Review No. 51

Review no. 51

Press Review 1—15 September 2013

Table of Contents Pages

African Union - 395ème réunion du CPS sur la situation en Egypte 4 - 395th PSC meeting on the situation in Egypt 5 - Conclusions opérationnelles de la 3ème réunion des chefs des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité des pays de la région sahélo-saharienne 6 - Operational Conclusions of the third Meeting of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan Region 9 - Conclusions de la 2ème réunion ministérielle sur le renforcement de la coopération en matière de sécurité et l’opérationnalisation de l’Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité dans la région sahélo-saharienne 13 - Conclusions of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalization of the APSA in the Sahelo-Saharan Region 17 - Statement of the africa forum on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic 21 - Tenue d'un atelier sur la Sécurité aux frontières à Tripoli, Libye 25 - Convening of a workshop on Border Security in Tripoli, Libya 27 - Sierra Leone donates $ 1 Million to AU Trust Fund on Mali 29 - Communiqué du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA), en sa 394ème réunion sur la situation à Madagascar 31 - Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 394th meeting on the situation in Madagascar 33 - L'Union Africaine se félicite des résultats de la réunion au sommet entre les Présidents du Soudan et du Soudan du Sud 35 - The African Union welcomes the outcome of the summit meeting between the Presidents of Sudan and South Sudan 36

Terrorism in Africa - Africa and the merchants of death 37 - Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence In North Africa? – Analysis 39 - Crisis Today, Catastrophe Tomorrow – An Analysis 56 - Al-Qaïda résiste encore 60

Chad - West Africa: 'Chad Not Looking for International Credit over Mali Intervention' Says Country's Foreign Minister 66

DRC - Africa: Eastern Congo's Recent Troubles - Who Pulls the Strings, What Is At Stake, and Why Do Things Happen? 68

Libya - Un an après Benghazi, la Libye en base-arrière d’un djihadisme maghrébin en mutation 78

Egypt - Egypte: à qui profite la crise? 81

Mali - Mali's Post Elections Challenges 84

Niger - Analysis: After Mali, Niger battles to secure its borders 88

Nigeria - Will Nigeria’s Boko Haram Survive Death Of Its Leader? – Analysis 92

Somalia - Somalia: Kenya Needs a Comprehensive Exit Plan in Somalia 95 - Analysis of Somalia's Juba Agreement 98

Tunisia - Tunisie: le dernier espoir des "printemps arabes" 102

Terrorism in the World

Russia - Analysis of Putin's plea to Americans over Syria 104

Syria - Intervening in Syria and the humanitarian case: What does the research say? 109

USA - Radical Muslim groups give way to radicalized Muslim individuals 114

African Union

395ème réunion du CPS sur la situation en Egypte

Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa 395ème réunion tenue le 13 septembre 2013, a suivi une communication du Groupe de haut niveau de l'UA pour l'Égypte sur la situation en Égypte et ses efforts. Le Conseil s'est félicité de la deuxième visite effectuée par le Groupe en Égypte, du 27 août au 4 septembre 2013. Le Conseil a exprimé sa gratitude aux autorités égyp- tiennes pour avoir facilité la visite du Groupe, ainsi que ses consultations avec di- verses parties prenantes égyptiennes. Le Conseil a également salué les mesures prises par le Groupe pour interagir avec les acteurs internationaux concernés. Le Conseil a encouragé le Groupe à poursuivre ses efforts et ses interactions avec les parties prenantes égyptiennes et les autres acteurs concernés. Le Conseil attend avec intérêt un rapport du Groupe de haut niveau sur la situation en Égypte et les efforts qu’il y déploie, ainsi que sur la voie à suivre. Le Conseil a réitéré ses communiqués et communiqués de presse antérieurs sur

395th PSC meeting on the situation in Egypt

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 395th meeting held on 13 September 2013, was briefed by the AU High-Level Panel for Egypt on the situation in Egypt and on its efforts. Council welcomed the 2nd visit to Egypt undertaken by the High Level Panel from 27 August to 4 September 2013. Council expressed its appreciation to the Egyptian authorities for facilitating the Panel’s visit and its consultations with various Egyp- tian stakeholders. Council also welcomed the steps taken by the High-Level Panel to interact with relevant international stakeholders. Council encouraged the Panel to pursue its efforts and interactions with the Egyp- tian stakeholders and other concerned actors. Council looks forward to a report by the High-Level Panel on the situation and on its efforts, as well as on the way forward. Council reiterated its earlier communiqué and press statements on the situation in Egypt, stressing, in this respect, the need for all parties to eschew all forms of violence and uphold the spirit of dialogue, inclusivity and national reconciliation.

Conclusions opérationnelles de la 3ème réunion des chefs des Ser- vices de Renseignement et de Sécurité des pays de la région sahélo- saharienne

CONCLUSIONS OPÉRATIONNELLES 1. La 3ème réunion des chefs des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité des pays de la région sahélo-saharienne s'est tenue à N'Djamena, le 10 septembre 2013. Les pays suivants ont participé à la réunion: Algérie, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Iv- oire, Libye, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sénégal et Tchad. Outre la Commission de l'Union africaine (UA), la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique centrale (CEEAC), la Communauté des États sahélo-sahariens (CEN-SAD), la Mission de l’UA au Mali, le Centre africain d'Étude et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme (CAERT), le Comité africain des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité (CISSA) et l’Unité de Fusion et de Liaison (UFL) ont également pris part à la réunion. 2. La réunion a eu lieu dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des conclusions de la réu- nion ministérielle sur le renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire et l'opération- nalisation de l'Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA) dans la région sahélo-saharienne, tenue à Nouakchott, le 17 mars 2013, et fait suite aux pré- cédentes réunions des chefs des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité des pays de la région, tenues respectivement à Bamako, le 18 avril 2013, et à Abidjan, les 20 et 21 juin 2013. 3. La cérémonie d’ouverture a été marquée par l’allocution prononcée par l'Ambas-

sadeur Ramtane Lamamra, Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité de l'UA, ainsi que par celle du Secrétaire d'État à l'Intérieur et à la Sécurité de la République du Tchad, M. Mahamat Adji Ngoua. 4. La réunion a procédé à une revue de l'évolution de la situation sécuritaire dans la région et des mesures prises pour la mise en œuvre des Conclusions opération- nelles adoptées à Abidjan. 5. La réunion a noté que si des progrès ont été réalisés dans les efforts visant à relever les défis sécuritaires auxquels la région fait face, la situation n’en demeure pas moins préoccupante. La vigilance doit donc rester de vigueur et des efforts dé- terminés doivent être déployés pour approfondir la coopération en matière sécuri- taire, sur la base d’une vision unifiée de la sécurité collective, de la transparence et de la responsabilité partagée. 6. La réunion s'est félicitée des mesures prises en vue de la mise en œuvre des conclusions opérationnelles d’Abidjan, soulignant en particulier les éléments ci-après: (i) la mission consultative conjointe CAERT–CISSA–UFL en Libye, du 3 au 5 septembre 2013, et l'organisation, par la Commission de l'UA, en collaboration avec le Gouvernement libyen, de l'Atelier sur le renforcement opérationnel de la sécurité aux frontières terrestres dans la région sahélo-saharienne, les 4 et 5 septembre 2013. À cet égard, la réunion a exprimé sa gratitude au Gouvernement libyen pour avoir facilité la mission conjointe CAERT–CISSA–UFL en Libye, ainsi que pour toutes les dispositions prises en vue d’assurer le bon déroulement de l'Atelier; (ii) la production et la diffusion d'une édition spéciale de la revue de presse quotidi- enne du CAERT consacrée à la région du Sahel; et (iii) la transmission aux pays de la région des documents pertinents de l'UA et de la CEDEAO en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme. 7. La réunion a également noté que les rencontres régulières des chefs des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité se sont révélées être un instrument précieux de renforcement de la confiance, et ont également contribué à la promotion de la collaboration entre tous les services concernés. 8. La réunion a souligné la nécessité de redoubler d'efforts pour mettre en œuvre les aspects pendants des conclusions d'Abidjan, notamment: (i) la finalisation et la diffusion, par le CAERT et le CISSA, dans un délai de quinze jours, de la matrice sur le renforcement des capacités; (ii) l’organisation des activités sur le renforcement des capacités recensées par le CAERT, dans les délais nouvellement convenus; (iii) la tenue d’autres activités de formation sur la collecte et l'analyse de renseignements dans le cadre de l'appui au renforcement des capacités, avec la facilita- tion de la Commission de l'UA. Ces activités auront pour objectifs: d'introduire de bonnes pratiques et des méthodes de collecte et d'analyse du renseignement, de

doter les membres de la communauté du renseignement des compétences et de la formation nécessaires, de tirer les leçons et de faire partager le bénéfice de l'expé- rience des pays de la région et au-delà. À cet égard, la Commission de l'UA, le CAERT, le CISSA et l’UFL se rapprocheront des États membres de l’UA et des partenaires pour l'organisation de ces formations et séminaires; (iv) la présentation d'un rapport sur les menaces émergentes et non convention- nelles à la paix et à la sécurité dans la région; et (v) le suivi effectif des recommandations de la mission d’évaluation qui s’est rendue au Niger, du 10 au 15 juin 2013. 9. En outre, la réunion a approuvé les mesures suivantes: (i) l'identification des mesures de sécurité et des accords existants entre les pays de la région et l'évaluation de leur état de mise en œuvre, avec pour objectif de soutenir leur opérationnalisation et l'amélioration de leur efficacité, le cas échéant. La Commission fera circuler un questionnaire à tous les pays de la région pour recueillir les informations nécessaires. Les réponses à ce questionnaire devront être communiquées dans un délai d’un mois; (ii) l’élaboration, sur la base des expériences existantes, d'un concept d'opération générique sur les patrouilles conjointes et les unités mixtes, avec pour but d'aider les pays de la région dans leurs efforts, notamment à travers le partage d’expéri- ences réussies, y compris l’arrangement entre le Tchad, le Niger et le Nigeria. Un projet de concept devrait être diffusé dans les 45 jours; (iii) la prise diligente des mesures requises pour assurer le suivi des conclusions de l’atelier de Tripoli sur le renforcement de la sécurité aux frontières et des recommandations de la mission d’évaluation effectuée en Libye; (iv) l’organisation, par l'UA, en collaboration avec le Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR), d'une rencontre qui réunira les pays d'origine, de transit et d'accueil des réfugiés pour discuter des questions d’intérêt commun, y compris la sécurité des camps de réfugiés, et s'accorder sur des mesures concrètes; (v) l’initiation par la Commission de l’UA, sur la base des décisions et instruments pertinents de l’UA, d’une réflexion sur les liens entre l’immigration clandestine et la sécurité; (vi) l'organisation par la Commission, en collaboration avec les partenaires con- cernés, d'un atelier de renforcement des capacités en matière de lutte contre le trafic d'armes de destruction massive (armes chimiques, nucléaires, biologiques et radiologiques) et matériaux connexes; (vii) la nécessité d’améliorer la communication, par les mécanismes compétents, des informations et des renseignements en leur possession des aux pays concernés et vice-versa. Le CAERT, le CISSA et l'UFL informeront leurs membres sur les mécanismes existants;

(viii) l’envoi, en tant que de besoin, de missions dirigées par le Haut Représentant de l'UA pour le Mali et le Sahel dans les pays de la région pour aider à promouvoir et à renforcer la confiance. 10. Les participants ont exprimé leur gratitude aux autorités tchadiennes pour l'accueil chaleureux qui leur a été réservé et pour toutes les dispositions qui ont été prises pour assurer le bon déroulement des travaux de leur réunion.

Operational Conclusions of the third Meeting of the Heads of Intelli- gence and Security Services of the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan Region OPERATIONAL CONLUSIONS

1. The 3rd meeting of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region was held in N’Djamena on 10 Septem- ber 2013. The following countries and organizations participated in the meeting: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. In addition to the Commission of the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN- SAD), the AU Mission in Mali, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Ter- rorism (ACSRT), the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) also took part in the meeting. 2. The meeting was held within the framework of the implementation of the conclusions of the ministerial meeting on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahelo-Sahara region, held in Nouakchott, on 17 March 2013, and in follow-up to the first and second meetings of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of the countries of the region, held in Bamako, on 18 April 2013, and in Abidjan, from 20 to 21 June 2013.

3. The opening ceremony was marked by the statements made by Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, and Mr. Mahamat Adji Ngoua, Deputy Minister for Interior and Security. 4. The meeting considered the developments of the security situation in the region and the steps taken towards the implementation of the Operational Conclusions adopted in Abidjan.

5. The meeting noted that while progress has been made in dealing with the security challenges facing the region, the situation nonetheless remains of concern. Ac- cordingly, there is need for continued vigilance and determined efforts to deepen security cooperation, based on a unified vision of collective security, transparency, and shared responsibility. 6. The meeting welcomed the steps taken towards the implementation of the Abid- jan conclusions, highlighting in particular the following: (i) the joint ACSRT-CISSA-UFL consultation mission to Libya, from 3 to 5 September 2013, and the organization, by the AU Commission in collaboration with the Libyan Government, of the workshop on enhancing operational land border security in the Sahelo-Sharan region, from 4 to 5 September 2013. In this regard, the meeting expressed its gratitude to the Libyan Government for facilitating the joint ACSRT- CISSA-UFL mission to Libya, as well as for all the arrangements made to ensure the successful conduct of the workshop; (ii) the production and dissemination of the special edition of the ACSRT’s Daily News Highlight devoted to the Sahel region; and (iii) the production and dissemination to the countries of the region of relevant AU and ECOWAS counter-terrorism policy documents. 7. The meeting also noted that the regular meetings of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services have proved to be a valuable confidence building tool, while also contributing to fostering collaboration among all concerned services. 8. The meeting stressed the need for renewed efforts to implement the outstanding provisions of the Abidjan conclusions, notably: (i) the finalization and dissemination, within fifteen days, by the ACSRT and CISSA, of the capacity building matrix; (ii) the holding of the capacity building activities identified by ACSRT, within the newly-agreed timelines; (iii) the implementation of other trainings activities on intelligence collection and analysis, as part of the capacity building programme facilitated by the AU Commis- sion. Such activities will be directed towards introducing best practices and methods for intelligence gathering and analysis, equipping members of the intelligence community with the required skills and education, as well lessons learned, bene-

fiting from the experiences of countries in the region and beyond. In this regard, the AU Commission, ACSRT, CISSA and UFL will engage AU member states and partners on organizing such trainings and seminars; (iv) the presentation of a report on the emerging and non-conventional threats to peace and security in the region; and (v) the effective follow-up of the recommendations of the assessment mission that visited Niger, from 10 to 15 June 2013. 9. Furthermore, the meeting agreed on the following steps: (i) the identification of existing security arrangements and agreements among the countries of the region and assessment of their implementation status, with the objective of supporting their operationalization and enhancing their effectiveness, where appropriate. The Commission will circulate a questionnaire to all countries of the region to seek the required information. Responses are expected within a month; (ii) the development, based on existing experiences, of a generic concept of operations for joint patrols and mixed units, with the view to assisting the countries of the region in their efforts, learning from successful experiences, including the arrangement between Chad, Niger and Nigeria. A draft concept of operations should be circulated within 45 days; (iii) timely adoption of the required measures to ensure the follow-up of the Tripoli workshop conclusions on the enhancement of border security and the recommendations of the assessment mission to Libya; (iv) convening, by the AU, working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), of a meeting that will bring together countries of origin, transit and host countries to discuss issues of common concern, including security of refugee camps, in order to agree on practical measures; (v) initiation by the AU Commission, and on the basis of the relevant AU policies and decisions, of a reflection on the links between illegal migration and security; (vi) convening, by the Commission in collaboration with the relevant partners, of a capacity building workshop on counter-trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials; (vii) enhancing communication of information and intelligence from the relevant mechanisms to the concerned countries and vice-versa. In this respect, ACSRT, CIS- SA and UFL will update their member countries on the existing mechanisms; and (viii) missions by the AU High Representative for Mali and Sahel as appropriate within the region to assist in furthering and consolidating confidence. 10. The participants expressed their gratitude to the Chadian authorities for the warm reception accorded to them and for all the arrangements that ensured the smooth holding of the meeting.

Conclusions de la 2ème réunion ministérielle sur le renforcement de la coopération en matière de sécurité et l’opérationnalisation de l’Ar- chitecture africaine de paix et de sécurité dans la région sahélo- saharienne

conclusions 1. Dans le cadre du suivi des conclusions de la réunion ministérielle sur le renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire et l’opérationnalisation de l’Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA) dans la région sahélo-saharienne, tenue à Nouakchott, en République islamique de Mauritanie, le 17 mars 2013, la deuxième réunion des pays de la région a eu lieu à Ndjamena, au Tchad, le 11 septembre 2013. 2. Les Ministres et autres représentants des pays ci-après ont pris part à la réunion: Algérie, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Libye, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Nigeria, Sénégal et Tchad. Les organisations et structures régionales ci-après ont aussi participé à la réu- nion: le Centre africain d’Étude et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme (CAERT), la Com- munauté économique des États de l’Afrique centrale (CEEAC), la Communauté des États sahélo-sahariens (CEN-SAD), le Comité des Services de Renseignements et de Sécurité africains (CISSA) et l’Unité de Fusion et de Liaison (UFL). Le Haut Représentant de l’UA pour le Mali et le Sahel, ainsi que le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies au Mali et chef de la Mission multidi- mensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA) ont également pris part à la réunion. 3. Les participants ont délibéré sur les questions ci-après et convenu des conclusions

suivantes: Sur la situation politique et sécuritaire dans la région sahélo-saharienne 4. Les participants à la réunion ont fait le point de la situation politique et sécuritaire dans la région sahélo-saharienne depuis leur rencontre de Nouakchott. Ils se sont félicités de l’évolution positive de la situation au Mali, qui a permis le déroulement, les 28 juillet et 11 août 2013, des deux tours de l’élection présidentielle. Les participants ont félicité le Gouvernement de transition et le peuple maliens pour avoir réus- si, avec l’appui de la communauté internationale, à relever le défi de l’organisation et de la tenue de ces élections, dans la paix et la transparence. Ils ont exhorté les acteurs maliens à poursuivre les efforts engagés en vue de mener à son terme le processus de réconciliation nationale, notamment à travers la mise en œuvre scrupule- use et diligente de l’Accord de Ouagadougou du 18 juin 2013, et de consolider la paix. 5. Les participants ont pris note des progrès accomplis dans le déploiement de la MI- NUSMA, qui a pris la relève de la Mission internationale de soutien au Mali sous conduite africaine (MISMA), à la suite de l’adoption de la résolution 2100 (2013) par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. 6. Les participants ont reconnu qu’en dépit des progrès accomplis, la région sahélo- saharienne reste toujours confrontée à de sérieux défis sécuritaires. À cet égard, ils ont relevé les tentatives de reconstitution et de regroupement de groupes terroristes au nord Mali, et d’autres problèmes connexes. Sur l’état de mise en œuvre des conclusions de la réunion de Nouakchott 7. Les participants se sont félicités des actions menées au cours du dernier semestre dans le cadre des efforts de renforcement de la coopération entre les pays de la ré- gion sahélo-saharienne. A cet égard, ils ont relevé avec satisfaction: (i) la tenue, à ce jour, de 3 réunions des chefs des services de renseignement et de sécurité, à Bamako, le 18 avril 2013, à Abidjan, les 20 et 21 juin 2013, et à N’Djamena, le 10 septembre 2013, réunions qui ont permis de promouvoir la transparence et de renforcer l’interaction et la confiance entre les pays de la région sur les questions de sécurité régionale; (ii) les missions d’évaluation entreprises au Niger, du 10 au 15 juin 2013, après les attentats terroristes qui ont eu lieu à Agadez et à Arlit, en mai 2013, et en Libye, du 4 au 5 septembre 2013, dans le prolongement des conclusions opérationnelles de la réunion d’Abidjan; (iii) l’atelier sur la sécurité aux frontières tenu à Tripoli, les 4 et 5 septembre 2013; et (iv) les mesures prises par le CISSA en vue de la mise en place d’un système de communication sécurisé entre les services de renseignement et de sécurité des pays de la région. 8. Les participants ont entériné les conclusions opérationnelles des 2ème et 3ème réunions des chefs des services de renseignement et de sécurité des pays de la région

sahélo-saharienne. Ils ont souligné la nécessité d’assurer le suivi et la mise en œuvre effective des mesures convenues. Dans ce contexte, ils ont mis l’accent sur l’importance que revêtent: (i) l’échange en temps réel de renseignements; (ii) la mise en place d’une infrastructure de communication pour faciliter des échang- es sécurisés de renseignements et d’informations entre les acteurs concernés dans les pays de la région; (iii) la conduite d’activités de renforcement des capacités des structures nationales de renseignement et de sécurité; (iv) la sécurisation des camps de refugiés, pour éviter l’infiltration d’éléments armés et l’exploitation des refugiés; (v) l’opérationnalisation des arrangements et accords de coopération entre les pays de la région, y compris les patrouilles conjointes et la mise en place d’unités mixtes; et (vi) le suivi des conclusions des missions d’évaluation effectuées au Niger et en Libye et de celles de l’atelier sur la sécurité aux frontières. À cet égard, ils sont convenus d’accélérer la mise en œuvre du Plan d’action de Tripoli, adopté par la réunion min- istérielle régionale sur la sécurité aux frontières, tenue les 11 et 12 mars 2012, qui constitue un instrument central dans les efforts de sécurisation des frontières dans la région. Sur les prochaines étapes en vue du renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire et de l’opérationnalisation de l’Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité 9. Les participants se sont engagés à poursuivre les actions en cours dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des conclusions de Nouakchott. Ils sont convenus de la nécessité de renforcer les efforts dans les domaines suivants pour lutter plus efficacement contre le terrorisme et l’extrémisme violent: (i) les programmes de lutte contre la radicalisation et de dé-radicalisation; (ii) la gestion efficace du secteur de la sécurité et de la défense, y compris la lutte ré- solue contre la corruption et d’autres pratiques pouvant compromettre l’efficacité de la lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité transfrontalière; et (iii) l’harmonisation des législations nationales, ainsi que l’entraide et l’extradition judiciaire. 10. Les participants ont demandé à la Commission d’élaborer une matrice de travail pour faciliter la prise rapide de mesures de suivi dans les domaines identifiés au paragraphe 9 ci-dessous. Ils ont demandé à la Commission de transmettre aux États de la région un rapport orienté vers l’action dans un délai de deux mois. 11. Les participants ont pris note de la recommandation faite par la Commission dans son rapport sur l’état de mise en œuvre des conclusions de la réunion ministérielle de Nouakchott sur les modalités d’opérationnalisation de l’APSA dans la région sahélo-

saharienne, en attendant les résultats de l’évaluation en cours de la Force africaine en attente (FAA) et l’adoption des modalités de mise en place de la Capacité africaine de réponse immédiate aux crises (CARIC), dont la création a été décidée par la 21ème session ordinaire de la Conférence de l’Union, tenue à Addis Abéba, les 26 et 27 mai 2013. Ils ont exhorté les pays de la région à apporter leur appui total à cette initiative dont la mise en concrète contribuera au renforcement de l’appropriation par l’Af- rique des efforts de paix sur le continent. 12. Les participants ont exhorté les Nations unies, conformément à l’appel lancé par le Conseil de paix et de sécurité (CPS) de l’UA le 25 avril 2013, à apporter l’appui nécessaire aux initiatives de renforcement de la coopération régionale en matière de sécurité, dans le cadre du Processus de Nouakchott. Ils ont demandé l’établissement de mécanismes appropriés pour faciliter la coordination entre les mesures prises dans le cadre du Processus de Nouakchott et les activités de la MINUSMA. Ils ont ex- horté l’ensemble des partenaires internationaux à soutenir pleinement le Processus de Nouakchott. Ils ont entériné la proposition d’organisation d’une table ronde de donateurs pour mobiliser des ressources pour des activités spécifiques prévues dans le cadre du Processus de Nouakchott. 13. Les participants ont soulignée la nécessité de promouvoir une approche globale qui prenne en compte les différents aspects des défis auxquels la région sahélo- saharienne est confrontée. Ils ont réitéré l’importance de la Déclaration sur le Sahel adoptée par la 314ème réunion du CPS tenue à Bamako, le 20 mars 2012, et ont in- sisté sur l’urgence d’efforts renouvelés, en vue de sa mise en œuvre effective. Ils ont indiqué attendre avec intérêt les mesures envisagés par l’UA à cet égard. Ils se sont félicités de l’adoption de la Stratégie des Nations unies pour le Sahel. Ils ont souligné la nécessité d’une coordination étroite des efforts et initiatives, en vue de maximiser leur impact. 14. Les participants sont convenus de se réunir avant la fin de l’année 2013. La date exacte et le lieu de la prochaine réunion feront l’objet de consultations au niveau ap- proprié. La prochaine réunion des chefs de Service de Renseignement et de Sécurité aura lieu au cours de la première quinzaine du mois de novembre 2013. Le lieu sera déterminé à la suite de consultations entre la Commission et les pays de la région.

15. Les participants ont remercié le Gouvernement de la République du Tchad pour avoir abrité la réunion, ainsi que pour l’hospitalité et les dispositions prises en vue du bon déroulement de cette réunion. Ils ont, en particulier, marqué leur profonde gratitude au Président Idriss Deby Itno, pour son engagement personnel et son soutien aux efforts et initiatives en faveur de la sécurité et de la stabilité dans la région sahélo -saharienne.

