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FREE THE WILDERNESS PDF Samantha Harvey | 336 pages | 02 Mar 2010 | Vintage Publishing | 9780099526537 | English | London, United Kingdom Tactical Belts, Duty Belt, Military Belt, Instructor Belt The Battle of the Wildernessfought May 5—7,was the first battle of The Wilderness. Ulysses S. Grant 's The Wilderness General George G. Meade's Virginia Overland Campaign against Gen. Robert E. Both armies suffered heavy casualties, around 5, men killed in total, a The Wilderness of a bloody war of attrition by Grant against Lee's army and, eventually, the Confederate The Wilderness, Richmond, Virginia. The battle was tactically inconclusive, as Grant disengaged and continued his offensive. Grant attempted to move quickly through the dense underbrush of the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, but Lee launched two of his corps on parallel roads to intercept him. Gouverneur The Wilderness. Warren attacked the Confederate Second CorpsThe Wilderness by Lt. Richard The Wilderness. Ewellon the Orange Turnpike. That afternoon the Third Corpscommanded by Lt. Hillencountered Brig. George W. Getty 's division VI Corps and Maj. Winfield S. Fighting until dark was fierce but inconclusive as both sides attempted The Wilderness maneuver in the dense woods. James Longstreet arrived in time to prevent the collapse of the Confederate right flank. Longstreet followed up with a surprise flanking attack from an unfinished railroad bed The Wilderness drove Hancock's men back to the Brock Road, but the momentum was lost when Longstreet was wounded by his own men. An evening attack by Brig. John B. Gordon against the Union right flank caused consternation at Union headquarters, but the lines stabilized and fighting ceased. On May 7, Grant disengaged and moved to the southeast, intending to leave the Wilderness to interpose his army between Lee and Richmond, leading to the bloody Battle of Spotsylvania Court House. In MarchGrant was summoned from the Western Theaterpromoted to lieutenant general, and given command of all Union armies. He chose to make his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, although Meade retained formal command of that army. William Tecumseh Sherman succeeded Grant in command of most of the western armies. This was the first time the Union armies would have a coordinated offensive strategy across a number of theaters. On April 27,a dispatch was sent The Wilderness P. Sheridan to Maj. Humphreys, Chf. Gregg: Col. Taylor at Morrisville reports all quiet in that section. Taylor asks permission to send men on a scout to Falmouth to obtain information. Grant's campaign objective was not the Confederate capital of Richmond, but the destruction of Lee's army. Lincoln had long advocated this strategy for his generals, recognizing that the city would certainly fall after the loss of its principal defensive army. Grant ordered Meade, "Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. Both Union and Confederate casualties could be high, but the Union had greater resources to replace lost soldiers and equipment. At the beginning of the campaign, Grant's Union forces totaledmen and guns. George G. The five corps were: [13]. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia comprised about 64, The Wilderness and guns and was organized into four corps: [14]. Vincent J. Esposito, West Point Atlas [15]. Early settlers in the area had cut down the native forests to fuel blast furnaces that processed the iron ore found there, leaving what was mainly a secondary growth of dense shrubs. This rough terrain, which was virtually unsettled, was nearly impenetrable to 19th-century infantry and artillery maneuvers. A number of battles were fought in the vicinity between andincluding the bloody Battle of Chancellorsville The Wilderness May The Wilderness had been the concentration point for the Confederates one year earlier when Stonewall Jackson launched his devastating attack on the Union right flank at Chancellorsville. But Grant chose to set up his camps to the west of the old battle site before moving southward; unlike the Union The Wilderness of a year before, Grant had no desire to fight in the Wilderness, preferring to move to the open ground to the south and east of the Wilderness before fighting Lee, thereby taking The Wilderness of his superior numbers and artillery. Speed was of the essence to the The Wilderness because the army was vulnerably stretched thin as it moved. Although Grant insisted that the army travel light with The Wilderness artillery and supplies, its logistical "tail" was The Wilderness 70 miles. Sylvanus Cadwallader, a journalist with the Army of the Potomac, estimated that Meade's supply trains alone—which included 4, wagons, ambulances, and a herd of cattle for The Wilderness using a single road would reach from the Rapidan to below Richmond. Grant gambled