DOCSLIB.ORG

Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the Numerus Clausus Principle

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the Numerus Clausus Principle Article Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle Thomas W. Merrill, and Henry E. Smith" CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 3 II. THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS IN THE COMMON LAW OF PROPERTY .............. 9 A. The Numerus Clausus as a Norm of JudicialSelf-Governance ....... 9 B. The Common Law's Standardizationof Property....................... 12 1. Estates in Land ................................................................... 12 2. ConcurrentInterests ........................................................... 14 3. Nonpossessory Interests....................................................... 16 4. Interests in PersonalProperty ............................................ 17 5. Intellectual Property........................................................... 19 C. JudicialRecognition of the Numerus Clausus ........................... 20 D . Sum m ary..................................................................................... 23 t John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. t" Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University. The authors would like to thank Charlotte Crane, Bob Ellickson, Richard Epstein, Clay Gillette, David Haddock, Henry Hansmann, Michael Heller, Jim Krier, John Langbein, Richard McAdams, Fred McChesney, Eric Posner, Eric Rasmusen, Carol Rose, Bob Scott, Marshall Shapo, Dick Speidel, Jim Speta, Debra Stark, and the participants at a Northwestern faculty workshop and at the 2000 annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association for their input on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Bill Springer for his excellent research assistance. All errors are the authors'. Merrill's work was supported by the Julius Rosenthal Foundation. Smith's work was supported by a John M. Olin Faculty Fellowship and by the David S. Ruder Corporate Research Fund at the Northwestern University School of Law. 2 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 1 III. MEASUREMENT COSTS, FRUSTRATION COSTS, AND THE OPTIMAL STANDARDIZATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS ....................... 24 A. Measurement-CostExternalities .............................................. 26 B. FrustrationCosts and the Language of Property Rights ........... 35 C. Optimal Standardizationand the Numerus Clausus .................. 38 D. Information Costs and the Dynamics of Property..................... 40 IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS .................................................................. 42 A. LibertarianObjections ............................................................. 43 1. Notice Cures A ll .................................................................. 43 2. Standardizationand Network Effects ................................. 45 3. Privately Supplied Standardization................................... 49 B. The AntifragmentationObjection .............................................. 51 C. The Irrelevance Objection......................................................... 54 V. THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE .................... 58 A. The Numerus Clausus and the Source of Legal Change ........ 59 B. The Consequences of Making Legislatures the Agents of Change ..................................................................... 60 1. Clarity ................................................................................ 6 1 2. Universality ....................................................................... 62 3. Comprehensiveness.............................................................. 62 4. Stability .............................................................................. 63 5. P rospectivity ........................................................................ 64 6. Implicit Compensation....................................................... 65 C. Legislated Rule Changes: The Final Balance........................... 66 V I. C ONCLUSIO N ......................................................................................... 68 20001 The Numerus Clausus Principle I. INTRODUCTION A central difference between contract and property concerns the freedom to "customize" legally enforceable interests. The law of contract recognizes no inherent limitations on the nature or the duration of the interests that can be the subject of a legally binding contract. Certain types of promises-such as promises to commit a crime-are declared unenforceable as a matter of public policy. But outside these relatively narrow areas of proscription and requirements such as definiteness and (maybe) consideration, there is a potentially infinite range of promises that the law will honor. The parties to a contract are free to be as whimsical or fanciful as they like in describing the promise to be performed, the consideration to be given in return for the promise, and the duration of the agreement. The law of property is very different in this respect. Generally speaking, the law will enforce as property only those interests that conform to a limited number of standard forms. As it is stated in a leading English case, "incidents of a novel kind" cannot "be devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner."' With respect to interests in land, for example, the basic forms are the fee simple, the defeasible fee simple, the life estate, and the lease. When parties wish to transfer property in land, they must specify which legal form they are using-fee simple, lease, and so forth. If they fail to be clear about which legal interest they are conveying, or if they attempt to customize a new type of interest, the courts will generally recast the conveyance as creating one of the recognized forms. Of course, the law freely allows customization of the more physical, tangible dimensions of ownership rights. Property comes in all sorts of shapes and sizes. But with respect to the legal dimensions of property, the law generally insists on strict standardization. Every common-law lawyer is schooled in the understanding that property rights exist in a fixed number of forms. The principle is acknowledged-at least by implication-in the "catalogue of estates" or "forms of ownership" familiar to anyone who has survived a first-year property course in an American law school.2 The principle, however, is by 1. Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834). 2. Standard reference and instructional materials present the list of property options as being closed. For example, a chapter entitled "Introduction to Permissible Interests in Land" in a leading treatise begins as follows: "This Treatise explores and discusses the general principles of law that apply to 'permissible interests in land,' which courts and legislatures have recognized." 1 RicHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 11.01, at 11-2 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1999); see also CHARLES DONAHUE, JR_ ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 457 (3d ed. 1993) (" IT]he common law regarded the system of estates as closed."); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110:1 no means limited to estates in land and future interests; it is also reflected in other areas of property law, including landlord-tenant, easements and servitudes, and intellectual property. Nor is the principle confined to common-law countries; to the contrary, it appears to be a universal feature of all modem property systems.' In the common law, the principle that property rights must conform to certain standardized forms has no name. In the civil law, which recognizes the doctrine explicitly, it is called the numerus clausus-the number is closed.4 We adopt this term for purposes of our discussion here, which focuses primarily on the common law. As befits a doctrine that has no name, the principle that property rights must track a limited number of standard forms has received very little examination in Anglo-American legal literature. We have discovered only one full-length English-language article on the numerus clausus.5 This is again in contrast to the civil law, where the doctrine is widely acknowledged by commentators as being a substantive limitation on the definition of property, as in Germany,' or a limitation on the circumstances 204 (4th ed. 1998) (referring to the "standardization of estates"); LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 61, at 45-46 (2d ed. 1956) (presenting a short section entitled "A Doctrine of Fixed Types of Estates"). 3. As one leading English comparativist has stated, "In all 'non-feudal' systems with which I am familiar (whether earlier, as at Rome, or later), the pattern is (in very general terms) similar: there are less than a dozen sorts of property entitlement." Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 239, 241 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987). As noted infra Section fI.B, depending on how one does the classification, American common law recognizes more than a dozen forms of property. Still, as far as we are aware, Rudden's point about the number of forms being finite and effectively closed in all known non-feudal property systems is accurate. 4. John Henry Merryman, Policy, Autonomy, and the Numerus Clausus in Italian and American Property Law, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 224 (1963); Rudden, supra note 3, at 240. 5. Rudden, supra note 3. Certain applications of the doctrine are addressed in Merryman, supra note 4, and, as we note below, the doctrine is considered
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Property and Democratic Deliberation: the Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law Anna Di Robilant Boston University School of Law
    Boston University School of Law Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law Faculty Scholarship Spring 2014 Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law Anna di Robilant Boston University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Recommended Citation Anna di Robilant, Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law, 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 367 (2014). Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/77 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PROPERTY AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION: THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS PRINCIPLE AND DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM IN PROPERTY LAW 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 301 (Issue 2 / Spring 2014) Boston University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 14-27 (June 19, 2014)) Anna di Robilant Boston University School of Laww This paper can be downloaded without charge at: http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2014.html Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2456658 \\jciprod01\productn\C\COM\62-2\COM203.txt unknown Seq: 1 18-FEB-14 8:34 ANNA DI ROBILANT* Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law† ABSTRACT First-year law students soon become familiar with the numerus clausus principle in property law.
    [Show full text]
  • The Law of Property
    THE LAW OF PROPERTY SUPPLEMENTAL READINGS Class 14 Professor Robert T. Farley, JD/LLM PROPERTY KEYED TO DUKEMINIER/KRIER/ALEXANDER/SCHILL SIXTH EDITION Calvin Massey Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law The Emanuel Lo,w Outlines Series /\SPEN PUBLISHERS 76 Ninth Avenue, New York, NY 10011 http://lawschool.aspenpublishers.com 29 CHAPTER 2 FREEHOLD ESTATES ChapterScope -------------------­ This chapter examines the freehold estates - the various ways in which people can own land. Here are the most important points in this chapter. ■ The various freehold estates are contemporary adaptations of medieval ideas about land owner­ ship. Past notions, even when no longer relevant, persist but ought not do so. ■ Estates are rights to present possession of land. An estate in land is a legal construct, something apart fromthe land itself. Estates are abstract, figments of our legal imagination; land is real and tangible. An estate can, and does, travel from person to person, or change its nature or duration, while the landjust sits there, spinning calmly through space. ■ The fee simple absolute is the most important estate. The feesimple absolute is what we normally think of when we think of ownership. A fee simple absolute is capable of enduringforever though, obviously, no single owner of it will last so long. ■ Other estates endure for a lesser time than forever; they are either capable of expiring sooner or will definitely do so. ■ The life estate is a right to possession forthe life of some living person, usually (but not always) the owner of the life estate. It is sure to expire because none of us lives forever.