Conclusions of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationali ation of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan Region

conclusions 1. As a follow-up to the ministerial meeting on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahelo-Saharan region, held in Nouakchott, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, on 17 March 2013, the second ministerial meeting of the countries of the region took place in N'Djamena, Chad, on 11 September 2013. 2. Ministers and other representatives of the following countries took part in the meeting: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. The following regional organizations and bodies also participated in the meeting: the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Communi- ty of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL). The AU High Repre- sentative for Mali and the Sahel, the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for West Africa and the Special Representative of the UN

Secretary-General in Mali and Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Mission for Stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA) also attended the meeting. 3. Participants deliberated on the issues below and agreed as follows: On the political and security situation in the Sahelo-Saharan region 4. Participants reviewed the political and security situation in the Sahelo-Saharan region since their last meeting in Nouakchott. They welcomed the positive developments in Mali, which enabled the organization of the two rounds of the presidential election, on 28 July and 11 August 2013, respectively. Participants commended the Transitional Government and the people of Mali for having successfully organized the elections in a peaceful and transparent manner, with the support of the international community. They urged the Malian actors to pursue their efforts in order to successfully complete the national reconciliation process, including through the scrupulous and diligent implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement of 18 June 2013, and consolidate peace. 5. The participants took note of the progress made in the deployment of MI- NUSMA, which took over from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), following the adoption of resolution 2100 (2013) by the UN Security Council. 6. Participants acknowledged that despite the progress made, the Sahelo-Saharan region was still facing serious security challenges. In this regard, they noted the attempts of the terrorist groups to reconstitute and regroup in northern Mali, and other related problems. On the status of implementation of the conclusions of the Nouakchott meeting 7. Participants welcomed the actions taken during the last six months as part of the efforts to enhance cooperation among the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region. In this regard, they noted with satisfaction: (i) the holding, to date, of three meetings of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services, in Bamako, on 18 April 2013, in Abidjan, on 20 and 21 June 2013, and in N'Djamena, on 10 September 2013, which helped to promote transparency, as well as to strengthen interaction and build confidence among the countries of the region on issues of regional security; (ii) the dispatch of assessment missions to Niger, from 10 to 15 June 2013, after the terrorist attacks in Agadez and Arlit, in May 2013, and to Libya, on 4 and 5 Septem- ber 2013, as a follow up to the operational conclusions of the Abidjan meeting; (iii) the organization of the workshop on border security in Tripoli, on 4 and 5 Sep- tember 2013; and (iv) the measures taken by CISSA for the establishment of a secure communication system among the Intelligence and Security Services of the countries of the region.

8. Participants endorsed the operational conclusions of the 2nd and 3rd meetings of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of the countries of the Sahelo- Saharan region. They stressed the need to ensure the follow up and effective implementation of the agreed measures. In this context, they emphasized the importance of: (i) the timely exchange of intelligence; (ii) the establishment of a communication infrastructure to facilitate secure exchange of intelligence and information among the actors concerned in the countries of the region; (iii) the conduct of activities to build the capacity of the national structures in charge of intelligence and security; (iv) ensuring security in the refugee camps to avoid infiltration by armed elements and exploitation of refugees; (v) the operational arrangements and cooperation agreements between the countries of the region, including joint patrols and the establishment of mixed units; and (vi) the follow up of the conclusions of the assessment missions to Niger and Libya, as well as of those of the workshop on border security. In this regard, they agreed to activate the Tripoli Plan of Action adopted by the regional ministerial meeting on border security, convened by the Libyan Government, from 11 to 12 March 2012, as a key instrument for border security in the region. On the next steps to enhance security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 9. The participants pledged to continue the ongoing activities as part of the implementation of the Nouakchott conclusions. They agreed on the need to enhance efforts in the following areas, in order to combat terrorism and violent extremism more effectively: (i) counter radicalization and de-radicalization programmes; (ii) the effective management of the security and defense sector, including the res- olute fight against corruption and other practices that undermine the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism and transnational crime; and (iii) harmonization of national legislations and mutual legal assistance and extradition. 10. Participants called on the Commission to develop a matrix to facilitate prompt follow up action in the areas identified in paragraph 9 above. They requested the Commission to forward an action-oriented report to the countries of the region within two months. 11. The participants took note of the recommendation made by the Commission in its report on the status of implementation of the conclusions of the ministerial

meeting of Nouakchott on the operationalization of APSA in the Sahelo-Saharan region, pending the outcomes of the ongoing assessment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the adoption of the implementation modalities of the African Ca- pacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), whose establishment was decided by the 21st ordinary session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa, on 26 and 27 May 2013. They urged the countries of the region to lend full support to this initiative, whose implementation will contribute to the enhancement of Afri- ca’s ownership of peace efforts on the continent. 12. Participants urged the United Nations, in accordance with the appeal made by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 25 April 2013, to provide the necessary support to the initiatives aimed at strengthening regional security cooperation, within the framework of the Nouakchott Process. They requested the establishment of appropriate mechanisms to facilitate coordination between the steps taken under the Nouakchott Process and MINUSMA’s activities. They urged all international partners to fully support the Nouakchott Process. They endorsed the proposal to organize a donors’ round table to mobilize resources for specific activities provided for under the Nouakchott Process. 13. Participants stressed the need to promote a comprehensive approach that takes into account the different aspects of the challenges facing the Sahelo-Saharan region. They reiterated the importance of the Declaration on the Sahel adopted by the 314th meeting of the PSC, held in Bamako, on 20 March 2012, and underlined the urgency of renewed efforts to ensure its effective implementation. They looked forward to the steps being contemplated by the AU in this respect. They welcomed the adoption of the UN Strategy for the Sahel. They stressed the importance of close coordination of all efforts and initiatives, in order to maximize their impact. 14. Participants agreed to meet before the end of 2013. The exact date and venue of the next meeting will be determined after consultations at the appropriate level. The next meeting of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services will take place during the first half of November 2013. The venue will be determined after consultations between the Commission and the countries of the region. 15. Participants thanked the Government of the Republic of Chad for having hosted the meeting, for their hospitality and for all the arrangements made for the smooth conduct of the meeting. They especially expressed their deep gratitude to Presi- dent Idriss Deby Itno, for his personal commitment and support to the efforts and initiatives aimed at furthering security and stability in the Sahelo-Saharan region.

Statement of the africa forum on the situation in the Syrian Arab Re- public

We, members of the Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government, commonly referred to as Africa Forum (AF), have been deeply concerned about the protracted civil war in Syria, which has now raged for two-and-a-half years. It has been our understanding from the beginning that this conflict was occasioned by serious differences among the Syrian people concerning their country’s constitutional and political system. It was also our understanding that the root cause of the conflict was and remain essentially political. Accordingly, its solution could only be political, and not military. Against this background, we have therefore held the view that the Syrian belligerents must urgently enter into inclusive negotiations to end the civil war through a peaceful process. Consequently, the international community has had the solemn responsibility to encourage and assist all the Syrians to engage in these inclusive negotiations. In this regard, as Africans, we have been ready to give all necessary support to the two eminent Africans, Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi, who were given the oner- ous responsibility to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict. We, therefore, support the fundamental position agreed by major players in the world concerned about Syria, in favour of a peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict, as reflected in the June 6, 2012 Final Communiqué of the Geneva Conference on Syria. Accordingly, we have been and are opposed to all international interventions which have added and would add fuel to the fire, by arming any and all the Syrian belligerents. We have received with horror the news that chemical weapons have been used in this conflict, and strongly condemn this. We are therefore convinced that all Member States of the United Nations (UN), without exception, should rely on the UN to establish the truth, to the best of its ability, with regard to various important matters. These are whether and what chemical weapons were used, where and when, and who used them. As Africans we remain acutely conscious of the elaborate disinformation campaigns in which major powers engaged, among others by using world media outlets, to propagate falsehoods to justify their armed interventions in Iraq and Libya. The only correct response even to the use of chemical weapons is not further to escalate the violent conflict, but radically to intensify and accelerate the effort towards a negotiated peaceful resolution of the Syrian civil war. Therefore, as Africans, we strongly urge that all Member States of the UN, again without exception, should desist from taking any military action in Syria of any kind, including using the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Government as justification for such action. The speedy and correct resolution of the conflict in Syr- ia demands the exercise of courageous and stellar statespersonship, without regard to the personal and national short-term interests of particular politicians in our var-

ious countries. We strongly urge that no foreign power whatsoever should insert itself in the im- mensely destructive Syrian civil war as a belligerent, even on the basis that it seeks to deter the use of chemical weapons. All those who would be statesperson players on the global stage, today, must understand what motivated the statespersons of the day, at the end of the Second World War, to insist on the establishment of international institutions, processes and law to help ensure the peaceful resolution of conflicts within and between countries. That insistence by the Allied Powers against Nazism resulted, among others, in the adoption of the UN Charter, which is a fundamental and inalienable part of contemporary international law. We, on our part, as Africans, are directly interested in a law-governed rather than an arbitrary system of international relations, imposed on the world by those who exercise military and other might. For this reason we insist that any action which practically repudiates the UN Char- ter would be an historical regression that takes all humanity backwards towards an unacceptable past, thus to repudiate the inalienable right of all nations to determine their destiny. International law upholds the view and sets the norm that conflicts within and between States should be resolved peacefully, rather than through resort to force. We strongly support the view that, in the main, international law prohibits that any State should intervene in any other to encourage the violent overthrow of the Gov- ernment of the day. This international law also regulates all such interventions as would be said to discharge the so-called ‘responsibility to protect’ peoples subject- ed to unacceptable human rights violations by their own Governments. Consistent with all the foregoing, we are convinced that the international community has a solemn obligation to do everything possible to help end the Syrian conflict by peaceful means. We urge that all African Governments, and all other Governments throughout the world, working though the UN, must act urgently to help achieve this outcome, in the fundamental interest of the peoples of Syria and the rest of the world. It is our hope and expectation that all relevant multilateral organisations, including the African Union (AU), led by the UN, will, at last, discharge their responsibility aggressively and faithfully to represent the view of the peoples of the world in favour of peace, refusing to be intimidated by those who exercise inequitable global political, military and other power. Signed by: MEMBERS OF THE AFRICA FORUM 1. HE Nicephore Dieudonne Soglo, Former President of the Republic of Benin and Vice Chairperson of the Africa Forum

2. HE Sir Quett Ketumile Joni Masire, Former President of the Republic of Botswa- na 3. HE Festus Gontebanye Mogae, Former President of the Republic of Botswana 4. HE Pierre Buyoya, Former President of the Republic of Burundi 5. HE António Manuel Mascarenhas Gomes Monteiro, Former President of the Re- public of Cape Verde 6. HE Pedro de Verona Rodrigues Pires, Former President of the Republic of Cape Verde 7. HE Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, Former President of the Republic of The Gambia 8. HE Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings, Former President of the Republic of Ghana 9. HE John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor, Former President of the Republic of Ghana 10. HE Henrique Pereira Rosa, Former President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau 11. HE Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, Former President of the Republic of Kenya 12. HE Emilio Mwai Kibaki, Former President of the Republic of Kenya 13. HE Prof Amos Claudius Sawyer, Former President of the Republic of Liberia 14. HE Dr Elson Bakili Muluzi, Former President of the Republic of Malawi 15. HE Alpha Oumar Konaré, Former President of the Republic of Mali 16. HE Cassam Uteem, Former President of the Republic of Mauritius 17. HE Karl Auguste Offmann, Former President of the Republic of Mauritius 18. HE Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Former President or the Republic of Mozambique and Chairperson of the Africa Forum 19. HE Samuel Daniel Shafiishuna Nujoma, Former President of the Republic of Na- mibia 20. HE Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari, Former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 21. HE Dr Abdul Salam Abubakar, Former President of the Federal Republic of Nige- ria 22. HE Matthew Olusegum Obasanjo, Former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 23. HE Gen Dr Yakubu Jack Dan-Yumma Gowon, Former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 24. HE Miguel Dos Anjos Trovoada, Former President of the Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe 25. HE Fradique Bandeira Melo de Menezes, Former President of the Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe 26. HE Alhaji Almad Tejan Kabbah, Former President of the Republic of Sierra Leo- ne 27. HE Nelson Rolihlahla Dalibhunga Mandela, Former President of the Republic of South Africa and Patron of the Africa Forum 28. HE Thabo Mbeki, Former President of the Republic of South Africa 29. HE Sadiq Al Mahdi, Former President of the Republic of Sudan 30. HE Benjamin William Mkapa, Former President of the Republic of Tanzania 31. HE Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Former President of the Republic of Tanzania 32. HE Dr Kenneth David Kaunda, Former President of the Republic of Zambia

33. HE Rupiah Bwezani Banda, Former President of the Republic of Zambia* 34. HE William Eteki Mboumoua, Former Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 35. HE Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali, Former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) 36. HE Kofi Atta Annan, Former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) 37. HE Prof Adedeji Adebayo, Former UN Under-Secretary General and Execu- tiveSecretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 38. HE Chief Eleazar Chukwu Emeka Anyaoku, Former Secretary General of the Commonwealth of Nations 39. HE Dr Babacar N'Diaye, Former President of the African Development Bank (AfDB) 40. HE Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Former Secretary General of the Organization of Afri- can Unity (OAU) 41. HE Edem Kodjo, Former Prime Minister of the Republic of Togo and Former Sec- retary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 42. HE Abdoulie Janneh, Former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Econom- ic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 43. HE Jean Ping, Former Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU)

Tenue d'un atelier sur la Sécurité aux frontières à Tripoli, Libye

Addis Abéba, le 5 septembre 2013: Un atelier de deux jours sur le renforcement de la coopération opérationnelle pour la sécurité aux frontières terrestres dans la ré- gion sahélo-saharienne s’est ouvert à Tripoli, en Libye, le 4 septembre 2013. L'atelier réunit les pays de la région et d'autres parties prenantes, y compris les organisations et structures régionales compétentes, ainsi que les institutions partenaires. L'atelier, qui est co-organisé par la Commission de l’Union africaine (UA) et le Gou- vernement libyen, participe du suivi des conclusions de la réunion ministérielle sur le renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire et l'opérationnalisation de l'Architec- ture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA) dans la région sahélo- saharienne, tenue à Nouakchott, en Mauritanie, le 17 mars 2013, ainsi que des conclusions opérationnelles de la 2ème réunion des chefs des Services de Rensei- gnement et de Sécurité des pays de la région, qui a eu lieu à Abidjan, en Côte d’Iv- oire, les 20 et 21 juin 2013. Dans son allocution d'ouverture, la sous-Secrétaire d’État aux Affaires politiques au Ministère libyen des Affaires étrangères, Mme Wafaa Bu'giegis, a réitéré l'engagement de la Libye à contribuer au relèvement des défis sécuritaire de l’heure. Elle a souligné que l’atelier est une occasion pour la région de renouveler son engage-

ment à forger une vision commune, d'intensifier les efforts collectifs et de dévelop- per des mécanismes opérationnels pour répondre efficacement aux problèmes qui se posent. Pour sa part, le Représentant spécial de la Présidente de la Commission de l’UA en Libye, Mondher Rezgui, a exprimé la profonde gratitude de l'UA au Gouvernement libyen pour avoir abrité l’atelier et mis à disposition les facilités requises pour en assurer le succès. Il a, en outre, souligné que l’échange d’informations, la coordination et la collaboration sont essentielles pour assurer la sécurité aux frontières. L’atelier, qui s’appuiera sur le Plan d’action de Tripoli adopté par la réunion min- istérielle régionale sur la sécurité aux frontières, tenue les 11 et 12 mars 2012, devrait permettre d’identifier les lacunes dans le contrôle aux frontières et lesmeilleures pratiques dans ce domaine, ainsi que de s’accorder sur des mesures à moyen et à long termes permettant de combler ces lacunes et de développer des modalités améliorées de communication entre les agences frontalières des pays concernés. Il est également attendu que l’atelier permette d’élaborer les mécanismes nécessaires de suivi et de délimiter les rôles et responsabilités des États concernés et des organisations régionales et internationales compétentes dans la mise en œuvre de ses conclusions.

Convening of a workshop on Border Security in Tripoli, Libya

Addis Ababa, 5 September 2013: A two-day workshop on enhancing operational land border security cooperation in the Sahelo-Saharan region opened in Tripoli, Libya, on 4 September 2013. The workshop brings together the countries of the region and other stakeholders, including relevant regional organizations and structures, as well as partner institutions. The workshop, which is being convened by the Commission of the African Un- ion (AU) and the Libyan Government, is a follow-up to the conclusions of the ministerial meeting on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahelo-Saharan region, held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on 17 March 2013, as well as the operational conclusions of the 2nd meeting of the Chiefs of Intelligence and Security Ser- vices of the countries of the region, which took place in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, on 20 and 21 June 2013. In her opening statement, the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs in the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Wafaa Bu’giegis, reiterated Libya’s commitment to play its role in addressing the security challenges at hand. She stressed that the workshop is an opportunity for the region to renew its commitment to forge a common vision, intensify collective efforts and develop operational mechanisms to effectively address the problems facing it.

On his part, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Libya, Mondher Rezgui, expressed the AU’s deep appreciation to the Libyan Gov- ernment for hosting the workshop and for providing the necessary facilities to ensure its successful conclusion. He further stressed that communication, coordination and collaboration are key to effective regional border security. The workshop, which will build on the Tripoli Plan of Action adopted by the regional ministerial meeting on border security, held from 11 to 12 March 2012, is expected to identify gaps in border control and best practices in this area, as well as agree on medium and long-term measures to address such gaps and develop en- hanced modalities of communication among the border agencies of the concerned countries. The workshop is also expected to develop the necessary follow-up mechanisms and delineate the roles and responsibilities of the concerned states and regional and international organizations in the implementation of the outcome of the workshop.

Sierra Leone donates $ 1 Million to AU Trust Fund on Mali

Sierra Leone’s Permanent Representative to the African Union, Ambassador An- drew Gbebay Bangali, handed over the cheque to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, who received it on behalf of the Chairperson of the Commission. The pledge was made in response to the request by AU Peace and Security Coun- cil (PSC), at its 341st meeting, held on 13 November 2012, to the Chairperson of the Commission, to mobilize adequate support for the African-led international efforts to help resolve the multidimensional crisis in Mali. Sierra Leone joins other African countries and institutions, which include Gabon ($1m), Namibia ($1m), Nigeria ($5m) and CEN-SAD ($1m), which have already hon- ored their pledges to the AU Trust Fund, which administers the financial support to AFISMA. The AU extends its deep appreciation to these countries and institutions and urges others to also honor their pledges to the Trust Fund. Sierra Leone’s Permanent Representative to the African Union, Ambassador An- drew Gbebay Bangali, handed over the cheque to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, who received it on behalf of the Chairperson of the Commission. The pledge was made in response to the request by AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), at its 341st meeting, held on 13 November 2012, to the Chairperson of the

Commission, to mobilize adequate support for the African-led international efforts to help resolve the multidimensional crisis in Mali. Sierra Leone joins other African countries and institutions, which include Gabon ($1m), Namibia ($1m), Nigeria ($5m) and CEN-SAD ($1m), which have already hon- ored their pledges to the AU Trust Fund, which administers the financial support to AFISMA. The AU extends its deep appreciation to these countries and institutions and urges others to also honor their pledges to the Trust Fund.

Communiqué du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA), en sa 394ème réunion sur la situation à Madagascar Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA), en sa 394ème réunion tenue, le 5 septembre 2013, a adopté la décision qui suit sur la situation à Madagas- car : Le Conseil, 1. Prend note du rapport de la Présidente de la Commission sur l’évolution de la situation à Madagascar [PSC/PR/2.(CCCXCIV)], ainsi que des communications faites par le Commissaire de l’UA à la Paix et à la Sécurité et le Médiateur de la Commu- nauté de développement de l’Afrique australe (SADC) dans la crise malgache. Le Conseil prend en outre note des déclarations faites par la Commissaire de l’UA aux Affaires politiques, ainsi que par les représentants de la présidence de la SADC, des Nations unies, de l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) etde l’Union européenne (UE); 2. Rappelle ses communiqués et communiqués de presse antérieurs sur la situation à Madagascar. Le Conseil rappelle également les conclusions de la 7ème réunion du Groupe international de contact sur Madagascar (GIC-M), tenue à Addis Abéba, le 26 juin 2013 ; 3. Réitère son appréciation à la SADC et à son Médiateur dans la crise malgache, l’ancien Président Joaquim Chissano du Mozambique, pour leur engagement et la qualité de la coopération et de la coordination avec l’UA, qui ont grandement con- tribué aux avancées qui ont été enregistrées. Le Conseil félicite la Commission pour son implication active et sa contribution au processus de sortie de crise. Le Conseil réitère également son appréciation aux partenaires internationaux regroupés au sein du GIC-M pour leur appui constant aux efforts de l’UA et de la SADC; 4. Se félicite de l’évolution positive de la situation à Madagascar, notamment la re- composition de la Cour électorale spéciale (CES), l’élimination par la nouvelle CES des candidatures illégales de la liste des candidats à l’élection présidentielle, la publication, par la CES, d’une liste définitive de 33 candidats remplissant les conditions légales requises en vue de participer à l’élection présidentielle, et l’adoption par la Commission électorale nationale indépendante pour la Transition (CENI-T), conjoin- tement avec les représentants des Nations unies, d’un calendrier révisé pour la tenue des prochaines consultations électorales fixant au 25 octobre 2013 le 1er tour de l’élection présidentielle, et au 20 décembre 2013 un éventuel 2ème tour couplé aux élections législatives; 5. Apporte son plein appui aux décisions prises par la CES, et félicite les personnali- tés et formations politiques qui ont accepté les décisions de la CES. Le Conseil, en particulier, félicite le Président de la Transition, Andry Rajoelina, pour le rôle crucial qu’il a joué dans la prise des mesures nécessaires en vue de la relance du processus électoral sur des bases conformes aux textes malgaches pertinents et aux de- mandes des partenaires de Madagascar, ainsi que pour l’entière coopération qu’il a

apportée à l’UA et à la SADC ; 6. Exhorte tous les acteurs politiques et sociaux malgaches à contribuer positivement au processus en cours, en particulier en préservant la paix et la stabilité, ainsi qu’en faisant preuve d'esprit de tolérance et de réconciliation nationale, en vue du déroulement réussi des élections présidentielles et législatives qui marqueront le parachèvement de la restauration de l'ordre constitutionnel. Le Conseil exhorte en outre le Président de la Transition et l'ensemble du Gouvernement de Transition d’union nationale à poursuivre le processus de mise en œuvre de la Feuille de route pour la sortie de crise et de rester neutres tout au long du processus électoral ; 7. Met en garde tous ceux qui seraient tentés d’entraver le processus en cours, notamment en remettant en cause les décisions de la CES. Le Conseil souligne sa dé- termination, en collaboration avec la SADC et avec le soutien des partenaires internationaux, à prendre des sanctions individuelles, ainsi que toute autre mesure ap- propriée, contre tous les acteurs concernés ; 8. Décide, au regard des développements positifs intervenus à Madagascar, la levée immédiate des sanctions ciblées imposées à 109 personnalités politiques malgaches, aux termes de ses communiqués PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCXVI) et PSC/PR/ COMM.1(CCXXI) adoptés lors de ses 216ème et 221ème réunions tenues respectivement le 19 février et le 17 mars 2010, étant entendu que la reprise de la participation de ce pays aux activités de l’UA ne pourra intervenir qu’après la tenue de l’élection présidentielle et la prise de fonction du nouveau Président, con- formément au paragraphe 10 de son communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.(CCCLXVIII) ; 9. Exhorte les États membres de l’UA en mesure de le faire et les partenaires internationaux à apporter tout le soutien financier, logistique et technique pour accom- pagner le processus en cours et faciliter la tenue d’élections libres, transparentes, régulières et crédibles ; 10. Se félicite des mesures et dispositions envisagées par la Commission en vue d’assurer l’accompagnement et l’observation du processus électoral, y compris par le déploiement de missions d’observation électorale à long et à court termes diri- gées par d’éminentes personnalités africaines, et l’encourage à les mettre rapidement en œuvre. Le Conseil exhorte les autres acteurs internationaux concernés à prendre des dispositions similaires ; 11. Lance un appel à la communauté internationale pour qu’elle apporte un appui humanitaire d’urgence à Madagascar pour permettre au pays de faire face aux problèmes posés par la mauvaise campagne rizicole de cette année et par l’invasion acridienne, compte tenu particulièrement de l’impact que cette situation pourrait avoir sur la bonne conduite du processus électoral. Le Conseil exhorte en outre les partenaires internationaux de Madagascar à apporter le soutien requis pour le relèvement socio-économique de Madagascar ; 12. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question.

Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 394th meeting on the situation in Madagascar

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 394th meeting held on 5 September 2013, adopted the following decision on the situation in Madagas- car: Council, 1. Takes note of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the evolution of the situation in Madagascar [PSC/PR/2 .(CCCXCIV)], as well as of the briefings provided by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and the Mediator of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the Malagasy crisis. Council also takes note of the statements made by the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, as well as by the representatives of the SADC Chairperson, the United Na- tions (UN), the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF) and the Europe- an Union (EU); 2. Recalls its previous communiqués and press statements on the situation in Mad- agascar. Council also recalls the conclusions of the 7th meeting of the International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M), held in Addis Ababa, on 26 June 2013; 3. Reiterates its appreciation to SADC and its Mediator in the Malagasy crisis, former President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, for their commitment as well as for their cooperation and coordination with the AU, which have greatly contributed to the progress that has been recorded. Council commends the Commission for its active involvement and contribution to the crisis exit process. Council also reiterates its appreciation to the international partners acting within the framework of the ICG-M for their continued support to the AU and SADC efforts; 4. Welcomes the positive evolution of the situation in Madagascar, notably the re- composition of the Special Electoral Court (CES), the removal, by the new CES, of the illegal candidacies from the list of candidates for the presidential election, the publication by the CES of a final list of 33 candidates who meet the legal require- ments to participate in the presidential election, and the adoption by the Independ- ent National Electoral Commission for the Transition (CENI-T), jointly with UN representatives, of a revised calendar for the holding of the forthcoming elections, which schedules the holding of the 1st round of the Presidential election for 25 Oc- tober 2013 and that of a possible second round, coupled with the legislative elections, for 20 December 2013; 5. Fully supports the decisions taken by the CES, and commends the personalities and political groupings who have accepted the decisions of the CES. In particular, Council commends the President of the Transition, Andry Rajoelina, for the crucial role he played in the adoption of the required measures for the re-launching of the electoral process in a manner that is consistent with the relevant Malagasy legisla-

tion and the requests by Madagascar’s partners, as well as for the full cooperation he extended to the AU and SADC; 6. Urges all Malagasy political and social actors to contribute positively to the ongoing process, in particular by maintaining peace and stability and upholding the spirit of tolerance and national reconciliation, in order to facilitate the successful holding of the presidential and legislative elections that will mark the completion of the res- toration of constitutional order. Council further urges the President of the Transi- tion and the entire Transitional Government of National Unity to pursue the implementation process of the Roadmap for a way out of the crisis and to remain neutral throughout the electoral process; 7. Warns all those who may be tempted to hinder the ongoing process, particularly by challenging the decisions of the CES. Council underlines its determination, in collaboration with SADC and with the support of the international partners, to impose individual sanctions, as well as any other appropriate measures, against the concerned actors; 8. Decides, in the light of the positive developments that took place in Madagascar, to immediately lift the sanctions imposed on 109 Malagasy political personalities, pursuant to its communiqués PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCXVI) and PSC/PR/COMM.1 (CCXXI), adopted at its 216th and 221st meetings, held on 19 February and 17 March 2010, respectively, on the understanding that the resumption of the country’s participation in the AU’s activities will only take place after the holding of the presidential election and the assumption of duty of the elected President, in line with paragraph 10 of communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM (CCCLXVIII); 9. Urges all AU Member States in a position to do so, as well as the international partners, to extend all the necessary financial, logistical and technical support to the ongoing process, in order to facilitate the holding of free, transparent, fair and credible elections; 10. Welcomes the steps and arrangements envisaged by the Commission in order to support and observe the electoral process, including through the deployment of long and short term observer missions led by eminent African personalities, and encourages it to ensure their early implementation. Council urges the other concerned international actors to take similar measures; 11. Appeals to the international community to provide an emergency humanitarian assistance to Madagascar to help the country to cope with the problems caused by this year poor rice crop and the locust invasion, particularly given the impact that this situation may have on the conduct of the electoral process. Council further urges the international partners of Madagascar to extend the necessary support for the socio-economic recovery of country; 12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

L'Union Africaine se félicite des résultats de la réunion au sommet entre les Présidents du Soudan et du Soudan du Sud

Addis Abéba, le 5 septembre 2013: La Présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine (UA), Dr Nkosazana DlaminiZuma, se félicite des résultats de la réunion au sommet entre le Prési- dent Omar Hassan Al Bashir de la République du Soudan et le Président Salv a Kiir Mayardit de la République du Soudan du Sud, tenue à Khartoum le 3 septembre 2013. La Présidente de la Commission est encouragée par les mesures prises par les deux Présidents pour positivement conclure leur Sommet, en particulier la décision du Gouvernement du Soudan de suspendre indéfiniment l'arrêt du transport et de la transformation du pétrole en provenance du Soudan du Sud. Elle félicite les deux Présidents pour avoir initié l'activation des deux Comités créés pour superviser la mise en œuvre des Accords de coopération du 27 septembre 2012.

La Présidente de la Commission se félicite de l'engagement pris par les deux Prési- dents de poursuivre le dialogue sur toutes les questions en suspens, notamment celles relatives à Abyei. Dans l’intervalle, la Présidente de la Commission exhorte les parties prenantes et les citoyens des deux pays de continuer à apporter l’appui nécessaire aux efforts de leurs dirigeants respectifs visant à régler les questions en suspens.

The African Union welcomes the outcome of the summit meeting between the Presidents of Sudan and South Sudan

Addis Ababa, 5 September 2013: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, welcomes the outcome of the Summit meeting between President Omar Hassan Al Bashir of the Republic of Sudan and President Salva Kiir Mayardit of the Republic of South Sudan, held in Khartoum, on 3 September 2013. The Chairperson of the Commission is encouraged by the steps taken by the two Presidents to conclude the Summit with positive outcomes, particularly the decision by the Government of Sudan to indefinitely suspend the shutdown of the transportation and processing of oil from South Sudan. She commends the two Presidents for the activation of the two Committees created to oversee the implementation of the 27 September 2012 Cooperation Agreements. The Chairperson of the Commission welcomes the commitment by the two Presi- dents to continue their engagement on all outstanding issues, particularly those relating to Abyei. Meanwhile, the Chairperson urges all stakeholders and the citizens of both countries to continue to support their leaders in their efforts to address the outstanding challenges.

Terrorism in Africa

Africa and the merchants of death SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 It’s depressing how little seems to change when it comes to the relationship between the “great powers” and Africa. This piece by Michael Jones in World Outline provides an alarming summary of the latest turn in this relationship: In a strange parallel to the great 19th century’s “Scramble for Africa”, the world’s poorest continent is set once again to become the object of fierce Western competition. However, whereas Cecil Rhodes and Rudyard Kipling waxed lyrical about colo- nial possessions and the “White man’s burden”, today the prize takes the form of lucrative defence contracts and licenses for the local manufacture of hardware. As you might imagine, this is a very different “scramble” altogether. Wracked by poverty, malnutrition, disease and corruption, and with millions of its inhabitants dependent on foreign aid, Africa’s leaders, it seems, can nevertheless wave the magic wand and find a few billion dollars to buy deadly toys – and the Eu- ropeans, Americans, Russians and Chinese are only too happy to oblige. As Jones says, Africa, which accounts for 20 per cent of the world’s landmass and approximately 15 per cent of its population, is expected to spend over 20 billion dollars on defence projects over the next decade. As the European defence market becomes ever more bereft of big spenders and Asian markets face strong competition from China, Afri- ca’s 54 states will constitute the last major geopolitical frontier for defence companies… At the end of last month, Defense News reported that… South Africa has been a pio- neer during this new wave of interest, and has allegedly negotiated licensing deals with “Swiss, US, Russian, Brazilian, Malaysian and French companies”. Local rifle producer Truvelo has partnered with Colt Defense, the famed American arms manu- facturer, to produce sniper rifles that meet increased “police and military” demand. A similar deal was penned between South African aerospace company Denel and Swiss firm B&T “paving the way [for the production of] small arms ranging from sub -machineguns to grenade launchers”. In other regional deals, Algeria is interested in purchasing armoured vehiclesfrom Turkish company Otokar, whilst last year the Serbian Military Technology Institute negotiated with the Kenyan government for armoured vehicles and artillery. Ammu- nition factories are to be established in Libya and Egypt, and other deals for hardware with Sudan and Somalia are in the pipeline… It is concerning that so much government money will be invested into arms deals

when the UN has warned that 22 of the 24 lowest Human Development Index nations are in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in some instances GDP per capita is less than 200 dollars a year… It goes without saying that African states need to defend themselves from external threats and, more to the point, threats from national and transnational terrorist and criminal groups – the insurgencies in Mali and the Al-Qaeda attack on the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria are cases in point. But who will guarantee that Af- rican governments will not allow their purchases to fall into the hands of armed groups? The pattern so far is not encouraging. You have only to look at Libya. As Jones concludes, The West’s “burden” has become an unforgiving exercise in addressing Africa’s chronic deficiencies, whilst also providing it with the tools to foster instability. It is, of course, naive to think that disarmament is either realistic or desirable, but the situation in Africa is a complex web of security, poverty and exploitation. Perhaps the UN’s adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty this year after 20 long years of delib- eration will go some way towards reversing the problem. It sets out to “prohibit states from transferring conventional weapons to countries when they know those weapons would be used to commit or facilitate genocide, crimes against humanity”. Perhaps the UN Arms Trade Treaty will do the trick. However, the trend towards local manufacturing of weapons, be it on licence or otherwise, will make the treaty all the more difficult to enforce. One only has to look at the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s to see how things might develop. Source: www.redressonline.com/

Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence In North Africa? – Analysis September 12, 2013

NORTH AFRICA

By Anouar Boukhars The January 2013 French intervention in northern Mali has severely degraded the military capabilities of militant organisations, disrupted their organisational ca- pacities and destroyed many of their sanctuaries. But as violent extremists are being subdued in one area, new hot spots of confrontation are emerging. When forced out of one of their safe havens, transnational terrorist groups such as Al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)1 just disappear into other peripheral zones of tension. The possibilities for expanding the threat boundaries are manifold, as are the opportunities to exploit security vacuums in much of North Africa. Already, optimism about France’s military mission in northern Mali is giving way to concerns over AQIM’s creeping into Libya where it has dense connections to trafficking networks. AQIM’s ambition to diversify its redoubts and bases of operation extends to southern Tunisia, so far a corridor region for arms traffickers and criminal networks connected to the Sahel. Increasingly, however, weapons are being kept for use by local extremist groups, threatening to destabilise countries in the midst of difficult political transitions.2

This paper examines how chaotic environments in North Africa are giving new breathing space to a splintered terrorist organisation. Chastened by its many blunders in northern Mali, an off-balance AQIM is trying to shift gear, focusing less on becoming the face of local militancy in North Africa and more on stealthily para- siting local militant organisations without dominating them. Monopolising political and military power in northern Mali drove AQIM to the brink of defeat. The excesses of its operatives on the ground and zealous application of extremist forms of religious law alienated the local populations and gave rise to a tidal wave of popular revulsion against AQIM and its armed allies. Based on its past record, however, AQIM faces a steep learning curve. Undoubtedly, the organisation is capable of thriving in unstable areas and exploiting local extremist organisations. But its internal divisions and inconsistent narrative will continue to complicate its efforts to reinvent itself and gain popular support in North Africa. An adaptive but troubled organisation After its strategic reversals in northern Mali, AQIM is trying to remain relevant by creeping into unstable areas in North Africa and melding with local militant groups. The organisation is not the only transnational militant group that is attempting to stage a deadly comeback. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a splinter offshoot of AQIM whose membership is primarily West African, is also attempting to regroup and recruit in Niger, Mauritania and in the Polisario- controlled Sahrawi refugee camps in southwest Algeria. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recently warned that the precarious situation of young, dis- gruntled Sahrawis make them vulnerable to radicalisation.3As happened in northern Mali, the prospect of regional terrorist and criminal organisations exploiting secular ethno-nationalist grievances cannot be ruled out. Belonging to a militant group becomes enticing when membership in the organisation provides the potential to transcend ethnic specificity and entrenched social and tribal hierarchies. The many Malian Peuls and Songhay in Gao who joined MU- JAO hailed from lower social status and captive lineages.4 Some were lured by the prospect of transcending rigid social and clan structures; others, especially the Songhay, were driven by heightened feelings of ethnic nationalism; and almost all were tempted by the increasing monetary rewards of joining well-funded terrorist organisations. The same applies to those who actively sought out the Tuareg radical group Ansar Eddine (The Supporters of Religion). ‘By rooting their ideology and aims to Islam and Jihad’, writes Roland Marchal, ‘the radical Islamist armed groups were credible enough to challenge that social hierarchy’.5 Their zeal and overreach eventually doomed their project, but the fact that they managed to provide, albeit fleetingly, an alternative to a state of patronised corruption and pure anarchy is testament to the ability of transnational extremist groups to exploit social and political grievances.6 The prospect of AQIM and its affiliates manipulating ethnic and social tensions in

the hinterlands of North Africa is of great concern to regional governments and Western officials. AQIM is at its strongest when it concentrates on Western targets while stealthily using local militant organisations to advance its international agenda. As it learnt the hard way in northern Mali, to territorialise itself within a given base and monopolise political power was a huge miscalculation. It made the organisation unpopular and its warriors vulnerable to French reconnaissance aircrafts and American drones. The Mali fiasco for AQIM and its allies is another reminder that unwieldy transnational terrorist movements are not in the business of ruling or holding territory. Territorial grounding requires deep social connection and political purpose, which AQIM still lacks. In northern Mali, AQIM managed to build a network structure of family ties, establish economic and military alliances with local groups, and beef up its membership with local recruits. But the organisation’s own rigid hierarchical structures and the concentration of Algerians in top level positions made AQIM an Algerian organisation par excellence. This Algerian dominance, compounded by the organisation’s inability to rein in its operatives, undermined AQIM’s credibility as a well-run ‘democratic’ North African militant organisation and blunted its impact on the local populations. Following its strategic reversals in Mali, AQIM’s return to its de-territorialised nature is thus a logical course of action. By going back to its original form, AQIM hopes to get a new lifeline. Such mutation is not random, but rather characteristic of the organisation’s trajectory. Since its forced dislocation from its major hubs in Algeria in the early 2000s, AQIM (then the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat – GSPC) has sought strategic grounding and relevance in the Sahel. Its internal dis- cords, moral schizophrenia and lack of strategic constraint ended up costing it its territorial entrenchment in the vast northern spaces of Mali, prompting yet another process of transformation that takes it back to where it came from – North Afri- ca.7 After the French intervention: AQIM at a crossroads This is not the first time that AQIM finds itself uprooted, marginalised and drifting ideologically. After its strategic defeat in Algeria in the early 2000s, the then GSPC was in desperate need of finding a new sanctuary and rebranding itself. Its image was badly battered and its narrative was fragmented, incoherent and widely discredited. The 11 September 2001 attacks and the onset of America’s global war on terror suddenly gave a declining Algerian terrorist organisation new purpose and focus.8 Embracing Bin-Laden’s war against the ‘crusader alliance’ was an opportunistic means to salvage its reputation. At the time, Bin Laden’s cachet conferred re- spectability on militant groups. Acquiring his imprimatur in 2006 boosted the group’s acceptability in radical circles. In the midst of this search for a new incarnation, AQIM sought sanctuaries in the Sahelian hinterlands. Morocco, Tunisia and Libya were difficult to penetrate, but the immense territories of the Sahara provided ideal locations to resettle. Con-

trary to much conventional wisdom, however, Mali’s fall into AQIM’s hands was not due to the ‘syndrome of ungoverned spaces’. If that were true, Mauritania, Ni- ger and other weak states would have suffered the same fate.9 AQIM did not spread its tentacles in a political, economic and social vacuum in northern Mali. AQIM thrived because of the active collusion of state actors, the toxic relations between centre and periphery, and inter and intra-ethnic competition in the north over drug trafficking proceeds, resources, and rights. The eruption of civil war in Libya in 2011 was another opportunity for the organisation to seize the moment. Just as the global war on terror gave the organisation new life, the West’s military assistance in ending Muammar Gaddafi’s dictatorship in Libya opened new opportunities for AQIM to arm itself and further exacerbate insecurities in the region. Western governments also contributed to the growth of AQIM and its affiliates through payments of large sums of ransom money.10 But AQIM’s fortunes ended in January 2013, in part due to its overreach in hijack- ing the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. The organisation’s amorphous structure, factional competition within its Algerian leadership and the fluidity of its affiliates made it almost impossible for AQIM to rein in the excesses of its ‘hothead’ emirs in Mali. As predicted by Abdelmalek Droukdel, the Algerian-based emir of AQIM, the zealous application of a radical form of Shariah law alienated the local population and mobilised international support for ending AQIM-led rule in northern Mali.11 In a context of government-sponsored corruption and rigid social hierarchy, people yearned for justice and equal treatment, and Shariah held the prom- ise of equality for all under the law.12 But the hypocrisy of Droukdel’s fighters in upholding the rule of law to all but themselves and their extremist excesses and flouting of the standards of proof prescribed by Shariah alienated their constituen- cy.13 As Droukdel warned in a letter recovered by the Associated Press after the French intervention, the abrupt imposition of Shariah law in inhospitable environments undermines religious belief, causes a backlash against the mujahedeen, and inevitably leads to the defeat of their experiment.14 Droukdel wanted his commanders to compromise on ideology and to avoid antagonising regional neighbours. Only by building bridges can AQIM’s supporters get out of the fringes of society and with- stand resistance to its project. In a note of stark realism, he stated that ‘administration of at ‘administration of the region and standing up to the international, foreign, and regional challenge is a large duty that exceeds our military and financial and structural capability for the time being. So it is wise then for us not to bear the burden alone in this phase’.15 Droukdel did not hide his exasperation over the fact that his instructions went un- heeded by local commanders on the ground. In another letter found by the Associ- ated Press, Droukdel and the 14 members of AQIM’s Shura Council bemoaned the renegade actions of the commander of an AQIM battalion in the Sahel known as ‘The Masked Brigade’ and the ‘Signed-in-Blood Battalion’.16 Mokhtar Belmokhtar,

an Algerian jihadi gangster, is notorious for his insubordination and contempt for management authority, ‘a bleeding wound’ in his relationship with his AQIM bosses in Algeria.17 Belmoktar’s drift from AQIM culminated in his formal defection from the group in December 2012, a decision that according to the Shura Council threat- ened ‘to fragment the being of the organisation and tear it apart limb by limb’.18 It is important to note that insubordination and infighting within al-Qaeda and its affiliates is fairly common. The frustration of AQIM’s leadership with Mokhtar Bel- mokhtar’s disobedience recalls that of Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s new leader, with the then head of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Before his killing in an American bombing raid in June 2006, al-Zarqawi relished his rogue status, repeatedly shrugging off calls for restraint and defying pressure by the organisation’s core to change his ruthless tactics of gruesome beheadings of hostages and massacring of Shi’a. ‘Do not be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shaykh of the slaughterers’, al- Zawahiri warned al-Zarqawi. ‘We are in a battle’, he added, ‘and more than half of this battle is taking place in the media’.19 Al-Zawahiri feared that al-Zarqawi’s bru- tality was alienating Iraqis and draining any sympathy al- Qaeda enjoyed among the Sunni tribes for its war against US occupation. Similar frustrations have emerged lately with al-Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi, who is proving difficult to control. In April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced a merger of his group with Jabhat Nusra without the approval of Ayman al-Zawahiri or consultation with Abu Mohammad al-Golani, Jabhat Nusra’s leader. The latter saw the announcement as a power grab; ‘the most dangerous development in the history of global jihad’, to use the words of one of his operatives on the ground.20 Al-Zawahiri admonished al-Baghdadi for his unilateral move and urged him and al- Golani to submit to his mediation and ‘stop any verbal or actual attacks against one another’.21 Infighting between the Iraqi and Syrian branches of al-Qaeda has already led to several defections and ‘a breakdown in operations as members disa- greed over who commanded the battlefield’.22 Al-Zawahari fears that this discord threatens to distract from the challenges of war fighting and holding territorial control. This is the situation of AQIM today. Its shadowy nature and unwieldiness have made its project in the Sahel unworkable. Some AQIM internal correspondence reveals a deeply frustrated and powerless leadership, unable to control its operatives and execute its designs on the Sahel. Just as in the late 1990s, the hollowed-out terrorist organisation is once again at a crossroads and trying to reverse its decline. Efforts to build relationships with a diverse network of militants in North Africa are underway. AQIM’s Algerian leadership hopes that this time its soldiers will mask their true intent, adopt a low profile, and avoid dominating the political and military stage. ‘Better for you to be silent and pretend to be a “domestic” movement that has its own causes and concerns’, Droukdel told his ill-disciplined fighters in northern Mali. ‘There is no call for you to show that we have an expansionary, ji-

hadi, Qaeda or any other sort of project’.23 In other words, the goal is not to monopolise but to instrumentalise the local extremist groups that have sprung up in the aftermath of the Arab spring. Al- Qaeda members are already present in the leadership of these organisations, especially in Ansar al Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law) in Libya and Tunisia. Eying Libya and Tunisia AQIM recent attempts to regain influence start in the chaotic hinterlands of Libya. After being expelled from northern Mali, AQIM soldiers sought refuge in the Libyan areas that border Algeria, Chad, and Niger. Libya’s south exhibits similar character- istics to the Saharan territories AQIM exploited in Mali. It is an immense desert space that stretches over 2,000 km and lies at the crossroads of major trafficking routes to Algeria, Niger, and Chad. Even under Gaddafi, Libya’s south was an un- controllable hub for smuggling and trafficking. Since the dictator’s downfall, the region has been awash with weapons, criminality has shot up and clashes over the control of trafficking routes have become more frequent. Ethnic skirmishes between African and Arab tribes – once kept under control through repression or co- optation – add to the region’s growing lawlessness, as evidenced by the increase in robberies, jailbreaks, and deadly bomb attacks.24 Indeed, since December 2012, the south has been declared a closed military zone by the country’s General Na- tional Congress and is guarded by 6,000 soldiers.25 However, according tothe south’s former military governor, Ramadan Al Barasi, policing the desert would require tripling the number of soldiers, as well as significant investments in bolstering the capacity of the security services.26 Amidst this volatile environment, AQIM lurks in the shadows. Chastened by their blunders in Mali, the organisation’s fighters are operating under the radar. AQIM hopes that this time its operatives will stick to orders. Before their expulsion from Mali, Droukdel admonished his fighters for not broadening their alliances ‘to the various sectors and parts of Azawad society – Arab and Tuaregs and Zingiya (blacks)’ and for failing to ‘end the situation of political and social and intellectual separation between the mujahidin and these sectors, particularly the big tribes, and the main rebel movements with their various ideologies, and the elite of Azawad society, its clerics, its groupings, its individuals, and its noble forces’.27 He urged them to allow local militants full operational and administrative control of their territories, and to concentrate instead on their ‘external activity’.28 The car bomb attack on the French embassy in Tripoli on 23 April 2013 fits this mode of thinking.29 AQIM’s natural allies in Libya are local extremists who share the same ideology if not the same goals. They are mostly present in the eastern coastal region of Ben- ghazi, Darnah, and in the heavily forested Jebel Akhdar (the green mountain). These areas served as Islamist bastions of resistance against Gaddafi as well as pro- ducers of dedicated jihadi cadres who fought against the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.30 Dozens of militants from north-eastern Libya also fought with AQIM in northern Mali.31 The most notorious of these local extremist groups is Ansar al

Sharia, a constellation of Islamist militias with contacts with transnational jihadists transiting the area. Ansar al Sharia is suspected of having carried out the terrorist attack that killed US Ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi in September 2012, as well as the recurrent assaults on diplomatic and humanitarian missions. After the overthrow of Gaddafi, the group tried to position itself among the plethora of self-formed armed militias as a social and religious movement that can restore law and order. But its zeal and excesses, compounded by the attack on the US consulate, triggered a popular backlash against the group, as evidenced by citizens storming its headquarters after the death of Ambassador Stevens. Libyan radical Islamist groups are now facing the same challenges their fellow extremists confronted in Mali. Despite the weakness of the state and its inability to impose order, violent extremism has few takers even in a deeply conservative society as that of Libya. Libyan citizens have demonstrated remarkable courage and determination in pro- testing against the rule of armed factions, including government-aligned Islamist militias like the Supreme Security Committees and Libya Shield. These were depu- tised by Libya’s new rulers to restore order in the cities, pacify tribal tensions in the provinces and manage the country’s porous borders in the west and south.32 ‘Increasingly though’, writes Carnegie scholar Frederic Wehrey, ‘they have become a law unto themselves, pursuing agendas that are regional, tribal, Islamist and sometimes criminal’.33 The vigilance of civil society is unfortunately not enough to address the enormous security and political challenges facing Libya. Until the army and police are strengthened, and the parallel security forces are integrated into a national force or transformed into a national guard, insecurity will remain pervasive. Building functioning and inclusive security institutions will remain elusive as long as political reconciliation is stymied and the political drivers of insecurity are unaddressed.34 Libyans are increasingly frustrated with rising militia violence, high unemployment, paralysing political power disputes over the regions and a stringent political isola- tion law that bars officials who served under Gaddafi from public service.35 AQIM is exploiting this chaotic environment to regroup, recruit and build bridges with like-minded ideological extremists in the east and southwest of the country. Like in Mali, it will also seek opportunistic cooperation with tribal groups and criminal networks. ‘If we can achieve this positive thing in even a limited amount, then even if the project fails later, it will be just enough that we will have planted the first, good seed in this fertile soil’, Droukdel wrote in his manifesto.36 After failing in Mali, Droukdel hopes that AQIM can plant the seeds of another generation of AQIM sympathisers in North Africa. Naturally, Libya is not the only place where the organisation is attempting to recover from its losses. Several of its fighters are believed to have retreated to southern Algeria where they initially came from. Despite being uprooted from the main population centres in Algeria, AQIM

retains a marginal presence in the east and south of the country. Indeed, its main leadership never left its redoubts in eastern Algeria. It is not surprising, therefore, that AQIM still has many contacts with cells in the country. In the region of East- ern Kabylie, abductions and attacks on military barracks persist.37 The Bouira region in central Algeria remains restive, with regular skirmishes between armed militants and Algerian security forces.38 The strength and experience of Algerian security and military forces, however, precludes a scenario where AQIM regains its sanctuaries in the country. Tunisia is also a tantalising target for AQIM. Immediately after the overthrow of the country’s long-time dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, in January 2011, AQIM sensed an opportunity to position itself in the new volatile political transition. The sudden weakening of the repressive state apparatus opened up the public space for radical Salafi preaching and recruitment. ‘Take advantage of this historical opportunity to spread the manhaj (methodology) of tawhid (monotheism) and jihad’, read an AQIM communiqué released in the early weeks of the Tunisian revolution.39 In other statements, AQIM advised local militant groups to foster co- hesiveness among all Islamist groups and avoid unnecessary confrontations with the state. In the recent crackdown by the Tunisian Islamist-led government on radical Salafi groups, AQIM cautioned Islamist militants to show ‘patience and wisdom’ and avoid falling into the trap of ‘provocations’.40 To widen their recruitment base, AQIM urges Islamist groups to adopt a light touch in spreading the faith and avoid associating with Takfiri groups, who con- sider non- practising Muslims as infidels.41 ‘Let them be kind in their dawa (proselytising)’, a statement reads, ‘since kindness in any matter makes it beauti- ful and violence in any matter makes it disgraceful’.42 At the same time, radical militant groups remain alert at the fact that their enemies are waiting for the op- portune moment to strike. The military overthrow on 3 July 2013 of the demo- cratically-elected government in Egypt is a strong reminder of the power of the deep state, an assortment of the remnants of the old regime and bureaucratic forces, allied with secular opposition groups who deeply distrust all Islamists.43 In Tunisia, prominent secular figures have warned that when in power, they will strike hard on the Salafi movement. Tunisia is different from Egypt. The military is not a major political force and is very unlikely to act as an arbiter of power. But the fear of (secular) allies of the old regime rising again in Tunisia is probably one of the reasons why AQIM has argued against sending young Tunisians to battlefields as far as Syria. While the relation between militant groups and Islamists in government has been tense, the return of hardline secular groups to power would most probably result in violent crackdowns on Salafi groups. This might stymie Salafi outreach and their dawa services even as it opens up new recruiting possibilities. The assassination of Mohamed Brahmi, the leader of a secular opposition party, on 25 July 2013 led to greater uncertainty in Tunisia’s security environment.

