ISSN 0014-1690 The Ethical Record Vol. 99 No. 9 £1 October 1994

THE GOOD LIFE: LOVE SACRIFICE AND THE LITTLE PRINCE Derek Matravers 3

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANISM Jim Herrick 13

CAN FEMINISTS BE CHRISTIANS? CAN A MALE SAVIOUR SAVE WOMEN? Kathie Walsh 17

VIEWPOINTS Roy Silson, Richard Scorer, Michael T. Deans 21

EVENING CLASSES 23

ODIUM THEOLOGICUM. FUTURE EVENTS 24 First Street Preacher. tNTHE 'EATH WAS TER? HOW DID YOU GET Orr Second drtto "0, I WARMED UP an TYNDALL Altl"IALEY TO-RIGHTS, I CAN MLL YERI Punch 12 June 1875

EDITORIAL — THE HIGH POINT OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM

In August 1874, during its meeting in Belfast, the British Association for the advancement of Science was treated to two magnificent speeches. John Tyndall, physicist and lecturer at the Royal Institution, London, delivered his 'Belfast Address', a superb resume of the history of science, maintaining that the scientific world-view did not require any miracles: "I ... discern in that Matter which we, in our ignorance, ... have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of every form and quality of life".'

Thomas Henry Huxley, physiologist and 'Darwin's bulldog', spoke 'On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History', concluding that "the argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally good of men; and, therefore, that all states of consciousness in us, as in them, are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance".1

In that age of faith, where Providence was believed to be busily intervening in the

continued on page 2

I. J. Tyndall, Fragments of Soence, 1889. 2. T.H. Huxley, Method and Results, toll. 1894. SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY Conway Hall Humanist Centre 25 Red Lion Square, London WC I R 4RL. Telephone: 071-831 7723

Appointed Lecturers Harold Blackham T.F. Evans, Peter Heales, Richard Scorer, Barbara Smoker, Harry Stopes-Roe, Nicolas Walter. Officers Honorary Representative: Nicolas Walter. General Committee Chairman: Barbara Smoker. Treasurer Don Liversedge. Editor, The Ethical Record: Norman Bacrac. Librarian: Edwina Palmer. Registrar: Marion Granville. Secretary to the Society: Nina Khare. Tel: 071-831 7723 (The Secretary's office is now on the 2nd Floor, Bradlaugh House, 47 Theobald's Road) Hall Staff Manager Stephen Norley. Tel: 071-2428032 for Hall bookings. Head Caretaker David Wright. GEORGE W. WALFORD

George Walford died suddenly at home, aged 75, on 21 August 1994, leaving a wife and two daughters. He was born in London and was active in left-wing politics when young. He chose to avoid conscription during the Second World War. After the war he earned his living as an antiquarian bookseller until recently but his main interest was a theory of ideology on which he lectured to SPES. He gave what was to be his last lecture to the society last March, entitled What Religion does for Freethinking (ER, April 1994). He published his own journal, Ideological Commentary, and contributed to many others. At the time of his death he was starting work on his third book. Some of the people who knew him held a short meeting at Conway Hall in September to discuss the possibilities of continuing and/or creating an archive of his work. Adrian Williams

Editorial continued from page I 'natural course of events, and consciousness was a non-material substance interacting with the brain, the brilliant exposition of these views caused reverb- erations in the religious establishment, evidenced by the preachers in the Punch cartoon.

Tyndall commented in his 'Apology for the Belfast Address', written shortly afterwards, "From fair and manly argument, from the tenderest and holiest sympathy on the part of those who desire my eternal good. I pass by many gradations, through deliberate unfairness, to a spirit of bitterness, which desires with a fervour inexpressible in words my eternal ill".

Huxley noted, "there are so very few interesting questions which one is, at present, allowed to think out scientifically — to go as far as reason leads, and stop where evidence comes to an end — without speedily being deafened by the tattoo of 'the drum ecclesiastic' ". He could hear "that drum's discordant sound Parading round and round and round" even as he spoke.

These matters will be discussed further in our Tuesday Evening Class on Science, Philosophy and the Critque of Religion, tutored by Dr J.H.S. Green. (see p.23/24).

2 Ethical Record, October, 1994 THE GOOD LIFE: LOVE, SACRIFICE AND THE LITTLE PRINCE

Derek Matravers Darwin College, Cambridge Lecture to the Ethical Society, 26 June 1994

I. Over the past decade or so, a number of philosophers working in ethics have converged on the opinion that novels rather than moral theory provide the best answer to questions of justification for living an ethical life. I am sympathetic to this view and, this morning, I intend to illustrate how, when we come to the limits of philosophy, we do not come to the limits of enquiry. The question I shall address is whether or not we should be moral. I mean this to be taken as a reflective, philosophical question, not as, for example, a biological, psychological or sociological question. That is, I am not interested in the question of how morality fits into the picture of man's evolution; neither am I interested in the question of what events in our psychological histories cause us to behave in a moral manner; and I am not interested in whether or not a society which is run on moral lines is more efficient (by some measure or other) than a society which is not. At least, I am not primarily interested in those questions although they might play a part in the answer I seek. What I want is a reason to which a reflective person can appeal when he asks himself why he should live a moral life. I want a rationalisation of a moral life.

Why should one live a Moral Life? The question, then, is: why should one live a moral life? We must not assume there is an answer to this question. It might be, as many believe, that the moral life is, at a deep level, unjustified. This thought is troubling in one respect and liberating in another. Troubling, because morality is bound up with concepts such as love, honour, courage, integrity and a host of others to which reflective human beings form a powerful, if usually unscrutinized, attachment. It would be unfortunate if, on scrutiny, this attachment proved to have no persuasive grounds. Liberating, because morality prevents us from pursuing things which we would very much like to pursue. One might have moral qualms (perhaps stemming from attachments to other people) about accepting offers of casual sex. Other things being equal, there is a lot to be said for accepting such offers. If one believes morality is groundless, one at least will not have that obstacle to enjoyment.

This example rather dramatises the problem. If we are to constrain our behaviour for moral considerations then we should have a very good reason to do so. But most of us have no idea what such a reason could be.

The question, why should one live a moral life? is, as I have said, a reflectivequestion: a question about our beliefs and behaviour. Such a question need not have been asked. There have been (or, if not, there could have been) societies the inhabitants of which have accepted the prevailing moral beliefs and never thought to question them. For them it would be as senseless to question (say) 'murder-is wrong' as it would be for us to question 'there are people in this room'. This does not mean that ethics was well grounded for them and not for us (they just thought it was). What it does mean is that we have a practical problem they did not have. Because they never thought to ponder on the grounds for their moral beliefs they were able to persist unproblematically in being moral. We. however, have asked the question, and, having asked it, we have to answer it. The point is'that, without a reason why we should live a moral life, the possibility opens that we should not persist in being moral.

Ethical Record. October, 1991 3 What we want in answer to the question of why one should be moral is something with normative force; something that will convince us that we should be moral. There are many candidates for such an answer. For example, one could answer that one should be moral because otherwise one will burn in hell. Although this might convince some. it should not, because such a claim is false. Similarly, appeals to faith, fear, superstition and the like are not going to convince us, and should not convince others, because they are false. What should convince us, and will convince me, arc true propositions connected by rational argument. In short, what we want is a reflective answer that aims to be rationally persuasive.

2. The question before us — why should one be moral? — asks for a rationalisation of the moral life for someone who is inclined to live it. The answer I shall provide falls into three parts. First, I shall argue that whatever reason is provided should appeal to the self construed as an individual. This contrasts with a different conception of the self: namely, the self construed as part of some greater whole (that is, some sort of community). Put in less abstract terms, I shall argue that the reason will have to appeal to us as individuals, rather than as Englishmen, socialists or whatever. Examples of reasons of the latter sort might be; because it does England's name good in the world, because it would provide bread for our brothers or whatever. And, of course, if we do regard ourselves as Englishmen, socialists or whatever these reasons might well be compelling. What I shall aim to provide, however, is an answer that will appeal to a perfectly good notion of self which is prior to such allegiances. This answer will (of course) be more general and I hope will tell us something about such allegiances.

