DOCSLIB.ORG

An Analysis of the Determinants of Corruption: Evidence from the Italian Regions

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
An Analysis of the Determinants of Corruption: Evidence from the Italian Regions ISSN: 2038-7296 POLIS Working Papers [Online] Dipartimento di Politiche Pubbliche e Scelte Collettive – POLIS Department of Public Policy and Public Choice – POLIS Working paper n. 171 September 2010 An analysis of the determinants of corruption: Evidence from the Italian regions Nadia Fiorino and Emma Galli UNIVERSITA’ DEL PIEMONTE ORIENTALE “Amedeo Avogadro” ALESSANDRIA Periodico mensile on-line "POLIS Working Papers" - Iscrizione n.591 del 12/05/2006 - Tribunale di Alessandria An Analysis of the Determinants of Corruption: Evidence from the Italian Regions Nadia Fiorino∗ Emma Galli Università degli Studi L’Aquila and Università degli Studi di Roma “La CREI Sapienza” and CREI Abstract This paper investigates the causes of corruption in the Italian regions for the period 1980 to 2002 by selecting a number of hypotheses assessed in the literature. Corruption turns out to be driven by the level of per capita income and of education. While, as expected, income is negatively related with corruption, education is not; its positive impact on corruption can be explained as if corruption in Italy was typically a ‘white collars’ phenomenon during the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover the size of public investments in both the economic and politico- institutional dimensions seems to be a crucial factor in the explanation of the phenomenon. Keywords: Corruption; Determinants; Institutions; Italian regions JEL classification: O1; H0 1. Introduction Corresponding Author, Nadia Fiorino, Dipartimento di Sistemi e Istituzioni per l’Economia, Università degli Studi dell’Aquila, Via Giovanni Falcone, 25 - 67100 Coppito-L’Aquila, ITALY. E-mail: [email protected]. We would like to thank Luisanna Onnis, Fabio Padovano, Simona Scabrosetti, and the participants to the 2008 Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica Conference and to the 2009 European Public Choice Society Meeting. The usual caveat applies. The literature on the historical, cultural, economic and political determinants of corruption is quite developed: countries characterized by common law systems that embody greater protection of property against the state (La Porta et al., 1999), less hierarchical religions like Protestantism (La Porta et al., 1997), higher levels of income and education (Lipset, 1960), less government expenditures and regulations (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003), lower diversity along ethnic and income lines (Mauro, 1995; Alesina et al., 2002) and higher degrees of civicness of the population (Putnam, 1993) are expected to be less corrupt. Mixed predictions have been provided by the literature about the impact on corruption of federalism (Weingast, 1995; Breton, 1996; Tanzi, 1995) and of electoral systems (Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Lijphart, 1999). The empirical research however faces major difficulties in measuring corruption rates. Recently economists and political scientists have used indexes of ‘perceived’ corruption constructed by business risk analysts and polling organizations based on survey responses of businessmen and local residents. Among others, Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1997, 1999), Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Persson et al. (2003) used those indexes to investigate the causes of corruption in cross-national analyses. The Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International places Italy in the same group of several Eastern European, Asian and South-American countries with a score of about 5.2 calculated in a range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Indeed since its unification in 1861, the Italian political system has been characterized by a strong interaction between politicians, bureaucrats and citizens aimed to reap high benefits through special laws or through political appointments (the so-called clientelismo). In the 1980s yet the increasing practice of bribing politicians and bureaucrats associated with the ongoing fiscal crisis of the public finances began to modify the general attitude towards corruption and to spread greater intolerance towards it in the public opinion. Del Monte and Papagni (2007) show that corruption crimes increased steadily between the mid-1970s and the first half of the 1990s, especially in the Southern regions, and slightly decreased after 1993 as a consequence of the so- called Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) campaign undertaken by the judiciary system. However, the distribution of corruption crimes is not homogeneous across the territorial areas of the country. Our paper is an attempt to take account of this differentiation by selecting a number of hypotheses assessed in the literature about the causes of corruption and applying them to the Italian regions. In order to comparatively test the explanatory power of these hypotheses we built a set of measures of the level of corruption and of the economic and politico-institutional determinants on regional basis for the period 1980 to 2002. The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the leading theories of what causes corruption. The empirical framework is analyzed in Section 3 where variables and data are described. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 2. The determinants of corruption: a review of the literature It is difficult to fully capture the economic and social significance of corruption as well as its causes and consequences. The economic literature tries to investigate why public officials misuse their office for private gain more frequently in some countries than in others by identifying economic as well as social, cultural and political variables that correlate with the incidence of corruption. If we define corruption as a crime made by public officials for personal gain (as in Rose-Ackerman, 1975) the economic theory of corruption follows closely the economic theory of crime (Becker, 1968). The potential criminal, in this case a public official, weighs the benefits of crime against its costs. The various economic theories on the determinants of corruption are thus driven by this cost-benefit calculus of the potential criminal. National or local characteristics, however, will influence the level of corruption as they alter the benefits and costs of crime. The most relevant cost come from the risk of being caught and punished that depends in turn on the effectiveness of the country’s legal system and on the degree of protection it provides to private individuals harmed by corrupt acts of public officials1. The risk of being caught may be higher in more democratic systems where competitors for office have an incentive to disclose and publicize the incumbent’s misuse of office during the 1 On the impact of different legal systems – common law versus civil law – on corruption see, among others, La Porta et al., 1999 elections. This hypothesis is based on an extensive literature originated by Lipset (1960) that considers political attention a luxury good, education a way to lead individuals towards having a higher value of staying politically involved, civic engagement a channel towards closer monitoring (Putnam, 1993; Glaeser et al., 2004). Therefore, voters with higher income and education are expected to be both more willing and capable to monitor public employees and to take action when the latter violate the law. The literature considers also that the effectiveness of a legal system is rooted not only in the formulations of the laws but also in the ‘legal culture’, that is the expectations and practices that inform the way they are enforced. Different conceptions of the social role of law may imply dissimilar perceptions of the gravity of corruption. Besides losing their jobs, corrupt officials face a social stigma that highly depends on the prevailing moral norms and cultural expectations. In other words, the more dissonance occurs between the law and those norms, the lower legitimacy the legal system will tend to have and the higher will be then the degree of corruption (Treisman, 2000). The benefits of corruption come from public agents being able to allocate resources to private individuals, including the right to bypass certain regulations. Then the official uses his power to generate some gains for the private individual beyond those he would receive without state interventions. State measures such as regulations, taxation, public economic activities may be used to give the private agent advantages wit respect to others in the market and in return the private agent pays the official part of the rent. Therefore, the larger the public sector and the greater the number of regulations of the economy, the greater will be the opportunities for helping private actors either to benefit or to evade these regulations, increasing the possibilities for corrupt practices (Tanzi, 1994; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003; Adsera et al., 2003). Countries characterized by more regulations will experience higher levels of corruption as public officials and private individuals will have more resources to steal and more rules to exploit. Another set of theories on the determinants of corruption has focused on the effect of ethnic fragmentation on corruption and wasteful redistribution (Mauro, 1995; Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Alesina et al., 2002). If an area is worn out by ethnic divisions and leaders tend to allocate resources towards groups of their own ethnicity, then members of one ethnic group might continue to support a leader of their own group, even if he is known to be corrupt. Furthermore, other forms of division, such as income inequality, may also reduce voters’ desire to oppose corruption
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Mani Pulite) Inquiry on Corruption and Its Effects on the Italian Political System
    62 ALBERTO VANNUCCI THE “CLEAN HANDS” (MANI PULITE) INQUIRY ON CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM THE “CLEAN HANDS” (MANI PULITE) INQUIRY ON CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM Alberto Vannucci Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Università di Pisa [email protected] Abstract: The article offers a survey of the main effects of judicial inquiry on corruption in Italy (the “mani pulite” inquiry) and scandals on the political and party system. Some data on the evolution and achievements of the inquiry mani pulite are briefly offered, then focusing on the political consequences of the scandal in terms of delegitimization and consequent crisis of leading political figures, parties, and the political system as a whole. There is then a brief focus on the “lesson” of mani pulite – what did not work in political, institutional and societal mechanisms that should have provided a shelter against systemic corruption. Finally, the main long-term drawbacks of the judicial inquiry are analysed, e.g. the political career of the media tycoon Berlusconi, who was himself prosecuted for corruption crimes, with a dramatic increase of the institutional conflict between the political and the judicial power. Keywords: Corruption; Parties, Italian Political System; “Mani Pulite” Inquiry; Scandal. Resumo: O presente artigo apresenta um levantamento dos principais efeitos do inquérito judicial sobre a corrupção na Itália (especificamente a “Operação Mãos Limpas”) e os escândalos no sistema político e partidário do país. Alguns dados sobre a evolução e os alcances da Operação Mãos Limpas são brevemente expostos. Foca-se a atenção nas consequências políticas de tal escândalo em termos da deslegitimação e a consequente crise de liderança das figuras políticas, dos partidos e do sistema político como um todo.