    [Show full text]
  • Re-Evaluating Recreational Easements-New Norms for the Twenty-First
    Middlesex University Research Repository An open access repository of Middlesex University research http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk Pascoe, Susan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8618-2842 (2019) Re-evaluating recreational easements- new norms for the twenty-first century? In: Modern Studies in Property Law. McFarlane, Ben and Agnew, Sinéad, eds. Modern Studies in Property Law, 10 . Hart Publishing, pp. 167-186. ISBN 9781509921379, e-ISBN 9781509921409, e-ISBN 9781509921393, e-ISBN 9781509921386. [Book Section] (doi:10.5040/9781509921409.ch-010) Final accepted version (with author’s formatting) This version is available at: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/25568/ Copyright: Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically. Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study without prior permission and without charge. Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s). Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag- ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the date of the award.
    [Show full text]
  • Nestor Davidson Standardization
    DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION (BUT ALL COMMENTS ARE WELCOME) STANDARDIZATION AND PLURALISM IN PROPERTY LAW Nestor Davidson Standardization in property law—the near universal tendency of property interests to be found in a limited list of mandatory forms—poses an intriguing puzzle for property theory. If property law is meant to bolster autonomy and enhance the efficiency that private ordering can bring to economic relations, then how to account for a persistent feature of the law that seems consistently to undermine these goals? A number of scholars have attempted to tackle this problem in recent years. Some have focused on what might actually be efficiency enhancing about standardization. Others have argued that standardization instead reflects inherent categories of social or external meaning. These accounts, however, are ultimately limited. Efficiency theories overemphasize the structure of standardization with little interest in the content of the forms, while explanations focused on content fail to account for the persistence of the underlying structure of standardization in disparate legal systems. This Article proposes a theory of standardization in property law that focuses on the particular patterns of pluralism inherent in the standard forms. This pluralism brings to the fore the essentially regulatory function that the standard forms play. Even as standardization remains a consistent feature of property law, legal systems constantly tinker with the standard list and with the mandatory content of the forms themselves. This process produces a menagerie of forms that set the ex ante conditions under which property can be held while leaving a range of choice to private ordering as a matter of regulatory design.
    [Show full text]
  • The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law
    The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law Ius Commune Europaeum Bram Akkermans PhD-thesis The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law ISBN-13: 978-90-5095-824-0 D/2008/7849/65 NUR 822 © 2008 Intersentia Antwerp – Oxford – Portland www.intersentia.com No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photo copy, micro- film or any other means, without written permission from the author. PREFACE It is a great joy to finish a project after having worked on it for a period of four years. The work in this book is the result of research on my Ph.D. thesis at the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University, undertaken in the period from February 2004 until December 2007. During my research I have had the honour and pleasure to discuss my work with various property law and comparative law experts across the world. Some of them deserve a special word of thanks. First and foremost I owe gratitude to my supervisor Prof. dr. Sjef van Erp. Few in the world are patient enough to sit and listen to a beginning researcher and always make time to think and reflect with him. Many thanks for opening his incredible network for me. In the past years I have very much enjoyed working together, a cooperation I hope to continue for many more years. Second, the members of the Ius Commune Casebook Team on Property law must be mentioned. William Swadling of Brasenose College, Oxford University, for hosting me, both in the early as well as in the more advanced stages of my research.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 `Anna Di Robilant Property and Deliberation. the Numerus Clausus
    `Anna di Robilant Property and Deliberation. The Numerus Clausus Principle, New Property Forms and New Property Values. draft Introduction The numerus clausus principle means that property law recognizes only a limited menu of mandatory forms. In the United States, first year law students spend significant time mastering the limited menu of estates in land. In France or in Italy, every first year student learns that the “real rights” are ownership, emphyteusis, superficies, real servitudes, the right of usufruct, the right of use and the right of habitation. The numerus clausus principle exists in both the civil law and the common law, but, comparative law scholars warn, its nature and scope differ. In the civil law, the numerus clausus is a rigid rule with a long historical pedigree. It has structured the property system since Roman law. It is either explicitly stated or implied in the civil code. The menu of recognized forms is a relatively short one, comprising less than ten items. It is also significantly stable, with few variations from Justinian to the present. By contrast, in the common law, the numerus clausus has attracted the attention of property scholars only recently. It is a more flexible rule of judicial self-governance. The menu is a richer one, comprising forms, such as the trust, that civil law scholars have long envied. The fact that the numerus clausus is a near universal feature of property systems has not made it less puzzling to private law scholars. Isn’t private law’s very function to provide individuals with flexible legal devices that allow them to reach any desired economic outcome?1 If flexibility and customization are what private law promises, then why do virtually all modern legal systems provide a restricted list of recognized forms? In recent years, property experts have proposed a variety of possible explanations for the numerus clausus principle.