Second. I shall argue that we (or at least I) am unclear about what sort of reason we could appeal to in order to justify being moral. Would it, for example, be a worthwhile project to try to show that being moral was a way to become rich? It is certainly true that 'because it will make you rich' is a reason for doing something. But, pre-theoretically, I see no more (or less) reason to try to become rich than I do to try to become moral. As Matthew says, 'What is man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?' It is pointless rationalising morality in terms of wealth unless the pursuit of wealth can be assumed to be rational. What we will need to find, therefore, is something which will be a compelling goal for all rational people.

Third, I shall try to answer the question; that is, I shall try and provide some reflective and rationally compelling reason to be moral.

The Case for Individualism First, then, the case for individualism. My aim is to show that reasons need to be given to us as individuals, not simply as members of some community. Again, I shall divide this problem, this time into two parts. First, I will show that as a matter of fact we conceive of ourselves as individuals of the requisite sort and second, I shall argue that we are right to do so.

My claim that we conceive of ourselves as individuals is based on the claim that it is the Cities' concludes least confusing way of making sense of the facts. Dickens' Tale of Two with a famous and affecting speech by Sidney Carton from the foot of the guillotine. Carton is not the only affecting character in those last couple of chapters; there is also the seamstress who is to be executed for 'plots'. This character utters what I think is the most moving speech in the book:

4 Ethical Record, October. 1994 am not afraid to die, Citizen Evremonde, but I have done nothing. I am not unwilling to die, if the Republic which is to do so much good to us poor, will profit by my death; but I do not know how that can be, Citizen Evrémonde. Such a poor weak little creature!" Whilst granting that Dickens is laying it on a bit thick, this is saved from being pathetic by the tragic nature of the girl's misconception. She has identified herself with the Republic. As part of it, she cannot but share its aims. However, as one of its aims is to kill her, she faces a crisis because, quite naturally, she does not want to die. The way out of this crisis is for her to realise that, however laudable the aims of the Republic are, they conflict in this particular area with those of her (individual) self. Hence, at the very least, she could admit that she and the Republic disagree about one thing. There are some very depressing trains of thought in this area which it would take me too far from my topic to explore. Two comments on this. First, it does not follow, on the individualistic picture of self, that nothing is worth dying for. This is a point to which I shall return in the final part of this talk. Second (a related point) I have made things easy for myself. Intuitively, we can conceive of ourselves having interests apart from communities such as our country or our favourite political movement. The intuitive case becomes less clear when we consider ourselves as, for example, a parent. It is easier to conceive that, in some sense, the interests of myself and my child could not diverge. Although I concede that this is intuitively more compelling, I would still like to resist the conclusion. Instead, I would argue that it is unlikely (or perhaps a Very Bad Thing) that my interests should diverge from those of my child. Once more, it is simply a better way to make sense of the facts. The argument that we are right to consider the facts this way is in the unlikely combination of both being more philosophical and more simple. It also brings out the fact that I am not claiming very much; something which I hope will become clear as my talk progresses. My reason for putting 50p in the box which is being shaken under my nose is to help alleviate some disaster. The cause of my doing so is some neurophysiological statein my head. The cause is unquestionably mine, by which I mean it is in my head and not yours. We have (you will have to take my word for it) good reason to identify reasons and causes. Hence the reason must be mine as well. This says nothing about the nature of the reason — it might be selfish, it might not. All I am saying is that reasons must be reasons for individuals: that is, those sorts of things which have causes for their actions which are also reasons,

The Universal Standard tor Practical Reason 3. So far, I have argued that whatever reason I give for the good life has to be one which appeals to an individual who asks the question. The second claim I wanted to establish is that it is difficult to know where to look for a reason to be moral. To put the question slightly more formally, what is the universal standard for practical reason?

Above, I gave an intuitive argument that there are no obvious candidates for something it is somehow in our basic interests to pursue. I shall return to that issue in a moment; first I want to deal with a complication. A thought that might occur to us here (especially if we have read Immanuel Kant) is that there is something contradictory about giving people a reason to be moral. Such a reason can either itself be moral, or not moral. If it is moral, then we are

Ethical Record. October, 1994 5 justifying morality in terms of morality, which does not seem to advance us much. If it is not moral, then it cannot justify morality. For example, if you tell someone that every time they are good you will give them 5: I , and their reason for performing moral acts is to obtain £1, they are hardly being moral as much as pretending to be moral (in order to earn l). Similarly, having as one's reason for not beating up one's wife that one might go to jail (or to hell for that matter) is hardly the thought of a loving husband.

What this argument ignores is that there is a wide range of reasons for being moral which although not quite moral, are not quite not moral either. I mean reasons such as love, fidelity, flourishing, happiness and so on. A universal standard of practical reason is most plausibly sought from this group. For example, it has been claimed that the reason for being moral is that only by being so will one flourish. We all have good reason to flourish, so all that needs to be shown is that in order to flourish we need to be moral and hence we have a good reason to be moral. Furthermore, being moral in order to flourish does not sound nearly as bad as being moral in order to earn E I.

To flourish, the standard translation of Aristotle's 'cudiamonia', is a popular candidate for a universal goal which can also give us a reason to be moral. However, until some account is given of what it is to flourish (which, to be fair, Aristotelians have attempted to give) this account remains nothing more than a promissory note. If I say: I have a life to lead, why should it be a moral one?, it is of limited use to be told that it ought to be if I want to flourish.

In summary, goals which claim to be reasons to be moral can suffer from a number of defects. They might not be goals which it is any more or less rational to pursue than it is to pursue being moral, they might not give us reason to be moral (only a reason to act morally) or they might be a vague proMissory note which cries out for further elaboration.

A Compelling Case 4. I want, in this, the third part of the talk, to present a compelling case for living the moral life. Before doing so, however, there are two things that need to be made clear. First, a brief word about what I mean by 'moral'. I have no desire to justify everything which now falls under the word 'moral' — much of what passes for moral in this country and others are practices which we would be better off without. What I would like to justify can be gestured at with the description 'a disposition to form a community of interests with our fellow men'.

Second, I would like to say a little to clarify what I mean by 'motivation'. If I want a certain result — say, to get back to Cambridge — this will provide me with motivations for actions which will bring about this result — say, getting on a train. Why did you get on that train? Because I wanted to go to Cambridge. If we have a goal of which we arc aware, this is one of the ways in which we can provide a clear rationalisation of our behaviour. There are other motivations which are slightly less perspicuous; we are not really aware that we have them, we cannot necessarily articulate them and, often, we can find no reason for the behaviour that results in them. For example, I have a friend who cannot pass a worm in trouble without picking it up (with a twig) and putting it on some grass. If one asked her for her reason for doing this, she might very well not be able to provide one. When confronted with the circumstances in which there is a worm in trouble, she acts in that particular way.

6 Ethical Record. Octoho; 1994

The conclusion we should draw from this is that it is possible for us to have a reason for action even if we cannot articulate it. That is, in philosophical terms, we are disposed to act in certain ways in certain circumstances even if we cannot (a) articulate our reasons for doing so, or (b) even be aware we even have the disposition. To return to my example, my friend has a disposition to rescue worms which she cannot articulate, and the hero of many a romantic novel who says 'I never realised how much I cared about you, Dulcie' had a disposition of which he was not aware. To repeat, a motivation is a disposition to act in a particular way in particular circumstances, which we can have even if we cannot articulate any reason for acting or even if we are not aware we have such a disposition.

Having sorted this out, let us make our question more precise. 'Why should I live a moral life?' becomes something like: 'Is there any reason for me to have these moral dispositions I do have? Are the dispositions I do have ones that I just happen to have, or ones that I ought to have? This is a good question, not just about moral dispositions, but about all dispositions. For example, an over-exposure to Liebfraumilch has caused in some people a disposition to avoid all German wine. This is a disposition they should question, because there is plenty of good German wine (and apparently some good Liebfraumilch) which they are missing.

