que las islas disputadas entre el Japon y Francia, estdn fuera de nuestro tem'torio, de acuerdo con el Tratado de Pansy los siguientes de 1900 y 1930. "Hago esta declaracion despues de haber hecho un esfuerzo por localizar las citadas islas situadas bacia el Oeste de Palawan, con la ayuda de la Ofi"cina de Coasta y Geodesia. Estas islas distan 165 millas man·nas del puerto mas proximo de la Isla de Palawan, o sea, 70 mil/as menos que la distancia que media entre las citadas islas bacia el punto mas cercano de Indo-China, y estdn entre los 114o y 115o Este de Greenwich. Como quiera que nuestro temtono esta entre los 116 y 12l de longitud Este, dicho se estd que las citadas islas estdn /uera de nuestro tem'tono. "Los distinguidos Miembros del Comite de Ponencias habian oido de boca del P Ylla, en una declaracion que hiciera nte el citado Comzte, que las citadas islas estdn dentro de nuestro tem'ton.o; pero parece que el mismo P Ylla ha cambiado de parecer sobre el particular, ante la realidad de los hechos arriba mencionados. "Esto, sin embargo, no quiere decir que no tenemos derecho para reclamar dichas islas. Al contran·o, tenemos sobradas razones para reclamarlas, como son, a saber: su proximidad a la Isla de Palawan; y porque entre dichas Islas y Paragua solo media un canal estrecho y foe a profundidad, al paso que entre las mismas e Indo-China media un canal muy ancho y de mucha pro/undidad. 45 Chiu, H. and C. Park, "Legal Status of the Paracels and Spratly Islands," In Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No.1 (1975), cited in LuNing, Flashpoint Spratlys!. Dolphin Books, Singapore 1995 at p. 25 46 Valero, G.M.C., SpratlyArchipelago: Is the Question ofSovereignty Still Relevant? Institute oflnternational Legal Studies, Quezon City, 1993, p.63-65 47 Press Statement, July 10, 1971, quoted in the Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Cabal, op. cit. 48 Presidential Decree No. 1596, Declaring Certain Areas Parts of Philippine Territory and Providing for their Government and Administration (1978). In PNT, Doc. No. 40, pp. 465-466. The decree stated: "WHEREAS, by reason of their proximity the cluster of islands and islets in the South China Sea situated in the following: x x x are vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines; ''WHEREAS, much of the above area is part of the continental margin of the Philippine archipelago; ''WHEREAS, these areas do not legally belong to any state o; nation but, by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in accordance with international law, such areas must now be deemed to belong and subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines; ''WHEREAS, while other states have laid claims to some of these areas, their claims have lapsed by abandon­ ment and can not prevail over that of the Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds. XXX

90 PUBLIC POLICY Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines

"Section 1. The area within the following boundaries: x x x including the seabed, subsoil, continental margin, and air space shall belong and be subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines. Such area is hereby constituted as a distinct and separate municipality of the Province of Palawan and shall be known as "Kalayaan". 49 ·Presidential Decree No. 1599, Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and For Other Purposes (1979). In PNT, Doc. No. 42, pp. 468-469 50 Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1599 states: "Section 1. There is hereby established a zone to be known as the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. The exclusive economic zone shall extend to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured; Provided, that, where the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring state, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the state concerned or in accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles of international law on delimitation." 51 Art. 42, LOSC allows bordering States to adopt rules and regulations only with respect to the safety of navigation and regulation of maritime traffic, marine pollution management by giving effect to international regulations, prevention of fishing by fishing vessels, arid loading or unloading of commodities, currency, or persons in violation of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws. Transit passage cannot be suspended or impeded in any manner by bordering states. 52 The main trade-off, according to Senator Tolentino, was the EEZ, which resulted in an increase of 132,100 square nautical miles to the area wherein the Philippines could avail of the marine resources. The archipelagic waters provisions also meant that 141,800 square nautical miles of waters previously regarded by the inter­ national community as high seas came under the sovereignty of the Philippines. See Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa Concurring in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In PNT, Doc. No. 44D, pp. 513-540, at p. 517 53 Id., at p. 515 54 Statement of the Head of the Philippine Delegation, Jamaica, December 10, 1982. In PNT, Doc. No. 44A, pp. 505-508. 55 The Philippine Declaration on the Signing ofthe Convention on the Law of the Sea. In PNT, Doc. No. 44B, pp. 509-510 56 Resolution No. 121, Resolution of the Batasang Pambansa Concurring in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1984}. In PNT, Doc. No. 44C, pp. 511-512. 57 See Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa Convention on the Law of the Sea. In PNT, Doc. No. 44D, pp. 513-540. 58 Para. 2, Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. 59 See Proceedings of the Deliberations of June 26, 1986, where the EEZ is referred to as expanding the country's territory as against the 3 rhlle rule which was obsetved, and the right of innocent passage as necessary to save lives during fortuitous events. The EEZ is again referred to as the national territory in the record of Deliberations ofJune 30, 1986, and additionally it is said that the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea are reproductions of the definition of the country's national territory; straits are discussed as not being part of high seas and not the national territory. In the Deliberations of August 7, 1986, one Commissioner stated that the EEZ is now part of the internal waters of the Philippines, another said that the territorial waters can extend up to 300 miles from ·the nearest baselines under the archipelagic theory. In PNT, Doc. No. 48A, pp. 555-59;, and Doc. No. 49A, pp. 595-608. 60 China and Vietnam additiomiJ4rcontradicted the Philippines' claim to the Kalayaan Island Group. 61 Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Reiterated in Art.300 of the LOSC, as follows: "State Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which wopld not constitute an abuse of right." 62 Art. 317, LOSC

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 91 Batongbacal

63 Sec. 2, Art. II, 1987 Constitution 64 Sec. 4(2 ), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, wherein the Supreme Court is granted jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality or validity of any treaty. This provision also existed under the previous Constitutions. 65 See Abbas vs Commision on Elections, 179 SCRA 287 (1989) 66 Art. 8, LOSC. The second paragraph states: "2. Where the establishment of straight baselines in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided by this Convention shall exist in those waters." 67 Part III, LOSC. 68 There is no recognition of sovereignty over the waters beyond the 12 nautical mile limit, passage (both transit and innocent) cannot be suspended, and coastal state jurisdiction over passage is limited to only the select areas specified in the Convention. 69 Para. 2, Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. 70 For example, Indonesia has taken full advantage of the Convention to engage its neighbors in oil and gas exploration and fisheries cooperation, instituted a management regime for shipping in its archipelagic waters, and taken an active part in multi-lateral activities on marine pollution, fisheries, and ocean manage­ ment. Before the financial crisis, Indonesia had achieved economic development at a better pace in spite of the burdens of the Convention which the Philippines has been so concerned about. 71 In fact, it is a rather restrictive definition applicable to what may generally be described as artisanal fishers using small dug-out boats to fish for subsistence. Personal conversation with Amb. Has jim Djalal at the First ASEAN Legal Experts Meeting on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Manila Hotel, November 26-27' 1997. 72 The Torres Straits Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea signed in 1978 included a provision for access of traditional fishers; and a Memorandum of Understanding on Access by Traditional Indonesian Fisherpersons was signed between Australia and Indonesia in 197 4. 73 In the same manner that a coastal state is allowed to designate sea lanes and trafffic separation schemes through the territorial sea; this is different from Archipelagic Sea Lanes where the Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage may be exercised.

92 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns

GLENN D AGUILAR

Marine transportation is important because of the archipelagic nature of the Philippines, its strategic location in Southeast Asia and the contribution of the sector's different components to the economy. Safety at sea is of critical concern, given the numerous disasters that have occurred on Philippine waters. While the policy frame­ work is adequately addressed by existing government agencies, some glaring gaps such as the need to process and improve available information on sea states regu­ larly, the seaworthiness of outrigger boats or bancas, and the implications o(the preference of Filipino crew for work overseas, among other issues, are discussed in the paper. Marine transportation is well established as a means of travel and cargo trans­ port between the islands of the Philippine archipelago. As much as 90 percent of all cargo is reported to be sea-borne with the remainder divided between air and land modes of travel. The gross domestic products of the various regions are directly proportional to the volume of cargo shipped by sea. Most of the major cities such as Manila, Cebu, Iloilo and Davao are situated close to the sea, having their origins as sea ports during the Spanish or American periods. But long befure the colonial era, areas of trade flourished, aided by natural harbors and favorable sites for the ex- Aguilar change of goods. The importance of marine transportation for the country has been relatively understated, with the sector coming to prominence only when disasters at sea occur, prompting calls either for stricter implementation of existing rules or for outright punishment of the transportation agent, be this the shipowner, crew or even the relevant enforcement agencies.

