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ISSN 0014-1690 The Ethical Record Vol. 99 No. 9 £1 October 1994 THE GOOD LIFE: LOVE SACRIFICE AND THE LITTLE PRINCE Derek Matravers 3 THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANISM Jim Herrick 13 CAN FEMINISTS BE CHRISTIANS? CAN A MALE SAVIOUR SAVE WOMEN? Kathie Walsh 17 VIEWPOINTS Roy Silson, Richard Scorer, Michael T. Deans 21 EVENING CLASSES 23 24 ODIUM THEOLOGICUM. FUTURE EVENTS First Street Preacher. tNTHE 'EATH WAS TER? HOW DID YOU GET Orr Second drtto "0, I WARMED UP an TYNDALL Altl"IALEY TO-RIGHTS, I Punch 12 June 1875 CAN MLL YERI EDITORIAL — THE HIGH POINT OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM In August 1874, during its meeting in Belfast, the British Association for the advancement of Science was treated to two magnificent speeches. John Tyndall, physicist and lecturer at the Royal Institution, London, delivered his 'Belfast Address', a superb resume of the history of science, maintaining that the scientific world-view did not require any miracles: "I ... discern in that Matter which we, in our ignorance, ... have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of every form and quality of life".' Thomas Henry Huxley, physiologist and 'Darwin's bulldog', spoke 'On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History', concluding that "the argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally good of men; and, therefore, that all states of consciousness in us, as in them, are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance".1 In that age of faith, where Providence was believed to be busily intervening in the continued on page 2 I. J. Tyndall, Fragments of Soence, 1889. 2. T.H. Huxley, Method and Results, toll. 1894. SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY Conway Hall Humanist Centre 25 Red Lion Square, London WC I R 4RL. Telephone: 071-831 7723 Appointed Lecturers Harold Blackham T.F. Evans, Peter Heales, Richard Scorer, Barbara Smoker, Harry Stopes-Roe, Nicolas Walter. Officers Honorary Representative: Nicolas Walter. General Committee Chairman: Barbara Smoker. Treasurer Don Liversedge. Editor, The Ethical Record: Norman Bacrac. Librarian: Edwina Palmer. Registrar: Marion Granville. Secretary to the Society: Nina Khare. Tel: 071-831 7723 (The Secretary's office is now on the 2nd Floor, Bradlaugh House, 47 Theobald's Road) Hall Staff Manager Stephen Norley. Tel: 071-2428032 for Hall bookings. Head Caretaker David Wright. GEORGE W. WALFORD George Walford died suddenly at home, aged 75, on 21 August 1994, leaving a wife and two daughters. He was born in London and was active in left-wing politics when young. He chose to avoid conscription during the Second World War. After the war he earned his living as an antiquarian bookseller until recently but his main interest was a theory of ideology on which he lectured to SPES. He gave what was to be his last lecture to the society last March, entitled What Religion does for Freethinking (ER, April 1994). He published his own journal, Ideological Commentary, and contributed to many others. At the time of his death he was starting work on his third book. Some of the people who knew him held a short meeting at Conway Hall in September to discuss the possibilities of continuing and/or creating an archive of his work. Adrian Williams Editorial continued from page I 'natural course of events, and consciousness was a non-material substance interacting with the brain, the brilliant exposition of these views caused reverb- erations in the religious establishment, evidenced by the preachers in the Punch cartoon. Tyndall commented in his 'Apology for the Belfast Address', written shortly afterwards, "From fair and manly argument, from the tenderest and holiest sympathy on the part of those who desire my eternal good. I pass by many gradations, through deliberate unfairness, to a spirit of bitterness, which desires with a fervour inexpressible in words my eternal ill". Huxley noted, "there are so very few interesting questions which one is, at present, allowed to think out scientifically — to go as far as reason leads, and stop where evidence comes to an end — without speedily being deafened by the tattoo of 'the drum ecclesiastic' ". He could hear "that drum's discordant sound Parading round and round and round" even as he spoke. These matters will be discussed further in our Tuesday Evening Class on Science, Philosophy and the Critque of Religion, tutored by Dr J.H.S. Green. (see p.23/24). 