We have already seen some of the problems attached to the attempt to rationalise our moral dispositions. First, it is pointless to rationalise them in terms of a reason which will not motivate us as individuals. Second, it is difficult to see what to put after the 'because' in 'My moral dispositions are alright because...', there is nothing which is obviously all that appealing. Third, we have seen that the project of rationalising dispositions is difficult because of the possibility that we may not be able to articulate, or may not even be aware, of the disposition we are trying to rationalise.

If these problems were not bad enough, worse is to come. Dispositions are not like jackets, which we can put on, take off, buy and sell. They are ingrained habits of behaviour. Moral dispositions, such as courage, benevolence, temperance, justice are not the sort of thing that can be handed out in `virtue kitchens' situated at the corners of streets. People cannot come to possess these virtues (these dispositions to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances) simply by being told they should possess them. Similarly, someone whose circumstances change, perhaps by losing their job or going to university can find themselves questioning strongly held moral convictions (poor people deserve to be poor, homosexuals deserve to bc shot). Questioning these convictions does not, as we know, make them disappear. In fact, ridding oneself of moral convictions one feels are wrong can be a long and painful process.

This is not to say, of course, that beliefs and rational enquiry do not have a part to play. It is as well, however, to realise their limitations. This, of course, leaves me with a problem. If I am to fulfill my task and justify your moral dispositions, that is, make you happy to adhere to them, talking to you about them may not be the best way to do this. Showing you that the moral life is something worth living might be better. For the remainder of this talk I am going to do two things. First, l am going to identify a moral disposition which I hope at least some of you have and second, I am going to attempt to show that it is one worth cultivating.

Saint-Exupéry's Novels as Meditations 5. Actually, / am not going to do this; I am, instead, going to present arguments and observations by someone else who struggled with this problem: Antoine de Saint- Exupery. For those who do not know, Saint-Exupéry was a pilot in the early days of air

Ethical Record, October, 1994 7 flight. He wrote five novels, including The Little Prince, a story for children. All the novels are, to some extent, meditations on what it is that makes a life worth living.

There are advantages in using Saint-Exupery's arguments rather than my own. If you think about it, you are quite justified in being sceptical about the telling you the best way to live your life. I have lived a reasonably sheltered life, including having spent the past ten years in a University. In mitigation, I have studied philosophy which should have given me something to say about the meaning of life and, although sheltered, nobodies' life these days is that sheltered. Saint-Exupery, on the other hand, lived the kind of life which makes you think he might have something worthwhile to say. Fle came close to death many times, once from thirst in the desert often from hostile fire. He witnessed the fall of France (a country he loved). His integrity made him enemies and he was often betrayed. Throughout his life he had woman trouble, back- trouble, engine trouble and trouble with depression. I shall not here counter the unjust remarks that were made about his thought in Sunday Supplement reviews of a recent biography. An important point in this context is that his books, often austerely beautiful, contain arguments of sustained philosophical rigour.

First, then, to describe the motivation Saint-Exupery felt was important. There are three positions we can hold concerning love for our fellow man. First, that there is no reason to love our fellow man and we should not. Second, that there is reason to and we should. Third, that there is no reason and we should. The first is the position of the moral sceptic, the second the position of those Saint-Exupery calls humanists and the third the position of Saint-Exupery himself.

Recall that earlier I claimed that it is often difficult to find reasons for our motivations. In Saint-Exupery's terms, the humanists' attempts to find reasons for our motivation to love our fellow man are bound to fail for one (or both) the following reasons. First, there might simply be no reason why we should do so. Second, and more importantly, there is no reason which we will recognise as the true source of our motivation. To put the point in a deliberately crass way, we do not love our fellow man because it will earn us money, give us a good name, stop him damaging our fence and so on. We love our neighbour for no reason at all; our love is unconditioned. First, a quotation from Saint-Exupérv outlining this position, and then I will outline his argument in defence of it.

Humanism assigned itself the exclusive mission of brightening and perpetuating the ideal of the primacy of Man over the individual. What Humanism preached was man. But as soon as we speak of Man, our language displays itself insufficient. Man is not the same as men. We say nothing essential about the cathedral when we speak of its stones. We say nothing essential about Man when we seek to define him by the qualities of men. Humanism strove in a direction blocked in advance when it sought to seize the notion of Man in terms of logic and ethics, and by these terms communicate that notion to the human consciousness. Unity of being is not communicable in words. If I knew men to whom the notion of the love of country or of home was strange, and I sought to teach them the meaning of these words, I could not summon a single argument that would waken the sense of country or home in them. (Hight to Arras, London: Picador, 1987) p.249.

What Inept Cost Accounting! Saint-Exupery has a number of arguments for his view, the most compelling of which is as follows. We can recognise motivations for action as appropriate (right, true or whatever) but which we cannot possible rationalise quantitatively. Saint-Exupery gives two examples of this, the first of which sees him struggling with his position which he sees as a contradiction.

8 Ethical Record, October, 1994 Here I touch the inescapable contradiction I shall never be able to resolve. For man's greatness does not reside merely in the destiny of the species: each individual is an empire. When a inine caves in and closes over the head of a single miner the life of the community is suspended. His comrades, their women, their children, gather in anguish at the entrance to the mine, while below them the rescue party scratch with picks at the bowels of the earth. What are they after? Are they consciously saving one unit of society? Are they freeing a human being as one might free a horse, after computing the work he is still capable of doing? Ten other miners may be killed in the attempted rescue: what inept cost accounting! Of course it is not a matter of saving one ant out of the colony of ants! They are rescuing a consciousness, an empire whose significance is incommensurable with anything else. (Wind, Sand and Stars, London: Picador, 1987) p.I 25-6.

By the later book, Saint-Exupery is more confident in making what is essentially the same point.

I may, if I like, speak of a farm by referring to its fields, its streams, its pastures, its cattle. Each of these by itself, and all of them together, contribute to the existence of the farm. Yet in that farm there must be something which escapes material analysis, since there are farmers who are ready to ruin themselves for their farms. . (Flight to Arras, London: Picador, 1987) p.249.

The Act of Sacrifice And the point is this; we can recognise motivations that lead people to perform actions which neither they nor we could rationalise.

If such motivations cause us to act, even though reasons show us we would be better off if we did not, then we are(to whatever extent) sacrificing oursel ves. It is no surprise to find sacrifice at the centre of much of Saint-Exupery's thought, as illustrated in the following quotation:

The being of which we claim to form part is created within us not by words but by acts. A being is not subject to the empire of language, but only to the empire of acts. Our humanism neglected acts. Therefore it failed in its attempt. The essential act possesses a name. Its name is sacrifice. Sacrifice signals neither amputation nor repentance. It is in essence an act. It is the gift of oneself to the being of which one forms a part. Only he can understand what a farm is, what a country is, who shall have sacrificed part of himself to his farm or country, fought to save it, struggled to make it beautiful. Only then will the love of farm or country fill his heart. A country— or a farm — is not the sum of its parts. It is the sum of its gifts. (Flight to Arras, London: Picador, 1987) p.249-50.

Although Saint-Exupery is talking of a variety of motivations; love of farm, country and so on, the motivation which interests him most is, as I have intimated, love of our fellow men. 'Alright,' I can hear you say, 'enough of this. I can grant some of us — maybe even most of us — have such motivations. We are not always counting the cost. But you have not fulfilled your brief; you have told us nothing about what is so good about such motivations. So far all you have said is that we are occasionally disposed to sacrifice ourselves. You have said nothing about. why we ought to sacrifice ourselves'.

But now we encounter a problem we have encountered before. Of course I cannot show

Ethical Record, October, 1994 9 that you yourself have a good reason to sacrifice yourself. If there is something in it for you, something in it sufficient to make t he act conform to the dictates of practical reason, t he act will not be a sacrifice. If the reason you want is one which will explain how you come to gain by the action, the action will not be a sacrifice because, by definition, a sacrifice is an act by • which you stand to lose.

