CAMBODIA , , AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT FINAL ASSESSMENT REPORT

April 2019

This publication was prepared by NORC and Social Impact Inc. and authored by Suzanne Kelly-Lyall, Neil Loughlin, and Kimchoeun Pak. It was produced at the request of the Agency for International Development.

CAMBODIA DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT FINAL ASSESSMENT REPORT

April 2019 DRG Learning, Evaluation, and Research (LER) II Activity Tasking N002 GS-10F-0033M / 7200AA18M00016 Cover Photo Credit: Nicole Goodrich

DISCLAIMER

The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i FINDINGS ii ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS vi INTRODUCTION 1 ASSESSMENT PURPOSE 1 METHODOLOGY: THE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 1 ASSESSMENT CONTEXT 3 STEP 1: DEFINING THE DRG CHALLENGE: FIVE DRG ELEMENTS 18 CONSENSUS 19 INCLUSION 21 COMPETITION AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 25 HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW 29 GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS 34 SUMMARY 36 STEP 2: ANALYZING KEY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS 37 THE SPOILERS 38 INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ACTORS 42 STEP 3: USAID’S OPERATIONAL/ PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENT 46 U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA 46 USAID PRIORITIES, INTERESTS, AND RESOURCES 47 STEP 4: OUTLINING THE PROPOSED STRATEGY 52 SUMMARIZING STEPS 1 TO 3: THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 52 DRG OBJECTIVE 52 ANNEXES 61 ANNEX A: DONOR MATRIX 61 ANNEX B: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP LIST 65 ANNEX C: RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 77 ANNEX D: LITERATURE REVIEW 83 ANNEX E: BIBLIOGRAPHY 109 TABLES

Table 1: Cambodia's Top Export and Import Partners, 2017 ...... 41 FIGURES

Figure 1: World Economic Forum Gender Gap, 2018 ...... 9 Figure 2: Population with Internet Access in Cambodia (2010 - 2018) ...... 10 Figure 3: Migration Patterns in Cambodia (2013 vs. 2018) ...... 11 Figure 4: ADB and Estimates of 2018 GDP Growth...... 13 Figure 5: UNDP , 2017...... 14 Figure 6: , Countries, 2018 ...... 15 Figure 7: Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Governance, 2018 ...... 15 Figure 8: Transparency International CPI, 2018 ...... 16 Figure 9: World Press Freedom Index, 2018 ...... 17 Figure 10: , , 2018 ...... 17 Figure 11: Self-Reliance Metrics: Inclusive Development ...... 23 Figure 12: Self-Reliance Metrics: Open and Accountable Government ...... 26 Figure 13: V-dem Civil Society Capacity 2018 ...... 29 Figure 14: V-Democracy Cambodia Indicators (2013 - 2018) ...... 30 Figure 15: Significant Political Events in Cambodia since 2015 ...... 32 Figure 16: Violations of Fundamental Freedoms, April 2017 – March 2018 ...... 33 ACRONYMS

Acronym Name ADB Asian Development Bank ADHOC Cambodia Human Rights and Development Association ADS Automated Directives System AIIB Asian Investment Bank API Advocacy and Policy Institute ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AT Assessment Team BLDP Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index CAO Compliance Advisor Ombudsman CBO Community-Based Organization CCHR Cambodian Center for Human Rights CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy CDRI Cambodian Development Resource Institute CICP Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace CLC Cambodia Labor Confederation CNRP Cambodia National Rescue Party COMFREL Commitment for Free and Fair in Cambodia CPP Cambodia People’s Party CSO Civil Society Organization C-TIP Counter Trafficking in Persons DO Development Objective DOS United States Department of State DRG Democracy, Rights, and Governance EBA Everything but Arms EC Equitable Cambodia ERI Earth Rights International EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment FGD Focus Group Discussion FTUWKC Free Trade Union of Workers of Kingdom of Cambodia FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia GADC Gender and Development for Cambodia GDP Grassroots Democracy Party GDP HRP Human Rights Party HRW ICJ International Committee of Jurists ICNL Civic Freedom Monitor IFES International Federation for Electoral Systems IFI Independent Financial Institutions ILO International Labor Organization INGO International Non-Governmental Organization IP Implementing Partner IRI International Republican Institute I-SAF Implementation Plan – Social Accountability Framework KI Key Informant KII Key Informant Interview KYA Khmer Youth Association LANGO Law on Associations and Non-governmental Organizations LDP League for Democracy Party LER Learning, Evaluation, and Research LFPR Labor Force Participation Rate LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and LICADHO Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights MDB Multilateral Development Bank MFI Micro-finance Institution MIRO Minority Rights Organization MOC Ministry of Commerce MOE Ministry of Environment MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOI Ministry of the Interior MOL Ministry of Labor MP Member of Parliament NDI National Democratic Institute NEC National Committee NGO Non-Governmental Organization NORC National Opinion Research Center NRM Natural Resource Management ODA Official Development Assistance ODC Open Development Cambodia OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights PAD Project Appraisal Document PE Political Economy PEA Political Economy Analysis PM Prime Minister PR Public Relations RFA Radio Free Asia RGC Royal Government of Cambodia ROI Return on Investment ROL Rule of Law SADP Development Program SAF Strategic Assessment Framework SI Social Impact TI Transparency International TUL Trade Union Law UK UPR Universal Periodic Review U.S. United States USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollar USDAO U.S. Defense Attaché Office Cambodia USG United States Government UYFC Union Youth Federations of Cambodia VOA WFP World Food Program EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This assessment reflects on recent changes in the democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) operating environment in Cambodia. Following the four-step process outlined in USAID’s Strategic Assessment Framework (SAF), this assessment defines the core democracy, human rights, and governance problem(s) in Cambodia, identifies the interests and resources of key actors and institutions that could promote or inhibit progress toward democratization, and considers the United States Government’s (USG) current operational and programmatic environment in Cambodia. Second, it provides clear and actionable strategic and programmatic recommendations to address the identified core governance problem.

The assessment focuses on the last five years (2013-2018) and identifies areas of continuity and change. The Assessment Team (AT) concludes that unlike historical periods of constriction and détente enacted by the government of Prime Minister , this period (2013-2018) is different. It is marked by the growing economic and political influence of , as a powerful, coercive regional power. For this reason, a core issue explored in this assessment is that of China’s mounting political and economic influence on Cambodia and the ways in which this influence actively discourages a rules and rights-based approach to governance. We argue that the ‘rules of the game’ have changed, creating a political landscape now best characterized as a two-level game where all domestic policy consideration of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) now have a secondary foreign policy consideration.1 In light of the democratic backsliding and U.S. government policy decisions, programmatic options are limited; however, strategic program recommendations offered in this assessment account for this change by encouraging investment in key actors (i.e., women , youth, and workers) with the aim of building effective coalitions that can advocate for ‘win-sets’ that counter the ‘Chinese development’ model and encourage political competition and great accountability by the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).

The last USAID Cambodia DRG assessment was conducted in 2014. Since that time, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) has transitioned further away from democracy and rule of law toward a more consolidated authoritarianism and rule by law. Economically, Cambodia has experienced robust growth that has produced improvements in the lives of many Cambodians. Politically, the country is characterized as a ‘closing space’ for political and civil liberties. Following the CPP’s poor performance in 2017 Commune elections and in the run up to the 2018 National election, the government made regressive amendments to the Law on Political Parties and dissolved the primary opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), effectively ending genuine multi-party competition in the country. As of this writing, the CNRP’s is under house arrest, there is evidence of division within the CNRP, which has broken down into competing factions each with its own proclaimed party president and Permanent Committee, thereby leaving no viable alternative political opposition party. Historically, US support played an important role in encouraging progress on democracy and improvement in governance in Cambodia. In the period between 2013 and 2019, the RGC’s turn toward consolidated authoritarianism has been enabled by its increasing political, security, and economic ties with China. In contrast, relations between Cambodia and the United States and European Union are strained. This assessment informs future decisions about USAID/Cambodia

1 The ‘rules of the game’ refer to both formal and informal rules. A two-level game refers to the manner in which domestic politics influences foreign policy decisions and vice versa. See for example Putnam, R. D. (1988) Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460.

i DRG programming in response to these changes.

FINDINGS The team did not view consensus2 as a major or urgent problem. Cambodia is not a contested state per se; however, there is a divorce between the popular will and the authoritarian system of government. Election results in 2013, 2017, and the lack of competition in the National election of 2018, all indicate that the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) is facing its toughest challenge in over a decade. The emerging generation of Cambodian voters are free of the historical burden of life under the and thus do not vest the CPP with unquestioned loyalty. Decades of donor investment in human rights education by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) such as the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) and the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) have produced a democracy dividend reflected in the high level of rights awareness among Cambodian youth, indigenous, and marginalized communities as well as urban elites. Additionally, according to the Transparency International annual Corruption Perceptions Index (TCPI), Cambodia remains highly corrupt,3 and corruption permeates the CPP and government at all levels. This association between even local CPP officials and corruption degrades the Party’s legitimacy, which may raise longer- term questions regarding political consensus. Human rights and international organizations including TI, no longer believe it is safe to openly share and disseminate their findings in Cambodia for fear of reprisal.

The team did not view inclusion as an especially significant or urgent problem. However, it is clear that despite two decades of donor-funded public administration and local government reform, Cambodians lack any meaningful channels for citizen input. Watchdog organizations meant to provide safeguards, such as a local ombudsman4 or the National Election Committee (NEC), fail to provide recourse. In the absence of any meaningful grievance mechanism, it is difficult for aggrieved individuals and communities to make their voices heard and to demand accountability at any level of government. At the sub-national level, the national government's laws and policies are often misinterpreted or misapplied. While at the community level, where land disputes are played out, the absence of safe, impartial channels for grievance and sub-national government's misinterpretation of laws and policies place an increasing burden on CSOs to fulfill this role. Finally, political patronage and institutional incentives discount citizen voice and input in decision making such that even when local measures to increase citizen engagement with sub-national government are implemented, these systemic challenges persist.

Visible and growing economic disparity coupled with the increased presence of Chinese investment in key sectors, such as infrastructure and real estate, contribute to a sense of economic exclusion. The perception that there are ‘winners and losers’ in Cambodia’s 7% GDP growth economy is widespread. In 2016, Cambodia was upgraded by the World Bank to ‘‘lower middle-income country’’ status. Despite

2 USAIDs Strategic Assessment Framework Document (Master SAF, 2015. P 9) defines consensus through a question, asking if there is ‘a basic consensus on questions of national identity, historical narrative, and fundamental rules of the game? Is the political contest played by those rules?’ 3 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2018. www.transparency.org/cpi2018; Cambodia scores 20/100 and ranks 161st of 180 countries. 4 In 2017, following a prime ministerial sub-decree signed in February of that year, the RGC introduced a plan for forty new “ombudsman” offices to be implemented in provincial cities and districts across the country. The local citizen’s offices aim to solve out-of-court complaints brought against the public service at the sub-national level, with each district eventually slated to have its own office. These offices have yet to be fully established.

ii this success and effective reduction in the last two and a half decades, the overall sustainability of the Cambodian economic model is questionable. Growth has been fueled by over-exploitation of Cambodia’s natural resources for two decades, but natural resources are finite. Widespread and under- recorded household debt coupled with increasing outmigration by Cambodia’s working age population suggest that the 7% GDP growth indicator may not provide an accurate picture of the overall health of the economy. Additional challenges to the Cambodian economy include reliance on Chinese investment in high-risk sectors and government debt. There is also an increased risk of a real estate bubble in , and tourism (excluding Chinese tourism) has declined. Impediments to further industrialization remain considerably high due to the lack of a skilled workforce, high energy costs, and deficits in logistics. The absence of a ‘level playing field’ for responsible international investors may result in unintended consequences for the Cambodian people, as market competition that could increase social, economic, and environmental safeguards is unlikely. Concentrated wealth among elites is exacerbated by ongoing patterns of corruption and a focus on extending the nepotistic-style of rule to an emerging generation of elites. These elites are poised to monopolize natural resources and the benefit derived from access to capital and investment that ordinary Cambodians lack. Intergenerational wealth and power transfer also help enshrine the CPPs hold on political power.

Following the government’s targeting of high-visibility CSO leaders, the civil society sector is somewhat fragmented and in a period of introspection. The result of these systemic attacks has been self-censorship and no strategic and coordinated vision of the way forward. However, this period may offer greater opportunity for donors to encourage long-term CSO partners to develop succession plans that prioritize leadership by women and youth representing new voices and improved organizational capacity over charismatic leadership, upon which most organizations still rely. Similarly, conditioning CSO support on the development of a coordinated and strategic plan to conduct non-traditional advocacy may be warranted to deepen and extend engagement with emerging CSO leaders who favor use of social media and other modes of advocacy.

The competition of ideas and institutional checks and balances is extremely weak outside of CSOs. Those state actors with which the team met did not offer any diversity in viewpoints. Consultation with technical level staff within line ministries proved perfunctory. These interview respondents demonstrated a complete unwillingness to view institutions, the CPP, or their individual role within government with a critical eye. The team noted improvements in the public relations face of selected ministries such as the Ministry of Labor. Political experts within Cambodia argue that government officials do indeed hold more diverse views but that fear of reprisal is silencing those voices. In an off the record consultation with a mid-level ministerial official, a more skeptical view of Cambodia’s growth trajectory was voiced. Concern over the pillaring of natural resources, absence of a coherent economic development strategy that includes diversification into underdeveloped sectors such as tourism, and frustration with within line ministries provide anecdotal evidence that pockets of disaffection within national government do exist.

CSOs are not able to participate in the policy process. Historically, CSOs in Cambodia were engaged in public policy debates and decision making. For example, in 2013-4 multi-stakeholder technical working groups within the Ministry of Environment played a visible and groundbreaking role on revising Cambodia’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) law. CSO, government and private sector representatives took part in consultation and review of draft EIA legislation. More recently, however, they have been excluded

iii with one important exception of lobbying for the national action plan to prevent violence against women (2014-2018) and inclusion of provisions for the LGBT community.5

Accountability of the Cambodian state has been systematically weakened by the highly intrusive party and patronage systems. They both extract resources and rent-seek, to deliver mass-patronage benefits through party-funded projects and handouts. Accountability is highly centralized undermining any horizontal checks-and-balances, be it at national or sub-national level. The absence of viable political opposition at any level of government exacerbates the CPP’s accountability deficiency, as the party lacks an incentive to improve performance. Political analysts and observers note that the main obstacle to improving accountability is no longer weak technical capacity of ministerial staff. Instead, it is a leadership problem. In the absence of political will at the upper levels of national and sub-national government, lower- level staff are not incentivized to be accountable. The team notes some progress with social accountability programs funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank that have improved government responsiveness at the local level. For example, installation of ‘One Window Service Offices’ for citizens to interface with government has made it easier for citizens to engage more efficiently with local government.

Government responsiveness and effectiveness is a chronic problem in Cambodia. The lack of accountability translates to poor responsiveness and low efficacy. Technical capacity at the national level of government is not the main challenge to improving government effectiveness. Here too, the central problem is the absence of political will. The emerging generation of leadership, many of whom are the sons and daughters of existing CPP elites, have been exposed to modern management theory and practice through study in the United States, , and United Kingdom. Instead, the challenge is that the path to upward mobility within most government institutions remains loyalty to the CPP, not merit. A notable exception is the Ministry of Economy and Finance which emphasizes meritocratic recruitment. The absence of political opposition seems to have increased pressure for technocrats to exhibit unquestioning fealty to Hun Sen regardless of their personal views.

Rather than a rule of law, the CPP ‘rules-by-law.’ From 2013 onward, the CPP has introduced and used a suite of punitive laws designed to restrict, not protect, citizens’ rights. The AT encountered a widespread perception of judicial corruption and a belief that access to justice is limited to the wealthy and powerful. It is anticipated that the upcoming United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) will recommend that controversial laws such as the Law on Political Parties (Article 45), the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO), and the Law on Trade Unions will receive a strong recommendation for repeal from the UPR. In 2018, the judiciary’s total lack of independence from the CPP leadership and control by the weak Ministry of Justice, render courts a place of last, not first, resort. The most egregious recent example of the judiciary’s lack of independence is the 2017 Supreme Court ruling that overturned the 2017 National election results. The Supreme Court then dissolved the political opposition party at the behest of the Prime Minister. Both of these decisions exemplify the ways in which the Executive intervenes in judicial decisions to maintain political power. Citizens who seek justice at the sub-national and national levels for land disputes and other rights infractions seldom encounter impartial adjudication despite their adherence to the rule of law. The court’s

5 Ministry of Women’s Affairs (2014). National Action Plan to Prevent Violence Against Women 2014-8. Council of Ministers Plenary Session (5 December 2014). Phnom Penh, Cambodia. P.2

iv failure to challenge any of the problematic, restrictive laws introduced between 2015-2018, deepened the perception that the Supreme Court acts as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the Prime Minister.

The enhanced political and economic bilateral relationship between Cambodia and China, in combination with China’s growing sharp power6 in the region, is both exacerbating pre-existing obstacles to good governance and introducing new challenges. Pre-existing challenges include corruption, , and weak rule of law. New challenges include ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy, a non-rules- based approach to ‘development’ that preferences short-term financial gain for those in power over widespread distribution of financial benefits, and a rising tide of public outcry toward the visible Chinese presence in certain regions of the country.

Over the past five years, USAID/Cambodia DRG programming has operated in a period of democratic backsliding that can also be characterized as a closing space. It is under increased pressure and scrutiny by the host country government and constrained by the evolving priorities of the U.S. government. The Mission now contends with a coercive regional power that has focused deep investment in promotion of its alternative ‘development’ approach in Cambodia. The Mission’s portfolio has responded to these challenges but has perhaps been less strategic in vision. In 2017, the USAID-supported National Democratic Institute (NDI) was expelled by the Cambodian government. Subsequently, the government launched a high-profile media campaign that defamed leading civil society organizations, INGOs such as NDI, and USAID itself in response to what it named a ‘color revolution.’ In response, USAID has had to reduce and reassign some funding for traditional DRG programs. The current USAID portfolio supports a range of civil society strengthening projects, the emerging voices of women and youth, entrepreneurship, and counter-trafficking in persons (C-TIP) program.

USAID’s 2014-2019 Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) identifies competitive and politically accountable governance as a key enabler for Cambodia’s continued progress on the democratic trajectory. The strategy originally highlighted three key factors affecting overall governance quality: (1) government support for elections, institutional checks and balances, and a broader contestation of ideas in society; (2) efforts to ensure transparent, fair, and competitive elections and to sanction poor executive performance;7 and (3), the role donors (USAID and its development partners) play in promoting conditions that support citizens’ rights to associate, organize, and freely express themselves and in strengthening partisan and nonpartisan organizational frameworks that can structure and focus citizen voice and engagement. Following the reduction in funding and U.S. government sanctions, USAID recalibrated its approach to focus on new voices as emerging leaders that include: women entrepreneurs, civil society organizations, and human rights organizations.

Following the dissolution of the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) in 2017, the United States introduced a significant shift in USAID’s strategy for Cambodia. Specifically, the 2018 appropriations law restrict U.S. development assistance from directly supporting, with few exceptions, the government of

6 Walker, Christopher. "What Is “Sharp Power”?" Journal of Democracy, no. 3 (2018): 9-23. “Sharp power is an approach to international affairs that typically involves efforts at censorship or the use of manipulation to sap the integrity of independent institutions. This approach takes advantage of the asymmetry between free and unfree systems, allowing authoritarian regimes both to limit free expression and to distort political environments in while simultaneously shielding their own domestic public spaces from democratic appeals coming from abroad.” 7 In the Cambodian context this is a central consideration as the Prime Minister sought to actively weaken public institutions and enhance executive power during the 2013-2018 period.

v Cambodia at any level. This creates significant obstacles to effective democracy programming in Cambodia. These restrictions may usher in unintended consequences, particularly for community-based organizations, who are reliant on permission from local authorities to carry out their day-to-day activities. In theory, CSOs and community-based organizations should be able to operate at the sub-national level free of CPP interference, provided these organizations provide advance notice to local authorities of their planned activities; however, in practice CSOs find it increasingly difficult to obtain permission for their activities.8 Furthermore, CSO collaboration with sub-national government, Commune Leaders, and Village heads are constrained as funding for such initiatives is restricted under current U.S. appropriations law. The AT cautions that funding CSOs exclusively may exacerbate tensions between the RGC and the organizations it has targeted, such as ADHOC, LICADHO, and the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR). As recommended below, allowing CSOs some flexibility to use funding on activities that encourage cooperation with sub-national government in particular, could reduce mistrust.

In 2018, USAID amended its CDCS DRG Development Objective to, “…strengthen[ing] credible voices to promote fundamental democratic principles and human rights,” and the Mission anticipates a further operational change in 2019 when it shifts to directly awarding grants to local organizations. This change may provide additional program implementation challenges to the Mission given the new administrative burden it will place on Mission staff at a time when nimble, timely support for civil society organizations is arguably at its most urgent since the Peace Accord period of the early 1990s.

Genuine and legitimate questions about USAID’s ability to offer traditional DRG programs remain. At the same time, CSOs and implementing partners provide a strong chorus demanding increased international coordination and pressure on the government of Cambodia to improve accountability and reform draconian laws introduced to limit, not promote, rights. As the Mission contemplates a new strategy and activities, it is likely to adopt a more focused approach to the emerging voices of youth and women with clearly defined and achievable targets that encourage a more democratic trajectory for Cambodia.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The team has identified seven overall strategic recommendations for improving governance, accountability and responsiveness. The team also believes these recommendations support a ‘clear choice’ that will encourage Cambodia to balance national interests with its development partners to achieve more democratic development outcomes.

Unlike the last period in which a DRG portfolio review took place (2014), the strategic vision for the upcoming CDCS requires a clear, focused effort to dissuade Cambodia from further alignment with China. The DRG strategy should closely align with Embassy priorities under the new Indo-Pacific Strategy, Clear Choices, and USAID’s Journey to Self-Reliance. To do so will require that USAID and its development partners project a coordinated, coherent, and visible response to local and regional challenges to a rights-

8 This could change. At the January 17, 2019 Partnership Forum between the Government and CSOs, sponsored by the Cooperation Committee of Cambodia, and hosted at the Ministry of Interior (MoI), CSOs presented the RGC with 12 requests including clarification on the MoI November 2018 memo rescinding the three-day advance notice. During the Forum it was clarified that the new “#040 instruction of MoI is that registered NGOs/Associations are able to implement activities without three-days’ notice to the sub-national administrations if their activities are the same of their mandate registered with MoI.” It is too early as of this writing to gauge the practical impact of this.

vi based development model. Investment in key constituencies is only part of the solution; the team recommends below more robust deployment of social media and other ‘soft power’ projections to counter Chinese influence and strengthen the case for making a ‘clear choice.’ For both civil society and Cambodian citizens more broadly, the presence of USAID and the U.S. Embassy is essential in preventing further backsliding toward authoritarianism. This represents a critical time, as the Prime Minister of Cambodia is installing a new cadre of elites, many of whom are the children of current CPP leaders, to assume leadership when the eventual transition in power occurs. Similarly, the CPP is mobilizing youth through its Union Youth Federation of Cambodia (UYFC), the offices of which are often adjacent local CPP branches. The team strongly encourages USAID and the Embassy to maintain a focused investment in efforts to bolster emerging voices and reinforce the widespread benefits of human rights and rule of law norms for Cambodian society.

Enhance social capital through (1) continued support for existing CSOs and (2) strengthened channels for meaningful participation of youth and women in decision-making roles. Deepening political, economic and security ties to China provide outside legitimacy and protection and act as counters to democratic pressures from below. In this period of ‘democratic backsliding’, it is vital to bolster independent voices, including Cambodian rights-based CSOs, youth, women, and historically marginalized groups as they seek greater accountability from their government in order to prevent the space from closing further. USAID should also look to the private sector, particularly to foreign firms interested in expanding responsible supply chains in Cambodia, as well as cultivate local women-owned small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to model the benefits of rules-based behavior. Youth need a viable alternative to the CPP-sponsored Youth Federation. Alternatives could take various forms, from sports teams to programming to robotics clubs, within which leadership skills and democratic values would be integrated into non-political activities.

(3) Promote informed and responsible use, consumption and development of social and independent media platforms. USAID and partners countries such as , Australia and the EU need to work together to consider the media environment in Cambodian governance and efforts to improve rule of law and government accountability. The closure of , the removal of Cambodia’s independent media outlets from the air waves, including the U.S.-funded radio programs on Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA), and the 2018 sale of the once independent Phnom Penh Post to a Malaysian public relations firm owner with close ties to the Prime Minister, have curtailed freedom of expression and access to timely and accurate information.9 While this situation presents obvious challenges to accessing information and encouraging government effectiveness and accountability, an emergent concern is that of the widespread use of Facebook (and other messaging Apps such as Signal and Telegram) as the primary source of information in Cambodia. In 2018, according to the Telecommunicator Regulator of Cambodia, 6.8 million Cambodians use Facebook, which represents 69 percent of total social media use in the country.10 Improvements in telecom infrastructure and Cambodia’s

9 Robertson, Holly. ‘Cambodia’s ‘last bastion of independent media’ is thrown into turmoil.’ Los Angeles Times: May 20, 2018. https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-cambodia-independent-media-20180509-story.html. Accessed 12.27.2018 10Chan, Sok. ‘Internet users rise as network coverage expands.’ Khmer Times: July 24, 2018. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50514827/internet-users-rise-as-network-coverage-expands/Accessed 12.27.2018

vii youth bulge suggest that use of social media platforms will expand rapidly.11 Internet access broadly and use of social media specifically, both act as portals to freedom and potentially as instruments of the state. As the most developed countries in the world are wrestling with how best to address fake news and online manipulation, so too must Cambodia, albeit with far fewer resources. Expanding data, diagnostics, and learning so that journalists, human rights defenders, and citizens can use these tools securely and with discernment is critical to preventing state capture of one of the few relatively ‘open spaces’ in Cambodia.

(4) While focusing on civil society, the US should maintain limited relations with Cambodian government officials where reasonable. Specifically, USAID should support ‘non-political’ engagement with ministries through creation of technical partnerships that contribute to better working relations and goodwill among technical staff in the ministries and with USAID. While we do not recommend extensive government engagement and recognize that legal restrictions prevent USAID from providing assistance to the Government of Cambodia, select interaction in the current environment can (1) achieve some modest reform goals in select areas, (2) help identify future reform partners, and (3) ensure US relevance as an alternative to China.

(5) Address and challenge Cambodia’s economic and political ties to China. The deepening authoritarian turn of the executive is being bolstered and emboldened by an assertive regional power. The Cambodian government’s closer economic and political ties to the People's Republic of China act as enablers in the process of closing democratic space. Foreign policy considerations are now directly linked to domestic policies in Cambodia and in turn so must foreign aid. CSO publicly express concern about China’s increasing role in Cambodia, but they often lack strong evidence of the negative costs of China’s dominant role. The AT recommends that USAID support evidence-based research that allows CSOs to show a true cost-benefit analysis of Chinese investment in real estate, natural resources, and loans to the RGC.

(6) Support research on household debt to inform evidence-based economic policy. Contrary to World Bank figures that do not capture individual debt, the team’s research revealed that average Cambodians are concerned about mounting personal debt. Current speculation about the relationship between extensive microfinance programs, debt and default rates, and the increasing out migration could benefit from research to support or challenge these claims.

(7) The USG should strengthen and coordinate international pressure using targeted sanctions to induce greater political concessions that open space for CSOs. A strong, well-coordinated campaign of targeted sanctions versus ‘blanket’ sanctions is needed to exert pressure on the government of Cambodia. Specific actions include linking the repeal of laws found to limit and not protect rights to sanction easing. Sequenced implementation could allow and the USG its partners to increase and decrease pressure based on demonstrable progress by the government of Cambodia. The AT recognizes that the United States Embassy in Cambodia would assume a leadership role in setting the sanction agenda, timeline, and benchmarks. USAID can exert additional pressure by linking aid to progress on rights- related improvements that could include quantifiable improvement in rule of law such as repeal of Article 45 of the Law on Political Parties, which was amended, but not repealed.

11 According to the UNDP 2017 Country Report for Cambodia; Cambodia has entered into a demographic bonus period. Youth, defined as an age group between 15 and 30 years old, makes up 33 percent of the population [MOEYS, National Policy on Development of Cambodian Youth]. This represents a significant young labor force.

viii INTRODUCTION

ASSESSMENT PURPOSE As part of the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Learning, Evaluation, and Research Activity, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) requested the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) and its subcontractor, Social Impact, design and conduct a Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) Assessment of Cambodia. This report has been written by an international team of independent consultants and intended to provide USAID and the United States Government (USG) with an independent assessment of the current situation and future prospects for strengthening DRG in Cambodia. The views expressed in this assessment are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of USAID or the USG.

The goal of the assessment is to define the core DRG problem(s) in the country, identify actors and institutions that support or resist reforms, and consider USAID’s operational and programmatic environment. The assessment follows USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) Strategic Assessment Framework (SAF) and involves two inter-connected tasks:

(1) An assessment of the macro political-economy in Cambodia and identification of primary challenges to and opportunities for democratization in Cambodia.

(2) The development of strategic and programmatic recommendations to address the core challenges to democratic development, the protection of human rights, and good governance in Cambodia.

The assessment begins by laying out the political and economic context. We then proceed through the four parts of the SAF methodology, including Step 1, defining the core DRG problems in the country, and Step 2, identifying actors and institutions that support or resist reforms, which we discuss together. This is followed by Step 3, considering USAID’s operational and programmatic environment. We conclude with Step 4, producing strategic and programmatic recommendations that are within the Mission’s manageable interest to address the core DRG problems.

METHODOLOGY: THE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK The assessment team (AT) applied USAID’s Conducting a DRG Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development (revised 2014) and the supplementary guidance for DRG assessment teams. The assessment is divided into four steps and is designed to serve as an analytical tool for developing strategies that address the core DRG problem(s) in a country, making program recommendations, and guiding resources to the DRG areas where they will have the most impact.

(1) In Step 1, the team analyzed the country context and political direction of the country, including identifying relevant fragility dynamics, in order to identify the key DRG problem(s). The analysis focuses on the five elements of the political system: (a) consensus, (b) inclusion, (c) competition and political accountability, (d) rule of law and human rights, and (e) government responsiveness and effectiveness. The team focused more attention on government effectiveness and competition

1 and political accountability, viewing them as critical entry points to understanding the Cambodian case.

(2) After identifying the primary problem(s) in Step 1, in Step 2, the assessment team examined the role of key actors and the institutions in which they operate. In light of the importance of China, we provide greater focus here than on other actors, like the legislature, which has been marginalized. As noted below in the limitations section, we were not able to interview many central or local government officials, which limits the analysis of these actors to secondary sources. For presentation purposes, we combine our presentation of Step 1 and Step 2. Step 2 actors include:

(a) The Executive (b) Financial and Oversight/Audit Bodies/Key Commissions (c) The Legislature (d) The Judiciary and Legal Professionals (e) Human Rights Institutions (f) Security Services (g) Local Government (h) Political and Electoral System, Political Party Representatives (i) Civil Society (j) Media (k) Private Sector (l) Other Non-State Actors (e.g., illegally armed groups, religious leaders, customary or tribal leaders, identity groups, criminal networks) (m) International and Global Actors

(3) In Step 3, the assessment team reviewed the U.S. and USAID’s interests and priorities in Cambodia, including relevant assistance programs, resources, and comparative strengths. This step served as a filter to determine what DRG problems USAID is best positioned to address and what actions USAID is best positioned to take.