    [Show full text]
  • The Persistence of Corruption in Italy
    The Persistence of Corruption in Italy: Politicians and the Judiciary since Mani Pulite Raffaele Asquer Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles Paper prepared for the WPSA 2013 ANNUAL MEETING March 28th, 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE 1 Abstract Starting in 1992, the Mani Pulite (“Clean Hands”) anti-corruption campaign promised to eradicate corruption from Italian political life. For a brief, yet intense period, the public rallied behind the prosecutors, and punished the allegedly corrupt politicians and parties at the polls. However, twenty years later, Italy is still ranked as highly corrupt by Western standards. Why, then, did the Mani Pulite campaign fail to have a long-lasting effect? Relying on original data on the anti-corruption investigations in Milan, as well as on a variety of datasources from the existing literature, this paper argues, first, that the investigations left essentially untouched entire parts of the country where corruption was widespread. Overall, the Mani Pulite campaign had limited deterring effects because judicial inquiries were obstructed by the statute of limitations, and even in case of conviction the sentences were generally mild. Second, the paper finds that the structures of corruption networks have changed since the Mani Pulite season, becoming less vulnerable to further judicial inquiries. There now seem to be multiple sites for corrupt transactions, somewhat dispersed throughout the political system, whereas in the past such activities were centrally managed by a cartel of parties. We reach this conclusion by combining evidence from the literature with original data on two subnational legislatures, the Regional Council of Campania (1992-94) and the Regional Council of Lombardy (2010-12) in which political malfeasance in general seemed widespread.
    [Show full text]
  • Mani Pulite, Lava Jato and the Road Ahead for Anti-Corruption Efforts in Brazil
    anti-corruption.com January 22, 2020 BRAZILIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW Mani Pulite, Lava Jato and the Road Ahead for Anti-Corruption Efforts in Brazil By Rafael Ribeiro, Hogan Lovells When Sergio Moro, Brazil’s current Minister In my opinion, reports of Lava Jato’s demise of Justice and Public Safety, studied the are exaggerated, but significant additional anti-corruption push in Italy stemming from popular pressure will be needed for the gains Operation Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) in 2004, made in fighting corruption in Brazil are to he could not have imagined he would later be maintained long-term. In this article, I will lead a corruption investigation in his home briefly discuss the aftermath of Italy’s Mani country with even more far-reaching effects – Pulite investigation and the demonstrated lack Operation Lava Jato (Car Wash). of popular support that it enjoyed during its final years, the circumstances that have led In a 2004 academic article analyzing Operation Lava Jato to similarly see a reduction in popular Mani Pulite, Moro concluded that: support, and finally discuss steps that must be taken so that Lava Jato’s failures and successes Perhaps the most important lesson from alike ultimately can continue to assist Brazil this entire episode is that judicial action in its long struggle against corruption and its against corruption only will be effective corrosive effects. with the support of democracy. It is she who defines the limitations and the possibilities See “Anti-Corruption Is Front and Center for of judicial action. As long as [judicial action] Recently Elected Presidents in Latin America” counts with the support of popular opinion, (Nov.