'Alright', you say (your temper fraying slightly), 'all this shows is that we have a word for acts which we have no reason to do. Therefore any motivation we have to perform such acts is one which, rationally, we ought not to have'. The point, although forceful, is a little unfair. For, as I have pointed out, there is no ultimate standard in terms of which dispositions to behaviour can be rationalised. It is unfair to criticise me for not justifying the motivation to sacrifice ourselves if there is no agreed measure by which such things are justified.

Despite this, in order for anything• I have said to count as a reason to be moral, this challenge must be met. And it can be met if we grant to Saint-Exupery two assumptions. I think we should grant them, because they are true. They could be argued for, although I am not going to do so here. The two assumptions are as follows. First, we have a notion of value which is, we might say, value per se. Not everything we find of value is of valueper se. It is of value for me to complete my James Bond collection, but I certainly do not think it is of value per se. I have hopes that the reverse of this is true; that everything that is of value per se is something I find of value. The second assumption is that, with the benefit of hindsight, we can discriminate those things which are of value from those which are not. We do not have to be infallible about this, and fact of self-delusion suggests we will not be. There are many reasons why we might find things of value when in fact they are not.

Selfless Acts of Comiadeship Saint Exupery's claim is that acts of sacrifice, or, less dramatically, selfless acts of comradeship, are the most valuable events life has to offer. There is a curious echo of this in a much-ridiculed passage from Prinopia Ethica, a book written at the beginning of this century by that most English of philosophers, G.E. Moore. There Moore announces after 188 pages of preparation 'By far the most valuable things, which we can know`or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects'. (Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902) p.188. Why should we accept this? What can be said in favour of the view that what is of value in a life are selfless acts of cqmradeship?

I have already argued that a rational argument cannot be given here, because there is nothing in terms of which we could justify morality which would have universal rational appeal. The alternative is for Saint-Exupéry to show that he is right. Such a thought is not original to Saint-Exupéry. Previous moralists who realised that narrative illustration was the way to convey one's message include such diverse characters as Socrates, Jesus and Nietzsche. Indeed, if one reflects that what needs to be shown is that companionship is valuable, not only Saint-Exupéry but a great deal of other literature could be pillaged for examples. Perhaps it is part of what it is that makes a work of literature great that the examples it provides are rationally convincing — a point best left for another time.

First, a couple of quotations to show that this is, in fact, what Saint-Exupé ry was doing. In a leiter he wrote in 1944 he says:

I wrote Wind, Sand and Stars in order to tell men passionately that they were all inhabitants of the same planet, passengers on the same ship. (Wartime Writings, London: Picador, 1982) p.205.

10 Ethical Record, October. 1994 Of more significance is a reply to a friend in publishing who had written to ask him to hurry up with a manuscript. Part of the significance of this quotation is the confidence Saint-Exupery displays as to the compelling force of his reflections.

Do you think I like having to substitute a piece of nonsense for what I wanted to say about responsibility, just because of lack of time? If I had found the right words, nothing would have shocked you. You would have found yourself faced with such simple facts that it would have seemed to you that you had discovered them yourself; you would have been my prisoner for the rest of your life without

knowing it — yes. I really believe for the rest of your life. (Wartime Writings, London: Picador, 1982) p.87.

Time is needed to elaborate a point of view which will make the reader a prisoner for the rest of his life.

Stories and Snippets Convince So what are these stories?They are, in the main, autobiographical snippets. Some, like the story of the anarchist's smile, are too lengthy to relate here. They arc not arguments, yet they are convincing on a reflective level. They vary from an almost direct statement of belief...

No man can draw free breath who does not share with other men a common and disinterested ideal. Life has taught us that love does not consist in gazing at each other but in looking outward together in the same direction. There is no comradeship except through union in the same high effort. Even in our age of material well-being this must be so, else how should we explain the happiness we feel in sharing our last crust with others in the desert? No sociologist's textbook can prevail against this fact. Every pilot who has flown to the rescue of a comrade in distress knows that all joys are vain in comparison with this one. (Wind, Sand and Stars, London: Picador, 1987) p.141.

...to the relation, of specific events. Here, Saint-Exupery has just returned from an exceptionally dangerous flying mission in 1941.

I walked slowly, not caring where I went. I had promised myself this conversation with my village; but now I found that I had nothing to say. I was like that heavily laden bough that had flashed into my mind when the sense of victory swelled within me. I strolled and lingered, filled with the thought of the ties that bound me to my people. I was one with them, they were one with mc. That farmer handing round the bread had made no gift to us at table: he had shared with us and exchanged with us that bread in which all of us had our part. And by sharing the farmer had not been impoverished but enriched. He had eaten sweeter bread, bread of the community, by that sharing. (Wartime Writings, London: Picador, 1982) p.238.

In other places, the appeal is more direct. The following is part of an address to young American servicemen, about to go and get shot at in a European war.

For eight years I lived the life of an airline pilot. I had a salary. Every month I could buy some goods I wanted with the money I earned. But if my life as an airline pilot had brought me no other advantage besides these material ones, why

Etlfical Record, October, 1994 II should I have loved it so much? It gave me much more. But I must admit that it only truly enriched me when I gave more than I received. The nights that enriched me were not these in which I spent my earned salary, but those in Buenos Aires, at the time when the postal air routes were first started, when I had fallen asleep exhausted after flying for thirty hours without sleep and a sudden phone call, due to a far-off accident, would get me out of bed: 'You must go to the airfield... You must fly to the Straits of Magellan...' And I got out of bed grumbling. I filled up on coffee to keep from falling asleep while flying. Then, after an hour's drive along rough, bumpy dirt roads, I shook hands without saying a word, still half asleep, crotchety, stiff from the rheumatic pains that winter weather brings on after two sleepless nights... I got the engine started. I read the weather forecast as a set chore: storms, frost, sleet... and I flew off into the night toward a doubtful dawn. • But when I weigh the feelings left in my heart by the events of my life, I find that only the memory of these tasks counts. Their shining path surprises me and I remember that feeling of being comrades-in-arms in the hours of the night. I discover with surprise that the hands I shook while grumbling have left me with a memory of deep affection. The search for lost comrades, the forced landings for repairs in rebel territory, the utter exhaustion, that aspect of action that cannot be reckoned in terms of payment — now I discover that this was what stirred me, though at the time I was unaware of its power. But the memory of the nights spent squandering my salary is nothing but ashes. (Wartime Writings, London: Picador, 1982) p.77-8.

It is in the nature of the case that snippets will not do; the corpus of Saint-Exupery's work is a sustained attempt to convince the reader 'of the meaning and purpose of humanity'.

Non-Rationalisable Human Dispositions The final point I would like to make runs counter to the optimistic thread of this talk. The basics of the view of ethics I have been discussing rests value ultimately in non- rationalisable human dispositions. Dispositions are transmitted from generation to generation, a transmission that is only possible if some minimal cultural conditions apply. Such a view supports the claim (recently expressed by a philosopher in this tradition) that 'nothing in our communal life is more important than the moral education of our children'. Towards the end of his life (he died on active service in 1944) Saint-Exupéry grew increasingly depressed about the future. He was of the opinion that some worthwhile dispositions were (literally) dying out, and that human life was becoming progressively more impoverished. It is difficult to preach that our age is a particularly appalling one compared to others, when one is conscious of the fact that the same sentiment has been expressed in almost all ages by intelligent people. This does not, of course, show that our claim would be wrong and, for what it is worth, I think Saint- Exupery's predictions of catastrophe have, largely, been borne out. He wrote the following to a friend at the height of the war, in 1943:

I can't bear to feed generations of French children to the German Moloch. Our very substance is threatened. When it has been saved, then the fundamental problem of our time will have to be considered — the meaning and purpose of humanity. No answer is forthcoming and I have the feeling of moving toward the blackest times in the history of the world. (Wartime Writings, London: Picador, 1982) p.137 D

12 Ethical Record, October, 1994 THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LIUMANIM

Jim Herrick Editor New Humantst and International Humanist News Keynote speech at the Ethical Society's Annual Reunion, 25 September 1994

• My country is the world and my religion is to do good. — Thomas Paine My allegiance is to man — Locally to the Nigerian; universally to humanity. — Tai Solarin

The quotation from Paine is very well-known. It is unarguable and perhaps to put it into action — for all

people consider themselves global citizens or every non- INERNAIIONAL religious person to aim to do good — is too much. Yet it expresses an inescapable ideal for humanists and something HUMANIST I hope we are working towards. Humanism is a tool with which we give meaning to our personal life and with which NEWS we try to create global patterns of behaviour which enhance all human life.