AQIM and militant groups are trying to prepare for all eventualities. In Tunisia, Ansar al Sharia – whose fugitive leader, a veteran of the Afghan war against the Soviets, is suspected of orchestrating the September 2012 attack on the US embassy in Tunis – is the group closest in ideology to AQIM.44 Unlike the case of AQIM fighters in Mali, AQIM is content to see Ansar al Sharia assume operational control of dawa activities in Tunisia, while it concentrates on militant activity in and outside of the country. AQIM has so far benefited from the disorganisation and demoralisation of Tunisian security and intelligence services. The military is still struggling to dislodge AQIM-linked operatives holed up since last December in the southwest rugged mountainous border with Algeria.45 On 29 July, at least eight soldiers were killed in an ambush.46 So far, Tunisia’s frontier regions in the west and south have been used as transit points for armed militant groups, smugglers and drug traffickers connected to the Sahel, and increasingly to Egypt and the Levant. If these non-state violent actors establish a presence in Tunisia’s borders, the danger to the country and its neighbours would be consequential. They can provide safe havens for AQIM and its affiliates to plot attacks on eastern Algeria, as well as offer violent extremists an environment suited for generating profits from smuggling and illicit trafficking. They can also be ideal locations to recruit and train the growing number of disen- franchised and alienated Tunisian youth. The number of Tunisians involved with regional terrorist organisations is already a great concern. The danger of Tunisian violent extremists was highlighted in the terrorist attack perpetrated against the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria, in which one third of the 32 hostage-takers were Tunisians. Tunisians also constitute one of the largest cohorts of foreign fighters in Syria. Tunisian security forces have been mobilised to prevent a further influx of young Tunisians to Syria. Several networks specialised in facilitating the journey through the Libyan border have recently been dismantled. Tunisian authorities fear that the country could become more than just a transit route as Tunisians fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, a local Syrian extremist group, return home. Terrorism is ‘the biggest threat facing Tunisian security in the post-revolution era’, said Prime Minister Ali Larayedh.47 In this context of security vacuum and fragmented politics, there are many win- dows of opportunity for AQIM to creep into Tunisia and Libya. The proliferation of militant organisations and the ever-larger availability of weapons complicate the landscape of militancy in the Maghreb and beyond. As a recently released UN report warned, the flows of weapons from Libya ‘are fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-state actors, including terrorist groups’.48 Marginalising AQIM The prospect of cross-pollinisation between AQIM and local militant groups is a

source of great concern to both North African and Western governments.49 The latter also fear cross-fertilisation between AQIM and terrorist organisations in Afri- ca such as Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.50 This was expressed in January 2013 by UK Prime Minister David Cameron when he warned after the hostage crisis in Algeria that the West should brace for another decades- long struggle against Islamist militancy in North Africa. ‘This is a global threat and it will require a global response’.51 The Western response will be key to whether AQIM remains a containable threat or develops into a major danger to regional stability and Western interests. AQIM’s internal divisions, hollow ideology, and lack of control over its affiliates and field operatives seem to condemn it to a parasitic role. International overreaction to threats, however, could give AQIM a new boost. The global war on terrorism helped AQIM to come out of irrelevance. Similarly, mil- itarisation of policy risks accelerated the development of a ‘common conscious- ness’ among local and regional militant organisations.52 The temptation to make counterterrorism policies a fixture of policy towards North Africa does not take into account local dynamics and does little to address the real political, economic and regional causes that drive militancy. A balance must be found between remote controlled killing of suspected terrorists and helping governments in difficult transitions revive their economies and reform their security and judicial sectors. AQIM can only be marginalised, as Olivier Roy aptly put it, if the ‘local forces it takes advantage of could be persuaded that they have no reason to protect it’.53 The same applies to other transnational terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula operating in Yemen, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, based in Iraq and active in Syria, or local extremist groups like Boko Haram in northern Nigeria or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria. In the case of Syria, local and transnational extremist groups cannot be contained as long as Western countries are unwilling to provide moderate rebel forces with arms and training. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Jabhat al Nusra have lost a lot of popular support due to their religious radicalism. For example, in Raqqa in Syria militant brigades who control the city thanks to superior armed forces and alliances with influential local tribes were recently compelled by popular protests to tone down their zealous preaching and limit their interference in people’s daily lives.54 The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has also recently stepped up its community outreach to ‘soften its image’ and counter mounting backlash against its radical tactics and attempts to impose harsh Islamic law. During Ramadan, the group, for example, sponsored and featured online several community gatherings, food distribution events, ‘ice- cream-eating competitions’ and other cash prize contests. This is ‘a far cry from the organization’s usual fare of video offerings, which includes public executions’, wrote Loveday Morris in The Washington Post.55 Whether this change of tactic pays off or not, the reality remains that some of the groups or tribes supporting the rebellion in Syria will continue to cooperate with Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant as long as they do not see credible alterna- tives.56

To marginalise extremists groups in Tunisia and Libya urgent efforts must be de- ployed to help both countries address their uneven regional development and high unemployment rates, as well as reform and democratise their security institutions. The most urgent task in Tunisia is for political actors quickly to smooth over the last remaining differences over the constitution draft and move towards elections. The country desperately needs its rulers to focus on the economy and on strengthening the rule of law and order. Failure to do so would threaten the democratic transition in Tunisia. Popular patience for political squabbling, economic incompetence and insecurity is wearing thin. The key therefore is to fulfil people’s economic needs and reassure sceptical secularists that their interests and values will be protected in the new Tunisia. Equally important, stigmatising all Islamists and Salafists and resurrecting the security state as some hardline secularists are calling for is a recipe for more violence and unrest.57 The worst case scenario would be to see Tunisians’ anger and frustration transformed into support or acquiescence to the necessity of overthrowing the democratic order to save the Tunisian state. The interruption of the democratic process would be a huge boon for violent extremist groups. After the military coup in Egypt, the 62-year old, Egyptian-born leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, re- joiced in militant websites that ‘democracy failed’.58 Al-Zawahiri has warned for decades that the ‘crusaders’ and their secular allies in the Middle East will never allow Islamists to attain political power. The Algerian experience when the military aborted the electoral process in 1992 taught him not to trust democratic elections.59 For al-Zawahiri, the only path to power is through violent confrontation with secular dictatorships and their Western enablers. In Libya, the problem of militias cannot be resolved without addressing the trust deficit in state institutions and resolving the persistent mistrust and hostility between Libyan revolutionaries and those who were coopted or obliged to work within the parameters set by Gaddafi. The EU and the US should engage more in these processes. Libyan authorities desperately need assistance in building their army and integrating parallel security forces. The recent initiative by the Europe- an Union on 22 May to launch an EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya is a good starting point. 60 The mission, which has an annual budget of €30 million, falls under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and is tasked with helping Libya improve its border monitoring capacity. The EU should also coordinate with the US its assistance efforts in the post-conflict reconstruction of the country.61 Given the regional dimension of the Libyan crisis, coordination is also necessary between EUBAM Libya and the CDSP Sahel missions, mainly EU- CAP SAHEL Niger and EUTM Mali. If left unaddressed, Libya’s insecurities threaten to further fuel conflicts beyond its borders. So far, most local militant groups in Libya and Tunisia have had tenuous relations with AQIM and their goals have been shaped and driven by local concerns. Their calculations are, however, likely to shift depending on how successful they are in

pursuing their objectives. Western countries therefore need a ‘more tailored and locally driven approach’ to deal with these evolving threats and changing political conditions, writes Financial Times columnist Roula Khalaf.62 In addition, the international community should try to mitigate external pressures on beleaguered governments in transition by promoting regional cooperation in intelligence sharing and monitoring of financial flows from drug trafficking. The transnational nature of the threat makes it impossible for any country to tackle it by itself. The recent terrorist blasts in Tripoli and northern Niger, as well as the attack on the gas field in Algeria, which was executed by a multinational group of militants, attest to the threat of trans-border militancy. Unfortunately, international efforts to encourage regional cooperation have been hindered by a lack of coordination between border states, the opacity of the Algerian regime and the persistent suspicion and mistrust between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara dispute. The January 2012 agreement between the prime ministers of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia to form joined teams better to coordinate security along their porous borders and stem the flow of drugs, arms, and fuel has not yet lived up to its potential. However, in the last few weeks, Algeria has started coordinating with Tunisian forces to confront the mounting threats in Jebel Chaambi near their shared border, and sharing security information collected from aerial reconnaissance. Both countries have also agreed to establish a military-security liaison and a joint committee to exchange intelligence information. The EU and the US must encourage and support these endeavours. Conclusion Chaotic spaces in Libya and the difficult political transition in Tunisia give AQIM new breathing life to arrest its strategic decline and stage a comeback. The documents found at a compound in Timbuktu show a frustrated organisation that is fully aware of its past mistakes and limitations. They also show, however, a group that is determined to change its tactics, compromise on ideology and broaden its alliances with local militant groups. ‘The current baby is in its first days, crawling on its knees, and has not yet stood on its two legs’, wrote Droukdel in the context of Mali. ‘If we really want it to stand on its own two feet in this world full of enemies waiting to pounce, we must ease its burden, take it by the hand, help it and support it until its stands’. Despite its strategic overreach and reversal in Mali, AQIM is planning for the long haul. But reviving its fortunes is still a tall order for an organisation that is not only internally-divided but is also incapable of bringing meaning to its project for the region. AQIM stands at a crossroads and so does the policy approach to counter- ing it. Future choices, whether by local or international actors, will play a critical role in further narrowing or expanding the attractiveness and room for manoeuvre of AQIM in North Africa. In particular, if the democratic transition in Tunisia is

aborted and counter-terrorism policies become militarised across the region, AQIM’s project and narrative might gain renewed traction. Conversely, if the con- solidation of democratic institutions and the improvement of living standards continue, not least thanks to the targeted support of external partners, AQIM will likely remain a manageable threat to fledgling governments in transition, striking at Western targets when it can and trying to exploit local conflicts to its advantage. Author: Anouar Boukhars is visiting fellow at FRIDE and non-resident scholar at the Middle East Programme of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also an assistant professor of International Relations at McDaniel College in Maryland. Source: This article was published by FRIDE as Working Paper 120 August, and may be ac- cessed here (PDF) Notes: 1. The group now known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was initially called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), before becoming an affiliate of -al Qaeda in 2006. 2. M. Nichols, ‘Libya arms fueling conflicts in Syria, Mali and beyond: U.N. experts’, Reuters, 9 April 2013, available at: http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/04/09/us -libya-arms-un-idUSBRE93814Y20130409 3. A. Hirsch, ‘Mali conflict could spill over into Western Sahara, warns Ban Ki- moon’, The Guardian, 9 April 2013, available at: http://www.guardian. co.uk/ world/2013/apr/09/mali-conflict-spread-western-sahara 4. R. Marchal, ‘Mali: visions of war’, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 2(2), 1–8, p. 17, 2013. 5. Ibid. 6. See B. Lecocq, G. Mann, B. Whitehouse et. al., ‘One hippopotamus and eight blind analysts: a multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali’, Review of African Political Economy, 2013, available at: http://www.centre-cired.fr/IMG/pdf/Lecocq_Mann_Et_ Al_- _One_Hippo_8_Blind_Analysts_Editors_Cut_1_.pdf 7. M. Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, ‘AQIM: Maghreb to Mali, and back’, Open De- mocracy, 19 April 2013, available at: http://www.opendemocracy. net/mohammad -mahmoud-ould-mohamedou/aqim-maghreb-to-mali-and-back 8. See H. Roberts, ‘Call to arms will bring no peace to Sahel’, The Financial Times, 24 January 2013, available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/ s/0/6422e874-661d-11e2- b967-00144feab49a.html#axzz2J8N1wmfg 9. Y. Guichaoua, ‘Mali: the fallacy of ungoverned spaces’, University of East Anglia blog, 12 February 2013, available at: http://www.uea.ac.uk/ international- development/dev-blog/home/-/asset_publisher/1I1JoAAhCZsR/blog/id/2506832 10. W. Lacher, ‘Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region’, The Car- negie Endowment for International Peace, September 2012, available at: http://

carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf 11. R. Callimachi, ‘In Timbuktu, al-Qaida left behind a manifesto’, Associated Press, 14 February 2013, available at: http://hosted.ap.org/specials/ interactives/ _international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdf 12. For an excellent explanation of Islamic law and why Shariah can be appealing to Muslims, see N. Feldman, ‘Why Shariah?’, The New York Times, 16 March 2008, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16Shariah-t.html? pagewanted=all&_r=0 13. Marchal, ‘Mali: visions of war’, op. cit. 14. Callimachi, ‘In Timbuktu, al-Qaida left behind a manifesto’, op. cit. 15. Associated Press, Mali Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook, available at: http:// hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida- manifesto.pdf 16. See ‘Les dessous de la rupture entre AQMI et Mokhtar Belmokhtar’, Le Monde, 29 May 2013, available at: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/afrique/ article/2013/05/29/ les-dessous-de-la-rupture-entre-aqmi-et-mokhtar-belmokhtar_3420473_3212.html 17. R. Callimachi, ‘AP exclusive: rise of al-Qaida Sahara terrorist’, Associated Press, 28 May 2013, available at: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap- exclusive-rise-al-qaida- saharan-terrorist 18. Ibid. 19. L. Mansfield, His Own Words: a translation of the writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri (Lulu Pub., 2006), p.271. 20. B. Atassi, ‘Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger’, Al-Jazeera English, 9 June 2013, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html 21. B. Mroue, ‘Syria And Iraq Al Qaeda Merger Annulment Announced By Ayman Al Zawahri’, Huffington Post, 10 June 2013, available at: http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/10/syria-iraq-al-qaeda-merger- annulment_n_3415138.html 22. B. Atassi, ‘Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger’, op. cit. 23. Callimachi, ‘In Timbuktu, al-Qaida left behind a manifesto’, op. cit. 24. J. Thorne, ‘Libya’s greatest security threat: its porous southern border’, Chris- tian ScienceMonitor, 7 August 2013, available at: http://www. csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0807/Libya-s-greatest-security-threat-its- porous-southern-border. See also R. Worth, ‘Jihadists’ surge in North Africa reveals grim side of Arab spring’, The New York Times, 19 January 2013, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/ world/africa/in-chaos-in-north-africa-a- grim-side-of-arab-spring.html?pagewanted=all 25. A. Entours, D. Hinshaw, and D. Gauthier-Villars, ‘Militants, chased from Mali, pose new threats’, The Wall Street Journal, 24 May 2013, available at: http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578503464066163002.html 26. J. Thorne, ‘Libya’s greatest security threat: its porous southern border’, op. cit. 27. Associated Press, Mali al-Qaida’s Sahara playbook, op. cit., p. 3. 28. Callimachi, ‘In Timbuktu, al-Qaida left behind a manifesto’, op. cit. 29. See H. Sallon, ‘L’attentat de Tripoli, symptôme de l’absence d’Etat en Libye’, Le

Monde, 24 April 2013, available at : http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/ libye/article/2013/04/24/l-attentat-de-tripoli-symptome-de-l-absence-d-etat-en- libye_3164978_1496980.html 30. Ibid. 31. W. Lacher, ‘The Malian crisis and the challenge of regional security cooperation’, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 2(2), 1–5, p. 18, 2013. 32. J. Dettmer, ‘Extremists setting up shop in Libya’, Voice of America, 7 June 2013, available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/libya-niger- mali/1677341.html 33. F. Wehrey, ‘Libya doesn’t need more militias’, The New York Times, 10 June 2013, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/opinion/ libya-doesnt- need-more-militias.html?_r=0 34. F. Wehrey and P. Cole , ‘Building Libya’s security sector’, Policy Outlook, 6 Au- gust 2013, available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/08/06/ building-libya- s-security-sector/ghle 35. D. DePetris, ‘Libyan degaddafication law’s scope raises concern’, Atlantic Senti- nel, 13 May 2013, available at: http://atlanticsentinel.com/2013/05/ scope-of- libyan-degaddafication-law-raises-concern/ 36. Associated Press, Mali al-Qaida’s Sahara playbook, op. cit. 37. M. Benyakoub, ‘Le terrorisme en Kabylie, jusqu’à quand?’, El Watan, 11 August 2013. 38. According to the Algerian newspaper El Watan, the Bouira region has become in the last few years the new headquarters of AQIM. Since the war in Mali, the number of armed militants active in the region has also increased. See A. Fedjkhi, ‘Bouira, nouveau QG d’AQMI?’, El Watan, 22 July 2013. 39. ‘To our people in Tunisia: the tyrant has fled but the infidel and tyrannical system remains’, al-Andalus Media, 28 January 2011. 40. A. Yahya al-Shinqiti, ‘O people of Tunisia of al-Qayrawan be supporters of Shari’a al-Rahman’, al-Andalus Media, 18 May 2013. 41. For a brief explanation of Takfirism, see S. Shahzad, ‘Takfirism: a messianic ideology’, Le Monde Diplomatique, July 2007, available at: http:// mondediplo.com/2007/07/03takfirism 42. ‘To the wise men of the Islamist movement in Tunisia’, al-Andalus Media, 22 Oc- tober 2012. 43. M. Strasser, ‘The Egyptian opposition’s deal with the devil’, Foreign Affairs , 2 July 2013, available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/ the-egyptian-oppositions-deal-with-the-devil?cid=rss-letters_from- the_egyptian_oppositions_deal-000000 ; C. Levinson and M. Bradley, ‘In Egypt, the “deep state” rises again’, The Wall Street Journal, 19 July 2013, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244252045786017000512 24658.html; K. Abou El Fadl, ‘The collapse of legitimacy: how Egypt’s secular intelli- gentsia betrayed the revolution’, ABC , 11 July 2013, available at: http://www.abc.net.au/religion/ articles/2013/07/11/3800817.htm

44. Ansar al Sharia claims to have thousands of followers and has invested heavily in charity activities in poor neighbourhoods. For example, it has volunteer doctors run its makeshift clinics. The group also denies any involvement in the US embassy attack or in the political assassinations that have rocked Tunisia in the last seven months. See, I. Mandraud, ‘En Tunisie, la menace djihadiste d’Ansar Al-Charia’, Le Monde, 9 August 2013, available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-bin/ACHATS/ acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=1240743&xtm c=mandraud&xtcr=1. 45. B. Roger, ‘Tunisie: sur la trace des djihadistes de mont Chaambi’, Jeune Afrique, 7 May 2013, available at: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ ART- JAWEB20130507161818/ 46. C. Gall, ‘Tunisia faces more anger after an ambush kills soldiers’, The New York Times, 29 July 2013, available at: http://www.nytimes. com/2013/07/30/world/ africa/tunisia-faces-more-anger-after-soldiers-die-in-attack.html 47. J. Oumar, ‘Al-Qaeda split could spell turmoil’, Magharebia, 20 June 2013, available at: http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/ 2013/06/20/feature- 01 48. Nichols, ‘Libya arms fueling conflicts in Syria, Mali and beyond: U.N. experts’, op.cit. 49. See G. Miller and J. Warrick, ‘Although splintered, al-Qaeda finds new life in unstable areas’, The Washington Post, 2 February 2013, available at: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-02/world/36698995_1_al-qaeda- qaeda-cia-drone-strikes 50. J. Blitz and R. Khalaf, ‘Al-Qaeda: the jihadi hydra’,The Financial Times , 3 February 2013, available at:http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ce19f802- 6c5e-11e2-b774-00144feab49a.html#axzz2WCFMLecb 51. J. Blitz, ‘Cameron leads warnings on jihadi threat’, The Financial Times, 20 Janu- ary 2013, available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/546e45d6-6316-11e2-8497- 00144feab49a.html 52. A. Brahimi, ‘Al-Qaeda in a changing region’, Paris: IFRI, September 2012, available at: http://www.ifri.org/downloads/notebrahimifinal.pdf 53. O. Roy, ‘Vaine stratégie française au Mali’, Le Monde, 4 February 2013, available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2013/02/04/vaine-strategie-francaise-au- mali_1826781_3232.html 4. T. Pierret, ‘L’influence des salafistes risque de diminuer en Syrie’, Le Monde, 11 July 2013. 55. L. Morris, ‘Al-Qaeda tries to soften image with ice cream’, The Washington Post, 25 July 2013, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ middle_east/al-qaeda-tries-to-soften-image-with-ice-cream/2013/07/25/250dec6e -f54d-11e2-81fa-8e83b3864c36_story.html 56. See T. al-Abed, ‘Raqqa: search for civil rule’, Assafir, 2 July 2013.

57. International Crisis Group, ‘Tunisia: violence and the Salafi challenge’, Middle East/North Africa Report 137, 13 February 2013, pp. ii-iii. 58. See, P. Bergen, ‘Al Qaeda leader’s “I told you so” on Egypt’, CNN, 15 August 2013, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/15/opinion/ bergen-zawahiri-egypt 59. Ibid 60. ‘EUBAM Libya: story of a long-awaited CSDP mission’, International Security In- formation Service, May 2013, available at: http://isis-europe.eu/sites/ default/files/ publications-downloads/esr66_EUBAMLibya_May2013MHLA_1.pdf 61. See ‘EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya’, Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions_operations/eubamlibya/ eubam_factsheet_en.pdf 62. R. Khalaf, ‘Algeria shows we need a new approach to terrorism’, The Financial Times, 18 January 2013, available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/ cms/s/0/496c9e92- 6165-11e2-957e-00144feab49a.html#axzz2a6bSRu6l

Source: Euro Asia view

Crisis Today, Catastrophe Tomorrow – An Analysis by Dr. Lawrence Davidson Part I – Crises Both Local and Global If one is inclined to make a list of worri- some trouble spots plaguing the world, there would be a lot to choose from: Syria, Egypt, Israel/Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Kashmir, Con- go, Iran, those pesky disputed islands lying between China, Japan and the Phil- ippines, and of course, the meddlesome behavior of the United States. I apolo- gize if I inadvertently left out anyone’s favorite trouble spot. It is perhaps little comfort that each of Dr. Lawrence Davidson these man-made problems has a finite potential to be disruptive. What I mean by this is that they are localized in both space and time. Yes, I know that some of these problems have been going on for generations, and that thousands upon thousands have lost their homes, been maimed, or been killed. However, the problems represented above will not go on for millennia. It’s likely that all of them (except perhaps Washington’s ability to meddle) will be resolved, for better or worse, within say, the next 25 to 50 years. There is another category of problems, also man-made, that seem more perenni- al in nature. These problems manifest themselves as universal social ailments such as crime and poverty. Such problems wax and wane in intensity, but are ap- parently always with us. Now we come to a truly unique problem different in nature from those above. This is the issue of global warming. This also is man-made but with extraordinary long-range impact both in space (it is planet-wide) and in time (now we are talk- ing millennia). Yet it is a problem over which we do have control. We know what causes it and we know how to at least ameliorate the situation. That is, if we wanted to, we could begin to get global warming under control and manage its consequences for as long as it takes to minimize the threat. Here are some particulars about global warming: Climate scientists are 95% sure that global warming is caused by human activities that began with the industrial revolution in the mid eighteenth century and sped up enormously in the last half of the twentieth century. The primary causes of global warming are the production of “greenhouse” gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), largely resulting from the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.