    [Show full text]
  • Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law Nestor M
    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 61 | Issue 6 Article 1 11-2008 Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law Nestor M. Davidson Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Recommended Citation Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 Vanderbilt Law Review 1597 (2019) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol61/iss6/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 61 NOVEMBER 2008 NUMBER 6 Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law Nestor M. Davidson* IN TROD U CTIO N .............................................................................. 1598 I. STANDARDIZATION AND THE FORMS OF PROPERTY ............. 1603 A. The Numerus Clausus Principle ............................ 1604 1. Property in Standard Forms ....................... 1604 2. Dynamism in Standardization .................... 1610 a. Dynamism in the List ....................... 1610 b. Dynamism in Mandatory Content.... 1612 c. Dynamism in Private Latitude......... 1615 3. The Institutions of Standardization ........... 1616 B. The Problem of Standardization............................ 1618 1. The Many Lives of Property ........................ 1619 2. Specialization and Efficiency .....................
    [Show full text]
  • A Gross Oversight? an Analysis of the Statutory Introduction of Covenants in Gross and Their Potential Threat to the Boundaries of Property Law
    A Gross Oversight? An analysis of the statutory introduction of covenants in gross and their potential threat to the boundaries of property law Natasha Lea A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Bachelor of Laws (Honours) University of Otago October 2018 1 Acknowledgements With the warmest, tightest hugs I wish to thank Lucy and Gendi, for being the best flatties and closest friends for the last four years; to Jordan, for his hugs and comic relief; to Tom for always being there; and to Meg for her friendship, incredible suggestions, words of wisdom, and generally bettering my life. To you, and all my other amazing friends, the tolerance you all have of my stress levels is truly admirable. To my family for their continued support, love and phone calls. Despite your confusion as to what I have been researching for the past year, you are my rock. To Nicola Peak, for inspiring me as an incredible property lawyer and role model. Thank you for teaching me the ‘tangibility’ of property and law. To Stuart Anderson, for sparking an idea for an entire dissertation topic from a singular comment in a second-year property law lecture. Lastly, to Ben France-Hudson, for being himself; the most remarkably talented, caring and compassionate lawyer and friend. I count myself incredibly lucky to have had you by my side throughout this process. Thank you for absolutely everything. 2 Contents Introduction 4 I Approaches to freehold covenants 6 A Freehold covenants 6 1 The creation of freehold covenants 7 B Closed classes of property
    [Show full text]
  • Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests
    Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests D. Benjamin Barros* Table of Contents I. Introduction ...................................................................................... 4 II. The Case for Reform ........................................................................ 7 A. The Bestiary of Estates and Future Interests .............................. 7 B. The Unnecessary Complexity of the Current System .............. 17 C. If It Ain’t (Completely) Broke, Why Fix It? ............................ 20 III. Two Mechanisms of Reform: Restatements v. Model Laws .......... 22 IV. Crafting a Model Law ..................................................................... 28 A. Initial Considerations ............................................................... 28 1. Naming Issues ................................................................... 29 2. Elimination of the Vestiges of Feudalism ......................... 30 3. Alienability of Present and Future Interests ...................... 30 4. Scope and Definitions of Present and Future Interests ...... 31 B. Present Possessory Interests ..................................................... 32 1. The Fee Simple Absolute .................................................. 32 2. Nonrecognition of Fee Tail and Fee Simple Conditional ........................................................................ 33 3. The Life Estate .................................................................. 34 4. The Tenancies ..................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Yaã«Ll Emerich, Conceptualising Property Law: Integrating Common Law and Civil Law Traditions
    Journal of Civil Law Studies Volume 12 Number 2 2019 Article 12 12-31-2019 Yaëll Emerich, Conceptualising Property Law: Integrating Common Law and Civil Law Traditions John A. Lovett Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls Part of the Civil Law Commons Repository Citation John A. Lovett, Yaëll Emerich, Conceptualising Property Law: Integrating Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 12 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2019) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol12/iss2/12 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BOOK REVIEW CONCEPTUALISING PROPERTY LAW: INTEGRATING COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS, by Yaëll Emerich, Elgar, 2018, ISBN 978-1-78811-183-6, 352 pp, £22/$31. In her newly published book, Conceptualising Property Law: Integrating Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, Yaëll Emerich explores the evolution and current status of property law in the civil and common law.1 The predominant theme that emerges from this impressively learned, eight chapter study is one of convergence. Emerich repeatedly reveals that property—both as a general legal concept and as a set of institutional arrangements governing how people use, manage and exchange both tangible and intangible re- sources—actually functions in remarkably similar ways in the civil law and common law traditions despite different historical origins and doctrinal labels.