Historically we have moved from identification with the region we live in to considering ourselves members of a nation state; the next step, and one that is only beginning, is to move to being global citizens. We know we are full world citizens when we helplessly see on television the massacres in Rwanda and the murders in Haiti, the 'ethnic cleansing' in old Yugoslavia and the murder of Kurds in Southern Turkey. How can we possibly solve such problems, when even a railway strike in one country seems totally insoluble? International humanism does not feel helpless in the face of world problems; we feel by linking ideas, efforts and mutual support of groups in all parts of the world that a rational attempt can be made — if not to solve all problems — at least to ameliorate some of them.

Historical Tradition International cooperation in secularist causes goes as far back as Bradlaugh's contact with Mazzini — one of the leaders of the struggle for Italian unification. Bradlaugh took a keen role in the foundation of the organisation the World Union of Freethinkers (which still exists). It began as a federation of international freethought groups and was set up in 1880. In the 1930s it fought the restriction of freethought organisations being attempted by dictatorships.

The freethought organisations of Europe were much weakened by the 2nd World War. When Harold Blackham tried to revive the World Union of Freethinkers he found it hopelessly divided. He therefore joined with Jan van Prag of the Dutch humanists to create the International Humanist and Ethical Union in 1952. Although he fought hard, for the sake of clarity, to keep the word 'ethical' out of the title, the Americans, who have a large ethical movement, insisted on keeping it i n . The difference between WUF and IHEU is that WUF has members mainly from Catholic countries and is very anti-clerical with strong socialist leanings, while IHEU is mainly from Protestant countries and has a strong ethical component. The initiative for the foundation of IHEU came from the Ethical Union in Britain and the Dutch Humanist League. The other founder members were the American Ethical Union, the Freireligiose Gemeinden Deutschland, the HumaniStche Verbund van Nederland en Belgie, and the Indian Radical Humanist Movement. Sir Julian Huxley presided at the first conference in Amsterdam.

Ethical Record, October, 1994 13 There has been — unsurprisingly — much discussion of what the members of IFIEU mean by 'humanism'. In recent years members have arrived at a broad statement with which all should concur: 'Humanism is a democratic, non-theistic and ethical life stance which affirms that human beings have the right and the responsibility to give meaning and shape to their own lives. It rejects supernatural views of reality'. It might be worth adding that the membership organisations of IHEU have increased from 60 to over 90 since 1988.

Norway and the Netherlands Among the largest and most successful of humanist organisations are those in Norway and in the Netherlands. The importance of these is that they can demonstrate to us what activities can be successful and they can inspire us to develop similar influence.

Norway has the largest humanist movement in the world in its ratio of members to the size of the population, i.e. over 50,000 members and a growth rate of between 2,500 and 3,000 per year. What is the reason for this phenomenal success? Above all they point to the coming of age ceremony — comparable to a religious confirmation — which is a very important cultural event for Norwegians. Not everyone likes ceremonies, but ceremonies are certainly a growth area in the BILA — if not quite on the Norwegian scale. Among other reasons for Norwegian success is the lingering power of Lutheran religion, which some people are eager to resist.

There are similarities in the Netherlands which has one of the other large humanist organisations in Europe, though there is not quite the same pressure for humanist ceremonies. The principal reason for its success is the church tax system. In Holland every citizen has to pay a tax as a contribution to their church; there is no right to be exempt from the tax, but a non-believer may designate his or her contribution to the Dutch Humanist League — which means that it is well-funded. Humanists are also given the same rights as Christians in other areas — as the Christians have a weekly mcdia slot, so the humanists are allowed one too; the Chistians have the right to introduce religious education to school children — so the humanists are given the right to introduce humanist education as an alternative. There are religious padres and chaplains in the prisons, so humanists can offer the same, and there is humanist counselling in hospitals in parallel to hospital chaplains.

Another feature in Holland is the University for Humanist Studies. A description of the University is given in their leaflet:

Dialogue and discourse are the essence of humanism. This also characterises the University for Humanist Studies where science is practised w' th openness and room for diversity.

Eastern Europe Among the problems which world humanism has to face today, at a period after the collapse of communism, is that atheism is identified with that political creed. It is necessary, therefore, to develop a humanism which is morithan atheism, which proposes a positive ethical identity, and emphasises the values of tolerance and democracy. The Catholic Church, with a Polish Pope, has rapidly moved in to re-establish its power and influence — not only in Poland. The Association for Humanism and Independent Ethics in Poland has the aim of creating a secular state, defending freedom of speech and thought, and popularising ethics independent of religion. With a feared likely Concordat between the Polish state and the Vatican, there would be complete removal of the right to obtain an abortion, and divorce would probably be made much more difficult.

14 Ethical Record, October, 1994 In Romania there is a Humanist Movement of Romania which is trying to act as a political party, with the aim of creating a humanist society based on justice and the law, economic and political democracy, an education system without indoctrination, and the cultivation of humanist ethics.

Fundamentalism Humanists all over the world fight for a secular state and human-bound ethics. This includes the fight against Christian and Islamic fundamentalism. Essentially the fight against Christian fundamentalism is in the USA, while against fundamentalist Islam it is in Asia and North Africa — but with outposts in Europe.

U.S.A. It is one of the essential tasks of American humanism to take on the Christian fundamentalist right. In the USA are two large organisations (although not that numerically vast in ratio to the size of the population): namely the American Humanist Association and the Council for Demoeratic and Secular Humanism. They have the problem that secular humanism is charged with being responsible for the rise of crime, satanic child abuse, the breakup of families — not to mention earthquakes and tornadoes! The Right is against evolution teaching and also trying surreptitiously to reintroduce religion into American schools.

Clinton is sympathetic to many humanist ideas, but he daren't make this obvious, and indeed he even had to backtrack on his promise to remove discrimination against homosexuals in the armed forces. But there is a powerful alliance between the political right and the evangelical right, aiming to oust Clinton in two years time.

Islamic Fundamentalism The power of the spread of Islam is daily news. There is the attack on Taslima Nasreen in Bangladesh for her novel depicting Muslim attacks on Hindus and for a statement in which she seemed to criticise the Koran. Islamic fury has caused riots, with death threats and now her flight to Sweden. There are shades of Salman Rushdie here — though I suspect that Rushdie is the greater writer. Taslima Nasreen has shown great courage —and is clearly a great supporter of women's rights in Muslim countries.

In North Africa we observe Algeria and Egypt, where Islamic fundamentalist groups are fighting (with guns and bombs) to gain control. In India the intercommual struggle has intensified in the last decade — especially the conflict between Hindus and Muslims. This is seen in the struggle over the mosque at Ayodhya which is allegedly on the site of the birth of a Hindu god. Everyone knows that the syncretism of Indian religion means that there are many joint sites in Indian history, but this has not enabled a solution to be found at Ayodhya.

India India has the strongest humanist movement in the third world. There are small struggling groups in Africa but almost no humanist groups in China or the Far East (despite long non-theistic Confucian and Buddhist traditions). India has a secular constitution — partly a result of the British colonial period — and it has so far not been altered.

The Indian Secular Societ y, which has been in existence for 26 years, is dedicated to the defence of a secular India, saying that it believes that the most serious threat to the development of India as a secular democratic state guaranteeing individual freedom and social justice to its citizens; comes from religious obscurantism.

Ethical Record, October, 1994 15 The Atheist centre in South India is run as a cooperative by the family of its founder Gora. Some of you may have heard his son, Lavanam, who has often visited England. The centre combines counter-religious propaganda with social work. It gains money from Save the Children Fund and its social work is impressive.