The long-term consequences of global warming will be a reduction in the polar ice caps and a subsequent rise in sea levels as well as a greater incidence in extreme weather patterns bringing on floods, droughts, hurricanes, tornadoes and the like. There will be disruption in food production and water supplies as the availability of fertile land shrinks. There will be an increase in the area of the planet covered by desert. We can bring some of today’s local crises together with the eventual effect of global warming and see where, in the long run, it leaves these trouble spots. For instance, both Jews and Muslims claim the same Israel/Palestine as their sacred God-given land. In a hundred or so years most of that divine patrimony will be unlivable without desalination and irrigation technology that may not be available in a cost-effective manner. The same can be said for much of Syria and North Africa west of the Nile, where the water table shows signs of contamination with salt water from the Mediterranean. A century from now, coastal areas of Yemen, Somalia, lower Egypt, Israel/Palestine, and the U.S. too will all be inundated. Parts of cities such as Tel Aviv, Haifa, Alexandria, Benghazi, Jedda, New York, among many others, are likely to be washed away. Bahrain may be under water altogether. Part II – The Role of Natural Localism Today much activist energy is being directed toward the disputes of the Middle East and elsewhere, and rightly so. I myself spend a good amount of time and effort writing about U.S. foreign policy toward that region, in an attempt to influence public opinion. How about the issue of global warming? There are, of course, plenty of scientists tracking this growing crisis. There is a world appointed body, the, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created in 1988, which periodically issues fact-based public reports, highlighting the danger. Con- sidering the potential for global (as against local) catastrophe, have the efforts of the scientists and IPCC resulted in significant movement toward at least amelio- rating this problem? Not at all. Things are just steadily getting worse. Why is it that local problems can often get so much attention and this other problem, the one that threatens the entire planet, get so little? The answer may have to do with a phenomenon I call natural localism. At its simplest, natural localism says that the great majority of people (going beyond activists now) pay attention to what they perceive to impact their lives both in their immediate locale (space) and in the present or relatively near future (time). The key phrase here is “what they perceive.” The present crises around the world do not get much of a rise out of Americans unless hyped by the media in a way that makes them appear to potentially intrude on their local lives. Headlines about nuclear weapons (re: North Korea, Iran), the travails of “the Holy

Land” (ideologically dear to the hearts of American fundamentalist Christians and Zionist Jews), chemical weapons in Syria, WMDs in Iraq seem to be sufficient to get the attention of varying numbers of Americans who identify the problems as actually or potentially, physically or emotionally affecting them locally. Global warming has not reached that threshold of noticeability yet. The sea levels are not quite high enough, the natural disasters not quite often enough, the tem- perature levels not quite hot enough and, most significantly, the media hype not intense enough to register local concern. Take for instance the case of deforestation. According to the Global Canopy Pro- gram, or GCP, an alliance of leading rainforest scientists, “deforestation accounts for up to 25% of global emissions of heat-trapping gases.” This is the result of not only cutting down the rain forests of South America, Africa and Indonesia, but also of the burning of much of the felled wood. Why is this happening? Because the immediate local benefit of doing so for the creation of farmland, cattle pasture, gold mining, hardwood production, etc., is seen as much greater than the hazy probability of catastrophe sometime in an indefinite future. This fact is worth repeating. The latest GCP report declares, quite factually and de- finitively, “if we lose the forests, we lose the fight against climate change.” Yet, such is the power of natural localism to shape our perceptions and actions that the ruination of the entire planet means little when weighed against the immediate gain possible today. It is not just the poor and uneducated who will act in this way. One of the things grown in the space that used to be Brazil’s Amazon is soybeans. As a consequence, Brazil has become the second-largest exporter of this crop next to the U.S. Brazilian soybeans are bought to, among other things, feed the chickens that go into your fast-food fried-chicken sandwiches. They are also in your tofu and diesel fuel. That means that very large corporations are going for profits now even though they almost certainly know it will mean disaster later. It is no doubt the large corporate interest in this problem that has held to a mini- mum mass media attention to global warming. After all, it is such businesses that own of most of our information outlets. Thus, most of the TV, radio, newspapers and news magazines have not elaborated on the assured fate of the world’s grand- children as the sea levels rise and the grain fields turn to desert. If they did, public concern would almost certainly see this as a problem that is of local import and demand government and corporate attention to it. Actually, eventual concern might turn out to be so great that global warming could replace the proverbial invasion from outer space. That is, it could be the threat that unites all parties against a common enemy. So, if the United Nations Security Coun- cil can’t agree on Syria or Israel, maybe its members can rally together to persuade Brazil and Indonesia to stop deforestation and save the planet. Part III – Conclusion

Natural localism is a universal reality that tells us that the greatest public response will be directed to those events and issues that are perceived to have the greatest immediate impact on local life. The popular reaction will decrease as the situation appears the more distant in both space and time. Of course, as suggested above, distant events or issues can be made to appear immediate and of local import through manipulated presentations by the mass media. No one in Boise, Idaho, Little Rock, Arkansas, or Piscataway, New Jersey, knew that they lived in mortal fear of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction until Condoleezza Rice evoked “mushroom clouds” and every major news outlet repeated the message for weeks on end. So we will just have to wait until we are told we are in local trouble. In other words, we will wait until things are so bad that the U.S. government and its corporate media cannot avoid the issues involved. By that time it will certainly be too late. The result will not be solutions but rather hand-wringing and finger-pointing. In the meantime hysteria will prevail over such things as those media-hyped (and therefore locally significant) mythical Iranian nuclear warheads, and the Palestinians who are portrayed as terrorists because they refuse to accept that they are occupy- ing land that rightfully belongs to the Jews of Brooklyn, among others. What a crazy world! In fact it is so crazy that I strongly recommend not making any long-term investments in oceanfront property. ************************* About the author Dr. Lawrence Davidson DR. LAWRENCE DAVIDSON is a history professor at West Chester University in Pennsylvania. He is the author of Foreign Policy Inc.: Privatizing America’s National Interest; America’s Palestine: Popular and Offical Perceptions from Balfour to Israe- li Statehood; and Islamic Fundamentalism. His academic work is focused on the history of American foreign relations with the Middle East. He also teaches courses in the history of science and modern European intellectual history.His blog To The Point Analyses now has its own Facebook page. Along with the analyses, the Face- book page will also have reviews, pictures, and other analogous material.

Al-Qaïda résiste encore 09/09/2013 Après l'élimination de Ben Laden en mai 2011, le président Obama disait Al-Qaïda sur le point d'ê- tre "vaincue". Douze ans après l'attentat du World Trade Center, la nébule- use terroriste continue de frapper. Combien de vies con- naîtra encore Al-Qaïda ? L'organisation terroriste Un salafiste d'Al-Qaïda en Somalie, en 2011 "est décapitée et sera vaincue", paradait le président américain Barack Obama en mai 2011, après avoir rencontré le commando qui venait d'abattre, dans son repaire pakistanais, l'ennemi numéro un, Oussama Ben Laden. La mission semblait bientôt accomplie : aucune action d'envergure n'avait touché l'Europe depuis les attentats de Londres en 2005, l'armée furtive des drones avait transformé ses meilleurs chefs et nombre de ses combattants en "chaleur et lumière", et l'élan démocratique du Printemps arabe avait sanctionné sa défaite politique. Début 2013, la déroute sous les bombes fran- çaises d'Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi), qui s'était emparée avec ses alliés jihadistes du Nord-Mali, illustrait l'échec de sa stratégie de territorialisation. Mais la mouvance radicale est comme l'hydre dont les têtes repoussent aussitôt coupées ; protéiforme et clandestine, elle a appris à s'adapter à tous les terrains et à toutes les circonstances. Le 22 août, le chef dissident d'Aqmi, Mokhtar Belmokh- tar, donné pour mort il y a quelques mois, unissait sa katiba au Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (Mujao) et constituait le groupe des Mour- abitoune avec, semble-t-il, la bénédiction de l'organisation centrale d'Al-Qaïda. "Nous disons à la France et à ses alliés dans la région [que] les -moudjahidine se sont réunis et ont décidé de vaincre vos armées et de détruire vos plans et vos projets", déclarait à cette occasion le cerveau de la sanglante prise d'otages de janvier 2013 sur le site pétrolier d'In Amenas, en Algérie. Réfugiés en nombre dans le Sud libyen, les jihadistes continuent d'opérer dans toute la région. En mai, deux attaques sont menées au Niger, et des vétérans du Mali prennent part aux violents combats qui opposent, depuis début août, l'armée tunisienne à des éléments radi- caux dans le mont Chaambi. "L'icône Ben Laden est morte, vive le jihad : l'idéologie est là, bien vivante encore et même stimulée par les nombreux espaces de crises apparus dans la région", constate le chercheur Abdelasiem El Difraoui, auteur d'Al- Qaïda par l'image (Presses universitaires de France, 2013).

Une nidification dans tous les États affaiblis Depuis sa création il y a exactement vingt-cinq ans dans un Afghanistan en guerre, la "base" a nidifié dans tous les États affaiblis, faillis ou voyous de la région, des zones tribales du Pakistan et du Yémen au Soudan de l'extrémiste Hassan el- Tourabi, de la Somalie ruinée à l'Irak en guerre. Elle prospère dans le chaos et la violence, et les difficiles transitions révolutionnaires dans le monde arabe ont mis à sa disposition un terrain inespéré. En Syrie, l'État islamique d'Irak et du Levant (EIIL) et la Jabhat al-Nosra, ses filiales locales, combattent en première ligne de l'insurrec- tion et se distinguent des autres groupes anti-Assad par leurs capacités d'organisation et leur expérience du combat. Dans les régions qu'ils contrôlent, leurs katibas

jettent les fondements d'un État islamique, préparant l'avènement ultime du cali- fat. La charia y est appliquée avec une rigidité absolue et les jihadistes, en position de force, n'hésitent plus à s'attaquer aux Kurdes et aux éléments de l'Armée syrienne libre (ASL) qui entravent leurs conquêtes. Au Yémen, l'armée échoue à

reprendre aux trois ou quatre milles combattants d'Al-Qaïda dans la péninsule arabique (Aqpa) les territoires reculés qu'ils occupent. Dans la région Afghanistan- Pakistan, où les attaques de drones ont fait des ravages parmi les qaïdistes, le re- trait américain de Kaboul et le retour en force des talibans auxquels ils restent liés pourraient leur apporter un second souffle. Enfin, pour nombre d'experts, la prochaine terre de leur jihad pourrait vite devenir l'Égypte - patrie du numéro un de la nébuleuse, Ayman al-Zawahiri -, où les violences se multiplient entre l'armée et les partisans islamistes du président Morsi, déchu le 3 juillet. Trois mille jihadistes seraient réfugiés dans le désert rocheux du Sinaï, y opérant des attaques meurtrières contre l'armée depuis l'éviction des Frères musulmans. Dans les autres pays de la région, Al-Qaïda poursuit son oeuvre de séduction, constate le spécialiste des mouvements islamistes Dominique Thomas : "Aujourd'hui, son idéologie a essaimé dans la quasi-totalité des pays arabes. C'est aussi sa force et sa victoire, et je ne vois pas de raisons pour que cette tendance s'inverse." Privés par l'invasion américaine de leur base afghane, contraints par la "guerre globale contre le terrorisme" à limiter leurs mouvements et leurs contacts, les dirigeants d'Al-Qaïda ont opté pour une stratégie de territorialisation opportuniste par des groupes plus ou moins autonomes. Une concentration sur le "jihad local" qui ne les amène toutefois pas à délaisser les objectifs mondiaux contre "l'ennemi lointain" : les États-Unis, Israël et leurs alliés. Ces dernières semaines, la multiplication d'actions spectaculaires et de menaces a démontré la capacité de nuisance encore phénoménale d'Al-Qaïda. Fin juillet, ses commandos attaquaient des prisons dans neuf pays, dont l'Irak, la Libye et le Pakistan, libérant des milliers de détenus parmi lesquels des dizaines de membres de l'organisation. Le 3 août, Washington ordon- nait la fermeture d'une vingtaine de représentations -diplomatiques en Afrique et au Moyen-Orient : ses services de renseignements venaient d'intercepter une communication où le chef d'Aqpa promettait à Zawahiri un attentat qui "changera l'Histoire", a précisé le président du Yémen. "La menace la plus précise et la plus crédible depuis le 11 Septembre", avait alors averti Michael McCaul, président du Comité pour la sécurité intérieure du Parlement américain. En Europe, selon les mêmes sources sécuritaires américaines, Al-Qaïda aurait projeté des attentats contre des trains à grande vitesse. Aucune de ces menaces ne s'est - encore - concré- tisée, mais le bruit et l'angoisse générés sont déjà une victoire pour la mouvance terroriste. Les principales succursales qaïdistes. L'ONU a rencensé 66 entités attachés ou qui se revendiquent associés d'Al-Qaïda. © J.A. Cliquez sur l'image pour l'agran- dir. Enfin, si l'Occident n'a plus connu depuis huit ans d'attentat de grande ampleur comme ceux de New York, Madrid et Londres, la propagande en ligne d'Al-Qaïda convainc un nombre croissant de partisans zélés de passer à l'action. À Tou- louse, Mohamed Merah abattait 7 personnes dont 3 enfants en mars 2012. En avril 2013, au marathon de Boston, les bombes des frères Tsarnaev faisaient 3 morts

et 264 blessés. Un mois plus tard à Londres, Michael Adebolajo et Michael Adebowale tuaient un soldat britannique à l'arme blanche. Des actions beaucoup moins mortifères que les grandes attaques des années 2000, mais dont l'impact médiatique reste considérable. Du "loup solitaire" des villes d'Occident aux milliers de combattants de Syrie, Al-Qaïda opère désormais via tous types de cellules autonomes. "Al-Qaïda, c'est un peu tout à la fois, avec une organisation centrale affai- blie qui exerce différents degrés de contrôle sur ses succursales, d'Aqpa, gérée par un proche de Zawahiri, à l'EIIL, sur lequel elle a une influence minimale, en passant par la franchise Aqmi", explique Difraoui. La branche au Yémen est la plus structurée La tête pensante de l'hydre reste le successeur officiel de Ben Laden, l'Égyptien Ay- man al-Zawahiri, qui a cofondé l'organisation en 1988. Avec ses épaisses lunettes et son carré de barbe blanchie, ce chirurgien de formation issue de la bonne bour- geoisie cairote a tout sauf l'allure romantique du cavalier Ben Laden. Il n'en est pas moins dépourvu de charisme et d'une effrayante intransigeance dans la violence. Reclus dans les zones tribales du Pakistan, siège de la "centrale", ce "Vieux de la montagne" de 62 ans instruit, excommunie, anathématise et menace via les relais internet de l'organisation. Et les groupes qui s'en réclament se placent par le même biais sous son autorité. "Zawahiri exerce une autorité morale et il reste le calife à qui l'on prête allégeance mais que l'on n'écoute pas forcément", explique Difraoui. En avril, son refus d'intégrer la Jabhat al-Nosra syrienne à l'EIIL n'a ainsi pas été suivi. Est-ce pour raffermir son autorité qu'il a nommé quelques semaines plus tard comme numéro deux de l'organisation Nasser al-Wuhayshi, le chef d'Aqpa ? La branche basée au Yémen est en effet la plus apte et la mieux structurée d'Al- Qaïda, la seule qui ait multiplié les tentatives d'opérations extérieures ces dernières années, piégeant par exemple en 2010 deux imprimantes destinées à être con- voyées par avion aux États-Unis et au Qatar. Alors que se réveillait en Occident la peur de nouvelles attaques, le portrait de l'artificier d'Aqpa, Ibrahim Hassan al- Asiri, s'est affiché dans les journaux. Ce talentueux chimiste aurait inventé un liquide qui, imprégné sur des vêtements et séché, se transformerait en explosif. À propos de cette assertion comme sur la déclaration faite par Bagdad le 1er juin an- nonçant le démantèlement d'unités de production de gaz sarin, Dominique Thomas conseille la plus grande prudence : "La puissance de propagande d'Al-Qaïda est l'une de ses meilleures armes, et les deux camps se livrent à une vraie guerre de la communication."

Source: Jeuneafrique.com

Algeria

Après la pression de l'armée dans les maquis de Boumerdès Huit terroristes abattus en un mois le 07.09.13 | 10h00 1 réaction Imprimer Envoyer à un ami Flux RSS Partager Al Qaîda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) a subi d’importantes pertes dans ses rangs ces derniers jours dans la wilaya de Boumerdès. Avant-hier, deux sbires de Abdelmalek Droukdel ont été éliminés par une unité spéciale de l’armée à Ben Ouali, village relavant de la commune de Cap Djinet. L’information a été confirmée peu après par le ministère de la Défense nationale qui a précisé, dans un communiqué, que ladite opération s’est soldée par la récupération d’une arme d’assaut de type kalachnikov et d’un fusil à pompe. Les corps des deux islamistes armés ont été transportés à l’hôpital de Thénia pour identification. En attendant les résultats définitifs des analyses ADN, certaines sources locales soulignent que l’un deux serait le dénommé M. Smaïl, 35 ans. Natif de la même localité, ce sanguinaire avait rejoint les maquis il y a trois ans. Selon nos sources, les forces de l’ANP auraient agi sur la base de renseignements soutirés à un autre terroriste capturé au cours de l’opération de ratissage menée la semaine dernière à Baghlia. Une opération qui avait, pour rappel, permis également la destruction de plusieurs caches terroristes dans la forêt El Kahla. Le coup de filet d’avant-hier porte à huit le nombre de terroristes mis hors d’état de nuire grâce à l’engagement des forces combinées de sécurité qui maintiennent la pression sur certains massifs de la ré- gion depuis plusieurs mois. D’aucuns auront remarqué que la capacité de nuisance des groupes armés est presque réduite à néant durant ces deux dernières années dans cette partie du pays où sévissaient jadis les katibete les plus sanguinaires de l’organisation que dirige Abdelmalek Droukdel. Les forces de l’ANP avaient installé des campements même au niveau des massifs forestiers qui étaient impénétrables par le passé, tels que les hauteurs d’Ammal et Sidi Ali Bounab. Dans les maquis de Keddara, pas moins de 13 terroristes avaient été éliminés depuis le début de l’année. La dernière offensive militaire en date avait été menée le 7 août dernier et s’est soldée par la neutralisation de trois islamistes armés. Dix jours plus tard, les militaires ont réussi à abattre deux autres éléments de la seriet El Arkam près de Si Mustapha, à 23 km à l’est de Boumerdès. Arrestation d’un terroriste condamné à 20 ans de prison Par ailleurs, l’APS annonce que les services de la Gendarmerie nationale ont arrêté, mercredi à Koléa (Tipasa), un terroriste recherché par la justice et condamné par

contumace à 20 ans de réclusion criminelle, a-t-on appris hier de source sécuritaire. La cour de Béjaïa avait rendu à son encontre un jugement par défaut pour son implication dans «des assassinats de citoyens et la formation de groupes terroristes», ajoute la même source, soulignant que le prévenu a été présenté devant les juridic- tions compétentes à Béjaïa. Les éléments de la brigade de la Gendarmerie nationale de Koléa ont arrêté ledit terroriste lors d’une patrouille de routine en procédant à la fouille d’un véhicule suspect, au lieudit Maqtaâ Kheira, qui se dirigeait vers Alger, a précisé la même source.

Source: www.elwatan.com/

Chad

West Africa: 'Chad Not Looking for International Credit over Mali In- tervention' Says Country's Foreign Minister 10 SEPTEMBER 2013 ANALYSIS Moussa Faki, the Foreign Minister of Chad, has stated that his government was "not looking for [any] recognition or credit" for its role in the military intervention in Mali, but rather was concerned with "peace and security for the region". Faki, speaking at Chatham House on 5th September, added that "what happened in Mali could happen in any state in the Sahel" and stressed the transnational nature of terrorism in the region. He added that due tocombat experience gained during the Chadian civil war, the country's armed forces had become highly professional and effective at operating in desert conditions. Whilst Chad is not a member of ECOWAS, which coordinated the initial Mali intervention, it felt it had to intervene in the conflict due to the West African regional organisation's incapacity to coordinate it effectively itself. Chad, however, paid a high price for its role, with 30 of its French (and US) trained soldiers being killed in the operation. Writing for African Arguments in March of this year, Celeste Hicks - former BBC correspondent in N'Djamena - stated that "the deployment has been a way to show how far Chad has come since the dark days of 2006 and 2008 when two serious rebellions came within hours of unseating Deby. It has helped to establish a narrative of the country as a regional leader, and perhaps persuade detractors that the $600m of oil revenues siphoned off from social spending plans, to buy military equipment - including six re-conditioned Sukhoi jets, attack helicopters and armoured personnel carriers - was money well spent." Foreign Minster Faki sought to portray Chad as an assertive regional 'island of stability' in a sea of failing states. For example, pre-revolutionary Libya was described as "the most gangster-like country" in the region and is now awash with arms and run by an administration unable to enforce its will or ensure security. The conflict in Sudan's western Darfur region - where refuges have spilled over and live in camps in Chad - is, according to Faki, a continuing threat to the country's internal stability. This is of particular significance to the current Chadian administration of Idris Deby whose ethnic group (and that of his foreign minister), the Zahgawa, straddles the border between Chad and Darfur.

Faki's talk also highlighted his desire for Chad to take up the next rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council, giving "a new voice for the region", particularly given Chad's experience of living and dealing with refugees. Faki denied that Chad has been "playing power politics" in its neighbour, the Cen- tral African Republic (CAR). He admitted that Chadian mercenaries had a role in former President Bozize's takeover and, following this, Chad had supported his regime. However, he stated that the group that has now taken over is "mixed and dangerous" including many itinerant Cameroonian, Darfurian and Chadian mercenaries. Faki argued that the CAR should not be allowed to fall into "complete chaos" and that Chad would support the 18 month timeline leading towards fresh elections. Chad already has a contingent of soldiers in MICOPAX - the regional peacekeeping force for the CAR - but he did not suggest that its numbers would be increased through further deployment of troops.

Source: allafrica.com

DRC

Africa: Eastern Congo's Recent Troubles - Who Pulls the Strings, What Is At Stake, and Why Do Things Happen? 5 SEPTEMBER 2013

Photo: Samuel Okiror/IRIN Congolese refugees in Uganda Considered an overview, this piece combines a wide range of events, observations, and consequent thoughts on the current situation in the eastern DRC. Focusing on M23 rebels, DRC government, and the UN mission it will alsotake into account main other dynamics and actors. An accumulation of events In the last few weeks, the often low-intensity conflict in eastern Democratic Repub- lic Congo (DRC) became not so low in intensity with newsworthy events unfolding on an almost daily basis. North of Goma fresh clashes broke out between the Con- golese armed forces (FARDC) and the notorious M23 rebel movement. During the ensuing bombing, various neighbourhoods in Goma were hit, as well as Rwandan territory in Rubavu district, bordering the DRC. The UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo, MONUSCO, for the first time engaged in offensive operations through its newly created Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) and faced fierce protests from residents of Goma resulting in tumultuous scenes in the bustling border town. One peacekeeper was killed andthe shelling of Rubavu provoked a military build-up by the Rwandan army on the border. After several days of joint FARDC-MONUSCO offensives (with losses suffered), M23 retreated from Kibati and announced a uni-

lateral ceasefire, asking for the Kampala peace talks to resume. Relations between the DRC government and its Rwandan counterparts have hit rock bottom and both regional and international mediation efforts have ground to a temporary halt. With opinions varying between anticipation of a window of opportunity and imminent regional war it is time to ask: Who pulls the strings, what is at stake, and why do things happen? Shelling and protests in Goma Skirmishes between FARDC and M23 resumed on August 23rd between Kibati and Kibumba at a spot locally known as 'three antennae'. The following day, the city of Goma was hit by heavy shelling. Grenades landed close to the Mugunga IDP camps and in the busy neighbourhoods of Ndosho, Katindo, and Birere. Explosions were also reported from nearby sites in Rwanda. A total of at least four people died in a sequence of attacks which left dozens wounded, another two casualties resulted from a rocket that targeted the village of Kanyarucinya. On the Rwandan side, casualties have also been reported. The renewed bombing of North Kivu's capital created a climate of chaos and fear among residents. A few hours after the bombing, citizens took to the streets and engaged in protests against MONUSCO withcars burnt and civilians injured. The popular outburst focused on peacekeepers, and their intervention brigade in particular, accused of not protecting civilians despite the establishment of a security zone around Goma and the smaller town of Sake one month earlier. In what became a violent demonstration, the civilian population demanded that the Blue Hel- mets enlarge the security zone northwards to more aggressively engage M23. Stones were thrown at peacekeepers but the anger also turned against M23 as well as political and public authorities. Following a series of popular protests in Goma, the demonstrations show how much the city's inhabitants betrayed by all parties in the conflict. The demonstrations culminated in the deaths of 2 Congolese civilians - - allegedly shot by Uruguy- an peacekeepers and Congolese policemen. MONUSCO refuted the allegations and an independent investigation is to follow. An indicator of how serious popular tensions in Goma have grown, Martin Kobler, the new head of MONUSCO, went on a PR offensive asking the population for its support and apologising for the general state of insecurity. Yet, Kobler stated that MONUSCO could not be held accountable for everything that went wrong in DRC. Later on, the UN denounced M23 as being responsible for the shelling. The rebels in turn rejected this and claimed that FARDC elements had shot mortars into Rwan- dan territory. The Rwandan army's spokesman, Joseph Nzabamwita, commented that his country could not accept the constant reoccurrence of such incidents and pointed the finger of blame at the DRC government. The blame game continued with DRC authorities accusing M23 of firing into Rwandan territory to create a mo- tive for drawing in the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF). No independent assessment