SOME HISTORY

Excavations in Butuan City have unearthed 12 vessel artifacts capable of un­ dertaking long ocean voyages, with the carbon dating process establishing these artifacts to be from the 8th century AD. Both legends and historical accounts de­ scribe our islands as having been settled by peoples from other parts of Asia, arriv­ ing at our shores by sea. Ethnographers note the similarities in language among the Southeast Asian peoples. Archeological artifacts point to common traditions be­ tween the peoples of Taiwan, Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Specific artifacts such as the Manunggul burial jar found in Palawan with a cover shaped like a boat and two human figures paddling atop is cited as proof of a common widespread culture throughout the mentioned areas. The features of this artifact including the type of boat, placement of the arms and facial expressions have also been found in various artwork and on other artifacts throughout the region (Zayas, 1998). The Spaniards noted the navigational skills of Filipinos, particularly the Bisaya who used a compass such as that used by the Malays and Chinese. Sailing tech­ niques employed by Malayo-Polynesian peoples were found among the early Fili­ pinos. There is also growing evidence that the Micronesian Islands were peopled by the ancestors of the Filipinos because of similarities in rice culture, betel nut chew­ ing and tuba or coconut wine production. With the coming of the Spaniards, the native boat, the Karakao, was transformed into a warship, with lantakas or small bronze cannons on both ends. This early use as a gun platform and a speedy craft to overtake enemy vessels gives testimony of its excellence. After the capture of a Moro in Butuan, Legaspi noted that he was "... a most experienced man who had much knowledg~ not only ofmatters concerning these Fzlipinas Islands, but those of Maluco, Borney, Malaca, Jaba, India and China, where he had

94 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns had much experience in navigation and trade." (Blair & Robertson, 1973 ). Such navi­ gational skill would have been developed through a tradition of constant voyaging and exploration when seasonal winds were favorable, literally blowing people from one island to another. Popular stories derived from oral histories describe the settling of 12 datus somewhere in Panay where they purchased the lowland areas from the Aetas for the price of a golden hat or salakot and a golden necklace. Historical accounts of early Malay settlement of the islands also made frequent mention of ships called balanghais that transported datus or chiefs from the southern Malay islands to settle in the country. Today, the basic unit of Philippine government, the barangay, derives its name from these vessels which were already in use in the islands before the Spanish came. During the Spanish era, galleons plying the Manila-Acapulco (Mexico) trade route were built in Philippine shipyards which boasted an availability of ship grade timber, trained craftsmen and a large labor pool. Filipinos were hired to crew for most of these ships, beginning a strong tradition of seafaring that continues to this day, with the Philippines supplying 16 percent of the world's crew requirements. The foregoing indicate the sea-going nature and importance of marine transpor­ Filipinos were hired to tation to Filipinos. However, recent disas­ crew for most of these ters and incidents within Philippine waters strongly contrast with and somehow dimin­ ships, beginning a strong ish the glories of such a tradition, reflecting .tradition of seafaring that the need 'to minimize, if not altogether pre­ continues to this day ... vent, further incidents.

PASSENGER ROUTES

About 45 million passengers traveled the different routes of the islands in 1998, with travel lasting anywhere from a brief 10 minutes to more than 2 days from port to port or from landing to landing, utilizing ferryboats or large ships ranging from dilapidated wooden hulls to new fast ferries and Superferries:1M.ost of the routes

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 95 Aguilar are within the archipelagic seas where the waters are relatively calm because of the protection afforded by the many islands. Most of these voyages begun and ended in the major cities where the major ports are located. These major routes are also where most adverse incicients occurred (Figure 1) .. ' .

Oro

0

Figure 1. Major shipping routes of the Philippines.

96 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns

Accommodations on the larger well-served routes are relatively more comfort­ able with cruise ship-like berths providing amenities and services rivalling those provided by hotels on land. On board comfort for shorter routes however, except for those serviced by fast craft, are relatively spartan, offering only bunks or folding canvas beds for passenger comfort. Even shorter routes serviced by outrigger boats are strictly no-frills affairs, with only shared benches for accommodation. The beginning and end of classes, holidays such as Holy Week, All Saints Day and Christmas are the peak times for passenger traffic. These are also the times when the highest casualties for disasters at sea are recorded. The larger shipping lines such as WG&A, Negros Navigation and Sulpicio Lines serve the major routes while the shorter routes are served by individual companies running ships and ves­ sels in varying degrees of seaworthiness. Classification Society Rules with strict guidelines for operation cover all ships above 500 gross tons while those below 500 gross tons are covered by Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations. How­ ever, no standards have been set for the construction, crewing and operation of craft weighing less than 3 gross tons. For now, Philippine ports are simply embarkation/disembarkation points where passengers transfer from one mode of transport to another. However, it has long been pointed out that a Roll-On Roll-Off system (or RORO) wherein a family in Manila can drive their car up a ferry, travel with their car on the boat and simply drive off when they reach Cebu or any other destination would be more efficient. A refrigerated cargo truck carrying vegetables from Baguio could also get on a RORO ferry and disembark in Cebu; the same refrigerated truck can then return to Manila, carrying fish from Cebu for Manila's markets. The RORO system is thus seen to minimize the time and hassle of terminal waits for car owners and to be more convenient for cargo carriers who do not have to deal with intermediate transfers of cargo. An added benefit for consumers would be in the freshness of produce be­ cause of minimal handling during transport. While it is unfortunate that. the RORO system could displace several entities in the transport business who depend on hauling passengers and cargo to and from the ports, the RORO system has proven most efficient in other settings and is a standard feature in multi-mode transport systems in developed countries. Consid-

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 97 Aguilar erable discussion of and some groundwork has been done on the development of a Western Philippine highway consisting of ROROs and highways to complement the existing Philippine Highway on the eastern side of the country connecting Luzon to Mindanao. This would open up tnore options for mode of transport, resulting in the better distribution of goods throughout the country. Currently, for example, imported corn is much cheaper for hog raisers in Luzon than corn produced locally because of high transportation costs. Travel by sea could be reduced if parts of the journey were through land, thus reducing exposure to dangerous sea states occurring at specific times of the year. RORO ferries, built large to accommodate vehicles, would ensure safer travel over a wide range of sea conditions. The larger financial investment in a RORO system would also force operators and regulators to implement and more strictly enforce safety rules and regulations to avoid catastrophic disasters.

MARITIME INCIDENTS

The Philippines is featured in the Guiness Book of World Records as having suffered the highest number of casualties in an accident at sea, during peacetime, with the Dona Paz incident in 1987. The official count of fatalities was reported at 1,840, although unofficial counts estimate the number of those lost to be as high as 4,341. But whether we go with the official or unofficial tallies, the Dona Paz trag­ edy remains the world's worst accident at sea in terms ofhuman deaths; the Mont Blanc and Imo collision at Halifax Harbor in 1916 is listed in second place with 1,600 casualties, including those deaths that occurred on land from the explosion and resulting fire. (Table 1).

98 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns

Table 1. Disasters at sea with the world's highest casualties.