(4) Based on the results of Steps 1-3, in Step 4 the assessment team will make recommendations to USAID for how best to address DRG challenges as inputs to the development of the Mission’s new CDCS and DRG Project Appraisal Document (PAD). Where relevant and appropriate, the team’s recommendations consider gender and youth dynamics of DRG problems.

The assessment team collected data primarily through a review of relevant literature, media, and relevant USG and Implementing Partner (IP) documents, key informant interviews, and a review of existing indices and other data. The team used the SAF to create provisional lines of inquiry, and then developed semi- structured interview protocols around the specific governance issues organized into the five main categories of the SAF and an additional section focusing on foreign policy considerations. The team included two ‘cross-cutting’ questions in each research category for comparative analysis.

2 Field work took place in November and December of 2018. In total, the team conducted 54 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and 14 focus group and/or small group discussions. Research occurred in Phnom Penh, Koh Kong, , Kompot, , Battambang, and provinces. The team also conducted interviews with USAID and Embassy officials in Phnom Penh and select representatives from RGC. In Bangkok, we interviewed human rights defenders, CSO activists, and former USAID DRG implementers. In total, the team spoke with 153 individuals representing civil society, unions, the private sector, academic and policy/research institutions, youth, women, and rural and urban Cambodians. The team sought to ensure a balanced gender distribution, resulting in participation of 68 women (44 percent) and 85 men (56 percent).

RESEARCH LIMITATIONS The current political sensitivity in Cambodia toward USG policies limited the team’s ability to meet with and gain a broader perspective from government stakeholders at both the national and sub-national levels. Select interviews with technical-level officials within a small number of ministries; namely, the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Labor, comprise the only government key informants included in this assessment. Similarly, the team adapted the SAF framework to work within the current constraints in Cambodia. A detailed analysis of the judiciary and legislature, for example, was not deemed instructive for the Mission as their lack of independence from the executive has only been enhanced in the current period. Thus, even if we had been granted access to these state actors, we are doubtful that interviews would have yielded actionable recommendations within USAID’s own policy constraints. This holds true for the security services, state human rights and election commissions as well. We do note, however, that to identify points of mutual interest and cooperation with the donors, and eventually with government of Cambodia, meetings with sub-national level officials will be essential in the future. Our analysis, therefore, necessarily focuses more on the areas where USAID has greater programmatic flexibility: civil society, women, and youth.

Another limitation was that the AT had only limited access to USAID documentation. For example, the 2014 DRG assessment is labeled sensitive but unclassified, which restricts dissemination to only USG personnel, and the evaluation team was unable to review this and other similar documentation.12

ASSESSMENT CONTEXT This section reviews the context of Cambodia, with a particular focus on the five years since 2013. This section identifies both the areas of continuity with the past as well as the areas of significant change. In the following sections we look at the (1) political, (2) economic, and (3) foreign policy context.

POLITICAL CONTEXT Since late 2012, Cambodia has undergone a significant shift in its political context, from a period of contestation and the apparent opening of space around the 2013 national elections, to a sustained crackdown culminating in a closing of political space and a return to one-party hegemony. The shift in the

12 We should also note that the assessment team’s scope of work requested that the team apply different lenses in applying the SAF, including a gender lens, a youth lens, and fragility lens. Regarding use of the fragility lens, USAID guidance on what a fragility lens entails, includes many of the factors already examined in the SAF. As such, fragility is not a core theme in our approach.

3 political context began with the merger of the two main opposition parties in 2012 – the eponymous Party (SRP) and the Human Rights Party (HRP) led by opposition leader Kem Sokha. This represented a union between former Finance Minister and long-term CPP critic Sam Rainsy and the Human Rights Party (HRP) led by former Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) and later National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) party- official-turned-democracy-activist, Kem Sokha. They became President and Vice-President respectively of the newly created Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP). The CNRP was able to challenge the CPP’s hegemony at the ballot box in July 2013, winning 44.46 percent13 of the popular vote and 55 of the 123 seats in the National Assembly, compared to the CPP’s 68 seats and 48.83 percent of the vote. While the CNRP did not win outright, their strong performance sent shockwaves through the CPP government, which had expected to fare far better. In the previous election in 2008, the CPP had won 90 seats and gained 58.11 percent of the vote. This was the first major electoral challenge to the party since 2003.

CNRP supporters were drawn particularly from younger, urban Cambodians, who were not easily convinced by the CPP’s long-standing claim of legitimacy as the party that ousted Pol Pot and as the party of development. Instead they appeared more concerned with the inequality, corruption, unemployment, and underemployment plaguing the country.

The formation of the CNRP coincided with an increasingly vocal labor sector organized by a thriving union movement visible on the streets of Phnom Penh from the early 2010s. They called for higher wages and better working conditions, particularly in the garment sector, which employed more than 500,000 Cambodians of which 90% were young women,14 forming an important political bloc. The CNRP publicly supported the workers’ demands. The CNRP further benefited from discontent of hundreds of thousands of Cambodians who had suffered as a result of a sustained period of urban and rural land dispossession, which likewise increased incidences of protestors taking to the street. Their claims were taken up by the opposition, who promised to address the problem when in office.

Protest culminated in late 2013, as CNRP supporters, workers, and land rights protesters were gathering in the streets on a daily basis. CNRP calls for the Prime Minister to step down then coalesced with workers still protesting on the streets. They were met by sporadic, violent repression by the security forces made up of the police, military police, and the army, including the Prime Minister’s powerful bodyguard unit. In January 2014, these security forces brutally cracked down on opposition party supporters and workers in Phnom Penh, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries and compelling the CNRP to come to the negotiation table. At the same time, protest leaders were detained, and protest effectively banned on threat of further violence by the security forces. These protests were widely covered in the international press and resulted in condemnation by the international community of the RGC for turning its security forces on demonstrators.

13 Figures taken from: COMFREL, 2013 National Assembly Elections Final Assessment and Report on the 2013 National Election, December 2013. http://www.ccc- cambodia.org/kh/download?file_id=890&action=view&view_file_id=148801741558b15807682692.88505083 14ILO, Growth continues for Cambodia’s garment and footwear sector, Cambodia Garment and Footwear Sector Bulletin, Issue 1. International Labour Organization. ‘Growth continues for Cambodia’s garment and footwear sector.’ Labour standards in global supply chains: A Programme of action for Asia and the garment sector: July 2015. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--- asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_383562.pdf

4 By late 2015, there was a brief period labelled as ‘a culture of dialogue,’ during which time the CNRP and CPP took their seats in the National Assembly and tried to govern; however, relations quickly deteriorated into a tit-for-tat war of words that resulted in the opposition boycott of the National Assembly. (The violent attack on two CNRP lawmakers by security forces is perceived to be the trigger event for the boycott.) Thus, the scene was set by the CPP, who deployed a toxic narrative of threats to peace and stability by ‘hostile forces’15 intent on a color-revolution. This included the full force of the state administration and its security force apparatus.16

With full CPP control over the legislature, in 2015-2016 the legislature passed a number of increasingly repressive laws aimed at stymieing independent protest and further closing the space for opposition politicians and human rights and other activists to carry out their work. Following the self-exile of Sam Rainsy and house arrest of CNRP President Kem Sokha in 2016, a number of notable independent critics were arrested. This group included five former and current employees at the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), a longstanding and highly respected human rights NGO. It was followed by the brazen killing of government critic , whose death sent shockwaves through the country. Although the perpetrator was quickly apprehended and later sentenced to life imprisonment, there were multiple inconsistencies in his trial, many believe his killing was politically motivated and orchestrated by the Prime Minister, and hundreds of thousands of Cambodians took to Phnom Penh’s streets to protest.17

In June 2017, the CNRP made strong gains in commune elections. In response, the CPP-controlled legislature amended laws that would allow for the dissolution of the CNRP. The CNRP was dissolved, and its parliamentary seats were divided up between smaller parties. The CPP took nearly all of the CNRPs commune seats. These actions disenfranchised the many Cambodians who voted for CNRP representatives. This was rubber stamped by the CPP-controlled Supreme Court. In addition, CNRP President Kem Sokha was arrested, convicted of treason, and spent most of 2018 in jail. Following his house arrest, Kem Sokha was released on bail in December 2018.

In parallel to the crackdown on political opposition, 2016-2017 saw the shuttering of independent media in Cambodia. Cambodian radio stations broadcasting U.S.-funded Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA), vital sources of independent news with a countrywide reach, were shut down. Print media in English was also attacked. The only truly critical newspaper, The Cambodia Daily, was closed in late 2017, shortly after the arrest of Kem Sokha. At the same time, the CPP government increased its own use of social media platforms, including Facebook, in an attempt to garner public support. In addition,

15 Heder, S., 2018. ‘Cambodia–: Special Relationship against Hostile and Unfriendly Forces’. Southeast Asian Affairs, pp. 113-131. 16 The color-revolution narrative gained pace shortly after the 2013 election, as a catch-all term to describe the activities of the CNRP, NGOs, political activists and others the government decided were acting to overthrow Hun Sen. It was accompanied by bellicose warnings by Hun Sen, senior ministers and security force commanders, that attempts to change the CPP government would result in civil war. 17Chheng, Niem. ‘Woman who accused Hun Sen of Kem Ley assassination on Facebook sentenced.’ The Phnom Penh Post:11 January 2018 https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/woman-who-accused-hun-sen-kem-ley-assassination-facebook- sentenced

5 the Phnom Post, the nation’s most widely circulated daily English language publication, now effectively functions as the RGCs mouthpiece.

The crackdown also focused on western-backed civil society organizations. In August 2017, the Cambodian government forced the closure of the office of the USAID-funded National Democratic Institute (NDI) and expelled its country director. The expulsion of NDI was part of attempts to portray the U.S. and EU-financed democracy programming as fomenting a ‘color-revolution’ to destabilize the Cambodian government.18 It is noteworthy that contrary to the CPPs claim, NDI programs offered assistance to both CNRP and CPP representatives alike, in keeping with its commitment to free and fair elections through non-partisan support.

All this set the stage for the CPP to comfortably win the general election in 2018, effectively unopposed despite the participation of small, government-aligned parties and embryonic independent parties who in reality could not threaten the CPP in any significant way. The CNRP urged its supporters to boycott the election and, in the face of CPP threats against non-voters, to spoil their ballots. In the end, the CPP won all 125 seats in the National Assembly, but with a significant number of spoiled ballots, signifying19 continued objection to CPP dominance in many parts of the country. The year 2018 ended with small overtures suggesting the possible return, of political opposition and a small opening of space for political competition.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT Despite obvious political challenges, Cambodia is expected to continue its strong economic performance in the short and medium term. The high economic growth of 7 percent per annum enabled Cambodia to graduate from a lower income country (LIC) to a lower middle-income country in 2015 (with a of USD1,140). Over the past five years (2013-2018), the Cambodian economy has made some progress toward much needed diversification. According to the government, the absolute poverty rate has been reduced to below 10 percent.20 The 7 percent annual growth is expected to continue in the short and medium term though economists outside of Cambodia take a less optimistic view if a suspension of EBA privileges is fully implemented. Fast growth in manufacturing (about 10 percent per year) and service sectors (about 7 percent) are contributing to the GDP expansion but would be impacted negatively by EBA and US sanctions. A less encouraging development is a 1.8 percent growth rate in agriculture. In 2019, more than half of the Cambodian economy still relies on this vital sector and sluggish growth creates risk among the already vulnerable farming communities of Cambodia. The agriculture sector is also vulnerable to regional and international market shocks and lacks effective policy oversight to protect farmers and fisherfolk. Climate change, economic land concessions owned by foreign entities that produce export commodities, along with the encroachment by Vietnamese and Chinese commercial fishing vessels along the Cambodian coastal region, have depleted Cambodian fish stocks. Fish is still the country’s main source of protein, thus threats to fish stocks raise legitimate questions regarding food security. Despite

18 Radio Free Asia, NDI Accused of Assisting Opposition to Undermine Cambodia’s Ruling Party, 17 August 2017. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/accused-08172017161318.html 19 Spoiled ballots were as many as 594,843 votes, or 8.4 percent of the vote total. Thul, Chan Prak. “Spoilt Cambodian ballot papers seen as protest over “sham election.’ Reuters (World Online Ed.). July 30, 2018. 20 RGC (2018) Rectangular Strategy Phase IV

6 public outcry, the Ministry of Mines and Energy continues with development of large-scale hydro-dams21 with Chinese financing, notably the contested Lower Se San 2. Hydropower that now accounts for 45 percent22 of Cambodia’s energy portfolio. Cambodia’s annual has been kept at around 3 percent, and the current exchange rate is at R4,050 per USD. The national debt is kept at USD1,400 million in 2019, of which 49 percent is now owed to China.23

Notable progress in public financial management has been made. From 2013 to 2018, Cambodia’s current revenue increased more than twofold, from USD 2,264 million to USD 4,560 million, as has the total state expenditure, which has also increased nearly twofold. For example, the budget for the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport increased by more than threefold; the budget for the Ministry of Health was increased by nearly 2.5 times, and the budget for the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries increased by nearly threefold. Locally financed direct investments increased by nearly 2.5 times. The national budget system has been somewhat improved through better and more effective management of the national budget at both allocation and operation levels.24 It is anticipated that this last area will require a lot more effort, especially in terms of decentralization of service delivery functions to the sub-national level, which stalled in recent years. Despite these gains, a gap in public participation in financial planning and oversight hinders greater government responsiveness and accountability.

The improved GDP performance has not eliminated a number of risks to the economy. Domestically, they include: (1) elevated financial sector vulnerabilities stemming from strong credit growth, its concentration in the real estate sector, and concerns about credit quality, external funding, and growing systemic importance of Money Flow Index (MFI); (2) a revenue shortfall in the medium term, owing to fiscal spending pressures and the materialization of contingent liabilities risk, which could erode policy space to respond to unexpected events over the medium term, and; (3) large minimum wage increases, which could further erode Cambodia’s competitiveness while other production costs such as logistic costs remain relatively high. External risks to the economy include: (1) legitimate concern over the full or partial withdrawal of Cambodia’s Everything but Arms (EBA) status or loss of preferential access to key export markets in the EU in the medium term; (2) an escalation of the U.S. – China trade war, the global rise in protectionism, and trade sanctions that could hamper exports and FDI. Finally, weaker-than-expected growth in China, which has significant negative spillovers through FDI, banking, and tourism, and increased money laundering concerns, associated partly with informal capital flows from China.25 The absence of adequate safeguards to protect the agriculture sector are of special concern to pig farmers who are vulnerable to fear importation of diseased animals that threaten their livestock.

Inequality and vulnerability are emerging concerns. The RGC cites the Gini-coefficient, to support its claims that inequality has been reduced. However, the observable contrast between the rich and poor has

21 Open Development Cambodia (ODC) URL: https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/hydropower-dams/ The Lower Se San 2 has been developed by China Huaneng Group and Cambodia’s Royal Group with a total cost of US$ 977 million, and with an installed capacity of 400MW and US$ 29.59 million of revenue annually. The floodgates closed in September 2017, with full generation expected before the end of 2018. 22 Cheang, Sopheang. Cambodia’s Biggest Hydropower Dam Now Producing Electricity. Associated Press, December 17, 2018. URL: https://www.apnews.com/f2585bb421b246f197f1d404f5fc85f9 Retrieved 1/6/2019. 23 RGC (2019) National Budget Law for 2019. 24 RGC (2018) Rectangular Strategy Phase IV 25 MEF (2018) Updates on Cambodian economic situation (Unpublished memo)

7 led some to question if the Gini-coefficient data, which is based on consumption, really reflects the extent and trend of inequality in Cambodia. This suspicion is supported by the remaining rate of vulnerability among the population, rather than absolute poverty. Structurally, the economy is shifting from agriculture to industry and services; however, a large share of the population is still employed in the agriculture sector (55.6 percent in 2008 and 41.5 percent in 2015). As a further indication of vulnerability in this vital sector, growth in agriculture declined from 7.2 percent for the period from 2003-2007 to only one percent in 2013-2017.26

Chinese investment in real estate, construction, and large-scale infrastructure introduced an influx of potentially game changing foreign capital. This investment could offer a greater benefit if distributed more evenly and not directed to the Prime Minister’s ‘winning coalition’. Similarly, the continued absence of transparency with regard to FDI, poor government oversight of these investments (often by design), and lack of strategic economic development policy result in new market vulnerabilities. For example, a national economic policy that reinvests FDI in long-term, structural reform in education so that the education system aligns with regional and global market demand, could offer Cambodia greater economic security and position it to compete more effectively with regional neighbors. Similarly, while World Bank GDP figures27 offer an overall optimistic outlook, mounting household debt, increasing rates of out-migration and increasing inflation – particularly in housing and food costs – are sources of discontent among ordinary Cambodians. Despite modest progress on Economic Land Concessions (ELCs), the granting of large-scale plantations, animal raising, industrial development, mining, and tourism continue to negatively impact the rights of rural communities. Loss of livelihoods and land encroachment into forested areas, including along Cambodia’s once pristine coastal regions, persist in 2019. The rapid commercial development of the coastal area of Sihanoukville by Chinese investors is understood to be a cautionary tale by Cambodian environmental and rights activists. who fear that the distorted real estate market, displacement of local community, and loss of livelihood will be replicated in Kompot and coastal areas.

Gender inequality remains a concern. Cambodian women have the highest labor force participation rate (LFPR) in the region at 79.7 percent, but a gender gap remains: the male LFPR is 89.1 percent. Eighty-nine percent of all women’s employment, compared with 75 percent for men, are restricted to just three industries: (1) agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (66.3 percent); (2) wholesale and retail trade and services (12.7 percent); and (3) manufacturing (10.3 percent).28 Cambodian women are also subject to a high rate of workplace harassment. According to the 2017 Care Report on the prevalence of sexual harassment in Cambodian garment factories, 30 percent of women self-report having experienced workplace harassment and/or violence.29

26 MEF (2018) NBC-IMF Conference 27 The World Bank, Country Economic Outlook: Cambodia (2018). Recent Economic Development and Outlook for Cambodia, [November 26, 2018]. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/publication/cambodia-economic-update-october-2018-recent-economic- developments-and-outlook 28 Asian Development Bank (ADB): ADB Gender Strategy in Cambodia 2014-2018: Gender Analysis Summary. URL https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cps-cam-2014-2018-ga.pdf Retrieved 01.07.2019 29 CARE International (2017). ‘I know I cannot quit.’ The Prevalence and Productivity Cost of Sexual Harassment to the Cambodian Garment Industry. Canberra: CARE Australia.

8 In the public sector, there has not been real progress towards gender parity. The Cambodian guarantees women the same political rights as men, but in practice women in 2018 continue to confront systemic gender discrimination30 and still struggle to fully participate in political life. At both the national and subnational levels, few Cambodian women hold visible, influential decision-making roles. The ADB 2014-2018 Gender Analysis Summary notes, “…while the proportion of female civil servants increased from 32 percent in 2007 to 35 percent in 2012, the proportion of women elected to the National Assembly decreased from 22.0 percent in 2008 to 20.3 percent in 2013 (25 of 123 seats).” There was no change in the percentage of female senators from 2007 to 2012 (9 of 61 seats [15 percent]). Following the 2017 redistribution of Commune Chiefs by the CPP, the number of female Commune Chiefs increased by 20 percent from 1,940 to 2,323.31 In contrast, of the 58 National Assembly seats, women were given only 2. In 2019, there is only one female deputy prime minister, two female ministers, 16 female secretaries of state, and 40 female under-secretaries of state or holders of equal ranks, and these dismal figures have not moved significantly since the gains made in 2013. At the subnational rank, there is only one female governor elected in 2017, Ms. Mithona Phouthong (CPP). While the 2013 local elections represented an opportunity for CNRP women, this opportunity has shrunk with the rollback in democratic progress. Observational data indicates that women in 2018 are less inclined to take part in political activities or parties, favoring lower-risk opportunities in the private sector. The fact that so few women lead civil society organizations indicates that challenges to ascension also remain in this sector. The few high-profile women political figures, with the notable exception of the Vice President of the CNRP, Mu Sochua, are the daughters of leading opposition party figures Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha. This is an indication that the dynastic tendency of Cambodian political parties is not limited to the ruling party.

The Global Gender Gap Report is a framework for capturing the magnitude of gender-based disparities and tracking their redress over time. The report benchmarks 149 countries on their progress toward gender parity using a scale from 0 (disparity) to 1 (parity) across four thematic dimensions - Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political Empowerment. Figure 1 shows that Cambodia ranks at the bottom as compared with its neighbors.

Figure 1: World Economic Forum Gender Gap, 2018

0.740 0.748 0.702 0.698 0.690 0.690 0.683

0.640 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Cambodia Vietnam

30 Cambodian Center for Human Rights. 2013. Policy Brief: Women’s Political Representation in Cambodia. P.4 Phnom Penh Cambodian Center for Human Rights. URL: https://cchrcambodia.org/index_old.php?url=media/media.php&p=analysis_detail.php&anid=28&id=5; Kijewski, Leoni and Meta, Kong. Women Still Underrepresented in Politics. The Phnom Penh Post. March 6, 2018 31 Ibid.

9 The use of new technologies, especially digital ones, rapidly increased, but there is still limited capacity among young people to harness its potential. The Government, as indicated in its Rectangular Strategy 4 (RS4), has given more attention to how technology, especially in the context of Industrial Revolution 4.0, can help ensure economic growth and prosperity in Cambodia. 32 Recent studies also indicate the impressive rate of digitalization in the economy and how active, young Cambodians are involved in this transformation.33 Yet, there is a need to better understand the extent to which Cambodian youth, especially the less well-off, have harnessed these technologies. Despite broad access to new digital technology such as internet and social media, anecdotes suggest that a large percentage of rural youths, migrant youth, and those living in urban poverty, do not understand how best to make use of these tools.

As shown in Figure 2, internet access has grown considerably, including areas outside of Phnom Penh. Internet access via mobile phones has opened a space that the government of Cambodia has not yet been able to seal shut. This access allows youth to mobilize within Cambodia as well as across the region and beyond and prompts both greater political awareness and a rising tide of expectations with regard to government accountability. Perhaps the greatest evidence of this generational shift in perspective was witnessed in the 2013 local and 2017 national elections where “…the CNRP’s growing electoral strength…reflected the will of a younger and more globalized electorate that is less focused on Cambodia’s past turbulence, more concerned about corruption and inequality, and more demanding about government accountability and performance, according to observers.”34

Figure 2: Population with Internet Access in Cambodia (2010 - 2018)

Between the 2013-2018 assessment period, low skilled, rural and cross-border labor migration rose rapidly. According to a recent report by the World Food Program (WFP), rural-urban and cross-border migration has grown in the last five years. It shows that rural-rural migration accounts for only 13 percent of migration, rural-urban for 56 percent and cross-border for 31 percent. Most of the migrants are youth

32 RGC (2018) Rectangular Strategy Phase 4 (RS4) 33 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) 2018) Economic Transformation in Cambodia and Abroad 34 Wallace, Julia ‘As Demographics in Cambodia Shift, Youth Seek Political Change,’ The New York Times, February 17,2016 URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/world/asia/cambodia-hun-sen-sam-rainsy.html (accessed December 21, 2018)

10 and the majority are low-skilled35 (see Figure 3). These migrants are at increased risk for labor exploitation and human trafficking, an area of programmatic focus for USAID.

Figure 3: Migration Patterns in Cambodia (2013 vs. 2018)

Rising rural household debts, especially from micro-finance institutions (MFI), now stands at around 60 percent. While the rate of indebtedness has been on the rise, it seems that loans are not being used on productive activities to advance social mobility. Instead, MFI loans are used for household consumption with low return on investment (ROI). If the trend continues, it may lead to additional ‘low skill migration and the indebtedness trap’ conundrum for many rural households, therefore affecting its youth members.36

FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT CAMBODIA-CHINA BILATERAL RELATIONS The most important foreign policy development in Cambodia concerns its complex and deepening relationship with China and the shift away from Western development partners, notably the United States and the European Union. In recent months, the government of Cambodia has attempted to deflect Western criticism by contending that its foreign policy is part of a broader alignment with Asian regional powers. Trade with China, , and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries is perceived to be critical to achieving higher middle-income status by 2030. The Cambodian government has prioritized strategic bilateral relations with China, Japan, and Vietnam and downgraded its military cooperation with the United States.37 However, unlike bilateral relations with Japan or Vietnam, Cambodia conducts joint military exercises with China. Political observers within and outside of the country increasingly perceive Cambodia as a proxy for China within regional platforms such as ASEAN.38 As of 2019, China is Cambodia’s largest military donor, a fact that raises further questions about China’s ambitions in the region; specifically, with regard to its interests in the South China Sea. Cambodia’s growing

35 Pak, K and Saing, D (2018). Migration in Cambodia trend drivers and impacts 05Feb2018. 36 Ibid. 37 Parameswaran, Prashantha, Why Did Cambodia Downgrade U.S. Military Ties Again? The Diplomat, April 5, 2017 URL: https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/why-did-cambodia-just-downgrade-us-military-ties-again/ (accessed 12/30/18) 38 Ibid.

11 economic, military, and soft-power ties to China increase the probability that it could inadvertently act as China’s client state on the Mekong. While the Cambodian Foreign Minister challenged the claim that China is planning to build a naval base along the Koh Kong province coastal region, most Cambodian political analysts regard the claim as fallacious.

Three decades of Western investment in the promotion of democratic principles is thus challenged by an emboldened autocratic regime with a new and powerful regional patron. In 2019, at a moment when USAID is limited in its ability to assist the Cambodian government, China continues to cultivate and deepen relations with Cambodia through concessional loans for large-scale infrastructure projects, a commitment to increase tourism by 40 percent, and 100 million dollars in military aid.39 In the most recent sign of enhanced Sino-Cambodian cooperation, three Chinese navy ships docked at the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port on January 8, 2019 for Anti-piracy and Rescue drills.40

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE RELATIONS The political influences and is being influenced by trade relations with China, the U.S., and the EU. Cambodia’s growing economic ties include well-documented investment in large-scale infrastructure, particularly within the controversial hydropower energy sector, as well as economic land concessions, construction, and real estate. The 2017 World Bank trade figures suggest that Cambodia’s economy remains dependent on the key export markets of the United States, United Kingdom and Germany. The aggregate export figure as a percentage of overall exports is nearly 40 percent. Because the United States is the single largest overseas market for Cambodian merchandise exports, which consist mostly of garments and footwear, the threat of targeted sanctions by the U.S. has garnered the attention of the government, unions, and civil society.

In contrast, China is the number one investor, as it exports more than twice that of Cambodia’s next greatest export investor, Thailand. The lack of transparency that characterizes Chinese investment in the region is also present in Cambodia. A true accounting of Chinese investment is difficult to capture because of its opacity. Corruption, the absence of social and environmental safeguards, and complex financial arrangements further complicate accurate trade and investment accounting in Cambodia. As trade ties continue to deepen with China and may decline with the western trading partners, it is clear that the asymmetrical bilateral relationship with China is likely to expand as the CPP grows increasingly dependent on Chinese trade and investment to maintain the aggressive economic growth that Cambodians have experienced and come to expect.

While Japan is officially the largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and second largest source of foreign direct investment in Cambodia, the relationship does not mirror Chinese investment and foreign aid practices that are often characterized as ‘no strings attached’ loans. Cambodia appears willing to accommodate or support Beijing’s positions on various regional issues, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea, as a tradeoff for Chinese loans, military support, and investment.

39 Edel, Charles, Cambodia’s Troubling Tilt Toward China, Foreign Affairs. August 17, 2018 URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-08-17/cambodias-troubling-tilt-toward-china (accessed December 23, 2018) 40 Koemsoeun, Soth. Chinese Navy Ships to Dock at Sihanoukville. The Phnom Penh Post. URL: https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/chinese-navy-ships-dock-sihanoukville (Accessed January 7, 2019)

12 CAMBODIA-UNITED STATES BILATERAL RELATIONS The team begins with the premise that this period in Cambodia is different and vital as it reflects a broader geopolitical competition between the ideals of a free and open society and that of a rising power with a repressive vision of the regional (and global) world order. To advance a new Indo-Pacific Strategy that successfully champions the open and free societies the United States has invested in building in the region since the end of Vietnam War, USAID must clearly articulate and demonstrate the ways in which authoritarian regimes do not serve the broader interests of ordinary Cambodians. The authoritarian rule of the CPP serves minority interests that align with that repressive world view.

CAMBODIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ECONOMY: IMPROVED GDP PERFORMANCE As seen in Figure 4, Cambodia’s economic performance, as measured by the GDP growth rate, leads the Mekong sub-region. Although it is important to note that -- as detailed elsewhere in this assessment -- aggregate GDP figures as determined by the World Bank and ADB may not provide a true accounting of GDP because FDI figures, household debt, and migration are areas of opacity where accurate data is difficult to capture.

Figure 4: ADB and World Bank Estimates of 2018 GDP Growth

8.0%

7.0% 6.9% 7.0% 6.6% 6.6%

6.0%

5.0% 4.5%

4.0%

3.0%

2.0%

1.0%

0.0% Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam Myanmar

13 The Human Development Index (HDI) measures average achievement in key dimensions of human development and, in this accounting, Cambodia fares poorly in comparison to its neighbors (see Figure 5). Cambodia’s close ranking with Myanmar, a country only reopened to the world in 2009, is striking.

Figure 5: UNDP Human Development Index, 2017

0.8

0.75 0.755

0.7 0.694

0.65

0.6 0.601 0.582 0.55 0.578

0.5 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam Myanmar

GOVERNANCE: A SHARP AND CONTINUED DECLINE FROM 2014 – 2018 While Cambodia has been characterized as ‘not-free’ for two decades, more recent assessments including that of Polity, show movement towards greater in the period from 2013 until present. Over the past year, Cambodia dropped another point and moved closer to characterizations as a ‘closed autocracy’. The Polity Data set codes authority characteristics of states. The dataset covers all major, independent states in the global system with a population of more than 500,000. The Polity score is a spectrum from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). It consists of six component governance measures that record the qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and political competition, and changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. As seen in Figure 6, Cambodia received an overall score of -5, which makes it a ‘closed ,’ defined as ‘a regime that mixes democratic and autocratic features.’ As seen in the figure, it is the only country in the Mekong region to have its Polity score change from 2014 to 2017: it dropped from 2 down to -4, a net a change of -6. It dropped a further point to -5 in 2018.

14 Figure 6: Polity Data Series, Mekong Countries, 2018

10 8 6 6 4 2 1 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 -2 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -10

Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam Myanmar

Another index, Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), evaluates whether or not developing countries are steering toward democracy and a market economy. BTI compiles two indices: The Status Index and the Governance Index. The Status Index measures how much progress a country has made on its path toward democracy and economy transformation, while the Governance Index determines the quality of political leadership steering these transformation processes. As such, unlike other indices discussed above, the BTI is a combination of democratic, economic, and leadership factors. On a scale of 1-10 where 10 is positive development, Cambodia received a 4 on the Status Index and a 3.23 on the Governance Index. Figure 7 illustrates how Cambodia has been declining on the overall BTI and how it scores below Laos and Thailand, both of which are governed by communist (Laos) or military-led (Thailand, since the 2014 coup d’état) unitary governments.

Figure 7: Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Governance, 2018

5.5

5

4.5 4.51

4 3.97 3.89 3.5

3.23 3 2014 2016 2018

Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam Myanmar

15 CORRUPTION: A CHRONIC BUT NOT DEEPENING PROBLEM Corruption is a well-documented phenomenon in the region. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks 180 countries/territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople. The scale ranges from 0-100 where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. Cambodia is consistently ranked as the worst in the region; however, the overall decline of democracy has not made a measurable impact on public perceptions of corruption (see Figure 8). Cambodia scores 21 out of 100 and is 161 among the 180 countries ranked in the CPI.