has provided any clarity thus far on this although the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) is tasked with such a role. After a troubled week, an uneasy calm reigns again around Goma, but the next attack on the city might well be the straw that breaks the camel's back. An economy of rumours and concomitant 'radio trottoir' being a well-known attrib- ute of the agglomeration's daily life, recent attacks also additionally created further mistrust among people and indiscriminate inculpation of rwandophone individuals. What role for M23? In various press communiqués, the political leadership of M23, centred on Bertrand Bisimwa, Rene Abandi, and Amani Kabasha, denounced war-mongering attitudes among the FARDC command and positioned itself as defensively reacting to renewed DRC offensives. A series of skirmishes in June had already pushed the insurgent army of 'Brigadier-General' Sultani Makenga back to a number of strategic hills between Kibati and Kibumba, around 15 kilometres from Goma (taking the air- port as a reference point). It is unclear how much more the rebel forces will move behind that frontline, but the FARDC have already retaken Kibati. Throughout its most recent press releases, the movement that is composed of ex- CNDP cadres and officers has repeatedly underlined how its forces have inflicted serious losses on the FARDC. Indeed, a recent Al Jazeera report indicates the military hospital in Goma is full and points to a restriction in access to the hospital zone to get further information on the numbers (not names, which would be a breach of medical ethics). However, the ceasefire proposed by Bisimwa triggers the impression that M23 might have suffered even more casualties. This would tally with reports indicating that South African snipers in the intervention brigade killed scores of Makenga's men. Rumours of Rwandan support have, as usual, also flared up - although on this occasion no proof has been delivered. On a different note: many M23 combatants do wear Rwandan uniforms (without the flag tag) but at least as many wear Congolese uniforms and others have Ugandan, US, UK, or Belgian fatigues. While nothing should be ruled out, the most plausible analysis is that M23 is consolidating its forces between Rutshuru, Bunagana, and Cyanzu and possibly regaining strength through taxation of incomes and is reorganisating its battalions. M23's propaganda channels have been surprisingly active in announcing how many hostile combatants had been captured and held in good conditions. Whilst they are generally cordial and open in their dealings with foreign visitors, almost no outsid- ers have so far managed to look behind the scenes of the rebel movement. The state of the Congolese army The ramshackle Congolese army appears to have been resurrected (in operational terms) after a its clear defeat last November when M23 took Goma and FARDC soldiers added another infamous chapter to their history by committing mass rapes

while retreating to Minova and Bweremana. But the tide now seems to have turned. Propped up by various commando units (and perhaps also Republican Guards) the government troops have launched relatively impressive attacks against M23 positions close to Kibati since August 22, intensifying on August 23 and 24 and finally August 28 and 29. Without public or official word from President Kabila, the commander-in-chief, this more aggressive and effective stance by the FARDC is difficult to explain. Headed by the Chief of Land Forces, General Olenga, and the Army Chief of Staff, General Etumba, the FARDC is led by a former bartender in Germany and a well- established career general whose shady networks have given rise to all sorts of speculation. Colonel Mamadou Ndala, the officer in charge ofanti-M23 operations, employs an attitude reminiscent of Olenga's statements and has, sofar, transformed them into concrete military action. This was widely supported and backed up by MONUSCO. Etumba has, however, been criticised by civil society activists and local journalists for sabotaging FARDC supply lines. A further reason for the FARDC's improved battlefield performance may lie in a recent massive reshuffling of senior positions. Numerous generals have been re- tired while others were newly appointed. Despite including a range of fresh briga- diers with doubtful track records in terms of conduct and unit oversight, these measures have coincided with the turning point in M23-FARDC combat. On the battlefield, the recent desecration of enemy corpses added another chapter in a long list of inexcusable behaviour. MONUSCO's intervention brigade stepping up In a first step, the intervention brigade rendered all prophecies of doom ridicu- lous: even before fully assembling its forces (the Malawian contingent still has not completely arrived and South African attack helicopters are scheduled to reach the frontlines soon) it has engaged in offensive operations alongside the FARDC. Ukrainian helicopters (which were a part of MONUSCO before the FIB) shot up M23 positions around the 'three antennae' while South African snipers and artillery bombarded the rebels from the UN's Munigi base between Goma and Kibati as early as August 24. With M23 retaliating, one Tanzanian FIB soldier has been killed in action by mortar shells, while a handful of others suffered injuries. De- spite the fact that FARDC infantry did the main job of engaging M23's fighters, it can easily be argued that MONUSCO was instrumental in what turned out to be a preliminary military win by the Congolese forces with M23 retreating around five kilometres northwards. Various statements made by new MONUSCO head Martin Kobler and the military spokesman,Lt.-Col. Felix-Prosper Basse, have underpinned actual behaviour. Dur- ing the FIB's military activities, the tone employed was clearly that of an alliance between DRC troops and the Blue Helmets. While this certainly allowed for more consistent collaboration on the ground too, it bears the danger of partiality and too much alignment towards the FARDC, which is one of the major human

rightsabusers in eastern Congo. However, it can also offer increased possibility of vetting Congolese units. The relative swiftness of last weeks' MONUSCO-FARDC cooperation could also be attributed to other causes: troops currently engaged on the Congolese side are mostly commando divisions disposing of much better military, operational, and probably even IHL training. But this overtly intensive allegiance to FARDC not only calls into question the notion of civilian protection which,besides restoring state authority, is the key job of the Blue Helmets. It also contributes to MONUSCO's continuing credibility problem. In July, disorganisation in MONUSCO's hierarchy reduced the coherence of its public statements and reaction capacity (the SRSG hiatus and the numerous personnel changes in the higher military echelons were the main causes of this) the mission's performance has largely improved in that regard throughout August. Force Com- mander Dos Santos Cruz of Brazil and FIB commander James Mwakibolwa of Tanza- nia do not contradict each other and seem to pursue similarly tough agenda. Against this backdrop, the allegation (especially in UN circles) of continued Rwan- dan support to M23 is taken for granted - the positioning of Tanzania and South Africa fits well into this general school of thought. Tanzania has recently suffered tensions in its relations with Rwanda when Jakaya Kikwete asked for negotiations with FDLR rebels (bearing in mind that parts of their senior command are old genocidaires). Paul Kagame bluntly rejected this sugges- tion. South Africa is also angry, as Rwandan secret services repeatedly launched operations to kill exiled Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, a former close aide toKa- game (turned oppositionist) on their soil. That does not mean these two main FIB protagonists are interested in waging war against Rwanda, but the intervention brigade's presence and activities is following up on the political interest to signal to Kigali strong discontent over some of its recent foreign policy. Kinshasa's bargaining and Kigali's lurking Caught in the middle of two wary and differently thinking capitals, the Kivus in many regards depend on the decisions taken by the Congolese and Rwandan political establishment. Very quickly, it was obvious that Kinshasa, and Joseph Kabila in particular, have accommodated an offensive UN brigade deploying against rebel groups in the unstable east. Kabila recently received Kobler in Kinshasa - this initial encounter was reportedly very cordial and framed by mutual respect. At the same time, a ministerial delega- tion was sent to Goma, where they went on a PR trip to officially deliver assets and items in support of the FARDC's frontline troops and show solidarity with the people of Goma, as well as demonstrating unity with MONUSCO. Lambert Mende, the DRC's government spokesman, admired by many nationalist Congolese while decried by Rwandans as 'vuvuzela', attempted to back up both the 'hearts and minds' campaign of the DRC government and MONUSCO as well as to interpret and multi- ply any international statement critical of M23 and/or Rwanda.

From Kinshasa's perspective, the military developments made for a situation in which the Kampala talks are no longer part of perceived political reality. This view- point is, to an extent, justified: Although rhetorical commitment has been made to the Kampala talks by Kobler, Mary Robinson, and most of the UN Security Council as well as other key brokers, few of these actors have placed the diplomatic path over the military one in the last two weeks. In a joint press conference in Goma on September 2nd, Robinson is quoted stating that recent military action was condu- cive to future peace negotiations. The widespread relevance of article quinze and système D in DRC politicsshould serve as a reminder not to forget pressure on Kin- shasa too. Otherwise, the upcoming concertations nationales (set to start on Sep- tember 4) between government, opposition (not UDPS, MLC and UNC though), and civil society could easily become a farce. On the Kigali side there is, however, a different picture: The Rwandan government was silent until shells landed on the soil of Rubavu disctrict and in Gisenyi's urban areas. First, Brigadier General Nzabamwita, the RDF's spokesperson, warned against the continuation of shelling. He firmly declared that subsequent violations of Rwandan territory could not remain unanswered and pointed the finger at the FARDC. Chief diplomat Louise Mushikiwabo followed with a similar statement, while President Kagame did not give any public statement on the recent events. It can be supposed that Kigali knows very well about its diplomatic and political lee- way in the current situation. Reports indicate that RDF units have consolidated along the DRC border while in- cursions into the latter seem to be happening in Congolese fantasy for the time being. While Rwanda's announcement to not stand still in case of further bombs onto their territory is credible and justified, it is also clear that any action that may result in RDF opposing (directly or indirectly) UN troops (including Tanzania and South Africa) would come at a high cost for the Rwandan government too. The wider conflict topography in eastern Congo A narrow focus on the M23-FARDC showdown north of Goma has limited our observations on what else is happening in North and South Kivu. Certainly, in terms of regional and national stability and security, these may be second-range events. Be- ing overlooked, they still bear medium-term risks of impacting on the overall situation as well. A few frontlines and tension areas to keep in mind are summarised below: A segment of Raia Mutomboki recently clashed with Mayi Mayi Kifuafua (a former segment of Raia Mutomboki) in Wanyanga, Walikale territory. After a series of confrontations throughout the last weeks, these opponents are reported to have agreed upon a ceasefire brokered by an alliance of government and customary authorities. An accord was signed in late August. Other Raia Mutomboki in Shabunda and Kalehe remain active as well. Among the

South Kivu groups, only the founding chapter referring to Jean Musumbu (the least active) has approached the government with an offer of integration. In northern Shabunda, a new coalition of various chapters and subchapters of the franchise- style militia phenomenon signed a partnership accord in June. They include a varie- ty of commanders such as Sisawa Kindo, Donat Kengwa, Daniel Meshe, Albert Kahasha and others. Since the accord was signed, parts of the conglomerate not only caused trouble at the margins of Shabunda and Mwenga but also neutralised each other in internal disagreement during July and August. On the Ruzizi Plain (Uvira territory) the fault lines between Barundi and Bafuliro communities created new troubles. However, as notorious Major Bede's MCC is reported to be behind many of the security incidents, this ethnic framing could well be a smoke-screen for opportunistic politico-military elites such as the Mufuliro-but -M23-stooge Bede himself. It is unclear to what extent there might be a link to the remaining splinter groups among the high plateau's Banyamulenge communities. A new chapter of failed army integration features the Mayi Mayi Yakutumba/Aoci saga further south in Fizi. The men of William Amuri 'Yakutumba' have left transit centres in the area (i.e. Sebele) in absence of proper supplies and to follow up on their previous businesses. In the course of action, confrontations and skirmishes with government troops wreaked havoc in the area including urban fighting in the town of Baraka. One of Yakutumba's main allies, the leader of Mayi Mayi Aoci, has reportedly been captured by the FARDC. APCLS, MAC, Sheka - continued troubles in Pinga (Masisi): In Kashebere, the APCLS of 'General' Janvier Buingo Karairi (the Hunde-based part of former PARECO) have clashed with Mayi Mayi MAC. Time and again, the M23 and local resources report incursion by the FDLR and some parts of a Congolese Hutu militia called Nyatura in the area of Kiwanja and Rutshuru. Without doubt recent weakening of M23 have - as the group's infighting in February 2013 did - left security voids now used by these opponents of M23. Among others, the UN Group of Experts' current midterm report suggests that these groups also act in alliance with the FARDC. Around Ituri, FRPI forces of renegade commander Cobra Matata reignited their combat against FARDC troops (fighting centred around the town of Gety) and triggered the forced displacement of thousands. Meanwhile, the ADF-Nalu situation at the shores of Lake Edward remains highly volatile. Local communities and humanitarian actors face insecurity since recent ADF activities and the exodus of over 50,000 into Uganda. Regional and international actors Leaving Congolese ground, a short scan of regional actors beyond Rwanda may be surprising. Both the AU and the ICGLR have been unusually quiet. Is the AU over- stretched with Egypt, Mali, Somalia, and the Central African Republic? Has SADC's military approach in the guise of the MONUSCO intervention brigade prevailed

over the diplomatic ICGLR version fostering Kampala talks? Yoweri Museveni has now called another ICGLR summit - possibly to deflect tensions exacerbated by the Gisenyi shelling and the subsequent military build-up of RDF along Rubavu. Late July this year, a high-profile meeting on the ongoing turmoil in eastern DRC took place. Scheduled as a 'ministerial meeting', the world body's 7011th session was chaired by US Secretary of State John Kerry (presiding as US representative), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim, Ban's Spe- cial Envoy to the Great Lakes Mary Robinson, AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra, the Foreign Ministers of DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda (Raymond Tshibanda, Louise Mushikiwabo, and Sam Kutesa), and other high-level diplomats. Attendees also included the US's new Special Envoy to the Great Lakes, Russ Feingold, and MONUSCO's new head, SRSG Martin Kobler. Main concerns at the New York level remain centred on the intervention brigade's ability to operationally take up the challenge of dealing with several armed groups at the same and live up to purely military expectations. Their ability to limit civilian distress while chasing militias will also be a major factor as increased humanitarian disaster is the last thing eastern Congo needs. With MONUSCO's strengthened alignment to the DRC government and FARDC during Martin Kobler's first weeks in office, the general UN stance appears to have become even more critical toward M23. France, as a permanent member of the Security Council and with former top- diplomat Ladsous at the helm of DPKO, plays a key role in this positioning resulting in a Rwanda-critical attitude as well. After the skirmishes that marked the first offensive MONUSCO engagement and brigade casualty, the French pushed for a strong condemnation of M23 that was ultimately blocked by Rwanda. It has also called for the Security Council's most recent briefing on the situation, after which M23 was condemned. As with the crisis in Syria, on eastern Congo France and the US appear to be more or less close allies, with the UK slightly adrift. In early September, Mary Robinson, Russ Feingold, and others are starting a visit to the region to upscale international diplomatic efforts in the aftermath of this most recent Goma crisis. GWOT - the Goma War On Twitter On Twitter, Facebook and other social networking websites to a lesser degree, the conflict is neatly represented by the accompanying battles over supremacy of com- mentary. M23 has, almost since its creation, been present through a number of 'corporate accounts' (@m23congodrc and @m23marscongo) and individual representatives (@kazaramavianney, @bbisimwa, @renabandi, and @benjioldman). The FARDC just recently joined the online fight (@FARDC13, it is doubtful that it is an official FARDC account, but it is at least a very well-connected individual close to the FARDC). There are a vast number of individuals either pushing for the FARDC's or M23's cause across Twitter. On the DRC government side, government spokesperson Lambert Mende (@lambert_mende) is the only salient voice. While none of

the accounts have received any verification sign by Twitter, there is reason to believe they are to large extent authentic. Rwanda, in turn, has a verified account at government level with President Paul Kagame (@paulkagame). Much more vocal than the Head of State, however, is Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo (@lmushikiwabo), while Rwandan Defence Minister James Kabarebe (@kabarebejames) is also present. Both on pro- and anti-M23 sides, among advocates for DRC and for Rwanda, there are plenty of private individuals, journalists, officials acting in private capacity and others (such as expatriates based in the region and international observers) engaging in the GWOT. Many moderate and impartial observers here merge with some of the most radical lunatics bordering on the sphere of hate speech The shelling of Goma was 'an event' on Twitter as well, connected to reporting from the ground and speculation that largely did not come from individuals based in the region. While up to now it is unclear how the shelling actually happened, the twitter event 'shelling of Goma and Rubavu' has developed a virtual existence independent from the actual incidents. This is similar to earlier events such as the alleged presence of RDF soldiers on Congolese soil (which turned out to be wrong in almost all cases) and the ethnically motivated persecution of Rwandans in Goma (which turned out to be wrong in many cases, while true in many others). After all, the whole twitter conundrum makes a case for specific research concentrating on the conflicts seen from and carried out on Twitter (as well as other social networking sites). Concluding Remarks and Outlook Congo's east is not at rest, as so often has been the case throughout the past two decades. These days, many aspects of the crisis appear especially massive, both on the side of threats (regional involvements, multitude of armed actors, etc.) and opportunities (Addis Ababa Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework of ICGLR, political commitment of UN and others, etc.). One big thing, however, is still missing. Without prejudice to the Kampala talks, concertations nationales, intervention brigade involvement, (all of those in theory have a chance to change things for the better for the concerned populations) there is still no complete approach. Such a thing would include different, well-matched layers of diplomatic efforts and negoti- ation: 1. On the regional level, serious dialogue between Kinshasa and Kigali. 2. On the national level, Kampala talks with the commitment of both parties and credible concertations nationales with the participation of all stakeholders (both subsequently merged into one national dialogue framework). 3. On the local level(s), tailored peace talks and integration efforts for all non-state armed groups (while not lumping all together but still streamlined, coordinated by an impartial oversight committee), relined by a new, creative, and sustainable

effort in DDR and SSR combining donor commitment and government willingness. This may well sound ambitious, but complexity certainly demands for holistic but sophisticated approaches

Source: allafrica.com

Libya

Un an après Bengha i, la Libye en base-arrière d’un djihadisme ma- ghrébin en mutation 12 septembre 2013 11:57

La Libye base-arrière du terrorisme au Maghreb

Un an après l’attentat contre le consulat américain de Bengha i, la Libye reste in- stable tout en servant de base de repli et de jonction des djihadistes du Maghreb et du Sahel. Synthèse des analyses récentes sur l’impact de la situation libyenne.

Le11 septembre dernier, l’ambassadeur américain en Libye, Christopher Stevens, meurt asphyxié lors d’une attaque menée par des assaillants armés de missiles anti- aériens et de lance-roquettes contre le consulat de Benghazi. Les autorités améri- caines reconnaissent rapidement l’implication d’Al-Qaida. Le choc dans l’opinion publique américaine est énorme. C’est la première fois depuis 1979 qu’un ambassadeur meurt en fonction, ciblé par des agresseurs armés. L’attaque de Benghazi a été suivie, en janvier 2013, par la prise d’otage spectaculaire du site d’exploitation de gaz de Tiguentourine (In Amenas), dans le sud de l’Algérie, qui a fait 40 morts. Du jamais vu en Algérie où les installations pétro-gazières n’avaient pas été touchées dans les années 90, marquées par les violences et le terrorisme. Pour la première fois, l’Algérie était frappée au cœur de son économie : les revenus engendrés par le pétrole et le gaz représentent 97% de ses exportations. Des groupes interconnectés Depuis ces attaques, des liens ont été mis en avant entre les auteurs de l’attaque

de Benghazi et ceux de la base gazière de Tiguentourine, selon plusieurs sources anonymes qui se sont confiées à l’agence de presse Reuters. Selon l’une d’entre elle, les djihadistes qui préparaient l’attaque sur le site gazier algérien avaient acheté des armes en Libye, avant de s’installer plusieurs mois dans la zone frontalière algéro-libyenne. C’est là qu’ils auraient rencontré les hommes qui ont planifié l’attaque sur le consulat américain de Benghazi. Il existerait donc une coordination croissante entre les groupes armés en Afrique du Nord, ce qui fait peser un risque régional. Pour illustration, la composition « multinationale » du commando qui a mené l’attaque de Tiguentourine : seul trois membres du commando étaient algériens. Les autres étaient maliens, ni- gériens, des mauritaniens ou encore canadiens. Les Tunisiens, majoritaires, étaient au nombre de onze. La Tunisie, en transition délicate, fait désormais face à la montée du terrorisme. Selon Reuters, l’attaque de Benghazi était menée avec la participation de membres du groupe tunisien Ansar al-Charia. Le 28 août dernier, le groupe était officiel- lement classé parmi les organisations terroristes par le gouvernement tunisien. Il entretient des liens avec Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) et les groupes djihadistes qui se battent dans le mont Chaambi contre les forces de l’ordre, à la frontière algérienne. Selon le ministre tunisien de l’intérieur, la moitié des djihadistes qui se trouvent au mont Chaambi sont des Algériens. La Libye, terre d’accueil La Libye, toujours déstabilisée après l’intervention occidentale contre le régime de Kadhafi, est devenue un marché d’armes ouvert et une terre d’accueil pour l’ensemble des groupes islamistes du Maghreb et d’Afrique subsaharienne. L’écono- mie du pays est asphyxiée par la fermeture de ses principaux terminaux pétroliers, du fait de l’incapacité du gouvernement à faire entrer les milices dans les rangs. Ironie du sort, le pays est forcé à importer l’or noir. Le sud du de la Libye est aujourd’hui présenté comme étant le lieu de repli des djihadistes qui ont été chassés du Nord du Mali, après l’intervention française du dé- but de l’année. Les salafistes-djihadistes tunisiens désormais traqués par les auto- rités pourraient, selon les analystes, faire également de la Libye leur base arrière. Ces mouvements islamistes, qui font la jonction « maghrébo-sahélienne », men- acent l’ensemble de la région. L’industrie pétrolière visée Ainsi, des groupes armés prennent fréquemment pour cible les installations pétro- lières d’états maghrébins ou du golfe persique, dont les revenus dépendent de leurs exportations. En août dernier, l’oléoduc principal du Yémen était attaqué, pour la deuxième fois en une semaine. Depuis 2011, le pipeline qui fournit Israël en gaz égyptien est aussi régulièrement pris d’assaut. En conséquence, les entreprises étrangères qui investissent dans la région commencent à modifier leur ap-

proche sécuritaire. Après l’attaque de Tiguentourine, Statoil et British Petroleum (BP) ont quitté l’Algérie, et entretiennent le flou sur leur retour. Plusieurs dizaines de leurs em- ployés étrangers avaient perdu la vie lors de la prise d’otage. En juin dernier, Statoil a créé un département de sécurité autonome de la gestion économique de l’entre- prise, présidé par une femme. Son objectif est d’éviter que les soucis économiques ne viennent peser sur les dispositifs destinés à assurer la sécurité du personnel. Source: www.maghrebemergent.com

Egypt

Egypte: à qui profite la crise? le 05/09/2013 à 16:17 Alors que l'Egypte a connu de nouveaux soulèvements et un changement de pouvoir cet été, L'Express décrypte qui sont les gagnants de cette crise.

EGYPTE- Après la destitution de Mohamed Morsi, l'armée a opéré une répression des Frères musulmans et des pro Morsi. Reuters La destitution de l'ex-président Mohamed Morsi, issu des Frères musulmans, le 3 juillet dernier, et le retour brutal au pouvoir des militaires en Egypte, ont sans aucun doute mis en lumière les intérêts géostratégiques de chaque acteur de la région. Pour Bertrand Badie, spécialiste des relations internationales à Sciences Po, ils ra- battent les cartes dans le monde arabe: "Des pays comme la Syrie, l'Arabie saoudite ou l'Algérie se retrouvent à soutenir tous les trois le régime militaire. La situation où l'ami de mes amis est mon ami ne tient plus." Avec Israël, ces trois pays semblent être les "gagnants" de la crise en Egypte. Syrie: Assad se frotte les mains La posture éradicatrice du général Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi est du pain-béni pour le ré- gime de Damas. Elle donne au président Bachar Al-Assad l'opportunité de montrer qu'il poursuit le même combat que son "frère arabe" contre le "péril islamiste". Cette rhétorique permet de "brouiller les cartes et de jeter la suspicion sur l'opposition syrienne, principalement composé des Frères musulmans", analyse Bertrand Badie.

Au pouvoir, Morsi avait vivement soutenu la rébellion syrienne. Sa chute enlève une épine du pied d'Assad dans une région majoritairement hostile. "Plus la situation en Egypte va se compliquer moins les Occidentaux auront d'éléments pour intervenir en Syrie, explique Bertrand Badie. Les Russes et les Chinois pourront de- mander: 'Pourquoi viser la Syrie et pas l'Egypte?' C'est une contradiction sur laquelle Assad sait jouer." Arabie Saoudite: le pari risqué Avec leur promesse d'aide de 5 milliards de dollars au gouvernement égyptien, les dirigeants saoudiens ont clairement opté en faveur du nouvel homme fort au Caire, le général Al-Sissi. Logique. Riyad a toujours perçus les "printemps arabes" comme des processus démocratiques contraire à ses intérêts. Les Al-Saoud "ont vu d'un mauvais oeil la chute des dictateurs avec lesquels ils s'entendaient bien, hormis Kadhafi". Riyad entend profiter de la chute du pouvoir des Frères musulmans en Egypte pour asseoir davantage son hégémonie dans le monde sunnite. "Une fenêtre s'ouvre pour que l'Arabie Saoudite prenne la tête de la ligue arabe", explique Bertrand Badie. Avec Bagdad hors circuit depuis la chute de Saddam Hus- sein, Damas qui vacille et l'échec de Doha (qui avait misé sur les Frères partout dans le monde arabe), Riyad a les mains libres. Mais pour le chercheur une telle prise de position reste un pari risqué. "Comment peut-on combattre les Frères musulmans en Egypte et les soutenir en même temps en Syrie en étant leur principal bailleur de fonds?". Une ambigüité que Riyad devra manipuler avec habileté s'il ne veut pas s'attirer les foudres de son nouvel allié. Algérie: la peur de l'islamisme Alger a observé l'échec de l'islam politique en Egypte. L'Etat algérien avait vu d'un mauvais oeil, en 2012, l'arrivée au pouvoir des partis islamistes aux portes de leurs frontières. "Ses deux voisins directs au Maghreb (Tunisie, Maroc) sont gouvernés par des partis islamistes; tandis qu'au sud, dans le Sahel, la menace djihadiste reste présente, rappelle Bertrand Badie. L'Algérie espère que le cas égyptien va faire ré- gresser les islamistes d'Ennahda en Tunisie." Autrefois très critiquée, l'affrontement entre l'armée algérienne et les "terroristes" islamistes retrouve un parallèle troublant aujourd'hui avec les événements en Egypte. "D'un certain point de vue, les Algériens pourront dire 'On avait raison'", décrypte Bertrand Badie. Israël: Al-Sissi, l'allié objectif Si Israël n'a pas apporté son soutien officiel au général Al Sissi, le nouvel homme fort de l'Egypte se retrouve être "à court terme, son allié objectif de circonstances" selon Bertrand Badie. L'enjeu est de garantir l'accord de paix de 1979 entre les deux pays à tout prix ainsi que l'aide militaire américaine (1.3 milliards de dollars

par an) au gouvernement égyptien. éAvec Morsi, il y avait une vive préoccupation du côté israélien, rappelle Bertrand Badie. On se dirigeait vers une renégociation des accords de camp David." Les positions très ferme d'Al Sissi contre le Hamas -au pouvoir à Gaza et proche des Frères musulmans- convergent également avec les intérêts israéliens. Tout comme celles à l'encontre des groupes armés dans le Sinaï, craignant que la région ne se transforme en foyer djihadiste aux portes de ses frontières. Attention toutefois, cette coopération risque de vite être remise en cause à moyen terme, selon Bertand Badie, en raison de "l'ultranationalisme et l'anti- occidentalisme exacerbée qui se mettent en place progressivement en Egypte".