One further point about Islamic fundamentalism — which certainly has relevance to this country as well as world-wide: it is very important not to confuse criticism of religion with prejudice against an ethic group. It is therefore always important to make clear that humanists are equally critical of Christianity and Islam and that they defend the civil rights of minorities — as Muslims are in Britain.

Some of the general areas I have mentioned in this summary of humanist action are: the need to think out strategies for dealing with fundamentalism; the need to develop an ethical content as well as counter-religious one; the extent to which humanist organisations in Europe can be highly successful with the right people and right circumstances.

I would stress four more points about humanism world wide: I. We must work with other organisations where appropriate, and especially with human rights organisations. We should try to be in the lead in the opposing of torture, in abolition of capital punishment, in women's rights and in gay rights,

2 We must defend democracy, free speech and scientific inquiry. The humanist mind is an inquiring mind. The freedom for pure scientific research is as important as the need for scientific research to reduce the practical problems of the world.

3 Support for the United Nations is paramount. The ideal of a world government is far away — and the UN has if anything lost power in the last decade. But the IHEU thinks representation at the UN is very important and has representatives in Geneva and New York, and also on the NGOs of UNICEF and WHO. Eventually we must eliminate warfare by international control — but our power to do this is very limited.

4 Secularism is a key word for international humanists. I have referred to the situation in India. Britain needs a similar separation of church and state. A recent attempt was made in Germany to introduce the word God into the constitution — not successful so far. Secularism is not easy in the face of religion which says that God is all pervading and must be allowed to operate in all spheres of society:

Two major world issues which would need separate consideration are the threat to the environment and the economic divide between the South and the North. Although international organisations are working on this, it is up to humanists as individuals and in organisations to play their part in these key areas.

To conclude I want to read the basic principles of humanism by which all world humanist organisations are guided: It is dramatically clear today that our earth is made up of interdependent nation-states and that whatever happens on one part of the planet affects all the rest. Whenever human rights are violated, all of humanity suffers. The basic premise of this global ethic is that each of us has a responsibility to the world community at large. (A Declarationb of Interdependence: A New Global Ethic) 0

SOUTH PLACE SUNDAY CONCERTS Conway Hall, Red Lion Square, Holborn WC1 6.30 pm £3.00 16 Ethical Record, October, 1994 CAN FEMINISTS BE CHRISTIANS? CAN A MALE SAVIOUR SAVE WOMEN?

Kathie Walsh Research Officer with INFORM Lecture to the Ethical Society. 12 June 1994 Feminism There is a mounting feminist critique within all major religions, but this paper concentrates on some of the issues being addressed by Christian feminists. Within this context the word 'feminist' is used to refer to persons and activities directed towards challenging the systematic subordination of women and girls. This subordination has taken place within an overall system, commonly referred to as 'patriarchy', wherein all relationships are constructed in terms of domination and subordination. Some women have enjoyed more power than many men within patriarchy, but at whatever social level they find themselves, women have always exercised less overt power than the men with whom they share their lives. This subordination has been maintained through the system of law, education, politics, industry, commerce, advertising, sport, arts — and religions.

The subordination of women can be seen to have been maintained and reproduced by powerful men, whether deliberately or not, by four inter-related means. First, language has been used by men to stereotype, to define, to limit, and to silence women and girls. Women themselves have been robbed of the power of naming. Second, women have been largely excluded until recently from education and from academic areas wherein the construction of publicly legitimated knowledge takes place. The male has been seen as the norm of humanity and, by extension, the female has been seen as abnormal or deficient. Third, women have been excluded from the activity of defining and setting boundaries, particularly the boundaries between public and private, and sacred and profane space. Male friendly environments have been established which have militated against the flourishing and fulfilment of those women who have ventured to transgress the boundaries. Fourth, women's material, emotional and intellectual dependence on men has been built into the structures of western society. All this has undermined women's self-esteem and, many would argue, adversely affected the personal development of women. It has given a false sense of superiority and completeness, thereby distorting and limiting men's development too.

Christian Feminism There are three main reasons why the initial question, 'Can a feminist be a christian?' arises, and why it matters: First, and despite the efforts of secular humanists and others, people continue to be and to become 'religious'. Second, christians become feminists and remain christian, and Third, feminists become christians and remain feminists. There is a further challenege because, ironically, conservative christians and polemical feminist separatists line up together to deny that a person can be both a feminist and a christian.

Christian feminists look for inspiration and support for their position to feminist theologians. Feminist theology takes many forms but initially it was "... a reaction and a protest provoked by a theology that for many centuries took for granted that reality (including religious or spiritual experience) had its centre in the male of the species. It was based on scriptures which were written in terms of a patriarchal mentality and flourished

Ethical Record, October, 1994 17 in a male-dominated culture and a hierarchically structured Church" (Halkes in CowlMon 34. 1980:110). My parenthesis.

Both that exclusion from leadership and shaping roles in Christianity, and the silence surrounding the contributions they have made in these areas, have not only caused a distortion in our understanding and interpretation of ourselves and 'God', but have contributed greatly to systematically sustaining and promoting injusticcs against women throughout Western society. From reaction and protest, then, feminist theology has moved into construction. As in other areas of feminist scholarship, feminist theology is much more interdisciplinary than patriarchal theology, but it is useful to identify some of the work being done by using traditional sub-disciplines within theology.

Feminist Biblical Scholarship Feminist biblical scholars are looking again at the original texts and at the traditions of translations and interpretations of these texts. They are asking why particular texts were included in the original canons of scripture and how they have functioned, in terms of, say, sanctioning or limited authority, for both women and men within faith communities. Whilst conceding that almost without exception the Christian scriptures are the constructions of males within patriarchy, feminist scripture scholars are coming up with alternative ways of interpreting and translating texts which enable them to function more positively in women's lives today. They are also reading the silences within the texts, seeing afresh the women who hitherto have appeared as shadowy adjuncts to the male heroes, and 're-membering' those who are not mentioned but must have been there. Often what is said and unsaid reveals women both acting as agents of initiative and change and surviving against the odds.

A feminist reading of the 'fall' stories for instance, shows Eve not as weak and gullible but as envisioning something better (i.e. having knowledge, upon which to base her own life decisions rather than living in blissful, ignorant obedience) and taking the risk to realise this. It also reveals Adam childishly standing by and whining, "it wasn't my fault, she made me do it". A little later wc see Lot held up as an example of courteous hospitality for offering his virgin daughters as rape victims rather than two visiting male messengers (Genesis 19). And in the story of Ruth and Naomi we see women bearing their own burdens, knowing "hardship, danger, insecurity and death. No God promises them blessing; no man rushes to their rescue. They themselves risk bold decisions and shocking acts to work out their own salvation in the midst of the alien, the hostile, and the unknown". (Trible, P. God & the Rhetoric of Sexuality. Fortress, 1978).

Christian women today derive some strength from the observed egalitarian impulses of the early church. For instance the realisation that, as leaders of the early house churches in such places as Corinth, Rome and Philippi, women would have been the first recipients of the epistles of Paul, and active in promoting his message. And while it is possible to trace, through the commonly regarded post-Pauline epistles of Timothy and Titus, the path of the gradual erosion of women's power and leadership roles as Christianity sought to accomodate to the prevailing patriarchal culture, the matter does not end there. Both within the canonical and non-canonical gospels we see Mary Magdalene appearing as a real contender with Peter for leadership in the earliest Jesus movement. And some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that the positive way in which women appear in the Gospel of John indicates that women may have been key figures in the school that produced this text.

18 Ethical Record, October, 1994 Christian Feminist History Just as biblical scholars are recovering and reclaiming the women of the bible accounts, so feminist church historians are bringing to light the characters and activities of women from all periods of the christian past. What emerges is that within the constraints put upon them women have made enormous contributions at nearly all stages of Christian history. Christian women from the earliest times have contributed to, and sometimes been pioneers in music, art (including much of the illumination of manuscripts), liturgy (including the design and making of liturgical vestments, altar cloths, hangings), medicine, literature, education, missionary work, the medieval guilds, monastic and religious life. Nor have women been unaware of the prejudices under which they have laboured. Covertly and overtly we find words of protest about their condition, often in direct response to overt misogynism, from women throughout Christian history. And behind almost every famous Christian male there have often been not one but several very able women. Christian feminists feel angry that this part of the christian story never seems to have been considered worthwhile telling. They feel robbed of a powerful part of their heritage. Restoring the women to their rightful place in the Christian story enables women today to envisage possibilities for their own lives formerly denied to them.