Figure 8: Transparency International CPI, 2018

40

37 35 35

30 30 29

25

21 20

15 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam Myanmar

MEDIA, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND RIGHTS: A CONTINUED DECLINE SINCE 2016 Prior to 2016, Cambodia enjoyed relatively strong press freedom as compared with its Mekong neighbors, notably Laos and Vietnam. As seen in Figure 9, in 2016, press freedom began to decline in concert with other reversals of Cambodian civil liberties.

16 Figure 9: World Press Freedom Index, 2018

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 30 35 43.15 40 45 44.31 45.9 50 55 60 65 66.41 70 75 75.05 80

Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam Myanmar

In the Freedom in the World annual report of political rights and civil liberties around the world, which was released in early 2018 – prior to Cambodia’s more recent contraction in political and civil rights - Cambodia was ranked ‘Not Free’ with a score of 5.5 in Freedom on a scale of 1 to 7 (with 7 being the least free). As shown in Figure 10, this was similar to other countries in the region. Cambodia had the same score as Thailand, was somewhat freer than Vietnam and Laos and was somewhat less free than Myanmar. Cambodia's score has not changed since 2013, while most other countries’ scores have improved. Despite its score remaining the same, Cambodia received a downward trend arrow from Freedom House (FH) due to a crackdown on the political opposition, and we expect that the score will be lower in the 2019 report.

Figure 10: Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2018

7

6.5 6.5

6 6

5.5 5.5

5 5

4.5

4

3.5 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam Myanmar

17 STEP 1: DEFINING THE DRG CHALLENGE: FIVE DRG ELEMENTS

The SAF lays out a four-step process. In Step I we explore the five DRG elements: consensus, inclusion, rule of law and human rights, competition and political accountability, and government responsiveness and effectiveness, and in Step II we explore the political actors. While we have followed the SAF and separated them out, many of the actors are introduced in the context section above or Step I. As such, Step II is brief and offers more of a summary. The team uses a political economy analysis (PEA) lens that links domestic governance challenges to foreign policy considerations as they relate to Cambodia’s relationship with China.

The team viewed competition and political accountability, human rights and rule of law, and government responsiveness and effectiveness as the most salient areas for this inquiry. Following the July 2017 commune election and subsequent dissolution of the CNRP ahead of the national election, the CPP maintains a political stranglehold on power. The legitimacy of the election and of the CPP’s political dominance is contested. At the close of 2018, the absence of local independent media and ongoing factionalism within the former CNRP leadership limit meaningful, overt challenges to the CPP’s legitimacy. The targeted attack on prominent human rights’ CSO leaders contributes to ongoing security concerns and self-censorship. This period of repression is further marked by the 2015 introduction of a suite of restrictive laws that limit rather than protect rights. These laws are designed to constrain civic space, freedom of expression, assembly, association, freedom of the media, of trade unions, and of any political opposition. In this regard, we view the rule of law as significant but also apply our analytical lens posing the question about external drivers that may embolden the CPP and provide technical support to author and implement laws such as the Law on Non-governmental Organizations (LANGO, 2015) that closely mirror similar laws in Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos.

We do not focus on judicial independence nor the courts more broadly in Step II because other recent assessments such as the ICJ Submission to the Periodic Review of Cambodia (July 12, 2018 & January 19, 2019) deal with this arena more specifically.41 We do, however, document how the fundamental lack of judicial independence remains a significant barrier to a functional democracy. The team finds noteworthy the irony that the authoritarian government of Hun Sen has mastered use of legal instruments to ‘rule by law’ rather than implement legitimate rule of law to protect the rights of Cambodians. For example, the Law on the Functioning and Organizing of Courts, the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, and the Law on the Status of Judges and Prosecutors all compromise the independence of the court and preference the Executive, rendering both local arbitration and the highest court in Cambodia ineffectual in the face of political pressure42.

41 International Commission of Jurists. 2018. Submission of the International Commission of Jurists to the Universal Periodic Review of Cambodia: July 12. URL: https://www.icj.org/cambodia-icj-submission-to-the-universal-periodic-review-upr-of- cambodia/ 42 Universal Periodic Review Cambodia 2018: FIDH suggested recommendations for the UPR of Cambodia. December 2018

18 The most relevant and prominent governance debate in Cambodia is fundamentally the question of Cambodia’s shift from an electoral autocracy to a closed autocracy43 and what this portends for political competition and government accountability. Our analysis joins this specific governance question to a larger political economy question that places Cambodia’s democratic deterioration within a regional trend toward state repression fueled by China’s growing economic and political influence.

In a modification of the SAF framework, the team conjoins the SAF questions that address particular domestic governance concerns, specifically as they relate to the deepening authoritarianism of Hun Sen, to Cambodia’s foreign policy decisions. The team suggests that Hun Sen’s turn toward China for economic support has evolved into a more complex political alliance, with the Prime Minister seeking power consolidation among his ‘winning coalition’.44 This group of political and business elites are rewarded for their loyalty through benefits derived from Chinese dept-diplomacy. The Prime Minister is under some pressure to quickly secure short-term rewards to an expanding circle of beneficiaries. These elites are needed to secure Hun Sen’s own legacy. In exchange, Cambodia now prioritizes policies that align with and advance China’s own ambitions in the region.

CONSENSUS

USAID’s Strategic Assessment Framework Document defines consensus through a question, asking if there is ‘a basic consensus on questions of national identity , historical narrative, and fundamental rules of the game?’45 Cambodia has a Constitution that enshrines, in principal, laws to protect the rights of citizens, and it does not have the societal rifts that other countries have along ethnic, linguistic or religious lines.46 Cambodians do not contest the narrative of their national history. Thus, while there is a lack of consensus on the rules of the game (discussed more below) consensus was not the central focus of the five SAF elements. The current political crisis and period of closing space, accompanied by a rapid and deepening relationship with China and shift away from Western development partners, has pushed other DRG elements to the fore. There is, however, a lack of political consensus between the government and its supporters and the larger society.

ETHNIC, LINGUISTIC AND RELIGIOUS CONTEXT Cambodia is ethnically homogenous, with nearly 98 percent of its population ethnically Khmer.47 The is widely spoken as the primary language in the country, and, with the exception of some members of Cambodia’s indigenous communities, it is widely understood. Cambodia is a majority Buddhist country, and is the state religion under the constitution, which further respects the right to freely practice other religions.

Border issues with all three of the country’s neighbors remain contentious and regularly feature in the public discourse for political ends. For example, Cambodia’s dispute with Thailand over the Preah Vihear

43 Democracy for All: V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018. University of Gothenburg, . P.30 44 Siverson, Randolph M., Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce. The Selectorate Theory in International Politics, World Politics, Online Publication Date; June 2017. DOI 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.29 45 USAID. DRG Strategic Assessment Framework, pg. 9 46 These factors of fragility are defined by USAID's Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF 2.0) and thus support the ATs assessment that Cambodia is not a fragile state in 2018 as defined by the CAF. 47CIA, CIA Factbook: Cambodia, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html

19 Temple in 2008 and 2010-2011 has played into historical narratives of Cambodians’ fear of their neighbors’ designs on its territories. Border disputes with Vietnam remain a particularly contentious issue to this day, which has been politicized by the opposition in order to portray the CPP government as subservient to the Vietnamese. In 2008, Sam Rainsy was forced into exile for moving border posts with Vietnam. In 2017, ahead of the commune election, an apparent border skirmish with Laos was quickly de-escalated, though not without some bellicose rhetoric from Prime Minister Hun Sen.

One area relating to questions of legitimacy and consensus over the political direction of the country is fear that immigration is negatively affecting ‘Khmer’ culture and identity. The fear of being swallowed up or overrun by larger foreign ‘outsiders’ has been integral to Cambodian national identity formation.48 In the past, this has been expressed in xenophobic and violent ways toward the country’s ethnic Vietnamese and Cham populations. It has also been mobilized more recently for the political ends of the opposition.49 POLITICAL CONSENSUS One important theme that emerged in interviews was a generally held belief in the importance of democracy underpinning Cambodian society. With the exception of a few government officials and members of government affiliated organizations, there was universal frustration at violations of fundamental rights and the recent deterioration in the quality of democracy in Cambodia. This was felt equally in the urban and rural areas, and between old and young interviewees.

On the question of political consensus, interview respondents made clear their preference for a rights and rules-based system, and the fundamental need for democracy as underpinning Cambodia’s political culture. Ordinary Cambodians who were interviewed articulated clearly, though in different ways, their preference for political competition and the rule of law, which were seen as fundamental for government accountability and improved livelihoods. In many cases, particularly among CSO and academics, respondents feared the Cambodian government’s deepening relationship with China, and what this meant for the possibility of future democratic progress, government accountability, and equitable development. Despite the stance of the government, interviews and conventional wisdom suggests that ordinary Cambodians overwhelmingly maintain a favorable attitude toward the US. Among CSO respondents, a clear and consistent message that USAIDs support, particularly for human rights, is a vital counter to the RGCs attempts to close political space and encroach on civil liberties.

In addition, the majority of respondents readily identified, understood, and supported the constitution as a national document underpinning social and legal norms. The team found near-consensus among respondents that not only legal but moral values were embodied in the constitution. There was considerable fluency in understanding the tenets of Cambodia’s constitution and, for example, Cambodia’s policy of independence of political neutrality in foreign affairs. In this context, the extent to which rights and rules embodied in the constitution were ignored, implemented unfairly or intermittently by the government, with adherence to the constitution depending on power differentials, was repeatedly the subject of complaint.

48 Penny Edwards, Cambodge: Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007). 49 Tim Frewer, The Diplomat, Cambodia’s Anti-Vietnam Obsession, September 6, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/cambodias-anti-vietnam-obsession/

20 Given the country’s shift toward authoritarianism and rule by law, the team suggests that a lack of consensus between Cambodian society, on the one hand, and the government and its supporters on the other hand, characterizes the current period. The CPP’s long and vocal public claim that it is the natural party to represent the people, has not been internalized by ordinary Cambodians. Most respondents expressed a negative view of the CPP broadly and Hun Sen specifically, who was frequently regarded as an autocrat with interest in maintaining power and securing his political legacy through dynastic rule rather than progress for Cambodia. This raises broader questions about the current government’s legitimacy, as people expressed their powerlessness in exercising the political rights under the constitution and Cambodian law in the context of closing space.

As noted in the limitations, interviewees were not a representative sample of Cambodian society due to a variety of constraints. Nonetheless, we observed a surprising level of consensus among non-government affiliated interviewees. Furthermore, while the few government affiliated individuals we met were able to reproduce the party’s recent narrative on stability over rights and development over equality, government workers we met with separately and alone expressed misgivings about the trajectory of their country.

On the issue of gender, there is a general consensus among stakeholders that women are important members of society making valuable contributions to the political, economic, and cultural life in the country. However, the potential for more engagement and a more active, visible roles in leadership positions is not yet being realized. This was shared in urban and rural centers, amongst young and older people. However, there are still considerable barriers to women’s full participation in public life.

In 2018, Cambodians are more concerned with their current daily lives and needs rather than the past. Younger interview respondents have only known Cambodia since democracy was introduced in the early 1990s, and they have enjoyed relative prosperity, nutrition, and internet access. There was consensus that the young are an important political voice; however, there remain barriers to their participation in politics and the economic life of their country, which is discussed in the next section.

CONCLUSION The team found that there was agreement among most interviewees that this period of closing space is undermining the legitimacy of the government as it struggles to reassert its authority through repression rather than conciliation. At the domestic-international level, support for Cambodia’s deepening relations with China comes from the top and is causing considerable disquiet among ordinary people. This is furthering the divergence in viewpoints between those at the top who benefit from the current political system and those who feel Cambodia is on the wrong path. The aims of the U.S. and other Western development partners more closely align with the aspirations of the Cambodian people consulted for this assessment.

INCLUSION

Continued dominance of one political party in national and local level political positions and the increasing authoritarianism of the government has resulted in widespread exclusion. Huge numbers of Cambodians are unable to participate fully in the political and economic life of their country. This includes ordinary Cambodians whose daily concerns is with keeping their heads below the parapet and avoiding political

21 confrontation that may adversely affect those livelihoods. The AT further found that women, young people, and marginalized groups such as indigenous peoples and LGBT, face particular barriers to inclusion.

INCLUSION AS A POLITICAL TOOL The carrot of inclusion and the threat of exclusion are powerful tools wielded by the CPP to co-opt, reward, force, cajole, threaten, and repress citizens into accepting the status quo. The party is pervasive in the districts and villages throughout Cambodia. The 2017 commune election results suggested much of the population was pushing back against the government’s monopoly, but this has been met with attempts to co-opt and/or repress discontents into accepting the status quo. In the fallout of the dissolution of the CNRP, villages that supported the CPP were given preferential treatment, alongside former CNRP villages who were willing to join or pledge public support for the party. Those who did not, or who were identified as ‘opposition villages’ or ‘opposition families,’ were excluded from accessing benefits from the state, and also targeted for intimidation. Respondents reported actively seeking ways to benefit their communities and societies, but voiced frustrations that they were restricted in further improving their day-to-day lives and those of their families and communities, outside of officially coordinated or officially sanctioned channels.

ECONOMIC EXCLUSION At the economic level, the AT found that interviewed ordinary Cambodians are aware of the rapid growth of the country’s economy but feel excluded from the benefits. In many cases, improvements were seen as cosmetic with inequality of service provision to poor rural communities versus urban ones and rich and poor. There was widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo, to the extent that in polling ahead of commune elections in 2016, the majority of Cambodians favored the CNRP to manage the economy and rein in corruption, despite Cambodia’s high GDP.50

This was also manifest in villagers and urban communities feeling excluded from the apparent benefits of a closer economic relationship with China, which is touted by the government as a way to rapidly improve Cambodia’s economy. Rather, the perception among interviewees was that much of this investment made its way into the hands of the elites and corrupt government officials, who benefitted from the relationship while ordinary Cambodians did not. This compounded a fear that Cambodians were increasingly excluded from parts of their country. The most salient example of this is Sihanoukville, a much-visited seaside resort and port now rapidly transforming into an overseas Chinese destination with hundreds of casinos catering to Chinese patrons, environmental degradation, and skyrocketing inflation that is driving local residents out.

INCLUSION AND GENDER Inclusion/exclusion emerged as an important and cross-cutting theme in relation to gender. In general, the team’s findings align with those of the UNDP and other gender assessments that note the paucity of women in visible, decision making roles. Only 20 percent of National Assembly members are women, despite making up 51 percent of the population, ranking Cambodia 96th out of 191 countries.51 At the most senior level, there are currently only three female Ministers. It was widely noted by stakeholders working in areas that engage with politics that both the ruling party and opposition do not see the value

50 Ben Paviour and Ben Sokhean, The Cambodia Daily, Official, Pollster Confirm CPP Polling After Findings Leaked, June 19, 2017. https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/official-pollster-confirm-cpp-polling-after-findings-leaked-131470/ 51 Women in Parliaments. Nov 2018. Although we should note that Cambodia is ranked above the United States.

22 of women’s participation and do not provide the financial or leadership support for them to do so. In CSOs and other organizations there are few women leaders, and few women in management roles. Instead, with some notable examples, the tendency is for women to work in the administrative sections. Women, who are in leadership roles, tend to be the heads of sections focused on women’s and children’s rights or leaders of organizations that focus primarily on gender issues. In the union sector, women are grossly underrepresented in negotiating roles, despite making up the majority of the workforce and having emerged as an important political bloc. This point is not missed on the Prime Minister and the CPP government more generally. In the wake of protests, the government attempted to co-opt female workers into the political fold through wage increases, gifts, and regular visits promising improvements to their livelihoods in return for supporting the CPP government.52 Despite these limitations, as shown in Figure 11, USAID’s economic gender gap indicator based on the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Gender Gap Report53 places Cambodia somewhat above the global average. This indicator measures wage equality for similar work, wage equality overall, ratio of female to male labor participation, the ratio of female to male legislators, officials, and managers, and the ratio of female to male professional and technical workers.

Figure 11: Self-Reliance Metrics: Inclusive Development

Source: Cambodia Journey to Self-Reliance: FY 2019 Country Roadmap. USAID

YOUTH INCLUSION Youth interviewed for this assessment generally reported feeling excluded from politics. The view is widely held that while they can contribute much to the country’s economy and society, it is dangerous to participate in politics. Social media platforms provide a platform for youth voices to be heard; however, there is wariness over the extent to which it was secure to share or ‘like’ opinions online. Several respondents noted the arrests of youth activists and some interviewed youth activists had themselves been warned by CPP officials in their communities not to speak openly in public about problems in their villages.

Youth in urban areas expressed hopes for their economic futures but worried about their job prospects. They were hungry to be included in the benefits of Cambodia’s economic growth. There was a strong belief that studying and working hard could lead to a share in those benefits; however, they also recognized disparities in

52 Kong Meta, The Phnom Penh Post, Hun Sen Promises Weekly Garment Factory Visits, 7 August 2017. 53 World Economic Forum (2017) The Global Gender Gap Report. Geneva: World Economic Forum. URL: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf

23 the system. For example, wealthier students are increasingly opting for private education, leaving poor students with sub-par education in neglected public schools. Education itself becomes another way to exclude the poor from upward mobility and lets the CPP off the hook in tackling needed education reform. In rural areas and among the poorer youth respondents we spoke with, although they expressed some hope for their futures, overall feelings of powerlessness and exclusion were amplified among these respondents. Escape can be found through internal migration to the cities, mainly Phnom Penh, or out of the country, usually to Thailand, though this comes with its own dangers in terms of labor and/or other exploitation.

One avenue to government co-option is through the CPP’s growing Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia (UYFC). It is headed by Hun Sen’s youngest son, Hun Many, and it is financed by some of Cambodia’s wealthiest enterprises. It regularly organizes activities for students to participate in and gives financial and other benefits in return for joining the organization or participating in its activities. The AT saw the UYFC as a clear attempt to co-opt urban youth, particularly students, to the CPP. This demographic was an important CNRP voting bloc in 2013. The UYFC does not appear to have been wholly successful in its attempts to co-opt youth at the district and village level. Repression by local CPP officials to force acquiescence of the youth seems more the order of the day but should not be mistaken for loyalty to the CPP. In many rural communities, the UYFC is the only option for organized activities including soccer, social events, and competitions.

EXCLUSION OF ALREADY MARGINALIZED GROUPS We interviewed other important groups about inclusion, including indigenous peoples and LGBT activists. In our interviews with indigenous people, they felt they were looked down on by the majority Khmer in government. More important to them were concerns related to their livelihoods, to be able to continue their traditional ways of life free from land grabs, illegal logging, and forest clearance, all of which negatively impacted their income, their ancestral lands and their sacred areas.

Members of the LGBT community felt excluded from public life to a large degree, and also face issues around bullying. For LGBT people, fear that family reputation will be negatively affected if they enter political or economic life in a publicly ‘out’ way is a barrier to open participation, informed and exacerbated by perceived traditional values. At the activist level, LGBT people face similar intimidation and threats as other CSO activists. However, despite the roll back of civil liberties and general targeting of CSO leaders for intimidation, LGBT activists with whom we met did not feel that they have been singled out based on gender preference. This perspective was validated during the team’s consultation with UNOCR staff, who did not find in their rights assessment that the current period represented a disproportionate decline in the rights of the LGBT community.

It was clear to the AT that the CPP’s current governance model does not include the majority of Cambodians. This is reflected in V-Dem’s Social Group Equality index, which measures if social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties. A low level indicates that some social groups enjoy considerably fewer civil liberties than the general population. Cambodia scores poorly on this indicator and below South Asian averages.54

54 See for example Social group equality in respect for civil liberties. 2017. V-Dem: Jan. 23.

24 CONCLUSION Most Cambodians are excluded from participating in the political life of the country. The benefits of the rapid GDP growth the country has experienced over the last decade, which looks set to continue through China’s unrestricted investment in the country, is similarly guarded by those who obtain the most from it. The CPP has thus far managed to remain in position by sharing the benefits of its control to a relatively small group of supporters while repressing others. However, its investment in the UYFC, together with attempts to co-opt workers, particularly female garment workers, suggest it realizes this model is not sustainable in the long term if it wants to return to holding a semblance of relatively free and fair elections in the future and counter its legitimacy problem. New voices, supported by more inclusive traditional CSOs and other organizations and individuals, are hungry to be included in shaping their country’s future. This extends to marginalized communities such as LGBT and indigenous people. This presents an opportunity for development partners to work with and equip them with the technical, leadership and digital advocacy and security skills to shape that future, contributing to more equitable development in contrast to the current system, which excludes by design.

COMPETITION AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The AT placed particular emphasis on the political competition and government accountability component of the SAF in response to Cambodia’s shift from an electoral autocracy to a closed autocratic regime. During this period of closing space, which had already seen the opposition dissolved, a crackdown on free expression, and independent media shuttered, many ordinary Cambodians we spoke with lamented this recent deterioration, particularly when measured against the previous mandate prior to the dissolution of the CNRP.

DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS The dissolution of the CNRP has removed competition from the political arena and disenfranchised the nearly 45 percent of CNRP voters who chose that party to represent them in 2013. More than half a million Cambodians chose to spoil their ballots rather than be forcibly included in rubber-stamping the CPP’s control over the state. As shown in Figure 12, Cambodia scores close to the bottom on USAID’s Self Reliance Metric of V-Dem’s Liberal , a measure of freedom of expression, freedom of association, suffrage, elections, rule of law, judicial constraints on the executive branch, and legislative constraints on the executive branch.

25 Figure 12: Self-Reliance Metrics: Open and Accountable Government

Source: Cambodia Journey to Self-Reliance: FY 2019 Country Roadmap. USAID

INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES Despite the obvious undermining of political competition and accountability, China is providing international legitimacy for the CPP government. China was one of the few countries who agreed to send international observers to monitor Cambodia’s election in 2018, and it was quick to congratulate Hun Sen on winning the election. The NEC received USD 25 million in ‘technical support’ from China in advance of the controversial 2018 National election. This is at odds with the US, EU, and other partners, who rejected requests to send observers and found the elections to be flawed. Throughout the Assessment, China’s direct or indirect influence on the country’s trajectory was at the forefront of the minds of the stakeholders with whom the team spoke, who either experienced it directly or indirectly with information garnered via Facebook.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION: THE MEDIA Similarly, the shuttering of the independent media and reduced access to information has also undermined accountability. As seen in Figure 12, Cambodia scores at the absolute bottom of the Self-Reliance Metric of World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, which measures the degree to which a government shares information, empowers people with tools to hold the government accountable, and fosters citizen participation in public policy deliberations.

Access to information is curtailed by the government at every turn as part of the government’s attempt to control the flow of information. Journalists and others the team spoke with noted that their freedom to operate has been increasingly restricted over the past five years, leaving an enormous gap in access to information for ordinary Cambodians. The CPP has long had a monopoly over television stations and Khmer language print media; for example, Hun Sen’s daughter Hun Mana, has holdings in Bayon Television and in the government friendly daily Kampuchea, The Daily. However, in 2017, the government silenced around 30 independent radio stations, whose reach into rural areas meant it was an important outlet for Cambodians to gather news. This was followed by the closure of the English language daily The Cambodia Daily on dubious tax grounds in September 2017 and the sale of The Phnom Penh Post to a Malaysian public

26 relations (PR) firm whose owner had previously worked for the Prime Minister.55 Cambodia now ranks 142 out of 180 countries according to the World Press Freedom Index, a 10 place drop from 2017.56

The team also was informed of grants being given by the Chinese government to support academic research within Cambodian think thanks. This is a concern given the restrictions placed on academic freedom in China. For example, a well-regarded political analyst within a leading think tank noted that her own research on domestic politics and foreign policy has been constrained and that researchers are feeling pressure to self-censor their views.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION: DIGITAL PLATFORMS Despite government media monopolies and the near absence of independent media in 2018, respondents still found ways to access unbiased news sources. Internet access has grown tremendously in Cambodia over the past five years, and news outlets were overwhelming accessed online, normally through Facebook, and usually on Smartphones. Often cited as independent news outlets include Radio Free Asia and Voice of America. Activists, CSOs, and political analysts use these platforms to share their opinions and publicly comment on the news stories of the day.

Respondents told the team that they would ‘like’ but not always ‘share’ stories on their own Facebook pages, and would sometimes comment on stories and posts highlighting social issues. This fit a broader pattern whereby respondents noted regular use of social media for news, and to share information, but are wary of online surveillance. While the tactics of government monitoring and threats pre-date the expansion in social media use in Cambodia, government use of new tactics for digital surveillance is a rising concern. While respondents are still using social media platforms widely, the shift from free expression to just ‘sharing’ content but not ‘liking’ or expressing personal views, suggest that Cambodians are now engaged in self-censorship on what had been a relatively free and open space for civic discourse. The atmosphere of fear and its chilling effect have extended to the web and social media, which has often been an important platform for activism. Interviews suggest that people have increasingly engaged in self- censorship. While the media and those operating in the political sphere are primary targets for digital surveillance, civil society organizations and other members of the general public have begun to feel its effects as well. For example, the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO), a repressive law that gives the government considerable authority to police and sanction civil society organizations, has been extended to apply to web-based activity. As a result, the government has warned CSOs that pages on their website violate the political neutrality clause. In one case, LICADHO, a prominent human rights organization, was warned about a page titled ‘Cambodia’s Political Prisoners.’57

Cyber security is an issue that needs to be addressed, particularly as the Cambodian government is taking measures that look set to restrict online freedom, including the recent telecommunications law. Reported incidences of hacking, supported by the Chinese government, suggest that online attacks on government critics is already a weapon in the CPP’s arsenal. Maintaining unfettered access to the internet without fear

55 Financial Times. 2018. Cambodia’s last independent paper sold to Malaysian PR firm owner. Financial Times: May 18. 56 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index: Cambodia, 2017. https://www.transparency.org/country/KHM 57 Khuon Narim and George Wright, The Cambodia Daily, Rights Group Warned Over ‘political Prisoners’ Page, May 20, 2016. https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/rights-group-warned-over-political-prisoners-page-112823/

27 of surveillance is critical if youth and civil society organizations are to make positive use of Facebook and other social media platforms to share information.

WhatsApp and other messaging platforms are important tools for sharing information, to talk with friends and family, as well as to bring up problems in schools and communities. In this regard, messaging apps such as Viber, LINE, and Telegram58 offer a more secure pathway for youth to mobilize without fear of surveillance because they utilize end-to-end encryption technology that is more difficult to trace.

CIVIL SOCIETY With a few exceptions, such as lobbying for the national action plan to prevent violence against women, CSOs are not involved to any great extent in the policy-making process. This is despite having been so in the not too distant past. For example, in 2013-4 period multi-stakeholder technical working groups within the Ministry of Environment played a visible and groundbreaking role on revising Cambodia’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) law. Instead, as of 2018, CSOs are seen as competitors by the government, and they have been targeted for repression. In addition to intimidation, legal and bureaucratic red tape is designed to inhibit their work. The most egregious is the passing of the LANGO, which provides the legal basis to unfairly and indiscriminately target NGO activities.59 The LANGO was put into action in October 2015 when the Ministry of Interior sent a letter to provincial authorities informing them that CSOs must seek permission three days prior to performing a public activity. The same letter directed local officials to report any activity taking place without prior consent, though this is not specified in the law. According to respondents, this translated in near-blanket monitoring of their activities. At the time the research was conducted, it appeared this ban was being lifted, and established NGOs were coordinating among themselves to test the water as to how much space this now gave them to operate. In January 2019, the Cooperation Committee of Cambodia (CCC)60 convened the first of four planned consultations with civil society at the Ministry of Interior (the next is scheduled to take place in March 2019). At this consultation the MoI confirmed that the requirement to give three-day advance notice to government officials for CSO activity has been revoked.

58 Telegram is used by rights activists in countries where they fear government reprisal for their activities. End-to-end encryption has also made this app the messaging platform of choice by terrorist groups, notably ISIS. 59 FIDH, Cambodia: The Dangers of LANGO, 7 August 2015. https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/cambodia/cambodia-the- dangers-of-lango 60 At the regional level, CCC is a full member of CIVICUS, International Forum of National NGO Platforms (IFP), The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD Watch), and ASEAN CSR Network. CCC is also an active member of Asian Development Alliance (ADA), International Civil Society Center (ICSC), and Management Systems International (MSI). Having this privilege, CCC channels the common CSO’s concerns on civic space to reach international communities and seeks for short-term and long-term solutions. At the national level, CCC is a vice-chair of Implementation Plan Social Accountability Framework (I-SAF) of National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development (NCDD).

28 Figure 13: V-dem Civil Society Capacity 2018

NEW VOICES With regards to youth, new, younger and often female, tech-savvy individuals and organizations are mobilizing around certain issues to achieve specific goals. They are well-educated and able to deploy their tech ability to use Facebook and other social media platforms to convey their message and attract ‘likes’ or ‘shares’ from the general public. As the majority of Cambodians now get their news online, through Facebook and YouTube, these youth are positioned to be ‘influencers.’ In this space, there are land and natural resource activists, including indigenous peoples, feminists and women’s rights activists and educators, new citizen journalists, and LGBT rights defenders. Despite the risk to post videos on Facebook, activists persist. In September of 2018, two young activists affiliated with the CSO Mother Nature were convicted of incitement for filming boats they believed were carrying silica sand off the coast of a special economic zone (SEZ) in Koh Kong province. The beach they filmed belongs to a powerful ruling party Senator Ly Yong Phat. The original complaint against them was filed by the chief of staff of Yong Phat’s LYP Group, Chan Nakry. Mother Nature’s video posts often go viral in Cambodia.

CONCLUSION The AT found competition and political accountability to be the most problematic of the five SAF areas in Cambodia at present. It is clearly government policy to stifle competition in order to reassert its grip over the country. Coupled with the Cambodian government’s cozying relationship with China, which provides some international legitimacy and economic support, the return to more open electoral competition looks unlikely in the short term. However, the societal consensus remains for a democratic Cambodia and important democratic foundations, built with decades of support from the U.S. and other pro-democracy development partners, remain in place. While the political opposition is currently fractured, the architecture that allowed for political contestation in 2013 is still present. Political analysts and CSO leaders indicated that Cambodians have embraced the need for legitimate political opposition but are not wed to that opposition being the CNRP. Former CNRP supporters have not lost the appetite for political engagement but may be less committed to the CNRPs current leadership.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

The AT paid particular attention to the human rights and rule of law element, as part of the broader focus on democratic backsliding. Recent legislative changes have strengthened the government’s hand in restricting the rights of its citizens. Among ordinary Cambodians, the AT encountered a widespread

29 perception of judicial corruption and belief that access to justice is limited to the wealthy and powerful. Respondents who had used the courts had little faith in a positive resolution, as the courts were widely believed to be corrupt, administering justice only to the rich and influential This resulted in significant distrust in the courts as an avenue for achieving justice.

Figure 14: V-Democracy Cambodia Indicators (2013 - 2018)

THE LAW VERSUS REALITY On paper Cambodia has a strong legal framework. Its constitution is a fairly robust legal instrument for the protection of its citizens’ rights. Cambodia is obligated under international law to respect, protect and fulfill fundamental rights having ratified numerous international human rights instruments which explicitly guarantee these rights. As the V-Dem table Figure 14 (above) indicates, rule of law is an area of measurable decline in the 2013-2018 assessment period.