Source: http://www.lexpress.fr/

Mali

Mali's Post Elections Challenges 4 SEPTEMBER 2013

Photo: Pierre René-Worms/RFI IBK on the campaign trail. Today, 4 September 2013, the new president of Mali will be inaugurated. Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was voted into office in August with an overwhelming majority. It had been a high-risk election, held against the background of a multidimensional crisis with regional consequences. With Keïta's accession to power, efforts to resolve the complex crisis facing Mali enter a new phase, which will be decisive in terms of consolidating the security and political gains of the past months. The transition period, which is now coming to an end, had two main functions: to manage the crisis in the north and to organise countrywide elections. The first aim was partially accomplished through the military intervention of France's Operation Serval and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). As to the second, a preliminary peace agreement was signed between, on the one hand, the Malian transitional government and, on the other, the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA) and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), which had taken control of the Kidal region after the military intervention.

The Preliminary Agreement for the presidential election and inclusive peace talks, signed on 18 June in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, was to be implemented in two stages. First, it had to create conditions allowing presidential elections to be held across the country, including in the Kidal region. Second, after the election, it had to ensure the continuation of an inclusive dialogue that would lead to the signing of a final and comprehensive peace agreement. The presidential election passed the crucial test on 28 July and 11 August 2013, when its two rounds of voting took place. Given the political, logistical and security challenges, the presidential elections were considered successful both nationally and internationally. First, the entire country was able to participate, although the voting in Kidal turned out to be largely symbolic. Second, no major security incidents were reported during the polls. Third, participation rates in the first and second rounds exceeded all predictions, amounting to 48,98% and 44,41% respectively. While analysts initially feared that the president-elect would lack legitimacy, Keïta, leader of the Rally for Mali (RPM), was elected with an overwhelming majority of 77,62% in the second round. And while there was concern about post-election protests calling the results into question, Keïta's rival, Soumaïla Cissé, representing the Union for the Republic and Democracy (URD), conceded defeat even before the announcement of the provisional results. In terms of the challenges ahead, Keïta urgently has to address the thorny security issues in northern Mali, including the problem of Tuareg armed groups, as well as Arab and Songhai militias. In this regard, the inclusive dialogue, a central part of the reconciliation process, will deal with the following themes: the administrative and institutional organisation of Mali, particularly in the northern regions, the strategy for regional and local integrated development, and the reorganisation of the defence and security forces, as well as the socio-economic disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme for the northern armed groups. The inclusive dialogue will also discuss the improvement of administrative, economic and political governance, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and their resettlement, and the protection and promotion of human rights, justice and reconciliation. According to the Preliminary Agreement, the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commis- sion plays a central role in the dialogue process, which should lead to a final comprehensive peace agreement. Keïta also plans to organise a national conference on northern Mali. This confer-

ence, which will be a prelude to negotiations for the final comprehensive agreement, will lay the foundations for dialogue and reconciliation. To fully address the security issue, Keïta, with the support of external partners, will also need to tackle the reform of the defence and security sectors, a theme that figured prominently in the election campaign. The development of regional cooperation will also need to be adequately taken into account to address the security dimension of Mali's problems. Other major challenges are consolidating the political gains and continuing the in- stallation of democratic institutions, including the renewal of the National Assem- bly. The deputies' mandate, which had expired over a year ago, was extended to allow the Assembly to serve until the next parliamentary elections. However, ever since the transitional government announced that the first round of these elections would take place on 27 October 2013, the Malian political class has been divided. Part of the political class, especially supporters of the United Front for the Protec- tion of Democracy and the Republic (FDR), feel that the elections should be held as soon as possible. Others, especially those close to the coalition led by Keïta, believe it is important to use the pre-election period to better address those aspects that proved problematic during the presidential election, including the question of voters who recently turned 18, refugees and internally displaced people. The next steps in the democratic process will largely depend on the ability of the government to create the conditions for a constructive working relationship with the opposition. In addition, in some areas of Mali, especially in the Kidal region, the parliamentary elections could lead to violent power struggles between or within communities. Finally, the new president is expected to start showing results in terms of the country's economic recovery. The Malian economy was badly affected by the security and institutional crisis. On 15 May 2013, a high-level conference of donors for the development of Mali was held in Brussels, at the end of which €3,25 billion was raised to finance a '2013- 2014 plan for the sustainable recovery of Mali'. The introduction of good governance practices remains the cornerstone for the mobilisation of these external resources. The success of the economic recovery, beyond the support of the international community, also depends on the ability of the new government to create conditions for the development of economic activities in peripheral regions. The success of the presidential election is a victory for Mali and its partners. How-

ever, it should not overshadow the important challenges that lie ahead. The full implementation of the Preliminary Ouagadougou Agreement must remain a priority for the new Malian authorities and external partners. Close attention must be paid to the post-election talks, as well as to defence and security sector reform, the organisation of parliamentary elections and economic recovery. Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni, Senior Researcher, and Baba Dakono, Junior Fel- low, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division, ISS Dakar

Source: Allafrica

Niger

Analysis: After Mali, Niger battles to secure its borders

Mali’s 2012 crisis put its neighbours on the alert NIAMEY, 12 September 2013 (IRIN) - The takeover of northern Mali by Islamist rebels after a 2012 coup, and the subsequent French-led intervention, have widened fears of a spill-over of insurgency in the region. Niger, which has socio-political problems comparable to those of Mali, is battling to secure its territory from militants still operating in Sahel’s remote wilderness. Insecurity is an ever-present threat. The country suffered twin attacks on 23 May, when assailants struck a military base and a French-run uranium mine in the north, killing dozens. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a prominent and long-time Sahel jihadist who had claimed responsibility for the Algerian gas plant attack in January, said his fighters were behind the strikes. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which had operated in northern Mali before being dislodged by the French military, also claimed responsibility. Bolstering security Niamey has been working to bolster its security strategy. In October 2012, it launched a five-year US$2.5 billion plan to secure and develop its northern region, whose residents, especially the Tuareg, say they have been marginalized. As in neighbouring Mali, the Tuareg in northern Niger have carried out a series of rebellions demanding autonomy, social and political inclusion, and the development of their homeland.

The country has also introduced legal reforms, enacting anti-terrorism legislation, setting up a special team of lawyers and security officers to work with the government on terrorism matters, upgrading military hardware, and cooperating with France and the US on security. US drones began operating in Niger in December 2012. Nigerien troops are also being trained by their American and French counterparts.

“Niger has shown not only political commitment, but a certain level of coherence in dealing with the threat of terrorism,” David Zounmenou, senior researcher on West Africa at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), told IRIN. Niger, an impoverished Sahel nation prone to droughts and food scarcity, also faces additional threats from Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria to the south and from militias in the north suspected to be operating in southern Libya, analysts say. Politically, Niger has worked to improve the inclusion of its Tuareg population to end the cycles of insurgency. Failed unity coalition During Niger’s 3 August independence day celebration, President Issoufou Maham- adou called for the formation of a national unity government, part of a political co- hesion plan he sees as crucial to dealing with the country’s security threats. Howev- er, a subsequent cabinet shake-up has cost his ruling coalition the support of its main ally, who quit in protest of the seats it was allocated in the new government set-up.

“In terms of security plans, it certainly weakens the national consensus that has prevailed thus far in Niger. Institutional consensus has been the backbone of the response mechanism to offset the spill-over of the insurgency in Mali and to manage successive attacks,” said Zounmenou. But West Africa political analyst Kamissa Camara says the political disagreements have little bearing on Niger’s security worries. "The risk is that [expenditure] on social assistance programmes could increasingly be adjusted depending on security concerns, and it is doubtful that this will be to the benefit of the Nigerien population as a whole." “The political fall-out is more indicative of the superficial political arrangements made before the second round of the 2011 presidential elections and the ensuing struggle for influence between two complementary but oxymoronic political figures,” Camara said, referring to the president and Hama Amadou, the leader of his coalition’s main ally. Other threats

In addition to its security worries, Mahamdou’s government, which came to power in 2011 after a brief period of instability, is struggling to better the lives of citizens, the bulk of whom are living in extreme poverty. The country sits at the bottom of the UN Human Development Index. Although the government is making improvements in sectors such as health, education and agriculture, some 85 percent of Nigeriens survive on less than US$2 a day. Around 2.9 million people currently face food shortages. Natural disasters and recurrent food shortages are greater threats to many Ni- geriens than security fears, say analysts. The country recently appealed for help following devastation by floods that have killed two dozen people and left some 75,000 others homeless. Niger has the world’s largest uranium reserves, but receipts from uranium mining have made little impact on the lives of many Nigeriens. And while the country began pumping its first oil in early 2011, it was later was forced to cut back its budget due to poor revenue. The shortfalls could impact Niger’s security budget. “An intense focus on security could affect Niger’s budget spending on other strategic sectors. The defence budget more than doubled in 2012, although it’s still behind the health and education expenditure,” said Jean-Hervé Jezequel, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group. “The risk is that [expenditure] on social assistance programmes could increasingly be adjusted depending on security concerns, and it is doubtful that this will be to the benefit of the Nigerien population as a whole,” Jezequel told IRIN.

Counterproductive?

When Islamist rebels began advancing on Mali’s capital in January this year, Niger supported the French intervention. It has also sent some 900 soldiers as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. However, there are concerns that its stance in the Mali crisis and its security cooperation with Western countries could stoke extremist militia threats. “As Islam is dominant in our country, it is easy for these forces of evil to infiltrate Nigerien youths,” noted Zarami Abba Kiari, the ruling party’s deputy spokesman, who argued that the national unity government could forestall such risks.

Insurgent groups have used Niger for their cross-border activities in Mali, Nigeria and Libya, and with light government presence in certain regions of Niger, the country risks becoming a safe haven and rear base for militant groups targeting other countries, like Chad and Algeria, that have largely expelled these groups from their territories, ISS reckons. “The structural complexities of Niger, illustrated by its vast desert, its arid territo-

ry, and the borders it shares with Algeria, Libya and Chad, are certainly contributing factors to these [security] threats,” Camara told IRIN. Weak governance, underdevelopment and poverty have created a breeding ground for militancy in West Africa and the Sahel, academics argue. “There is need for concrete response to [Niger’s] socio-economic problems. Young people are looking for jobs, effective health care, education… If they are not satisfied, this can provide them with a reason to join jihadist movements,” said ISS’s Zounmenou.

Source: IRIN

Nigeria

Will Nigeria’s Boko Haram Survive Death Of Its Leader? – Analysis September 3, 2013

NIGERIAN SOLDIERS

Nigeria’s military has announced that Abu-Bakr Shekau, the leader of the militant group Boko Haram, died of a gunshot wound sustained when government forces attacked his hideout near the border with Cameroon sometime between 25 July and 3 August. The military counterinsurgency unit that made this declaration was established to take over the mission from the Special Forces and pursue and attack Boko Haram at every possible turn. The Nigerian military has launched several attacks on Boko Haram in its strongholds in the northeast of the country since May, and militants have responded in turn by ramping up attacks on civilian and military targets. Abu-Bakr Shekau was one of the most prominent terrorists within Boko Haram. He was the leader of the extremist faction of the militant main group, which carried out violent campaigns that resulted in the deaths of at least 3,600 people since 2009. This group has affiliated itself with al-Qaeda and it targets anyone who abides by civil (Western) laws, education, and culture – even their fellow Muslims. However, the available evidence is still insufficient to confirm Shekau’s death. There are two possible outcomes that could result if the death of Abu-Bakr Shekau

is confirmed. On one hand, constructive engagement and social reconciliation could become easier, since it has long been reported that Shekau was an obstacle in launching and sustaining any peace dialogue with the sect. Shekau also derailed development in Nigeria by fueling tensions between ethnic groups. Ethnic violence halted local development activities, frightened investors and alarmed neighboring countries to the north of Nigeria. Therefore, the death of Shekau could hasten the resolution of the conflict in the north, pave the way for social reconciliation in Nige- ria, and enable equal development and distribution of wealth between north and south.

In addition, the death of Shekau might weaken Boko Haram and make it vulnerable to attacks by the Nigerian and US governments. Therefore, killing Shekau could have an enormous effect on the way the group is organized and its capacity to car- ry out bloody attacks in the future. However, sufficient information is not available on the composition and organization of Boko Haram, so it’s difficult to predict the extent of any possible weakness resulting from the death of the group’s leader.

On the other hand, Boko Haram might become more aggressive in response to the death of Shekau. Since the army announced Shekau’s injury and the possibility of his being killed, at least 70 people have died in a number of Boko Haram attacks in the north. On July 29, Boko Haram killed 15 people when a bomb went off in the major northern city of Kano. On August 11, militants killed 44 Muslims praying at a mosque, and on August 17, terrorists killed at least 11 people in Damboa in Borno state. Socioeconomic considerations will play a major role in the future growth of the Boko Haram group. Boko Haram asserts itself as the defender of Islam and Muslims against the government, the US, and Christians. Add a deteriorating economic situation, widespread unemployment, and the persistent corruption of the political elite, and all this suggests no shortage of young people wanting to join Boko Ha- ram.

The group also has considerable resources at its disposal. Much of the sophisticated arsenal being used by Boko Haram originated in Libya, only to be transferred after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. This transfer was the result of collaboration between many other African Islamist groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Is- lamic Maghreb, Somalia’s al-Shabaab, and financiers from several different countries.

In addition to external resources, Boko Haram continues to benefit from pervasive poverty in the north. More than 70 percent of the population of northern Nigeria lives below the poverty line, and Shekau has taken on an almost Che Guevara-like aura in the eyes of local youths.

There is also the fear of a future coalition between Boko Haram and other extremist groups in the Niger Delta and elsewhere in Africa, which would drive instability

in key areas for oil production. Nigeria is home to more than 2.6% of global oil reserves.

Whether Shekau is dead or not, it is the Nigerian government’s responsibility to redraft the methods of dealing with Boko Haram and other groups – those that default to the use of violence to deal with historical grievances. Security and military operations are not the only way to reduce the growth of these groups or eliminate them. The Nigerian government needs to open a dialogue in parallel with trying to restore stability in the north through development and investments that provide employment for the youth of the region. In addition, the government needs to in- troduce channels for the northern youth to express their opinions and convey their demands peacefully, so as not to be easy prey for recruitment into extremist groups.

Suzane Mneimneh is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com

Source: eurasiareview.com/

Somalia

Somalia: Kenya Needs a Comprehensive Exit Plan in Somalia 11 SEPTEMBER 2013 Kenya's intervention in Somalia in October 2011 came as a surprise to many Horn of Africa observers. According to the Kenyan government, the raison d'être for intervening was to pursue Al Shabaab members who allegedly abducted aid workers in North- ern Kenya and kidnapped tourist along the coast. Initially this sounded plausible (and even reasonable) given the genuinesecurity threats posed to Kenya by Al Shabaab. But shifting dynamics in the port city of Kis- mayo raise questions regarding the changing goal of the occupation. Recent events reveal Kenya is keen in establishing a "sphere of influence" through Jubaland, putting the Al Shabaab theory to a stern test. Since the intervention, the blowback has been evident - there is a deteriorating security situation along the border with Somalia, and in Nairobi there have been a series of grenade attacks. Whilst some of these have been the work of opportunistic criminal andbusi- ness groups, others like the attack on the church in Garissa, bear the hallmark of Al Shabaab (and have been claimed as such through their twitter handle.) Liberators or occupiers Striking a somewhat righteous if not opportunistic posture, many Kenyans supported the intervention uncritically. And the initially triumphalist note prevented many from asking questions about the entire enterprise. But the "altruism" explanation seems to be wearing thin against naked realpolitik displayed by the Kenya Defense Forces in Kismayo and its single minded determination to establish a sphere of influence in Jubaland. There is an obvious rationale for wanting to control Kismayo - the strategic port is the nerve center of sea trade, and when it was controlled by Al Shabaab it provided the group with ready income. But taking full control of Kismayo has not been a straight forward affair due to several interlocking and competing interests. This is where Kenya needs to be cogni- zant of Somalia's history and the radioactive nature of internal Somali clan dynamics (especially for an external actor like Kenya with questionable finesse.) Kenya now seems to be walking straight into the local clan politics with its eyes wide open, particularly as a result of their support for Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, and by extension his clan, at the exclusion of the government in Mogadishu, which until recently was at loggerheads with Madobe.

Recently, a rather misguided and naïve display saw Somali Ministers from the Cen- tral Government mistreated when they visited Kismayo - a move intended to undermine the authority of the new president. All the talk of federalism has become a self-fulfilling prophesy and masks the nefar- ious interests of Kenya which has aligned itself with Madobe and his clans. If the people in Kismayo want a devolved authority that is nominally answerable to Mogadishu, but autonomous at the same time, then that discussion should be left to the Somalis themselves. Trying to influence such an outcome is counterproductive and dangerous in the long run. If devolution is nothing but Kenya's attempt at establishing a satellite state remote-controlled from Nairobi, then this reeks of sheer opportunism. A recent rapprochement in Addis Ababa between Madobe and Mogadishu over the key outstanding issues is, however, commendable as tensions between the two sides were threatening to escalate. To make the deal, both sides made some concessions - the federal government recognized Madobe as the interim leader, and in return, the port will be handed to the federal government after six months. However, there is a caveat regarding the revenues generated by the port - priority will be given to the security and institutional building of the Jubas. Regarding security, the Ras Kamboni militias will be absorbed into the Somali National Army, although the local administration will be responsible for police and law and order issues. Remarkably, no timeline was set for this integration. Wither Al Shabaab? The only real beneficiary from the above mess is Al Shabaab, whose stock in trade for recruitment is the weak central government. Al Shabaab also bills itself as the vanguard of Somalia against external forces - the mere presence of Kenya inside Somalia is a perfect storm for the group; it will provide them with a raison d'etre to 'liberate' the country from the infidels. This will potentially undo any gains made since intervention and demonstrate Al Shabaab's ability to transcend clan divisions. Acute internal contradictions within the group are of greater existential danger than any external interventions - the pan-Somali nationalism espoused by Aweys and the transnational jihadist wing of Godane (nom de guerre of 'Abu Zubeir') was difficult to reconcile. The recent departure of Sheikh Aweys (regarded as the father of the jihadi movement in Somalia), the alleged killing of Ibrahim al-Afghani and fleeing of the group's spokesman Mukhtar Robbow, reveals a serious power struggle within the group. But what is going on in Kismayo gives the group a second chance, similar to the 2006 Ethiopian invasion. On the humanitarian front, as a demonstration of how tenuous the security situation is, recently, after decades of working in Somalia, Medicin Sans Frontiers (MSF) announced it was leaving.

In a statement, the MSF said, "We are ending our programmes in Somalia because the situation in the country has created an untenable imbalance between the risks and compromises our staff must make, and our ability to provide assistance to the Somali people." Their departure raises serious questions about the regional interventions (Kenya, Ethiopia etc) and the attendant wave of good news coming from Somalia since they took place. This has seen Somalia once again on the international radar; two international conferences in London, countless visits by foreign dignitaries saying this is Somalia's moment and many triumphalism stories in the news media - opening of beech res- taurants, ice cream parlors and theaters. But all this gives a false impression that the country has finally left its chaotic past behind and underplays the one significant weakness that all previous Somalia governments had to contend with - the lack of the monopoly over the use of force. Without an army and a police of its own, peace and security will always be tenuous in Somalia. In an effort to rebrand and remain relevant, on Eid, which marks the end of month of Ramadhan, Al Shabaab released through its media wing, Al Kataib, the video, "The Path To Paradise". The 40 minute long video chronicles the lives of young recruits from Minnesota who joined Al Shabaab. The major theme of the video revolves around the evils the West is perpetrating on earth, and calls on every Muslim to participate, as a religious duty in defeating the Kufars (infidels.) For Kenya, the lack of clear timetable for withdrawal from the outset was problematic because it provided a sort of open-ended commitment, which will inevitably fall prey to the ever lurking danger of mission creep. The window when Kenyans troops were regarded as liberators has long been closed and with it the goodwill of the Somalis. An indefinite stay and interference in Somalia's internal politics will make the AMISOM mission in Somalia - billed as 'Africa's solution to Africa's problem' - look like an occupation. Abdullahi Boru Halakhe is a Horn of Africa Analyst. Allafrica.com

Analysis of Somalia's Juba Agreement 03 September 2013 L-R SFG IGAD and Jubaland Reps sign agreement

Somalilandsun - Mogadishu-based The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies recently published an analysis of the Juba Agreement titled "The Jubba Agreement: Imper- fect Progress." On 27 August 2013 the Somali Federal Government and the leaders of the Juba regions signed an agreement that offers some hope for the future of peace in the region. The Heritage Institute expressed concern, however, that the agreement is vague, falls short on key specifics, and imposes cumbersome obligations to the parties. Comment The Juba Agreement: Imperfect Progress The Agreement between the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and the leaders of the Jubba regions in Addis Ababa on 27 August is a much-needed break from a protracted stalemate between the two sides following the needless death and injury of hundreds of innocent Somalis. That the parties have acknowledged the limits of their powers and the potential for mutual destruction is encouraging. But as ever with such agreements in contemporary Somali politics, the devil is in the details, or lack thereof. Presumably by design, the Agreement is crafted in worryingly vague terms, falls short on key specifics, and imposes cumbersome obligations to the parties. Crucial-

ly, important benchmarks have been delayed indefinitely. This approach is unnec- essarily risky. As they have throughout the crisis, conflicting parties may interpret vague agreements to suit their respective political agendas ensuring implementation remains elusive. Sustained progress inSomalia depends upon the commitments of both parties to the underlying objectives of the agreement. Strengths of the Agreement The plethora of armed groups remains a potent threat to the stabilization of the region. Article Three of the Jubba Agreement, which deals with management of security forces and reintegration of militias into the Somali National Army (SNA), is an important development. The commitment to establish a joint technical committee to assess the current situation and offer guidelines in this regard is sensible. Equally sensible is the attempt to reach out to al-Shabaab foot soldiers and wean them back into society with full amnesty. Ambiguity and delay A key provision of the Jubba Agreement is the establishment of the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA). Article One calls for a deliberative body, to be called the 'Regional Assembly', which would act as the IJA's parliament. Clause 8 requires that the Regional Assembly be a "representative body of all clans and constituencies and selected by the traditional elders with seats been [sic] distributed proportionally among the districts of the three regions in full consideration of inclusivity, balance and in [a] reconciliatory manner." In the absence of reliable population data and a recent census, the accurate distribution of seats "proportionally among the districts" and clans is not possible. Rep- resentation lies at the heart of Somalia's political conflict. Use of this language threatens to incite further conflict. Like other parts of the Agreement, sustainable implementation of Article One will rely heavily upon the commitment of the signatories to see it succeed. Clause 12 of Article Two stipulates that the IJA transfer management of air and sea ports to the SFG in six months, after which the SFG is mandated to appoint a com- petent" management body in consultation with the IJA but with funds raised exclu- sively dedicated to the development of the Jubba regions. This unnecessary delay stalls progress and increases the possibility of the collapse of the Agreement. The signatories could have established a simple and effective management scheme with fewer strings attached and with immediate effect. Of particular concern is Clause 15 of Article Two which stipulates that the interim agreement will remain in force until "there is a final agreement on revenue sharing in the country". Considering the pace of progress on the intricate matters of federalism and natural resources, the interim agreement is likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future. The indefinite delay of a final agreement calls into question

the signatories to its objectives. Unrealistic The call for a Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu within two weeks of signing the Agreement is too ambitious. It is almost inconceivable that a conference of such importance can be organized effectively with such short notice. The laissez- faire approach to reconciliation conferences as a destination rather than a means to an end is alarming. Clause 22 of Article Four stipulates that during the Reconciliation Conference, the two sides will agree upon "modalities of development of the roadmap for the establishment federal member state." While it would be encouraging for such an agreement to be reached in the next fortnight, it is neither likely given the depth and breadth of conflict in the Jubba regions, nor legal according to either side's constitutional prerogatives. The Provisional Constitution assigns the responsibility of formulating national policies on federalism to the Somali Federal Parliament (SFP) and the yet-to-be-established Independent Boundaries and Federation Com- mission. Reflections In June, HIPS offered options for compromise on the Kismaayo crisis. It is encouraging that the outline of the Jubba Agreement in Addis Ababa broadly corresponds with HIPS' recommendations. The next step in the process is to draft an implementation roadmap with clear timelines to ensure progress is sustained and an independent body tasked with monitoring how both parties honor and implement the agreement. Having hosted the dialogue, Ethiopia secured this role, but it would have been wise to make it broadly representative of the international community. It is disappointing that the Agreement makes no reference to the ultimate goal of a regional leadership elected by and accountable to its citizens. Nonetheless, following the debacle witnessed in the selection process of the Federal Parliament the establishment of the Regional Assembly offers an opportunity to refine the process of enlisting broadly legitimate and representative traditional elders to support political developments in the country. A deal on the crisis in the Jubba regions was long overdue. The SFG and leaders of the Jubba region are courageous to have taken this important step sketching a path out of the prolonged stalemate. Negotiations were extraordinarily arduous. Both sides deserve credit for demonstrating the ability to compromise for the sake of the nation. The objectives of the Agreement, despite its flaws, are positive. The commitment to addressing the problems associated with a multitude of armed groups operating in the region is particularly positive. The Agreement, however, makes several references to a federal system of governance that currently does not exist and is not likely to be fully consolidated for some years. This may render aspects of the Agreement practically untenable for the fore-

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seeable future increasing the likelihood of its collapse. That articles of the Agree- ment may not correspond with the Provisional Constitution is also a cause for concern – two contradictory legal documents will further complicate an already complex situation. Goodwill and the commitment to the robust implementation of the Agreement are critical. 'Spoilers' will attempt to undermine progress and an inher- ently weak political system exposes the Agreement to numerous threats. Failure to implement the agreement, for the population of the region, however, is not an op- tion.

