IFC's Ill-Judged Investments in DR Congo's Mines
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IFC’s ill-judged investments in DR Congo’s Mines Why has IFC abandoned Congolese victims of corruption? 17 September 2019 Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID) | UK Charity No. 1150846 | UK Company No. 04895859 Studio 204, Screen Works, 22 Highbury Grove, London, N5 2EF, UK | Website: www.raid-uk.org Table of Contents 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................................... 3 THE CORRUPTION SCHEME .................................................................................................................................................. 4 HOW MUCH DID IFC LOSE? ................................................................................................................................................. 5 WHY DID IFC NOT JOIN THE SHAREHOLDER ACTION? ................................................................................................................ 5 COMPLAINT TO THE WORLD BANK GROUPS INTEGRITY VICE-PRESIDENCY .................................................................................... 6 2. UPDATE ON US COURT JUDGEMENT JUST PRIOR TO PUBLICATION ...................................................................... 7 3. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 8 PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT ................................................................................................................................................... 8 THE CONTEXT AND LEGACY OF THE CORRUPT DEALS .................................................................................................................. 9 AFRICO’S KALUKUNDI CONCESSION AND THE ROLE OF IFC ....................................................................................................... 10 4. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF IFC’S INVESTMENT IN AFRICO ............................................................................ 11 THE INITIAL INVESTMENT .................................................................................................................................................. 11 IFC OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................................................... 11 IFC DUE DILIGENCE .......................................................................................................................................................... 12 IFC UNDERSTATES THE RISKS .............................................................................................................................................. 12 THE ESCALATING OWNERSHIP CRISIS: IFC’S RESPONSE ............................................................................................................ 15 5. IFC’S ANTI-CORRUPTION STANCE ........................................................................................................................ 19 6. THE CORRUPT TRANSACTION AND WHAT HAPPENED TO IFC’S SHARES IN AFRICO ............................................. 20 THE IMPACT UPON EXISTING SHAREHOLDERS ......................................................................................................................... 22 WHAT HAPPENED TO IFC’S SHARES ..................................................................................................................................... 23 7. THE WIDER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AFRICO OWNERS AS VICTIMS ........................................................................ 24 8. THE CORRUPT ACQUISITION OF FIRST QUANTUM’S KOLWEZI MINE: IFC’S CONTRASTING POSITION IN PURSUING ITS LOSSES ........................................................................................................................................................... 25 9. THE REAL HARM CAUSED BY CORRUPTION TO MINING COMMUNITIES IN CONGO ............................................. 29 10. REVISION OF IFC POLICY DOCUMENTS................................................................................................................. 32 11. QUESTIONS FOR IFC AND RAID’S RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................... 33 ANNEX – CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN RAID AND IFC ................................................................................................ 36 2 1. Executive Summary On 29 August 2019, a United States court confirmed that the corrupt takeover of a mining company in the Democratic Republic of Congo had produced real victims who are entitled to a restitution award. The victims are the former shareholders in a Canadian mining company, Africo Resources Limited, which held a 75% stake in the valuable Kalukundi copper and cobalt concession in southern Congo. The shareholders lost control of their Congolese investment in 2008 when Dan Gertler, a notorious Israeli businessman, working alongside an American hedge fund and high ranking Congolese officials, orchestrated a take-over. “Africo must be screwed and finished totally!!!!”, Gertler wrote in a text message revealed in earlier court papers. Back in September 2016, the hedge fund, Och-Ziff (since renamed “Sculptor”), had admitted violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, with its OZ Africa subsidiary pleading guilty to criminal charges. One of the investors in the failed Africo mining project was the International Finance Corporation, the private-sector arm of the World Bank Group. IFC was an important “seed” investor, seeking to encourage economic growth and poverty alleviation in Congo after years of devastating conflict. In 2007, it had a 6% holding in the Africo project and an option to buy more shares. The decision by the US judge that the shareholders were victims and were entitled to restitution could have been an important moment for IFC, setting it on the road to recuperate its losses and to stand-up against corruption, which had robbed it and the Congolese people of much needed socially responsible development. The Congolese people needed a champion to fight for them, especially since residents of the affected mining communities who lost out could not be directly involved as victims in the legal case (US law requires a crime victim to be directly and proximately harmed). But IFC was surprisingly absent. IFC says it had no entitlement to join the action because it had transferred away its “legal rights”. The “third party” IFC refers to as recipient is, based on company filings, most likely a former Africo chairman, Chris Theodoropoulos. Shares equivalent to IFC’s holding were “repurchased” by the company from Theodoropoulos in 2009. If and when compensation is awarded, IFC will need to explain why it has given away rights worth up to $50 million, squandering any prospect of recovering funds for ultimate re-investment in Congo. Moreover, because victim restitution rights can only have arisen in September 2016, IFC will also need to explain exactly when it gave up these rights. By failing to add its weight to the victim claim, IFC has also missed a crucial opportunity to send a strong message to the perpetrators of corruption. Indeed, IFC has never publicly denounced the corruption that so negatively affected its investment, even though the FCPA action against Och-Ziff laid bare the Congolese corruption scheme, with Gertler and then president Joseph Kabila clearly identifiable as co-conspirators. A year later, in 2017, Gertler was named a “corrupt actor” by the US Treasury and placed under sanctions. Yet Gertler and his companies have not been added by the World Bank Group to the list of companies blacklisted from doing business with the Bank (a process known as debarment). Instead, IFC officials stayed quiet and appeared to slowly back away from their investment. In Congo, a multitude of corrupt deals have left a legacy of exploitation, mismanagement, environmental harm and mass unemployment, all contrary to IFC’s aims to revitalise the local economy and provide desperately needed social investment and environmental clean-up. As well as its investment in Africo, IFC had sunk $4.5 million into First Quantum’s Kolwezi project, which also 3 was targeted under the corruption scheme, with the same grim consequences for local communities. Examining IFC’s record therefore matters. Given that IFC’s investments in Congo went so spectacularly wrong, the RAID report examines what happened, what lessons could have been learned and why red flags were not raised earlier about Gertler’s role. Exactly who now stands to benefit from IFC’s restitution rights and under what circumstances did IFC sign these away? This report forms part of a submission RAID is making to the World Bank Group’s Integrity Unit, requesting an investigation into: (i) the role of Gertler and his companies in the Congolese mining projects; (ii) the adequacy of IFC’s due diligence prior to investing in the Africo project; (iii) IFC’s record during the period of investment; and (iv) whether IFC has done all it can to support victims of corruption (for further information see RAID’s letter to the Integrity Vice-Presidency on 17 September 2017). The corruption scheme In the September 2016 action under the FCPA, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) detailed the “DRC corruption scheme”. Referring to the Africo mining project, the US authorities described how a high-ranking public official “orchestrated the taking of Africo's interest in the DRC Mine” and