The reality, however, is different. The CPP government has proven adept at adopting various human rights standards which it has then chosen to ignore. This narrative includes the government’s weak implementation of legislation to protect expressive rights. Moreover, RGC has actually enacted legislation that contradicts its legal commitments to “recognize and respect” human rights enshrined in its constitution61 and by virtue of its ratification of international human rights covenants and conventions. Since 2015, the government has passed a raft of repressive laws which have served to tighten its grip on power, and legally intimidate and harass potential opponents.

61 See Art. 31. Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia. http://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/9539

30 A new lèse-majesté law adopted in February 2018 is modeled after a similar law in Thailand used to prosecute government critics. Observers fear the lèse-majesté law will be used for the same purpose in Cambodia. It allows a prosecutor to file criminal charges on behalf of the monarchy against anybody deemed to have insulted the monarchy. In a rare act of opposing the will of the CPP, the King, refused to sign this bill.

In addition to new laws passed legislating repression, several existing laws have been amended since the 2014 Assessment. The most important of these are amendments to the Law on Political Parties. In July 2017, the National Assembly amended the law so that political parties cannot be led by somebody with a criminal conviction. This was followed by an amendment to the Election Law in October, which allowed for the seats of dissolved parties to redistributed to other parties. This laid the groundwork for the dissolution of the CNRP in November 2017, and the redistribution of its seats to CPP-friendly parties. Demonstrative of the malleability of the law for political ends, at the time of the Assessment, in December 2018, the National Assembly again amended the Law on Political Parties to open the space for opposition politicians to regain full political rights at some point in the future through a request to the King. However, important caveats remain, with request for return directed via the Ministry of Interior to Prime Minister, and then to the King.62 As such, the government maintains control of the process and the King has not overtly demonstrated independence from the Prime Minister’s position on sensitive political issues. As of this writing, 35 opposition figures have submitted requests to the Prime Minister and nine have been approved.

62 Chheng, Niem. “King signs Article 45 amendment paving way for opposition return.” Phnom Penh Post, 9 January 2019, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/king-signs-article-45-amendment-paving-way-opposition-return

31 Figure 15: Significant Political Events in Cambodia since 2015

FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND THE REPRESSION OF HRDS With regard to expressive rights, following the security force’s violent crackdown on protests in 2014, a government-imposed ban on public demonstrations was introduced, and it remains in place. Cambodia’s Freedom Park, a once vibrant place for people to express their political views, has been closed since 2014. Activists report being no longer able to organize even minor demonstrations without fear of reprisal and being targeted by the government for attempting to do so. This makes it difficult for Cambodians to exercise their legal rights to expression and assembly. All public protest is demonized as an attempt to overthrow the government. In one example, called ‘Black Monday,’ demonstrators, who mobilized on the streets in 2016 to protest the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders, were labelled illegal and

32 threatened with arrest by senior members of the security forces.63 During the ‘Black Monday’ campaign there were at least 38 instances of arbitrary arrest, mostly women human rights activists in Phnom Penh.

Figure 16: Violations of Fundamental Freedoms, April 2017 – March 2018

Source: FFMP Media Monitoring and Incident Reporting Databases, May 2018

A number of respondents working in the areas of human rights and rule of law detailed how they faced intimidation, including physical intimidation as part of their work. This stretched to intimidation of their families and surveillance of their homes and workplaces. At the time of the Assessment, six leading union leaders were found guilty of instigating violent protests in 2013 and 2014 but had their jail terms suspended. Although older, another high-profile case that was raised in interviews as having a chilling effect on human rights was the arbitrary detention of five former and current senior staff members of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), on allegations of ‘’ in a case that had clear political overtones. The charges levelled against them focused on their human rights work.64

In recent years, Cambodian women have emerged as strong advocates for human rights. As a result, they have been targeted for physical and psychological forms of intimidation, including threats and surveillance. This includes the prominent activist Tep Vanny, a member of the Boeung Kak Lak community, who was imprisoned for more than two years on charges on ‘intentional violence,’ in addition to retroactively applied previous allegations against her, which proved unsubstantiated. Her trials were beset with violations to her fair trial rights and exposed the failures of the Cambodian justice system in protecting the rights of its citizens.65

LAND GRABBING AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES Among the most pressing human rights abuses in Cambodia over the past two decades has been in the area of land dispossession. An aggressive land control program by the government saw much of

63 RFA, ‘Cambodian Military Threatens ‘Black Monday’ Busts,’ 20 May 2016. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/military- threatens-black-05202016152539.html 64 HRW, ‘Cambodia: Drop Fabricated Charges Against ‘ADHOC 5’,’ 26 August 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/26/cambodia-drop-fabricated-charges-against-adhoc-5 65 FIDH and Forum ASIA, ‘CAMBODIA 32nd Session of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), January 2019. https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fa_fidh_licadho_joint_submission_cambodia_upr_july_2018.pdf

33 Cambodia’s agricultural and forest land given over to private Cambodian and foreign concessionaires, often working together. This has resulted in the widespread seizure of land farmed by rural and urban communities. Communities and activists who speak up have faced judicial intimidation and violence by the security forces. As a result, countless communities, including indigenous people have been forced off land. Although the government has made some attempts to stem the tide of land grabbing, many disputes remain unresolved and problems remain. In response to a protest over land in Kratie province in 2018, shots were fired, injuring farmers.66 The AT found communities, including the indigenous people it met, still locked in disputes with powerful companies linked to the government. Recent infrastructure and other booms, including a number of high-profile hydropower partnerships between local businesses and Chinese companies have resulted in problems for communities in those areas, and raise the specter of future disputes across Cambodia as more infrastructure projects are planned, as Chinese investment in Cambodia goes into overdrive.67

The AT concluded that the situation in Cambodia was one of ‘rule by law’, not ‘rule of law.’ Legislating repression and using judicial harassment to stifle pro-democracy and pro-human rights voices has been fundamental to closing the space in Cambodia. However, as noted above the general citizenry have a good grasp of the fundamentals of their rights under law. In this context, violations of the law also undermine the legitimacy of the government and contribute to the sense that the system is rigged against ordinary people. Even within this repressive context, the AT found people searching for ways to push for their rights, at great personal risk. Usually these efforts found expression in posting videos online such as that of a young activist in Sihanoukville who posted results of a simple lab water test to show how local officials are neglecting waste management in favor of coastal development at the peril of the local community.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS

The team assessed this element to be a significant problem for governance in Cambodia. The country’s deepening economic relationship with China, with its rapacious appetite for land investment opportunities, coupled with its desire for political clout in the ASEAN region, looks set to exacerbate pre-existing barriers to government responsiveness and effectiveness. Unfortunately, Cambodian citizens have been kept largely outside of this important debate on the future direction of the country.

RESPONSIVE TO WHOM? Official positions in government and bureaucracy are doled out along lines of patronage and the capacity to generate revenues. Select stakeholders expressed moderate hope that the government is starting to address some of its administrative failings, although tangible examples of positive developments were hard to find. Optimists pointed to the fact that the government is in the process of promoting from within; however, this process is slow, and favors people with family links to existing officials over the promotion

66 Liam Cochrane, ABC News, ‘Cambodian Director of Sofitel Hotel Linked to Business Which Saw Shooting of Farmers,’ 16 March 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-16/cambodian-head-of-sofitel-hotel-has-business-link-to-shooting/9553564 67 Dominic Faulder and Kenji Kawase, Asian Nikkei Review, Cambodians Wary as Chinese Investment Transforms Their Country, 18 July 2018. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Cambodians-wary-as-Chinese-investment-transforms-their- country

34 of new, technically capable people. This presents other problems, as loyalty and the ability to generate resources for superiors plays a role in selection and promotion above competence.

The problems associated with decentralization illustrate this point. Decentralization efforts have strengthened the party at the subnational level, as reforms were used to replace aging functionaries with new, equally loyal party officials. 68 At the same time, important public goods such as schools and health clinics have been delivered as “gifts” by the CPP, rather than normal functions of service delivery by the state. The efficacy of this mass patronage in delivering votes is tempered by the public’s view of gifts as not contingent on votes,69 evident in the 2013 election. Nevertheless, these examples illustrate the blurring of state and party distinctions.

CORRUPTION Corruption is ubiquitous in Cambodia. It currently ranks 161 out of 180 places in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.70 All aspects of political and economic life are touched by corruption. Respondents noted in order to complete even simple tasks such as registering births or marriages, they were expected to pay beyond the stated fees or risk waiting excessive amounts of time to get something done. This was a constant frustration of respondents. In some instances, respondents told of trying to avoid paying the extras in order to get something done, only to eventually cave in order to find resolution. The police and local officials were cited as those respondents regularly had to pay. However, there was also some sympathy that these officials are usually poorly paid, and that some had little choice but to extract extra income from corruption.

While petty corruption is a daily obstacle, large-scale rent-seeking behavior has enabled the capture of the Cambodian state by wealthy politicians, high-ranking government officials, and business tycoons, often working in tandem to extract benefits from their position. Perhaps the most egregious of these has been in the allocation of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) to CPP tycoons. According to Global Witness in 2013, just five CPP senators owned 20 percent of all this land.71 As previously noted, land dispossession has been a pressing human rights issue in Cambodia, and respondents still touted land issues as one of the major areas where they faced conflict with the government.

CHINESE FDI By far and away the most significant future barrier to government responsiveness and effectiveness is its closer relationship to China. Chinese FDI has flooded into Cambodia over the past few years. While the effects of this has been noted in previous sections of the Assessment, it is worth noting here that stakeholders were cognizant of the effect this was having on Cambodia. Already this has caused significant disquiet among ordinary Cambodians. Respondents in particular noted investment in Sihanoukville as an example of the uneven distribution of spoils of this system, which disincentivize government responsiveness in favor of short-term reward in terms of easy access to Chinese money for government officials.

68 Netra Eng, Sophal Ear, “Decentralization Reforms in Cambodia,” Journal of Southeast Asian Economies (JSEAE), Volume 33, Number 2, August 2016, pp. 209-223. 69 Astrid Norén-Nilsson, “Good Gifts, Bad Gifts, and Rights: Cambodian Popular Perceptions and the 2013 Elections”, Pacific Affairs, 89, no. 4 (2016): 795-815 70 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2018. https://www.transparency.org/country/KHM 71 Global Witness, Rubber Barons, 13 May 2013, pp. 2

35 Cambodia’s political and economic elite, who have already amassed significant fortunes through their connections with government, despite protestations and the impact this has had on ordinary Cambodians, are set to benefit most from this boom. Cambodia’s wealthiest tycoons operate in partnership with Chinese companies in order to build and operate infrastructure projects or supply the land on which Chinese condominiums are built.

Government unresponsiveness and ineffectiveness is not new in Cambodia. Entrenched political and economic interests have long been a barrier to reform. However, the enormous changes underway in Cambodia’s political economy through closer relations with China is both a symptom and a cause for greater problems down the road. As this process accelerates, the AT anticipates greater governance problems faced by the Cambodian people, who have expressed significant misgivings to the team over the direction this is taking their country. They will need the tools and support to push back and claim a stake in the country’s development and to prevent or at least ameliorate the extent to which the distribution of economic spoils is funneled to regime insiders at a time when ordinary Cambodians are losing their civil liberties.

SUMMARY

To recap, the team viewed competition and political accountability, human rights and rule of law, and government responsiveness and effectiveness to be the most problematic areas for democracy, rights, and governance in Cambodia today. The democratic backsliding period has been characterized by a targeted clampdown in these areas in order to maintain power at a time when the government’s popular legitimacy is contested. The government has not chosen to turn to the full electorate for its mandate, but instead has grown closer to a coercive international actor in the form of China. Despite the government’s rejection of democracy, the AT found that consensus remained among interviewed stakeholders for a democratic system characterized by rule of law with greater political and economic inclusion. In this context, the tactics of repression buoyed by the material support of China, does not align with the wishes of the Cambodian people. The disjuncture between the government of Cambodia and its citizens opens the possibility for USAID to engage as an alternative aligned to the will of the majority of Cambodians.

36 STEP 2: ANALYZING KEY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS

Step 2 includes an examination of key actors in Cambodia and the institutions that structure their incentives. In the Cambodian context, the conclusion of this section is fairly straightforward. The Hun Sen government controls all of the levers of power in Cambodia, including the executive, the legislature, the security forces, and government officials throughout. This control has occurred largely through the apparatus of the CPP and through a mix of rewards, or patronage, for collaborators and repression for opponents.

Step 2 aims to determine both who are potential champions of reform and if these potential reformers have a ‘pathway’ to achieve reform. While this step does identify several potential champions in the former opposition party and in civil society, these actors do not have an obvious pathway to effect change. As such, Step 1 suggests that there are very serious DRG problems in Cambodia, but Step 2 does not identify simple, short-term means to address those complex problems. However, recent scholarship on authoritarian regimes and democratic regression72 suggests; “backsliding73 is best conceived as a change in a combination of competitive electoral procedures, civil and political liberties, and accountability, and that backsliding occurs through a series of discrete changes in the rules and informal procedures that share those elections, rights, and accountability.74”The AT suggests that greater investment directed toward seminal political actors that include youth and women and selective institutional engagement may yield better long-term results. The team recommends that instead of promotion of multi-party election (which might not in and of itself lead to desired outcomes in Cambodia given the government’s unwillingness to honor free and fair elections), USAID could calibrate focus on building more social capital75 that increase accountability, transparency, and protections for the rights of individuals and entities in Cambodia. In the run up to the 2018 election, the political landscape was characterized by mobilizational asymmetry76 wherein the power of the Executive to preference the CPP so constrained the CNRP that even a popular electoral victory could be dismantled by diktat. In 2019, there is no indication that political equilibrium will ensue with reinstatement of the CNRP alone.

USAID does not need to create demand for democracy but can catalyze this aspiration. Youth, CSOs and women want fundamental rights and government accountability. This longer-term approach anticipates 72 Valeriya Mechkova, Anna Lührmann, and Staffan I. Lindberg, ‘How Much Democratic Backsliding?’ Journal of Democracy 28, no. 4 (2017): 162–69; and Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘Southeast Asia’s Democratic Decline in the America First Era,’ Council on Foreign Relations, Expert Brief, October 27, 2017 https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/southeast-asias-democratic- decline-america-first- era. and Larry Diamond, ‘Facing up to the Democratic Recession,’ Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (2015): 141–55. 73 Lust, Ellen and Waldner, David, ‘Phase I: Theories of Democratic Backsliding’, “Theories of Democratic Change—Phase I: Theories of Democratic Backsliding.” Democratic backsliding is an unsettlingly common phenomenon. Too often, competitive elections are undermined, citizens lose their rights to mobilize or voice their demands, and governments become less accountable. That is, changes are made in formal political institutions and informal political practices that significantly reduce the capacity of citizens to make enforceable claims upon the government. These changes may not lead to the breakdown of democratic regimes—indeed, backsliding can occur in both democratic and authoritarian regimes—but they do degrade citizens’ rights and their engagement with the state. May 2015. P.3 74 Lust, Ellen and Waldner, David, ‘Phase I: Theories of Democratic Backsliding’, “Theories of Democratic Change—Phase I: Theories of Democratic Backsliding.” This publication was produced by USAID in partnership with the Institute of International Education as part of the Research and Innovation Grants Working Papers Series. May 2015. 75 Ibid P.14 76 Ibid P.20

37 the country undergoing eventual political transition in the future and invests in building capacity to ensure that a cadre of competent leaders will be found outside of the current CPP elite or security services. USAID already has taken steps to invest in emerging voices through support of youth, women, and civil society. The team identifies these groups as potential, long-term political actors of influence in need of increased support.

In the following paragraphs we begin with the ‘spoilers,’ those that benefit from and perpetuate the status quo, and then discuss the potential ‘champions,’ or those that would benefit from reform. Finally, the team adds a regional context section that includes cross-national indices to help contextualize Cambodia as compared with its neighbors.

THE SPOILERS THE EXECUTIVE Cambodia’s political system continues to be dominated by Prime Minister Hun Sen. He is supported by the upper echelons of the CPP, the CPP-aligned security forces, and a group of wealthy tycoons who have benefitted to a significant degree from their financial support of the CPP under Hun Sen.77 Hun Sen was voted President of the CPP in 2015, following the death of the former party President and Hun Sen rival . This gave Prime Minister Sen formal, full control over the party, which he dominates along with the military and state he has long managed. While the executive is not monolithic, by using his Prime Ministerial position to appoint key allies to influential roles within the government and military, Hun Sen has been able to consolidate power within the Executive branch.78

THE CPP The Cambodian People’s Party is the primary institution for the control of the state. It is led by Hun Sen and the Permanent Committee, the top-level body within the party, which is inhabited by loyal and longstanding party functionaries, ministers, and leaders from within the security force command structure, including the Prime Minister’s eldest son, Hun Manet.

Another governing body is the broader based Central Committee, which was further expanded in 2018. It now consists of 865 members, more than those of China and Vietnam’s Central Committees combined. The expansion appears to represent an effort to reward supporters. The newly admitted included those from various state institutions who toed the CPP government’s line in the post 2013 political turmoil. The expansion also includes more children of current members in the party hierarchy.

At the lower levels, the party remains the electoral vehicle of CPP state, providing a veneer of legitimacy even as it contests elections more or less unopposed. This allows it to populate the National Assembly and pass repressive laws to further maintain the status quo. Electoral losses in 2013 and 2017 are indicative that the party has not successfully won over a sufficient number of voters to provide sufficient margins at the polls to secure legitimacy. This is despite years portraying itself at the party of development and an

77 Iqbal, Heather. ‘Who Profits from the Death of Cambodia’s Democracy?’ Global Witness: July 20, 2018. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/cambodia/who-profits-death-cambodias-democracy/ 78 For more information on the personalisation of power in Cambodia see Lee Morgenbesser, “Misclassification on the Mekong: The Origins of Hun Sen’s Personalist .” Democratisation 25, no. 2, (2017)

38 impressive membership of more than 5 million members in a country with a population of 16 million. However, the CPP has a history of coercing members who then do not vote for it.79

THE SECURITY FORCES Security forces are active political players in Cambodian politics and among Hun Sen’s key constituents for his continued political dominance. Their loyalty is evidenced in their willingness to crackdown on opposition supporters post 2013, and to use violence against opposition MPs.80 In 2015, when the CPP Central Committee was expanded by more than 300 members, a significant number of these new members were drawn from the security forces.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS Senior and lower-level members of the judiciary, legal, and other official government bodies are also CPP members. This is demonstrative of the party’s continued existence, at the top, as an organ to co-opt important sections of society, for the continued dominance of the Prime Minister and his supporters. The massive expansion of the Central Committee in 2015 included the children of current party elders, who are either already, or in the process of, being groomed for high-ranking positions within government.

THE LEGISLATURE After the boycott of the opposition in 2015, the legislation became entirely controlled by the CPP with the CNRP absent. The legislature has been responsible for passing several bills that undermine democracy, competition, accountability, human rights, and the rule of law. This was then cemented in the 2018 national election when the CPP won all 125 seats in the 2018 election.

THE JUDICIARY As noted above, the CPP controlled legislature has undermined the independence of the judiciary through passage of the Law on the Functioning and Organizing of Courts, the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, and the Law on the Status of Judges and Prosecutors. The lack of independence is evidenced by the Supreme Court’s rubber stamping of the dissolution of the CNRP. CHINA The role of China requires particular attention, as China has emerged as the Hun Sen government’s enabler, providing it with both international legitimacy and resources to benefit domestic constituents. The Cambodia-China relationship and Cambodian dependence can be understood in terms of Sharp Power81 in which China is exerting influences in multiple domains: (a) trade and investment, (b) military aid, and (c) cooperation in foreign policy objectives. In this last category, China’s approach to bilateral relations with Cambodia remains fundamentally asymmetrical. As such the AT disagrees with the argument

79 Caroline Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, (London & New York: Routledge: Curzon, 2003), chapter 4. 80 Mech Dara and Shaun Turton, The Phnom Penh Post, MP attackers promoted, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/mp-attackers-promoted 81 Diamond, Larry and Schell, Orville, 2019 China’s Influence and American Interests: Prompting Constructive Vigilance. Hoover Institute Press. Stanford University, Stanford, California.

39 that Cambodia is ‘free’ to choose its development partners, as we recognize a fundamental inequality in bargaining positions, with China controlling the terms of engagement with Cambodia. While China is not the cause of Cambodia’s challenges in attaining democracy, it has proven adept at exploiting pre-existing weaknesses to advance its own political and economic aims. The centrality of the CPP, its one-party nature, rollback on civil liberties, rent-seeking behavior, and patronage of elites create circumstances easy to exploit by China’s “united front”82 as part of its broader “go out” policy in the region. In its association to China’s approach to nation-building, the united front work serves as a key political tool to access local elites and autocratic leaders and manage these key influencers.

We discuss each of these three influences in turn:

Cambodia’s growing economic ties with China include well documented investment in large-scale infrastructure, particularly within the controversial hydro-power energy sector, economic land concessions, construction, tourism, and real estate. A true accounting of Chinese investment is difficult to capture because of its opacity. Corruption, the absence of social and environmental safeguards, and complex financial arrangements further complicate accurate trade and investment accounting.

As seen in Table 1, China is also Cambodia’s number one importer, providing more than twice the value of goods than Cambodia’s next greatest source of imports, Thailand. As trade ties continue to deepen with China and may decline with western trading partners, it is clear that the asymmetrical bilateral relationship with China is likely to increase as the CPP grows increasingly dependent on Chinese trade and investment to maintain the aggressive economic growth that Cambodians have come to expect. A more insidious motivation to increase trade with China regards the need of the Sen family to continue expanding its extensive business portfolio and those of the members of the Prime Minister’s coalition to maintain support. Bestowal of economic benefits and special privileges that include access to lucrative business deals with China are part of this calculation. In 2018, the volume of trade has continued to expand, reaching USD17,606 million in imports and USD12,768 million in exports.

82 A recent article in the Geopolitical Monitor notes that, “United front work is one of several Mao-era policies that President Xi has dusted off and refitted for contemporary use. The president has even evoked Mao’s language, describing the united front as a ‘magic weapon’ that can be used to bring about ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’” Critically, the United Front has specific goals with regard to the export of China’s foreign policy aims as outlined in a leaked internal CCP memo, which outlines threats to the CCP, including Western parliamentary democracy, universal values, civil society, neo-liberalism, and freedom of the press. Geopolitical Monitor. Backgrounder: A Brief History of China’s United Front (March 22, 2019) URL: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/backgrounder-a-brief-history-of-chinas-united-front/

40 Table 1: Cambodia's Top Export and Import Partners, 2017

Top Importers Top Exporters Market Trade (USD Partner Exporter Trade (USD Partner Million) Share (%) Million) Share (%) 1 United States 2,147 21.32 1 China 4,551 36.79 2 United Kingdom 953 9.47 2 Thailand 1,910 15.44 3 Germany 904 8.89 3 Vietnam 1,416 11.45 4 Japan 827 8.21 4 Other Asia 702 5.67 5 655 6.50 5 565 4.56

2017 World Bank trade figures suggest that Cambodia’s economy still remains dependent on the key export markets of the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. These three trading partners account for nearly 40 percent of exports (See Table 1). The United States is the single largest overseas market for Cambodian merchandise exports, which consist mostly of garments and footwear; thus, the threat of targeted sanctions by the U.S. has garnered the attention of the government, unions, and civil society. Nonetheless, the share of exports to the U.S. has decreased substantially from 62 percent in 2008 to 23 percent in 2018, while the shares of the EU and Japan have risen significantly. Gross exports have been increasingly diversified. While Cambodia is still heavily depending on the garment sector, dependence on garments is decreasing. In the 2008, garment export accounted for 96 percent of exports, but by 2017 that percentage had dropped to 72 percent.83 As such, Cambodia remains economically dependent on the US, but this dependence is decreasing.

In fact, Cambodia’s embrace of China has corresponded with a shift away from Western development partners, notably the United States and European Union. In late 2018, the government of Cambodia has attempted to deflect Western criticism by contextualizing its foreign policy as part of a broader alignment with Asian regional powers. Trade with China, Japan, and ASEAN countries are perceived to be critical to achieving higher middle-income status by 2030. The Cambodian government has prioritized strategic bilateral relations with China, Japan, and Vietnam and downgraded its economic and military cooperation with the United States84. The RGC may believe that Cambodia’s regional significance is also enhanced through its closer affiliation with the region’s most powerful country. The RGC is aware that in the face of western criticism, China will defend the government against international critics.

Cambodian and Chinese leaders promote the complementarity and mutual benefit of China’s foreign policy centerpiece, the Belt and Road (BRI) Initiative and Cambodia's Rectangular Strategy. The RGC touts the acceleration, transformation and upgrading of Cambodia’s economy which in turn provides a regional space for Chinese companies to enhance international cooperation and development. Ironically, China points to its FDI in Sihanoukville, one of the cities most vocally criticized by CSOS and ordinary citizens, as an example of mutual cooperation and benefit. Xinhua85 reported in September 2018 that a total of

83 MEF (2018) Economic developments, outlook and challenges 84 Parameswaran, Prashantha, Why Did Cambodia Downgrade U.S. Military Ties Again? The Diplomat, April 5, 2017 URL: https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/why-did-cambodia-just-downgrade-us-military-ties-again/ (accessed 12/30/18) 85 Shumei, Leng. “China, Cambodia to enhance exchanges”, The Global Times. January 19, 2019. URL: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1136414.shtml accessed February 15, 2019.

41 125 companies from around the world had invested in Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SEZ) of which 108 are Chinese companies that employ 21,000, the vast majority of which are workers from China. Chinese bilateral exchanges have increased.

China has become Cambodia’s largest military donor, contributing 100 million dollars in military aid.86 These resources have likely been an important factor in ensuring military and security sector support for the Hun Sen government. In addition, Cambodia conducts joint military exercises with China. In the most recent sign of enhanced cooperation with China and affront to the U.S. Navy, three Chinese navy ships will dock at Sihanoukville Autonomous port on January 8, 2019 for Anti-piracy and Rescue drills.87

This aid does not appear to be without strings. Political observers within and outside of Cambodia increasingly perceive Cambodia to act as a proxy for China within regional platforms such as ASEAN.88 This generates a concern that Cambodia will support China’s claims in the South China Sea. Cambodia’s growing economic, military and soft-power ties increase the probability that it could inadvertently act as China’s client state in the Mekong. While the Cambodian Foreign Minister challenged the claim, there is some evidence to suggest that China is planning a naval base along the Koh Kong province coastal region.89

INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ACTORS THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION After its relative success in the polls and mass mobilization of its supporters in 2013-2014, joined on the streets by demonstrating workers and other discontents, the government responded with a series of repressive actions aimed at suppressing dissent, while containing and eventually disabling the opposition as a political force. This included a violent crackdown by government security forces in January 2014, and a series of repressive laws culminating in its eventually dissolution in 2017, effectively ending multi-party democracy in the country. At the time of writing, the CNRP’s Kem Sokha is under house arrest, there is division within the CNRP, and there is no viable political opposition party ready to take its place. Division is illustrated by public criticism of Sam Rainsy by Kem Sokha’s eldest daughter, Kem Monovithya. The criticism referred to Sam Rainsy’s negative assessment of an amendment of the law on political parties that could allow CNRP official to return to politics. The CNRP would still be banned, cases will be analyzed individually, and those wishing to return would have their appeal go through the Interior Ministry and the Prime Minister, before being passed to the King.90 The public spat has appeared to dissipate in recent months. Unity between Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha had been critical in merging the opposition vote to threaten the CPP in 2013 and 2017.

86 Edel, Charles, Cambodia’s Troubling Tilt Toward China, Foreign Affairs. August 17, 2018 URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-08-17/cambodias-troubling-tilt-toward-china (accessed December 23, 2018) 87 Koemsoeun, Soth. Chinese Navy Ships to Dock at Sihanoukville. The Phnom Penh Post. URL: https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/chinese-navy-ships-dock-sihanoukville (Accessed January 7, 2019) 88 Parameswaran, Prashantha, Why China’s New Cambodia Military Boost Matters, The Diplomat, June 20, 2018 URL: https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/why-chinas-new-cambodia-military-boost-matters/ (accessed January 1, 2019) 89 Chheng, Niem. 2018. Government denies Koh Kong Chinese naval base ‘rumour’ Phnom Penh Post. November 19, 2018 URL: https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/government-denies-koh-kong-chinese-naval-base-rumour (accessed February 26, 2019 90 Nachemson, Andrew. “Trick or real? CNRP split over Cambodia move to ease politics ban.” Al Jazeera, 13 December 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/trick-real-cnrp-split-cambodia-move-ease-politics-ban-181213230418789.html

42 In February 2019 Sam Rainsy told his supporters to prepare for his return; a promise that seems difficult to keep. 91 If he returned, he would almost certainly be arrested and imprisoned immediately. At present it is difficult to imagine that the government would allow the CNRP to run for election in future in its current iteration and under current political conditions.

In a Kabuki-like portrayal of political opposition, the CPP has encouraged formation of quasi-parties commonly referred to as; ‘ghost and moth’ parties, as they are regarded to be fronts for CPP interests rather than truly independent voices. Of the more independent parties, the Grassroots Democracy Party (GDP) appears to have maintained its independence. The formation of the party was supported by the murdered political analyst Kem Ley. However, it polled only 1.11% of the vote in 2018. Other parties include the League for Democracy Party (4.86%) and The (3.35%). Respondents in AT interviews presented mixed assessments of these parties’ independence.

The most meaningful opposition remains the remnants of the outlawed CNRP, or new expressions of the SRP and HRP separately. A combined opposition would remain a potent threat to the government if it was allowed to contest elections; however, the splintering of the CNRP’s leadership may provide an opportunity for long overdue emergence of new political leadership.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS Cambodian CSOs have been built from the ground up, often with foreign assistance, since the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992-1993. CSOs include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Buddhist institutions, trade unions and media associations. CSOs in the provision sphere are viewed as important service delivery partners, but do not enjoy much influence on policy.92 On the other hand, human rights organizations are viewed as hostile, and as allied to the opposition, and have been targeted for judicial and other repression throughout the post UNTAC period.93

As of 2016, there were almost 5,000 NGOS/Associations registered in Cambodia.94 In Phnom Penh there are more than 10 NGO networks operating, including the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia and the NGO Forum. There are twenty NGO networks operating in the provinces, though their reputations and ability to operate and function effectively is mixed.

Although NGOs have been targeted by the government since UNTAC, the AT found the operating environment for human rights organizations in particular to be significantly squeezed by government repression in the post 2013 elections context. Many, though not all, KII respondents saw this repression as different from previous periods of repression and easing. High profile organizations and NGO activists reported a restricted environment, including the arrest of the five human rights organizers from ADHOC (known as the ADHOC 5), forcing these organizations to find new ways to operate, or to carry on operating as normal but under greater surveillance. The national Human Rights Commission is a CPP led

91 Hutt, David. “Will Sam Rainsy Make His Last Stand in Cambodia?” The Diplomat, 15 February 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/will-sam-rainsy-make-his-last-stand-in-cambodia/ 92 Cooperation Committee for Cambodia. “CSO Engagement”, http://www.ccc-cambodia.org/en/what-we-do/multi-stakeholder- engagement-and-inclusive-partnership/cso-engagement 93 The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. “Civic Freedom Monitor: Cambodia”, 13 December 2018, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/cambodia.html 94 Cooperation Committee for Cambodia. “CSO Engagement”, http://www.ccc-cambodia.org/en/what-we-do/multi-stakeholder- engagement-and-inclusive-partnership/cso-engagement

43 and funded body. As such it lacks independence and is negatively perceived by rights’ activists who view the Commission as a sham.