2 Ethical Record, October, 1994 THE GOOD LIFE: LOVE, SACRIFICE AND THE LITTLE PRINCE Derek Matravers Darwin College, Cambridge Lecture to the Ethical Society, 26 June 1994 I. Over the past decade or so, a number of philosophers working in ethics have converged on the opinion that novels rather than moral theory provide the best answer to questions of justification for living an ethical life. I am sympathetic to this view and, this morning, I intend to illustrate how, when we come to the limits of philosophy, we do not come to the limits of enquiry. The question I shall address is whether or not we should be moral. I mean this to be taken as a reflective, philosophical question, not as, for example, a biological, psychological or sociological question. That is, I am not interested in the question of how morality fits into the picture of man's evolution; neither am I interested in the question of what events in our psychological histories cause us to behave in a moral manner; and I am not interested in whether or not a society which is run on moral lines is more efficient (by some measure or other) than a society which is not. At least, I am not primarily interested in those questions although they might play a part in the answer I seek. What I want is a reason to which a reflective person can appeal when he asks himself why he should live a moral life. I want a rationalisation of a moral life. Why should one live a Moral Life? The question, then, is: why should one live a moral life? We must not assume there is an answer to this question. It might be, as many believe, that the moral life is, at a deep level, unjustified. This thought is troubling in one respect and liberating in another. Troubling, because morality is bound up with concepts such as love, honour, courage, integrity and a host of others to which reflective human beings form a powerful, if usually unscrutinized, attachment. It would be unfortunate if, on scrutiny, this attachment proved to have no persuasive grounds. Liberating, because morality prevents us from pursuing things which we would very much like to pursue. One might have moral qualms (perhaps stemming from attachments to other people) about accepting offers of casual sex. Other things being equal, there is a lot to be said for accepting such offers. If one believes morality is groundless, one at least will not have that obstacle to enjoyment. This example rather dramatises the problem. If we are to constrain our behaviour for moral considerations then we should have a very good reason to do so. But most of us have no idea what such a reason could be. The question, why should one live a moral life? is, as I have said, a reflectivequestion: a question about our beliefs and behaviour. Such a question need not have been asked. There have been (or, if not, there could have been) societies the inhabitants of which have accepted the prevailing moral beliefs and never thought to question them. For them it would be as senseless to question (say) 'murder-is wrong' as it would be for us to question 'there are people in this room'. This does not mean that ethics was well grounded for them and not for us (they just thought it was). What it does mean is that we have a practical problem they did not have. Because they never thought to ponder on the grounds for their moral beliefs they were able to persist unproblematically in being moral. We. however, have asked the question, and, having asked it, we have to answer it. The point is'that, without a reason why we should live a moral life, the possibility opens that we should not persist in being moral. Ethical Record. October, 1991 3 What we want in answer to the question of why one should be moral is something with normative force; something that will convince us that we should be moral. There are many candidates for such an answer. For example, one could answer that one should be moral because otherwise one will burn in hell. Although this might convince some. it should not, because such a claim is false. Similarly, appeals to faith, fear, superstition and the like are not going to convince us, and should not convince others, because they are false. What should convince us, and will convince me, arc true propositions connected by rational argument. In short, what we want is a reflective answer that aims to be rationally persuasive. 2. The question before us — why should one be moral? — asks for a rationalisation of the moral life for someone who is inclined to live it. The answer I shall provide falls into three parts. First, I shall argue that whatever reason is provided should appeal to the self construed as an individual. This contrasts with a different conception of the self: namely, the self construed as part of some greater whole (that is, some sort of community). Put in less abstract terms, I shall argue that the reason will have to appeal to us as individuals, rather than as Englishmen, socialists or whatever. Examples of reasons of the latter sort might be; because it does England's name good in the world, because it would provide bread for our brothers or whatever.

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