Ship/Nationality Date Location Deaths

* Wilhelm Gustloff 30 Jan 1945 Baltic NNE of Leba 6000 to

(German refugee ship) 8000

* Goya (/German Navy troop/

refugee ship) 16-17 Apr 1945 Baltic near Hela - 7000

• [Chinese army evacuation ship] Nov 1948 6000

* Junyo Maru (Japanese Navy

prisoner ship) 18 Sep 1944 off Sumatra 5620

• Toyama Maru (Japanese

Navy transport) 29 Jun 1944 bound for Okinawa 5400

* Cap Arcona (German

refugee ship) 03 May 1945 Lubeck Bay 5000+/-

Dona Paz {Philippine] 20 Dec 1987 Tablas Strait 4341

* Lancastria (Cunard/Military 17 Jun 1940 off St. Nazaire 3500 to

troopship) 6500

* General von Steuben (German 10 Feb 1945 off Stolpe Bank,

military transport) Baltic 3500

* Provence (French Navy 26 Feb 1916 off Kithira Island,

auxil' cruiser) Greece 3100

* Thielbek (German refugee ship) 03 May 1945 Lubeck Bay 2800+/-

* Neptunla (Italian military transport) 18 Sep 1941 off Tripoli 2500

* Oceania (Italian military transport) 18 Sep 1941 off Tripoli 2500

* Yamato (Japanese Navy battleship) 07 Apr 1945 SW of Kagoshlma 2498

* Bismark (German Navy) 27 May 1941 2200

* Sinfra (German prisoner transport) 19 Oct 1943 north of Crete 2098 \

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 99 Aguilar

I ' Ship/Nationality Date Location Deaths

• Ural Maru (Japanese transport) 27 Sep 1944 240 km west 2000

ofMasinlik,

Philippines

• Scharnhorst (German Navy) 26 Dec 1943 off North 1964

Cape of Norway

• Rigel (German prisoner transport) 27 Nov 1944 north of Namsos 1833

• Arisan Maru (Japanese prisoner ship) 24 Oct 1944 South China Sea 1792

* Taiho (Japanese Navy aircraft carrier) 19 Jun 1944 west of Guam 1650

Mont Blanc [French}, lmo {Belgian) 06 Dec 1917 Halifax harbour 1600

Titanic (WSL) 15-16 Apr 1912 North Atlantic 1523

Sultana [American] 27 Apr 1865 on the Mississippi 1450 (up

to 1900)

* HMS Hood (RN) 21 May 1941 North Atlantic 1338

• Lusitania (Cunard) 07 May 1915 1198

Toya Maru [Japanese] 26 Sep 1954 1172

• Kiangya {Chinese] 03 Dec 1948

explosion (probably mine),

Estonia [Estonian] 28 Sep 1994 Baltic Sea 1049

General Slocum [American] 15 Jun 1904

burned, New York City 1030

• HMS Invincible (RN) June 1916 1026

Empress of Ireland (CP) 29 May 1914 St. Lawrence River 1014

Notes: War time or military based Incidents are marked with an * while Passenger ships sunk during peace time are shown in bold fonts References: Lloyd's 1986; World Book 1993

100 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns

Since 1987, there have been several ferry disasters in the Philippines including the following: 1. MVDofia Marilyn: (a sister ship of the Dona Paz) sunk off Leyte on 24 October 1988: 254 deaths 2. MV Cebu City: Collided with a Singaporean-registered freighter Kota Suria at the mouth of Manila Bay on 02 December 1994: 114 deaths 3. Kimelody Cristy Fire south of Manila on 13 December 1995: 32 deaths 4. Gretchen 1 Overloaded ferry sunk off Central Philippines on 18 February 1996: 52 deaths 5. Princess of the Orient Sunk during a typhoon at the mouth of Manila Bay on 20 September 1998: 150 deaths 6. Rosario 2 Caught fire off Central Philippines on 01 August 1999: 4 deaths 7. Asia-South Korea Sunk after hitting reef off Northern Cebu on 23 December 1999: 42 deaths 8. Our Lady of Mediatrix Caught fire from bombs rigged to three buses on board off the port of Ozamis City on 25 February 2000: 45 deaths 9. Anahada Overloaded, sunk in Sulu waters on 12 April2000: 143 deaths

The safety record of Philippine marine transport is of great concern because of the alarming frequency with which accidents occur as well as the magnitude of loss. Some conditions that contribute to increased risk at sea are poor safety sup­ port systems including the lack of warning systems and the inadequate number of rescue boats, lack of proper training of crew and the continued use of old ships with inadequate navigation and survival equipment. Then too, typhoons and prevailing Southwest and Northwest monsoons make travel by sea unsafe at certain times of the year. Some routes are inadequately served because of the inflexible schedules of the ferries or insufficient traffic, invariably leading to passenger overloads on

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 101 Aguilar none too seaworthy vessels. Most ferries that remain in use, particularly the smaller boats that ply the shorter routes, are old, have wooden hulls and were purchased second hand, making sea travel on them all the more risky. An average of 197 vessels per year were involved in maritime incidents from 1990 to 1999, with a total number of 109 confirmed casualties. It is 'unfortunate that the database of the Coast Guard covers incidents only from 1990, although it is enough to give us a clear idea of the state of marine transport in the country. Figure 2 indicates that boats capsizing because of adverse weather conditions com­ prise the largest group of accidents.

600 '

500

400 :;; ..0 E ::0 z 300

200

Figure 2. Total Number of Incidents from 1990 to 1999 caused by adverse weather conditions

Most incidents occur near ports or harbors with major disasters occurring in the sea-lanes or while the vessels were in transit. This thus indicates the need to implement watchkeeping rules more strictly to ensure general crew competence while the ships are underway. That the majority of incidents occur near major ports also points to the aggregation of vessels in the port areas, a need for more efficient

102 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns systems of vessel traffic and the implementation of strict safety protocols when approaching ports and harbors. The inadequacy of our ports in providing safe har­ bors or shelters during typhoons are also implicated by the data. The issuance of aN ational Maritime Safety Code in 2001 includes vessel safety parameters according to class sizes and specifies minimum crew qualifications. A significant development is the requirement for the classification of vessels 500 gross tons and above, thus greatly contributing to safety and disaster prevention while at sea. The Maritime Industry Authority is mandated to establish policy guidelines and to issue all necessary administrative orders regarding implementation. More than adequate administrative orders have already been issued on safety, including AO number 143: "Rules and regulations to implement the International Safety Management (ISM) Code in domestic shipping"; AO number 148: '~endments to Chapter XVIII of the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations (PMMRR) 1997 on minimum safe manning for ships in the domestic trade"; AO number 154: "Reiteration of safety related policies/guidelines/rules and regulations for guidance and strict compliance"; AO number 159: "Adoption of a National Safety Management Code and Providing Rules and Regulations for its implemen­ tation in the Domestic Shipping". But while these rules and regulations already do much to ensure safety at sea, gaps remain which are only partially addressed by the existing issuances of MARINA and other related agencies.

WEATHER PREDICTION

Most reports of vessel capsizing occur in rough sea states or because of wave heights wrought by severe weather disturbances. Most capsizing and sinking inci­ dents between 1990 to 1999, particularly involving smaller craft, occurred during typhoons. Typhoon Norming in 1998 was by far the most destructive, capsizing a record 82 small craft, the highest on record. (Figure 3). Larger passenger vessels, big commercial fishing boats and cargo ships have weather faxes that receive weather plots regularly. But such information is not avail­ able to smaller vessels, including the more numerous mo~arized bancas. Some

VOLUME N NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 103 Aguilar

90 ~------~Ty~p~ho~o~nN~o~rm~in~g~------,

Number of 80 Motorized Ban cas Sunk or Capsized

60 ~------~------~~------~

50 ~------~------~-~~------~

Typhoon Pepang Typhoon Loleng 40 I

Typhoon Rosing Typhoon Gading

Jan-95 May-95 Sep-95 Jan-96 May-96 Sep-96 Jan-97 May-97 Sep-97 Jan-98 May-98 Sep-98 Jan-99 May-99 Sep-99 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

FIGURE 3. Most capsizing incidents occurred during strong typhoons from 1990 to 1999. References: Philippine Coast Guard Records, 1990-1999

mechanism must therefore be developed to enable remote coastal communities at risk as well as travelers to access critical information regarding weather conditions prior to their journey for better decision-making. The most common measure for safety is wave height which is used to predict what sea conditions will be within a few hours. This is done in coordination with the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) which monitors wind speed on an almost daily basis through its meteo­ rological stations all over the islands. Wave heights can then be calculated from the direction and speed of the winds and geographical area and rated according to existing standards such as the Beaufort Wind Scale which indicates wave heights for corresponding wind speeds and scale ratings from 1 to 10, from the very calm to the very rough. In advisory warnings, the rating system is simplified to 4 signals to be similar to the typhoon warning system. This rating system is used during ty-