    [Show full text]
  • How to Tackle Flooding in Venice What Are the Institutional and Material
    How to tackle flooding in Venice What are the institutional and material causes of MOSE’s failure? Master course: Environmental and Infrastructure Planning 11/06/2018 Student Supervisor Nicola Belafatti F.M.G. (Ferry) Van Kann s3232425 [email protected] University of Groningen Faculty of Spatial Sciences Abstract Literature extensively discusses the role of different elements such as corruption and stakeholder involvement as drivers of megaprojects’ success and failure (among others: Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg 2011, 2014; Locatelli 2017; Pinto and Kharbanda 1996; Shenhar et al., 2002; Shore 2008; Tabish and Jha 2011; etc). Scholars analyse reasons and incentives leading to the undertaking of public projects. The main consensus is that insufficient stakeholder involvement, processes lacking transparency and missing institutional checks are factors hindering the appropriate fulfilment of initial expectations and the realization of the project resulting in cost and time overruns (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg 2014). The thesis tests the existing theories by linking them to a specific case study: Venice’s MOSE. The city of Venice and its lagoon have long been threatened by increasingly frequent floods, severely damaging the city’s historical and cultural heritage and disrupting people’s lives. The acqua alta phenomenon has considerably increased in scale and frequency throughout the last decade. The Italian government, in order to protect the lagoon and the city, launched in 2003 the construction of a mobile barrier called MOSE (MOdulo Sperimentale Elettromeccanico, Experimental Electromechanical Module) whose development had started back in the 1970s. The one-of-a-kind giant structure, known worldwide for its length and mass, has not yet been completed, though.
    [Show full text]
  • The Second Earthquake: How the Italian State Generated Hope and Uncertainty in Post-Disaster L’Aquila
    The second earthquake: how the Italian state generated hope and uncertainty in post-disaster L’Aquila Jan-Jonathan Bock Woolf Institute, Cambridge Recent analyses of the state have emphasized its inability to generate hope among citizens, suggesting that neoliberalism and globalization erode its protective power. However, this article suggests that the state still features as a coveted agent of support, in particular during unstable times. After the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, the Italian state became the key actor responsible for emergency aid, restoration, and urban redevelopment. Dedication and the performance of compassion produced expectations of swift improvement. Hope became dependent on state authority. A few years later, uncertainty replaced hope, as promises for recovery remained unrealized. The state morphed from an agent of hope into the source of hopelessness, generating uncertainty and a sense of crisis. Since the state is revealed through its effects, this article highlights the need to trace state power in intimate human emotional experience, such as hope or despair. The production of a specific condition of uncertainty reveals the significance of state power in human life, particularly during times of personal or collective crisis. On 6 April 2009,at3.32 a.m., a major earthquake rocked the city of L’Aquila, the administrative capital of the central Italian Abruzzo region.1 Before the earthquake, L’Aquila had been an important regional centre in a rural and sparsely populated region. One third of the 73,000 inhabitants were L’Aquila University students, most of them from southern Italy. The charming old town – centro storico – attracted young people, enticed by the affordable rent for large baroque apartments.
    [Show full text]
  • The Making of the Padanian Nation: Corruption, Hegemony, Globalization And
    The making of the Padanian Nation: Corruption, Hegemony, Globalization and Legitimacy Sinan Celiksu Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under the Executive Committee of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2014 ©2014 Sinan Celiksu All rights reserved ABSTRACT The making of the Padanian Nation: Corruption, Hegemony, Globalization and Legitimacy Sinan Celiksu This dissertation examines the relationship between state failures and state legitimacy in Italy. The study is based on a one-year ethnographic field research in Varese City. The political party Northern League and its followers (Leghisti) has been chosen to observe the state-society relationships. It has been discovered that among others, three factors were instrumental in the process by which the state-society relationships has been deteriorated so as to open the path for an alternative legitimacy claim such as Padanian nationalism. Initially, revelations of political corruption and illegal state practices, failure of the state to address problems related to globalization such as global economic integration and uncontrolled immigration were instrumental. Later, struggle of hegemony and subjugation between the League and the state has been another important cause for deteriorated relationships. This study also provides qualitative data on the processes by which those deteriorated relationships and state failures contributed the rise of xenophobia and suggests that this failures of the state coupled with the problems brought about by the uncontrolled immigration and global economic expansion is likely to open a path for criminalization of both immigrants and local people. Table of Contents LIST OF GRAPHS, IMAGES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS ...........................................
