NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology Faculty of Social Sciences Master’s thesis and Technology Management Department of Sociology and Political Science Andreas Bruvik Westberg BruvikWestberg Andreas Trondheim, Spring2011 Trondheim, Science thesisinPolitical Master’s else? everywhere they And whyare Somalia? Northwest in nopirates there Why are Horn: on Africa’s Resource The Lootable The lootable resource on Africa’s Horn Why are there no pirates in Northwest Somalia? And why are they everywhere else? Andreas Bruvik Westberg Spring 2011 Master’s thesis in Political Science Department of Sociology and Political Science (ISS) Norwegian University of Science and Technology i Abstract: In this thesis I wish to examine the underlying mechanisms that caused the onset of piracy in Somalia. Since the 1990s piracy has spread like wildfire from the Northeast of Somalia and Southwards. Yet it has failed to take root in the Northwest. Why are there no pirates there? And why are they everywhere else? To explain the onset of piracy I introduce conflict study literature on lootable resources and actors in conflict. I propose that the concepts of lootability and obstructability enable us to understand why, when and how individuals and groups decide to violently appropriate international shipping. The presence of weak institutional authority, economic marginalization and a heavy reliance on artisanal fishing appear to be important contributors to the presence of piracy. My main conclusion is, furthermore, that while the precise activity of hunting down and hijacking is a new phenomenon, the activity of looting international shipping and demanding ransom is no stranger to the shores of the Northeast. ii Acknowledgements I wish to extend a profound gratitude to my supervisor Nils Petter Gleditsch for his patience and timely, mind-reading abilities. A special appreciation goes to “The Row” at Room 9453: Dženana Besic for her ability to inject me with oxygen when needed and the ability to listen to my ceaseless ramblings, Ådne Naper for countless stimulating discussions on the study of conflict, the conflict of studies and the conflicts of studying, Gina Olafsson for her excellent coffee taste and infectious humour, and Jonas Ramberg for the audacity of always being a week in front of the rest of us! I thank all of you for two very rewarding years in my MA studies. I am grateful to my three sisters and parents for their encouragement and support. Lastly I would like to send my eternal admiration to my four grandparents, Haakon, Ingeborg, Johannes and Viktoria, for their sense of righteousness and fortitude. iii Table of Contents Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... iii 1.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 The literature on piracy in Somalia .................................................................................................... 3 3.0 Theory: The political economy of piracy ........................................................................................... 5 3.1 Need, greed and grievance: The onset of rebellion ......................................................................... 5 3.2 The primacy of resources: Scarcity versus abundance ................................................................... 8 3.3 The social contract ........................................................................................................................ 11 3.4 Lootability and obstructability ...................................................................................................... 14 3.4.1 H1: Lootability favors poverty ............................................................................................... 16 3.4.2 H2: Obstructability favors intensity and duration ................................................................. 17 3.4.3 H3: Illegality favors rebels .................................................................................................... 18 4.0 Method .............................................................................................................................................. 19 4.1 The comparative case study .......................................................................................................... 19 4.2 Proxying governance..................................................................................................................... 21 5.0 Data ................................................................................................................................................... 23 5.1 International shipping: An obstructable resource ......................................................................... 23 5.1.1 Resource choke sectors .......................................................................................................... 23 5.1.2 Distance from resource choke sector ..................................................................................... 24 5.1.3 Mean wind speed level .......................................................................................................... 25 5.1.4 Proximity of legal structures .................................................................................................. 26 5.1.5 Density of ships ..................................................................................................................... 27 5.2 Data on piracy attacks ................................................................................................................... 28 6.0 Analysis: Understanding piracy through lootability ......................................................................... 29 6.1 Fragmentation: Somaliland‟s unity, Puntland‟s marginalization .................................................. 32 6.1.1 Somaliland‟s unity ................................................................................................................. 32 6.1.2 Puntland‟s marginalization .................................................................................................... 36 6.2 The political economy of Northern Somalia ................................................................................. 40 6.2.1 The Northwest: Insulated, but not marginalized ................................................................... 40 6.2.2 The Northeast: Self-destruction ............................................................................................. 42 6.3 Puntland‟s marine Mecca .............................................................................................................. 46 6.3.1 The coast is closed ................................................................................................................. 46 iv 6.3.2 Artisanal fishing in the Democratic Republic of Somalia ..................................................... 48 6.4 The merits of lootability and obstructability................................................................................. 50 7.0 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 54 8.0 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................... 56 9.0 Appendix I: Somalia’s social contract ............................................................................................ 64 10.0 Appendix II: Clans and institutions of Northeast Somalia ............................................................... 67 11.0 Appendix III: Clans and institutions of Northwest Somalia ............................................................. 70 12.0 Appendix IV: Figures and tables ..................................................................................................... 72 13.0 Appendix V: Six towns on the Northern coast ................................................................................. 86 v vi 1.0 Introduction Somalia‟s civil war, now having lasted a full 20 years since the fall of General Muhammad Siyaad Barre‟s regime on January 26th 1991, has torn the country apart through insurgency, warlordism, inter- clan fighting, Islamic jihadists and foreign intervention (Hesse 2010b: 247). As Barre‟s regime fell so did the Somali central government, and with it the country‟s institutions. The territory of Somalia has been left ravaged by the whims of near-anarchy and statelessness. What has followed has been widespread displacement of large sections of the population, a substantial exodus and a humanitarian crisis unparalleled in its longevity on the African continent. After two decades there have been fourteen failed attempts at producing a unified, national government for the former republic. In the mid-1990s piracy first appeared on the horizon, a few years after the dissolution of the central state. As the state institutions of the Democratic Republic of Somalia fell apart, so did the country‟s Westphalian sovereignty and with it the coast guard and its control over Somalia‟s territorial waters. This period saw the increased presence of foreign, industrial-scale fishing trawlers in Somali waters1, leading local fishermen to engage in deterrence and retribution to protect their fish stocks and economic livelihood (Pham 2010: 331). Yet equally it