104 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns phoons and at the peak of the Southwest and Northeast monsoons which com­ monly bring high sea waves. Ideally, TV or radio weather reports should include wave heights with the rating system in any advisory warning to vessels of varying sizes. Presently, the Coast Guard prohibits ships of a certain size from sailing only during typhoons, but there may be instances when strong winds, in the absence of a typhoon in a particular area, may whip up waves of disastrous heights. It was such weather conditions which led to the Gretchen and Anahada disasters (refer to Table 1). Information on wave height is regularly broadcast in more developed countries such as Japan and the United States. These warnings are in terms of small craft advisories where vessels up to a certain size are warned against setting sail. Weather reports can also be made more specific for regional broadcasts to local routes and fish­ ing grounds. Carried by the national net­ At the very least, marine works, such broadcasts would be useful environment subjects on a regional or on a shipping lane basis. included in our school Such information can also be carried in curricula will instill newspapers and weekly magazines. awareness of the dangers Campaigns utilizing posters and leaf­ associated with particular lets among other forms, can be used to educate the public regarding the warning sea conditions. system. A long term approach to and in- vestment in· maritime safety and in the marine environment would include subjects such as oceanography and meteorology in the high school curricula. Being an archi­ pelago, it is critical that we know more about our marine waters. At the very least, marine environment subjects included in our school cur­ ricula will instill awareness of the dangers associated with partinl,lar sea condi­ tions. And since much of our trade and travel is done on the seas, knowing about the sea state will aid in the prevention of accidents and untoward incidents at sea by informing the shipowners and passengers on prevailing conditions beforehand.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 105 Aguilar

A policy should therefore be instituted to make information regarding the sea state and equivalent craft limits a regular feature of weather reports, especially during the typhoon season or during the months of heightened monsoon activity from June to November.

CREW, VESSEL CONDITIONS AND MANAGEMENT

The facility to communicate in English and good training and aptitude on board are among the major reasons for the great demand for Filipino sailors on merchant fleets. However, this preference for Filipino crew members has adversely affected the domestic shipping industry where the wages are considerably below international rates. The best and brightest products of Philippine maritime schools readily find work abroad, leaving the domestic fleet to choose from a considerably diminished pool of qualified graduates. Maritime incidents recorded by the Phil­ ippine Coast Guard involving rounding, sinking, collision, fire, capsizing, missing vessels and engine trouble attribute the greater majority of these incidents to a lack of crew skill, attitudes and competence as well as to possible rule violations or vessel mismanagement (NMSC, 1996). While the licensing requirements of MARINA are well established, the large discrepancy in wages can only contribute to less capable manning resources for our domestic fleet. U nfortunate!y, this is a situation which can only be remedied by offering more competitive rates to those offered by foreign fleets, which may not be possible, given our current economic difficulties. One way to improve this condition is through constant training requirements and the strict implementation of STCW 95 {Standards for Training Certification and Watchkeeping} required by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for the world's fleets. This would ensure proper training for domestic and foreign crew members. The Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations (PMMRR) of 1997 cover the requirements for ship safety and include manning regulations. But the fact that many unfortunate incidents implicate crew errors or inadequacies draws attention to the aspect of implementation. Then too, shipowners, crew members or

106 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns officers responsible for disasters are seldom caught or punished. Sulpicio Lines was immediately suspended after the Princess of the Orient incident which resulted in 150 deaths in 1998 but was back in operation after a week or so. This highlights the need to correct flaws in the implementation of rules and regulations so these can be respected and followed. 63% of medium and larger vessel types weigh 3 to 99 gross tons; 27% of these vessels are from 100 to 499 gross tons while the remaining 10% weigh more than 500 gross tons. The merchant fleet has 22% of passenger ferries, general cargo of 43 percent and barges for 9 percent. 70% of the country's merchant fleet is less than 15 years old while some of the older ships with a gross tonnage of 2000 are over 20 years old. Vessel conditions for the larger commercial operations have im­ proved considerably in terms of vessel age, machinery and equipment, evidencing the separation of passenger operations from crewing functions by most shipping companies. Most second hand passenger liners had their first lives as cruise ships and were built for hotel type management rather than crew-managed passenger service. This has made for relatively better service on board and encouraged com­ petition among liners serving the same routes. Unfortunately, the safety preparedness of passengers on board has not simi­ larly improved. While it is mandatory for airline passengers to listen to safety pre­ cautions regarding the use of life vests and location of exits, there are no equivalent briefings on board passenger ships. Fire, for instance, is a frightening possibility in the larger passenger ships; exit location briefings, life vest donning procedures and lifeboat assignment briefings as well as fire drills should be regularly conducted to ensure appropriate passenger and crew response. Earlier, it was noted that most accidents occur during peak travel times such as holidays and vacation periods. Overloading has been blamed in many of these cases, as passengers frantically attempting to get home. Es~entially a scheduling problem, shipping companies should schedule more trips to accommodate.the increase in passengers rather than forcing the overflow into their regular schedules. In this case, long term scheduling and proper anticipation using optimization approaches and models can help in minimizing difficulties, especially during peak seasons. How-

VOLUME N NUMBER l January-June 2000 107 Aguilar ever, increasing the frequency of trips during peak times is a partial solution which must be coupled with improved safety practices. Smaller operations, including shorter routes between non-major ports, are ser­ viced by older ships including wooden (comprising 57% of all ships) and larger motorized outrigger boats (Marina, 1998). Several incidents and disasters includ­ ing the major capsizing incidents involved crafts in this category, serving notice of the need to more strictly implement and monitor safety rules and regulations gov­ erning lifesaving equipment and procedures as well as the procurement of a license to operate. There are also reports of fishing boats converted for passenger opera­ tions, increasing the risk to these passengers if the proper vessel modifications are not made. Search and rescue capabilities should be upgraded and improved, requiring a considerable investment in rescue boats, communication equipment, support fa­ cilities and rescuer training. During the last 5 years, a remarkable growth in the routes serviced by fast ferry craft, particularly in the Visayas, has been observed. These fast ferries have cut travel time by almost half in most of the routes, improving passenger movement between the shorter passenger routes. Further expansion of fast craft service is seen, particularly in the areas served by traditional wooden hulled ferryboats. The route optimization of such fast craft is interesting because there may be some ports which can more practically be served by these craft than by planes or the slower large passenger ferries. Fast craft may also offer an alternative to the more usual passen­ ger ferry and land transport options even for the longer haul voyages and coastal travel along the Western coast of Luzon or the Eastern coast of Mindanao. However, the potential for disaster of the fast craft is obvious, given the shorter response time coupled with the greater magnitude of force in case of collision. Hence, navigation hazards along the routes must be well documented for fast craft operations, other craft plying the route should be aware of fast craft operations and traffic systems near crowded ports must be established. The crew must also exer­ cise extra care during the course of the voyage at all times.

108 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns

SMALL CRAFTS

Small indigenous fishing craft are ubiquitous features of the country's fishing communities, dotting nearly all beach areas and serving as a major fishing and trans­ portation platform for these communities. These boats are mainly of the banca type, which can be either non-motorized or motorized. Their sizes vary from 3 to 20 meters in length for the former and up to 30 meters for the latter. A count in 1985 found more than 465,000 bancas across the regions. The lack of more recent statistical data for small crafts points to a major research gap which must be ad­ dressed for development and planning purposes. Small craft are over-represented in the total count of accidents at sea, a finding which can be accounted for in the total percentage of such sea going crafts, their construction, including materials used, as well as lack of safe harbors and!or berthing places for them. (Figure 4)

450

~~------~

~~------~

~~------~

Figure 4. Classification of incidents from 1990 to 1999 (M Vessels refer to passenger ships, F Ships are fishing vessels and M Bancas are the small motorized bancas.)