    [Show full text]
  • Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law Nestor M
    Fordham Law School FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History Faculty Scholarship 2008 Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law Nestor M. Davidson Fordham University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Recommended Citation Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law , 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1597 (2008) Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/158 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 61 NOVEMBER 2008 NUMBER 6 Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law Nestor M. Davidson* IN TROD U CTIO N .............................................................................. 1598 I. STANDARDIZATION AND THE FORMS OF PROPERTY ............. 1603 A. The Numerus Clausus Principle ............................ 1604 1. Property in Standard Forms ....................... 1604 2. Dynamism in Standardization .................... 1610 a. Dynamism in the List ....................... 1610 b. Dynamism in Mandatory Content.... 1612 c. Dynamism in Private Latitude......... 1615 3. The Institutions of Standardization ........... 1616 B. The Problem of Standardization............................ 1618 1. The Many Lives of Property ........................ 1619 2. Specialization and Efficiency ...................... 1622 3. Standardization, Identity, and Autonomy..1622 II. THE CONUNDRUM CONSIDERED ......................................... 1624 A. Structural Efficiency Accounts ............................... 1624 Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. A.B. Harvard University 1990; J.D. Columbia Law School 1997.
    [Show full text]
  • Landmark Cases in Land Law
    LANDMARK CASES IN LAND LAW Edited by Nigel Gravells lAN[ IN LA Editt'd bj Contents Landmatl in the La Preface v on leadlr Notes on Contributors ix having CI Equiry at 1 Keppell v Bailey (1834); Hill v Tupper (1863) 1 volume! The Numerus Clausus and the Common Law interestn Ben McFarlane decided 2 Todrick v Western National Omnibus Co Ltd (1934) 33 the selec The Interpretation of Easements lawyers. Peter Butt a reappl 3 Re Ellenborough Park (1955) 65 perspect A Mere Recreation and Amusement or theor Elizabeth Cooke neolecn perceivt 4 Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd; explore Old & Campbell Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Friendly law of I Society (1979) 81 the con Stitching Together Modern Estoppel of certa Martin Dixon of [he { 5 Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd (1979) 99 in own Annexation and Intention collect! Nigel P Gravells acaden 6 Williams and Glyn's Bank Ltd v Boland (1980) 125 The Development of a System of Title by Registration Roger Smith 7 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (1980) 155 Maintaining the Integrity of Registration Systems Mark P Thompson 8 Street v Mountford (1985); AG Securities v Vaughan; Antoniades v Villiers (1988) 181 Tenancies and Licences: Halting the Revolution Stuart Bridge 9 City of London Building Society v Flegg (1987) 205 Homes as Wealth Nicholas Hopkins LANI viii Contents IN LA 10 Stack v Dowden (200-); Jones [' Kernott (2011) 229 Edited b~ Finding a Home for 'Family Property' Andrew Hayu-ard Notes on Contributors 11 A-1anchesterCit}' Council t' Pinnock (2010) 253 Landman Shifting Ideas of Ownership of Land in the La Susan Bright Stuart Bridge is one of Her Majesty's Circuit Judges.
    [Show full text]