Feminist Prayer and Liturgy Because of its more public dimensions the issues of language and liturgy perhaps arouse the strongest feelings among feminists and their opponents. For those who see language as something which forms us as well as being formed by us, gender symbolism of metaphors such as 'God' is of central significance. Many claim that patriarchy rests on the ubiquitous designation of God as 'He', and that until this changes, patriarchy will remain. New prayers have been written that avoid all ascription of gender to the 'Godhead', others which refer alternatively to God as he and she, and others which maintain the male forms for the Father and Son but refer always to the Holy Spirit as 'she'. In the expressed worries of some traditionalists, what often emerges is just how literally many people take Christian metaphors: "If you say God is mother, then that would mean that Jesus has two mothers and no father".

The arguments surounding the ordination of women are so familiar they hardly need rehearsing here. But worries about overturned or unusable metaphors figure largely (as in the 'Christ as bridgegroom, Church as bride' symbolism), and so does the prospect of having to redraw boundaries between sacred and profane space and contact. What emerges constantly in the debate is how dualistic christian constructions are. The debate between the feminists who leave and those who stay, and between the christian feminists and their opponents in the Churches is whether these dualistic, patriarchal constructions can be changed and christianity can remain, or whether to change these constructions would leave one with nothing that is any longer recognisable as christianity.

Feminist Christian Anthropology 'Christian Anthropology' is the area of study which addresses questions of the nature of the person, or what it means to be human. A number of Christian feminists are engaged in the debate about how women and men are the same or similar, about how they are different, and about the significance that is to be given to the sameness, but more usually to the differences. This is a central concern for those addressing ethical and political issues. The question of who is qualified to make what sort of decisions, and on what this qualification rests, comes up in relation to church law and teaching on doctrine and morals, on church order, and in terms of church-state relations.

Ethical Record, October, 1994 19 The christian feminist view, broadly, is that there are significant differences between women and men, just as there are between women and women and between men and men, across history, race, class and cultures. They argue that women and men as we know ourselves in the western world are products of a patriarchal way of relating, and that we could all learn and change for the better, within certain limits, if we organised ourselves in ways more conducive to everyone's flourishing and fulfillment. What they cannot accept, however, is that there is something innate in menqua men, and in womenqua women that makes the former suited to controlling the mega-systems and institutions of human society, and the latter unsuited. Many would agree that the significant thing about human beings is that we are self-interpreting language beings, whose self-interpretaions both make us and arise out of who we are, and thus, are unique contributions to reality. It becomes encumbent upon us then to create the sorts of conditions wherein all people can make realistic assessments of who we are and what we might become as human beings. Sexual difference is clearly a limitation as well as a possibility, but the extent to which it is more the former is, it would be argued, up to society to decide. The limitations hitherto placed on women's spheres of activities and influence have been to the detriment not only of women themselves but of society as a whole. Feminist Christian Doctrine Arguably, the greatest challenge to Christian feminists is that the pivotal figure of their religion is undeniably male, and this takes us back to our starting question: Can a male saviour save women? Many have immediately concluded that the answer must be no, and have made a deliberate decision to leave Christianity behind. Acknowledging their debt to the christian tradition for much of their spiritual development, whilst proclaiming its inability to promote the full human development of women, these women often refer to themselves as post-Christian feminists.

Those who remain within Christianity take one of five main approaches in an attempt to transform the central metaphors of incarnation and salvation to make them work more effectively in women's lives. Some look back to medieval times in the effort to reclaimn some of the female imagery used for Christ's humanity. Christ becomes Christa, the mother, nourishing the faithful with her body. Another approach is to see Christ as the incarnation of female divinity, of Sophia, Holy Wisdom. Whilst these approaches throw up some bold female images for the Christ figure, these, and almost all other representations of the 'feminine' or immanent aspects of God are the undersides of a dualism that continues to image the transcendant aspects of God as male.

A third appioach looks back to the Jesus of history not as a stereotype of the new humanity, but as a prototype. Jesus is seen as the original 'women identified man', and the earliest Jesus movement as a discipleship of equals. A further approach also begins with the Jesus of history, but sees him this time as the iconoclastic prophet who speaks on behalf of the marginalised and oppressed. In the crucifixion ofJesus we see the kenosis, or self-emptying, of patriarchy, not its promotion. A final approach locates christology not in one person but in the community. In this Way the Incarnation of God is not a one-off event effected in one person two thousand years ago but it is seen as an ongoing task that takes place within the community of believers. Salvation too is seen more in terms of community and process. Feminist theologians draw attention to the fact that symbols do not function uniformly in the lives of people in very different historical, cultural and material circumstances. 20 Ethical Record, October, 1994 Behind their work is the belief tha t it is both desirable and possible to put all the symbols of christianity at the service of the promotion of the full personhood of women as well as men. Christian feminist theologians are not claiming to have any special knowledge deriving in a reductionist way from female biology or even psychology. Often what they are doing, in fact, is building on work being done by male theologians, and, conversly, sympathetic male theologians are taking up and developing themes of feminist theology. If symbols are seen for what they are and not idolised, Christianity can, they argue, bring a necessary comfort, but also a necessary challenge, to transcend current limitations and help promote the flourishing and fulfilment of both women and men.

Further Reading Reuther, R and McCloughlin, E Women of Spirit. Female Leadership in the Jewish and Christian Traditions. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979 Radford-Reuther, R Sexism and God Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology. SCM, 1983.

VIEWPOINTS

Logical Analysis or Wishful Thinking?

I was very disappointed with Geoffrey Read's outline of his concepts (The True Nature of the Temporal Process, Ethical Record, September 1994). In common with many philosophers he discusses vague ideas based on what appear to be essentially personal assumptions. His drawings also suggest a lack of knowledge of reality. Even the simplest animals make choices whilst mammals and birds may make very complex decisions about their future behaviour. He dismisses centuries of science as valueless and apparently is unaware that — for any new theory or hypothesis — scientific method requires a firm base of supporting evidence — rather than mere opinion. Proposals should never overlook any contradictory evidence — it is far too easy to ignore facts that suggest doubt. In addition, any good hypothesis should be able to predict the results of experiments as yet untried and also suggest where further evidence might be dicovered. As presented his story fails in all these respects. He offers no evidence of any kind in support of his hypothesis. Geoffrey Read also confuses practice and theory. Our present science and technology — however incomplete or misused — provides a wide base for practical living. In what way does his dismissive hypothesis explain any aspect of the world about us? It is easy to produce wild theories but unless they interact logically with practical experience they are unlikely to have any great effects on human survival.

He describes mathematics as 'a ghostly fabric' yet in every field of knowledge and human activity a point is reached where mathematics provides a tool to increase understanding. A mathematical analysis often discloses patterns not previously obvious and can provide guidelines that distinguish significant differences from errors in experimental measurements. Mathematics can also analyse the limits of measurement and prediction and specify which problems are in principle soluble and which not. Even the simplest arithmetic may lead to major progress. Gregor Mendel counted progeny types and made the simple discovery that they segregated in a 3:1 ratio. No one through several previous millenia had observed this basic fact, which led to today's science of genetics. Overall Geoffrey Read's picture appears to be wishful thinking rather than based on logical analysis of evidence. Roy Silson — Tring, Hens.