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 109 Aguilar

The double outrigger nature of Philippine small crafts makes vessel seaworthi­ ness dependent on the strength of the outrigger beams connecting the outrigger to the main hull. Outrigger floats are mainly of bamboo and serve to increase the initial stability of the banca. They stabilize the craft by minimizing the rolling mo­ tion induced by the waves, providing comfort to the passengers - a major reason for the ubiquity of the banca form. Such stability however, is very much dependent on the outriggers; too heavy or overloaded boats may cause the beams to break and thus, to capsize the boat. There is no standards, rules or guidelines for small boat construction. While a majority of these craft have more than adequate strength in their beams, the ~trong bending movement induced by high waves expose the wooden or bamboo beams of boats larger than 10 meters to very severe stresses, weakening the material so that there is the danger of sinking or capsizing. Losing one or both outriggers can immediately swamp the main hull with water, rapidly filling up the interior. A danger during high waves is when excessive rolling motions prevent the hull from returning to an upright position, flipping it over. This may happen when the center of gravity of the boat is too high and the outrigger floats are neither large enough nor have sufficient buoyancy. The application of external moment may ex­ ceed the righting force so that the vessel flips over or sinks when the hull fills with water and the materials of the craft lack sufficient buoyancy to enable the hull to float. This is another standard to consider, particularly with large topheavy boats and small outrigger floats. Any consideration of design for resistance and propulsion efficiency will find the bancas already highly optimized with the present hull evolving through a long period of trial and error. However, boat builders usually scale up their designs to accommodate larger fishing gears and bigger, more powerful engines using the same design as the smaller ones. Such scaling up results in larger forces acting on critical areas of the beams, requiring the use of very strong materials of sufficient dimen­ sions to withstand the stresses present. It therefore becomes necessary to institute standards defining material type, strength characteristics and minimum dimensions, particularly for the beams. Bam­ boo has sufficient strength for small enough craft, particularly if doubled or rein-

110 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns forced with wooden beams. But in larger boats whose beams are made of wood, the structure must be of sufficiently high quality, durability and dimensions- all of which must be specified in an administrative issuance for strict compliance. Addi­ tional reinforcements such as steel rods or altogether replacing the booms with steel or fiber reinforced material should be considered. Construction for the main hull is usually of a semi-dugout nature where the bottom component is a carved log to which side frames are attached and plywood nailed to the frames to form the sides. This form evolved from dugout logs which were found to be virtually unsinkable, however, the use of plywood and adding cargo space result in less buoyancy when water enters the hull. Standards for frame size, plywood thickness as well as material qualities have to be determined and enforced to ensure more reliable operation in varying sea conditions. Power must also be sufficient to enable small craft to more quickly reach safety in times of danger. Most engines have more than enough power for the size of the craft with a large number using second hand truck diesel engines converted for use in the marine environment. Second hand engines may be sufficient in calm waters and under safe conditions, but the need for reliability and performance when con­ fronted with larger waves demands that rules be devised setting standards for en­ gine make, service age, maintenance record and minimum horsepower. It may also be necessary to make engine reliability inspections mandatory, focusing on the main­ tenance record; the absence of such leaves passenger safety to the shipowner's dis­ cretion or to crew competence in undertaking engine repairs when needed. Life saving paraphernalia for larger vessels are standard, although the same cannot be said for the smaller craft. Most small craft remain afloat even when cap­ sized because of the highly buoyant nature of the semi-dugout bancas. But over­ loaded or weighed down small to medium crafts where the dugout component of the hull cannot provide sufficient buoyancy may. capsize and sink when water en­ ters the interior. Suggestions have been made to replace the banca's outrigger hulls with West­ ern style single hull non-outrigger forms. Many efforts have also introduced mono­ hulled forms. But most monohulls introduced as alternatives are of fiberglass rein­ forced plastic (FRP) 10 times more than the native banca. There are also many

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 111 Aguilar instances when outrigger boats begin as single hulled boats but eventually add outriggers to increase initial stability and to take in more cargo or to increase load­ ing capacity. For certain larger size crafts then, it may only be when the scarcity of wood makes the dugout very expensive that the monohull type made from FRP or steel will gradually replace the existing fleet.

SAFE HARBORS AND ANCHORAGES

It is normal to see beaches full of outrigger boats in most coastal communities throughout the year, especially during the fishing season. However, it is rare to see fully protected harbors where small crafts can shelter during bad weather except for the well-established ports mostly located in large cities. While the size of most era& allow beaching during typhoons, a safe harbor or protected anchorage is a necessity for those sizes that cannot be manhandled. Larger boats typically stay at anchorage near fishing grounds for the duration of the season. The absence of such protection results in the transfer of fishing activities to the leeward or protected side of any island where they operate. For instance, ring netters and purse seiners operate in the northern parts of islands when southwest mon­ soons occur and move to the southern parts when the northwest monsoon blows. Such a practice is advantageous from the viewpoint of fisheries management as it allows for the replenishment of stocks. However, safe harbors with adequate sea wall protection, berths or protected anchorage can prevent damage during typhoons as what happened in 1998 with Norming when 82 small boats capsized off Panay Island including Caticlan (near Boracay). Natural safe harbors exist and are in fact used by boats during typhoons but these are mainly undeveloped and devoid of any infrastructure or port facilities. Ideally, fishing communities with a significant fishing fleet should have a safe and well-protected harbor. Protective structures include a breakwater or seawall capable of keeping out destructive waves and strong winds, anchorage of sufficient depth, berths to tie boats to and slipways for hauling or launching boats. For now, such facilities are present only in river mouths, enclosed bays and in developed and well established ports. Boats basically have to fend for themselves and seek protec-

112 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns tion wherever possible in other areas. While several attempts have been started to establish municipal ports, the results are inadequate, with most efforts ending in a single jetty or pier, mainly for the purpose of landing caught fish. Most fishing grounds are located near the coast but an increasing population and finite resources have led to the overexploitation and depletion of traditional fishing grounds. Fishing activities are now con- ducted further from shore, requiring bigger and Natural safe harbors more capable boats. It thus becomes necessary exist... but these are to plan for fully protected harbors for fishing fleets in selected fishing areas. mainly undeveloped An underdeveloped sector of the marine in­ and devoid of any dustry has to do with small craft for pleasure and infrastructure or port sports fishing. Most of these vessels cannot be facilities beached, requiring berthing or anchorage. The more expensive value of these vessels also requires that they be amply protected from rough weather. Some resorts have already built marinas for yachts, along with breakwaters or shelters, but their use is limited to the more upscale and expensive boats. In better times with more improved finances, perhaps more people will be able to afford the pleasures of the sea coupled with the sustainable utilization of marine resources. Engineering interventions can then be prioritized to protect more cosily investments in crafts and marine structures.

NAVIGATIONAL HAZARDS

A major characteristic of Philippine seas is the presence ofpayaos or anchored rafts serving as platforms for fish aggregating devices. Usually anchored at depths from 200 to as deep as 3500 meters, they sometimes straddle the s.ea-lanes. Found throughout the archipelago and employed by the fishing industry to ensure a good catch, their popularity is such that they have been adopted by other countries all over the world. There is no policy at present on the deployment ofpayaos; incidents have been reported of propellers snagging on the ropes and of aggregating devices

VOLUME IV NUMBER l January-June 2000 113 Aguilar attached to the rafts. They thus present a navigational hazard for smaller sized vessels traveling at night without a radar. Some rafts are sturdier and made of steel with cables in the upper portion of the mooring system; such a construction is a source of danger and damage in cases of collision with moving vessels. Lighthouses are crucial to navigation, particularly at night, so that lighthouses are being installed or upgraded throughout the country, often with the aid of foreign funding. Particular attention has been given to the better traveled routes such as that from Manila to Cebu, with lighthouses installed in most of the waypoints and critical landmarks. Hence, this aspect of safety at sea has been adequately ad­ dressed. However, lighted buoys marking the more dangerous shoals and underwa­ ter obstructions are needed, particularly near well-traveled routes.

SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPREPAIR INDUSTRIES

The Philippines does not have a competitive shipbuilding industry. Very few shipyards regularly construct new ships, with most doing mainly repair work. There is therefore room for growth and expansion in the ship repair business, considering the number of ships constantly in need of repair in the local market. Most shipown­ ers prefer to purchase second hand ships eecause of their faster capital return, with ships larger than 500GT mostly sourced abroad. Only the Tsuneishi Corporation in Balamban, Cebu produces regularly for the foreign market . The government considers shipbuilding a major investment priority, offering tax breaks and other incentives to investors. So far, the only significant investment in this area has been the Keppel and the Tsuneishi shipyards, both of which are foreign owned. Lack of reliable steel supplies, the absence of ancillary industries and an unfavorable local market are major reasons why this industry cannot seem to take off. Even the boatbuilding industry has essentially remained a backyard undertak­ ing with the construction of the ubiquitous bancas. Some progress has been shown in the production of fiberglass boats although the high costs involved have limited production to government contracts or to the leisure type boats which only the more affluent can afford.

114 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns

The availability of naval architects to do the necessary calculations for stability also impacts on safety. Without a significant shipbuilding industry, naval architec­ ture as a field of study attracts very few students, with a graduation average of 12 to 15 a year for the past 10 years (data taken from NAMED. The absence of imple­ mentation of classification society rules and regulations has an impact on the final design for smaller craft, which are now mainly left up to the boatbuilder. Construc­ tion typically comes before the line drawing, particularly for small to medium pas­ senger and cargo craft as well as for fishing boats in the medium to small categories (150 to 20.1 and 20 to 3 gross tons). The hydrostatic calculations necessary for stability are normally dispensed with, or if done at all, are based on as-built plans. Most construction is done by boatbuilders whose skill is based on experience handed down through generations of such workers. The more crucial crafts are those purchased second hand and modified for another purpose as well as those newly built from a copied design. This is where accurate calculations are needed to ensure stable and safe platforms. Of particular importance are the larger type crafts which originally begun as fishing boats but were converted into passenger vessels after substantial modifications. Stability stan­ dards to structural specifications must be strictly enforced to ensure proper perfor­ mance and safety. Shipbreaking is another potential growth area, albeit an environmentally un­ friendly one, because of the many pollutants and other toxic substances with po­ tentially disastrous effects which ships carry. This was found to be the case in India where as much as 80 percent of the world's old fleet is disposed.

MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY

As a player in the Asian region, the Philippines straddles and lies adjacent to the crucial sea -lanes that oil tankers traverse to bring precious oil to Taiwan, Japan and Korea. This is the South China Sea to which a lot of attention has been paid because of its strategic and natural resource value. With a proclaimed 200 kilome­ ter Exclusive Economic Zone encompassing 220,000,000 hectares, the Philippines has a significant position in the area and is a permanent component in the dynamics of utilization and management of this resource.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 115 Aguilar

More than half of the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Londok in Indonesia, with most ships continu­ ing on to the South China Sea. All ships passing through the Malacca and Sunda straits pass near the Spratly Islands, a group of islands in the middle of the South China Sea contested by China, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. Ships that pass through this region carry mainly raw The Philippines is blessed materials such as crude oil and liquefied with a very diverse natural gas. More than 80 percent of the crude oil supplies for Japan, South Ko­ aquatic environment... rea and Taiwan flow through the South hence, the country's food China Sea from oil suppliers in the Middle supply and biodiversity East, Mrica and other nations. This trans­ will be at risk in lates to 75 percent of South Korea's en­ cases of disaster. ergy supply and 60 percent of the supply for Japan and Taiwan. Supertankers with up to 100,000-ton capacities pass near the islands, increas­ ing the potential for environmental disaster. Even within the archipelago, tankers carrying fuel to the different islands are potential sources of oil pollution, should collisions or leakage occur. While regular oil discharges are covered by existing rules and regulations, we do not have the capability to cope with large-scale oil slicks and massive discharges. The Coast Guard is mandated to take care of pollution but capability and equipment buildup is needed to ensure preparedness and the ability to contain or mitigate oil pollution whenever it occurs. The Philippines is blessed with a very diverse aquatic environment, including coral reefs, mangrove swamps and seagrass beds, hence, the country's food supply and biodiversity will be at risk, in cases of disaster.

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

Many institutions are involved with our maritime sector such as the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) for vessels, shipbuilders and crew licensing; the Philippine Coast Guard {PCG) for search and rescue; the Philippine Ports Author-

116 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns ity (PPA) for our ports, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) for fishing ports and fishing vessels; the Philippine Regulatory Commission (PRC) for licensing; the Philippine National Police-Maritime Command for law enforcement; the Philippine Navy for search and rescue and patrols; the Department ofinterior and Local Government (DILG) for the Local Government Units; the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) for navigational charts; the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for workers on board vessels; the Maritime Training Council (MTC), the Technical Education and Skills Devel­ opment Authority (TESDA) and the Commission on Higher Education (CHED} for crew training and education. There have been arguments for and against the creation of a Department of Maritime Affairs to consolidate all the functions which are now assigned to various departments. A major argument against this would be the additional financial costs a new department and office would entail; an argu­ ment for it is the establishment of a more focused and well-coordinated bureau­ cracy which does away with the need for inter-department coordination and all the difficulties this entails. But whether a new office is created or the present set-up of various offices maintained, the need to attend to our marine environment is of primary importance. The Philippine Marine transportation industry is an important sector because of our country's geographical nature. Safety is of primary importance, given the country's record of maritime tragedies and incidents. A lot of work needs to be done, not only ensure safety on the seas, but also to develop the potential of our seas. In the short term, developing appropriate policies, rules and regulations and the proper enforcement of such rules may decrease the number of accidents at sea. For the medium term, research and development must play a crucial role in providing the requisite information needed to create or adjust policy to make the industry viable and to assure safe traveL In the long term, education is the best and only way to ensure the institution not only of maritime safety consciousness but also of an appreciation of our marine environment and the desire to fully develop this sector.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 117 ' REFERENCES

Aguilar, G. D. 1999. Current Status of Research and Education and their Techno­ logical Components of the Philippine Marine Industries. Paper presented at the Roundtable on Marine Transportation. Quezon City: University of the Philip­ pmes. Badon-Antonio, S. B. 1998. The Philippine Marine Transport System: Implications for an Integrated National Ocean Policy. In Reynaldo Vea and I. M. Fernandez (eds) Philippine Ports, Shipping and Navigation under the New International Law of the Sea, A Roundtable Discussion. Quezon City: Institute of Interna­ tional Legal Studies UP Law Center. Blair, E.H. andJ. R. Alexander. 1973. The Phtlippine Islands 1493-1895,55. Ma­ nila. Lloyds 1986. Lloyds Registry of Shipping. London: Lloyds. Lorenzo, E.M. 1998. The domestic shipping industry of the Philippines: A situa­ tion report. Domestic Shipping Office. Manila: Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA). MARINA. 1998-2000. Accomplishment Report. Manila: Maritime Industry Au­ thority. MARINA. 1998-2000. The foreign shipping industry of the Philippines: A situation report. Manila: Maritime Industry Authority. MARINA. 1998-2000. The maritime manpower industry in the Philippines: A situ­ ation report. Manila: Maritime Industry Authority. MARINA. 1999-2000. The domestic shipping industry of the Philippines: A situa­ tion report. Manila: Maritime Industry Authority. NMSCC (National Maritime Safety Coordinating Council). 1996. Comprehen­ sive National Maritime Safety Plan (Draft), 1996-1998. Annex A. PCG. 1990-2000. Detailed Maritime Incident Reports. Manila: Philippine Coast Guard. PPA. 1999. Ports Statistics ofthe Philippines. Manila: Philippine Ports Authority Sigua, R. and Aguilar, G.D. 1999. Marine Transportation and Safety. In Jay Batongbacal (ed) Archipelagic Studies Charting New ~ters, pp. 71-86. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