CBOs have emerged as strong advocates for their rights in Cambodia, particularly in connection to land dispossession. Groups such as the Boeung Kak Lake activists and networks such as the Prey Lang Community Network have had a noticeable impact on the national discourse around issues such as displacement and forest conversion. The Boeung Kak Lake activists are indicative of the strong role women have played as grassroots activists. Like human rights organizations, they too suffer having been targeted by the government. Separately, villagers told of the difficulties in gathering to discuss community and other issues.

In the current environment, given all the restrictions on NGOs highlighted in this report, there is little room for organized, independent civil society to emerge. Established NGOs and smaller community groups told of the difficulty in operating. Gatherings of more than a few people at any time can be designated as a protest or require permission. This raises the importance of maintaining support for those organizations who can operate, even in a restricted way, to ensure that gains are not completely lost.

INDEPENDENT UNIONS Independent unions emerged in late 1990s as strong voice for workers’ rights. Prominent union members such as aligned themselves with Sam Rainsy. Chea was killed as a result. In 2013 the unions were pivotal in organizing the protests for higher wages and better conditions that coalesced with CNRP rallies after the election. In the post-2013 election climate, union activity was severely repressed, and a number of union leaders were imprisoned and harassed through the courts, with many of the cases ongoing at the time of writing. Together with restrictions on union activity placed on them by the LANGO and the Trade Union Law, it makes it difficult to conduct their normal activities, and coordinate workers’ demands. In response to these union activities during early part of the 2010s, the government increased its overtures to workers and promotion of pro-government unions (known as yellow unions) in order to channel avenues for workers to raise issues. The recent ‘mushrooming’ of CPP-supported unions is widely regarded as an attempt at government suppression of the one remaining independent union.

WOMEN Cambodian women have the highest labor force participation rate (LFPR) in the region at 79.7 percent, but a gender gap remains (the male LFPR is 89.1 percent). Three sectors account for 89 percent of all women’s employment: (1) agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (66.3 percent); (2) wholesale and retail trade and services (12.7 percent); and (3) manufacturing (10.3 percent). For men, these sectors account for 75 percent of employment, indicating that women’s employment is more concentrated95. Regarding women’s involvement in the public sector, the situation in 2018 does not indicate real progress in gender parity. The Cambodian Constitution guarantees women the same political rights as men, but in practice women in 2018 continue to confront systemic gender discrimination96 and still struggle to fully participate in

95 Asian Development Bank (ADB): ADB Gender Strategy in Cambodia 2014-2018: Gender Analysis Summary. URL https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cps-cam-2014-2018-ga.pdf Retrieved 01.07.2019 96 Cambodian Center for Human Rights 2013. Policy Brief: Women’s Political Representation in Cambodia. P.4 Phnom Penh Cambodian Center for Human Rights. URL: https://cchrcambodia.org/index_old.php?url=media/media.php&p=analysis_detail.php&anid=28&id=5

44 political life. At both the national and subnational levels, Cambodian women do not yet hold visible, influential decision-making roles. The ADB 2014-2018 Gender Analysis Summary notes; …while the proportion of female civil servants increased from 32 percent in 2007 to 35 percent in 2012, the proportion of women elected to the National Assembly decreased from 22.0 percent in 2008 to 20.3 percent in 2013 (25 of 123 seats). Following the 2013 local elections where women within the CNRP had the genuine opportunity for advancement, the subsequent rollback on democratic progress has also negatively impacted Cambodian women. Observational data indicates that women in 2018 are less inclined to take part in political activities or parties favoring lower-risk opportunities in the private sector. The fact that so few women lead civil society organizations indicates that challenges to ascension also remain in this sector.

YOUTH Youth, defined as an age group between 15 and 30 years old, makes up 33 percent of the population [MOEYS, National Policy on Development of Cambodian Youth]. This represents a significant young political and economic force. An estimated 300,000 young Cambodians [UNCT’s Common Advocacy Point, 201197] enter the labor market every year, but often they do not have the required skills to meet the needs of the labor market. Outmigration for unskilled and skilled labor is growing among youth and estimated to be approaching 2 million migrants per year seeking better opportunities in Thailand, , Japan and Korea. Education reform is needed to equip young people with relevant education and skills.

Cambodia has the largest youth population in the region with nearly 49 percent of the total population defined as youth.98 Increasing patterns of migration, high levels of internet usage, and improvements in living standards all separate Cambodian youth from the experience of their parents and grandparents. The current generation has witnessed and participated in periods of democratic easing and has direct experience with multi-party democracy (in the Cambodian context). They have greater expectations with regard to government accountability and knowledge of their rights, compared with older Cambodians. These changes in attitude in combination with the large youth vote in 2013 and 2017 elections in part account for the CPPs increased investment in the Youth Federation and other similar programs to attract youth participation and party loyalty. The Youth Federation, in particular, seems to target university- educated youth indicating the party’s interest in recruiting the ‘best and brightest’ as they prepare for careers in the public sector. As detailed elsewhere in the assessment, observational data indicates that Youth Federation membership has less to do with actual party loyalty and more to do with the benefits such membership confers. In rural communities, the Youth Federation may be the only sponsor of a soccer team and its sole social event convener. Scarves, pins and other tokens of membership are given to youth who participate in the Federation. If presented with alternatives, the team believes that youth can be encouraged to participate in clubs, activities, and teams that support democratic principles.99

97United Nations. ‘Support to the Royal Government of Cambodia to deliver evidence-based Drug Dependence Detoxification, Treatment and Aftercare for people who use drugs.’ UN Common View Point: July 2011. https://cambodia.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Promotional-materials- soft/Annex%209_UNCT%20Common%20View%20Point%202011.pdf Accessed 12.27.2018 98 UNFPA Cambodia Youth Fact Sheet 2015 URL: https://cambodia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub- pdf/Flyer_Cambodia_Youth_Factsheet_final_draft_%28approved%29.pdf Accessed January 16, 2019. 99 One reviewer noted that the business community is another potentially important, independent actor. The reviewer noted that the Cambodian Federation of Employers and Business Associations (CAMFEBA) has lobbied vigorously for certain liberal reforms and that international brands that buy from Cambodia have also proven a crucial ally

45 STEP 3: USAID’S OPERATIONAL/ PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENT

In the period leading up to the 2017 National election (2013-7), USAID invested heavily in traditional DRG activities in support and development of multi-party elections. To that end, USAID partnered with the National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), and International Federation of Election Systems (IFES) to build political party capacity. Following the expulsion of NDI from Cambodia as part of the widely publicized reaction to a purported ‘color revolution’ and Hun Sen’s suppression of the political opposition after their 2017 electoral gains, the United State government responded with several steps (as detailed below) to register U.S. objection to these anti-democratic actions. In turn, USAID recalibrated its DRG portfolio to comply with USG policy and to support new, and emerging voices in Cambodia. These programs sought to engage youth, women and civil society as the democratic space continued to close in Cambodia. In this regard, USAIDs portfolio of disparate activities in fact provides a vital lifeline to civil society under attack by its own government.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA

The Administration and the 115th Congress took decisive steps in response to Hun Sen’s 2017 suppression of the political opposition including:

• In November 2017, the Trump Administration withdrew $1.8 million in planned technical assistance to the National Election Committee (NEC).

• The Senate passed S.Res. 279 on November 16, 2017, urging the Department of the Treasury to consider blocking the assets of senior Cambodian government officials implicated in the suppression of democracy and human rights abuses.

• On December 12, 2017, the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on U.S. policy options to promote democracy and .

• In December 2017, the Trump Administration announced that the U.S. government would ‘restrict entry into the United States of those individuals involved in undermining democracy in Cambodia.’100 In August 2018, in response to the National Assembly election, the Administration announced that it would ‘expand’ the restrictions.

• Pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which implemented the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Section 1261 of P.L. 114-328), in June 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Cambodian General Hing Bun Hieng, commander of Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit, ‘for being the leader of an entity involved in serious human rights abuses.’31 Sanctioned

100 Walsh, Eric and Prak Chan Thul. U.S. to deny visas to Cambodians over opposition crackdown. Reuters. December 6, 2017 URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cambodia-visas/u-s-to-deny-visas-to-cambodian-officials-over-opposition- crackdown-idUSKBN1E02LF.

46 individuals are denied entry into the United States, and any assets that they hold in the United States are blocked.

• The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), enacted on March 23, 2018, imposes conditions upon U.S. assistance to the Government of Cambodia related to democracy and regional security. The act mandates funds for democracy programs and ‘programs in the Khmer language to counter the influence of the People’s Republic of China in Cambodia.101

In 2018, relations between the U.S. and Cambodia have continued to worsen. In response to these actions, Cambodia has further distanced itself from the U.S. and strengthened its alignment with China. For example, the Cambodian government responded with the 2017 indefinite postponement of the Seabees (the U.S. Navy Mobile Construction Battalion) without an explanation despite eight years of cooperation and more than $5 million in community service projects throughout the country.102

USAID PRIORITIES, INTERESTS, AND RESOURCES

For the past quarter century, USAID programming in Cambodia has promoted human rights, supported democratic institutions, and strengthened the role of women and youth in the political process. USAID has worked with the government and political parties - both those in power and those not - to enfranchise all of Cambodia's citizens. Recent Cambodian government actions have dramatically altered the operating environment for USAID programming. Fearing electoral losses in the run up to the July election, the government harassed and intimidated CSOs, passed several restrictive new laws intended to constrain freedoms of speech and association, shuttered independent media, negated the results of the 2013 national and 2017 local elections by forcibly dissolving the leading opposition party, and launched an unprecedented campaign of anti-American propaganda designed to preemptively delegitimize the U.S. Government's goals, activities, and popularity among the Cambodian people.

These events required USAID/Cambodia to reconsider its Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS), which was approved for the period of May 2014-April 2019. Based on a mid-course stocktaking in 2016, findings from the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) development process, portfolio reviews, and ongoing U.S. Government consultations, amendments were made to Development Objectives (DO) 1 and 3 to better align with the operating environment and USG strategy. With these amendments, USAID extended its CDCS for another 18 months. The principal goal of amended DO 1 is to reorient USG DRG programming from improving political competition and electoral accountability to an enhanced focus on strengthening democracy and governmental accountability and promoting fundamental freedoms.

Following 2017 commune elections, USAID issued a statement commenting that government action was:

…politically motivated and represents a deliberate attempt by the Government of Cambodia to deny Cambodia's second largest party - which received 44 percent of the

101 Congressional Research Service, Cambodia: Background and U.S. Relations, December 14, 2018 Pp.5-8 URL: https://crsreports.congress.gov R44037 102 Hul Reaksmey, ‘Cambodia Scraps U.S. Aid Program, accepts $150M from China,’ VOA, April 7, 2017; Matthew Burke, ‘Cambodia Kicks Out Navy Seabees with No Explanation,’ Stars and Stripes, April 5, 2017.

47 vote in the June 2017 commune elections - the right to participate in the country's 2018 National Elections. The Cambodian government's disenfranchisement of millions of its citizens undermines fundamental principles of democracy and rule of law and endangers Cambodia's economic prosperity and international standing.103

In a sharp turn away from its historical partnership with the government of Cambodia, the United States government took a firm stance against the CPP. This did not prevent further backsliding, and the July 2018 parliamentary elections were deemed neither free nor fair. USAID and the United States Department of State indicated that the failure to represent the will of the Cambodian people represented the most dramatic setback to democracy as enshrined in Cambodia’s own Constitution.

Despite these major challenges in the programming environment, USAID continued to offer meaningful support to civil society during a critical period of closing space by calibrating focus on investment in emerging voices, including those of Cambodian women and youth, human rights programming, labor rights, countering human trafficking (C-TIP), empowerment of marginalized communities, promotion of effective entrepreneurship, and programs in support of healing and reconciliation for victims of , as well as protection for the fundamental freedoms monitoring project of the International Center for Not-for- Profit Law (ICNL) and Solidarity Center.

The amended DO 1 is to strengthen credible voices to promote fundamental democratic principles and human rights in Cambodia. These voices include a range of non-government enterprises and organizations. This support aims to help citizens effectively formulate and channel their demands for government accountability and policy changes across a range of sectors, including human rights, the environment, economic and social policy, and education. The development of these fundamental skills, particularly among women, youth, business groups, and marginalized segments of the population, aims to leave Cambodians better prepared to engage effectively in competitive politics when that is possible again. This engagement will also go a great distance toward maintaining U.S. legitimacy and popularity among Cambodian citizens by championing the issues they care the most about.

THE ENVIRONMENT FOR DRG PROGRAMMING Cambodia, as part of the USG’s broader objectives to introduce its new Indo-Pacific Strategy, might best be understood as a bellwether country within the Greater Mekong context. In this regard, Cambodia’s democratic regression coupled with deteriorating bilateral relations with the United States and closer ties to China, offer a portal into a new strategic calculation for the region. In particular, regional security is increasingly linked to access, contestation and claims to the South China Sea. These issues are likely to garner greater attention in the coming years and the heightened risk for conflict between China and Vietnam is observed within Cambodia. The team observes that Cambodia’s enhanced economic and political ties with China both increase Cambodia’s risk to external shocks and those within the region. For this reason, we strongly encourage that diplomatic channels remain open and that USAID and its development partners seek avenues for constructive engagement with the government of Cambodia. To

103 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Spokesperson Clayton McCleskey. Statement of the Dissolution of the Principal Opposition Party in the Kingdom of Cambodia. November 17, 2018. URL: https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/nov-17-2017-statement-spokesperson-dissolution-principal-opposition- party-cambodia USAID Office of Press Relations. Accessed January 7, 2019.

48 disengage entirely from the government at this juncture is to invite a number of unintended consequences not only for Cambodia but for its neighbors. Cambodia still has significant growth challenges including upgrading infrastructure, improving agriculture, and moving the garment sector up the value chain. China has made it clear it has both the financial and technical resources Cambodia needs to achieve its economic growth goals. Absent the US and EU and other Western partners, Cambodia will increasingly look to China for support. The Mekong countries are rapidly transforming but all still need U.S. support albeit in new and different forms. For the U.S. to maintain influence in the region, Cambodia should not be dismissed as a country of low strategic value to the United States.

The team finds that the current period represents democratic backsliding rather than progress. Donors and civil society organizations alike are reporting new challenges in the project approval process, which already is quite burdensome and subject to delay. Notably, the Ministry of Interior’s (MoI) decree requiring all NGOs to seek a 3-day pre-approval to carry out activities was a significant setback for small community- based organizations that carry out localized service provision and activities. As documented in this assessment, media closures, arrest and detention of CSO leaders and rights defenders, dissolution of the CNRP, and ‘rule by law’ all present challenges to reform. During the field research period of this assessment, the MOI issued a letter that claims to remove the advance notice decree. A wide range of civil society actors, political analysts, and business owners placed little faith in the letter’s promise of greater freedom to carry out activities.

Multilateral donors, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have played an essential role in promoting good governance reforms in Cambodia. As examples, the World Bank’s Demand for Good Governance Project104 and the ADB’s Decentralized Public Service and Financial Management Sector Development Program105 worked with the RGC to support the Cambodian government’s Rectangular Strategy and National Program for Sub- National Democratic Development 2010-2019 respectively, to foster responsive government and to improve national and sub-national accountability and service delivery. This included measures such as supporting ‘one-window service’ to streamline citizen-government interaction.106 Success in these initiatives have been mixed, as government structures remain tightly controlled and politicized at the grassroots. Research indicates that accountability programs need electoral accountability measures to succeed.107 Cambodia has not only compromised electoral accountability through flawed elections, but also by vacating the seats of elected CNRP commune council representatives and replacing them with CPP representatives. In this space, it is difficult to advance reform directly, and USAID can best contribute to promoting citizen engagement for good governance programs by promoting eventual democratic engagement through less contentious areas of programming. (The Team details these suggestions in the Recommendations section.)

104 Word Bank, Project Performance Assessment Report: CAMBODIA Demand for Good Governance Project, Report No. 116799. 26 June 2017. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/987321500652281850/pdf/116799-PPAR-P101156- PUBLIC.pdf 105 ADB, Cambodia Gets Funding Boost to Improve Public Service Delivery, 29 August 2016. https://www.adb.org/news/cambodia-gets-funding-boost-improve-public-service-delivery 106 Overseas Development Cambodia, Government Service, 15 December 2015. https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/government-services/ 107 Eng Netra, Vong Mun and Hort Navy, Social Accountability in Service Delivery in Cambodia, CDRI Working Paper Series No. 102, June 2015. https://cdri.org.kh/wp-content/uploads/wp102e.pdf

49 A few illustrative factors explain the current challenges of the Cambodian government and opportunity for reform if it wants to expand cooperation with donors, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and domestic civil society on meaningful governance reforms:

• As suggested earlier in the analysis, the CPP is deeply invested in a centralized government and to that end, no meaningful decentralization has taken place in recent years. Thus, despite investment by donors in efforts to decentralize government, no real progress on decentralized policy reform or public consultation in the reforms the CPP has proposed, has taken place in recent years. Sub- national redundancies and localized corruption (e.g., respondents complained of this when trying to obtain a National ID card or when in need of a localized government service) persists as the modus operandi in Cambodia.

• There is broad acknowledgement that the relative role and influence of U.S.-development assistance, while still of paramount importance in advancing rule of law and human rights, is waning in comparison to Chinese investment that is supporting the government of Hun Sen. This imbalance has implications for Cambodia reversing its democratic regression in the near and mid- term.

• The threat of U.S. sanctions and those of the EUs EBA policy prompted a bellicose response from the government of Cambodia. While much of this response may be rhetorical and designed to project a ‘we don’t need western donors’ view, it has real implications for foreign aid. Donors are now constrained by these sanctions and the CPP may find itself pushed closer to China for technical and economic assistance. In turn, the CPP may find it more difficult to negotiate effectively with the U.S. and its development partners.

Lastly, the team encouraged USAID to consider how best to align programmatic interests with the new Indo-Pacific Strategy so that the U.S. Embassy and Mission can provide complimentary support with the aim of aligning a more strategic vision for U.S. investment in Cambodia and the Mekong sub-region. Countering Chinese encroachment on Cambodian sovereignty serves to advance areas of mutual interest between Cambodia and the United States such as trade, equitable economic growth, and regional peace and stability. At the same time, USAID working in concert with the European Union can exert more pressure for reform if sanctions are mutually reinforcing. Similarly, cooperation on determining a set of realistic reforms that the government of Cambodia can enact together with incentives for these reforms, will allow USAID to set the donor aid agenda. Linking specific reforms to types of foreign aid that advance U.S. interests including upgrading the independent unions’ capacity to negotiate, the advancement of women to leadership roles within Unions, and health and safety improvements may be favorably regarded by the RCG and thus act as an incentive to amend the Law on Unions. The government of Cambodia is more likely act in enlightened self-interest than in fear of international reprisal. Sanctions must be in place (and acted upon if necessary) but the incentives to change behavior relate to Cambodia’s development priorities (such as diversifying the economy).

Despite the challenging and evolving political landscape of Cambodia in 2018, USAID has a vital role to play as civil society’s trusted donor on governance issues and is the best equipped to invest in areas of historical strength: human rights, rule of law (including media), advancement of women into visible, decision-making roles within Cambodian society, longer-term investment in youth through educational

50 opportunities, leadership for change, and safe and responsible use of digital platforms for access to information, freedom of expression and mobilization. If anything, positive can be said to have emerged from the recent decline in democracy, it is greater appreciation of and demand for USAIDs support of civil society in Cambodia. While there is always the long-term list of donor dependency, the short and medium-term need to support civil society far outweighs this risk.

51 STEP 4: OUTLINING THE PROPOSED STRATEGY

SUMMARIZING STEPS 1 TO 3: THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

Based on an analysis of Cambodia’s democracy, human rights, and governance challenges (Step 1), a political economy analysis of actors and institutions (Step 2), and consideration of USG and USAID priorities, interests, and resources (Step 3), the team has formulated the following problem statement identifying the core DRG challenge in Cambodia with two interconnected parts:

Political space is closing in Cambodia and civil liberties are being undermined: Since the introduction of electoral democracy in the early 1990s Cambodia’s politics have been characterized by cycles of democratic easing following elections and subsequent authoritarian retrenchment prior to balloting. The dissolution of the CNRP political opposition party, imprisonment and subsequent house arrest of the CNRP leader Kem Sokha, and passage of a series of restrictive laws have codified and solidified the denial of fundamental democratic rights. Prior to the 2018 election, Cambodia’s vibrant civil society organization (CSO) landscape, which was established and has been bolstered with international support since the country opened up in 1992 and 1993, has been the target of regime repression through both formal legal mechanisms and informal means.

Autocratization is facilitated by China: The deepening authoritarian turn of the Executive is being bolstered and emboldened by a coercive regional power. The Cambodian government’s closer economic and political ties to the People's Republic of China acts as an enabler in the process of closing of democratic space. Specifically, Chinese investment in infrastructure and other projects perpetuates status quo political power by concentrating wealth among elites. This undermines economic levers that aim to distribute wealth equitably. Deepening political and military ties between Cambodia and China provide false legitimacy and protection to resist pressure from other international actors and act as counters to democratic pressures from below. This political problem has economic implications. The team regards the foreign investment and trade practice of China to be counter-productive to Cambodia’s journey to self-reliance. As detailed elsewhere in the assessment, the team contends that despite 7 percent GDP growth, the Cambodian economy is at greater risk in 2018 because of its growing dependence on China for investment.

DRG OBJECTIVE

In this period of ‘autocratization’, it is vital to continue to foster democratic advances and prevent the political space from closing further. This requires bolstering independent voices including Cambodian rights-based CSOs, youth, women, and historically marginalized groups as they seek greater accountability from their government. In light of the above problem statement, the AT developed the following DRG

52 objective statement that should undergird USAID’s future DRG strategy and programming in the next CDCS period:

Enhance social capital as a best possible route away from authoritarianism through increased independent youth groups, strengthened CSOs, increased women’s participation in all levels of decision-making, more effective use of digital and social media platforms by these groups, increased understanding of the shortcomings of the China- promoted development model.

In light of the growing global ‘autocratization’ trend,108 this focus should be enhanced and linked to the larger framework we outline in which local program investment align more closely with broader foreign policy considerations in an effort to counter Chinese influence on these emerging and potentially vital target groups. Efforts to mobilize constituencies outside of the formal political realm must underscore recognition that youth, women, and the broader civil society sector have a direct stake in a more democratic form of governance where preferencing a rules-based approach will offer greater benefit to more Cambodians and mitigate risk for conflict.

There are no ‘quick wins’ to advance democracy in Cambodia. Instead, the assessment team offers the following core recommendations that should be considered essential for the design of new programs.

(1) USAID should focus its support on non-state actors. Greater and more targeted investment in CSOs, community organizations, youth, and women should be the focus of this approach. By working with a wider set of non-state reform actors, USAID programs can reduce the possibility that declining political conditions erase historic gains. This is especially critical with regard to past gains in human rights education and civil society development over the past two decades. Existing CSOs play a key role supporting communities and advocating for rights at the local level, particularly in rural areas where poverty is higher, and education is low. USAID should ensure that the progress made in developing robust civil society actors and organizations is not lost under the weight of government repression, while identifying new actors to push for future reform. As noted below, some level of engagement with Cambodian government, particularly with select ministries and at the sub-national level, is encouraged; however, at this time, efforts to work with core government officials, agencies, and institutions will likely be counterproductive given authoritarian control and influence.

(2) Support CSOs that model values of inclusive, democratic leadership. Advancing women to leadership roles, succession planning to bring more youth into leadership, and implementation of external oversight bodies to build transparent and accountable organizations that monitor and assess performance will provide a channel to build the skills and awareness that emerging CSO leaders will need to navigate the political landscape and prepare for potential roles within government in the future. This in turn will enable capable leadership by those outside of the CPP and elite circles.

108 Democracy for All? V-DEM Annual Democracy Report 2018. University of Gothenburg. URL: https://www.v- dem.net/en/news/democracy-all-v-dem-annual-democracy-report-2018/

53 (3) Improve capacity, online safety, and Internet access via mobile phones to keep open a vital space for public discourse and youth mobilization. There is a need to better understand the extent to which Cambodian youth, especially those with modest resources, are harnessing these technologies. Interviews suggest that while a large number of rural youths, migrant youth, and those living in urban poverty, have access to digital technology such as internet and social media, they do not have a good understanding of how to make the best use of these tools. The team encourages greater investment in the promotion of digital literacy, online security, and mobilization among youth and the general population.

(4) Maintain limited relations with Cambodian government officials where possible. Specifically, USAID should support ‘non-political,’ technical engagement with ministries through creation of technical partnerships that contribute to better working relations and goodwill among technical staff in the ministries and with USAID. While we do not recommend extensive government engagement in the current environment, select interaction can (1) achieve some modest service-delivery oriented reform goals in select areas, (2) help identify future reform partners, and (3) ensure US relevance as an alternative to China. Closing diplomatic channels is likely to create a stronger backlash toward civil society, not the CPP as the RGC will be further emboldened to constrain or remove civil liberties. Long-term disengagement from government risks creating a vacuum that other actors will fill. Planning for eventual restoration of cooperation is therefore important.

This engagement can include supporting reforms in the primary education sector, nutrition, and health. USAID can also offer expertise in e-government and ‘one-window’ service, reducing the avenues for corruption in bureaucratic processes. These measures already attract support from the EU and partner governments such as and Sweden. USAID involvement would promote joined-up approaches to engaging with the Cambodian government between partners sharing similar DRG goals whilst allowing USAID to operate within its own policy constraints. This could also include governance programs working on legal, financial and regulatory reform to help deconcentrate economic benefits derived from opaque foreign investment.

(5) Address and challenge Cambodia’s economic and political ties to China: The deepening authoritarian turn of the executive is being bolstered and emboldened by a coercive regional power. The Cambodian government’s closer economic and political ties to the People's Republic of China act as enablers in the process of closing democratic space. Cambodian and U.S. foreign policy considerations are now directly linked to domestic policies in Cambodia and in turn so must foreign aid. CSO publicly express concern about China’s increasing role in Cambodia, but they often lack strong evidence of the negative costs of China’s dominant role. The AT recommends that USAID support evidence-based research that allows CSOs to show a true cost- benefit analysis of Chinese investment in real estate, natural resources, and loans to the RGC.

(6) Align local program planning with international levers of pressure, such as sanctions. Raise the level of cooperation between USAID and its development partners, specifically the EU to ensure that sanctions going forward are targeted, timely, and impactful. USAID should avoid unilateral actions and work with partners including MDBs, INGOs, and donors to send a firm, coherent message regarding restoration of rights in Cambodia. For example, leverage UPR review,

54 International Center for Justice (ICJ) and other bodies to advocate for legal reform. Specifically, the USG should join repeal of restrictive legislation to sanction easement.

DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESES These recommendations correspond with the following development hypothesis:

IF (1) civil society, including traditional organizations and newer groups (i.e., independent youth organizations and women), are strengthened, (2) social media is protected as a venue for free speech and social mobilization, (3) USAID maintains its relevance through non- political, technical reform victories, (4) public research demonstrates the negative impacts of the China model, and (5) sanctions relief is tied to rolling back repressive legislation, THEN social capital built from below and reform pressure from the international community will (a) prevent further backsliding and (b) build a stronger foundation to take advantage of future political openings.

During this time of constriction, USAID will still need to plan for longer-term political transition while maintaining vigilance with regard to the potential for disruptive external shocks from global and regional trade disputes, conflict in the South China Sea, or more localized forms of unrest from security services. While the team does not recognize immediate threats to peace and security, we do suggest USAID undertake a scenario planning exercise to explore several potential outcomes in Cambodia. This foresight exercise would be greatly aided if paired with a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) of the current Cambodian/Chinese bilateral relationship and what it portends in the various potential scenarios. Both exercises might be timed to guide additional input into the upcoming CDCS thus should be undertaken in the mid-term.

ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAMMATIC ACTIVITIES The team strongly encourages USAID to consider the above recommendations for improving DRG, countering further Chinese encroachment of the political and economic arenas, and ensuring that civil society, independent youth groups, and women remain engaged in the longer-term aspiration of building democracy and protecting rights, efficiency, and representation in particular, for halting backsliding and returning Cambodia to the path toward democracy, based on the foregoing analysis:

Opportunities Created for Emerging Domestic Constituencies: Youth and Women (Recommendations 1 and 2)

• Strengthen the capacity of youth groups outside of the CPP-sponsored Youth Federation. Provide financial and capacity building support to alternative youth organizations to conduct activities such as organizing sporting events, providing youth centers, and offering access to English language books and movies.

• Invest in support for groups that can evolve into voices of opposition as space is gradually reopened. We regard Cambodia’s female garment workers, who have become a constituency of note, as an example of how groups outside of the formal political arena (trade unions, in this example) can gain purchase for political reform. For example, introduction of small

55 business associations (SBA) modeled after the United States SBA and targeting women working in the informal sector could offer women an opportunity for deeper engagement, leadership, and access to financial resources that raise their own stake in franchisement.

• Investment in creation of a more level playing field where all youth and not only those with the resources to pay for private education and study abroad, is crucial to ensure that Cambodia improves equality for its citizens. The quality of the young people who will join the labor force coupled with their ability to see a hopeful future in their own country will determine whether Cambodia can take advantage of the demographic bonus period, a one-time opportunity for development. USAID should invest in cross-sector programs such as education reform to include technical schools that offer coding, business, and vocational skills to meet an emerging demand.

• Leadership, technology, and education. Cambodian youth have both an understanding of their rights and expectations as stakeholders in a more democratic future. Youth appear to be the most promising emerging voice in Cambodia and are at risk of co-option by government affiliated and financed organizations such as the UFYC. There is a need to support the creation of innovative opportunities that encourage youth to invest in Cambodia instead of seeking opportunities through migration. Similarly, women are already successful small business owners, garment workers, and activists but often lack access to tools that will elevate small business owners to successful entrepreneurship, Union organizers, and visible CSO leaders.

• Improve the digital literacy and online safety of youth; USAID should invest in providing access to coding classes to address these issues while also investing in skill development that will prepare youth to occupy skilled employment and spur local entrepreneurship that can provide an alternative to migration. USAID Tech Challenges in Thailand may offer an instructive model for Cambodian youth and counter government incursion into this space. Engaging youth to combat fake news propagation would upgrade their capacity to discern real and fake news while not directly challenging the government.

• Establish English language clubs, debates, model UN, scholarships, regional exchanges, and movies; cultural and sports activities; to provide much needed alternatives to youth federation expansion. Launch these activities in areas where marginalized communities live (urban and rural).

• Support issue-based research and coalitions including CSOs, community-based organizations, policy/think tanks and academics to improve the frequency and quality of policy debate at the frontlines of work on Cambodia’s most urgent economic, social and environmental issues. The coalitions should establish linkages with specific development objectives to channel societal voices and provide evidence and alternatives viewpoints on government performance in those priority areas. Encourage regional symposia to build regional cooperation on issues of mutual concern (democratic backsliding, environmental degradation and regulatory reform, social accountability). Support a working group to provide comprehensive, regional legal review to build the case against encroaching authoritarianism as manifest in laws regarding digital privacy and security, , and freedom of expression. We think that creation of a regional

56 working group may prove most effective, as it would allow Cambodian legal and CSO experts to compare laws with their counterparts. This could provide protection to Cambodian researchers, as it would regionalize the research, while also countering China’s regional influence.

• Partner with U.S. technology and business leaders to offer women and youth entrepreneurial and vocational mentoring. This should include digital literacy, online safety, and leadership training. Provide opportunities for regional exchange with women business leaders in Vietnam and Thailand. Support informal women business owner associations modeled on Chambers of Commerce to foster networking and mentorship. The USAID/CISCO technology training centers in and elsewhere may provide a useful model for Cambodian women, particularly tech-savvy younger women and girls. A ‘girls Code’ club would offer hard skills that align with regional and global demand.