    [Show full text]
  • Identity Crisis in Italy This Page Intentionally Left Blank IDENTITY CRISIS in ITALY
    168 25 168 Spurred by ongoing conflicts between city-states and the nobility, unification for Italy was a gradual and difficult process. While such divisions shortly subsided to allow the peninsula to become unified, Italy has always been troubled by the difficulties of cultivating a national identity. Identity Crisis Throughout the past and in the present, Italy has been a nation of division. But recently this division has become deeper because of the growing differences between the various parts of the country caused by ITALY IN DENTITY CRISIS unresolved political, institutional, economic and secu- rity problems. The need for academic discourse on the in Italy division encouraged scholars to cooperate and identify the most important causes and elements of the Ital- ian identity crisis such as the political crisis caused by feelings of lack, instability or injustice, the economic 238 and financial crises leading to the erosion of social cohesion and the insecurity linked to immigration. This book presents the result of this dialogue. Fanni Tanács-Mandák (ed.): I (ed.): Tanács-Mandák Fanni The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project PACSDOP-2.1.2- CCHOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance.” Edited by: FANNI TANÁCS-MANDÁK European Social Fund INVESTING IN YOUR FUTURE Identity Crisis in Italy This page intentionally left blank IDENTITY CRISIS IN ITALY Edited by Fanni Tanács-Mandák Dialóg Campus Budapest, 2019 The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project PACSDOP-2.1.2- CCHOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance”.
    [Show full text]
  • The Economic Effect of Corruption in Italy: a Regional Panel Analysis
    Munich Personal RePEc Archive The Economic Effect of Corruption in Italy: A Regional Panel Analysis Lisciandra, Maurizio and Millemaci, Emanuele University of Messina February 2015 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62173/ MPRA Paper No. 62173, posted 15 Feb 2015 14:18 UTC The Economic Effect of Corruption in Italy: A Regional Panel Analysis Maurizio Lisciandra and Emanuele Millemaci* ABSTRACT This paper provides a within-country analysis of the impact of corruption on economic growth using a panel of Italian regions from 1968 to 2011 through a robust measure of corruption. This measure is averaged over 5-year periods to reduce short-run fluctuations and to reduce probable delayed effects, which are typical for latent phenomena such as corruption. The results show a significant negative impact of corruption on long-term growth in all specifications, both on average and for each Italian region. As a consequence, a zero-level of corruption is growth maximizing. This effect is non-linear such that the negative impact of corruption on growth becomes less intense as corruption increases. Keywords: corruption, economic growth, cross-regional analysis, dynamic panel data. JEL: D73; K4; O10; R11. * University of Messina. Department of Economics, Business, Environmental and Quantitative Methods (SEAM), Piazza Pugliatti 1, 98122 Messina, Italy. Email: [email protected] (corresponding author), [email protected]. We thank the seminar participants at the STOREP 2014 in Bergamo and WINIR 2014 in London for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 1. INTRODUCTION Corruption is a very latent phenomenon. Both the theoretical understanding and empirical evidence show that the effects of corruption can be multidimensional, persistent and uncertain.
    [Show full text]
  • 6 Why Is Italy Disproportionally Corrupt?: a Conjecture 135 Unlikely to Subvert the Ranking in Any Drastic Way
    This book considers how emerging economies around the world face the challenge of building ~N good institutions and effective governance, since so much of economic development depends n ~ 3 _-1 on having these in place. The promotion of shared prosperity and the battle against poverty ;= QJ require interventions to reach out to the poor and the disadvantaged. Yet time and again we =3CD have seen such effort foiled or diminished by corruption and leakage. INSTITUTIONS, The creation of good governance and institutions and structures to combat corruption require determination and passion bat also intricate design rooted in data, analysis, and research. In this book, leading researchers from around the world bring to the table some of the best GOVERNANCE available ideas to help create better governance structures, design laws for corruption control, and nurture good institutions. AND THE CONTROL Kaushik Basu is Professor of Economics and holds the C. Marks Chair at Cornell University, New York, USA; and former Chief Economist of the World Bank, 2012-16. Tito Cordella is adviser in the World Bank Development Economics Group, Washington DC, USA. OF CORRUPTION Edited by Kaushik Basu and Tito Cordella Aalgrave ISBN 978-3-319-65683-0 macmillan 11 9 656830 www.palgrave.com IEA Conference Volume No. 157 INEQUALITYAROUND THE WORLD Edited by Richard B. Freeman Kaushik Basu • Tito Cordella Editors MONETARY THEORYAND POLICY EXPERIENCE Edited by Axel Leijonhufvud MONETARY THEORY AS A BASIS FOR MONETARY POLICY Edited by Axel Leijonhufvud Institutions,