that Meade could move his army quickly enough to avoid being ensnared in the Wilderness, but Meade recommended that they camp The Wilderness to allow the wagon train to catch up. Grant The Wilderness miscalculated when he assumed that Lee was incapable of intercepting the Union army at its most vulnerable point, and Meade had not provided adequate cavalry coverage to warn of a The Wilderness movement from the west. On May 2, Lee met with his generals on Clark Mountain, obtaining a panoramic view of the enemy camps. He realized that Grant was getting ready to attack, but did not know the precise route of advance. He correctly predicted that Grant would cross to the east of the Confederate fortifications on the Rapidan, using the Germanna and Ely Fords, but he could not be certain. To retain flexibility of response, Lee had dispersed his Army over a wide area. Longstreet's First Corps was around Gordonsvillefrom where they had the flexibility to respond by railroad to potential threats to the Shenandoah Valley or to Richmond. As Grant's plan became clear to Lee on May 4, Lee knew that it was imperative to fight in the Wilderness for the same reason as the year before: his army was massively outnumbered, with approximately 65, men to Grant's , and his artillery's guns were fewer than and inferior to those of Grant's. Fighting in the tangled woods would eliminate Grant's advantage in artillery, and the close quarters and ensuing confusion there could give Lee's The Wilderness force better odds. He therefore ordered his army to intercept the advancing The Wilderness in the Wilderness. Ewell marched east on the Orange Court House Turnpike, reaching Robertson's Tavern, where they camped about 3—5 miles from the unsuspecting soldiers in Warren's corps. These two corps could pin the Union troops in place they had been ordered to avoid a general engagement until the entire army could be unitedfighting outnumbered for at least a day while Longstreet approached from the southwest for a blow against the enemy's flank, similar to Jackson's at Chancellorsville. The thick underbrush prevented the Union Army from recognizing the proximity of the Confederates. Adding to The Wilderness confusion, The Wilderness received an erroneous report that the Confederate cavalry under J. Stuart was operating in his Army's rear, in the direction of Fredericksburg. He ordered the bulk of his cavalry to move east to The Wilderness with that perceived threat, leaving his army blind. But he assumed that the corps of Sedgwick, Warren, and Hancock could hold back any potential Confederate advance until the supply trains came up, at which time Grant could move forward to engage in a major battle with Lee, presumably at Mine Run. Private Frank Wilkeson [22]. Grant was notified of the encounter and instructed "If any opportunity presents itself of pitching into a part of Lee's army, do so without giving time for disposition. Ewell's men erected earthworks on the western end of the clearing known as Saunders Field. Warren approached on the eastern end with the division of Brig. The Wilderness Griffin on the right and the division of Brig. James S. Wadsworth on the left, but he hesitated to attack because the Confederate The Wilderness extended beyond Griffin's right, which would mean that they would be subjected to enfilade fire. He requested a delay from Meade so that Sedgwick's VI Corps could be brought in on his right and extend his line. Warren was correct to be concerned about his right flank. As the Union men advanced, Brig. Romeyn B. Ayres 's brigade had The Wilderness take cover in a gully to avoid the enfilading fire. The brigade of Brig. Joseph J. Bartlett made better progress to Ayres's left and overran the position of Brig. John M. Joneswho was killed. However, since The Wilderness men were unable to advance, Bartlett's right flank was now exposed to attack and his brigade was forced to flee back across the clearing. Bartlett's horse was shot out from under him and he barely escaped capture. To the left of Bartlett, the Iron Brigadecommanded by Brig. Lysander Cutleradvanced through woods south of the field and struck a brigade of Alabamians commanded by Brig. Cullen A. Although initially pushed back, the Confederates counterattacked with the brigade of Brig. Gordon The Wilderness, tearing through the line and forcing the Iron Brigade now The Wilderness with green recruits from its devastating losses The Wilderness Gettysburg to break for the first time in its history. As the majority of the new recruits fled from the terrors of combat, the old veterans of the brigade attempted to hold their ground and eventually were forced to retreat against overwhelming odds. Further to the left, near the Higgerson farm, the brigades of Col. Roy Stone and Brig. James C. Rice attacked the brigades of Brig. George P. Wilderness Tactical Products, LLC Company, Dealer and Order Information.