Source: somalilandsun.com/

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Tunisia

Tunisie: le dernier espoir des "printemps arabes" le 05/09/2013 La transition politique tunisienne est plus que chaotique et une crise sur le projet de nouvelle constitution paralyse le processus de démocratisation.

En Tunisie, le processus de démocratisation est au point mort, ou presque. Reuters Près de deux ans et demi après la chute du régime de Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, la transition politique reste tumultueuse en Tunisie. Une crise qui paralyse le processus démocratique du berceau des "printemps arabes". En désaccord sur le projet de nouvelle constitution, ni l'opposition ni Ennahda, le parti islamiste au pouvoir, ne cèdent sur leurs revendications. Ennahda soutient l'idée d'un "dialogue national", sous le parrainage du puissant syndicat UGTT, et se dit favorable à la formation d'un gouvernement apolitique dès lors qu'un consensus aura été trouvé sur la Constitution et les élections. La coalition d'opposition, qui organise toujours des manifestations quotidiennes à Tunis, réclame, de son côté, la démission du cabinet actuel et la mise en place d'un gouvernement de technocrates avant toute négociation sur la Constitution et les élec- tions.

Le réalisme politique d'Ennahda Pourtant, souligne Pierre Vermeren, historien du Maghreb contemporain à l'univer- sité Paris 1, la Tunisie reste le "laboratoire de la démocratisation dans le monde arabe". "C'est là que cela a commencé et que les choses peuvent encore aboutir", estime-t-il. A condition que les responsables politiques soient à la hauteur. Rached Ghannouchi n'entend pas subir le même sort que ses "frères" en Egypte. "On sent un grand sens politique chez lui, analyse Pierre Vermeren. Il connait très bien l'histoire de la Tunisie, ses valeurs et son aversion dans la violence." Depuis que le parti est au pouvoir, Ennahda a toujours fait des concessions

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majeures. Que cela soit sur la place de la Charia (loi islamique) dans la Constitution, le statut des femmes, la mise en place éventuelle d'un gouvernement apolitique, aucun sujet n'a été évité. Le premier ministre Ali Larayaredh a même jugé le mouvement salafiste Ansar Al Charia, responsable des assassinats non- revendiquées des opposants de gauche Chokri Belaid (6 février) et Mohamed Brahmi (25 juillet). Le devoir de réussir la révolution La Tunisie peut s'appuyer sur une société civile déterminée et dynamique pour mener à bien les projets de la "évolution de Jasmin". "Il existe une élite intellec- tuelle en Tunisie beaucoup plus libre et affranchie qu'au Maroc ou en Algérie", rappelle Pierre Vermeren. Un volontarisme incarné par le syndicat UGTT, institution la plus solide et légitime du pays. "L'UGTT, qui a porté la révolution, a un pouvoir de contrainte sur le gouvernement", ajoute l'historien. Les handicaps apparents sont peut-être sa chance: le plus petit du Maghreb ne dis- pose pas de pétrole ni d'économie de rente, et ne possède surtout pas de poids géopolitique: "La Tunisie n'a pas reçu le soutien des pays du Maghreb. Ceux des pays du Golfe, surtout le Qatar, ou de l'Union Européenne a été très timide, explique Pierre Vermeren. Elle doit se débrouiller seule. Cette autonomie est une chance." Ansar Al-Charia, le péril de la révolution Radicalement hostile au processus politique actuel, le mouvement Ansar Al Charia a été interdit depuis mai 2013 pour avoir proféré des menaces de "guerre" contre le gouvernement lors de son Congrès. Torturés et traqués sous Ben Ali, les membres du mouvement salafiste ont été libérés grâce à une amnistie générale post- révolutionnaire. Le mouvement est soupçonné d'être proche des groupes djihadistes actifs dans le mont Chaambi, à la frontière algérienne, à l'origine d'actes terroristes qui se sont soldés par une quinzaine de morts au sein de l'armée depuis décembre. "Aujourd'hui isolé, marginalisé, décrédibilisé, Ansar Al charia n'a rien à perdre et peut entretenir la violence pour saboter le processus démocratique", conclut Pierre Vermeren.

En savoir plus sur http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/tunisie-le- dernier-espoir-des-printemps-arabes_1277905.html#BBxcqTD1oQQ7riJS.99

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Terrorism in the World

Russia

Analysis of Putin's plea to Americans over Syria 12 September 2013

Mr Putin's article follow talks with Mr Obama earlier in the month Russian President Vladimir Putin has made a direct appeal to the American people for the US to resist military strikes against Syria. The BBC's diplomatic correspondent Jonathan Marcus gives his detailed assessment of the article Mr Putin has written in the New York Times. A Plea for Caution From Russia By VLADIMIR V. PUTIN MOSCOW - RECENT events surrounding Syria have prompted me to speak directly to the American people and their political leaders. It is important to do so at a time of insufficient communication between our societies. JM: An indication of the tensions at the highest levels between the US and Russia - the fall-out over Edward Snowden, Syria, human rights in Russia itself and so on. All good reasons for Mr Putin to seek to bypass the White House and talk directly to the American people and the world. Relations between us have passed through different stages. We stood against each other during the cold war. But we were also allies once, and defeated the Nazis to-

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gether. The universal international organization - the United Nations - was then established to prevent such devastation from ever happening again. The United Nations' founders understood that decisions affecting war and peace should happen only by consensus, and with America's consent the veto by Security Council permanent members was enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The profound wisdom of this has underpinned the stability of international relations for decades. No one wants the United Nations to suffer the fate of the League of Nations, which collapsed because it lacked real leverage. This is possible if influential countries bypass the United Nations and take military action without Security Council authorization. JM: Mr Putin presents himself as a defender of the UN system, where of course Russia has a veto in the Security Council and has consistently blocked any concert- ed action on Syria. Western leaders have blamed Moscow for preventing any UN response to the Syrian crisis. The potential strike by the United States against Syria, despite strong opposition from many countries and major political and religious leaders, including the pope, will result in more innocent victims and escalation, potentially spreading the conflict far beyond Syria's borders. A strike would increase violence and unleash a new wave of terrorism. It could undermine multilateral efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and further destabilize the Middle East and North Africa. It could throw the entire system of international law and order out of balance. JM: A clear statement of Moscow's position that US military action might precipi- tate a wider regional crisis with significant consequences well beyond the Middle East. Of course the US and its allies fear that the continuation of the Syrian crisis and the eventual collapse of the country into anarchy could have a similar outcome. Syria is not witnessing a battle for democracy, but an armed conflict between government and opposition in a multi-religious country. There are few champions of democracy in Syria. But there are more than enough Qaeda fighters and extremists of all stripes battling the government. The United States State Department has des- ignated Al Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, fighting with the opposition, as terrorist organizations. This internal conflict, fuelled by foreign weapons supplied to the opposition, is one of the bloodiest in the world. JM: A re-statement of Russia's much more sceptical approach to the whole phenomenon of the Arab Spring. Moscow has always regarded the West's response to the wave of often violent change as simplistic and naive. Mercenaries from Arab countries fighting there, and hundreds of militants from

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Western countries and even Russia, are an issue of our deep concern. Might they not return to our countries with experience acquired in Syria? After all, after fighting in Libya, extremists moved on to Mali. This threatens us all. JM: The Syria crisis risks exporting al-Qaeda type extremism. Russia has always argued that it has a more pragmatic view of the complexities of the Syrian situation. The divided opposition does indeed present the West with problems since some of its most effective military elements are groups with strong links to al- Qaeda. From the outset, Russia has advocated peaceful dialogue enabling Syrians to develop a compromise plan for their own future. We are not protecting the Syrian government, but international law. We need to use the United Nations Security Coun- cil and believe that preserving law and order in today's complex and turbulent world is one of the few ways to keep international relations from sliding into chaos. The law is still the law, and we must follow it whether we like it or not. Under current international law, force is permitted only in self-defense or by the decision of the Security Council. Anything else is unacceptable under the United Nations Charter and would constitute an act of aggression. JM: A restrictive - but many would say an accurate - view of the current state of play in international law. Russia has long held that national sovereignty is sacro- sanct and that only the UN Security Council can sanction military intervention in very specific circumstances. No one doubts that poison gas was used in Syria. But there is every reason to believe it was used not by the Syrian Army, but by opposition forces, to provoke intervention by their powerful foreign patrons, who would be siding with the funda- mentalists. Reports that militants are preparing another attack — this time against Israel — cannot be ignored. JM: Russia is still adhering to the view that it may have been opposition forces who used chemical weapons in an effort to force a US intervention. Here there is no common ground with Washington. Russia clearly discounts the US intelligence material pointing to the government's role. It is alarming that military intervention in internal conflicts in foreign countries has become commonplace for the United States. Is it in America's long-term interest? I doubt it. Millions around the world increasingly see America not as a model of democracy but as relying solely on brute force, cobbling coalitions together under the slogan "you're either with us or against us". But force has proved ineffective and pointless. Afghanistan is reeling, and no one can say what will happen after international forces withdraw. Libya is divided into tribes and clans. In Iraq the civil war continues, with dozens killed each day. In the United States, many draw an analogy between Iraq and Syria, and ask why their government would want to repeat recent mistakes.

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JM: An easy shot. Putin is pointing to the war-weariness in the US and amongst many Western publics. Iraq and Afghanistan have not turned out well and, according to the Russian president, they have discredited a generation of US policy- making. No matter how targeted the strikes or how sophisticated the weapons, civilian casualties are inevitable, including the elderly and children, whom the strikes are meant to protect. The world reacts by asking: if you cannot count on international law, then you must find other ways to ensure your security. Thus a growing number of countries seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. This is logical: if you have the bomb, no one will touch you. We are left with talk of the need to strengthen nonprolifera- tion, when in reality this is being eroded. JM: US action, he believes, is actually promoting proliferation. Is this the message the Iranians and the North Koreans have received? We must stop using the language of force and return to the path of civilized diplomatic and political settlement. A new opportunity to avoid military action has emerged in the past few days. The United States, Russia and all members of the international community must take advantage of the Syrian government's willingness to place its chemical arsenal under international control for subsequent destruction. Judging by the statements of President Obama, the United States sees this as an alternative to military action. I welcome the president's interest in continuing the dialogue with Russia on Syria. We must work together to keep this hope alive, as we agreed to at the Group of 8 meeting in Lough Erne in Northern Ireland in June, and steer the discussion back toward negotiations. If we can avoid force against Syria, this will improve the atmosphere in international affairs and strengthen mutual trust. It will be our shared success and open the door to cooperation on other critical issues. JM: Mr Putin shifts to a much more positive tone, seeing cooperation on Syria as a path to a better relationship all round. This is bolstered by his warm remarks that follow about his developing personal ties with President Obama. My working and personal relationship with President Obama is marked by growing trust. I appreciate this. I carefully studied his address to the nation on Tuesday. And I would rather disagree with a case he made on American exceptionalism, stating that the United States' policy is "what makes America different. It's what makes us exceptional." It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation. JM: The sting in the tail. Mr Putin condemns the whole concept of "American ex-

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ceptionalism", the idea shared by many Americans that their country has a special place in the world and a special duty to promote its values. We are all equal in the eyes of God, says Mr Putin. The implication? There are no more superpow- ers now. There are big countries and small countries, rich and poor, those with long democratic traditions and those still finding their way to democracy. Their policies differ, too. We are all different, but when we ask for the Lord's blessings, we must not forget that God created us equal. Vladimir V. Putin is the president of Russia. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24063187

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Syria

Intervening in Syria and the humanitarian case: What does the research say? September 12, 2013

The possibility of a Russian-backed deal on chemical weapons disarmament for Syria through the United NationsSecurity Council has, for the moment, slowed potential U.S. military action. The immediate historical precedent that many in government and the news media have turned to is the successful dismantling of Lib- ya’s weapons of massdestruction programs in the mid-2000s. For perspective on any potential weapons inspection mission in Syria, see the paper “Who Won Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theo- ry and Policy,” from Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock of Duke Uni- versity. A 2006 Congressional Research Service report, “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” has details of that effort. Still, the strong possibility of military intervention remains if no such deal can be reached. So what do history and social science suggest about the consequences of a Western-led attack on the Assad regime? The Syrian dilemma It is first worth reviewing the rapid series of events leading up to this point. On Au- gust 21, a chemical-weapons attack was alleged to have taken place in a Damascus suburb. Nine days later, the United States detailed evidence that it said supported the conclusion that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was behind the attack — and had thus crossed the “red line” established by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons. (Syria signed the original protocol, but not the 1977 amendment on the protection of victims of internal armed conflicts.) In response, the Obama administration has advocated a military strike against the Syrian regime, supported by France, even as U.S. residents expressed skepti- cism after the long series of wars and military interventions since 9/11. On Septem- ber 9, however, a proposal by Russia to put Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons under international control could defuse the crisis. While U.S. government officials have used several arguments for intervening in Syr- ia’s civil conflict that began in 2011, one is that the years-long humanitarian disaster had taken on a new dimension with the use chemical weapons. Calling for lim-

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ited military action, President Obama said, “We cannot turn a blind eye to images like the ones we’ve seen out of Syria.” In his official statement, Secretary of State John Kerry described the attack as “this crime against conscience, this crime against humanity, this crime against the most fundamental principles of international community, against the norm of the international community.” The humanitarian disaster caused by the ongoing Syrian conflict is undisputed: the U.N.estimates the death toll at more than 100,000, with some 2 million refugees displaced. But could intervention only make matters worse, particularly for civilian non-combatants? And could the very threat of intervention also serve to deepen the conflict? Or do threats help deter violence? While some recent international interventions — including in Libya in 2011 — have been generally seen as successes, the outcome of others appear to be significantly less positive. A 2011 study published in Political Research Quarterly, “Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?” examines the effects of foreign military interventions on human-rights grounds in 145 countries from 1981 to 2001. “The empirical evidence offers robust support for the assertion that supportive and neutral military interventions deteriorate the level of respect for physical integrity rights,” writes the author, Dursun Peksen of East Carolina University. “Supportive intervention is likely to increase the predicted probability of extrajudicial killing by 103 percent. Neutral interventions … increase the predicted probability of extrajudicial killing by 130 percent.” Peksen concludes: As military intervention becomes a counterproductive policy tool instigating more human-rights abuses, the target state will likely experience more violence, humanitarian disasters, and other instabilities given the inherent link between the respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace and security. What about the “responsibility to protect”?

A 2005 U.N. initiative called the Responsibility to Protect(R2P) stipulates that “the international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations” from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing and their incitement. The R2P concept, formulated after the violence in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, has since been invoked in Libya and South Sudan. President Obama has explicitly compared the situation in Syria to the genocide in Rwanda, saying, “If you decried inaction in Rwanda, Syria

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[is] a no-brainer.” Over the last three decades, there have been a number of international interventions with humanitarian aims. Sometimes they have taken the form of U.N. peacekeeping operations. For data and analysis of these efforts, see the 2013 study “United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments, 1990- 2011,” published in Conflict Management and Peace Science. Other interventions include Operation Allied Force, NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999, which is being considered as a model for the current Syrian conflict. At the time President Bill Clin- tonarticulated his support for the Kosovo strikes using humanitarian language, ex- plaining that, “ending this tragedy is a moral imperative.” However, some research indicates that caution is necessary when intervening on human-rights grounds. In “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” a 2013 paper published in International Security, Alan Ku- perman of the University of Texas challenges “conventional wisdom” about the conflict and suggests how, on a number of points, intervention made matters worse. The essay explores a central idea: “Humanitarian intervention risks backfir- ing by escalating rebellion, both in the country where it is conducted and beyond. This is because it encourages substate groups to believe that by violently provoking state retaliation, they can attract intervention to help achieve their political objectives, including regime change.” Kuperman concludes: Overall, NATO intervention significantly exacerbated humanitarian suffering in Lib- ya and Mali, as well as security threats throughout the region. The only apparent benefit is that Libyans have been able to vote in democratic elections, butthe elected government has little authority in a country now controlled by dozens of tribal and Islamist militias accountable to no one. NATO intervention increased the duration of Libya’s civil war by approximately six times, and its death toll by seven to ten times. The potential role of “moral ha ard” The idea that R2P could create incentives for rebellions to grow worse and opposition fighters to take more risks — assuming they will ultimately be “bailed out” by outside intervention — was the subject of a 2011 study by Paul D. Williams of George Washington University and Alex J. Bellamy of Griffith University (Australia). The result, “On the Limits of Moral Hazard: The ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ Armed Conflict and Mass Atrocities,” was published in the European Journal of Internation- al Relations. The authors find that “there is no empirical evidence to support the general con- tention that victims’ groups bring genocide upon themselves, and … moral hazard theory’s view of provocation is arbitrarily focused on the moment of rebellion and ignores the historic and strategic context in which political pressure builds before intra-state armed conflict erupts.” They conclude that the “empirical evidence relating to the frequency, duration and severity of rebellions and genocidal violence

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contradicts moral hazard theory’s conclusion that R2P is a remote cause of genocide.” However, a 2011 study published in the journal Civil Wars, “Mainstreaming the Re- sponsibility to Protect in Peace Operations,” offers concrete suggestions for better implementing the R2P through peace operations. The authors, Bellamy and Charles T. Hunt of the University of Queensland, state that interventions must be “designed, planned and resourced with a clear understanding of the threats to civilian populations and what it will take to address their needs.” They note in their conclusion: There are at least three major areas in which an [R2P] lens could be brought to bear in order to strengthen the capacity of peace operations to protect populations from genocide and mass atrocities: (1) developing protection and atrocity-specific doctrine; (2) translating doctrine into training; and (3) ensuring that risks are properly assessed and missions given appropriate mandates and capabilities. Are humanitarian interventions effective? Reviewing military intervention in Lib- ya, a 2011 report published in the International Review of the Red Cross,“The Use of Force to Protect Ci- vilians and Humanitarian Action: The Case of Libya and Beyond,” asserts that success is not always guaranteed and caution should be exercised when comparing future situations to Libya. “Such armed support to protect civilians,” writes author Bruno Pommier, “whether or not in the context of R2P, could be extremely difficult to implement in the future and would depend on changing power relations within the international community.” Similarly, in “Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Op- erations on Violence against Civilians,” published in Civil Wars in 2010, Lisa Hult- man of the Swedish National Defense College examines the effect of peace operations in countries experiencing ongoing armed conflicts. Her findings also caution against certain kinds of direct interventions: “There is no strong evidence that the behavior of governments is affected by peace operations: in general, there is no significant dampening effect of peacekeepers on the level of violence carried out by governments.” Furthermore, “when peacekeepers are present, the level of violence against civilians by rebel groups is in fact higher than when no peacekeepers are present.” Not all studies are dismissive of interventions. In a 2013 American Journal of Politi-

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cal Sciencearticle, “The Road to Hell? Third-Party Intervention to Prevent Atroci- ties,” Andrew H. Kydd and Scott Straus of the University of Wisconsin-Madison de- scribe a situation much like the one ongoing in Syria: A government and rebel group fight, the government commits atrocities, and a third party may intervene to stop the violence and abuse. They argue that, under the right circumstances, “a well-crafted intervention regime can reduce the expected level of atrocities and so be counted as welfare improving overall.” David R. Davis of Emory University and Amanda Murdie of Kansas State University make a similar point in a 2010 Human Rights Quarterly article, “Problematic Poten- tial: The Human Rights Consequences of Peacekeeping Interventions in Civil Wars.” They note that “peacekeeping interventions are not the magic solution to end human rights abuses in states with a history of civil war,” but there is also “great potential of specific actions within peacekeeping missions” to protect human rights. Options for action Military action aside, another outstanding question remains: What is the best way for the international community to help the people of Syria? In 2011, the Carr Cen- ter for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School published a working paper, “Improving the Protection of Civilians in Situations of Armed Conflict,” that suggests methods for increasing the protection of civilians during violent conflict. With input from representatives of the military, the United Nations, NGOs, and aca- demia, the paper lays out recommendations for the two main mechanisms by which civilians are protected in conflict zones: peacekeeping operations, and monitoring and investigation activities. Others have been making the case that given the high costs associated with military interventions, more preventive measures should be taken earlier. Ina Foreign Affairs article,“The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention: The Hard Truth About a Noble Notion,”Benjamin A. Valentino of Dartmouth argues: Washington should replace its focus on military intervention with a humanitarian foreign policy centered on saving lives by funding public health programs in the developing world, aiding victims of natural disasters, and assisting refugees fleeing violent conflict. He cites the costs — monetary and otherwise — of military interventions, including: “aiding defenseless civilians has usually meant empowering armed factions claiming to represent these victims, groups that are frequently responsible for major human rights abuses of their own.” Furthermore, “even if the ends of such actions could be unambiguously humanitarian, the means never are. Using force to save lives usually involves taking lives, including innocent ones.” Source: http://journalistsresource.org/

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USA

Radical Muslim groups give way to radicali ed Muslim individuals September 12, 2013 A new study and report released by the Homeland SecurityProject of the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) on Monday strongly suggests that the terrorist threat to the United States that should be addressed comes from individuals who are radicalized over the Internet or in local mosques within the U.S. rather than from terrorist cells comprised of al-Qaeda or other organization's members. The so-called "lone wolves" are often inspired by al-Qaeda's jihadist message, but also may be swayed by the messages of Hezbollah, Hamas, theMuslim Brother- hood, Al-Shabaab or other Islamist organizations, according to the researchers.

"While these lone wolves might not be able to kill in mass numbers, the Boston Marathon bombings and the Fort Hood slayings show that alienated persons influ- enced partially by online messaging can cause great damage," BPC officials state. The report, Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment, provides readers with an important and knowledgeable review of al-Qaeda and its affiliates such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQII), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Nigeria's Boko Haram. "The report also provides legislative and executive recommendations on how best to counter the threat and protect the U.S. homeland," according to BPC officials.

The authors are members of BPC's Homeland Security Project, which is led by former 9/11 Commission Co-chairs former New Jersey Governor Tom Kean and former U.S. Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Ind., who served as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee in 1985-1987. With President Barack Obama contemplating U.S. action in Syria due to the regime of its dictator Bashar al-Assad allegedly using chemical weapons, the BCP report urges the tracking of arms being smuggled to jihadist fighters in the region. With groups such as Hezbollah making threats of retaliation against the U.S. and its interests, the report advises U.S. leaders to incorporate "lessons learned from the Boston bombings into its current emergency-response plan to ensure a more meas- ured reaction to tragic but small-scale terrorist attacks." "This assessment finds that the United States faces a different terrorist threat than it did on 9/11/2001. The borders between domestic and international terrorism have blurred, and the U.S. adversaries are not only organizations, but also individuals. To best protect the homeland, we need to develop defenses against a more diffused threat posed by radicalized individuals, in addition to organized groups," said Gov. Kean.

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"The Bipartisan Policy Center's report is intended to evaluate the current domestic and international threats and provide recommendations to help lawmakers and the administration counter those threats," he added. The BPC's report also provides recommendations to both houses of the U.S. Con- gress, including reforms to the CIA drone program. The researchers advise members of Congress to use the upcoming withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan, which is scheduled for late 2014, as an opportunity to review the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) policy. It's also recommended that the government should create an independent investi- gative body – not unlike the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) – to conduct investigations into terrorist attacks within the U.S., with the goal of clearly ex- plaining how the terrorist attackers evaded law enforcement and identifying lessons that may be learned. "It has been twelve years since the attacks on 9/11. Political leaders from both parties should renew their focus on counterterrorism strategies to ensure that our current approach matches the threats of today," said Rep. Hamilton. "Congress should hold a series of public hearings to discuss where the U.S. stands in its counterterrorism strategy. Those hearings would be an opportunity to evaluate if our nation is absorbing the institutional lessons learned over the past decade, to analyze if the government is allocating resources to the right places, and most importantly, to determine what is missing from our strategy," Hamilton explained.

"Al-Qaeda has embraced a strategy that transformed it into a decentralized, net- worked, transnational movement, rather than the single monolithic entity it was on the eve of 9/11. This strategy was undoubtedly the result of necessity; U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the wake of the 9/11 attacks largely obliterated al-Qaeda as an organization," claims Peter Bergen, the director of the National Security Pro- gram at the New America Foundation.

Source: www.renewamerica.com

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