Strengthened CSOs and Mobilized Social Capital (Recommendations 2 and 3)

One of the main consequences of the CPPs dominance of all levels of political life is that it is now more challenging for community-based organizations that serve local interests to operate effectively. For example, ADHOC and LICADHO as well as CCHR have the local networks that enable them to provide the timely, small grants that young activists seek for new advocacy channels. This includes use of social media to disseminate videos such as those that show the ways in which government is failing to provide basic services such as waste management. The distribution of this support to activists and CBOs will ensure that funds reach emerging voices of youth while maintaining the important role of legacy rights organizations that continue to offer mentorship and guidance. These organizations remain the backbone of human rights education and advocacy training. They often act as a bridge to commune and village leaders thus prioritization of continued support for legacy rights organizations should continue. At the same time, CSO support could be improved with USAID conditioning future support for CSOs on improvements delineated in this assessment such as incorporation of gender sensitive policies (e.g., greater inclusion of women in leadership roles and succession plans).

• Support organizational planning that includes concrete leadership succession plan, digital literacy and online security training for staff, and diversification of funding models to advance toward self-reliance. Promotion of more women into leadership roles, targeted outreach to youth using tools that resonate with the emerging generation of activists (messaging apps, video, social media), and security training will encourage greater participation in CSOs.

• Increase support for National Democratic Institute’s (in absentia) work with CSO leaders including transnational programs to deepen regional networks, formation of digital ‘civic space’ and repository for secure engagement on human rights and ROL considerations encourage development of a digital platform approach that will engage women and youth using social media for advocacy training and lobbying efforts using a secure app.

• Restart investment in Journalism and support non-traditional media platforms: enhance skills with social media, digital literacy, online safety, and secure ways to access and disseminate information; create a network, platform, or apps for connecting journalists; upgrade

57 journalism skills through capacity building on more critical analysis of foreign policy and security issues to counter outside/regional powers’ influence. This could include weekly policy digest, documentary shorts, and photo essays to engage a wider Cambodian audience. USAID should promote informed and responsible use, consumption, and development of social and independent media platforms. USAID and partner countries need to work together to consider the media environment in Cambodian governance and efforts to improve rule of law and government accountability. USAID could partner with Facebook, now eager to improve its image and prevent repetition of misuse of its platform to propagate hate (as in Myanmar), and already approaching NDI to partner to upgrade safe and responsible use of social media in Cambodia.

• Assist with assessment of environmental and social protection safeguards (SES) as a key opportunity to account for local voices in public infrastructure projects and challenge Chinese ‘no strings’ attached investment. This could include support for regional expert group on SES to conduct research, consultation, and offer policy recommendations to the Ministry of Environment and allow Cambodia the opportunity to show positive leadership on an issue of regional concern.

• Provide legal training to enhance community forest patrols; USAID support for forest patrols have proved effective in combating forest loss and wildlife trafficking. Indigenous groups interviewed by the AT expressed the need for better legal training to increase the impact of their work. This would provide protection in their activities. USAID has strong partners with experience providing training on law and rights, already able to fulfil this role in building local legal capacity. Use of new technology could place a digital, legal compendium in the hands of these mobile patrol units for immediate access.

Improved Social Accountability Mechanisms through Conditional Re-engagement with Sub-National Government and Select Ministries

• Upgrade the capacity of the National Volunteer Network (NVN) by supporting community facilitation skills training and effective management and use of a social accountability E-platform maintained by CSOs to monitor sub-national government performance.

• Encourage CSO partners to advocate for access to government data on service provision at the sub-national level particularly in the less-controversial areas of water, sanitation, health and hygiene (WASH). The Ministry of Interior holds these data sets, but they could be made available on the social accountability platform and used by the existing Joint Action Acting Committees. This action could also serve as a confidence building measure (CBM) to begin to build trust in local government’s capacity for transparency and service provision.

• Partner with the EU to restart momentum on primary education reform. The Education minister is regarded as reform-minded and both the Prime Minister and his Deputy have indicated support for devolving power to the provincial governor for primary education. USAID can support CSO mobilization to demonstrate local-demand for this important first step in education reform.

58 • Support CSO inclusion in social accountability and public oversight of Asian Development Bank (ADB) new sub-national investment facilities to ensure public consultation in municipal-level infrastructure decisions. USAID should invest in addressing skill- gaps that might limit the efficacy of this initiative. CSOs should play a constructive role convening stakeholder consultation and leading efforts to inform local communities on the potential benefits and costs to locally financed infrastructure and energy projects.

Chinese Economic and Political Influence Challenged (Recommendation 5)

Cambodia’s deepening relationship with China is raising significant questions as to its ability to operate independently in the ASEAN region. The experiences of China’s other development partners in places such as Sri Lanka109 demonstrate that there is no such thing as ‘no-strings attached’ Chinese aid. USAID can contribute to promoting informed debate on the benefits and risks of over reliance on one development partner with its own geostrategic interest.

• Support policy research that equip Cambodian academics and development practitioners with the information to make independent policy recommendations, including facilitating the transnational exchange of ideas between Cambodian scholars and policy- makers tackling similar development problems, issuance of policy briefs and support of symposia to share learning. Engage civil society to become part of the policy-making process in order to promote the input of those willing to make an evidence-based case in favor of Cambodia’s interests.

• Support next-generation knowledge and learning about the Paris Peace Accords as a cornerstone to peace and stability in Cambodia. This could involve the use of animation, social media campaigns, sponsorship for youth history projects, and study groups to reignite interest into the accords.

International Pressure for Reform (Recommendation 6)

International pressure and follow through on both U.S. and EU sanctions are symbolic and practical tools. The USAID toolkit could be broadened to include cooperation with the World Bank, Swedish Development Agency (SIDA), and EU to encourage more progress on the I-SAF.110 reforms to increase social accountability, especially at the sub-national level. The government of Cambodia has rhetorically committed to continuing key aspects of its ‘General Mandate111 decentralization policy within which USAID could play a leading and constructive role if specific conditions are met to signal genuine commitment to enhancing social accountability at the sub-national level. R For this to take place, the team

109 is cited but China’s problematic ODA model is well documented in Africa and Latin America. See: https://www.odi.org/comment/10700-china-and-international-development-six-things-read-october and https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/are-ties-with-china-paying-off-for-latin-america/ 110 Asian Development Bank, Provincial Water Supply and Sanitation Project: Initial Poverty and Social Analysis (Ipsa), Cambodia. November 2015. URL: https://www.adb.org/projects/documents/cam-provincial-water-supply-and-sanitation-project-ipsa, Accessed January 15, 2019 111 Ferrazzi, Gabriel and Rodhewohld, Rainier. (2017). Emerging Practices in Intergovernmental Functional Assignment pp.81-87. New York, New York. Routledge.

59 recommends that certain conditions be met. These recommendations go beyond USAID’s manageable interest alone and are directed at US policy makers more broadly.

• A timeframe on repeal of the LANGO, Law of Telecommunications and Privacy Law, as well as those laws discouraging political participation, freedom of expression, and media censure (as detailed in other sections of this assessment);

• Increase pressure on government of Cambodia for reinstatement of political opposition as a precondition for USAID support and critical step in building momentum for the 2023 National Elections. Consider reinstatement of support for NEC if restructured to include independently nominated and appointed CSO members and term limits.

• End targeting and intimidation of civil society leaders who have successfully advocated for greater inclusion and human rights; finally, reinstatement of some opposition Parliamentary members as a concrete measure of good faith in a multiparty political system.

The changes underway in Cambodia’s political economy at the domestic and international levels will have far reaching consequences for the Cambodian people. However, even during this period of closing space, it is clear to the Assessment Team that the Cambodian people have made a clear choice between a democratic system underwritten by rule of law that promotes equitable development and a winner takes all autocracy in which development gains are not shared. The choice is resoundingly in favor of the former. The historical support of development partners such as USAID has been fundamental to this important result.

The AT deems it imperative that the steps Cambodia has made toward democracy, such as its vibrant CSO sector that is made up of a broad network of dedicated activists, the independent journalists who have come of age since UNTAC, and new emerging voices keen to find a role in promoting their community interests, need continued support to prevent loss of these advances and encourage Cambodia to return to the path toward democracy.

60 ANNEXES

ANNEX A: DONOR MATRIX

Table A1: USAID DRG Projects in Cambodia

Organization Name Project Name Start Date End Date Arbitration Council Foundation (ACF) Upholding Labor Rights for Women and Men in Cambodia 06/16/2015 09/30/2018

Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR) Protecting Fundamental Freedoms Project 10/01/2014 09/30/2019

Cambodian Human Rights and Development Empowering Marginalized Communities 12/11/2014 12/10/2020 Association Consortium for Elections and Political Process Str Cambodia Elections Management Project (CEMP) 03/22/2017 03/21/2019

Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) Development Innovations 08/07/2013 08/06/2019 Eastwest Management Institute Inc Cambodian Civil Society Strengthening (CCSS) 06/27/2016 06/26/2021 Media One We are the Same 03/18/2016 03/17/2020 National Democratic Institute Cambodia Democratic Reforms (CDR) Program 11/18/2015 09/30/2019 Khmer Vulnerability Aid Organization (KVAO) Returnee Integration Support Center 10/01/2014 09/30/2024

Transcultural Psychosocial Organization Cambodia Healing and Reconciliation for Victims of Torture of the 08/15/2016 08/14/2019 Khmer Rouge Trauma Veterans International Cambodia (VIC) Rehabilitation and Prosthetics Program for Persons 06/12/2015 12/31/2018 Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Cambodia Countering Trafficking-In-Persons (CTIP) 09/25/2015 09/30/2019

Cambodian Civil Society Partnership Community Leadership Empowerment Program (CLEP) 10/01/2018 09/30/2021

Gender and Development for Cambodia Collective Action to Support Women’s Rights (CASWR) 11/01/2018 07/31/2021

61 SILAKA Commune Level Organized Service and Engagement Gender 08/01/2018 11/30/2020 Advancement Program (CLOSE-GAP) Sovann Phoum Organization Cambodia Countering Trafficking-in-Persons Through 08/15/2018 08/14/2021 Economic Empowerment (CTIPE+) Transparency International Cambodia (TI Cambodia) Women and Youth Empowerment in Leadership (WYEL) 11/01/2018 10/31/2021 Activity Freedom House, Inc. Promoting Entrepreneurship and Constructive Civic 08/15/2018 08/14/2023 Engagement in Cambodia Documentation Center of Cambodia Documentation Center of Cambodia- Endowment 08/30/2005 09/22/2024 Family Health International 360 DCHA's Civil Society Sustainability Index (CSOSI) 10/01/2017 09/30/2022 NORC at the University of Chicago Impact Evaluation of Cambodia Democratic Reforms Program 10/01/2013 09/30/2021

NORC at the University of Chicago Democracy Rights and Governance Assessment (MSI) 08/15/2018 08/15/2019

62 Table A2: DRG by Donor and Number of Projects in Cambodia

Sector Donor Number of Projects Total Number Economic and Development ADB 2 31 Policy/Planning Australia 1 4 Germany 2 Japan 4 Sweden 8 Switzerland 2 UDNP 2 UNFPA 4 USA 2 Elections China 1 8 EU/EC 2 Japan 3 Switzerland 2 Human Rights Canada 1 32 1 EU/EC 7 Germany 1 Sweden 8 UK 3 USA 11 Legal and Judicial Australia 2 11 EU/EC 1 France 1 Japan 2 Sweden 2 Switzerland 1

63 UK 1 USA 1 Local Government Reform Canada 1 19 EU/EC 6 Germany 4 Japan 3 Sweden 1 Switzerland 2 World Bank 2 Public Financial Management ADB 2 15 EU/EC 4 Japan 2 Sweden 5 Switzerland 1 USA 1 Public Service Reform ADB 3 8 Australia 1 China 1 Japan 1 Sweden 1 UNDP 1 Civil Society EU/EC 2 11 Sweden 4 USA 5

64

ANNEX B: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP LIST

Competition and Government Political Rule of Law and Responsiveness and Category Consensus Inclusion Accountability Human Rights Effectiveness

Color Code

Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location Think Tank/Academic Mr. Ou Virak Think Tank* Tel: 012 404 051 Future Forum Policy Director Phnom Penh Mail:

Mr. Lam Socheat Advocacy and Democratic and social Think Tank Tel: Policy Institute development, policy Director Phnom Penh Mail: (API) research and advocacy Mr. Meas Nee Independent Think Tank* Tel: 012 751 421 (WhatsApp) Policy Political Analyst Phnom Penh Political Analyst Mail:

Ms. Netra Eng Cambodian Development Think Tank* Tel: Policy, Economics Researcher Phnom Penh Resource Institute Mail: CDRI

Ms. Channsitha Mark Royal University of Academic Political Economy Professor Phnom Penh Tel: Phenom Penh

65 Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location Mail: Cambodian Institute for Dr. Sovachana Pou Cooperation and Academic Tel: Peace (CICP)/ Policy Professor Phnom Penh Mail: Pannasastra University of Cambodia (PUC) Mr. Mark Grimsditch Academic/Researc Independent Financial Ind. Research – mostly Tel: Independent Phnom Penh her* Institutions (IFI) IFI. Mail:

Academic/Govern H.E. Ambassador Pou Sothirak Executive Director at CICP Policy Phnom Penh ments* Executive Director of CICP CICP

Mr. Ok Serei Sopheak Formerly of Academic/Researc Transparency Policy/Good Tel: 012 815 302 Former TI Phnom Penh her* International (TI). Governance Mail: [email protected] Now unaffiliated

Civil Society Organizations Mr. Soeng Sen Karuna Tel: 016 662 645 CSO Mail: ADHOC Human Rights Phnom Penh senkarunasoeng@adhoccamb odia.org

66

Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location Mr. Thun Saray Director. Has fled to CSO (is in Canada Tel: ADHOC Human Rights Canada but we can Canada but can Skype) * Mail: Skype. Skype: Mr. Pen Bonnar Tel: 016 383 777 Senior Programs CSO ADHOC Land Rights Phnom Penh Mail: Officer. [email protected] rg Human Representative of CSO* Ms. Wan-Hea Lee OHCHR Phnom Penh Rights/Elections OHCHR Cambodia CSO Mr. Son Saly OHCHR Human Rights OHCHR officer. Phnom Penh Ms. Chak Sopheap CCHR Tel: 011 943 213 Cambodian Center CSO* Mail: for Human Rights Human Rights Rights defenders Phnom Penh chaksopheap@cchrcambodia. (CCHR) org Mr. Vann Sophath, Land Reform Land Reform Project CSO Tel: Land Rights Phnom Penh Project (CCHR) Coordinator Mail: Sexual Orientation and Gender SOGI Programme CSO* Mr. Nuon Sidara Human Rights Phnom Penh Identity (SOGI) Coordinator Programme CCHR

67 Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location Dr. Kek Galabru (Pung Chhiv Kek) President of President of CSO* Human Rights Canada/Phnom Penh Tel: 066 728 445 LICADHO LICADHO Mail: licadhohotmail.gmail.com Former Director of Ms. Naly Pilorge Former Director LICADHO. Still leads CSO* Tel: 012 214 454 (WhatApp) of LICADHO Human Rights on a lot of Phnom Penh Mail: [email protected] (daughter of Kek) programmes. (daughter of Kek) – Mr. Mathieu Pellerin LICADHO Human Rights/Land LICADHO consultant CSO Tel: 012 426 787 Phnom Penh Consultant Rights/Security Sector since mid-2000s Mail: [email protected] Mr. Brad Adams/Phil Human Rights Human Rights/Security CSO* Director, Asia. Berkeley, California Robertson Watch Sector CSO Mr. Phil Robertson HRW Human Rights Deputy Director/Asia

Human Rights Watch – CSO (Bangkok) Ms. Almaz Teffera Human Rights Formerly of ADHOC Bangkok Cambodia Researcher

International Labor CSO (Bangkok) TBC Labor Name to be confirmed Bangkok Organization

Better factories CSO Esther Germans Labor Programme Manager Phnom Penh Cambodia

68

Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location

Mr. Meun Tola Central – Center Executive Director. Tel: 012 921 961 (WhatApp) for Alliance of Human Rights/Labor CSO* Recently charged by Phnom Penh Labor and Human Rights Mail: direct@central- gov. Charges dropped. cambodia.org Rights Commitment for Free and Fair Mr. Kuol Panha CSO* Elections in Elections Director Bangkok? Skype: kpanha Cambodia (COMFREL) Mr. Kol Preap Transparency Tel: 012 877 833 CSO* International Corruption Executive Director Phnom Penh Mail: Cambodia [email protected]

Mr. Sereyrotha Ken Wildlife Land/Forest CSO Tel: Conservation Country Director Phnom Penh governance Mail: Society Mr. Oudom Ham Earth Rights Hydropower/land Researcher/campaign Chiang Mai/Bangkok/ CSO/Activist Tel: International (ERI) rights organizer Phnom Penh? Mail:

Ms. Chhay Chhunly Women’s human Research/Advocacy CSO* Tel: Rights Defenders for Women’s legal Project Director Phnom Penh Mail: (WHRD) Project rights Ms. Thida Khus Public participation in CSO* Tel: 012 838 464 SILKAKA Executive Director Phnom Penh governance Mail: [email protected]

69 Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location

Ms. Ros Sopheap Gender and CSO Tel: 012 627 857 Development for Gender President Phnom Penh Mail: [email protected] Cambodia *Recently charged by Mr. Eang Vuthy Gov. Of Cambodia. EC Equitable CSO* Tel: Human Rights was suspended in 2017 Phnom Penh Cambodia (EC) Mail: but allowed to return to work in 2018.

Celine Martin Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, CSO Tel: Destination Justice Programme Manager Phnom Penh Intersex (LGBTQI) Mail: rights

Tek Vanarra *Former USAID CSO Tel: Forum Cambodia Human Rights beneficiary/Suzanne Bangkok Mail: knows Tek. Supports poor and vulnerable Cambodians, especially Development and in rural areas, actively Land rights in rural CSO TBC Partnership in contributing to an areas Action (DPA) enabling environment for sustainable and suitable development

CSO Eang Forum Asia Human Rights Director

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Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location International Senior Legal Adviser. Human Rights/Rule of CSO * Mr. Kingsley Abbott Committee of Bangkok based. Neil Bangkok Law (ROL) Jurists (ICJ) knows.

Working on ROL Bangkok or Phnom CSO* Em Liu ICJ Human Rights/ROL Cambodia Penh?

Working on CSO (London Corruption/Land Cambodia. Focus on Ms. Alice Harrison Global Witness London based) Rights/Environment Corruption and ruling family. Minority Rights Human rights, Marginalized Mr. Butmao Sourn Organization minority rights and Executive Director Phnom Penh Communities* (MIRO) ROL Cambodian Marginalized Minority rights, land Ms. Yun Mane Indigenous Peoples Executive Director Phnom Penh Communities rights Organization

Government Royal University of Academic Ms. Channsitha Mark Political Economy Professor Phnom Penh Phenom Penh

Cambodian Deputy President of Government* HE Say Chum People’s Party Elections Phnom Penh CPP (CPP)

Government* Mr. Sok Ey San CPP Elections CPP Spokesperson Phnom Penh

Member of Hun Sen’s youngest Government* HE Hun Many Elections Phnom Penh Parliament (MP) son.

71 Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location for

Minister of Government* HE Security Minister Phnom Penh National Defense

Ministry of Labor Minister of Labor and Government* Ith Sam Heng and Vocational Labor Phnom Penh Vocational Training Training Ministry of Mines Land management, Minister of Mines and Government* HE Suy Sem Phnom Penh and Energy natural resources Energy Council of Government Government Mr. Phay Siphan Elections Phnom Penh Ministers Spokesperson Minister of Land management, Minister. Son of Say Government* HE Say Sam Ol Phnom Penh Environment natural resources, Chhum

Minister – Often seen as the CPP moderate Government* HE Minister of Interior Security/policing (though crackdown Phnom Penh was orchestrated via the MoI)

Ministry of Land Management, Government* HE. Land management Minister. Phnom Penh Urban Planning and Construction

Government Mr. Khieu Sopheak Ministry of Interior Security/policing Mal Spokesperson Phnom Penh

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Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location Foreign Affairs National HE Keo Phirum National Assembly Foreign Policy Commission Phnom Penh Assembly* (opposition MP)

Minister of Government* HE. Aun Pornmoniroth Economy and Infrastructure Minister Phnom Penh Finance Minister of Government* HE. Dr. Ing Kuntha Phavi Human rights/gender Minister Phnom Penh Woman’s Affairs Dep’t of Legislation and Enforcement, Government Mr. Suon Sovann Land Management Deputy Director Phnom Penh Forestry Administration Chairman of Government HE Mr. Yang Sem Commission of the Senate Senator (CPP) Phnom Penh Senate

National Election Political* Em Sophath Elections Member Phnom Penh Committee (NEC)

Hang Puthea Spokesperson (the 2015 CPP/CNRP Political* Tel: 012 959 666 NEC Elections Phnom Penh selected ‘neutral’ Mail: [email protected] member)

Political (is in Former head of France but usually Cambodian available via Sam Rainsy Elections Former head of CNRP Paris National Rescue Skype/telephone) Party (CNRP) *

73 Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location Political (is outside CNRP Deputy – might Cambodia – Possibly Bangkok? Or Mu Sochua CNRP Deputy Elections be in Bangkok or is in possibly Bangkok) US? US. Neil knows * Ranking CNRP Ranking CNRP Political* Elections Phnom Penh Member Member

Yeng Virak Grassroots Political* Tel: 099 374 356 Democracy Party Elections Director Phnom Penh Mail: (GDP)

Yang Saing Koma Grassroots Political Tel: Elections Chairperson Phnom Penh Democracy Party Mail: Khem Veasna League for Political* Tel: Elections President Phnom Penh Democracy Party Mail:

President Free Chea Mony Trade Union of Workers of Union Tel: Worker’s rights Major trade union Phnom Penh Kingdom of Mail: Cambodia (FTUWC)

Ath Thorn Cambodia Labor Tel: Union* Confederation Worker’s Rights Major trade union Phnom Penh Mail: (CLC)

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Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location Former president of the Cambodian Independent Resigned from NEC to Union* Tel: Teacher Worker’s Rights protest dissolution of Phnom Penh Mail: Association. NEC Former NEC member

Multilateral Development Bank (MDB)/Other Country MDB Mr. Samiuela T. Tukuafu ADB Instructure finance Phnom Penh Representative

Community Southeast Asia Independent development and Development Program Consultant Mr. Graeme Brown ? Consultant strategic NGO (SADP) (former) transition Coordinator International Regional INGO Mr. Matt Hays Republican DRG Bangkok Representative Institute (IRI)

US Defense Attaché US Defense Attaché Embassy* Col. Michael P. Stelzig Defense attaché Office Cambodia Phnom Penh for Cambodia (USDAO)

Col. Paul Barta Australian Defense Embassy Defense attaché Phnom Penh Attaché Cambodia

Media Media Mr. Ratha Vong Khmer Times Env. /Politics Reporter Phnom Penh Media* Mr. May Thittara Khmer Times Env. Politics Reporter Phnom Penh

75 Category Name Affiliation Focus Position Presumed location Reporter (currently in Former Cambodia Media Mr. Aun Pheap Env. /Politics DC. Recently granted D.C Daily refugee status.

Media* Mr. Prak Chan Tul Reuters Politics Reporter Phnom Penh Former Cambodia Media Mr. Mech Dara Env. /Politics Reporter Phnom Penh Daily

Freelance (former Media Ms. Julia Wallace Politics Reporter Phnom Penh Cambodia Daily)

Youth

Tan Kim Heng Promotes youth Khmer Youth Phnom Penh Youth Tel: participation and social President Association (KYA) Mail: engagement

Mr. Ou Rithy Politikoffee and other Youth* Tel: groups working on Activist Phnom Penh Mail: youth empowerment

Promote youth Mr. Im Sothy participation in Youth Council of Executive Director Youth Tel: 077 723 267 development and Phnom Penh Cambodia (YCC) Mail: [email protected] provide a voice for young Cambodians

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ANNEX C: RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

Rule of Law and Government Cross- Competition and Human Responsiveness and Foreign Cutting Category Consensus Inclusion Political Accountability Rights Effectiveness Policy Questions

Color Code

Table A3: Design Matrix with Questions and Reference Information

Research Questions Types of Sources

Movement toward semi-authoritarianism; Hun Sen as authoritarian/ • Secondary Literature Review (desk review) autocratic leader. Documents will include but not limited to: government policies, reports, news, 1. How do people express their views in Cambodia today? (Note: journal articles, in Khmer and English (where available) types of media? What avenues for free expression are still • KIIs from both government and non-government sector, including line available?) ministries such the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), Ministry of Foreign 2. Can the CNRP movement survive the 2017 dissolution of the Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and party? Regulation, Ministry of Energy (MOE), Political Parties (Former CNRP, 3. Traditionally the Sam Rainsy Party and later the CNRP had strong Grassroots Democracy Party [GDP], League for Democracy Party links with some unions and land rights activists. Is this still the [LDP]), Academics (e.g. Paul Chambers, Sovachana Pou) regulatory case? bodies, CSO (including the Forum non-governmental organization [NGO]), media and human rights-focused bodies, election commissions, a. If yes/no, why? INGOs such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees b. If no, who do they support now? (UNHCR), Office of the United Nations for the High Commissioner for 4. Are there other voices emerging in Cambodia that might be able Human Rights (OHCHR), Technical Working Group representatives to fill the space? (Note: what form might this take? How might (TWG), think tanks such as Future Forum, Cambodian Development that happen?) Resource Institute (CDRI) (e.g. Netra Eng), former members of the

77 Research Questions Types of Sources CNRP (Son Chhay, Sam Rainsy, Mu Sochua), former or current Parliamentarians, and local government officials from deika councils (where possible), as well as current or former members of the judiciary.

• Secondary Literature Review (desk review) • KIIs drawn from CSO (e.g. HRW e.g. Brad Adams, former ADHOC - 5. Did the United States (US) Cambodia Democracy Act of 2018 Thun Saray, Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of (H.R. 5754) impact some groups in Cambodia more than Human Rights (LICADHO) – Mathieu Pellerin), MoFA, political others? In what ways? opposition (CNRP, GDP, LDP), Media (e.g. Prak Chan Tul), Academia, Defense attaches. 6. Are there barriers to government responsiveness and effectiveness? • Secondary Literature Review (desk review) 7. What do you think will become of the many planned reforms to improve state effectiveness? • KIIs as primary data source from rights-based and transparency NGOs e.g., ADHOC, Transparency International Cambodia (Mr. Kol Preap), 8. Of these reforms, is there one or more that seem most think tanks e.g. Future Forum, academics (e.g., Channsitha Mark, Paul, achievable? Chambers), Mr. Ok Serei Sopheak, media representatives (local and 9. What is needed for this reform to be carried out? international) 10. Is there one thing that most undermines your trust in government?

• Secondary Literature Review (desk review) 11. What is the most efficient way to get something done in • KIIs as primary data source from provinces Cambodia, e.g., settling a dispute? • CAO, Ministry of Interior (MOI), judicial representative, Parliamentary (Note: this is more for provincial level interviews) Institute of Cambodia (Ms. Heng Nida), ICNL (Civic Freedom Monitor), CSOs, FGDs.

12. What role does management of natural resources play in • Secondary Literature Review (desk review) people’s trust in government? • KIIs from both government and non-government sector, including line 13. Have government reforms since the moratorium on ELCs ministries such Ministry of Environment (MOE) Ministry of Land (2012) been successful for resolving land disputes? Management, Urban Planning and Regulation, Ministry of Energy (MOE),

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Research Questions Types of Sources 14. What benefits and negatives to you perceive in relation to CSO (including Forum NGO, Earth Rights International (ERI), Open Chinese infrastructure projects in Cambodia? Development Cambodia [ODC]), media and human rights-focused 15. What effects, if any, do they have on DRG? bodies, election commissions, INGOs such as UNHCR, Technical Working Group representatives (TWG) think tanks such as Future Forum, former members of the CNRP (if possible), former or current Parliamentarians, and local government officials from deika councils (where possible), as well as current or former members of the judiciary. 16. What emerging trends in women’s political participation, and other gender issues, do observe? 17. Are they having an impact? 18. What issues are there for women’s participation in politics? 19. In what ways are Cambodian women currently experiencing unequal access to resources? 20. Are there and particular dangers facing women activists and • Secondary Literature Review (desk review) CSO workers? • KIIs as primary data source from government, Ministry of Women’s 21. What are the main barriers to increasing women’s political Affairs (Dr. Ing Kuntha Phavi), INGO/CSOs., Thida Khus, OHCHR, participation within politics? In government institutions? National Election Committee (NEC), Ros Sopheap Gender and 22. What are the main barriers to increasing women’s economic Development for Cambodia (GADC), CCHR (Chak Sopheap), ADHOC, participation within the economy? LICADHO, former or current Parliamentarians (Mu Sochua CNRP). 23. Do women play a special role in advocacy for labor unions? 24. If more Cambodian women are in decision-making positions within political parties, would things be different? In what ways? 25. In which country within the region do women play the most important role in politics? Why do believe this is the case? 26. Are Labor unions (garment industry) and the right to organize • Secondary Literature Review (desk review) important?

79 Research Questions Types of Sources 27. Protests and the activities of labor organization has reduced in • KIIs as primary data source private sector, key line ministries, CSOs Cambodia since the 2014 crackdown. What space, if any, is working labor and rights issues (e.g. ADHOC, LICADHO, Central), there now for workers to push for their rights in Cambodia? INGOs (e.g. International Labor Organization - ILO) Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Ministry of Interior, NGOs (e.g. Central – Mr. Moen Tola, ADHOC, LICADHO) 28. In what ways are Cambodians are experiencing a rollback on • Secondary Literature Review (desk review) their democratic rights? • KIIs as primary data source from rights-based NGOs e.g., Adhoc, think 29. Are there specific constraints limiting your capacity to do your tanks Future Forum, academics from University of Phnom Penh job? (e.g., Channsitha Mark), media representatives (local and international), 30. Are there areas where it’s easier to engage with the gov in Ms. Chak Sopheap (CCHR), ADHOC, LICADHO your day to day work?

• Secondary desk review and KI interviews with legal professionals including KPMG Cambodia Limited, Cambodian Center for Human 31. What role do laws play in Cambodia? Is everyone treated Rights (CCHR), LICADHO, representatives of the Judiciary and if equally under the law? possible, the Executive, Ministry of Interior (MOI), International 32. Do you trust the police, the courts, to treat you fairly? Committee of Jurists (ICJ), LICADHO, ADHOC, Transparency International, FGDs.

• Secondary Literature Review (desk review) Changes to the Cambodia political economy (China, Vietnam, trade sanctions by the U.S. and European Union (EU), new trade partners • KIIs as primary data source from private sector, line ministries, e.g., , ) INGO/CSO working on corruption (e.g., Transparency International Cambodia), AIIB, ADB, World Bank, Ministry of Commerce (MOC), 33. In relation to Cambodia-China relations, what has/has not Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), OHCHR, labor unions, former or changed over the past few years? Why? current Parliamentarians, as well as current or former members of the 34. What are the benefits of these changes? What are the judiciary. negatives? • KI interviews with USAID Mission and Embassy Staff, MOFA officials, 35. How is the Cambodian experience of Chinese FDI similar or CSO such as The Asia Foundation, UNHCR representatives, AIIB and different to its neighbors? ADB representatives and others to be confirmed (TBC).

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Research Questions Types of Sources 36. Are there unintended consequences of international sanctions and trade restrictions?

