Markets As Regulators: a Survey
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
MARKETS AS REGULATORS: A SURVEY STAVROS GADINIS∗ AND HOWELL E. JACKSON† ABSTRACT Stock exchanges around the world have recently discarded their traditional mutual membership structure in favor of a for-profit corporate format. This development increased fears of conflicts of interest, as for- profit exchanges are more sensitive to pressures from their constituents and more likely to abuse their regulatory powers. In this Article, we explore the allocation of regulatory responsibilities to market infrastructure institutions, administrative agencies, and central government entities in the eight most influential jurisdictions for securities regulation in the world. Examining how different jurisdictions answer this question is particularly pressing given the December 2006 transatlantic stock exchange merger activity. After discussing the role of self-regulatory organizations in the oversight of modern stock exchanges, we report the results of a survey of the allocation of regulatory powers in a sample of eight key jurisdictions. In that survey, we examine the allocation of such powers at three levels: rulemaking, monitoring of compliance with these rules, and enforcement of rules violations. Based on our findings, we categorize these jurisdictions in three distinct models of allocation of regulatory powers: a Government-led Model that preserves significant authority for central government control over securities markets ∗ Clark Byse and John M. Olin Fellow, Harvard Law School; S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School. † John S. Reid, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This Article derives from a project the author prepared for the Governance of Infrastructure Institutions in the Financial Markets, undertaken by the Oxford Finance Group and led by Ruben Lee in 2006. The analytical framework presented in Part II of this Article and the collection and interpretation of surveys in Appendix A are primarily the work of Mr. Gadinis. The authors wish to express their thanks to the many respondents around the world who took time to complete our survey and respond to our follow up questions and also to the Leeds Research Fund and the Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business at Harvard Law School, which provided financial support. 1239 1240 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1239 regulation, albeit with a relatively limited enforcement apparatus (France, Germany, and Japan); a Flexibility Model that grants significant leeway to market participants in performing their regulatory obligations, but relies on government agencies to set general policies and maintain some enforcement capacity (United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and Australia); and a Cooperation Model that assigns a broad range of power to market participants in almost all aspects of securities regulation, but also maintains strong and overlapping oversight of market activity through well-endowed governmental agencies with more robust enforcement traditions (United States and Canada). TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1241 II. SELF-REGULATION IN THE MODERN STOCK EXCHANGE............. 1246 A. THE REGULATORY ROLE OF STOCK EXCHANGES ..................................... 1246 1. Organizing a Market and Setting Its Rules ........................................... 1246 2. A Public Interest Role for Exchanges ................................................... 1248 B. SELF-REGULATION: ADVANTAGES AND CONCERNS.................................. 1250 1. Why Grant Regulatory Powers to Stock Exchanges? ........................... 1250 2. What Are the Concerns Traditionally Associated with Self-regulation? ................................................................................................................... 1252 C. DEMUTUALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON ACADEMIC DEBATES OVER THE REGULATION OF EXCHANGES AND OTHER SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS ....................................................................................................................... 1257 1. How Does Demutualization Affect the Traditional Model of Self- regulation?.................................................................................................. 1258 2. Academic Perspectives on the Regulatory Implications of Demutualization ................................................................................................................... 1261 III. SURVEY AND ANALYSIS: THREE MODELS FOR ALLOCATING REGULATORY POWER.................................................................................. 1266 A. OVERVIEW OF SURVEY DESIGN ................................................................ 1267 B. SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS ............................................................... 1269 C. GOVERNMENT-LED MODEL....................................................................... 1271 1. Overview............................................................................................... 1271 2. How Do Agencies and Market Institutions Divide Areas of Regulatory Responsibility?........................................................................................... 1271 3. What Rules Define the Interaction Between Market Infrastructure Institutions and Administrative Agencies?................................................. 1277 4. What Is the Role of Central Government in the Securities Markets Regulatory Framework?............................................................................. 1278 5. How Vigorously Are Securities Laws Enforced in These Jurisdictions? ................................................................................................................... 1278 D. FLEXIBILITY MODEL ................................................................................. 1279 1. Overview............................................................................................... 1279 2007] MARKETS AS REGULATORS 1241 2. How Do Agencies and Market Institutions Divide Areas of Regulatory Responsibility?........................................................................................... 1280 3. What Rules Define the Interaction Between Market Infrastructure Institutions and Administrative Agencies?................................................. 1285 4. What Is the Role of Central Government in the Securities Markets Regulatory Framework?............................................................................. 1287 5. How Vigorously Are Securities Laws Enforced in These Jurisdictions? ................................................................................................................... 1288 E. COOPERATION MODEL .............................................................................. 1290 1. Overview............................................................................................... 1290 2. How Do Agencies and Market Institutions Divide Areas of Regulatory Responsibility?........................................................................................... 1290 3. What Rules Define the Interaction Between Market Infrastructure Institutions and Administrative Agencies?................................................. 1295 4. What Is the Role of Central Government in the Securities Markets Regulatory Framework?............................................................................. 1296 5. How Vigorously Are Securities Laws Enforced in These Jurisdictions? ................................................................................................................... 1297 IV. CONCLUSION........................................................................................... 1298 V. APPENDIX A: INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY CASE STUDIES.................... 1301 A. FRANCE..................................................................................................... 1301 B. JAPAN........................................................................................................ 1306 C. GERMANY ................................................................................................. 1312 D. UNITED KINGDOM .................................................................................... 1315 E. AUSTRALIA ............................................................................................... 1320 F. HONG KONG .............................................................................................. 1325 G. UNITED STATES ........................................................................................ 1329 H. CANADA ................................................................................................... 1335 VI. APPENDIX B: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE .......................................... 1339 A. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1339 B. ALLOCATION OF POWERS AMONG MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE INSTITUTIONS ....................................................................................................................... 1340 1. Overview of Institutional Framework in Your Jurisdiction .................. 1342 2. Authorizing and Supervising the Public Offer Process......................... 1344 3. Issuer Regulation following Public Offer/Listing ................................. 1352 4. Regulation of the Trading Process ........................................................ 1360 5. Regulation of Marketplaces .................................................................. 1366 6. Supervision of the Financial Intermediation Process