118 PUBLIC POLICY Some Marine Transport Concerns

United States Energy Information Administration. 2000. South China Sea Region Report. Washington DC: USEIA. World Book 1993. Guiness World Book of Records. Zayas, C.N. 1999. Tunga sa Maritimong Orientasyon sa Pag-aaral ng Lipunan at Kulturang Filipino. In Jay Batongbacal (ed) Archipelagic Studies Charting New \%ters, pp. 95-104. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 119

Book Review

Edgar Wickberg. The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898. Original 1965. Republished edition 2000. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

MICHAEL L TAN

The This is a republished edition of Wickberg's book, Chinese in which was first published in 1965. Except for the Philippine omission of Chinese characters, the book is reprinted Life tsso--ts9s as is. I never saw the original but reading this repub­ EDGAR WIQ'KIHlRG lished edition has been a riveting experience, a testa­ ment to the book's timelessness. Wickberg's preface to the republished edition ac­ knowledges the many changes that have happened since 1965 in the Philippines and within the Filipino­ Chinese community. Nevertheless, his thesis in 1965 is still valid- the situation of the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines today is shaped "in large part by the developments of the period 1850-1898". Wickberg's impeccable scholarship re­ constructs that vital period in Philippine history and shows how the Chinese mi- grants both influenced and were influenced by these events. Wickberg reminds us that there have been several waves of Chinese immigra­ tion, some dating back even before the Spanish colonial period. Although the book is subtitled "1850-1898", Wickberg adds very detailed informatiop as well for the th 18 century, showing how earlier Chinese immigrants gradually integrated into Phil- ippine society through intermarriages. We learn that by 1850, there were about 120,000 mestizos -legally defined as those whose fathers were Chinese or mestizo -out of the national population of 2,500,000. In a half dozen; provinces, mostly in Tan

Central Luzon, the mestizos comprised a third or more of the population and wielded great economic power as professionals and landlords. Jose Rizal was himself a fifth-generation mestizo. Eventually, these mestizos were to expropriate the term "filipino", originally used only by Spaniards born in the Philippines; several of these "new" Filipinos, including Rizal, later became promi­ nent in the reformist movement in the late 19th century that sought greater assimi­ lation with Spain. Wickberg' s book mainly deals with another wave of Chinese migrants that came in the 19th century, encouraged by more liberal Spanish immigration policies that accompanied the opening of the Philippines to world trade. These policies provided new economic opportunities and privileges for foreigners, including land ownership and inheritance. There were many "push" factors working from within China as well, including the civil unrest from the Taiping rebellion (1850 to 1864), the forced opening of China to the world, and even the availability of low cost steamship service between Hong Kong and Manila. The most important niche that opened up for the new wave of Chinese mi­ grants was in trading. The Chinese quickly took to wholesale and retail trading, from the tienda de sari-sari (variety stores) and tiendas de chucherias ("knick-knack stores") to the plush bazaars of Escolta. ·Wickberg provides a fascinating glimpse into these trading activities. We learn, for example, that the Chinese bazaars sold ''Viennese furniture, musical instruments from Paris, cooking stoves, cabinets, or­ naments for carriages, dinnerware, lamps, galvanized iron for roofing, Chinese silks, European cottons and yarns." {p. 108) These Chinese migrants were also active in the textile trade, with various com­ mercial areas for different segments of the market-the Escolta-San Vicente-Nueva area was for quality imported goods, Calle Rosario for intermediate quality goods and the Calle Tabora-Divisoria area for the cheapest imported cloths. The Chinese took advantage of new venture capital coming in from Europe and the United States. The first promissory note from the Banco Espanol-Filipino de Isabel II (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) was issued to a Chinese mer­ chant. Motivated by self-interest, European banks tended to recommend their Chinese clients to European merchants so that by 1879, one writer observed, "From

122 PUBLIC POLICY Book Review the commercial point of view, the Philippines is an Anglo-Chinese colony with a Spanish flag." (p. 72). That was probably an exaggerated statement. The westerners and local mestizo population continued to be major players in the local economy but the new migrants, Wickberg proposes, were more systematic in their buying and distribution activities and in positioning themselves in a comprador role for western capitalists. Anti-Chinese sentiment grew as the Chinese became more powerful economi­ cally, unlike the past though this did not erupt into pogroms and massacres as in earlier periods during the Spanish colonial occupation. The new migrants were able to prevent this partly because they were more organized in the 19th century. Under Spanish laws, they enjoyed legal rights and political representation including a Gremio de Chinos with an elected governadorcillo or capitan who spoke on their behalf. The Chinese also had mutual help associations. The Chinese Cemetery and the Chinese General Hospital were established during this period, partly because of anti-Chinese discrimination- non-Christians were excluded from Catholic cem­ eteries and the local hospitals such as SanJuan de Dios, would not admit Chinese patients. Moreover, these new migrants could fall back on China for assistance. The Spanish and Chinese governments had several treaties that looked after the welfare of the local Chinese. It was not surprising then that the Chinese, even as they were assimilated into the Philippine mainstream as merchants, resisted cultural integra­ tion, establishing temples, local newspapers, schools and even Chinese herbalist shops exempted from Spanish laws regulating the sale of drugs, arguing that such shops were "cultural". (This rather archaic principle has been retained into the 21st century- to this day, Chinese drugstores do not need to register their products for safety and efficacy since they are, technically speaking, cultural institutions.) The Chinese also became politically powerful, learning to maneuver their way around the Spanish bureaucracy. One of the community leaders,"Tan Quien-sien (better known as Carlos Palanca), was a powerful political figure. His power was such that he was sometimes perceived as corrupting government officials. The character Quiroga, a corrupt Chinese merchant in Rizal's El Ftltbusterismo, is be­ lieved to have been modeled after Palanca.

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 123 Tan

It is unfortunate that Wickberg's book ends with the Spanish occupation, al­ though he gives us one tantalizing passage that links the 2dh century with the 19th: "When the United States set the final seal of rejection upon full participation of the Chinese in Philippine society by encouraging both Filipino nationalism and Chi­ nese cultural exclusivism, the way had already been prepared for the Philippine Chinese to survive, not only as a community, but as a community whose cultural orientation was specifically Chinese." (p. 236) How very true. During the American occupation and the post-independence period, laws were passed to exclude foreigners, particularly Chinese who had not become Filipino citizens, from land ownership and the retail trade. Acquiring Fili­ pino citizenship was expensive and cumbersome. This only reinforced the separa­ tion of the ethnic Chinese from mainstream Philippine society. History repeats itself. Today, we find various degrees of assimilation among ethnic Chinese, even among the better known taipans or business tycoons. Alfonso Yuchengco is considered to be totally assimilated into Filipino society while Lucio Tan retains a very Chinese identity, sending his children off to China to study Chi­ nese. Others- the Gokongwei and Sy families- are somewhat in between. There are also non-taipan ethnic Chinese who self-identify as Tsinoy (Chinese­ Pinoy), emphasizing that the Filipino identity is primary. (Compare this to the older preferred term, Filipino-Chinese, which remains the name of the largest busi­ ness association, the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce.) But to many Filipinos, they remain Intsik. The close identification of Chinese­ Filipino business people with the Estrada administration and allegations of corrup­ tion have fanned anti-Chinese resentment. The kidnappings of ethnic Chinese add to perceptions of growing anti-Chinese sentiment. All this could lead to more segregation. There is , for example, talk of "reappropriating" the old term Intsik rather than Tsinoy, a way of reasserting one's Chinese identity. There is, too, a renewed interest in Chinese culture and language, which means a new market of younger ethnic Chinese who will be interested in reading Wickberg. (A side com­ ment here: my own rekindled interest in things Chinese made me feel that the omission of Chinese characters in Wickberg' s republished book was a loss. Many

124 PUBLIC POLICY Book Review

Chinese names- of people and places- would have made more sense if the Chi­ nese characters had been retained.) Having said all that, I should qualify that I do not think we will have a new ghetto or isolationist mentality emerging from among the ethnic Chinese. Wickberg' s book reminds us that there are many domestic and international events that shape the development of ethnic Chinese communities in the Philippines. The rise of an extremely diverse Greater Chinese community- China, Hong Kong, Macau, Tai­ wan, Singapore- means that there are no monolithic models for what "Chinese" is. Chinese-Filipinos continue to evolve, including a number who have initiated a new diaspora- weary of local civil unrest and kidnappings, some are migrating to the United States and Canada along with other Filipinos. By and large, however, the Tsinoy and Tsinay who stay on- direct descen­ dants of that wave of 19th century immigration- continue to shape a hybrid cul­ ture, much more self-conscious and vibrant than did earlier generations. The Tsinoy and Tsinay are now found in different occupations and are no longer lim­ ited to business and trading. A distinct Filipino-Chinese literature has emerged, reflecting an ethos that is very much rooted in the Philippines, yet with a gaze that looks out, not toward China, but to the world. That should not be surpris­ ing. Perhaps it is the same gaze that first" prompted the Chinese migrants of the 19th century to set out from China.