37. Are regional platforms important for Cambodia? (e.g., ASEAN) • MoFA, Mr. Ok Serei Sopheak, Mr. Chan Sophal, 38. Why do you think China have a preference to negotiate Dr. Chhenag Sovannarith bilaterally?

39. U.S.-Cambodia relations have been strained since 2014. What impact has this had on rights and governance? 40. On security. What is the future for U.S.-Cambodia security • MoFA, U.S. Embassy Staff, USAID Mission Staff cooperation as China-Cambodia security cooperation increases? What impacts will this have on DRG? 41. What are the main changes you’ve observed in Cambodia over the last 5 years? a. Economically? • Secondary Literature Review (desk review) b. Politically? • All KIIs 42. What do those changes tell us about the strengths and weaknesses of Cambodia? a. Economically?

81 Research Questions Types of Sources b. Politically? 43. What are the different views within the government about the role of China in Cambodia? 44. What is the future for U.S.-Cambodia security cooperation as China-Cambodia security cooperation increases? What impacts will this have on DRG? 45. What is the broader/longer-term view of the government toward the question of legitimacy – to what extent is this important to the PM? 46. U.S.-Cambodia relations have been strained since 2014. What impact has this had on rights and governance?

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ANNEX D: LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2018) Cambodia: Economy (https://www.adb.org/countries/cambodia/economy accessed Oct 26, 2018) Summary: This website outline Cambodia’s economic growth. Since 2016, Cambodia has had a consistent 7 percent GDP growth rate. Cambodia has been a leader in GDP growth rates within Southeast Asia since 2016.

Keywords: GDP, ADB, economic development

2. Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2012). Rural Development for Cambodia: Key Issues and Constraints (https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29792/rural-development- cambodia.pdf accessed Oct 29, 2018). Summary: This report speaks to the barriers of rural development in Cambodia. The high cost of doing business as a result of corruption and lack of competitiveness deters FDI in the rural sector. Beyond that, government decision-making is centralized without much interaction with no province or district involvement in development projects. In rural areas there are unequal: educational, skill development, health and capital outcomes. These unequal outcomes are due to the following: unequal access to infrastructure; productive assets such as land and credit; and, policy outcomes that discriminate against the poor. Low employment, food insecurity, financial institutions, climate change impacts, and roads are also problematic in rural areas.

Agriculture Sector: Underdeveloped agribusiness policy, lack of clear government roles, and lack of responsiveness to the private sector all drive up the cost of doing business. Agricultural productivity is decreased by the following: (1) agencies involved in land titling (e.g., Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction; (2) farmers cannot access capital or land titles; (3) lack of research on agriculture; and (4) misleading price signals due to lack of information, communication, and technology services within the industry.

Water & Fisheries: Despite the Fisheries Law in 2006, the community and small-scale fishing are subject to negative impacts from large commercial fishing due to lack of enforcement. Legislation for environmental protection and natural resources management is lacking. Fishery reform is to be desired and water resource policy must reconcile irrigation service fee collection and the operation and maintenance responsibilities of farmers.

Keywords: agriculture, water, rural development, infrastructure, local government, environment

3. Bader, Julia (2015). China, Autocratic Patron? An Empirical Investigation of China as a Factor in Autocratic Survival, International Studies Quarterly 59, pp 23–33. Summary: This article highlights the impact China has on the survival of other autocratic regimes. China has interests in autocratic survival to maintain sovereignty and prevent democratic domino effects. China also pursues foreign policy objectives and influence on other countries’ domestic political processes similar to democratic countries. The higher intensity relationship with another country, the

83 more influence a country has over their political processes, and authoritarian leaders are less constrained in external engagement.

Evidence shows that as China’s economic interests and interactions in the world grow (mainly trade), so does its influence and impact on other countries, stabilizing autocratic regimes (the political survival of leaders of autocratic regimes). However, the author finds that China’s engagement with developing countries does not automatically translate into dramatic Chinese influence on power politics regarding bilateral interactions. The author notes other channels of support by China to other authoritarian regimes may be more politically influential such as prevention of UN intervention and state-controlled media.

Keywords: China, authoritarianism, democracy, economics, political systems

4. Baliga, Ananth and Chakrya, Khouth Sophak (February 3, 2017) ‘Boeung Kak: A Disastrous Decade’ Phnom Pen Post (https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-post-depth- politics/boeung-kak-disastrous-decade accessed Nov 4, 2018). Summary: This news article reviews the progress in the Boeung Kak Lake area since the government sold the land to developers 10 years ago. In 2007, the Phnom Penh governor, , signed a 99-year lease in exchange for $79 million, without prior public consultation. Phnom Penh City Hall and the development firm Shukaku Inc, which is associated with powerful ruling party Senator Lao Meng Khin, agreed to develop the Boeung Kak Lake area. This project resulted in the eviction of close to 4,250 families of people and subsequent protests. Prominent land rights activists led by Yorm Bopha and others have endured beatings by police and district security guards. Most Boeung Kak Lake residents were resettled from Thai refugee camps in 1993. The Council of Ministers changed the site from ‘state-public’ to ‘state-private’ land, and local homes were flooded out.

An injunction was filed in the Appeal Court to hold Shukaku responsible for the flooding local houses, but it was rejected. Armed police intimidated and coerced villagers to accept payment for their land or face forced removal. The government rejected villagers’ demands for an onsite resettlement option, until the World Bank Inspection Panel critiqued the $28 million Cambodia Land Management and Administration Project which included the Boeung Kak area. The World Bank report claimed that the project arbitrarily excluded certain land from the titling process and in August 2011 the World Bank announced an immediate freeze on new lending. In response, the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, allocated 12.44 hectares from the original land to resettle nearly 700 families.

In April 2006, Chuktema unexpectedly switched to filling the lake from 10 percent to 90 percent and now the 90-hectare Boeung Kak lake is filled with mounds of sand. Boeung Kak lake was a recreational area, a place to live, and a place to farm. Male land activists for the Boeung Kak cause are rare, most activists are women. Almost 30 families at Boeung Kak lake are continuing to fight Phnom Penh City Hall for compensation or comparable plots of land.

Keywords: Boeung Kak lake, Phnom Penh City Hall, Shukaku Inc. World Bank, land activists, women

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5. Cambodian Center for Human Rights (April 2018) Legal Gender Recognition in Cambodia (https://cchrcambodia.org/index_old.php?url=media/media.php&p=filter_factsheet.php& cat=Rule of Law&id=5&show=factsheet accessed Nov 2, 2018). Summary: This report discusses transgender legislation. There is no law that explicitly enables transgender people to receive legal and administrative recognition but none to prohibiting recognition either. The lack of legal definition leaves room for unequal application of the law. Some transgender Cambodians are issued with identification cards conforming to self-defined gender identity, but most officials deny these requests. This legal situation must be clarified to protect all transgender Cambodians and to give them their right to legal gender recognition.

Keywords: transgender, laws, gender

6. Cambodian Center for Human Rights (August 2016) Trade Union Law (https://cchrcambodia.org/index_old.php?url=media/media.php&p=filter_factsheet.php& cat=Rule of Law&id=5&show=factsheet accessed Nov 2, 2018). Summary: This Fact Sheet provides an overview of Cambodia’s Trade Union Law (TUL), which was passed May 2016. TUL did recognize the right not to join a union (Article 7) and prohibition of discrimination by employers against union workers (Article 63). However, the TUL is not consistent with domestic or international human rights obligations. The process for adopting the TUL was not transparent and lacked consultation with stakeholders. Article 36 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (the ‘Constitution’) allows all citizens to join trade unions, which is also explicitly recognized in Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as well as in Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 1 of the TUL, does not protect civil servants, teachers, and domestic workers in unions, while Article 13 requires an absolute majority (50 percent +1) to strike. Article 17 requires more burdensome registration and reporting. Article 65(f) prohibits unions ‘to agitate for purely political purposes or for their personal ambitions.’

Keywords: civil society, trade unions, TUL

7. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (February 28, 2018) Cambodia Economy 2018 (https://www2.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/blog/anda/files/2010/06/11_kasumi-nakagawa.pdf accessed Oct 30, 2018) Summary: This website recounts the major demographic, social, legal, and economic facts about Cambodia. The majority of the population are Khmer (97 percent), while the Cham only constitute 1.2 percent, and Chinese and Vietnamese 0.1 percent each.

Economy: Cambodia was named a lower middle-income country in 2016. The agriculture, garment, construction, real estate and tourism sectors account for most of Cambodia’s economy. The agricultural sector employs about 48 percent of the employed persons. The garment sector is mostly women. However, Cambodia is still one of the poorest countries in Asia with large income inequality and poor job prospects. As of 2013, only 18 percent of the rural population was electrified.

International Environmental Agreements: The following are types of international environmental agreements of which Cambodia is a signatory: Biodiversity; Climate Change; Climate Change-Kyoto

85 Protocol; Desertification; Endangered Species; Hazardous Wastes; Marine Life Conservation; Ozone Layer Protection; Ship Pollution; Tropical Timber 94; Wetlands; and, Whaling. However, illegal logging and strip mining for gems has posed habitat loss, biodiversity loss, and soil erosion in the western region of Cambodia. Illegal fishing and overfishing have resulted in declining fish stocks and deforested has caused run-off which ruins ecosystems Potable water is not accessible to most of the population.

Political Process: In order to pass an amendment, it must first be proposed by the monarch, prime minister, or president of the National Assembly if supported by one-fourth of the Assembly membership. Then two-thirds majority of the Assembly membership must vote to pass the amendment. Constitutional articles on the multiparty democratic form of government and the monarchy cannot be amended.

Rule of Law (ROL): Cambodia has accepted compulsory International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction reluctantly as well as International Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction.

Human trafficking: Cambodian men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Cambodian men that work on Thai-owned fishing vessels are often subjected to forced labor at sea for years. Cambodian children face a risk of domestic servitude in Thailand and Vietnam, oftentimes with the families’ complicity. Cambodian and ethnic Vietnamese females are often trafficked from rural areas to Cambodian urban centers and tourist spots for sexual exploitation. International peoples travel Cambodia for child sex tourism, and Cambodian is a main exploiters of child prostitutes.

Keywords: demographics, economy, human trafficking, electrification, rural, environment, children, prostitution

8. Chen, Julia (February 12, 2014) ‘In Cambodia, Culture Shapes Identity, Spurs Economic Growth’ Asia Foundation. https://asiafoundation.org/2014/02/12/in-cambodia-culture- shapes-identity-spurs-economic-growth/ Summary: This report explains the importance of culture and identity for economic and social development. However, it points to the challenges that Cambodia has given the country’s history with the Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s. Cambodians return to cultural traditions can guide society going forward.

Keywords: identity, social development, unity, economic development

9. Chheang, Vannarith (October 23, 2017) ‘Cambodia And Gender Equality’ Khmer Times (https://www.khmertimeskh.com/5087257/cambodia-gender-equality/ accessed Oct 26, 2018). Summary: This article explains how gender equality improves economic development and outlines the challenges Cambodia faces in gender equality. McKinsey found that promoting gender equality in Cambodia could increase GDP by $12 trillion USD by 2025. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), outlines a number of gender gaps such as gaps in women’s wages, human capital, and social protection. Persistent cultural norms dictate that the role of women is as housewives and mothers, but more women are entering the job market. The Deputy Prime Minister, Sar Kheng, reiterated the government’s commitment to empowering women in the public sector. Under the current administration the ratio of female civil servants has increased from 21.13 to 25.98 percent from 2011

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to 2016. However, women have unequal access to economic benefits, political opportunity and social protection.

Keywords: women, gender equality, economic development, leadership

10. Chheang, Vannarith (July 17, 2017) Yusof Ishak Institute Analyze Current Events: Cambodian Power Shift in 2018? Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Issue 2017, No. 53 (https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_53.pdf accessed Nov 2, 2018) Summary: This research paper points to the Cambodia’s National Rescue Party (CNRP)’s gaining political traction in 2017. Despite the long-ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) majority of commune chief seats, CNRP overturned 498 seats. These political seats succeeded in removing the CPP’s political monopoly in rural areas. Thus, the 2018 general election was predicted to be a tight race.

Keywords: CNP, CPP, commune elections, rural

11. Dara, Mech (February 15, 2017) New Offices to Hear Out Complaints Phnom Penh Post (https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/new-offices-hear-out-complaints accessed Oct 29, 2017). Summary: This article recounts Cambodia’s move toward more Ombudsman. Forty ‘ombudsman’ offices were established across the Kingdom. These ombudsmen aim to solve citizens’ complaints outside of court. The ombudsmen have the tools to investigate but their authority is limited, and they have no punitive measures. Each committee has an elected district council member, civil society officer, and vendor representatives.

Keywords: ombudsman, courts, investigations, anti-corruption, civil society

12. Dara, Mech (October 24, 2018) Report Highlights Kingdom’s Land Woes Phnom Pen Post (https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/report-highlights-kingdoms-land-woes? Accessed Nov 2, 2018) Summary: This article summaries land disputes over time. Land appropriation has affected more than 20,000 families directly and indirectly across Cambodia. Land grabs threaten farmers livelihoods. This land is taken by the government for companies without consulting local people, and locals are not provided compensation. If the price of land increases, powerful individuals acquire false documentation and clear the land for sale. Cambodian-owned companies have a combined land concession of 924,896 hectares in 114 locations. Vietnamese firms have 356,560 hectares in 55 locations. Chinese companies have 369,107 hectares in 42 locations. The influx of Chinese nationals and rise in land prices has fueled land grabs, and it is reportedly common for the government to reject civil society’s reports.

Keywords: land, land grabs, farmers

13. Dr. Bhagat, Renu (2015) Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Cambodia Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Volume 6 No 4, 389-401 (https://www.japss.org/upload/3.%20Bhagat.pdf accessed Oct 28, 2018).

87 Summary: According to this academic publication, Cambodian has a liberal constitution but lacks implementation. An independent and impartial judiciary is lacking, and the executive branch’s excessive control/interference with the judiciary undermines crucial checks and balances. The executive has unofficially blurred lines of distinct between itself and the judiciary and legislature. A lack of checks and balances weakens government accountability.

Keywords: division of power, checks and balances, constitution, branches of government

14. Dr. Ledgerwood, Judy (2018) ‘Cambodian Recent History and Contemporary Society: An Introductory Course’ Northern Illinois University (http://www.seasite.niu.edu/khmer/ledgerwood/Part2.htm accessed Oct 26, 2018) Summary: This historical account recounts the history of marginalization within Cambodia since the 1970s. The ‘Khmer’ identity was created to transform the country into a ‘unified classless society’, by dictating people’s freedom of expression such as religion, language, and sexual relationships. Thus, Cambodians were forced to abandon their religions family ties, and lands. Among these groups were Vietnamese, Muslim Cham, and ethnic Chinese.

Vietnamese: Policies were in place to systematically remove and execute ethnic Vietnamese settled in Cambodia. The Vietnamese were forced to speak Khmer and abandon cultural ties.

Muslim Cham: The Muslim Cham’s language, religion, and dress have a distinct way of life from others within Cambodia. Thus, they were executed or forcibly removed from their homes. This has been considered genocide by some scholars.

Ethnic Chinese: The Chinese were discriminated against based on class and urban local. They were labeled as bourgeois ‘enemies’ of communism. The most prominent within the ethnic Chinese class were executed, and the rest were banned from using the Chinese language and ancestral worship.

Keywords: Vietnamese, Chinese, Cham, identity, social, unity, Khmer

15. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) (2018) (https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/node/39457 accessed Oct 27, 2018). Summary: This website explains what the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia are. The ECCC is a special Cambodian court that looks into the Khmer Rouge trials. The ECCC has internationally backed funding and has convicted 3 people in connection with genocide under the Khmer Rouge.

Keywords: ECC, courts, Khmer Rouge

16. Freedom House (2018) Cambodia (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- world/2018/cambodia accessed Nov 2, 2018) Summary: This report reflects the freedom and fairness of Cambodia’s electoral processes.

Head of government: King is chief of state, but the prime minister Hun Sen (1985- current) has most of the political power. Hun Sen’s victory in the 2013 National Assembly polls was marred by reports of duplicate voter names, vote buying, and voters casting ballots in unregistered

88 areas. The National Election Committee identified hundreds of thousands of duplicate or missing names from voter rolls.

National legislative representatives: Hun Sen threatened to ‘eliminate 100 to 200 people’ to ensure peace in the country because if his party were to lose it could incite civil war. The government banned two election-monitoring groups in the July 2018 election.

Electoral laws and framework: In July 2017, an amendment to the electoral law banned political parties from association with anyone convicted of a criminal offense. The Human Rights The legitimacy of the election was undermined due to the use of security forces in campaigns, punishments for boycotting the assembly, and a campaign period of only 21 days. Voting is tied to a citizen’s permanent residency and this status cannot be changed easily.

Keywords: freedom, elections, head of state, legislative representatives

17. Fund for Peace (2018) Fragile State Index (https://fundforpeace.org/fsi/wp- content/uploads/2018/04/951181805-Fragile-States-Index-Annual-Report-2018.pdf accessed Oct 28, 2018) Summary: This report indicates that Cambodia was indexed as 84.0, which is a ‘High Warning’ on the Fragile State Index. Cambodia has lost 1.8 points since 2008, based on social, political, and economic instability and lack of cohesion. The External Intervention Ranking placed Cambodia as 53rd, based on political, economic, and refugee interventions.

Keywords: fragility, rankings, cohesion

18. Harvard (2017) ‘The Global Gender Gap Report 2017’ (accessed http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf Oct 29,2018) Summary: This report covers the gender gap in Cambodia. Cambodia’s global gender gap score was 0.676 out of 1, and it ranked 99 out of 144 countries. The lowest scores were in educational attainment (literacy and school enrollment) and political empowerment (ministry and political administration positions).

Keywords: gender gap, women, education, political empowerment

19. Heder, Steve (2007) Staging Politics: Power and Performance in Asia and Africa; Political Theatre in the 2003 Cambodian Elections: 151 State, Democracy and Conciliation in Historical Perspective, International Library of Political Studies, ISBN: 978 1 84511 367 4, pg. 151- 172 Summary: This collection of analyses recounting the history of governance and . First, the chapter outlines the various interpretations of ‘theatre of power’ in Asia, as a form of governance that overawes the citizens with beauty and splendor to either inflict more pain on the ruled, to make brutal tyranny more bearable/to pacify the ruled and mitigate violence. In Cambodia,

89 this was increased with western colonialism, specifically by France. This theatre of power is said to have influenced the elections post-French occupation, in the Khmer Rouge regime, by creating the illusion of democracy as an act to demoralize citizens and to avoid citizen violence - false liberalization. These types of elections filtered down into state and village elections, creating a political stronghold within the government. Aid for China, Thailand and the West propped up this regime and its guise of liberalism.

This chapter implies that the power structure in Cambodia has not changed much since colonial times, despite the country’s independence, communist regime, denouncing of communism, liberalization, and reseating of its King. At the end of the Cold War in Cambodia, the ex-communists had to give in to international pressures for an election, as required by the 1991 Paris peace agreements. This treaty provided for the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), empowered to ‘control’ and thus politically neutralize existing administrative apparatuses, disarm existing armed forces and organize free and fair elections in which former communist party members would have to compete against a political wing of Pol Pot’s remnants. After which, Hun Sen’s and Chea Sim’s party changed its name to the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), abandoning socialism without true belief in liberal democracy. Hun Sen and Chea Sim thus had a 50–50 coalition government, but it was based on administrative, army and police structures that Hun Sen controlled, just as Sihanouk had done in the context of decolonization from France. Sihanouk himself was re- enthroned as King. The chapter claims that much of the aid and investment following the 1993 vote, has benefitted Hun Sen and his associates. Allegedly, few resources are invested back into society, while some funds are spent on the construction of schools, bridges and roads, they are often built as ‘gifts’ to prominent officials, essentially procuring Hun Sen votes during election campaigns.

Despite this claimed lack of progress, the current elections and governance in Cambodia has been applauded by certain organizations. The EU (European Union) noted that good legal framework and numerous NEC directives were not fully enforced; nevertheless, it claims that the electoral legal system is ‘substantially strengthened’ and proven as ‘workable’ in practice. The European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) noted that of the 349 complaints given to provincial election commissions, 169 had been ‘successfully reconciled’ by commune commissions, and few cases required National Election Committee (NEC) hearings and sanctions. EU figures indicate only two cases of alleged threats and one of assault made it to the NEC, as reflected in the findings that few Cambodians feel inclined to use the complaint system. This lack of interest in legal redress may be due to cultural norms (saving face, consensus building, and avoiding conflict) or due to fear of violence or lack of a fair and just response. The chapter claims that the current electoral processes and supporting legal system only strengthens impunity which contributes to widespread political violence, election law violations and intimidation of voters, under the guise of free and fair elections, as supported by international actors. In concluding, the author claims that democracy is truly ‘institutionally constrained free and fair elections’ resulting in a sanctioned ‘elected dictatorship, in which multi-party elections were expected to be close to farce’

Keywords: Asia, elections, governance, politics, Khmer Rouge, democracy, international aid, political theatre

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20. Honorable Chabot, Steve (July 25, 2018) Cambodia Democracy Act of 2018, Congressional Record, Volume 164 Issue 127 (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2018-07- 27/html/CREC-2018-07-27-pt1-PgE1102.htm accessed Nov 3, 2018) Summary: This congressional record explains the proposal of the H.R. 5754 by the CNPR opposition party. The H.R. 5754 would sanction individuals responsible for crushing democracy in Cambodia and to encourage them to change their behavior. For example, the Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen, stifled democracy by uprooting civil society organizations, cracking down on newspapers (the Cambodia Daily and outlets like Radio Free Asia), and forcing the National Democratic Institute to leave the country. Hun Sen claims that the United States is attempting to orchestrate a coup in partnership with, Kem Sokah, the leader of the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP). Thus, the CNRP was banned and its members of parliament were barred from public office or forced into exile. The CNRP claims that Cambodia is not democracy, but rather a dictatorship.

Keywords: democracy, civil society, sanctions, CNRP, CPP

21. Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) (September 26, 2018) Civil Society Groups Condemn the Wrongful Conviction of Four ADHOC Staff Members and an NEC Official Summary: This document is a statement of support and of protest regarding the arrest of some high- profile rights' defenders and a call for the immediate and unconditional overturn these convictions, as signed by communities and unions. This report also calls for a remedy for the 427 days spent in arbitrary pre-trial detention in accordance with international standards and the Cambodian government’s protection of human rights defenders and civil society’s fundamental freedoms. Senior Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) members NySokha, Nay Vanda, Lim Mony and Yi Soksan were convicted of ‘bribery of a witness’ under Article 548 of the Criminal Code on 26 September 2018. National Election Committee (NEC) official NyChakrya was found guilty as an accomplice under Articles 29 and 548 of the Criminal Code. The Phnom Penh Municipal Court has issued a five sentence. The alleged bribery relates to attaining legitimate legal and material assistance that is routine in their roles as human rights workers. On 18 September 2018, five witnesses were absent and only two witness statements read aloud, preventing cross-examination. No credible evidence was presented, and the burden of proof was not met. This process undermines the presumption of innocence.

ADHOC staff members are unable to continue their work without fear or restriction due to the constant threat of being sent back to prison. This is discrimination against human rights defenders. Human rights defenders support victims of civil and political rights violations, land grabbing and forced evictions, as well as survivors of gender-based violence in order to protect and defend human rights.

Keywords: ADHOC, NEC, human rights defenders, courts, arrests, civil society, community

22. Human Rights Watch (February 2, 2014) Cambodia: Garment Factories Thwarting Unions, Government Should Enforce Rights of Workers to Unionize, Demonstrate https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/02/cambodia-garment-factories-thwarting-unions Summary: This article reviews the government’s response to labor unions, based on interviews with almost 200 Cambodian garment factory workers and union representatives from 55 factories.

91 Cambodian government has not stopped garment factories from union-busting activities, intimidation, threats, and non-renewal of temporary employment contracts for union members. The garment workers identified problems with anti-union discrimination, management harassment, unlawful employment practices, and poor working conditions. In January 2014, Cambodian security forces (army units and gendarmes) broke up garment worker demonstrations in Phnom Penh for those seeking higher minimum wages, resulting in the killing at least five people and hospitalization of at least 39 others. Another 23 activists and workers were arrested, of which all were denied bail and face trial in government-controlled courts. The government of Prime Minister Hun Sen has since suspended all public assembly. The authorities are detaining those who gather in public places and use security forces, civilian ‘public order’ auxiliaries, and government-backed vigilantes to prevent protests. On January 26, these forces broke up trade unionists gathering at the Phnom Penh’s Freedom Park, which resulted in protesters, security personnel, and alleged government intelligence agent injuries. More than 100 labor union associates have been fired for participating in the demonstrations.

Keywords: protests, unions, garment, trade

23. Human Rights Watch (HRW) (October 24, 2016) ‘The Secret Underbelly of the Cambodian Garment Industry’ (https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/24/secret-underbelly-cambodian- garment-industry accessed Oct 27, 2018) Summary: This report details the poor working conditions and predatory labor practices that many women are subjected to. Lack of industry regulation is problematic, especially for those unregistered organizations that avoid regulation entirely. This article suggest that the government develop stronger enforcement mechanisms for formalizing business.

Keywords: women, gender equality, economic development, human rights

24. Hutt, David (January 12, 2017) The Real Danger of Cambodia’s ‘Gay King’ Episode The Diplomat (https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-real-danger-of-cambodias-gay-king- episode/ accessed Nov 2, 2018). Summary: This article revisits how the government of Cambodia has dealt with the digital photograph of the King of Cambodia, which suggest he may be a homosexual. Article 7 of the constitution states the King ‘shall be inviolable.’ But the law isn’t always clear in Cambodia. Government officials have said, ‘The king represents the whole nation and they are insulting the king, which is like they are insulting the whole nation.’ This comment implies that to be called gay is to be insulted and degrades one’s dignity, which implies that to be homosexual is to be lesser. An investigation was launched without an official complaint about the image, but death threats being made against CNRP deputy leader Kem Sokha were not investigated. This application of the law reflects unequal judicial process and uses of government resources.

Keywords: sexual orientation, , King

25. Kasumi, Nakagawa (2010) ‘Gender Mainstreaming in Cambodia: Toward a Gender Equal Society?’ Advisor to Ministry of Women’s Affairs (https://www2.gsid.nagoya- u.ac.jp/blog/anda/files/2010/06/11_kasumi-nakagawa.pdf accessed Oct 26, 2018) Summary: Cambodia’s Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) was established in 1997 and is mandated

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to, ‘promote and protect the rights of women and their families.’ In 1993, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, added ‘every Cambodian citizen shall be equal before the law, enjoying the same rights and freedom and fulfilling the same obligations regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religious belief, political tendency, birth origin, social status, wealth or other status.’ In 2004, the government of Cambodia adopted a political platform, ‘Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency,’ which in moved into the second phase in 2008, naming women as the ‘the backbone of Cambodian economy and society’. This gender mainstreaming is challenging given the budget needed implementation of Gender Mainstreaming Action Plans (GMAPs). This strategy includes access to primary and reproductive health care, more female school enrollment, job training, inclusion in governance, legal rights to fight against , human trafficking, and sexual exploitation. Article 36 of the constitution protects women’s rights to work, occupational freedom, and equal pay. The female labor force participation rate is 71%, with a strong transition to the garment industry without job security or equal pay.

Keywords: women, laws, constitution, gender equality, garment industry

26. Kelsall, Tim and Heng, Seiha (September 30, 2014) ‘The Political Settlement and Economic Growth in Cambodia‘. ESID Working Paper 37. Summary: This academic paper explores Cambodia’s past volatile economic growth, in the context of new economic growth, through interviews conducted in four economic sectors. Positive feedback loops exist between support for competitive export industries, state capacity, and structural transformation. Negative feedback loops stem from over-reliance on high-rent industries, insufficiently inclusive growth, and political instability. Economic growth and political stability have been combined by spurring mass employment through the garment and tourism sectors via political patronage with rent-seeking CPP businessmen. Yet, that model was challenged in July 2013 when the CPPP did not perform as expected against its opposition in the general elections. This led to a political standoff that hurt economic growth. Hun Sen’s dominant coalition gives technocrats enough latitude to support industry growth and rent-seekers use political backing to generate profits. This model may not remain stable.

Keywords: Developing countries, economic growth, inclusive growth, Cambodia, political economy, political settlements, politics

27. Keo, Piseth (2018) ‘Cambodian Identity’ Harvard Yenching Institute (https://harvard- yenching.org/features/cambodian-identity accessed Oct 26, 2018) Summary: A review of Yong Ty and Chhoy Yi Heang’s book, ‘Cambodian Identity’ points to a local conception of the core of Cambodia’s identity. This book was written in the local language by a Cambodian scholar, which is rare. The book covers aspects of Cambodia from culture to governance and natural resource management spanning from ancient times until now. The review of this book critiques its disregard for long standing communities within Cambodia.

Keywords: identity, social, unity

28. Lee, John (October 2018) Understanding Authoritarian Resilience and Countering Autocracy Promotion in Asia, Asia Policy: Volume 13, Number 4. pp, 99–122.

93 Summary: This article explores the reasons for authoritarian resilience and democratic erosion in Asia while offering descriptions of conditions and policies for democratization in the future. Rapid economic growth in Asia is said to lead to an independent and politically active middle classes, which pushes for democracy; however, rapid economic advances in Asia have not led to democratization. Many regional countries do not believe in universal suffrage and China has emerged as a regional and global leader promoting authoritarian approaches. The author argues that because democracy is stagnant in Asia and China is becoming more powerful, countering China’s anti-democratic narrative is urgent if democratization in Asia is to be successful.

The author notes that ‘Chinese economic and political support for Cambodia is a case study of autocratic promotion’ (pg. 114). The author would also suggest that Cambodia is a country leaning toward China’s one-party authoritarian model. Economic advances in Cambodia have not led to democratization. From 2011 to 2015, Chinese state-owned firms lent nearly $5 billion in loans and investment to Cambodia, about 70% of total foreign direct investment. China also provided military aid in the form of vehicles, loans to buy helicopters, and a training facility in southern Cambodia. Beijing has consistently supported the autocratic tendencies of the Hun Sen government, including when the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party was forcibly dissolved in 2017. The Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi issued a statement that ‘China supports the Cambodian side’s efforts to protect political stability and achieve economic development and believes the Cambodian government can lead the people to deal with domestic and foreign challenges’ (pg. 114).

The author notes that the United States could question Chinese support by highlighting economic deals weighted heavily in favor of Chinese firms, disregard for the environmental impacts of investments, and the use of Chinese workers. The author makes 3 more suggestions. First, accept that democracy cannot be assumed as the inevitable destination for rapidly growing economies in Asia and China is convincingly making the case that a one-party rule is a better model for some countries. Second, the message of democracy must be adapted to the region and shining examples of democracy in Asia must be center stage. Third, democracies need to focus on building practical institutions that increase accountability, transparency, and protections for the rights of individuals and entities in countries undergoing political transitions above universal suffrage.

Keywords: authoritarianism, democracy, China, Southeast Asia

29. Maza, Cristina (October 20, 2016) Cambodia Worst In Region For Rule of Law: Report, Phnom Pen Post (https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/cambodia-worst-region- rule-law-report accessed Oct 28, 2018) Summary: This news article recounts the concrete reasons behind the World Justice Project’s (WJP’s) ROL ranking of Cambodia. Court cases against rights workers, civil society, and members of the political opposition reflect the discrimination within the courts and criminal justice system. Corruption is observed in almost every sector. A lack of access to information and citizens knowledge of rule of law (ROL) leads to less government responsiveness. The government of Cambodia dismissed this report as bias.

