The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and the Political Economy of California Water Allocation RACHAEL E. GOODHUE Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley SUSAN STRATTON SAYRE Assistant Professor of Economics, Smith College LEO K. SIMON Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley Independent Institute Working Paper Number 75 September 22, 2010 100 Swan Way, Oakland, CA 94621-1428 • 510-632-1366 • Fax: 510-568-6040 • Email:
[email protected] • http://www.independent.org (This is a chapter from the forthcoming book Aquanomics: Water Markets, Bureaucracy, and the Environment, edited by B. Delworth Gardner and Randy T. Simmons) The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and the Political Economy of California Water Allocation Rachael E. Goodhue, Susan Stratton Sayre, and Leo K. Simon Introduction Large-scale water problems of the nature discussed in this book are inherently difficult to solve. Water distribution and use decisions must be made within a complex system with economic, political, engineering, legal, and ecological dimensions. Any policy choice will impact all of these dimensions. Two critical tasks in the resolution of such debates are to characterize these multi-dimensional impacts for each potential solution and to identify instruments capable of implementing particular choices. Because of the system’s complexity, however, it is virtually inevitable that stakeholders’ interests will conflict under any chosen policy path. These conflicts would be relatively manageable in a world in which (a) property rights were fully defined, (b) benchmarks were available and generally accepted as bases for interpersonal welfare comparisons, and (c) interpersonal compensation was feasible. In such a world, the logical approach would be to choose the policy that maximized aggregate welfare, thus ensuring economically efficient outcomes.