VOLUME N NlJMBER 1 January-June 2000 125 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

GLENN D AGUILAR is currently an Associate Professor at the Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanology, College of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences at the University of the Philippines in the Visayas. He is a Doctor of Engineering, having studied at the Design Laboratory, Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, University of Tokyo. Presently, he serves as theN ational Team Leader of the National Capture Fisheries Research Development and Extension Network of the Department of Agriculture.

JAY L BATONGBACAL obtained his law degree from the University of the Philippines and an MMM from Dalhousie University (Canada). He is a Research Fellow with the Archipelagic and Ocean Studies Program of the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UPCIDS) and serves as Executive Director of the Philippine Center for Marine Mfairs, Inc. (PhilMar)

NATHAN GILBERT QUIMPO, a former lecturer in Political Science and Sociology at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, is currently working for his PhD at the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, in Canberra, Australia.

DR MICHAEL L TAN is associate professor and chair of the Anthropology Department at the University of the· Philippines, Diliman. He writes an Op-ed column, Pinoy Kasi, twice a week for the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

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o VOL 1 N01 -THE CRISIS OF SUCCESSION (PREMIER ISSUE) I 1997 • The Crisis of Succession I Amanda Doronila • Exchange Rate Policy: Recent Failures and Future Tasks I Emmanuel 5 de Dios, Benjamin E Diokno, Raul Vfabella, felipe MMedal/a, Solita CMonsod • The Military and Constitutional Change I Carolina GHernandez • Kidnapping, Citizenship and the Chinese I Caroh'ne 5 Hau • Strategic Policy for Food Security I Walden Bello • Food Security and Rice I 0 D Corpuz • The Politics of Economic Liberalization I Paul D Hutchcraft

o VOL2 N01- GLOBALIZATION IN TURMOIL I 1998 • The Party's Over I Michael Vatikiotis • Global Capital : The Philippines in the Regional Currency Crisis I Gonza!o MJurado • Absorbing the Shock of Depression I Vicente B Valdepeiias Jr • Democracy, Markets and People in the Context of Globalization I Deepak Nayyar • Eastern Asia in the Next Decade I David Wurfel • The Cosmopolitical-Today I Pheng Cheah • Clinton in Barong I Michael L Tan o VOL2 N02 -NATIONALISM: A HUNDRED YEARS (CENTENNIAL ISSUE) I 1998 • The Left's Ventriloquist Act I Armando Malay Jr • Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Asia Pacific I Wang Gungwu • The Muslim-Filipino and the State I Patricio N Abinales • The Revolution Continues I 5atur Ocampo • Tracking the Nation I Jose Abueva • Directions for the Humanities I Elmer A Ordonez • Rizal and Kartini I Noel Teodoro

o VOL2 N03 - POLITICAL CHANGE IN EAST ASIA I 1998 • Filipino Elections and Illiberal Democracy I Belinda A Aquino • Take the Money and Run? Personality Politics in the Post-Marcos Era I John TSidel • The Asian Economic Crisis and Democracy I Harold Crouch • The Asian Values Debate: A Partisan Assessment I Carl H Lande • The Lava Brothers: Blood and Politics I Jose YDalisay Jr • Authoritarianism, Elections and Political Change in Malaysia I Edmund Terence Gomez 6 Jomo K5 • Whose Business Is It Anyway? Free and Fair Elections in the Philippines I Eva-Lotta Hedman o VOL2 N04- PEASANTS, PATRONS AND COOPERATIVES /1998 • Peasants, Patrons and Cooperatives I Teresa Encarnacion !adem • History at the Service of the Nation-State I Gregory Bankoff • Nationalism and a Usable Past I Kathleen Week(Y • Emancipation within Culture I Raul Pertierra • The Illusions of a Cinematic President I Patrick Flores • Women Warriors: Empowered Women in Southeast Asian Literature I Thelma Kintanar

128 PUBLIC POLICY D VOL3 N01 - RIZAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY I 1999 • Rizal in the 21st Century: The Relevance of His Ideas and Texts I Cesar Ad;b Maju! • Interpreting Masonry in the Philippines I Melinda Tria Kerkvliet • Women Reinventing Culture: Their Role as Cultural Patrons in Postwar Philippines I MinaRoces • Local Shakespeares, Shakespearean Locales I JudyCeline lck • The Fatherland, Nationalist Films and Modernity I Rolando Tolentino • Taxation by Regulation: Searching for a Post-Privatization Framework I Nimiii Mehta

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D VOL3 N03 -JOSE ENCARNACI6N: A MEMORIAL I 1999 • Jose Encarnacion: A Memorial I Emmanuel S de Dios and Raul VFabella • Myths and Fallacies in Economic Policy Debates I Gerardo P Sicat • Corruption: A Framework I Emmanuel S de Dios • Where Are We in Tariff Reform? I Gwendolyn R Tecson • Making Sense of Seattle: Distributional Conflicts, Institutional Diversity and the End of the Cold War I Raul VFabella • Competition Promotion and the Prices of Drugs and Medicines I Orville Jose CSolon and Eduardo PBanzon

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VOLUME N NUMBER 1 January-June 2000 129 \. I ' IN THIS ISSUE ' ~ .

Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality and Ethnocentrism NATHAr GILBERT QUIMPO

The Philippines is named after the Spanish king, Philip II, under whose orders the country was - colonized in 1565. Since the Philippines gained independence in 1946, there have been several attempts to have the country' name changed, mainly on the grounds that it is of colonial extraction. Each proposal for a name change has been shot down, and Phijjppines has prevailed. Defenders of Plulipp1i1es have argued that it is the veritable symbol of a saga of nation-building, of the struggle for freedom, and a true emblem of the nation and of national identity. \\'hile the name Philippines is certainly not the matrix of the colonial mentality that persists among many Filipinos, changing it may provide added impetus to the process of cultural decolonization. And while the roots of the long-standing armed conflict in southern Philippines are much more complex than terminological issues, the process of a name change may help in correcting historical distortions about Muslims, reconstructing a truly multi-ethnic and multicultural national identity and resoh·in g the armed confli ct.

Revisiting the Maritime Territories and Jurisdictions of the Philippines JAY L BATONGBACAL

The United ations Convention on the Law of the Sea is an internationally recognized legal framework for the management of the planet's oceans \\·hich has the support of a great majority of nation-states. But while the Philippines is a signatory to this, it has not undertaken any concrete measures for implementation. A main concern has been the impact of the Convention on the national territory. This issue is discussed by presenting an 0\·erview of the development of our national territory laws and the historical context for the introduction of the Convention. The impact of the Convention in light of the current laws is briefly discussed and recommendations made as to what needs to be done.

Some Marine Transport Concerns GLENN D AGUILAR

The issue of marine transportation is of crucial importance to the Phihppines because of the archipelagic natu1·e of the country, its strategic location in Southeast Asia and the contribution of the sector's various components to the economy. The many 1·ecent maritime disasters the country has suffered highlight the importance of ensuring safety at sea. While the policy framework is adequately addressed by existing rules and regulations and by various offices and agencies, there is a need fo r stricter implementation and enforcement of these rule , g reater need for research and de,·elopment to inform policy and most importantly, a greater emphasis on our maritime history and em·ironment in the school curricula to develop a consciousness and appreciation of them.