Keywords: division of power, checks and balances, judiciary, ROL

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30. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Department of Planning and Statistics (October 14, 2016) Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water (TWG-AW) The Fourth Meeting KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA (http://www.twgaw.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/08/Minutes-of-Meeting_20161014.pdfaccessed Nov 2, 2018) Summary: This government document details the national technical working group on Agriculture and Water meetings. Government departments, ministries, development partners, NGOs and private sector partners were all in attendance. The purpose of the meeting was to review the progresses and to identify the strategy and ways forward via this mechanism to reach a common goal.

Keywords: technical working group, agriculture, water, civil society

31. Minority Rights (2018) ‘Cambodia: Cham’ (https://minorityrights.org/minorities/cham/ accessed Oct 26, 2018). Summary: This report details the Cham’s current social, economic, and political status and challenges to advancement within Cambodia. In June 2015, the Cambodian government promised more Cham speakers, to compensate for the fact that public school instruction is not the Cham language. Most of Cambodia’s Cham Muslims still reside in rural areas remain victims of land grabbing for commercial contracts to private developers. These infrastructure projects have minimal regard for compensation or dislocation impacts on the Cham people’s livelihoods and family structures. The Cham are still seeking acknowledgement and repatriation for past abuses through bringing genocide cases against the Khmer Rouge leaders in the UN-backed Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Previous cases such as the investigation against Ao An’s case in December 2016 were closed and the ECCC’s jurisdiction is being questioned.

Keywords: Cham, land, Ao An, ECCC

32. Minority Rights (2018) ‘Cambodia: Chinese’ (https://minorityrights.org/minorities/chinese accessed Oct 26, 2018). Summary: This article notes the positive change in social, economic, and political status of the ethnic Chinese in Cambodia over time. China and Cambodia have been investing in promoting Chinese companies and Chinese languages within education and politics. Cambodian political parties have reported ‘sensitivity to the clout of the Chinese minority’ and their prosperity has been pro-actively promoted by the Cambodian government.

Keywords: Chinese, China, FDI, business, education

33. Minority Rights (2018) ‘Cambodia: Ethnic Vietnamese’ (https://minorityrights.org/minorities/ethnic-vietnamese/ accessed Oct 26, 2018). Summary: This report indicates the extent of the formal and informal exclusion of the ethnic Vietnamese residing in Cambodia. In 1993, the Cambodian constitution guaranteed rights and freedoms for all ‘citizens,’ regardless of race, but citizen is defined as a ‘Khmer citizen’ or ‘’. This definition precludes the ethnic Vietnamese from the same protections as other groups. Citizenship is gained by: birth, marriage, naturalization or on an exceptional basis. To be naturalized the applicant must be literate in written and spoken Khmer and a legal resident, among other requirements.

95 Many of the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia lack the documentation needed to prove their claims to citizenship due to forced relocation by the Khmer government and the current regime is not issuing birth certificates for Vietnamese children today. Corruption and unofficial fees have allowed some ethnic Vietnamese to acquire federal identification. Furthermore, the group has increased vulnerability to jailing for lack of id if they do not bribe corrupt officials. Citizenship or a birth certificate is needed to access education, healthcare, formal loans, social security safety nets, and to own land. The ethnic Vietnamese people are stripped of political participation and legal protections, as they also cannot vote or use the judicial system to change their circumstances.

Keywords: ethnic Vietnamese, citizenship, laws, corruption, education, healthcare, social safety nets, land

34. Narin, Sun (September 21, 2018) After CPP Election Win, Promises to Solve Cambodia’s Land Grabs Fade Again. Cambodia Center for Human Rights. https://www.cchrcambodia.org accessed Oct 26, 2018). Summary: This report covers the land grab issues in Cambodia. A minority group, the Suoy in Trapaing Chour, had government reserved land. The government granted HLH Agriculture Company Ltd. a 10,000-hectares of that land with no compensation for the villagers or regard for livelihoods. The CPP promised solutions to this problem. The CPP won the last elections, despite international concern over the lack of a free and fair vote. These land grabs by politically well-connected companies are rampant in Cambodia and have been since the early 2000s. These large state projects devastate not only livelihoods but also the environment. Land tenure regulation is still lacking, and the government has been slow to act on this issue.

Keywords: laws, land, infrastructure, business, patronage

35. National Legislative Bodies/National Authorities (October 9, 1996) ‘Law on Nationality’ (http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5210.html accessed November 2, 2018) Summary: The constitution of Cambodia reflects more inclusive definitions of citizenship. The citizenship law was adopted by the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Cambodia in 1996. Article 2 states, ‘Any person who has Khmer nationality/citizenship, is a Khmer citizen. A Khmer citizen shall not be deprived of nationality, exiled or extradited to any foreign country, unless upon there is mutual agreement.’ Article 4 states citizenship is granted for, ‘any child who is born from a foreign mother and father (parents) who were born and living legally in the Kingdom of Cambodia.’

Keywords: citizenship, laws, constitution

36. Office of High Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR) (July 30, 2015) Cambodia: Civil Society (http://cambodia.ohchr.org/en/civil-society-fund-freedoms/freedom-peaceful- assembly-association accessed Oct 28, 2018) Summary: This website indicates some improvements in civil society. Since the Law on Peaceful Demonstration passed in December 2009, civil society actors and activism democratic spaces has expanded. Cambodia has seen more of civil society’s role in democratic, social, and political affairs since 2013, with massive street protests. Civil society activists include trade unionists, garment workers, human rights defenders, students, media and the general populace with common concerns

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over fair wages, land disputes, and election results. The imprisonment and murders of civil society leaders has also been occurring.

Keywords: civil society, protests, laws

37. Open Development Cambodia (December 8, 2015) Cambodia: System of Government (https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/system-of-government/ accessed Oct 28, 2018). Summary: This website details the division of power within Cambodia’s government and its 3 branches. The members of the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly can have positions in either. Cambodian citizens exercise political powers through the Parliament, Council of Ministers, and the courts.

Keywords: division of power, constitution, branches of government

38. Open Development Cambodia (October 24, 2017) Civil Society (https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/civil-society/ accessed Oct 28, 2018) Summary: This article details the roles of civil society in Cambodia and the challenges they face. Civil society organizations in Cambodia include many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Buddhist institutions, trade unions and media associations. NGOs have been involved mainly in health, education, and environmental protection. Since the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, the Cambodian Constitution protections civil society in the following ways:

‘Article 35 gives citizens the right to participate actively in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the nation.

Article 37 allows peaceful demonstrations within the framework of the law.

Article 41 describes freedom of expression of ideas, freedom of information, freedom of publication and freedom of assembly.

Article 42 gives citizens the right to establish associations and political parties. Khmer citizens may take part in mass organizations to work together to protect national achievement and social order.’

However, civil society has limited collaboration with government policy and regulates their activities heavily. The imprisonment and murders of civil society leaders is increasingly concerning.

Keywords: laws, civil society, journalists, NGOs

39. Open Development Center (August 3, 2015) Population and Census (https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/population-and-censuses/ accessed Nov 1, 2018) Summary: This source summarizes the demographics of Cambodia. About 78 percent of the population live in rural areas. The current female population is about 50 percent.

Keywords: population, demographics, women, rural

97 40. Penh, Phnom (September 19, 2013) ‘Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia Face Discrimination’ IRIN (http://www.irinnews.org/report/98786/ethnic-vietnamese-cambodia-face- discrimination accessed Oct 26, 2018) Summary: This article gives a first-hand account of what it is like living as an Ethnically Vietnamese in Cambodia. This article details the concentration of capital and wealth accumulation within the Khmer families and the challenges that the Ethnic Vietnamese face. Lack of official documentation limits their right to land ownership and voting, and their ability to go to secondary school. There are concerns that the government repurposes forest land concessions from the poor for rich Vietnamese businessmen. The narrative recounts groups around the voting polls in the last July 28th election preventing ethnic Vietnamese voters (those who pay officials unofficial fees to get identification) from voting using violence. These issues are also true for ethnic Vietnamese whom have resided in the country for generations. Government spokesperson, Phay Siphan, acknowledges human rights violations against the minority and lack of legal protection but cites lack of political support from other political parties, civil society, and other governments for the few improvements.

Keywords: ethnic Vietnamese, human rights, civil society, citizenship, elections

41. Petersson, Markus (2018) Cambodia ́s Modern Patronage System: A Brief Reflection on Historical Foundations, Contemporary Articulations, and Future Policy Formations Future Forum. Summary: According to this research paper, infringements on public space and institutions has been increasingly worse through Cambodia, including political suppression of the opposition, legal attacks on critical media outlets, human rights workers and NGOs, political analysts, and the monastic community. These infringements are facilitated through the use of religion and a modern patronage system. However, decentralization offers a possible alternative for development.

The elite’s political survival hinges on fear and the capability to preserve stability and moral order which are reinforced through ceremonies, rituals, and rhetoric around Khmerness; however, tangible improvements at the local/village level are needed to sustain this position. Hun Sen ́s ‘personal’ projects to enrich villagers, aided by foreign investment, and use of Buddhism portrays Sen as benevolent and adds moral legitimacy. A sense of improved local conditions is needed to maintain political stability, and lower level public servants are accountable to their superior’s legitimacy and the material conditions of their constituents.

The Seila program, which began in 1996, was an internationally sponsored decentralization effort, that was since ended. Within the Seila program the same national-level governance organization patterns of patronage, trust deficiency, and influence of the elite ́s personal interests are present at the local level. Yet, local reforms have yielded more village dissatisfaction with abuse of local power because it affects their immediate existence and livelihood. A zone of contestation is opened due to the increased scope for dissatisfaction, relative proximity of local leaders, and increased accountability, all of which allow local authorities to be potential development agents. These tendencies within local project management which creates new spaces for local contestation and resistance also fosters ideas and attitudes which challenge inequalities and injustices that may spread throughout villages. However, local authorities are also plagued with political interference, chronic underfunding, corruption, and unsatisfactory organization capabilities which pose challenges to their ability to be development agents.

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The Ek project successfully established a functioning organization to improve water access using in- depth knowledge of the political system, avoidance of undermining elite actors, and appeals to political legitimacy. Pragmatically, development efforts that avoid obvious attempts to undermine patterns of influence and power, and appeal to the legitimacy of the elite may be more conductive toward substantial impacts. Most international aid tied to good governance upholds the current government order and institutional reforms within the upper levels of the Cambodian state apparatus have led to circumvention and counteraction of governance reform. The upper levels of the Cambodian state contain the most secure patronage connections and governance initiatives project a sense of compliance and progress while maintaining the status quo.

Keywords: decentralization, patronage, legitimacy, history, religion, foreign aid

42. Prak, Chan Thul (January 10, 2018) China Signs New Aid Agreements with Cambodia. Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-china/china-signs-new-aid- agreements-with-cambodia-idUSKBN1F00IJ accessed Oct 26, 2018) Summary: Cambodia has recently had stronger ties with China. China has invested billions of dollars in loans and other FDI in Cambodia in recent years. Cambodia and China recently signed 19 aid and investment pacts. China is Cambodia’s biggest aid donor. China pledges to give more than $184 million for future projects.

Keywords: Chinese, China, FDI, economic development, Asia

43. Reporters Without Borders (June 27, 2018) Cambodian Regime Completes War on Press Freedom Just Before Poll (https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/nov/30/journalists- living-in-fear-states-crack-down-press-freedom accessed Oct 28, 2018). Summary: This website details the role of journalists and the Cambodian government’s role in the 2018 elections. Cambodia ranks 142nd out of 180 countries in the 2018 World Press Freedom Index, which is lower than it was in 2017. The Cambodian government developed the ‘code of conduct,’ which limits reporting around elections. Journalists have been jailed.

Keywords: journalism, freedom, elections

44. Sineat, Yon & O’Byrne, Brendan (February 28, 2018) Analysis: The Government Has Announced Plans To Cover Workers’ Severance, But Is It The Best Solution To Factory Disputes? Phnom Pen Post (https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/garment-protest- continues accessed Nov 1, 2018). Summary: This article details the Cambodian government’s response to protests over garment factory closings. Recently, the government will pay severance wages for employees which abruptly lose their jobs in factories that have fled Cambodia. This decision is pro-worker without burdening private businesses, but it undermines good corporate citizenship. Economists and labor activists suggested a policy that requires companies to place deposits to discourage fleeing without severance pay. The Labor Ministry will pay a total of $4.6 million of severance pay to workers at nine factories that were abruptly shuttered this year. Article 116 of the Labor Law specifies that an employer must pay severance or indemnity pay to employees within two days of a contract being terminated, but this legal requirement is rarely met. Usually, protests by workers pressures local courts to sell the factory’s

99 assets to pay back wages, and oftentimes it is a long process and the assets are not enough to cover the full back pay. This presents a serious problem for the majority of workers who live paycheck-to- paycheck and spend most of their wages on rent and food. A long-term prevention plan is desired to prevent the investors from avoiding back pay to employees

Keywords: employee rights, Labor Law Article 116, garment industry

45. Smoke, Paul and Morrison, Joanne, Decentralization in Cambodia: Consolidating Central Power or Building Accountability from Below? (2008/01/01) International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, State University, International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU Summary: In this paper, we critically review the Cambodian decentralization process to date. The next two sections set the stage by respectively providing a brief overview of Cambodia’s economic, social, historical and political context and an outline of the basic organizational structure of government. The fourth section explores the forces driving the introduction and development of decentralization in Cambodia. The fifth and sixth sections respectively describe and evaluate the state of decentralization. The penultimate section outlines decisions that need to be made and challenges that will be faced in moving decentralization to the next level, followed by a few concluding comments. The Cambodian decentralization is recent and there is limited formal literature on the process, so much of the analysis here is based on interviews and our personal observations and experiences over more than a decade working on decentralization in Cambodia.

46. Sochua, Mu and Wikstrom, Cecilia (July 18, 2012) ‘Land Grabs in Cambodia’ New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/opinion/land-grabs-in-cambodia.html accessed Nov 4, 2018) Summary: This news article reviews the land diversion occurring in Cambodia and international actor’s responses to it. 80 percent of Cambodia’s total population live in rural areas. The government has allocated approximately 11,600 square miles of Cambodia’s arable land to investors, including major companies and local firms with ties to the governing Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). In 2009, Boeung Kak Lake in central Phnom Penh became the site of forced eviction. A joint venture involving a company owned by a senator planned to build a large luxury development. The World Bank suspended loans to Cambodia due to negative media attention. Thirty acres of the confiscated land was promised to be returned to 900 families that refused the inadequate compensation, but the Cambodian authorities have not determined the exact area to be returned.

The World Bank’s intervention demonstrates that foreign governments and international organizations have a role to play, just as much as local NGOs, Cambodian legislators and the media do. Members of the Cambodian Parliament asked the U.S. government to temporarily suspend foreign aid to the Cambodian military until a full project review is completed and fair compensation is paid to the affected communities. So far these appeals to the U.S. government have been unsuccessful.

Keywords: Boeung Kak Lake, FDI, World Bank, land

100 47. Sokhean, Ben (October 30 2018) Government Calls On Rhona Smith To Be ‘Partner’ and Not ‘Attack’ Phnom Penh Post (https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/government- calls-rhona-smith-be-partner-and-not-attack accessed Nov 2, 2018). Summary: The mandate of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights office in Cambodia has been extended and this news article covers the Cambodian government’s comments on the Special Rapporteur. Government spokesman asked the Special Rapporteur ‘partner’ and ‘mediator’ to ‘report the truth’, instead of ‘attack the government’, and ‘act as a lawmaker or judge’. Meetings with the Special Rapporteur and civil society organizations reflect their concerns regarding human rights and restrictions on our basic freedoms and rights. The Special Rapporteur’s role is to act as a mechanism to communicate the concerns of civil society organizations to the government. The civil society organizations hope that together they can use her to bring government focus to human rights and to find solutions to their concerns.

Keywords: UN, human rights, civil society

48. Sperfeldt, Christoph (January, 2017) ‘Report on Citizenship Law: Cambodia’ (http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45084/GLOBALCIT_2017_02_Cambodia.p df accessed Nov 1, 2018) Summary: This academic review of the literature argues that Cambodia’s most recent constitution awards some human rights protections but lacks in application. Cambodia’s Constitution may only protect human rights for ‘Khmer citizens’ but no other long-term resident groups. Article 2 of the 1994 Immigration Law considers an ‘alien’ to be ‘any person who does not have Cambodian nationality.’ Despite Article 14 and 16 of the 1994 Immigration Law, and the stated importance of possession of resident cards. The multi-year delays to issue residency cards for ‘immigrant aliens’, unclear legal requirements, and the lack of guidance for applying for naturalization has put long-term residents at risk of jailing or forcible removal from the country. Laws on citizenship are rarely implemented as written and this is compounded by the fact that laws, regulations, judicial rulings, and citizenship- related statistics are not easy for the public to access.

Keywords: citizenship, laws, constitution, Immigration Law, Khmer, forced removal

49. Steinfatt, Thomas M. (October 6, 2003) Measuring the Number of Trafficked Women and Children in Cambodia: A Direct Observation Field Study USAID (http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.320.8589&rep=rep1&type=pd f accessed Nov 1, 2018) Summary: This research, sponsored by USAID, attempts to estimate the number of trafficked sex workers in Cambodia, using direct observation. The researcher directly observed 146 different underage sex workers across 54 provinces. In 2003, the researchers would estimate 3,688 trafficked women and children in Cambodia, most of which are Vietnamese. However, other estimates of sex trafficked women and children are 80,000 to 100,000

Keywords: Sex trafficking, sex work, child sex tourism

50. The Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) (January 2014) Assessment Report: Complaint Regarding IFC’s Cambodia Airports Project (21363) Phnom Penh,

101 Cambodia (http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document- links/documents/Phnom_Penh_Asst_Rpt_ENG.pdf accessed Oct 29, 2018) Summary: This report details the World Bank’s Ombudsman case against Cambodia and its outcome. The Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) is the independent accountability mechanism for the International Finance Corporation (IFC part of the World Bank Group. CAO deals with complaints concerning the social and environmental outcomes of their projects. A case was decided on 2014 with the Cambodian Airport projects. The following was mandated to be resolved: local community and government engagement to assessments of negative impacts of the project; compensation for displacement or means to avoid displacement; and, increasing safety for people near to the airport.

Keywords: World Bank, infrastructure, Ombudsman, airports

51. The Associated Press (August 15, 2018) Cambodia’s Ruling Party Swept Seats, Official Results Show. Washington’s Top News (https://wtop.com/asia/2018/08/cambodian- election-results-give-ruling-party-sweep-of-seats/ accessed Oct 25, 2018) Summary: This news article covers Cambodia’s 2018 National Assembly election. Cambodia’s ruling party (the Cambodian People’s Party) occupies all 125 seats and the long-ruling Prime Minister Hun Sen serves yet another term. The July 2018 election was shrouded in skepticism around legitimacy.

The major opposition force (the Cambodia National Rescue Party) was claimed to be colluding with the United States and disbanded by Cambodian courts. Current officers were relieved of their positions and the party was banned from running for election for 5 years. The party leaders went into exile and the prominent leader, Kem Sokha, was jailed. Thus, there was no real competition in the 2018 election. The ruling party claims that elections are democratic, free and fair. Many western poll- watching groups agreed that the polls were not legitimate, especially as a large Cambodian poll- watching group was led by one of Hun Sen’s sons. Meanwhile, about 30 radio stations closed, and 2 English-language opposition newspapers were bought out by government sympathizers or closed.

Keywords: voting, CPP, CNRP, Hun Sen, media

52. Tilly, Mark (March 10, 2017) ‘UN Tells Governments to Defend People’s Privacy’ Khmer Times (accessed https://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/36323/un-tells-governments-to- defend-people---s-privacy/ Nov 2, 2018) Summary: This news article details the United Nations Special Rapporteur’s response to Cambodia’s Telecommunications Law. The United Nations Special Rapporteur denounced Cambodia’s Telecommunications Law, due to its implications for rights to privacy and its role in the arrest and jailing of student Kong Raiya, who posted on Facebook about a ‘color revolution.’ Mr. Raiya served an 18-month stint in prison after being charged with incitement. The report was concerned that broad language invited ‘increasing government intrusion into digital privacy.’ The Cambodia’s ruling and opposition parties’ victims of hacked and leaked messages between the government, opposition and people in business as well.

Keywords: laws, Telecom, United Nations, student arrest, digital privacy

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53. Transparency International (February 20, 2014) Cambodia: Corruption Concerns Amid Hopes for the Future (https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cambodia_corruption_concerns_amid_hop es_for_the_future accessed Oct 30, 2018) Summary: This report recounts Cambodia’s struggle with corruption and hopes for the future. Cambodia’s government passed the Anti-Corruption Law and its Anti-Corruption Unit in 2010. These actions were followed by criminal trials against corruption. The Rectangular Strategy for Growth also outlines strategies for dealing with corruption. However, much work on combating corruption remains.

Media: The director of Telecom Cambodia is suspected of embezzling state-owned money. However, the Anti-Corruption Unit dropped the case and he was promoted to a government position. Meanwhile, a pro-democracy activist, Mam Sonando, and others were jailed.

Political Competition: The parliamentary positions for the political opposition were removed right before a vote on a bill to deny Khmer Rouge crimes. The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) is inseparable from the Executive and the Legislature. The CPP sweeping election was not considered free or fair, as it included over-registration and use of temporary identification cards.

Economic Development: A United States Ambassador to Cambodia announced that corruption in the country deters U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI). Similarly, the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report indicated an unfavorable business climate. Regarding FDI, the ministry received unofficial fees for procurement contracts and charges up to triple the price.

Government Effectiveness: $1.5 billion USD is unaccounted for in the 2014 national budget. As centralized control increases so may the opportunities for nepotism and embezzlement.

Keywords: laws, corruption, doing business, elections, transparency, accountability

54. Transparency International (2018) Cambodia: Corruptions Perceptions Index (https://www.transparency.org/country/KHM accessed Oct 28, 2018). Summary: This website indicates that Cambodia ranks 21 out of 100 on the Corruption Perceptions Index, zero being the most corrupt. Cambodia ranks 161 out of 180, relative to other countries. Procurement of infrastructure projects has been monopolized using the state’s patron-client networks by the land concessions and exclusive access to resources. The administration is described as a kleptocratic bureaucracy that collects rents from bureaucracy. Many citizens report unhappiness with the political processes. In 2011 there was an anti-corruption law passed but implementation and division of power are still lacking.

Keywords: corruption, laws, patronage, land, natural resources, infrastructure

55. Transparency International (May 2015) Corruption Perceptions in Cambodia Small and Medium Enterprises (http://www.ticambodia.org/download/report-corruption- perceptions-cambodia-smes/ accessed Oct 30, 2018).

103 Summary: This report outlines corruption in Cambodia, as it relates to emerging businesses. Laws and regulations remain unclear. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs’) are unfamiliar with the laws and regulations relevant to them, or they are too complex to navigate. Regulatory agencies often ask for unofficial fees such as the Department of Taxation, Ministry of Education, and the Immigration Department. Much of this makes doing business more challenging on a daily basis. Because of lack of law enforcement many companies are unregistered and do not pay taxes. For those that do register, the process is not transparent or streamlined. Political connections make the registration process easier to navigate, creating unfair competition. A third of the participants would choose to use the court system for corruption problems, creating less accountability for corruption.

Key Figure of Interest: Drivers of unofficial fees

Keywords: laws, business, corrupt, doing business

56. United Nations High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) (2013) How Far Has Cambodia Come on Gender Equality? Reflecting on the CEDAW Concluding Observations (https://cambodia.ohchr.org/~cambodiaohchr/sites/default/files/news/WebDOCs/2013/U NWOMEN_OHCHR_OP-ED_CEDAW_COB%5BFINAL%5D.pdf accessed Oct 26, 2018) Summary: This report focuses on women’s rights activism. Law enforcement has been harsh on female human rights activists advocating for land rights. Yorm Bopha, an activist, has been jailed and excessive force was used against those protesting her arrest. AW. Resolution 1325 recognizes women in peace building and the Committee’s recommends that the security sector has more positive relationships with communities and with women particularly. This is especially true after the November 12 garment factory protests.

Keywords: women, protests, law enforcement

104

57. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (October, 2008) ESCUP: ‘Assessing Marginalization of Cham Muslim Communities in Cambodia’ (http://www.kapekh.org/files/report_file/33-en.pdf accessed Oct 26, 2018) Summary: This study’s main objective is to understand the Cham’s identity within Cambodia, their marginalization, and strategies to improve their situation. USAID interviewed 202 Cham individuals, including local leaders and national leaders, and deployed a survey to 168 Cham parents. The findings revealed gender barriers to education, including cultural norms. The Cham still suffer from religious exclusion in school, as public schools only allow Buddhist teachings. In general, Cambodia’s public health system lacks quality treatment. Gender inequities and vulnerable populations have a harder time accessing these facilities and have worse outcomes.

Keywords: Cham, gender, barriers, education, health

58. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2018) Journey to Self- Reliance: FY 2019 Country Roadmap (https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/country/cambodia accessed Nov 2, 2018) Summary: This report outlines how Cambodia scored on the capacity and commitment for self-reliance scales. Cambodia's capacity to be self-reliant exceeds the government’s commitment to doing it.

The capacity scale (0-1): Cambodia scored the highest on export diversification (0.75), child health (0.63), and on safety and security (0.51). Cambodia scored larger than 0.3 on the following: GDP per capita; civil society and media effectiveness; efficiency of tax administration; and, government effectiveness.

The commitment scale (0-1): Cambodia’s highest scores were on the following: economic gender gap; trade freedom; and, habitat and biodiversity protections. Cambodia scored 0 on open governance, and 0.08 on liberal democracy. Cambodia also scored low on social group equality.

Keywords: governance, commitment scale, self-reliance scale

59. USAID & International Republic Institute (IR) (November 10, 2016) International Republican Institute Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion (http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20January%2023%20Survey%20of%20Cambo dia%20Public%20Opinion,%20October%2028-November%2010,%202013.pdf accessed Oct 28, 2018) Summary: This report is a public opinions survey. 2,000 respondents interviewed using a stratified sample and random sampling. Corruption, nepotism, and environmental degradation were named as some of the highest concerns amongst citizens concerning the direction the country is moving. More roads, school, and health clinic infrastructure were cited for their contribution to bettering Cambodia. Judiciary and freedom of speech were considered the largest obstacles to ‘free and fair’ democracy in Cambodia, followed by equal political representation in the media. Domestic violence was overwhelmingly named as a barrier most faced by women.

Keywords: public opinion, patronage, corruption, media, infrastructure

105 60. Urmee, T., Harries, D., & Schlapfer, A. (2009). Issues Related to Rural Electrification Using Renewable Energy In Developing Countries of Asia and Pacific. Renewable Energy, 34(2), 354-357. Summary: This study was conducted using a pilot biomass energy development project. In 2010, around 76% of the villages in Cambodia were without electricity. This study found enough land and demand for energy development in rural Cambodia.

Keywords: electrification, energy, renewable energy

61. World Bank (April 14, 2018) Cambodia’s Social Accountability Framework Helps Improve Basic Public Services in Rural Areas (https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/04/14/cambodias-social- accountability-framework-helps-improve-basic-public-services-in-rural-areas accessed Nov 4, 2018) Summary: This report explains what the Implementation Plan for Social Accountability Framework (ISAF) in Cambodia is and the progress it has made. The ISAF is part of the government’s decentralization and de-concentration reform program, since 2015. ISAF has implemented social accountability activities in 75% of Cambodia’s provinces, 62% of districts and 56% of communes. Volunteer Community Accountability Facilitators (CAFs) help improve public services in their community, and more than 3,650 CAFs work in 98 out of 159 (62%) rural districts in the country. CAFs facilitate exchanges between citizens and their local services providers on the quality of services and developing prioritized action plans for improving service delivery. Service delivery lacks in public organizations such as local health centers, commune offices, and primary schools.

Keywords: ISAF, CAFs, public service, municipalities, decentralization, de-concentration

62. World Bank (December 2017) Change Management That Works: Making Impacts in Challenging Environments Governance Global Practice Group Summary: This paper outlines a political economic analysis conducted in Cambodia and , and its relationship to change management. The different political and institutional contexts of the two countries entailed that the program rolled out differently and with different effects, emphasizing how political economy influences change management. Change management influences the prospects for change by offering more choice, better strategies, and new allies specifically for political strategy and institutional culture. Change models feature the interests, values, norms, and competencies of different groups in an organization as changeable with the proper tactics by the appropriately supported actors.

In the Case study analysis of Cambodia explains that comradeship and patronage was developed to overcome weak public financial management that developed from extreme material shortages and an absence of formal institutions. Public financial management is weak due to lack of processes for collecting government revenues, unregulated natural resource revenues, falsified public payroll recipients, and excessive donor fragmentation and projectization, resulting in unmanageable heavy aid dependence. Weak public financial management is compounded low public service wages, politicization of the civil service, and patron-client relations to circumvent government bureaucracy.

106

The Financial Management Information System (IFMS) project organizational structure replicated the Cambodian ministry’s institutional structures instead of improving them, impacting project governance. Low status government positions lacked the political power to yield substantial political will for change management. Cambodia’s government organization is a hierarchical structure and formal horizontal ‘stakeholder’ steering groups were less successful due to lack of senior leader support and involvement. Formal attendance is a political and complex while critical behind-the-scenes negotiations between political allies become more commonplace and opaque, including development partners.

Keywords: governance, change management, leadership, stakeholder engagement

63. World Bank (February 2017) Linking Citizens To The State: An Assessment of Civil Society’s Contributions to Good Governance In Cambodia (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362- 1193949504055/4348035-1296838689014/7712311- 1298494972121/Assessment_CivilSocietyContributionsCambodia.pdf accessed Oct 30, 2018) Summary: This report focuses on Cambodia’s civil society and their relation to governance. The study identified the following key elements that enable/disable social accountability in four main areas:

– Information – Demand for information, access to information, citizen knowledge, and CSO information roles are lacking. – Voice – Voices are lacking in the following ways: reluctance to publicly question government, disempowerment to effect change, and lack of formal mechanisms for citizen voices in government. – Association – Civil society still has challenges with national level networks, promoting democracy within, and low levels of citizen mobilization. – Participation and Constructive Dialogue –The government’s current processes of decentralization and de-concentration allow for more dialogue but opportunities for citizens and CSOs to engage with government authorities is lacking. Civil society also lacks in constructive dialogue with the government.

Political factors: The Cambodian government is focused on improving governance from the ‘inside’ but citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) are needed for good governance. Rural areas have especial issues with trust and social cohesion, resulting in low associational activity and fear of authority. Power is personalized, not institutionalized, making bureaucratic mechanisms unreliable.

Social & cultural factors: These factors are currently in flux, but Traditional Cambodian society is hierarchical. Often times, this traditionalism excludes women and does not allow the questioning of power. Younger people are less traditional. However, much development remains.

Civil society: Most NGOs in Cambodia are funded by international donors and are donor dependent. These organizations are without grassroots links. Institutionalized interaction between Cambodian CSOs and the state are still limited.

107 Keywords: civil society, governance, collaboration

64. World Justice Project (2018) Rule of Law Index: 2017–2018 (https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2018-June- Online-Edition_0.pdf accessed Oct 28, 2018) Summary: According to this report, Cambodian scores low on the Rule of Law Index. Cambodia is especially lacking in open government, lack of corruption, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. Within those scores notably, corruption of the judiciary, no discrimination, no unreasonable delay, effective enforcement, respect for due process, rights to information, and complaint mechanisms scored lowest.

Keywords: division of power, checks and balances, constitution, branches of government, ROL

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