    [Show full text]
  • Sports Betting and Corruption: How to Preserve the Integrity of Sport
    Sports betting and corruption: How to preserve the integrity of sport STUDY Sports betting and corruption How to preserve the integrity of sport IRIS Pascal BONIFACE Sarah LACARRIERE Pim VERSCHUUREN Alexandre TUAILLON University of Salford (Manchester) Pr. David FORREST Cabinet PRAXES-Avocats Me Jean-Michel ICARD Jean-Pierre MEYER This publication was translated with the support of CCLS (Université de Pékin) Dr. Xuehong WANG 1 Sports betting and corruption: How to preserve the integrity of sport CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. ..... 4 Three major examples of corruption in sport ...................................................................................... 9 linked to sports betting ........................................................................................................................ 9 I. The vulnerability of sport in the face of sports betting .................................................................. 14 A. Analysis of the players and methods of corruption in sport ...................................................... 14 1. Fraud in sport at grassroots level: the first level of corruption .............................................. 15 How is it possible to rig a football game? ................................................................................. 15 The adaptation of corruption in sport to different disciplines ................................................... 17 Sportspeople
    [Show full text]
  • 'Mani Pulite': a Critical Analysis of Italian Corruption and Anti
    Bulletin of Italian Politics Vol. 1, No. 2, 2009, 233-64 The Controversial Legacy of ‘Mani Pulite’ : A Critical Analysis of Italian Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policies Alberto Vannucci University of Pisa Abstract: The presence of widespread corruption in the political and administrative system became a major political issue in Italy during the 1990s, but a few years after the beginning of the mani pulite (“clean hands”) inquiries the question faded from the agenda of Italian politics. Using statistical and survey data, judicial and newspapers sources, the article shows that presumably political corruption is still systemic in Italy, and that its spread in the last decade can be explained by several institutional and cultural factors, including the failure of anti-corruption policies, the approval of some potentially corruption-enhancing measures, and the persistence of internal ‘governance structures’ of corrupt transactions. The legacy of mani pulite, therefore, has not been an improvement of public ethics, but an escalation of tensions been political powers and the judiciary, exacerbated by the involvement of the Prime Minister and media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi in several inquiries for corruption crimes. Keywords: mani pulite (“clean hands”), political corruption, anti-corruption policies, Italian transition, systemic corruption, governance structures. Introduction The widespread nature of political and administrative corruption in Italy became a major – and for a certain period the main – political issue during the 1990s. February 1992 saw the start of the mani pulite (‘clean hands’) judicial inquiry in Milan, with the arrest of Mario Chiesa, socialist manager of a public hospice, and the subsequent expansion of the investigations to the whole country and a huge increase in the number of politicians, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs involved.
    [Show full text]
  • Scanned by Scan2net
    »^¿i-u litiu ij ^ is riU Jii <i ii4i tiiiii df iUiiii iiiiii; ?au iitiaii A' - /?. 3 A Comparison of Environmental Impact Assessment in the United States and the European Union: The Case Study of Italy Edward J. Balsamo B.A., B.S., J.D., Candidate for LL.M Degree (Legum Magistur) •!i: ::•> October 1,2003 European University Institute Florence, Italy Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the Diploma in Comparative, European and International Legal Studies (Ll.M.) M.KM.).jTJniinjuumnnüK»n;wf iüaMüati iuMMimnniiiMnnMini— mi— ^ rtW<É^ M|MMtn)|||f1rr i fcMj' European University Institute 3 0001 0041 4725 4 A Comparison of Environmental Impact Assessment in the United States and the European Union: The Case Study of Italy Edward J. Balsamo B.A., B.S., JJ>., Candidate for LLJVÍ Degree (Legum Magistur) October 1,2003 European University Institute Florence, Italy Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the Diploma in Comparative, European and international Legal Studies (LI.M.) LAW ECwJ9 BAL X i ' / -f: /-M I. Introduction.....................................................................................................................4 II. An Overview of Environmental Impact Assessment ................................................... 5 A. What is Environmental Impact Assessment?.............................................................5 B. Growth of Environmental Impact Assessment Internationally................................7 III. NEPA and the EU Directive - A Brief Comparison.................................................11
    [Show full text]