Ethical Record, October, 1994 21 There are so many falsehoods and non sequiturs, together with absurdities, in the article by Geoffrey Read in the Ethical Record of September 1994 that a reply would not merit the time spent on writing it. To a non-scientist it may possibly seem to be clever, but all I can say is that to define something does not make it a reality. (Prof) Richard Scorer — London SW20

I have spent much time with Geoffrey Read's The True Nature of the Temporal Procgss. On a final re-read, I deleted some 90 words per page of superlatives to discover the underlying content. It emerges that Read fails to understand the nature of natural philosophy in that: He nowhere refers to axioms or axiomatic philosophy. He fails to distinguish between perception and conception. Science, by definition, confines itself to reproducible, communicable experience. The body of knowledge which proves irreproducible is labelled paranormal. Since all communication is predicated by mental processing, then the laws of science are necessarily confined to mentally processed. reproducible experience. He criticizes what he does not understand — that mathematics never changes the (axiomatic) physics which it takes as input, and that theory advances by eliminating empirical constants, enhancing the simplicity which appeals to scientists. Since space, atomism and Newtonian mechanics are all axiomatic, the failure of science to explain them is a tautology. The set of assumptions which Read would put in their place awards every particle (he does not distinguish perceived from conceived) with a clock and free will, and consigns us to Flatland. Actually, I have a model for the origin of lift which goes a long way towards accommodating body, mind and spirit without challenging classical physics. By discovering clocks in living cells, it also accounts for most occult phenomena. By postulating that quarks are planes rather than points, it further explains super- conductivity and related phenomena. I have learned through experience that any new theory of everything need include all the phenomena explained by its predecessor. Read's proposals would seem to eliminate all human understanding of the natural world. His quotation from The Tower seems appropriate if only dead men dream! Michael T. Deans — London W4

SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY'S ANNUAL REUNION, 1994 General Committee Chairman Barbara Smoker introduced the speakers at the successful reunion held on Sunday 25 September in Conway Hall's library. Greetings from all the kindred societies were given by: British Humanist Association John Leeson (read by Don Liversedge); Central London Humanists William Hill; Gay & Lesbian Humanist Association Terry Mullins; Humanist Holidays Gillian Bailey; Humanist Housing Association Peter Heales; National Secular Society David Williams; Progressive League Dorothy Forsyth; Rationalist Press Association Nicolas Walter. Tim Sullivan (Atheist Community Centre, Oregon. USA) and Ray Dahlitz (Australian Secularists) also spoke, contributing to the international flavour of the event, in tune with the keynote address given by Jim Herrick (see p.I3) on The Importance of International Humanism. Chris Findlay entertained us with his piano music from Round the World Terry Mullins and Alice Marshall prepared and served the refreshments. N.B.

WHO WROTE THE NEW TESTAMENT, AND WHY Readers may be interested to note that SPES member Peter L. Griffith has just had the above title published by Minerva Press (ISBN 185 863 1742) at .C7.99.

22 Ethical Record, October, 1994 ETHICAL SOCIETY EVENING CLASSES SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRITIQUE OF RELIGION Tutor: J.H.S. Green

The talks aim to survey the attitudes to religion of selected scientists and philosophers, both believers and unbelievers, and to consider some of the arguments and evidence involved in their debates. The series attempts a critique of religion from the standpoint of philosophy of science, taken essentially chronologically.

Tuesdays at 6.30pm. The Library, Conway Hall, 25 Red Lion Square, Holborn, WC I. Fee I per lecture (includes tea) on October 4, I I, 18, 25, and November 1.

THE BIBLE: AN INTRODUCTION FOR UNBELIEVERS Tutor: Daniel O'Hara

8 November '94 What is the Bible and how did it come to us? 15 November '94 The Rise of the Critical study of the Bible. 22 November '94 The Old Testament: Law, Prophets and Writings. 29 November '94 The New Testament: Context, Text and Canon. 6 December '94 The Gospels: Do they give us reliable information about Jesus? 13 December '94 Biblical fundamentalism and how to counter it. A useful brief introduction to this course is 'What is the Bible' by Carl Loftmark, (RPA 1991) £4.50. available from the RPA, 47 Theobald's Road, London WC1X 8SP.

LONDON STUDENT SKEPTICS Held in Room 3D, University of London Union Building, Malet Street, London WC I at 7.30 pm.

Monday 17th October Dr Harold Hillman, University of Surrey, Honesty in biological and medical research? Monday 31st October Dr Brian Kaplan, Harley Street, The case for holistic/natural medicine Monday 14th November Dr Richard Wiseman, University of Hertfordshire, Parapsychology — a skeptical perspective

The freshers' fair will be held at ULU on October 10, I I and 12, so this will be the time to renew membership. Membership is £2 per year, and membership cards are required for entry to ULU. SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY Registered Charity No. 251396 Founded in 1793, the Society is a progressive movement whose aims are the study aml dissemination of ethical principles based on humanism, the cultivation of a rational and humane way of life, and the advancement of research and educabon in all relevant fields. We inviteto membership all those who reject supernatural creeds and find themselves in sympathy with our views. At Conway Hall thereare opportunities for participatiOn in many kinds of cultural activities, including discussions, lectures, concerts and socials. The Sunday Evening Chamber Music Concerts founded in 1887 have achieved international renown. A reference and lending library is available, and all members receive the Society's journal, The Ethical Record eleven times a year. Funerals and Memorial Meetings are available to members. Membership is £10 p.a. Please apply to the Secretary for Membership Application forms. The views expressed in this journal are not necessarily those of the Society Ethical Record, October. 1994 23 PROGRAMME OF EVENTS AT THE ETHICAL SOCIETY The Library, Conway Hall Humanist Centre, 25 Red Lion Square, Holborn, WC1 Tel: 071-831 7723 OCTOBER 1994 Sunday 9 11.00 am DO THE BRITISH REALLY EXIST? Peter Beresford Ellis. 3.00 pm WHO KILLED HILDA MURRELL? Judith Cook, discusses her new book Unlawful Killing. Tuesday II 6.30 pm SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRITIQUE OF RELIGION Tutor Dr J.H.S. Green. Evening Class No.2 The course of 'natural theology' since the 17th Century. Fee per class (Inc. tea). Sunday 16 11.00 am ETHICAL THOUGHT AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. Professor Jonathan Dancy. The Society's stated objects include the study and dissemination of ethical principles. The speaker challenges the implied link between an ethical thought and ethical principle and suggests that the Society has a mistaken or even incoherent object. 3.00 pm 'BEYOND BELIEF' Video Seminar. Barbara Smoker Thursday 18 6.30 pm Evening Class No.3 Tutor Dr J.H.S. Green. The high peaks of the Victorian debates on religion and scientific popularisation. Sunday 23 11.00 am DAVID HUME: SECULAR MORALIST. David McNaughton. assesses the contemporary appeal of the self-consciously secular, anti-christian moral theory advocated by David Hume. 3.00 pm TIIE FUNDAMENTALS OF FUNDAMENTALISM. Nicolas Walter Tuesday 25 6.30 pm Evening Class No.9 Tutor Dr J.H.S. Green. The impact of twentieth century science and philosophy on religion. Sunday 30 11.00 am DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS AND THE DISCREDITING OF CHRISTIANITY. Daniel O'Hara 3.00 pm DIALECTICS AND MUSIC. Aubrey Bowman. NOVEMBER 1994 Tuesday I 6.30 pm Evening Class No.5 Tutor Dr J.H.S. Green. The contentions of.today's scientific apologists for Christianity. Sunday 6 11.00 am THE HUMAN ANIMAL AND DARWINIAN ETHICS. Barbara Smoker asks What are the moral implications of Darwinism? How special are humans? Is the word 'Humanism' too misleading. 3.00 pm HOW HUMANISM STARTED, David Ibry. Tuesday 8 6.30 pm THE BIBLE: AN INTRODUCTION FOR UNBELIEVERS. Tutor Daniel O'Hara. Evening Class No. I What is the Bible and how did it come to, us? Fee El (inc. tea) per class. See page 23 for syllabus. Sunday 13 11.00 am THE NEMESIS OF FAITH BY J.A. FROUDE. Elinor Shaffer discusses the influence on Anglicans such as J.A. Froude of George Eliot's translation of Strauss's Life of Jesus.

CENTRAL LONDON HUMANISTS and SPES

Thursday 27th October at 7.00 pm Film Evening: THE MISSION (starring Jeremy Irons and Robert De Niro.) tells about the colonisation of South America

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